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Warrior—Diplomats: The Role of the Marine Attaché

Insurgency and the Role of the 21st Century FAO

The Other End of the Red Sea, or Has Anyone Considered a Base in Puntland?

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Letter from the President . . .

Dear FAO Colleagues,

Let me address two issues with you: FAOA Policy Lunches and FAOA membership. On the first issue, over the past two years we have had a series of Policy Lunches in the McNair Room at the Ft. McNair Officers' Club where the turn-out has been terrific. In fact, your outstanding support for these Policy Lunches often exceeded the capacity of the room, which made the venue crowded or, even worse, left some of you unable to get a seat at all.

Starting with our most recent Policy Luncheon on 3 April 2008, we have moved our events upstairs to the Ballroom where there is adequate seating for everyone attending. I would ask, however, that when you RSVP you consider that as an obligation to pay for the lunch, whether you attend or not. Your FAOA is charged by the number of meals we order and if there are "no shows" we are still obligated to pay for them.

Secondly, it is important to the future of your FAOA to increase the membership of active duty, reserve, and retired FAOs. Recently, your Board of Governors approved a "life membership" category for a one-time fee of $250.00. This brings you four membership options: 1 year - $25; 2 years - $38; 3 years - $46; and life - $250.

Membership includes a subscription to the *FAO Journal.* The journal is the place for us to share our professional experiences and knowledge of different regions of the world. It is also a perfect way for FAOs to get "published." Since the *FAO Journal* is a registered professional periodical, you are considered a published author if your article is approved for the journal.

Lastly, my thanks to BGen Dick Lake, Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, for his compelling and enlightening remarks concerning the importance of FAOs in today's security environment, which he presented at our April 2008 Policy Luncheon.

Best regards,

Steve Norton

Warrior – Diplomats: The Role of the Marine Attaché

LtCol R.E. Lucius, USMC
MARA/ALUSNA USDAO Hanoi

"By 'Intelligence' we mean every sort of information about the enemy and his country —the basis, in short, of our plans and operations."

— **Carl von Clausewitz,**
***Vom Kriege* (*On War*)**

"So it is said that if you know your enemies and know yourself, you will win a hundred times in a hundred battles. If you only know yourself, but not your opponent, you win one and lose the next. If you do not know yourself or your enemy, you will always lose."

— **Sun Tzu,**
(*The Art of War*)

Serving as a military attaché, I am often asked in the sincerest of ways if I've ever felt conflicted by the fact that many of my Foreign Area Officer (FAO) peers are currently on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan fighting a determined enemy while I make the rounds on the "alcohol, cholesterol, and protocol" circuit fighting little more than an expanding waistline. It is a fair question based on a widely embraced (though not entirely accurate) stereotype of attaché duty, and it deserves more than a dismissive reply. Consequently, this article is intended to contribute to a better understanding about precisely what it is that a Marine Attaché (MARA) does and how that mission contributes to the Marine Corps' overall warfighting effectiveness.

Functionally speaking, military attachés have been around for at least two thousand years, though the appellation itself is of a more recent vintage. The embedding of military specialists within diplomatic missions for the expressed purpose of ascertaining the military strength and intent of foreign armies is perhaps as old as the art of war itself. Scipio Africanus, the victor over Hannibal in the Second Punic War, reportedly embedded military officers among his ambassadors to the court of Numidia, charging them with determining the strength and disposition of King Syphax's army. Military liaison agents were also occasionally employed for similar ends up through the Age of Enlightenment, but it was not until the early 19th century that officers were assigned to diplomatic missions with some regularity.

While the posting of military officers alongside their civilian counterparts was initially resisted by many in diplomatic circles, the increasing complexity of warfare in the 18th century ultimately necessitated this innovation. No longer could nations depend solely on their civilian diplomats to report on such specialized matters as military organization, doctrine, and armaments; experts were now needed for investigating such matters. Napoleon Bonaparte is credited widely with making routine the use of military observers abroad, begun tentatively in 1806 with the appointment of a French Army Captain as Second Secretary of the French Embassy in Vienna. This officer was charged with "keeping strict account of the strength of the Austrian regiments and their location . . . so that no battalion is moved without it being known to him." Prussia, Austria, and Russia soon followed suit; by the 1830s, such exchanges had become a fairly common occurrence throughout Europe. The term "military attaché," however, did not come into common use until around the mid-1800s, when Great Britain began sending its own officers abroad.

The American Congress did not begin authorizing the appointment of military and naval attachés to American Legations overseas until September 1888, although a number of US Naval Officers had already been serving in that ca-

pacity since the early 1880s. The first US Naval Attaché, Lieutenant Commander French Chadwick, was posted to London in 1882; the second, a young Ensign by the name of George Foulk, was shipped off to Seoul in 1883. By the mid-1890s, the United States had ten military attachés abroad in Berlin, St. Petersburg, Paris, London, Vienna, Rome, Brussels, Madrid, Tokyo, and Mexico City. Following the Spanish-American War, the United States sent additional military attachés to various capitals throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, including the first American military attaché of African descent, Captain Charles Young, who took up residence in Haiti, and later served as military attaché to the Republic of Liberia.

The first Marine Corps officers called to such duty usually filled naval attaché billets, or what is more appropriately referred to as an American Legation US Naval Attaché (ALUSNA). Major Henry Leonard, who saved the life of First Lieutenant Smedley Butler and lost an arm for his troubles at the Battle of Tientsin, served as the first Marine Corps ALUSNA from 1905-1907. Three years later, he was followed by Captain Thomas Holcomb, Jr., who later went on to become the 17th Commandant of the Marine Corps (1936-1943). Within a decade, Marine Corps Officers were also serving as ALUSNAs in London, Paris, and Tokyo.

By the outbreak of World War I, there were about 350 military and naval attachés worldwide, 31 of which were from the United States (23 military and eight naval); by the start of World War II, however, that number had nearly doubled. These included Major Florence C. Jepson of the Women's Army Corps (WAC), who, in 1944, became the first female military attaché ever sent abroad. At one point, the United States had over 258 Army and Air Force Officers assigned to duty in 59 countries and another 160 Naval Officers posted as attachés in 43 countries; yet, by the early 1950s, that number had been cut by a third, and for about the next fifteen years it remained relatively stable.

Up until December 1964, each service had been responsible generally for managing its own attaché system, but with the promulgation of Department of Defense (DoD) Directive C5105.32, the Secretary of Defense assumed authority for the appointment of senior Defense Attachés (DATT), who, in turn, were given oversight for other US naval, military and air attachés assigned to their respective Defense Attaché Offices (DAO) and Defense Liaison Offices (DLO). This directive also led to the establishment of a centralized Defense Attaché System (DAS) under the management of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Since then, attachés have been nominated by their respective services, but ultimately approved, trained, and managed by DIA.

Today, there are 32 Marine Corps Attaché billets worldwide, five of which are also DATT positions, and eleven are concurrent ALUSNA billets. Tour length can range anywhere from 12-36 months depending on the assignment and whether it is an accompanied billet. Current billets are roughly divided between O-5s and O-4s, although most of the DATT jobs call for lieutenant colonels. Identification of additional MARA billets are in the works, with India, Afghanistan, and Iraq as likely new posts.

The primary job of a modern military attaché, and thus of MARA's as well, remains the observation and reporting of foreign military developments in the nation(s) to which he or she is accredited. This reporting typically includes gathering information about such obvious factors as a host nation's military institutions, manpower, doctrine and equipment, as well as its warfighting proficiency and combat readiness. It also includes seeking out countless other qualitative and quantitative data points concerning things like military morale, the relationships among key

leaders, attitudes towards other nations, domestic and international policy constraints, economic pressures affecting readiness, or anything else that can lead us to a fuller understanding of the host nation's military capabilities. Almost anything can contribute towards completing this complex mosaic.

Like other members of the diplomatic community, military attachés are also accorded immunity protections provided by the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Attachés are not spies, however, and most of their efforts are carried out overtly. Those who forget this cardinal rule find themselves frequently and quickly declared *persona non grata* (PNG) by the host nation and returned to service. While the truth is decidedly less glamorous and mysterious, much of what a capable military attaché learns is gleaned from informal discussions in social gatherings or in face-to-face exchanges across a conference table. In most countries you will also find a Military Attaché Corps (MAC) that provides both informal and formal opportunities for attachés to get together to compare notes and to complain invariably about their shared lack of access.

Fortunately, being selected for attaché duty nowadays is no longer dependent on the size of one's personal bank account or any tenuous family claims to royalty as it was in the days of Prussia's Kaiser Wilhelm I. Instead, officers interested in pursuing an attaché assignment ideally should have had some experience as a Foreign Area Officer (FAO), a Regional Affairs Officer (RAO), or as an Olmsted Scholar. Additional experience as a regional or country desk officer is also helpful. While a candidate should have a record that indicates both initiative and adaptability, he or she should also have demonstrated a capacity to perform independent duty in unfamiliar and difficult environments. Moreover, because of the "Johnny-on-the-spot" nature of attaché duty, a candidate should not only be able to speak intelligently and in detail about the doctrine, organization, and policies of American naval services, he or she should also possess more than a passing understanding of the political, military, economic, and cultural characteristics of both the United States and the host country. Moreover, an advanced degree and a capacity for language training is an enormous advantage in a job where you can be put on the spot at any time or place to discuss (sometimes in the local language) the most varied of topics.

Once a candidate is selected for a particular post by the Marine Corps' Director for Intelligence (DIRINT), he or she must be approved by DIA. Only then will the officer be scheduled for preparatory training, which can take up to two years, and which is anchored around the 12-week Joint Military Attaché School (JMAS) at Bolling Air Force Base in Washington, DC. This course provides the basic administrative and technical skills that attachés require to effectively carry out their diverse duties, as well as a number of more esoteric subjects, such as diplomatic etiquette, dressing for success, memory skills. and the cultivation of the social skills necessary for the assignment. For better or worse, attaché life is also full of temptations, some of which are manufactured by the host government to compromise the attaché and to embarrass the US Government. Consequently, both the Marine Corps and DIA greatly prefer to select attachés that are not only married, but who are in marriages that can sustain the myriad stresses of attaché life. Attaché duty is certainly one of those few billets where your spouse plays a truly integral role in your success, so much so that a separate, but concurrent, attaché spouse course is offered at JMAS. It is strictly voluntary but absolutely worthy of a spouse's time and effort.

After an officer graduates from JMAS, he or she will then be directed to attend a number of personal safety training courses. Successful completion of these will be followed by a series of briefings by country and regional specialists from various US Government agencies. Language training is also provided, if required, and take from several months to more than eighteen

months. DIA's Patriot's Memorial Wall provides a sobering reminder that military attachés have long been favored by terrorist groups looking for a highly symbolic target, so the final step before departing CONUS is to get fitted for your very own bulletproof vest.

When I first arrived as a new MARA in Hanoi, Vietnam, I was a bit surprised to learn that the traditional attaché duties of observing and reporting for which I had been trained accounted for only a part of my portfolio. It turns out that a great deal of my time has been spent coordinating and implementing various aspects of the US Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP) and carrying out the painstaking work of establishing and sustaining a complex spider web of bilateral initiatives aimed at building trust, encouraging transparency, and fostering cooperation. These initiatives include not only host-nation participation in US DoD sponsored seminars and conferences, but also the hosting of subject matter expert exchanges (SMEE), the scheduling of US Navy port calls, visits by delegations from military schools, and visits by senior US military leaders. Duty in a DAO also includes managing various elements of the security assistance portfolio, such as overseeing Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Excess Defense Article (EDA) transfer programs, as well as any International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs. It can also include overseeing Humanitarian Assistance (HA) and Humanitarian Civic Assistance (HCA) projects, and, in the case of DAO Hanoi, executing the US Department of State Humanitarian Demining Program, which includes about $3 million annually in various mine action programs. There is also the occasional natural disaster or other humanitarian crisis to which the US military must respond.

Additionally, I am called upon frequently to provide briefings to visiting US congressmen, senators, cabinet-level officials, as well as our own military leadership so that they are able to develop an accurate and objective understanding of the role that Vietnam's military plays domestically and throughout the region. I also get the occasional chance to lecture at local universities or to speak to delegations from important social, political, and economic constituencies. These invaluable opportunities to participate in public diplomacy allow me to talk about the United States and explain US policies. Many of my evenings are set aside to attend any of dozens of receptions marking important host nation events or those of other countries represented in the diplomatic corps. Military attachés attend these events in order to represent the US DoD officially, and even though they soon become tedious, they provide an informal (albeit important) occasion to trade professional gossip. These events offer truly unique opportunities for me to interact on a recurrent basis with some of the host country's most senior military and civilian leadership. Other than attaché duty, there are few other assignments where majors and lieutenant colonels can routinely rub elbows with a nation's leadership and work to influence the course of US foreign policy personally.

As an attaché you will find yourself inevitably laboring under a relatively complex hierarchy of bosses, often with sometimes very different goals and priorities. As members of the Embassy Country Team, the DATT and other service attachés work directly for the Ambassador, but since 1964 all military attachés have also fallen under the operational management of the Director of DIA. As a MARA and ALUSNA, you are also the personal representative of the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) and the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), respectively. Further complicating the chain of command is the fact that military attachés also answer to the appropriate regional unified combatant commander. Additionally, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the various major commands (MACOM) both have a lot to say about how you spend your time. With all of these bosses clamoring for your attention, it isn't diffi-

cult to see how a small DAO can have a hard time keeping up with all of the demands.

Sadly, it is true that military attachés are better known generally for their widely publicized failures, rather than for their often unreported successes. Indeed, few likely recall that Count Alfred Graf von Waldersee, von Moltke's successor as Chief of the Prussian General Staff, was the military attaché in Paris who quickly discerned the intent behind France's mobilization on 19 July 1870 and wired a timely warning to the Kaiser in Berlin. Nor do many perhaps remember that it was while serving as the US military attaché in Chile that famed Captain Andrew S. Rowan, whose exploits were immortalized in Elbert Hubbard's *A Message to Garcia*, had developed the contacts and language skills that would later serve him so well in his mission to find General Calixto Garcia in the hills of Cuba.

Finally, no discussion of attaché success stories would be complete without mentioning Captain C. R. Clark, USN, who, while serving as the ALUSNA in Havana in early 1962, noted suspicious port activity that indicated a rapid Soviet military buildup. His subsequent reports spurred increased monitoring of Soviet-Cuban communications and led to the U-2 overflights which helped prove eventually the presence of Soviet Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) on Cuban soil. Examples such as these serve merely to illustrate the strategic role that one attaché on the ground can play in an unfolding crisis. One need only look to the next emerging crisis and you will likely find that a military attaché has already been working quietly behind the scenes to establish and sustain US military influence and facilitate follow-on US military involvement.

During my time as an attaché in Hanoi, I have been privileged to serve on the forward edge of US efforts to forge a strengthened bilateral defense relationship with a strategically important partner. This relationship has implications not only for maintaining regional stability well into the future, but its health also allows US forces to focus their attention right now on more pressing problems elsewhere. I am hopeful that, by working to achieve US strategic objectives in my little corner of the world, my peers fighting elsewhere are more likely to get the resources they need to carry the fight ever forward. Furthermore, when a former attaché returns to the operating forces, he or she does so with a wealth of experiences and contacts, as well as a range of skills that are truly unique among his or her peers. In a world where culture is increasingly seen as warfighting enabler, the attaché can be a tremendous force multiplier for the commander wise enough to exploit his or her skills.

For an officer that is interested in blazing his or her own trail in an assignment that provides a lot of room for personal initiative and also unlimited opportunities to contribute in a meaningful way towards achieving US strategic objectives, the DAS may be what you are looking for. That being said, participation in the DAS has rarely been considered the fast track to promotion and command. You will likely never be adequately recognized for the contributions you make on behalf of US national interests, and most will never really appreciate the sophistication of the type of work you performed in some dark corner of the world. In some cases, those contributions may never even come to light. Yet, it is hard to overstate the sense of self-satisfaction that you will inevitably feel when your quiet and patient diplomacy helps persuade a potential enemy to pursue a different course of action or when it helps strengthen the resolve of a faltering friend, especially when precious American blood and treasure are ultimately at stake.

Insurgency & the Role of the 21st Century Foreign Area Officer: An Introductory Study Guide

Rod Propst

As the 21st Century unfolds, the fog of containment, a strategy which defined both our political and military worlds for the second half of the 20th century, has dissipated. In its place is a world of greater uncertainty—militarily, politically, diplomatically, economically—with no single strategy other than [perhaps] "Preemption" having established a strategic foothold. For the foreign area officer—our cutting edge politico-military warrior—what has emerged in these early years of the 21st Century is a focus on insurgency. Much has been made of "lost lessons-learned"; in fact, the wheel was partially reinvented, but in fairness updated with a new century focus, with the publication of the Army's FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, in December 2006. This article seeks to place what we know, from this century's experience; what we knew before, using some superior examples of insurgency literature every FAO should know; and how the foreign area officer can apply that knowledge in the many roles every FAO professional faces in one's career.

Preparation of the foreign area officer is a lifetime's undertaking. T.E. Lawrence, one of history's great insurgent warriors, once asked Basil Liddell Hart, "If your new book could persuade some of our new soldiers to read and mark and learn things outside drill manuals and tactical diagrams, it would be a good work." Lawrence described himself as an example of the necessary—"I was not an instinctive soldier… When I took a decision, or adopted an alternative, it was after studying every relevant—and many irrelevant—factors. Geography, tribal structure, religion, social customs, language, appetites, standards—all were at my fingertips. The enemy I knew almost like my own side. I risked myself ***among them*** [author's emphasis) a hundred times to learn." This is the foreign area officer corps at its heart; and the present article seeks to assist the reader in taking one small step forward in this endless endeavor—an understanding of insurgency for the 21st Century FAO.

The 21st Century Face of Insurgency—Counterinsurgency and FM 3-24

Navigating the maze of insurgency analyses is as fraught with philosophical danger as that faced by our warriors facing the physical

threat of improvised explosive devices and explosively formed projectiles used by rebels in our current conflict with Iraqi insurgents. Instead of an exploration of the myriad books available currently on insurgencies, the author believes it is most worthwhile to discuss insurgency in terms of current doctrine—as stated in Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*. The reason for this tack is simple—it is our doctrine, it represents our military's current best thought on what insurgency and countering that threat should look like, and it ensures that the reader gets at least a summary view of our doctrinal framework.

The initial chapter offers the requisite overview for the reader unfamiliar with this non-traditional form of warfare for regular army officer study. In the second chapter, the linkage between politics, diplomacy, host nation actors, and the martial aspect are all creatively linked—a linkage which the descriptions of the books which follow establishes as essential to counterinsurgency operations.

Chapter 3 deals in some detail on intelligence in counterinsurgency operations. The element of information is absolutely critical to the conduct and success of counterinsurgency operations. In particular, both Mao Zedong and Frank Kitson repeatedly hammer the reader on the importance of good information to counter the efforts of the insurgent adversary.

Chapters 4 and 5 are planning chapters. The former offers an overhead view of campaign and large operations planning. The latter delves more specifically into the execution of such a plan. Key in the fifth chapter is the short section on learning and adapting; the mere brevity of that short entry should not be a signal to the reader to offer that subject short shrift. The loss of Lessons Learned is precisely what prompted the re-engineering of the present manual—as we seemed to have momentarily misplaced the many Lessons Learned that both our prior experience and the body of work discussed herein provides.

Chapter 6 is particularly relevant to the modern, 21st Century reader. One of our greatest challenges is an exit strategy for separation from an insurgency, thus allowing a host nation force to assume our role. In order to reach that goal, the development of solid host nation security forces is essential. This chapter describes that challenge and how to meet it.

Although not specifically designed as a companion chapter, Chapter 7 offers a logical extension of the previous chapter. Discussing leadership and ethics is more than critical—it is absolutely essential to counterinsurgency success. If the insurgent lives like the fish in the sea of the people (Mao), then our task is to make that sea one where we swim equally with the insurgent. The enabler to do so is based on ethical, fair treatment of the population, who otherwise are driven to the enemy—as case study after case study not

only suggests but precisely describes.

Chapter 8 deals with the logistical considerations for counterinsurgency. As most staff college graduates attest, the study of logistics was not their favorite element in the college; however, all realize its importance. The value-added of understanding how to sustain a counterinsurgency is equally important to the foreign area officer reader on insurgencies.

The doctrinal volume ends with several appendices of significance—all worth review then careful study and application as warfighter and as foreign area officer pol-mil advisor. An understanding of the legal considerations of counterinsurgency is essential for the conduct of the ethical fight we demand of ourselves as professionals (Appendix D). The requirement for linguistic support of course rings true to every foreign area officer; understanding the importance of that capability and how to make it so is the subject of Appendix C. Appendix B offers an analytic approach for the application of METT-TC. Although it seems at first too difficult and burdensome, it is remarkably straight-forward and easy to apply. A careful study of this simple analytic tool is a must for the

foreign area officer student of insurgency.

The last Appendix discussed is intentionally out of order. Perhaps the most practical of the several Appendices is Appendix A. It is similar to the famous "150 Questions for a Guerrilla," the classic book by General Alberto Bayo, Castro's long-time mentor. The "Guide for Action" offers a hands-on, practical guide for the individual about to enter a counterinsurgency. Its sixty, step-by-step guidelines walk even the greenest participant through a process leading to greatest individual effectiveness in a counterinsurgency role. Its straight forward Plan, Prepare, Execute format is accessible and easy to use.

The last section of FM 3-24 of immediate use by the FAO reader is the list of references. One will note that highlights of several of these references are summarized in this paper. This is a solid initial study list for the counterinsurgent warrior of the 21st Century.

A one page overview of our military's newest counterinsurgency doctrine barely suffices; a more thorough review for understanding—coupled with extensive research and reading on the subject—will be requisite for the serious foreign area officer student of this subject.

Author's NOTE: The thorough reader, in conjunction with a careful study of the current doctrine, may wish to consider reading the several versions of FM 31-20 (1951, '55, '65, '71, '90, & present) and FM 31-21 (1951, '58, '61, '69, and present) to measure the development of doctrinal understanding and development of insurgency, guerrilla, and revolutionary warfare that these two central doctrinal volumes capture. Also note the Army's definition of "guerrilla" parallels the current definition for "insurgent."

This snapshot sought to provide a simplistic [space-constrained] overview of this important new manual. Equally of value is a study of some of the classics from the wealth of insurgency and counterinsurgency literature. That is the subject of the next portion of this brief overview study.

INSURGENCY—LEARNING FROM THE PAST: NINE ESSENTIAL FAO READS

For the modern foreign area officer, study is continuous. The FAO must always proceed with caution. Regional expertise is essential—it is at the heart of the foreign area officer's value-added to the military. However, regional expertise must be combined with a broader perspective on the warfighting art. The challenge is formidable; the rewards great. The challenge for the FAO is not to become a Pacific Ocean wading pool—very broad, but too shallow to be worth much; given the reality of time constraints, vaulting that obstacle represents a continuing test. From the wealth of insurgency and counterinsurgency literature, the author has chosen to pick some essential highlights from nine indispensable, classic studies. This article can barely do justice to these complex works; but perhaps by at least identifying these to the reader, guided study—providing the greater depth of knowledge we seek—will result. From theoretical works—Robert Taber's *WAR OF THE FLEA: THE CLASSIC STUDY OF GUERRILLA WARFARE*; Bard E. O'Neill's *INSURGENCY AND TERRORISM: FROM REVOLUTION TO APOCALYPSE*; Mao Zedong's *ON GUERRILLA WARFARE*—to case studies such as Alistair Horne's *A SAVAGE WAR OF PEACE* (Algeria); T.E. Lawrence's *SEVEN PILLARS OF WISDOM* (Arabia); Robert Asprey's *WAR IN THE SHADOWS: THE GUERRILLA IN HISTORY*; the Special Operations Research Office's *CASEBOOK ON INSURGENCY AND REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE: 23 SUMMARY ACCOUNTS*—to "how-to" books such as Frank Kitson's *LOW INTENSITY OPERATIONS: SUBVERSION, INSURGENCY, AND PEACEKEEPING*; and the United States Marine Corps *SMALL WARS MANUAL*—we shall identify essential, common threads.

WAR OF THE FLEA

Robert Taber's *WAR OF THE FLEA: THE CLASSIC STUDY OF GUERRILLA WARFARE* remains—despite its publication date in 1965—

relevant and largely current. While its concluding chapters concerning a roadmap for the conflict in Vietnam are of less interest today than when written, its introductory description of the nuts and bolts of insurgency offers the student new to the subject plenty of initial meat on which to chew. Prior to the introduction of that foundational material, it is useful to understand the meaning of the title the author selected.



The analogy insurgent as a flea is particularly apt and sets the stage for much that follows. The flea survives because he trades time for space, and uses that to multiply and create a larger community—a community which ultimately simply wears the host down. Insurgencies seek to recreate this ambience. A small core group (as few as eighteen men, such as Castro's initial insurgents) enters a country. At first they are a minor itch; over time, they grow. The host government tries to scratch at them, but the insurgent uses the space available to engage at selected times and places; the flea is analogous to Mao's fish in the sea. Next, again over time—time developed through judicious use of space—the insurgent creates a growing political will in the people for support. The insurgent militates the population. He creates the "will to revolt". In this sense the insurgent flea is a "political partisan"—

they are "…woers as well as doers". At all times the insurgent gains a foothold, often fighting a military and political enemy whose goals are so disparate as to cause failure before the war even develops.

Taber uses several case studies—albeit not in the depth that some of our other key sources describe—to further his description of insurgent warfare. Of course, Taber quotes Mao, as the fish in the sea metaphor earlier indicated. He also provides short lists from Sun Tzu, upon whom Mao based many of his martial, insurgent ideas. He then shows how select insurgencies—the Irish in the six Northern Counties, the EOKA in Cyprus are among these excellent overviews—applied these fundamentals. And he uses these to reveal a common theme—"despite the impressive technological innovation of the 20th Century, the principles of warfare are not modern, but ancient". He reveals General Giap's methods in Vietnam, "…dynamism, initiative, mobility, and rapidity of decision in the face of new situations". He uses General Grivas—the Cypriot insurgency's leader—as a link showing how the judicious use of focused terrorism serves the insurgent well. He describes a "…plague of dragon's teeth, sown in confusion, nourished in the soil of

social dissention, economic disruption, and political chaos, causing armed fanatics to spring up wherever peaceful peasants toiled."

Taber then moves on to why it remains so difficult for a larger power and its military to defeat an insurgency, He states, the "Army fights to control territory, roads, strategic heights, vital areas; the guerrilla fights to control people, without whose cooperation the land is useless to its possessor". The government and its military must control their land, its resources. In contrast, for the guerrilla, "territory is nothing, attrition is everything". The insurgent succeeds because his goal is achievable; the opposing government often fails because it is fighting a different war, whose ends are often immaterial to the enemy it faces. Thus, the government is vulnerable, and must maintain that appearance of normalcy to succeed. Where it is unable to do so, an insurgency has a marked advantage. And where the protracted war which is a central strength of insurgencies continues, the government is at ever-increasing risk. Taber's own words are of best use here, and tell a cautionary tale to those who must execute counterinsurgencies in the 21st Century:

- "Modern governments are highly conscious of what journalism calls 'world opinion'…larger community of interests … appearance of stability…protracted internal war threatens all of this"
- "Insurgency was successful simply because terror, sabotage, and constant disorder [make the situation] too unprofitable and politically embarrassing…to remain."
- "Rebellious colony through terrorism and guerrilla warfare, becomes (1) too great a political embarrassment to be sustained domestically or on the world stage, and (2) unprofitable, too expensive, or no longer prestigious."
- "Local military success will serve no purpose if the guerrilla campaign does not also weaken the morale of the government and its soldiers, strain the financial resources of the regime, and increase political pressure on it by creating widespread apprehension and dissatisfaction with a war in which there is no progress—and no end in sight."
- Thus, in summary, "It has given freely of its brains, its blood, and its lives. All has been to no avail. The world's mightiest nation has been unable to find the key to success."

Of course, the reader clearly sees the applicability of these cautions and challenges in our present world.

The insurgent "…flea survives by hopping and hiding; he prevails because he multiplies faster than he can be caught and exterminated." He does this by trading time for space in order to buy the ability to create a climate of change in the people. This—along with the two simultaneous yet disparate wars of the insurgent and the controlling government and military—form the heart of Taber's initial study of insurgency, O'Neill's book builds upon this introductory description with another theoretical work.

INSURGENCY & TERRORISM: FROM REVOLUTION TO APOCALYPSE

A second theoretical work also proves of value to the foreign area officer studying insurgency literature. ***INSURGENCY & TERRORISM: FROM REVOLUTION TO APOCALYPSE*** by Bard E. O'Neill actually offers a theoretical framework for the analysis of insurgencies—by students, warfighters, and other analysts, all of which identify the modern FAO. Written in 1990, it is even more compelling as a tool for today than it was on publication. Before O'Neill begins his description of his analytic tool, he describes some of the challenges of the study of insurgencies. Among these are ones the modern reader will recognize as relevant today—challenges of national integration and economic underdevelopment, the internationalization of insurgencies, the asymmetrical nature of the conflict and renewed North American involvement (we may have missed the need to colonize, but we have been less successful

dodging the "imperialist" bullet).

O'Neill's definition of insurgency is spot on. For him it is a "Struggle between a non-ruling group and the ruling authorities in which the non-ruling group consciously uses political resources and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more areas of politics." He then defines politics using three elements: the political system, the authorities, and their policies.



O'Neill further describes the types of insurgencies: anarchist, egalitarian, traditionalist, pluralist, secessionist, reformist, and preservationist. He then outlines the four problem areas associated with the proper identification of insurgent type (an important consideration for anyone who would use his analytic tool to study a particular insurgency). These four problem areas are: goal transformation, goal conflicts, misleading rhetoric, and goal ambiguity.

He concludes his introduction with a brief preview of the coming discussion of politics and the forms of warfare—with an emphasis on terrorism. Before detailing the various forms of insurgent strategies, he describes six variables that lead insurgents to pick a winning stratagem. These are: environment, popular support, organization, unity, external support, and the government response. These six factors form the basis for O'Neill's analytic tool.

Having defined the variables defining strategic approaches, O'Neil then introduces the several strategies available to insurgents. These include: the conspiratorial strategy (the quick strike—like the Bolshevik's of 1917), the protracted popular war (the Mao approach), the military-focus strategy (adopted by the South in our own Civil War), and the urban warfare strategy (the IRA approach—paralleling today's conflict in Iraq). The next six chapters provide details on each of the six elements of O'Neill's model.

Most interesting is the chapter on government response, since that is the area where the FAO will likely be a government value-added. Nearly every page has a sentence or phrase that jumps out at the modern reader as applicable to the 21st Century foreign area officer:

- "The success of the operation depends not primarily on the development of the insurgent strength, but more importantly on the degree of vigor, determination, and skill with which the incumbent regime acts to defend itself, both politically and militarily";
- "Historical and contemporary data reveal instances in which governments have misdirected policies because they misunderstood or falsely portrayed the goals, techniques, strategies, and accomplishments of their opponents. Whatever the reasons (inflexibility, sloppy thinking, ignorance, biases, bureaucratic imperatives, or psychological aversion to acknowledgement one's own weaknesses), the outcome is flawed, costly, and sometimes fatal policies and behavior";

- "Experience and the experts suggest that the most effective way to deal with internal terrorism…is to emphasize police work, good intelligence, and judicial sanctions";
- "Adaptability is crucial";
- The importance features of popular support—charismatic attraction of the insurgent leader, nationalism, religious appeals;
- Placing a "premium on patience";
- "Even where terrorism is limited to internal attacks, international cooperation is important because…aid for terrorists often come[s] from the outside";
- The absence of Flexibility and Integrity "…can create untold difficulties… [and the] absence of these attributes has a corrosive effect"; and finally,
- What is requisite is patience—the "Will to stay the course".

These are hardly revelations to the reader, but surely paint a clear cautionary picture to the political-military analyst. O'Neill's analytic framework offers a clear road usable to FAO analysts in the pursuit of their efforts.

ON GUERRILLA WARFARE

As a long-recognized classic suitable for study by all officers, Mao Zedong's ***ON GUERRILLA WARFARE*** merits special inclusion for the foreign area officer studying insurgency. Of the many available editions, any one that uses Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith's translation is recommended, as his introductory insights are as valuable to the reader as Mao's words.

Mao's guidance is simple, and need not be overly complicated by the reader. Mao begins with the most important linkage between the political and warfare; the reader will see this common thread throughout the selected studies. He cautions—as does Sam Griffith later—the military on too tight a focus solely on the military. 'There are some militarists who say, "We are not interested in politics but only in the profession of arms." It is vital that these simple minded militarists be made to realize the relationship that exists between politics and military affairs.' This linkage finds common expression across many of the selected works summarized in this paper. Mao then simply states the strategy for this type of martial endeavor—"…select the tactics of

seeming to come from the east and attacking from the wets; avoid the solid, attack the hollow; attack; withdraw; seek a lightning decision… withdraw when [the enemy] advances; harass him when he stops; strike him when he is weary." Central to Mao's approach was the conservation of [limited] human resources. Most important in this aspect may be the concept of "protracted war"; that is as vital today as it was in Mao's time—and important for the foreign area officer to understand, as it clearly indicates that insurgents are in it for the long haul, and their concern for American electoral cycles approaches zero, unless those cycles can be used to gain them an advantage over the U.S. enemy.

The crucial link between the warrior and the people forms Mao's next set of advice. The guerrilla/insurgent is of the people, for the people, and utterly dependent upon the people for his

survival and success. He cautions that the people must "…be inspired to cooperate voluntarily. We must not force them." Mao captured the essence of this formula in three rules and eight remarks, and used these to ensure that this vital link was never weakened by his forces. They are as follows:

Rules:
1. All actions are subject to command.
2. Do not steal from the people.
3. Be neither selfish nor unjust.

Remarks:
1. Replace the door when you leave the house.
2. Roll up the bedding on which you have slept.
3. Be courteous.
4. Be honest in your transactions.
5. Return what you borrow,
6. Replace what you break.
7. Do not bathe in the presence of women.
8. Do not without authority search the pocketbooks of those you arrest."

Mao's simple lesson—the strong link between force and politics and the same permanent link between the warfighter and the people surrounding the insurgent make this short book a must read.

SAVAGE WAR OF PEACE

Alistair Horne's *A SAVAGE WAR OF PEACE* (a book length case study of the Algerian insurgency) possesses dual value. First, as an exhaustive case study of all facets of an insurgency from the balanced point of view of all participants, it represents a thorough model of the several elements of insurgency and counterinsurgency "Common Threads", which appear in this paper's conclusion. Second, the Algerian savage war resonates in the current experience of the early 21st Century, with many lessons learned, to be learned, or in some cases lessons sadly forgotten. Horne's significant lessons from his case study include: 1) Commonality & Cohesiveness; 2) Small Beginnings; 3) Military Primacy; and, 4) the

Use of Torture.

Commonality & Cohesiveness. insurgencies share participant characteristics in common. These often include ethnicity. Although even the Muslim Algerians were of significantly mixed heritage—Berber, Arab, Kabyle, Chaouia, Mauritanian, and Turk—they were perceived by the French government and the Algerian *pied noir* colonists as simply Arabs, beneath and different. Separate and different, the native Algerians began to see themselves as the true Algerians, meriting their own government for their own people. Another commonality is of locale. While marginally "mixed", the truth is that French colonists and native Algerians were ghettoized. The most notorious of these was the Casbah of Algiers, where more than 100 thousand Muslims existed in under a square kilometer. This eased difficulties of attack and reprisal on both sides throughout the insurgency. Yet another commonality was of language. While many *pied noir* spoke Arabic, and many Algerians spoke French, for most French, Arabic was a foreign tongue; admittedly, this linguistic isolation was often used to the insurgents' advantage. Although others may be mentioned as adjuncts, the final significant commonality was that of religion. The Islamic faith bound the insurgents' backgrounds; although Islamic fundamentalism was not central to the Algerian experience, some present day ech-

oes back to Wahhabism and Fundamentalism harken back to that conflict.

These several commonalities yield a cohesiveness that is difficult for the outsider to penetrate. In Horne's lexicon the term is "collectivity"—of leadership, of suffering, and of anonymity ("he was an Arab, dressed as a person," as one non-FAO officer observed). Commonality, cohesiveness, collectivity—regardless of the noun, it represents the insurgent identifier and the outsider or governmental separator.

Small Beginnings. Although activity predates any single event of initiation, the massacres of May 8, 1945 at Setif both politicized and martialized many future insurgent leaders. Like the events of Derry's Bloody Sunday pitting peaceful marchers with a smattering of IRA agitators against the military, it is unclear "who fired the first shot". During the V-E Day parade a French commissioner was knocked down and a young Muslim was shot. At that point Muslims roamed the area and slaughtered 103 Europeans and injured an equal number. The French reprisal was brutal—almost a ten-to-one ratio of Muslims killed. Although the eight-year savage war was a decade away, the conflict bloomed from this point. Many future leaders—Abdulhamid Ben Badis, Messali Hadj, Ferhat Abbas—were profoundly influenced by these events. As one said, "Setif has taken us back to the days of the Crusaders"—a common theme in the early 21st Century. Later, on June 19, 1957, the most significant spark and response occurred. On that day Zabane and Ferradj were guillotined by the French for attacks on civilians. In response Saddi Yasef's hit squads—reminiscent of the Michael Collins shooters of the IRA—roamed the city of Algiers and shot to death 49 civilians. Yasef—whose campaign is immortalized in the film Battle of Algiers, where he plays himself thinly disguised, then initiated the attack which spooled up the war irretrievably. He sent three female bombers to mass gathering places (the parallel to Muslim, female, suicide bombers in Israel in the past few years is unavoidable) in Algiers where they killed scores of *pied noir*. The French response was the shift from a political-military solution to a purely martial approach, one which ultimately spun out of the control of the French government.

Military Primacy. With Yasef's bombings, the French sent in the *paras*. For the reader unfamiliar with France's recent history at the time, they had suffered the humiliation of German defeat and occupation, they faced challenges in Morocco, and they had most recently been embarrassingly evicted from Vietnam after the defeat at Dien Bien Phu, where many of their officers and Legionnaires had served and fallen. Over time, both their presence, their methods, and their disdain and ignoring of their civilian masters became greater. That led, in many cases, to excesses. Some French officers defend these excesses as both necessary and fruitful In truth, both led to greater international involvement and pressure on the French government to end the crisis, regardless of military success. SO Algeria won its freedom. The caution of military primacy is a hard-won lesson learned for all persons in uniform, as we face many of the same pressures and frustrations today.

Torture. Terrorism is a potential tool of insurgents; it was a tool used by them, and by their French adversaries, during the savage war. General Godard in Algeria said that "intelligence is capital." Many of the other texts summarized here state the same; however, the means used to obtain such information and the degree to which they are applied is the challenge. Jean-Paul Sartre said during this conflict, "Torture is neither civilian nor military; it is a plague on both of us." Over the long view, this is, of course, always the case. Albert Camus, a native Algerian, finally noted, "Such deeds inevitably led to the demoralization of France and the loss of Algeria."

As a study embodying many of the "Insurgency Common Threads" in our conclusion, Alistair Horne's *A SAVAGE WAR OF PEACE* is a worthy addition. As a summary of a conflict with too many parallels to our current efforts fighting

Islamic Fundamentalism, its lessons learned and many cautions merits detailed study by all foreign area officers, regardless of their region of interest.

SEVEN PILLARS OF WISDOM

One of the great warriors in the unconventional role is T.E. Lawrence. His ***SEVEN PILLARS OF WISDOM***, and the shorter ***REVOLT IN THE DESERT,*** are revolutionary primers on the conduct of a successful insurgency, making the study of these books well worth the investment in understanding insurgency for the 21st Century.

Lawrence was an unlikely soldier. An honors graduate at Oxford, he was a scholar, linguist, historian, and writer. He spent many of the pre-World War I years conducting archaeological digs in Syria. Lawrence saw the potential of an Arab Revolt, using the unifying theme of Arab nationalism—requiring only a charismatic Arab leader to move this strategic approach. In that, Lawrence found Prince Feisal, and immediately became what many foreign area officers and other special operations leaders seek to become—an officer instructor-advisor to potential allies.

Lawrence's strategy, as he defined it, merits discussion. He saw the Revolt's strategy as composed of three elements—algebraic, biological, and psychological. The first was easy; the land the Turks must control was massive, and that offered a strategic advantage to the insurgent bands of Lawrence and Feisal, who dealt in surprise and distance to maximize effect and minimize casualties. Lawrence saw his forces as "…an influence, a thing invulnerable, intangible, without front or back, drifting about like a gas." This translated algebraically into massive amounts of Turks tied down to static locations, while the insurgents roamed and struck at will—In Lawrence's own words, "We used the smallest force in the quickest time at the farthest place".

The second element, biological, was equally confounding for the Turks traditionally-based army. Lawrence called this "bionomics". This defined a relationship between the organism and the environment. Lawrence's insurgents were part of the environment and thrived in it; the Turks, by comparison, were outsiders, marginalized by the environment in which they operated. Lawrence preached "elasticity and freedom of movement". He also highly valued "perfect intelligence"—almost always the advantage of the insurgent, and equally important (and often lacking) with the larger force.

Lawrence's final strategic element was the psychological. It dealt with the will of the Arab to fight for his ethical rights in the environment. Since the environment was both biologically and psychologically Arab, the "Turkish army was an accident, not a target" for Lawrence. The insurgents followed that most ancient of axioms—hit 'em where they ain't—to phenomenal success. His insurrection, draped in nationalism, never sought to confront the en-

emy but rather to isolate him by destroying lines of communications (note also Mao's emphasis on lines of communications), so vital to a large, standing, occupying army such as the Turk's.

Lawrence's greatest achievement may be his gift of assimilation. As Asprey describes him, "…Thanks to linguistic ability, imagination, perception, intellectual and moral honesty, and immense energy, he went to the tribes, found a leader, determined a viable goal, weighed capabilities, and hit on a type of war compatible to leadership, capabilities, and political goals." This is the heart of insurgent, charismatic leadership; it is also an important facet for the foreign area officer. It is further defined by Lawrence himself in his "Twenty-seven Articles"—a short guide to new officers arriving in-theater for dealing with Arabs; it is also reflective of the foreign area officer mindset, which complements one's soldierly abilities. By any of these several measures, a careful study of Lawrence as insurgent leader and strategist is of great use to the modern foreign area officer.

WAR IN THE SHADOWS

WAR IN THE SHADOWS by Robert Asprey is a fine historical overview of guerrilla war, many instances of which actually describe insurgencies, or the fight by a population against its government's forces. While thorough and inclusive through 1975, it is the first half of the first volume this author believes is the most useful for study, as much of what follows in the remainder of the two-volume-set is familiar to most readers. Asprey's work covers all of the big, better known insurgencies—the Philippines, Mexico, Lawrence in World War I, Collins and the Irish Revolution, the Bolsheviks, Mao, British colonial uprisings, global movements in World War II, Southeast Asia; it is his coverage of the lesser known cases which add to the depth of foreign area officer knowledge base concerning insurgencies.

The initial challenges to modern armies [for their time] that Asprey explores begin 2,500 years ago. He describes The Persian Darius problems with the Scythians, who "…made it impossible for the enemy who invades them to escape destruction, while they themselves are entirely out of his reach." The Greek Demosthenes



in 426 B.C. faced the same challenge of insurgent tactics which Mao would later espouse, when the Aetolians "…being swift of foot and lightly equipped…" constantly harassed and destroyed the Greeks. Alexander the Great faced the same tactics in Turkestan and Bokhara. "No great battles awaited Alexander; he was to be faced by a people's war, a war of mounted guerrillas whom, when he advanced would suddenly appear in his rear,…and when pursued vanished into the Turkoman steppes." The Roman challenges in Spain against the Gauls met with the same insurgent tactics that work today.

Asprey voices a caution relevant to the modern reader. It concerns the loss of memory, the loss of lessons learned from one experience to the next, one war to the next, one generation of military professionals to the next (not to men-

tion our civilian oversight). Speaking of the Romans—the reader can decide if the words remain accurate today—Asprey says, "The lesson of the earlier insurgency crises must have struck even the most obtuse governor and dim-witted military commander; yet, with the passing of each crisis, the lessons seemingly vanished into the prevailing morass compounded by imperial arrogance, personal greed, and professional ineptness." If the lesson applies, even in part, to today, then it is hoped the reader heeds that caution.

Asprey applauds the modern foreign area officer by default. He says that these officers are "adaptable". That they think in terms of the "… unexpected or the indirect approach based on cunning." He says they must think at the "… strategic, political, and tactical levels."

Asprey even mentions previous [ancient] literature on the subject of insurgency. One of the most compelling is Nikephoros Phokas 965 volume titled ***ON SHADOWING WARFARE***. In it the author describes this type of warfare succinctly and aptly. His translator observes, the methods "… rely heavily upon the natural advantages offered by terrain, on the willing cooperation of the civilian population, on good intelligence, on interrupting the enemy's lines of communications, and finally on the demoralizing effect of an endless sequence of small, surprise, 'carefully planned tactical attacks in a war of strategic defensive.'" Mao and Kitson—describing insurgency operations—said it no better than this centuries before.

Of interest is understanding both the political and martial aspects of insurgent warfare is the case on Napoleon's Grand Army in Russia in 1811-12. The political element—Napoleon versus Alexander—soon resulted in abuses by both sides against the native population. That then caused numerous insurgent bands to spring up—Ermolai Chetvertakov, Estepan Eremenko, and Ermolai Vasilyev all offer case studies of interest in the art of guerrilla/insurgent warfare. By some accounts, over half a million French soldiers died in this catastrophe, much of the losses due to the harassment of the insurgent bands.

The power to embarrass the regular forces or to cause the local population to lose faith in our ability to help them is also an important aspect Asprey highlights. Describing the 19th Century fight of the British in Burma, he says that insurgents attack loyal locals who, "…having cause to recognize that we were too far off to protect them, lose confidence in our power and throw in their lot with the insurgents…In a country itself one vast military obstacle, the seizure of the leaders of the rebellion, though of paramount importance, thus becomes a source of great difficulty." Here, not much has changed.

One final case study, to highlight the importance of politics in insurgencies, is this case — General Hubert Lyautey in Indochina in the late 19th Century. The general was known as one who took an interest in the social welfare of those with whom he came in contact—the population of Indochina. He understood, "In every country there are existing frameworks. The great mistake for Europeans coming there as a conqueror is to destroy these frameworks." He battled the complicity of the population with insurgents by applying "…social, economic, and political measures designed to elicit equal if not greater support…" for the troops of Lyautey as for the insurgents. The careful reader notes that, like the modern foreign area officer, no mention of a marital solution appeared in the solution the general offered. Like Mao, Lyautey also relied heavily on information, on the correct behavior of his men, on his personal charisma and example, and in the care he took cementing relationships with tribal authorities. Lyautey summarizes his approach eloquently—"The rational method—the only one, the proper one, and also the one for which I was chosen rather than anyone else—is the constant interplay of force with politics." This remains good guidance to the foreign area officer as both advisor and warrior.

CASEBOOK OF INSURGENCY AND REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE

THE CASEBOOK OF INSURGENCY AND REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE remains a comparative studies classic. Although published in 1962—limiting the case studies to those occurring prior to that year and also limiting the case studies to those occurring in the 20th Century—many of the most vital insurgencies of the 20th Century are included: Vietnam, Malaya, Guatemala, Cuba, Algeria, Iraq and Iran, China, Spain, and Czechoslovakia, among the more familiar of these.

The authors recognized the need to extend the understanding of the processes of violent social change—including the already-established linkage between martial and political-diplomatic elements of insurgencies—and use that as a central focus of the volume. In this manner, they "…extend our knowledge of how revolutions are born, grow, succeed, or fail." Designed as an unclassified, open source only "reader" on insurgencies, it remains one of the best initial references for the study of the twenty-three case studies it includes.

As previously stated, the comparison across varied insurgencies is a complex, difficult task. The authors sought to ease this burden by application



of a standard format across all the case studies. This systematic ordering allows for ease of comparison and contrast among and between the studies. First, the case studies are grouped into seven geographic Sections—allowing for ease of regional comparison and contrast. Seeking to describe the complex political, military, cultural, social, and economic features of each case study makes perfect sense and is of immediate value-added to the foreign area officer reader of the studies.

Each case then develops in four standard parts: Major Historical Events, leading up to the insurgency; Environment of the Revolution, which includes geography; Form and Characteristics, delving into actors, forces, and goals; and Effects of the insurgency, both near- and long-term. Within each of these four major sections are four-five common sub-headings. These are designed to both ensure as complete an understanding of the case as possible and also to answer common operational questions which the professional reader needs—both for near-term study and perhaps for long-term application as an advisor or warfighter.

THE CASEBOOK OF INSURGENCY AND REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE ends with a list of recommended reading, its final contribution to the serious foreign area officer student of insurgency.

LOW-INTENSITY OPERATIONS: SUBVERSION, INSURGENCY, & PEACEKEEPING

Frank Kitson was a Oxford-trained warrior with extensive experience in insurgent warfare, particularly in Africa against the Mau Mau. His thoughtful studies of the art of counter insurgency remain of value today. One of the most highly recommended of Kitson's texts is ***LOW-INTENSITY OPERATIONS: SUBVERSION, INSURGENCY, & PEACEKEEPING***. While its general lessons are applicable to any officer studying insurgency, Kitson's view on the development of a specially trained cadre of country specialists is of further interest to the foreign area officer reader.

Even in the 1971 edition, Kitson saw the world as a place where insurgent warfare represented the wars of the future. Insurgency "…is the kind of war that fits the conditions of the modern age, while being at the same time well-suited to take advantage of social discontent, racial ferment, and nationalist fervours." This continues to ring true in 2008.

Like most of the authors represented herein, Kitson saw force as only a part of the equation of subversion and insurgency. He said, "Force, if it is used at all, is used to reinforce other forms of persuasion, whereas in more orthodox forms of war, persuasion in various forms is used to back up force." He sees force as secondary—unstated is its role in the support of the politics of the insurgency, as Mao and Lawrence

both highlight. He then clearly defines the two primary roles of the insurgent—roles the reader must understand in order to counter. "The really important point is that the leaders of a subversive movement have two separate but closely related jobs to do; they must gain the support of a portion of the population, and they must impose their will on the government either by military defeat or by unendurable harassment."

Kitson is among the authors who address terrorism as a part of insurgency. The insurgent tasks are clear. "Tasks may also include acts of sabotage and terrorism designed to ensure that the government deploys disproportionately large bodies of its own forces on protection duties and searches, and carefully calculated acts of revolting brutality designed to bring excessive government retaliation on the population thereby turning them against the government." Kitson saw this work in Africa, and he was as equally familiar with the terror imposed by the Irish Republican Army and its carefully calculated use of terror which often caused the provocation to over-react [by the British Army] they sought.

One of the key aspects of Kitson's view is the over-arching importance of information when fighting an insurgency. He saw it as "paramount." He continues, "The main problem of fighting insurgents lies in finding them, and it could be said that the process of developing information… constitutes the basic tactical function of counter insurgency operations." (A parallel view dealing with the Indian Wars of 1886 in the U.S. cautions the commander, "…be careful when operating independently with limited force and with inadequate knowledge of enemy and terrain."—a caution, along with dividing force, that Custer probably should have read.) He then describes what the author sees as a common foreign area officer trait—a curiosity, and an ability to think outside of the doctrinal box. "The [Intel} process is a sort of game based on intense mental activity allied to a determination to find things out and an ability to regard everything on its own merits without regard to customs, doctrine, or drill." That is a partial description of every good foreign area officer. Interestingly, Kitson describes the development of a foreign area officer corps in some detail.

Kitson saw quite clearly the need for area specialists. He says that the army owes it to the nation to provide properly trained and experienced officers "…capable of advising the government and its various agencies at every level on how best to conduct the campaign." To do this the individual must "…submerge themselves in the atmosphere of the country." Then, he even more explicitly states, "Each officer or group of officers could specialize in a particular area of the world…specialization should involve visits and some…of the languages of the area as well as a thorough study of the area's problems." Kitson, among the selected authors, is the one who most specifically calls for foreign area officer preparation—as counter insurgency advisors, in this limited case—and by that measure alone this selection merits a careful reading.

SMALL WARS MANUAL

Over a half century old, this landmark work continues to inform what we know about and how we practice or observe insurgencies. In the early part of the 20th Century, the Marines were our "force projection" platform of choice. Their several small wars lessons learned were captured over time. The Marine Corps Schools' Major S.M. Harrington first did a systematic study in 1921. Major C.J. Miller added to this with a study of the Dominican republic campaign in 1923. Later, several different campaigns of the time were serialized in the Marine Corps Gazette. Finally, a consolidated, overarching version appeared in 1940, the United States Marine Corps ***SMALL WARS MANUAL.***

Much of the Manual is a tactics guide. However, its introductory chapter and its chapters on handling the government and the population are central to the theme of the present article—a primer on insurgency.

The Introduction begins with one of the most cogent definitions applicable to insurgencies—"Small wars are operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our nation." Uncovering this simple definition is [alone] worth the investment in opening the Manual.



The legal aspects of small wars are highlighted. While much of the Manual's focus, given its heritage and timing was more applicable to the Monroe Doctrine, its lessons apply generally. First, use of force is illegal against other states—except where the "right of self-preservation" applies. That rule was invoked in the present Global War on Terror, particularly in the case of Iraq.

The basis of a strategy for small wars is explored in depth. Right off the bat, the Manual establishes the link between force and political strategy. In this strategy, both a military and a political strategy are executed simultaneously. Then the strategy must take into account the adversary—and whether that adversary follows the rule of law—and the civilian population. It also falls to small wars to take into account the terrain in which these operations occur, as their impact is different than those of a regular force.

What the Marine Corps identifies as "Psychology" in Section III is rather closely aligned with those elements of interest to the Foreign Area Officer. This includes; political considerations, social considerations, religious considerations, and the historical environment and its history—and respect for them all. Finally, the Section deals with how to interact with local populations for greatest success when facing an insurgency.

Later chapters and sections deal with the armed insurgent, and either disarming him or rendering him ineffective. Key in the set of actions one must take is the re-establishment of local authority and the formation of a constabulary (the same approach we are taking at present in Iraq). That set of efforts then bridge normally into the development of a strong local government; it is the development of a strong local government versus a strong national government that currently plagues our counterinsurgency efforts in the GWOT. The USMC ***SMALL WARS MANUAL*** merits study, although more selective reading is required, unless one reads it in preparation to be an on-ground commander.

The USMC Small Wars Manual should not be confused with a similarly named predecessor, the equally influential ***SMALL WARS—THEIR PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES***, written in 1896 by Charles Callwell. As an aside, Callwell's work is worth a brief mention. Callwell said that "Small wars are a heritage of extended empire"; while the U.S. may not be imperialistic in our view, one might recognize why those insurgents engaging our forces might not have the same point of view. Callwell called upon the complicated organism

which is the modern, regular army to adapt to the realities that small wars represent, that these conflicts must be approached "on a method totally different from the stereotyped system."

He says that "good intelligence exploited by mobility" are essential elements in countering an insurgency, and this axiom remains true today. While urging the development of self-reliant officers (a requisite FAO trait), he states that the guerrilla war is the one the regular army "… always has to dread [because]…an effective campaign becomes well-nigh impossible. " His



most vital lesson is deeply buried in the text—the importance of "national commitment" to fighting a small war over the long-haul—certainly a lesson that is applicable today in our present campaign in Iraq. The lessons the Marines and Callwell teach are vital to today's warrior, none more so than the trusted political-military advisor who is the foreign area specialist.

Having established both an historical context in the second section of this paper and current doctrine in the initial section, this overview closes with some thoughts on applicability to the foreign area officer warrior diplomat.

Insurgency and the 21st Century Foreign Area Officer—Conclusions

The several facets of insurgency—political, economic, diplomatic, and martial—demand that the foreign area officer be fluent in this form of warfare in order to complete all FAO roles. Not only is Sam Griffith's translation of Mao's work of value in itself as a revelation of Mao's thought, but also his Introduction to the 1941 work is of value as it illuminates both the value of understanding guerrilla warfare (as a sub-set of insurgency) and of the careful preparation of those officers charged with both the understanding and conduct or mitigation of such campaigns. In a brief caution, Griffith states, "We go to considerable trouble to keep soldiers out of politics, and even more to keep politics out of soldiers. Guerrillas do exactly the opposite." He understands, as Mao understood, that politics and guerrilla warfare are inseparable. Like Mao and

Common Insurgency Threads
Political versus Military Goals—Political Primacy Military = A Means To an End
Protracted War
The People
Commonality of Goals—People & Insurgents Disparate Approach—Insurgents & Government
Insurgent Cohesiveness— Ethnic, Religious, Linguistic
Intelligence/Info—Critical for both factions
Time, Space, & Will—the Insurgent Advantage
Dynamism, Speed, Rapidity of Focus Shifts
Disadvantages of the "Home Team"— Holding Terrain, Economy, World Opinion
Judicious Use of the Attack Means of Terrorism
Torture—Double-edged sword for either side
Loss of Memory (Political & Martial)— Insurgency Lessons Learned (And Lost)
Insurgent Use of the Ancient Rules of Warfare
Global Interest—To Include the Media

his fish in the sea, Griffith says, "the principal concern of all guerrilla leaders [in our case, read "insurgent leaders"] [is] to get the water to the right temperature and to keep it there…" a clear message to running or defeating an insurgency. A soldier's understanding of the political element is crucial, and especially so in the foreign area officer.

Griffith also places the value of understanding insurgencies in perspective for the military man. "A revolutionary war is never confined within the bounds of military action. Because its purpose is to destroy the existing society and its institutions and to replace them with a completely new state structure, any revolutionary war is a unity of which the constituent parts, in varying importance, are military, political, economic, social, and psychological." He has precisely described the modern foreign area officer and at the same time highlighted the importance of the study of insurgencies.

The careful military student of insurgency, particularly in our era, should strive to understand the mindset of the adversary. The following caution from Asprey has never been more relevant, if perhaps a bit inflammatory, "To define (and condemn) terror from a peculiar social, economic, political, and emotional plane is to display a self-righteous attitude that, totally unrealistic, is doomed to be disappointed by the harsh facts." The modern foreign area officer is particularly well-prepared and mentally suited to adhere to this caution, and to pass that caution professionally to a wide range of governmental agencies and one's commanders.

Larry Kahaner's short commentary on both Callwell and the Marine's Small War manuals captures the essence of the present paper—what we need are "…more soldiers with language skills, armed with durable rifles, who understand history, foreign culture, religion local customs and guerilla warfare." That forms the heart of this paper's summary of the importance of the foreign are officer and his understanding of insurgency.

The common threads of these several works apply to the in-depth preparation of the foreign area officer, with several "FAO threads" of our own:

- Regional Immersion;
- Linguistic Capability;
- Importance of Intelligence;
- Understanding of social, cultural, historical, political, diplomatic, and military underpinnings of a country or region;
- Necessity of being First a Warfighter, Second a FAO; and,
- Thorough understanding of the nature of 21st Century warfare—as represented by insurgency and counterinsurgency.
- The FAO need only remember these essential elements at all stages of development and execution to be the best pol-mil advisor our assignment demands.

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The Other End of the Red Sea, Or Has Anyone Considered a Base in Puntland?

By LTC Robert K. Holzhauer, USA, 48G

It is well known that the Suez Canal, located at the northern end of the Red Sea, is a strategic chokepoint to the Red Sea, a waterway vital to the world's economic prosperity. Our failure to consider the *southern* end of the Red Sea, particularly the Strait of Bab al Mandab, located between the Horn of Africa and Yemen, could prove disastrous for worldwide shipping. Not only is the strait constantly under threat by smugglers, pirates, and unstable governments (primarily Somalia), the Arabian Peninsula itself is also a target for members of extremist groups that wish to infiltrate by sea. As such, both CENTCOM and AFRICOM have a stake in securing this strategic waterway.

Human Trafficking & Piracy

Somalia accounts for the bulk of refugees crossing this strategic waterway. Most refuges are bound for Yemen, a country ill prepared to deal with the influx, which amounts to as many as 300 refugees a day. Without the assistance of the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), many of the refugees would suffer needlessly upon their arrival to Yemen. Upon learning that the smugglers were throwing their human cargo overboard during maritime intercepts, Yemen's government changed its policy for intercepting human smugglers. Yemeni police now track the vessels to shore, intercept the refugees as they disembark, and take them to UNHCR camps. The vessel is then seized while still in Yemeni waters.

Piracy has increased insurance rates substantially for international shipping in the region and, as a consequence, forced much of the traffic north, away from the Somali coast, into Yemeni waters. Unfortunately, Yemen's navy is all but inoperable and will require years to achieve a sustained operating capability. As a stop-gap measure, the Yemeni Coast Guard (YCG), run by the Ministry of Interior and trained by numerous security cooperation partners, patrols Yemen's coastline and has made substantial progress in the fight against smuggling. Ironically, its small fleet and budget are being used to much greater effect than those of Yemen's navy.

Proposals for Increasing Regional Security

Besides additional security assistance, or a wished-for donation of blue water-capable hulls, there are other ways to help the Yemeni government, particularly the YCG, secure its maritime borders. Yemen needs to link its existing services, along with their sensors and shooters, ef-

fectively through an organized and decisive maritime operations center. Yemen must link its planned coastal surveillance assets to provide a comprehensive picture of maritime activity. Moreover, Yemen desperately needs to create a comprehensive command control and communications network to secure all of its borders, not just the maritime border. At present, many outposts, both coastal and inland, are limited to hard-wire communications or experience spotty cellular coverage.

Somalia's trafficking of peoples and acts of piracy must also be isolated. Somalia's failed transitional federal government and endless civil strife call for innovation to break the status quo. A diplomatic approach might entail the immediate recognition of Puntland and Somaliland as separate, sovereign nations. Puntland is certainly the more viable candidate. Recognizing both has the potential of decisively limiting the coastline available to certain tribes and factions in Somali society that engage in maritime criminal activity and threaten the security of the Bab al Mandab. By recognizing Puntland, and then either through aid or presence, we can create an opportunity to establish a continuing maritime capability that would further pressure maritime criminals. Yemen already negotiates with Puntland for fishing rights and could easily form a maritime policing partnership with Puntland. (I am not the first U.S. official to suggest recognizing Puntland, nor will I be the last.)

Summary

The benefits of securing the Bab al Mandab are numerous: International shipping insurance rates would decline, extremists would be denied freedom of movement, and Yemen's shipping industry could rebound, giving the country a much-needed diversification from an oil economy that is rapidly approaching its twilight.

A secondary benefit of Yemen securing the waterway and its coastline is the reduction in regional smuggling, from which Saudi Arabia would also benefit. A reduction in the smuggling of contraband into Saudi Arabia from Yemen could only serve to improve relations between the two countries and invigorate border security cooperation between them.

Finally, a maritime operation with force projection capability based in Puntland would allow the coalition the ability to ensure safe shipping through the length of the Red Sea in the event of a regional crisis, such as the resumption of hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea or an unfriendly Sudanese government choosing to interdict shipping for its own reasons. A combined joint task force established between the two regional commands would certainly be capable of this function.

ARMY NOTES

COL John Blumenson, Chief, Strategic Leadership Division

The Army's Foreign Area Proponent Office has seen a number of personnel changes beginning with the retirement of COL Steve Beal. As many of you know Steve has lead the Division since September 2005 and has spearheaded numerous initiatives that have propelled the Army's FAO Program to new heights. During Steve's tenure demand for FAOs reached new heights with an increase of over 100 positions. His experience and knowledge will be missed by the Army and the FAO community. Best wishes to Steve and his family in all of their future endeavors.

As summer approaches we'll be seeing other division members departing: COL Al Brooks (48B) will be heading off to SOUTHCOM as the Deputy J-5; LTC Jeff Maxcy (48D/F/H/I) will be retiring and relocating to the Ft. Leavenworth, KS area to continue contributing to the fight, and LTC Ro Jackson (48G/J) is off to assume duties as the ARMA in Angola.

During this time of transition between the old guard and the new team the train isn't slowing down. Many initiatives such as the international military affairs (IMA) divisions at the Army Service Component Commands, the FAO path to General Officer and the development of FAO programs in our sister services continue. The one continuous beat I hear in all our initiatives and Department of Defense actions is the Army FAO Program remains the bell weather program for DoD. FAO Proponent is not resting on its status as the premier program, we still face challenges in meeting all of our requirements with limited personnel resources.

We continue to enhance our capability to get information to the field. Our website is the premier location for you to get current information on not just the FAO community but our Army. You can access our AKO site through our internet portal at www.fao.army.mil. LTC Jon Edwards (48C/E) remains our point of contact for the site.

Finally, let me take a few lines to introduce myself. Some of you may know me as the Assistant Division Chief where I have served as a drilling Army Reservist since June of 2005. With Steve Beal's departure and a gap of some months until the arrival of his successor, COL Michael Curci, I'm able to step in on an active duty tour and serve as the Division Chief. As I look back on my entry into the FAO Program during the dark days of the early 1990s, words cannot describe my feelings of elation to serve in the center of the FAO universe in a time that is one hundred and eighty degrees out from those dark days when the program was slashed and burned.

I look forward to getting to know as many of you as possible during the next six months and beyond.

USMC FAO Notes

LrCol Chris Sill, International Affairs Officer
Program Coordinator

The Marine Corps FAO program is currently undergoing an expansion to meet an increased demand for cultural and linguistic expertise across the board in general and at the operational and higher headquarters level in particular. In 2007, FAO accessions jumped from a traditional norm of ten officers per year to twenty-eight, a figure that is projected to be matched in 2008 before leveling off at a steady state of 20 officers per year in the long term. The first of those selected have begun to enter the training pipeline in Monterey and will complete their training in FY-11.

In December, the Commandant signed off a new operational employment concept, called 'The Long War', which provides a strategic direction for the Marine Corps that includes an increased emphasis on Security Cooperation and partner building capacity. As natural enablers for Security Cooperation activities, the Marine Corps FAO proponent foresees an increased role for FAOs at the Marine Component Commands, advising MARFOR commanders and guiding the employment of Security Cooperation Marine Air/Ground Task Forces as they deploy forward on SC missions. This, along with the traditional FAO role as attaches and Security Assistance Officers will ensure Marine FAOs are out in front engaging allies and partners while enabling the operating forces in their SC role.

Finally, as the Marine Corps continues to leverage the operational relevance of FAO skills, the FAO proponent is working with the Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF) to establish skill sustainment programs that will help ensure Marine FAOs serving in their Primary MOS keep their FAO skills sharp and ready to employ on a moment's notice. If successful, a proof-of-concept currently under development with III MEF in Okinawa, will be expanded to support FAOs serving in their PMOS in the remaining MEFs.

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