
FAO JOURNAL

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The FAO and Islam

Malignant Terrorism

**Staying Abreast of Conflict Situations: Nagorno —
Karabakh**

**Inaugural FAO Conference at the Naval Postgraduate
School**

**Readings for a Deeper Understanding of Islamic
History**

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Letter from the President . . .

Dear Colleagues,

Last week I was honored to meet with some severely wounded soldiers and marines who were visiting the Pentagon as part of the Army's Wounded Warrior Program for patients being treated at Walter Reed. It was a very moving experience and one that highlighted the human dimension of the military profession. These young heroes with substantial physical and emotional scars are facing their future with optimism, courage, and pride. They certainly deserve our thanks and appreciation for their sacrifice and I would highly encourage you to support your Service's program to help them, such as the Army's Wounded Warrior, the Marine for Life, and the Navy Safe Harbor.

I recently met with an official from the Defense Intelligence Agency Association (DIAA) to discuss how we might work together. As you know, DIA is the largest single user of FAOs with large numbers assigned to both the Defense Attaché System and as politico-military analysts. The DIAA organizes several functions annually with noted speakers who would be of interest to many of our members. They also sponsor a day at the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center where they receive classified regional updates. The FAOA Board of Governors will see if we can make these DIAA events available to you at minimal cost and I will notify you via e-mail of our results.

Let me once again strongly encourage FAOs, throughout the world, to write articles for the *FAO Journal*. We were unable to publish a *FAO Journal* in March 2007, because we had not received any articles. FAOs are our only source of articles and have valuable stories and insights to share with other FAOs. Please contribute to the *FAO Journal*.

We tried to host a FAO lunch at the Fort McNair Officer's Club on 30 May, but were forced to cancel that morning when the Club lost electrical power and closed. We will try to reschedule the lunch in late July or early August.



We're starting to plan to host a FAO Dining-In circa April 2008. If you are interested in helping put on this event please contact Bob Olson at rolsonssm@aol.com.

Finally, I noticed this upcoming item of interest: "**The Role of Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) in the 21st Century: Military Applications of Language and Culture**," conference is currently scheduled for July 20-21, 2007, at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. This conference will provide an opportunity for FAOs from all Services to meet, share experiences, learn the latest from experts in their respective fields, and shape the future of each service's FAO organizations. The organizers of this annual conference envision an annual forum for discussion of future directions, new developments, and current practices of FAOs in the new security environment. For more information go to: <http://www.nps.navy.mil/fao/>

Thanks,

Steve Norton

The FAO and Islam: What Every Foreign Area Officer Should Know

Rod Propst, Principal Terrorism Analyst, Analytic Services Inc.

INTRODUCTION. Know your Enemy—a basic tenet we all learned as lieutenants, some of us even as privates. This simple concept is at the heart of being a foreign area officer. We are charged with area understanding, cultural understanding and sensitivity, language as the bridge to others; but at our core, we are warriors—and as such must know our enemies, even those who are only potential enemies. So who are our enemies in the early years of the 21st Century? They are many and aggressive, seeking to punish America and Americans wherever we reside or work around the world. Many, it seems, share a common religion, regardless of their nationality; it is a religion that binds them. And, unfortunately, for a miniscule segment of that religion, their interpretation of their faith is one that appears to counter many of our nation's central beliefs. That religion is Islam.

But is this accurate? Is Islam, one of the world's great religions, the enemy? Does Islam demand our destruction? Does it represent a monolithic threat that we must, for our very survival, destroy? And the real, bottom line question—how much do you as a FAO really know about Islam? Have you invested in study and greater understanding of the world's second largest religion? It matters not if you are a Latin American FAO, as this author was, a Western European specialist, an Africanist, or an Orientalist. In this case, the events and challenges of the 21st Century require that you be a globalist in order to understand this global religion, some of whose adherents seek to reduce us and our allies to nothing.

The intent of this brief paper is to provide you with some initial understanding of Islam. Don't think of it as "Islam for Dummies"; it is not even that fluent or complete. The article represents some basics—the kind that at least make

one aware of what one does not know—and should prompt all FAOs to seek out more wisdom in this area, regardless of one's regional specialty. We shall introduce some basic tenets of Islam. For those of us who know there are two major divisions of Islam—Sunnis and Shi'ahs—we shall briefly describe some differences. We shall examine common world views—how many of us see the Islamic world, and how many Muslims see the West. We will examine the three Jihads—did you even know there were three until the first half of this sentence? Next, we examine Islamic Revivalism—reviewing its four basic typologies, and what each means to us. Finally, the article seeks to assign some basic practicality to the reading exercise by presenting some opportunities and policy options. As a foreign area officer, these policy options and opportunities will be readily recognized, as they are at the heart of the FAO skill set.


PRETEST. Let us begin with a simple test (seven questions) of our individual background knowledge. Don't worry; it's an easy TRUE/FALSE review—and no one is keeping score but you! Most Arabs are Muslim—true or false? Most Muslims are Arabs—true or false? Most Muslims live in the Arab world—true or false? Most Muslim nations are oil rich—true or false? Islamic revivalism is unique to the Arab world—true or false? All Fundamentalists are revivalists—true or false? Are most Arab-Americans Sunni or Shi'ah? The answer to Question 1 is—TRUE; most Arabs are Muslim, about 95%, of which 85-90% are Sunni. The answer to Question 2 is—FALSE; only about 20% of Muslims are Arab, about 186 million out of over a billion adherents. The answer to Question 3 is—FALSE; in Pakistan and India alone there are over 250 million Muslims, and Indonesia is the world's largest

Muslim nation. The answer to Question 4 is—FALSE; most Muslim nations do not have strategic oil reserves lying below their nation's surface. The answer to Question 5 is—FALSE again; Islamic revivalism is a global phenomenon. And the answer to Question 6 is—TRUE; all Fundamentalists are Revivalists, but as you will learn later, not all Revivalists are Fundamentalists—which represents opportunities for our country. The final, seventh question is neither true nor false; the Department of Homeland Security states that only 21% of Arab-Americans belong to either Islamic sect, and that in fact over 42% are Catholic.

How did you do? If you were like this author, and I suspect many were, then the answer is, "Not too good." That's okay. We study to learn more about our world—the central professional goal for all foreign area officers. We begin this learning introduction with a review of some of the basic tenets of Islam.

BASIC TENETS OF ISLAM. First, what is Islam; what does it mean? The root of the word means peace and submission. It is truly a religion of tolerance, and holds many aspects or demands for socio-economic equity. As one knows, Muhammad is the Prophet of Islam. I say "the", the singular, because he is seen as the last, the final word, if you will. But did you know that Islam also believes in many Christian and Jewish prophets who came before? They believe in Abraham, Moses, even Jesus—and are, in fact, the third and last of the three global religions in the Abrahamic . But the singular importance of Muhammad is that his is the last, definitive word from God. The tenets of Islam are easily divided into five *faraidh*, or obligations (one might even call them "pillars").

The first tenet is *shahada*, or professing faith. Many of you are already familiar with the profession—"There is no god, but God, and Muhammad is the messenger of God." This saying



has six important aspects. The first is the *Quran*, the Holy Book of Islam; it is the root source of the religion. Many adherents believe in the *hadith*; this is a book of the accounts of Muhammad's life; this is joined by the *Sunnah*, a book of the actual—it is believed—sayings and deeds of Muhammad. The fourth aspect of *shahada* is the *Iman*, or faith. The five elements/articles of this creed include Allah, angels, prophets, and holy books—sounds as if this has many parallels to many Western religions. The fifth aspect of *shahada* is *Ijma*, or communal consensus; this sense of equity permeates the religion. The sixth aspect of *shahada* is *Qiya*, or analogical reasoning; Islam is a religion of reason, with rules based on reason.

The second tenet of Islam is *Salat*. This is the tenet of prayer. The practice of prayer—its form, its number—is different between the two major sects of Islam, Sunnis and Shi'ahs. Sunnis pray a single prayer five times a day with arms folded, and believe that entry into paradise is solely at the mercy of Allah. Shi'ites believe in five different prayers, and pray only three times a day. In contrast to Sunnis, they believe that paradise and entry into paradise is guaranteed, as

long as one obeys and follows the laws of the religion.

The third tenet of Islam is *Sawm*. This is the fast. It has much in common with other fasts of other major religions—Passover or Lent, for example. The Islamic fast is lengthy—from dawn to dusk for thirty days. Islam even provides laws for when dawn and dusk occur—coming from a time when our technical measurements of light were less precise. The practitioner holds up a thread in black and a thread in white. When one can tell the color difference, it is dawn; when one can no longer tell black from white, it is dusk.

The fourth tenet of Islam is *Zakat*. This is the practice of alms giving, or charity. The basic rule for giving is 2.5%. But this is then followed by lengthy rules for giving more—remember the basis of economic equity previously introduced? A business man may be required to give more, a married man may be required to give more, and so on. Equitable distribution of wealth for all Muslims is central to its practice.

The fifth, final tenet of Islam is *Haj*. A *Haj* is a visit to Mecca. A *Haji* is one who has completed a single pilgrimage. Islam has other descriptive words for those who have visited Mecca on more than one occasion. The five *Faraidh* pillars presented describe the practice of the religion. But are all practices equal? The answer is NO; this answer defines the key differences between Sunnis and Shi'ahs.

SUNNI & SHI'AH: WHAT'S THE DIFFERENCE? When Dorothy arrives in Oz, she is quickly asked, “Are you a good witch or are you a bad witch?” If there are good Muslims and bad Muslims, how does one identify them, and what is the difference? First, Sunnis represent 85% of the total number of Muslims, Shi'ah the remaining 5%. Instead of paragraph text, these differences are better and more briefly summarized in the form of a simple chart.

WORLD VIEWS. The world view one brings to the

study of Islam and what can only be loosely described as the “Arab World” permeates one’s perceptions. Yet, the “Western” world view in many cases differs dramatically with the world view many Muslims share—even those who *are not* radicals who would destroy the world we live in.

The “Western” world view, if one even exists, is informed by three elements. The first is the “Golden Age” of the Arab World and of Islam. A culturally rich society, the Arab enlightenment predates that in the West by centuries. This point of view often assumes that the Golden Age is a thing of the past; of course, one sees that such a point of view is troublesome to many. The second of these problematic, largely Western elements that serve to box-and-bin our perceptions of Muslims and their world is the “Crusades”. These holy wars—at first designed to protect pilgrims visiting holy sites in the Arabian Peninsula—quickly led a life of their own. Some Muslim adherents view these incursions as just that; and even less radical believers may use the Crusades as philosophical or religious launching points to define current policies and activities in a negative manner. The final element of note in the Western point of view deals with the issue of Colonialism. In the Post-WWI and –WWII world, some might suggest that the world was divided up on the whims of the victors. This simplistic view is easy for other cultures to defend or overstate. While many in the West might apply these three elements to define their world view of the region and its predominant religion and chalk it up to “old news”; however, for much of the Muslim world, this is anything but old news. It is a foundational world view whose effects are still felt in the 21st Century.

The “Muslim world view”, again even if one universal point of view exists, contains four elements that from many Muslim’s vantage is simply a continuation—and a highly negative extension over time—of a profoundly negative bullying wrought with a complete lack of historical understanding and cultural sensitivity, much less the


SELECT FUNDAMENTALS & DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SUNNIS AND SHI'ITES		
	SUNNI—THE TRADITIONALISTS	SHI'AH
FOLLOWERS: ALI OR THE CALIPHATE? SUCCESSION & INTERCESSION ARE CENTRAL TO THE SPLIT OF ISLAM	CALYPH ABU BAKR'S FOLLOWERS; CONSIDERED AS THOSE WHO FOLLOW THE SAYINGS AND DEEDS OF MUHAMMAD	ALI IBN ABI TALIB, MUHAMMAD'S CLOSEST RELATIVE, FOLLOWERS; CONSIDERED "PARTISAN"
SHAHADA: PROFESSION OF FAITH	"THERE IS NO GOD BUT ALLAH, AND MUHAMMAD IS HIS MESSENGER"	SHAHADA + "ALI IS BELOVED OF ALLAH"
MUHAMMAD	AN ILLITERATE, MERE HUMAN WHO RECEIVED THE REVEALED MESSAGE; REJECTION OF MUHAMMAD'S DIVINITY	LITERATE, SEMI-DIVINE, AS ALL PROPHETS—ABRAHAM, MOSES, JESUS; SHARED BY MUHAMMAD'S DESCENDANTS
FQH = ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE; SHAR'IAH = DIVINE LAW SCHOOLS OF JURISPRUDENCE INCLUDE: HANAFI, HANBALI, MALAKI, SHAFI', & JAFARIYYAH	PROMOTE QIYAS AS THE 4TH SOURCE OF LAW—A RELIGIOUS ANALOGY USED TO OBTAIN JUSTICE WHEN A SPECIFIC ANSWER DOES NOT APPEAR IN THE QUR'AN. THE ULAMAA USES THE QUR'AN AND EXTRAPOLATES	PROMOTE ITHHAD
MARRIAGE	LIMITED DURATION MARRIAGE IS SINFUL	PERMIT MU'TAH, BUT WITH STRICT LAWS FOR DIVORCE
ADORATION	NO SAINTS ADORIZED	MORE RITUALISTIC, WITH SAINTS AND PORTRAITURE ALLOWED
PRAYER	5 TIMES DAILY ARMS FOLDED PARADISE AT ALLAH'S MERCY	5 PRAYERS, THREE TIMES DAILY ARMS STRAIGHT PARADISE GUARANTEED IF OBEYED
SUBGROUPS	WAHABBIS, SUFIS	TWELVERS, SEVENERS, ZAIDIS, DRUZE, ALAWIS, AHMADIYYA, KHANJITES
CENTRAL DIFFERENCE	IJMA—THE CONSENSUS OF MUSLIM SCHOLARS	ITHHAD—INDIVIDUAL INTERPRETATION
GLOBAL PRACTICE	85%	15%
WHERE ARE THEY?	GLOBAL	PRINCIPALLY IRAN, SAUDI ARABIA, LEBANON

long-term historical context. Within this foreign policy quagmire of opinion, the current view is that our war in Iraq is pure strategic adventurism; even many of our staunchest supporters shares this view. While many do not support our Iraq participation, they may remain firm supporters of the Global War on Terrorism. This is, of course, further complicated by one of the thorniest policy issues that divide Western and non-Western world views. This third world view perception is the United States' continued support of Israel. While not all Muslims call for the destruction of Israel, many see it as yet another "Crusade". This Islamist perception may be the second hardest challenge we face in both understanding and getting past these points of view to shared solutions. The hardest challenge, in this author's view, is the Muslim perception shared across much of the Islamic adherents regardless of typology, is that of Western decadence, as a direct threat to the fundamental teachings of Islam.

The fundamental disconnect between these competing world views is two-fold. First, for the West, the "Golden Age, Crusades, Colonialism Historical Perspective" is often based on who is right, or better-stated, whose cultural/historical background decides who is right. The Western world view often dramatically clashes

with Muslims' perceptions. The West sees the situation in terms of both history in the region and policy designed to achieve desired [Western] goals or policy objectives. While for the West this means a pragmatic, geopolitical focus, for the Muslim, the perception of how the world should operate pragmatically is very different from the Muslim's perspective. The Muslim perspective is often informed by what's right according to their religion. This is most often reflected in regional issue resolution as "It is God's Will." Where Islam's "God's Will" and the West's more pragmatic strategic approach meet is often across a wide and deep social, cultural, religious, and political chasm. As a foreign area officer of any regional specialty, as both a warrior and as a cultural/regional Subject Matter Expert representing our country in or to many foreign countries, knowing these perceptions and how to communicate them around the globe as our nation's "Strategic Scout, Forward-Deployed", understanding these dueling hemispheric perceptions is critical for your growth and as an official USG representative in your FAO role.

THREE JIHADS. The Jihad is likely the most inflammatory word in the GWOT lexicon. Yet it remains the least understood from the Islam perspective. Much of Islam's focus on Jihad has nothing to do with a holy war—a reverse Crusade to reduce Christendom to ashes. It misuse by radicals at the peak of the terrorist pyramid—where the "Base" is all Muslims as potential, yet unlikely supporters; the Radicals as sure supporters who may share a point of view of more extreme actors, but who stop short of translating that into direct action against perceived enemies in the West; or of the Muslim actors who commit acts of terror and represent just a fraction of the Muslim population worldwide. Such a model is true of terrorism writ large, regardless of religious context. This model applies a small fragment of Muslim belief and activism. *J'h'd'* (*jahada*) is simply defined as "to strive, to apply oneself to the utmost to an endeavor".



The greatest jihad is the *jihad-i-akbar*. This is simply a concept that defines the personal jihad, a jihad of doing good, fighting temptation, and avoiding evil; this set of rules is similar to parallel Christian values.

The second jihad is the battle against evils within the Muslim world. The *ummaic jihad* addresses wrongs by written or spoken word. This external jihad is non-violent in nature, and is a struggle of freedom, justice, and truth. These aspects parallel Christian concepts of Justice, Balance & Compassion, and Knowledge; both share the Abrahamic tradition and hardly espouse the route of terrorism.

The third jihad is the most problematic, especially so at its more fundamental religious core. The *jihad al-asghar* is the smaller, lower, lesser jihad; it is also an external jihad. It is martial in nature—a war in God's name. It is used to protect and promote the integrity of Islam—a defense of the *umma*. It is a struggle against aggressors who are not Muslims, a response to Crusades, for example. This third jihad, despite its martial focus, is never a fight between Muslims.

How does one translate this information into a usable, useful framework for understanding and discussion by a regional specialist where

Islam isn't a central feature? First, one must understand that Islam includes a wide diversity of beliefs, practices, and politics (examined in some detail in the next section). *Salafi Islam*, or Fundamentalist Islam, represents only 15-20% of the faithful. And of that, only 1% are adherents of *salafiyya jihadiyya*, whose adherents are the most extreme version, and who see only the route of violence will work to ultimately establish the goal of the Islamic State, or Caliphate. Jihadis believe that only they are the true sect; all other Muslims a merely Muslim. They believe that hostile unbelievers rule and would see Islam eliminated. They believe not only that only the Caliphate can properly implement the holy laws of the universal holy state, but also that they must continue to wage an eternal holy war against non-believers. To the jihadi: 1) there is only one God; 2) only he can write laws; 3) that means there can only be one sovereign & one religious government for all; 4) that anyone (country or individual) who writes laws has set themselves up as a false god and must be the focus of the eternal jihad. SO if other, less rigid sects of Islam exist, what are they, who are they, and how can one define them?

ISLAMIC REVIVALISM. Understanding Islamic Revivalism helps the non-Muslim layperson better understand the dynamic of extreme Islamic radicalism we experience in the 21st Century. This pluralistic revival is best understood via a brief examination of the four central Islamic typologies—Fundamentalists, Traditionalist, Modernists, and Pragmatists. Before we learn the similarities and contrasts pertinent to these Muslim sub-groups, it is useful to establish some overarching characteristics that apply to the current world. Islamic revivalism, like similar catholic or protestant activities, contains more than a bit of the use of religion as a political vehicle; in fact, the most extreme adherents insist that only a caliphate, an idealized Islamic state with one religious ruler, can exist, and that all other political paradigms (any State not run as a strict Islamic-based entity, strictly following God's laws and no

others) are invalid and must be attacked. Centrality of equitable treatment for all and justice are touch stones, as previously highlighted.

The **Islamic Pragmatist** is best suited to work with the West from most perspectives of commonality of interest. They are the most vocal proponents of secularism. They reject *Taqlid*, the Islamic profession of "blind faith". They are firm believers in the strength of the history of their shared Islamic culture across the globe. They believe that secular possibilities have been overwhelmed by the failure of secular governments to achieve meaningful Muslim goals—resulting in a wide range of secular crises—a) Identity, where the loss of roots and a sense of community is created by urbanization; b) Legitimacy, where the faithful ask, "What did secularization do for me today?"; c) Penetration, where secularists and their governments have failed to spread the word concerning pragmatism and how it works for Muslims; d) Distribution, where wealth, a key feature of Islamic justice and equitable treatment reflected in Islam's pillar of almsgiving, has not resulted in fair and equitable treatment for all citizens in a secular government; and e) Participation, which many see as limited, an inequitable sharing of political power or resources. They also believe in *Ijtihad*, the exercise of personal judgment based on the Qur'an and the Sunnah. While on the surface this appears to be the slice of the Islamic faithful with whom one would choose to have lasting relationships, one must be careful; two prominent Pragmatists one may recognize are Anwar Sadat and Saddam Hussein.

The **Islamic Modernists** also share many touch points with the West. However, the major disconnect is their lack of support to secular governments. Like Pragmatists, they do not support blind faith, the *taqlid*. They support *Ijtihad*, or personal interpretation of key Islamic texts. And, as the name suggests, they support modernization. They strongly believe in Muslim self-determination, and are willing to work within all

political systems in the Muslim fight for justice.

The **Islamic Traditionalists** are a bit more difficult to work with for the West. They adhere to *taqlid* concepts of blind faith. Unlike Pragmatists or Modernists, they do not believe in *Ijtihad*, or personal interpretation of religious texts. They are professed pacifists and fatalists, but are against modernization. Theocracy is requisite to Traditionalists, and the non-religious State is anathema. One statement by Ayatollah Sayid Kazem Shariatmadari, as Ayatollah Khomeini competitor in Iran, paints the key picture: “Democracy can’t survive in a theocracy.”

The key test for the West is posed by **Islamic Fundamentalists**. They reject blind faith and secular nationalism. They allow the *ijtihad*. A snapshot of some of history’s key Fundamentalists should reveal much to the reader. Muhammad ibn-Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792) was an early member; allied with the House of Saud, he was an instrumental voice for Wahabbism; Wahabbis, such as Usam bin Laden, represent a key, continuing threat to the West from Saudi Arabia and beyond. Muhammad Ahmad Abdullah al-Mahdi is known to many FAOS for his conflict in the Sudan, notably with Lord Gordon. Hassan al-Banna was kicked out of Egypt by Nassar, and readmitted by Sadat, where he influenced some current Fundamentalists. Most FAO readers know the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini of Iran and his impact on the West.

So what does this mean to the West? First, Fundamentalists reject the internal jihad; their external, martial jihad is the only correct interpretation. Second, Fundamentalists reject all forms of government other than the Caliphate. Other interpretations of Islam allow a non-government state as long as the created, man-made laws are just and moral; *Shar’ia* to Fundamentalists means that only Islamic law and only one interpretation of Islamic law is true. Most important, perhaps is the views of Fundamentalists on *da’wa*, the call to Islam. For most Muslims, it is

not only the personal calling, but the calling to a life which draws the non-faithful to Islam. It is often exercised, as with other religions, using missionary work. The much harsher Fundamentalist version is that all other Muslims have lost their way, and that they must be encouraged to find their way back to the true faith, and to bring themselves to the *jihad al-asghar* against apostate rulers, the occupiers, and the non-believing world.

OPPORTUNITIES & POLICY OPTIONS: WHAT EVERY FAO SHOULD KNOW. Our focus as foreign area officers is to assist with policy option development—achieved through greater cultural, historical, language, and other subtle contexts based on regional specialization and deep experience.

The basic understanding of Islam is vital, this author believes, across all regional specialties due to its potential for global impact and the interest of the people and governments in the several countries we as FAOs are assigned. Coupled with understanding is the absolute necessity of understanding how the FAO can assist in opening strategic opportunities through this deeper perception one refines via long experience in uniform as both a warrior and as a foreign area officer. The first opportunity—one all FAOs will recognize from their immersion training in various military schools abroad—is that even in the strictest military-to-military exchange, economic, scientific, technological, and cultural exchange foci are possible. That potential for dialogue drove this author to provide this briefest introduction to Islam. Developmental assistance, long an interest application of the FAO’s brother specialty of Civil Affairs (some of you may remember the old days when PsyOps, Civil Affairs, Special Forces, and pure FAOs were all linked in the Army in one specialty) stems from the baseline tools mentioned previously. Assistance in the softening of rhetoric, the pursuit of support across cultures, and greater tolerance (think the Golden Rule in its many manifestations across all religions and cultures) may provide a crack which then provides opportunity, which may ultimately lead to a broader set of policy options. Seeking to better

Malignant Terrorism

Captain Gary “Yuri” Tabach, USN

Center for Excellence — Defence Against Terrorism Ankara, Turkey

I decided to take advantage of my current assignment at the NATO Centre of Excellence – Defence Against Terrorism (official spelling) in Ankara, Turkey and exercise academic freedom by writing down some of my thoughts and observations regarding the hottest topic in today’s world affairs – global terrorism.

Many years ago I graduated from pharmacy school followed by several years of hands-on practice as a U.S. Naval officer. During this period I developed an interest in the chemotherapy treatment of cancer patients. I would now like to use my past experience in battling cancer, together with the knowledge gained in my present occupation, to compare terrorism to cancer and the fight against terrorism to cancer treatment.

At times chemotherapy must be very aggressive and is often damaging to the very human life that medical professionals are trying to save from a deadly malignancy. Many patients wonder if going through such an aggressive and painful treatment is worth it—just to have a chance to live, often with pain and deformities and always with a constant fear of recidivism. Naturally, some patients go through stages of denial and let their cancer take its course, hoping for the disease to somehow resolve itself. Typically these misguided victims look for cancer survivors who survived the illness without traditional medical intervention. Some resort to religion and prayer while others to alternative medicine, or to a combination of many different things, some of which may give false hope while causing more harm than good. However most of us if faced with this type of challenge to our health would hope and pray for a miracle but depend on medical professionals to be the instruments of healing.

Medicine however is not what I want to talk about at this time, except as an illuminating metaphor. Like the rational and realist cancer patient, we should not be satisfied just praying or hoping away the threat of global terrorism. Humanity is currently faced with little choice but to battle our social cancer, terrorism, with all the consequences for collateral damage it may cause—somewhat similar to the side effects caused by aggressive cancer treatment. Of course we have a choice to do nothing and simply hope for a miracle that one day soon all terrorists will realize that what they are doing is not kind and decent to the rest of us, nor is it an acceptable or an effective means of achieving their political goals, and stop their destructive activity.

I am not a scholar and I could never compete with politicians, diplomats, academicians or intellectuals in a struggle to characterize define or even eloquently express what terrorism is and what causes it (the entire United Nations (UN) can’t seem to agree either). I am simply a U.S. Naval officer who for the last few years has been working with this tremendously complex issue. Unfortunately during my career I have been a witness and otherwise exposed to terrorist attacks as well as antiterrorist actions. It did not take me long to realize that terrorism is a crime against humanity and in most of my personal experiences those who were branded as terrorists were first of all criminals who were trying to advance some political agenda through their brutally criminal actions against innocent people. These criminals soon learned that murder and terror was a simple, often effective, efficient and safe way for them to get greater society into disarray and simultaneously rally other sympathetic radicals, such as suicide bombers, around the “greater cause”, this in turn often equated to additional

funding for their organizations. Simply put the tactics of terrorism work, innocent people suffer while criminals profit.

Permit me now to take a step back and make some points from not too distant history. Recently the newly appointed U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates responded to President Vladimir Putin's less than diplomatic remarks about the United States by referring to the Cold War era as "less complex times" and "almost nostalgic" for these unpleasant, but yet much more stable days. Days when everything came down to two ideologies: Communism versus Democracy and Capitalism, represented by the costly game between Moscow and Washington.

In those days the West was in the West and the East was in the East, encamped on either side of an easily identifiable Iron Curtain. Although both sides possessed enough weapons of mass destruction to destroy the world several times over, structures and processes such as hotlines, summits, treaties as well and huge bureaucracies were maintained to keep things under control, to keep the Cold War from getting hot.

Today we do not have the good-old "Cold War", but we did inherit and even "improved" on those huge bureaucracies- burdens which our new adversary does not have or have need for.

For a brief period following the collapse of the Soviet empire it appeared that ideological differences which had existed between the two empires, trying to influence and divide up the rest of the world, were fading away. More or less the democratic free-market approach was accepted by all but a few minute holdouts of the former soviet block countries. Euphoria erupted as the possibility of "world peace" became more than just part of a Miss America's speech, and swept through much of the West.

Unfortunately, the somewhat unpleasant but familiar and even comfortable "Black and White" conflict of Cold War was replaced by a

very "Gray," confusing and ambiguous new world order of the post-Cold War world, a world for which the CIA, FBI, MI6, FSB or any other "guardians" of security and stability were totally unprepared (Israel perhaps being the only exception). Even though it was not a new trend, and has been around for millenniums, it appears that the world only now learned that no government was prepared to deal with the now accelerating and expanding phenomenon called global terrorism. Although for years the world was provided with plenty of warning signs for all to see, like plenty of warning was given regarding very harmful affects of sunrays and tobacco usage and just like the misguided cancer patient, nations seemed to have collectively opted to hope for some sort of a miracle.

In the last five years most of my friends and colleagues seem to have forgotten the collective feeling of euphoria of possible world peace, which fifteen years ago seemed reachable. Now, for an indefinable reason, the sensation of a return to the past, if not to a "Cold War", than defiantly a bit of "Cool" war is emerging on the horizon. All this is happening against a backdrop of global terrorism that brings to mind the most debased and ruthless human conduct imaginable going back as far as the Dark Ages. By and large, having common goals and a common enemy, Russia and the West, for what appear to be petty interests or sheer arrogance, are once again gearing up for a Cold (or Cool) War, instead of uniting to fight a common enemy, one that has gone "Hot" and is fighting to the death. Sounds silly? I would say it's asinine, because we, as a community of developed nations, cannot even agree on who the enemy is; and define terrorism in such way as to allow for united, universal response. Unfortunately, it is much easier and comfortable to return back to a style of business similar to the good old days, one that is easier to grasp and reference like the US versus Soviet Union relationship which existed for close to 50 years. It is almost beyond belief that despite the terror events that have occurred throughout the world over the past several years; the world com-

munity has been unable, or to be more precise, unwilling to formally define what is terrorism actually is, who are terrorists, what exactly is meant by defense against terrorism. Every time the UN tries to define terrorism, all it accomplishes is to clearly demonstrate how disunited they are and how counter-productive the UN's measures are in fighting or countering terror tactics. The most glaring example of this failure is the United Nations' absolute impotence in sanctioning a member-state that disseminates rhetoric for the total destruction of another member-state, while at the same time is developing the technology for nuclear weapons. It seems that even if terrorists' organizations were paying-members of the United Nations, the UN would not be able to do anything to curtail their activity.

As a result, terrorism continues to spread around the world just like cancer cells in a human body while world politicians just like a team of inexperienced, but arrogant physicians can not agree on the diagnosis of the disease, isolation of cancer cells and the best treatment of the illness. The European Union (EU) is still in the process of defining what the EU is all about, so they surely have not had the time to define something as intangible as terrorism. In this united Europe each country has its own approach to combating and defending against terrorism. An abundance of well-known TV and radio stations as well as humanitarian, cultural and countless other Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), which are sponsored by Middle East-based terrorist organizations and governments, operate freely in Europe propagating their bloody agenda. If by some chance, after a great deal of political pressure and legal due process, such organizations get shut down, all they do is move to another EU country and continue to operate with little to no interruption to their deadly programs. NATO has a somewhat cohesive statement on the subject of terrorism, but it is going through a major transformation process, and again each NATO country has its own agenda and definition of terrorism, terrorist organizations and their make-up. So, at the end of long meetings and expensive studies it

appears that no one has a true and clear definition of terrorism.

In actuality terrorism could be anything at anytime and anywhere: linking together almost every type of criminal activity - anything from disruption of water and food supplies to an attack on a military patrol to human and illegal drug trafficking, money laundering and fraudulent fund raising. An entire sovereign country could be a terrorist state with all of its daily bureaucratic processes and national wealth directly or indirectly supporting terrorism. Therefore, terrorism may absorb or reach into every aspect of life, in some cases, and into every government in every country in the world. Again, just like normal cells mutate into malignant ones in a human body.

I do not have a good, answer to this very multifaceted problem. I can't even begin to articulate such complex crisis that terrorism has created for us. However, I do have some observations and would like to share them with anyone who believes that we must fight global terrorism in all its forms. This particularly concerns our political leadership which sends my brothers- and sisters-in-arms to fight against that very loosely defined threat we call terrorism.

Allow me to analyze and discuss this issue further: During my 22-year career with the US Navy my service included postings in Russia, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Poland and now Turkey. While serving with the UN and NATO I worked closely with military, police and national security officers from over thirty different countries. All of these brave and honorable people in uniform had one thing in common, regardless what flag patch they wear on their sleeve, all wanted to protect their homelands, their citizens and their way of life. For the US and many other nation's military men and women, it does not matter if it is our own countrymen and families whose freedoms and lives are being threatened. Most men and women serving in the armed forces are willing to fight and put their lives in harms way to protect those that cannot fight or defend themselves, and

who only want to live their lives in peace and safety. For most of us in the military it is not important if the people we defend have different skin color, practice different religion or speak another language. All these things do not matter as long as these people, our global neighbors, strive to live in relative peace.

So, whom do we fight now? From whom do we protect innocent people? Every time I bring up this subject with my international colleagues, some proud Turkish officers point out to me that each and every time PKK terrorists attack peaceful villages inside of Turkey, Turkish Special Forces (SF) try to search and destroy these terrorists, but they can only pursue to the northern border of Iraq. Once the terrorists cross the border from Turkey to Iraq the coalition (meaning U.S.) forces do not allow Turks to cross the border to capture or kill these terrorists. On a particular occasion Turkish SF continued the pursuit across the border, to "fight terrorism where it lives..." as stated by President George W. Bush in one of his speeches to U.S. troops engaged in the fight against terrorism; however, in that case a US Special Operations team captured and apprehended the Turkish forces chasing the terrorists into Iraq's territory. So, in the end US antiterrorist forces arrested Turkish antiterrorist forces while the "bad guys" retreated to safety to catch up on their rest and recover so they could murder another day. By no means do I imply that US or Turkish elite fighting men did anything wrong. Both followed their orders as is expected of real warriors and both did it well. What I question is, how did these brave men end up in such a dangerous and idiotic circumstance? Based on this situation it would seem that Turkish citizens have the right to complain about the double standards practiced by the US. Unless president Bush by stating "fighting terrorism where it lives..." meant it applies only to the Americans.

On the other hand, I wish Turkish citizens would question the actions of the Turkish government for not only harboring an infamous Saudi

businessman, one of the top men on the UN terrorist watch list - for providing major financial support to Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups, but also that Turkish authorities, under pressure from some Turkish politicians, let this terrorist flee the country with all of the funds that were supposed to be frozen in Turkish banks.

Another case-in-point of this disunity is when Russian officers point out to me that the British government gives asylum and even citizenship to a known Chechen terrorist(s), responsible for some of the most hideous terror attacks in Russia. I understand and feel for these Russian officers; my wife and children were in Moscow at the Nord Oste stage performance the day before the entire theater was taken hostage by such terrorists. It is sickening to even consider that a beacon of inspiration for democracy and an exemplary model for law and order such as the United Kingdom, which has suffered a great deal from terrorism, could possibly harbor someone who was implicated in something like the Beslan school butchery. Recently, a very respected senior Russian General stated in his speech, "Russia is against such double standards, especially when it comes down to a known terrorist and we all must work these things out among each other." I am confident that most of us fully agree with him - we all must work this out, but who is going to start? Russia? I am not so sure. I do not think that President Putin knows of this good general making such statements on behalf of Russia, since the general's own commander-in-chief regularly hosts Hamas' top leadership in the Kremlin addressing them as "Defenders of Liberty". It is just as itchy to think that a world-leader like President Putin is not aware of Hamas being a well-known terrorist organization adamant on the destruction of an entire state.

Another example of such political "brilliance" was recently exhibited in Poland. The Polish government sent many of their good men to fight the war on terror around the world, includ-

ing in Afghanistan and Iraq. These are brave and devoted men, I served with them, they believe in what they do and they do it well. However, while these Polish men fight and die defending innocent lives against terrorists, their own government dedicates an entire city square in Warsaw, the capital of Poland, to General Dudayev. I have asked several of my Polish brothers-in-arms who is this General Dudayev and what did he do for Poland, but for some reason none of them could recollect him from their Polish history lessons. I know of many great Polish heroes who could have been honored by their people, but Polish politicians decided to honor a known Chechen terrorist, who most likely did not know one thing or cared about Poland. I can go on for pages and pages giving similar humiliating and exasperating examples, particularly when it comes to Western Europe. However, at this point I do not believe it will be constrictive. For any government to tell those of us in uniform to engage in the war against terrorism while supporting terrorism in another form is self-defeating comparable to my grandfather being told in 1941 by his Red Army commander to engage in the war against Blitzkrieg, while Stalin was hosting Hitler for a family dinner.

Well, as I said in the beginning of this article, I do not have the answers to deal with global terrorism. I only have a hope that, as it often happens during prolonged major crisis, great leaders will emerge to lead the great nations and the righteous in overcoming the evil. My wish is that Turkey will be once again led by a man such as Kamal Ataturk, Poland by a Marshal Józef Piłsudski, Great Britain by another Sir Winston Churchill and the United States by a president such as Theodore Roosevelt - so that great men such as these could rally other leaders of the new and old world democracies, of our small world and all of us together could get rid of this deadly cancer which is threatening our way of life and our very existence. Just like teams of medical professionals work in unity by creating medical consortium to fight life-threatening diseases,

knowing it very well that any other way the cancer will win and life is lost.

My optimism is supported that true leaders will surface; leaders who will be inspired by the ones such those as mentioned above and will place the people who entrusted them through a democratic process, before selfish political ambitions. So that those of us in uniform could be given a fair chance to search-and-destroy this cancer called global terrorism. This deadly cancer which strangles our world.

Continued from page 10

understand Islam across all foreign area officer regional specializations, as a fulcrum on which to better balance a wider strategic array of policies, was this article's goal. Like any brief introduction, this paper requires significant investment in the development of more complete understanding; for those readers who were less familiar, the author trusts this effort to serve you as a touchstone for advanced learning about Islam.

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Staying Abreast of Conflict Situations: Nagorno — Karabakh

By LTC Mark R. Wilcox, US Army (Retired)

The Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement...expressed hope that the sides will maintain the momentum that had developed in the negotiations in recent months and that the Foreign Ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan will meet again in the nearest future, to overcome the remaining differences on the basic principles of a future settlement agreement. They called on the parties to avoid any action anywhere, including in the United Nations General Assembly, that could undermine the positive developments of recent months.

*Joint Statement by the
Minsk Group Co-Chairs,
Paris, February 15, 2007*

The persistence of conflict in the contemporary international security environment is a reality that influences our national security policy and strategy. In some cases, we choose to intervene directly in conflicts; in others, we seek to manage conflict situations in order to achieve our national objectives. An understanding of the nature of conflicts and the positions of the belligerents is critical in formulating approaches to conflict management. Periodic opportunities to gain insights into specific conflicts therefore warrant our attention and study.

Fifteen years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, conflicts persist on the territories of states that once fell under Moscow's rule. The unresolved, "frozen" conflicts in the Caucasus region affect U.S. national interests and occupy the attention of Washington, as well as the international community. The Caucasus region

states – Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia – find themselves at the confluence of a number of U.S. interests and concerns: the flow of energy resources from the Caspian Sea region and Central Asia, the enlargement of European and Euro-Atlantic institutions (the European Union and NATO), and problematic relationships with Russia and Iran. In furthering American interests in the region, United States policymakers work bilaterally and through multilateral organizations to resolve the conflicts in a manner that supports allies and partners. The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan offers a case in point.

The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

The United States has played a key role in efforts to produce an agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. This region of Azerbaijan, historically populated mainly by ethnic Armenians, has been under the occupation of Armenian and so-called "Nagorno-Karabakh Republic" forces since a war between Armenia and Azerbaijan immediately after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. A cease-fire has been in place since 1994, with Armenian forces occupying not only the Nagorno-Karabakh region, but also a number of surrounding districts, including the Lachin corridor, which links Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia. Several hundred thousand ethnic Azerbaijani residents of Nagorno-Karabakh, who were forced out of the region, remain displaced in Azerbaijan. For Azerbaijanis, their return and the preservation of Nagorno-Karabakh as an integral part of Azerbaijan constitute a *sine qua non* for a settlement of the conflict.



This map is for reference only and should not be taken to imply political endorsement of its content

Source: International Crisis Group, *Nagorno-Karabakh: A Plan for Peace*, Europe Report No. 167, 11 October 2005, page 30, http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/caucasus/167_nagorno_karabakh_a_plan_for_peace.pdf, accessed 22 February 2007.

Negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan have taken place since 1994 under the auspices of the “Minsk Group” (so called because Minsk, Belarus was to be the site of the signing of a peace agreement) of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The United States, Russia and France, the three co-chairs of the Minsk Group, have led efforts to mediate an agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Although the Minsk Group has made progress, at times bringing the parties quite close to an agreement, difficult issues that will require tough political choices on the part of the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders remain unresolved.

The OSCE’s U.S., Russian and French mediators have expressed optimism about the prospects for progress in 2007. United States Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Bryza, the U.S. Minsk Group co-chair, told an interviewer on February 7 that the Armenians and Azerbaijanis “...don’t agree 100 percent on the basic principles, but they are close, very close” and only disagree on certain “technical issues.”

The Minsk Group co-chairs’ cautious optimism notwithstanding, it looks like business as usual between the Armenians and Azerbaijanis as they continue their efforts to stake out positions and seek the high ground in the eyes of

the international community. Symptoms of the long-standing dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh recently were once again on display as the two countries' delegations sparred in two different meetings held under the auspices of the OSCE.

A Dispute Over Data

On Wednesday, February 14 during the weekly meeting of the OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC), the Azerbaijani delegation challenged the veracity of Armenia's 2006 submission to the Annual Information Exchange on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). The specific allegation of the Azerbaijani delegation was the Armenians' failure to report the transfer of 4000 rifles and carbines and 100 hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers from Serbia to Armenia, as reported by Serbia in its SALW annual information exchange submission. Averring no "pretensions to the exporter country [Serbia], which has openly shared this information with other participating states," the Azerbaijani delegation "stress[ed] the fact that...the Republic of Armenia has opted for concealing the purchase of weapons from Serbia under the above said categories. The Azerbaijani statement cited as evidence Armenia's submission to the Annual Exchange of Information on SALW, which reported the import of only four revolvers and self-loading pistols (and not from Serbia).

The Armenian response thanked "our Azerbaijani neighbors for being so attentive to our reports" and suggested that further clarification of certain technical points, e.g. actual quantities and dates of delivery of the armaments, was in order. The Armenians also noted that in 2005 Azerbaijan "in a rude manner had accused Armenia in failing to report" a transfer of conventional arms from Slovakia to Armenia. In this earlier case, the Armenian delegation reported, the Slovaks addressed the technical error in question by correcting their submission to remove the armaments in question. The Armenian statement implied that the new Azerbaijani accusation was

analogous to the previous "rude" one, and would be resolved in a similar manner.

Both sides consistently have examined with great care each other's submissions to various data exchanges on armed forces and armaments, e.g. for the Vienna Document 1999, Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Global Exchange of Military Information and Annual Exchange of Information on SALW, in search of discrepancies with which to confront one another in open fora. Armenia and Azerbaijan can be expected to continue this practice in order to garner support and further their agendas vis-à-vis Nagorno-Karabakh.

A Frank Exchange of Views

The OSCE Permanent Council, meeting on February 15, also witnessed an exchange on Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenian Ambassador Jivan Tabibian criticized the submission to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) of a resolution regarding the unresolved conflicts in Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan by the GUAM Member States (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova). The thrust of Tabibian's comments was that, first, the conflicts in question are not alike, and, second, "Though operating for a long time, with occasional progress and some setbacks, the [OSCE] Minsk Process remains the only recognized and enabled process in the OSCE for the search for Peace [sic] in Nagorno-Karabakh." In a none-too-subtle warning, Tabibian concluded that,

Armenia believes that deflecting this process through an undifferentiated United Nations General Assembly resolution, may derail the delicate stage of the bilateral meetings held under the auspices of the Co-Chairs of the Minsk group. Armenia will consider the introduction of such a resolution a serious threat to the integrity of the ongoing negotiations. Under the circum-

stances Armenia will have to seriously reconsider its continued willingness to participate in the present format. It will do so convinced that our interlocutors do not share our confidence in the promises of the current state of play under the Minsk Group Co-Chairs.

GUAM delegations rose to the Armenian challenge. Speaking on behalf of the GUAM states, the Georgian delegation disputed Armenian Ambassador Tabibian's comments and dismissed his concerns. Noting that "[t]his is, we believe, a critical period in the resolution processes" for the conflicts, the Georgian ambassador explained the purpose behind the draft UNGA resolution as to "draw the attention of the international community to these conflicts and to the urgent need to make real progress in their settlement." In substance and tone, the Georgian statement on behalf of the GUAM states, while rebutting the Armenian statement, was a model of diplomatic tact.

A subsequent response by the Azerbaijani delegation, however, was less nuanced. Speaking in a national capacity, the Azerbaijani representative began by characterizing the Armenian statement as "nothing but a farcical panic and hysteria" and then asserted that the Armenian concerns over the GUAM UNGA initiative were "completely wrong." The Azerbaijani delegation brushed aside Armenia's statements about their efforts towards settling the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, observing, "...contrary to these brazen declarations, Armenia's continued behavior and regressive attitude in the negotiations gives us no hope for a substantial breakthrough." The Azerbaijani delegation accused Armenian foreign minister Oskanian of having taken positions, during a 23 January 2007 meeting with his Azerbaijani counterpart in Moscow, which contravened and were tougher than those expressed previously over the key issues of the return of the displaced Azerbaijani population to their homes in Nagorno-Karabakh and the use of the Lachin corridor. Regarding the former issue, the Azerbaijani statement made clear that the status of Nagorno-

Karabakh cannot be determined in the absence - "as a result of ethnic cleansing" - of the Azerbaijani population. On the latter issue, the Azerbaijani asserted that Armenia is "trying to appropriate the whole region under the pretext of guaranteeing the preservation" of the Lachin corridor." The Azerbaijanis affirmed that "[t]he land communication between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia is possible only under the conditions of mutual use of the corridor and respect for the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan." Concluding, the Azerbaijani delegation made clear that in cooperation with the other GUAM states, Azerbaijan would continue to pursue the adoption of a resolution concerning the unresolved conflicts in the GUAM area in the UN General Assembly. Not to be outdone by the Armenian ambassador's warning, the Azerbaijani representative added that "I would like to bring to the attention of the Armenian Delegation that if the negotiations are not continued on the basis of already agreed issues, it will become needless to continue them at all."

Prospects and Implications

How to interpret this latest rhetorical dust-up between Armenia and Azerbaijan? Pessimists will chalk it up to "business as usual" on the diplomatic front of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. This exchange is not the first instance exchange of rhetorical fire between the Armenians and Azerbaijanis, and it will not be the last. Optimists, in line with the cautious optimism of the Assistant Secretary of State Bryza and the Minsk Group co-chairs, might view the Armenians' angst over the GUAM states' UNGA effort as a renewed commitment to the Minsk process and interpret the Azerbaijanis' focus on only two issues – tough ones though they are – as a positive sign that the two sides are close to an agreement.

What are the implications for U.S. policy? The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan continues to intrude on U.S. bilateral and multilateral efforts in the Caucasus region. The U.S. must continue to manage bilateral relationships with Armenia and Azerbaijan, while simultane-

ously pushing them towards a resolution of the conflict; always keeping in mind the myriad U.S. interests in the region that involve energy, NATO enlargement, relations with Russia, and challenges from Iran. Even working through a multinational institution like NATO has proven challenging, as the 2004 killing of an Armenian officer by an Azerbaijani at a NATO language course in Hungary and the Azerbaijanis' denial of visas to Armenian officers for attendance at a NATO Partnership for Peace event in the same year have demonstrated. It is therefore worthwhile to keep a finger on the pulse of the conflict in any way possible, even, as in this case, through

monitoring what might seem like banal diplomatic exchanges.

End Notes

¹ Joint Statement by the Minsk Group Co-Chairs, Paris, February 15, 2007, http://osce.usmission.gov/archive/2007/02/MGCoChairs_Paris_Feb15.pdf, accessed 23 February 2007.

² For more information, see U.S. Department of State, "The United States and the Conflict Over Nagorno-Karabakh," Fact Sheet, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Washington, D.C., February 7, 2005, <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/41401.htm>, accessed 23 February 2007.

³ Danielyan, Emil. "Armenia/Azerbaijan: Has a New Chance Emerged for Karabakh Peace?" Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/02/40543219-3a2c-4ba8-95db-b1773daeb378.html>, accessed February 16, 2007.

⁴ The OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation meets weekly in Vienna "to discuss and make decisions regarding military aspects of security in the OSCE area, in particular confidence- and security-building measures." <http://www.osce.org/fsc/>, accessed 22 February 2007.

⁵ In accordance with the politically-binding OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons, all 56 OSCE participating states exchange, on an annual basis, information about their small arms exports to and imports from other OSCE participating states. *OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons*, 24 November 2000, Section IV: Management of Stockpiles, Reduction of Surpluses and Destruction, paragraph (E), Transparency Measures. http://www.osce.org/documents/fsc/2000/11/1873_en.pdf, accessed 23 February 2007.

⁶ FSC.DEL/554/06, 28 December 2006, "Republic of Serbia: Annual Information on SALW," Annex 3, Template for the Annual Information on SALW Exports, report for calendar year 2005.

⁷ FSC.DEL/38/07, 15 February 2007, "Statement by the Delegation of Azerbaijan at 507th meeting [sic] of the Forum for Security Cooperation."

⁸ FSC.DEL/464/06, 17 October 2006, Delegation of the Republic of Armenia, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, note verbale 327/OSCE/101, Annex 4, Template for the Annual Information on SALW Imports, report for calendar year 2005.

⁹ FSC.DEL/40/07, 20 February 2007, "Statement in Response to Azerbaijan at the 507th Meeting of the OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation, February 14, 2007."

¹⁰ The OSCE Permanent Council, the organization's main decision-making body, meets weekly at the ambassador level "to discuss current developments in the OSCE area and to make appropriate decisions." <http://www.osce.org/pc/>, accessed 22 February 2007.

¹¹ Azerbaijan has sought to include of the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh and the negotiations towards a settlement on the UNGA agenda since at least 2004. At that time, the Armenian Foreign Minister warned of the potential negative consequences of this initiative on the ongoing Minsk Group process. See McMahon, Robert, "Nagorno-Karabakh: UN General Assembly to Discuss Occupation of Azerbaijani Land," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2004/11/fd3b3f90-d3a8-43df-9b5d-77a21d5431a0.html>, accessed February 16, 2007.

The GUAM delegations to the UN requested the inclusion of "Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development" on the agenda of the current (61st) UNGA. See UNGA A/61/195, 14 August 2006, "Request for the inclusion of a supplementary item in the agenda of the sixty-first session, Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development, Letter dated 10 August 2006 from the representatives of Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General," <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/466/35/PDF/N0646635.pdf?OpenElement>, accessed February 16, 2007. The conflicts in question are those involving the separatist territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, Transnistria in Moldova and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan.

¹² PC.DEL/125/07, 15 February 2007, "Statement On the Draft UN GA Resolution on the Protracted Conflicts in GUAM Area delivered by Ambassador Jivan Tabibian at the 652nd Meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council February 15, 2007."

¹³ PC.DEL/129/07, 15 February 2007, "Statement by the Georgian Delegation on Behalf of GUAM."

¹⁴ PC.DEL/130/07, 15 February 2007, "Statement at the 652nd meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council, 15 February 2007," Permanent Mission of the Republic of Azerbaijan to the OSCE.

Inaugural FAO Conference to be Held at the Naval Postgraduate School

By Captain Laura Y. Renner, USAF

The Interservice Foreign Area Officer Organization (IFAOO) at the Naval Postgraduate School will host its inaugural conference July 20-21, 2007, at NPS in Monterey, Calif. With the theme "The Role of FAOs in the 21st Century: Military Applications of Language and Culture," the conference aims to provide an annual forum where FAOs, operators, senior Department of Defense leaders and members of academic circles can exchange ideas, refine their understanding, and share visions for the future.



FAOs will use this conference to refresh their knowledge, discuss latest developments in the field and further develop their networks.

Peter Rodman, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, will give the keynote address at the banquet that Friday night. He served as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from 2001 to 2007. Rodman's expertise includes regional policies in rela-

tion to Europe, East Asia, South Asia, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf.

The Air University Culture and Language Center (CLC) is co-sponsoring the conference. Established in 2006, the center focuses on cultural studies, cross-cultural communication, and cultural awareness programs. The CLC's directors believe adding cultural anthropology to the typical FAO curriculum of political science, regional studies and language will better prepare them for the challenges they will face in their jobs.



Air Force Maj. Jackie Chang started the IFAOO in 2005. Noting the co-location of NPS and the Defense Language Institute on the Monterey Peninsula, she seized upon the opportunity to bring FAOs of all services together to maximize their development and networking efforts.

"There was no centralized database or systematic way to find out who the other FAOs were," Chang said. "So I thought, 'why not start our own professional organization to enable that, as well as to share information?'" With so many FAOs already at NPS and DLI, she created a focal point where FAOs could maximize the resources available here.

To activate this vision, the IFAOO at NPS will host what it anticipates will become an annual conference that examines this recently reenergized career field from all angles. "NPS and DLI

can serve as the West coast hub for the FAO community,” stated Army Brig. Gen. Charles Hooper, Defense Attache in Beijing and IFAOO former faculty advisor. “There are many resources here on which senior leaders on the East coast can capitalize.”

The organization expects a robust turnout from FAOs serving all over the world, whether they are currently or have previously served in FAO positions. For more information, to submit a paper for the conference, or to register, visit the IFAOO’s website at www.nps.navy.mil/fao or



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Readings for a Deeper Understanding of Islamic History: A Means of Fighting Islamist Militant Ideology

By LCDR Youssef Aboul-Enein, MSC, USN

The current war against al-Qaida and their affiliates has forced necessary debate on the differences between Islam and Islamism. When the President of the United States remarks that Islam is a hijacked religion, there is no explanation as to what that may mean, even Muslims are remiss in this need to tangibly explain and demonstrate the pseudo-intellectual and medieval arguments of Islamist militant ideology. However in the realm of books and glimmers of movements from Indonesia to Tunisia, there is what can only be described as needed discourse on future of Islamic thought in the 21st century. Three books will be recommended as a means of demystifying Islamic history. But before tackling these more complex books on Islamic history it is recommended that those with little knowledge of Islam read Karen Armstrong's book, "*Islam: A Short History*," (New York: Random House, paperback, 2002) and her recent biography of Prophet Muhammad.

The first book entitled *Islam vs. Islamism: The Dilemma of the Muslim World* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2006) by Professor Peter Demant of Brazil's University of Sao Paulo, who lived eight years in Jerusalem before lecturing on Asian history. His book covers the complex and diverse history of Islam with a focus on basic Islamic law and contrasting it to embellished or politicized Islam as a means of addressing setbacks in history. The book is divided in three parts, one entitled, and "Yesterday," the other "Today," and the third part is the entitled, "The Future." One cannot understand how Islamist militant clerics suppress aspects of Islam that do not fit their worldview without understanding Islam's foundation and past. The second part discusses the ideologues who have shaped Islamist radicalism, and corrupted the faith like Ibn Taymi-

yyah of the 13th century, Sayed Qutb (1906-1966) and Mawdudi (1903-1975) and is balanced with a counter argument like the Islamic Judge Ali Abdul-Razak, a disciple of the modernist reformer Muhammad Abduh, the Grand Mufti of Cairo (1849-1905). Judge Abdul-Razak would publish a book arguing that the Caliphate is not Islamic orthodoxy but Islamic political tradition that even predates Islam. Demant proposes in his final part that the revival of Islamic reformist thought and energizing constructive interpretation from Ibn Rushd (1126-1198) and Ibn Khuldun (1332-1406) to an honest assessment of Prophet Muhammad as not just that of a warrior, but as civic leader, husband, merchant, father and a look at his life in totality. This is the counter-balance against Islamist militancy, *takfiri* ideology, and other intolerant strains of Islam that has only dishonored the faith. At its root, al-Qaida seeks to change the nature and character of Islam into one homogenous and intolerant strain, Muslims must come to recognize this and be outraged.

Martin Lings a Sufi Muslim convert and Arabic linguist published perhaps one of the most comprehensive biographies of Prophet Muhammad; it is hidden gem that was introduced to me by a Defense Department colleague. Entitled, "*Muhammad: His Life Based on the Earliest Sources*," (Rochester, Vermont: Inner Traditions International, 1983) is not for the novice, and it delves into the life of Prophet Muhammad (570-632 AD) from the earliest sources of the *Hadith* (prophet's sayings and actions) along with reports of those who knew Muhammad, his wives, partners, advisors, early converts and his adversaries. It is these details of Prophet Muhammad's life that is completely missing from Islamist militant diatribe, they are reduced by Zawahiri and

other militants into a warlord, and therefore does dishonor to the Prophet and richness of his life. Readers will understand how Muhammad, before becoming a Prophet had a deep interest in why justice, and protection of the weak (those not affiliated with a tribe) had been abandoned by the Arabs. He questioned why a primitive rule of law existed in Byzantium but not among Arab tribes? This meant the slightest provocation would mean a tribal blood feud in Muhammad's time. There are discussions of his treatment of non-Muslims from the context of seventh century Arabia. Such as the details behind his treatment of three Jewish tribes in his confederacy of Medina, and the succession crisis which was brought on by a lack of clarity in who would succeed Muhammad. The book paints a realistic portrait of Muhammad's life within the context of his times. Reader will find many surprises such as the influence and importance of Christians on early Islam, the historical context of the war verses and much more. This history is neglected by politicized Islamist militancy. This book can be found in libraries today or you can obtain it through inter-library loan, this book was acclaimed by Muslim scholars of the mid-eighties.

Readers must spend time understanding the period of Islam between the death of Prophet Muhammad in 632 to 661 AD. This period of the first four Caliphs, typically called the Rightly Guided Caliphs. Wilfred Madelung of Oxford University wrote, "*The Succession to Muhammad: A Study of the Early Caliphate*," (Cambridge, Great Britain: Cambridge University Press, 1997). Looks at the men who would succeed Prophet Muhammad and explore the intrigues and tribal politics they faced in keeping the infant Islamic society intact. Perhaps one of the most important figures was Omar ibn al-Khattab, who would eventually become the second Caliph after Muhammad's death. Omar would be instrumental in positioning the first Caliph Abu Bakr to succeed Muhammad and the book reveals how these two combined with Abu Ubaydah used cajolery, negotiation, bribery and argument, the realism of tribal politics to develop and retain an Islamic society. Abu Bakr would face tribal rebellion and tribes wanting to leave Prophet Muhammad's confederacy. Omar, the second Caliph would see an expanding empire and would institute the rudiments of an administration called *diwans*. It was under his rule Byzantine forces were defeated and the Levant and Egypt lay open. The third caliph

Uthman ibn Affan would see much division and outrage about his nepotism and he would succumb to assassins, the earliest instance of Muslim on Muslim political violence. Finally Ali ibn Abi Talib would face challenges being implicated in the murder of Uthman because of his criticism of the former caliph. His challenger would be Muawiyah governor of Damascus, and with the involvement of the Prophet's wife Aisha (Abu Bakr's daughter) Ali's caliphate would be opposed and the first wider Muslim civil war ensued. This history is vital to understanding the issues and problems of the modern Middle East. American military planners must immerse themselves in this history to understand the region, and the selective imagery used by our adversaries.

Editor's Note: LCDR Aboul-Enein is a Middle East Analyst, who served as advisor and Middle East Country Director at the Office of the Secretary of Defense from 2002 to 2006.

The ***FAO Journal*** needs:

FAO articles written by FAOs!

All FAOs are requested to submit articles to be published in the ***FAO Journal***. Articles should nominally be 7-10 pages, single spaced (longer articles will be considered). Graphics (pictures, maps, charts) should be included embedded in the article and sent separately (in a PowerPoint file is convenient).

After publishing in the ***FAO Journal*** articles will be uploaded on the FAOA web site (www.faoa.org).

Please e-mail articles and graphics to editor@faoa.org or webmaster@faoa.org.

Without your articles the ***FAO Journal*** cannot be published!

ARMY NOTES

**COL Steven Beal, Chief,
Strategic Leadership Division**



I am nearing my first full year as Chief of the Army's Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Proponent office. During this year I have spoken with many leaders of our Army, visited many of you in the field and participated in a number of FAO in-country training conferences. These conversations and experiences have re-affirmed the vibrancy and strength of the FAO community and the critical role FAOs play in our Army's mission. I would like to reiterate my appreciation and admiration for the work you are doing.

The Army recently selected its new class of brigadier generals. Two career FAOs were selected - Colonel (P) Charles Hooper and Colonel (P) Henry Nowak. They are the 2nd and 3rd FA48 single track colonels selected for GO, the first being BG John Adams in 2003. Since the inception of the single track system and under Army transformation, Army FAOs have become increasingly knowledgeable regarding their regions of expertise due to more in-country time and service in repetitive FAO assignments, and also increasingly competitive for selection to colonel. The selection of two career FAOs to brigadier general in 2007 is important, as will be their ability to hopefully move into other general officer billets as true multi-skilled leaders. FAO was the only functional area to have officers selected for BG. This is a remarkable success for our community and validates the strong program we maintain and continue to improve.

Over the past few months FAO Proponent office sponsored three separate In-Country Training (ICT) conferences. A combined conference for Europe, Eurasia, Middle East and Africa FAOs was hosted by DAO Cairo, Egypt from 26 February to 1 March 2007. This conference included a number of senior Army Attaches from Moscow, Cairo, and Paris, as well as the director of Army G-35, Strategic Plans and Policy, BG(P) Pete

Vangjel. The conference for Asia FAOs took place in Hanoi, Vietnam, 12-16 March 2007. Over 30 ICT and Operational FAOs from South Asia, Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, and China attended the Hanoi conference. In Brazil, from 19-23 April 2007, Latin America FAOs joined participants in our Military Personnel Exchange Program (MPEP) for in-depth discussions on a number of shared issues.

These conferences updated both ICT and operational FAOs through non-attributable briefings and discussions on strategic-level issues and current initiatives related to the FAO profession. FAOs from different regions discussed seam issues within and across regional boundaries and focused learning objectives for the second half of their ICT tours. Each conference had multi-agency and multi-service participation, supported the overall development of the FAO Pentathlete, and served as a forum for hands-on mentorship and management of ICT officers. FAO Proponent appreciates the strong support provided by the respective DAOs and MILGRPs for our conference. Stay tuned for information on our FY 08 conferences.

General George Casey said on 10 April 2007 when he assumed responsibility as the Army Chief of Staff, "seldom in our history have our soldiers faced greater challenges. We serve at a time when the stakes for our nation and our way of life are high and the demands on our force are significant." As FAOs we support the fight and stand on the front line of promoting, defending and espousing the virtues of the country we all have chosen to serve. As the FAO community strives to meet the Army's demands during one of the most extensive transformations in our Army's history, FAO proponent sincerely appreciates input from and dialogue with each of you.

USMC FAO Notes

**LtCol Chris Sill, International Affairs Officer
Program Coordinator**



1. New USMC International Affairs Officer Program Coordinator Aboard. Effective 1 May, LtCol Chris Sill replaced LtCol Mike Oppenheim as the International Affairs Officer Program (IAOP) Coordinator at Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. LtCol Sill is a Russia/Eurasia FAO with two utilization tours under his belt – one as the Marine Attaché in Kiev, Ukraine; and a second as an on-site START inspector/monitor with DTRA. He is returning from an operational assignment with the 3d Marine Air Wing at Al Asad Air Base, Iraq. LtCol Oppenheim departed to take battalion command with III MEF in Okinawa, Japan.

2. Desk Officer Adjustments. The summer rotation of International Issues Branch Officers is underway: North East Asia desk officer LtCol Jon Foster (PLU-1) is departing to take command. South East Asia desk officer, LtCol Travis Tebbe (PLU-2) will be moving to the Center for Advanced Operational Cultural Learning (CAOCL) at Quantico, Virginia. Eastern Europe, Caucasus, Africa and Israel (PLU-6) desk officer, Maj Mike Barnes, and the Security Cooperation and Programs (PLU-7) manager, LtCol Art Collins will be retiring. Inbound desk officers will be aboard by mid-summer and will be noted in the next edition of the FAO Journal.

3. FAOs outbound this summer to commence In-Country Training (ICT).

a. Mid-East/North Africa. There are four Marine FAOs finishing up their Arabic training at DLI and heading out for in-country training this summer. Two will be based out of Cairo, one in Muscat, Oman; and the fourth in Amman, Jordan.

b. Korea. A Marine FAO-in-training will graduate DLI in the Korean Basic Course this month. He deploys to Korea in June for a 6-month ICT followed by a year at the Korean Armed Forces Command and Staff College.

c. China. One Marine FAO wraps up his Mandarin Chinese training at DLI and will head to Beijing for a year of ICT.

d. Japan. A Japanese FAO will head to Japan for his immersion training this summer.

e. Greece. One Greek FAO will conduct his year of ICT based out of Thessaloniki, Greece.

f. Senegal. Lastly, a Marine Sub-Saharan Africa FAO will complete his French language training and head off to Senegal.

4. Marine Corps FY08 LtCol and Col selection boards. Marine FAOs fared very well in the FY08 LtCol and Colonel selection boards released in February. The selection rate for FAOs in-zone for O-5 this year was an astounding 100%. While not as high as the O-5 rate, FAOs in-zone for O-6 were selected at a rate 4% higher than the overall, in-zone population.

5. Proposed FAO Billet Expansion. The Marine Corps continues to work the DOTMLPF issues to support an initiative to create 24 additional FAO billets. These billets will place 3 structured FAO billets at each Marine Expeditionary Force, and the same at each geographic Marine Component. 18 FAO billets are to be coded for LtCol, 6 FAO billets are to be coded for Major. All are regionally appropriate to the missions and needs of each respective unit. Additionally, efforts continue toward addressing inventory production increases beginning academic year 2008 in order to ensure an initial operational capability by 2011.

6. New FAOs and RAOs. The Marine Corps recently concluded its FY07 2nd Qtr FAO/RAO Experience Track Board. The Board reviews packages of officers who have met the requirements for graduate level regional study, in-country experience, and language proficiency. The Board awarded the following 10 FAO/RAO designations:

- 3 Latin America FAO designations
- 1 East Asia RAO designation
- 1 China (PRC) FAO designation
- 1 Sub-Saharan Africa FAO designation
- 3 Western Europe FAO designations
- 1 FSU RAO designation

F.Y.I. — Service FAO POCs



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
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