A PIVOT OF WILL

DO
MIL-TO-MIL EXCHANGES WITH CHINA DESTABILIZE THE REGION?

DOES
CHINA HAVE AN AFRICA PROBLEM?

IN PRAISE OF TAIWAN’S ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

22 | TOWARD A ‘NORMAL’ JAPAN
5 | THE CASE AGAINST ARMING VIETNAM AND THE PHILIPPINES
12 | OPERATIONALIZING PROACTIVE US-JAPAN CONTRIBUTIONS TO PEACE
18 | U.S. RESPONSE TO CHINESE CLAIMS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
34 | HOW TO GROW ASIA-PACIFIC LANGUAGE AND CULTURAL EXPERTISE
43 | THE KOREAN PENINSULA FROM A PLA PERSPECTIVE
74 | LOOKING TO PRE-WORLD WAR II JAPAN TO ASSESS U.S. POLICY WITH CHINA
SUBSCRIPTIONS & MEMBERSHIPS
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ISSN 1551-8094

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COVER IMAGE
President Xi Jinping at press conference.

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5 | To Arm or not to Arm: The Case Against Arming Vietnam and the Philippines by Colonel (selectee) David W. Dengler, U.S. Air Force

12 | Operationalizing Proactive US-Japan Contributions to Peace by Captain Brent Sadler, U.S. Navy

16 | Does China Have a Looming Africa Problem? by Porter Morgan and Jason Nicholson


22 | Toward a ‘Normal’ Japan by Major William C. Atkins, U.S. Air Force


31 | Taiwan’s All-Volunteer Force Recruitment, Retention, and Identity by Captain Jason P. Lam, U.S. Army

34 | How to Grow Asia-Pacific Language and Cultural Expertise by Major Ravi Balaram, U.S. Army; Major Shane Hughes, U.S. Air Force; and Major Ron Garberson, U.S. Army

40 | Against the Tide Explaining Slow Globalization in the Middle East/North Africa Region by Major Chris Townsend, U.S. Army

43 | The Korean Peninsula from a PLA Perspective by Captain (P) Jason Lam, U.S. Army

50 | Towards Understanding Post-Colonialism, Strategic Culture, and Sub-Saharan Africa by Major Michael J. Oginsky, U.S. Marine Corps

60 | Through the Eyes of Putin by Major Walter “Rick” F. Landgraf III, U.S. Army

64 | FINDING A NATIONAL APPROACH TO COMBAT THE TERROR/CRIME NEXUS by Lieutenant Colonel Phillip M. Zeman, U.S. Marine Corps

67 | AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE LOGISTICS by Captain Randall W. Peck, U.S. Navy; Colonel Edward D. Maddox, U.S. Army; Lieutenant Colonel Michael S. Mismash, U.S. Army

74 | Road to War? Looking to Pre-World War II Japan to Assess U.S. Policy with China by Lieutenant Colonel Callistus Elbourne, U.S. Air Force; Major Matthew Jamison, U.S. Army, and Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Miller, U.S. Marine Corps

79 | Turkey & Egypt: The Military’s Role & Moderation of Political Islam by Major Andrew Zapf, U.S. Army

NEWS FROM THE FIELD


56 | Coup Attempt in Turkey, A FAO Reports by Major Jeff Jager, U.S. Army

84 | 2016 FAOA Academic Research and Writing Awards Program

88 | Notes from the FAO Foundry by Mark B. Chakwin, Colonel U.S. Army (retired)

BOOK REVIEWS

48 | Jihad and the West: Black Flag Over Babylon; Author: Dr. Mark Silinsky; Reviewed by Colonel Vincent Aleazar, U.S. Air Force, retired;

72 | Flash Points: The Emerging Crisis in Europe; Author: George Friedman; Reviewed by Commander Frank Okata, U.S. Navy

73 | Inventing the Way of the Samurai: Nationalism, Internationalism, and Bushido in Modern Japan, Author: Oleg Benesch; Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Jason “Brad” Nicholson, U.S. Army
U.S. missile strikes in Syria and the dropping of the Mother of all Bombs in eastern Afghanistan, have established a new precedent in American foreign policy. Perhaps it should not come as a surprise during this season of shifting political tides, but these military actions have resulted in a drastic pivot of the public interest away from the Middle East and towards North Korea.

Putting more money behind U.S. pivot to Asia intentions of the last several years, National Security Adviser Gen. H.R. McMaster has assured that the U.S. will pay for the $1 billion THAAD missile defense system in South Korea. The system is now operational in the country despite Chinese attempts to hack the system and demand its removal.1

The questions that now gain more media attention are, what would Kim Jong-un do with a long range nuclear capability? What will the U.S., South Korea, and China do in anticipation of that risk? How will all of this affect China’s imperialism in the South China Sea? At this point in time China has reclaimed 3000 acres, deployed advanced fighter aircraft and surface to air missiles, and installed a new RADAR system on Cuarteron Reef, changing the operational landscape of the South China Sea (p. 13). As one of our authors argues, China may actually be working against its own long-term gains (p. 16).

What would happen if the North Korean government collapsed?2 These questions have been bandied about by Asia analysts and foreign policy SMEs for quite some time, and yet just now they are reentering the public consciousness in a significant way.

It is therefore timely that we have amassed a larger than usual volume of papers and essays focused on these regions. This is a double issue that serves as both the Winter 2016 and Spring 2017 editions for the FAOA Journal. Normally the journal runs between 45 and 60 pages. This one weighs in at 92, and with a few exceptions, much of the focus is on Asia.

While many of the papers were written over the past two years, taken together at this point in time they provide excellent context for current events. We hope you will find them thought provoking and helpful. Feel free to leave comments in our LinkedIn discussion thread or submit letters to response to editor@faoa.org.

While there are many political appointments currently still vacant, we hope that FAOs will be able to fill some of the roles that carry the weight of addressing these critical questions. (As you hear of FAOs or FAOA members being selected to relevant positions, please let us know at editor@faoa.org).

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for South and Southeast Asia position will be filled by Retired Colonel and FAO Joe Felter, who now works at Stanford’s Hoover Institute. Felter led the International Security and Assistance Force, Counterinsurgency Advisory and Assistance Team, in Afghanistan, reporting directly to Generals Stanley McChrystal and and David Petraeus and advising them on counterinsurgency strategy.3

I want to thank the Editorial Board and Chairman John Haseman for their due diligence in peer reviewing for this edition, and of course all of the authors for submitting such excellent material. Now that we have completed such a large edition, it is time to refill the queue, so please do write. We are a community of communicators, and there is no better place to practice your craft than here among peers.

Sincerely,

Graham Plaster
Editor in Chief, FAO Association Journal
Follow on Twitter @FAOAssociation

Fellow Foreign Affairs Professionals at Home and Abroad,

2 www.amazon.com/Preparing-Possibility-North-Korean-Collapse/dp/0833081721
The U.S.-China relationship arguably presents America’s greatest foreign policy challenge in the 21st Century. Enormous uncertainty exists about each nation’s intentions; will the United States seek to contain China, or will China use its growing military capability to establish regional hegemony? In this light, the South China Sea serves as a possible flashpoint where overlapping claims to rock outcrops and resource rich waters by seven countries -- China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Taiwan, and Brunei -- create the key ingredients for a regional conflict with major geopolitical consequences. While the small atolls have little intrinsic value, the region possesses symbolic and strategic value as the key to maritime trade, natural resources, and security. The United States proclaims a neutral stance, but it does have interests at stake along with a key regional ally, the Philippines. Every year, dozens of incidents at sea occur between Chinese vessels and those of the United States or regional countries. This heightens tensions and raises the risk that a minor incident escalates into hostilities.

The United States has pursued several policy options to resolve these disputes peacefully: dialogue, bilateral and multi-lateral engagements, stronger economic ties, and building the capacity of regional militaries among others. Of late, the lack of a diplomatic resolution and the growing perception of Chinese assertiveness have encouraged the Obama administration and regional analysts to consider stronger efforts to equip partners with defense articles. In fact, the United States relaxed elements of the non-lethal embargo on Vietnam in 2007, and further reduced lethal arms restrictions in October 2014 to permit sales to Vietnam.

However, to date the public debate within the foreign policy community on this subject lacks sufficient intellectual depth of analysis. Experts suggesting the United States should arm regional partners often provide it as “recommendation” without analyzing the benefits, consequences, or risks of such a decision. Presumably they tie such statements to deterrence—the idea
that strong partners will thwart Chinese aggression by raising the costs of war, and potentially enable negotiations to settle the disputes. Will China see the threat and remain deterred, or will it respond in kind? Could American attempts to stabilize the situation by balancing regional actors against China only fuel mistrust and trigger a full arms race leading to greater instability?

On the 100th anniversary of WWI, the South China Sea offers an inviting area for comparison to the causes of that war. A complex interplay of factors led to WWI: alliances, perceptions of power, arms races, fear of being out-mobilized, nationalism, and national pride among others. Although not all of these elements exist in this region today, some parallels certainly exist: American and Chinese power balancing efforts, the degree of fervor and prestige involved, and potential flashpoints. Hostilities are not a given, but they could happen if actors fail to take deliberate steps concerning their actions and intentions. If not, tactical level misunderstandings could escalate -- the 21 Century equivalent of Archduke Franz Ferdinand’s assassination.

The South China Sea represents just one area that has strained U.S.-Sino relations; getting this relationship right may prevent an armed conflict that will harm both nations. Efforts to develop a permanent solution in this region may build cooperation and trust, and offer solutions to resolve other strategic issues with China. In order to initiate the first step to find off ramps before escalation begins, America should reconsider the value of equipping Vietnam and the Philippines with lethal arms. As subsequent analysis will show, the deterrent value gained will be modest, while the disadvantages --negative perceptions that will result in China, and the incongruence with the strategic environment -- will further complicate efforts to resolve these territorial disputes peacefully, and increase the risk of a security dilemma between all parties. Therefore, the United States should exercise strategic restraint and not provide lethal arms to Vietnam and the Philippines in exchange for active Chinese participation in a diplomatic process to resolve the territorial disputes within five years.

**Strategic Context**

**Interests**

To grasp the unfolding South China Sea events, one must understand the sources of tension including the claims and interests of the nations involved, and the maritime incidents that have occurred in recent decades. This sea covers 3.5 million square kilometers, an area roughly one third of the continental United States. A large number of uninhabited small islands, rocks, and shoals lie within those waters, but as an example, the Spratly Islands cover less than three square miles (See Figure 1). Within this region, China claims “indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof.” In many cases, Chinese claims extend into the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of other states, often hundreds of miles closer to these states than to China. China also seeks to restrict access by foreign military vessels in these waters in violation of international law. The major territorial claims include:

1. Paracel Islands: occupied by China since 1974, but disputed by Vietnam
2. Scarborough Shoal: disputed by China, Taiwan, and the Philippines
3. Spratly Islands: disputed by all parties except Indonesia; of the 30,000 features, ~50 are occupied -- China: 6; Vietnam: 29; Malaysia: 5; Philippines: 9 Taiwan: 1; Brunei: claims EEZ only

These overlapping claims of sovereignty, often times within other nations’ EEZs, cause the greatest source of tension. China, Vietnam, and the Philippines have stoked intense nationalism to raise public awareness and build support for actions to enforce their claims. In many cases, these passions take the form of protests and calls for tough stances that put pressure on political leaders not to compromise. As the only geographically separated state, the United States lacks claims to the South China Sea, and maintains neutrality in the disputes, even concerning the Philippines’ claims.

Beyond sovereignty, all four nations maintain multiple interests in the region, from sea lines of communication and natural resources to maritime security. China’s leaders need a strong economy and high employment to ensure internal stability and to preserve the one party political system. The maritime domain underpins China’s economy by providing access to raw materials, and a path to foreign markets for finished products. An estimated “$5.3 trillion dollars of waterborne trade (half of the global total by gross tonnage and one-third by monetary value)” travels through the South China Sea every year with roughly “$1.2 trillion belonging to the United States.” Similarly, “In 2011, 15.2 million [barrels] of oil per day transited the Malacca Straits, just 10 percent less than the Strait of Hormuz.” In 2013,
China, Vietnam, and the Philippines imported approximately 5.7 million, 60,000, and 300,000 barrels of oil per day respectively. Clearly, the South China Sea represents a major thoroughfare, and China’s share certainly overshadows its rivals. This region’s significance will only grow in the future given oil’s importance. By 2035, Asia will consume an estimated 90 percent of the energy produced by the Middle East and North Africa; presumably, China will dominate this demand.

The region is also a source of resources, both energy and fish. Estimates vary greatly based on the source, but the region may hold as little as 11 billion, or as much as 125 billion barrels of oil, a so-called “second Persian Gulf.” China is also the world’s largest consumer and exporter of fish, and nearly 70 percent of Southeast Asia’s 593 million people reside near the coast and eat fish from these waters. Experts assess these waters account for one tenth of the global fishing catch, although over-fishing has stressed those stocks to near collapse.

Finally, the regions’ nations view the South China Sea as critical to their security. Whereas the Philippines and Vietnam currently view the waters in terms of basic maritime and coastal security against non-state and regional threats, China’s great-power stature leads it to view the neighboring seas as critical to its national security against a range of regional and global threats. This stems from centuries of history, but particularly the last 175 years. Within that period, China faced economic exploitation from European and Japanese powers—what Chinese term the “Century of Humiliation.”

Since then, China witnessed America’s ability to strangulate resource-dependent Japan during WWII, the decisive U.S.-led coalition victory over Iraq in 1991, and the United States’ use of two aircraft carriers to deter Chinese coercion of Taiwan in 1996. Finally, the United States maintains eight military bases and three alliances within the first and second island chains. Thus, Chinese leaders pursued a Mahanian approach in the mid-1990s to modernize its navy and secure the maritime near abroad to gain access to the open ocean and to provide maritime defense in depth rather than defend itself at the shoreline. Those decisions 20 years ago gained added support when the United States made the “Pacific Pivot” in 2011 -- a policy China naturally linked to containment.

From China’s perspective, influence over the South China Seas provides the added benefit of securing the sea lanes needed to access resources and markets. In fact, Robert Kaplan argues China needs the South China Sea to exert influence into the Indian Ocean, and to the first and second island chains. Indications suggest China wants access to overseas ports -- sometimes referred to as the “string of pearls” -- to facilitate its security in the Indian Ocean. In light of China’s fixation on maintaining a strong economy, the desire to strengthen its influence over the sea lanes makes sense. This situation is no different from America’s own desire to protect sea lanes to its key resources and markets, the Persian Gulf being one. The obvious difference becomes whether China pursues simple influence or control.

United States’ interests center on two themes: international order and freedom of navigation. Conflict prevention remains a centerpiece of American foreign policy to preserve the international order, avoid human suffering and financial disruptions, and prevent escalation. The United States fears that if China successfully uses force in the South China Sea, it may similarly act against Taiwan or the East China Sea. Moreover, if a just peace fails to emerge, the likelihood of a follow-on conflict grows. Next, freedom of navigation serves as a key element of global free trade and the overall American economy, especially given the volume and value of trade in these waters. China’s desire to restrict military vessels from its EEZs conflicts with the majority of world interpretations. According to one expert, “The PRC has more aggressively and consistently enforced such restrictions in its claims than any other state.”

Strategies
China has employed a variety of instruments of power -- diplomacy, information, economic, and military -- to protect its interests, to assert its sovereignty claims, and to deter other states. Moreover, the military serves as just one component as illustrated in China’s Three Warfares Concept. Disintegration Warfare uses “politics, economy, culture, military threats, conspiracy, media propaganda, law, information and intelligence.”

Next, Unrestricted Warfare defined as “using all means, including armed force or non-armed force, military and non-military, and lethal and non-lethal means to compel the enemy to accept one’s interests.” Finally, Intelligence Warfare seeks to gain insight on adversary capabilities and intentions. Collectively, this strategic framework provides China a multi-faceted approach to achieve its ends.

Diplomatically and politically, China has largely avoided multilateral efforts to resolve this dispute. In fact, China often tries to influence the agenda of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) fora to avoid discussion of the dispute. Chinese diplomats prefer bilateral meetings where China holds greater power over its neighbors; thereby avoiding nations “ganging up” on it. This divide and conquer tactic has worked well in support of Chinese efforts to elude concessions. Next, China has built outposts on atolls and created administrative jurisdictions to enforce their claims on the basis of possession. In June 2012 for example, China elevated Sansha jurisdiction on Woody Island from a county to a prefectural-level city (a regional level descriptor that includes multiple counties) to give it greater symbolic importance. Finally, diplomats attempt to reassure neighbors that China does not have hegemonic intentions to ally their fears and to minimize U.S. participation in the disputes. However, China’s actions often undercut that assertion leaving most states skeptical, while inducing greater U.S. involvement.

Militarily, China significantly overmatches the Philippines and Vietnam, and even the United States to a degree given its global commitments. China seeks to avoid armed conflict and minimizes its military’s direct role with a few hundred troops garrisoning the islands it holds. Coast Guard and fishing vessels provide China’s primary day-to-day enforcement capability. These often-termed paramilitary forces provide a government-sanctioned element (white hulls) to enforce jurisdiction, yet they
remain under the threshold of naval combatants (gray hulls). However, military forces linger just over the horizon should states attempt to escalate situations or enforce control of their claims. Strategic patience underpins these levers as China gradually conditions regional states to its claims by continually establishing new norms. Experts have termed this approach everything from tailored coercion, coercive diplomacy, and “Finlandization,” to incrementalism, salami slicing, or a cabbage strategy.

As China gauges international reaction, it moderates its actions to ease tensions. New provocations will restart the previous tactics if a favorable strategic setting exists, but always staying short of armed conflict. Fortunately, “military power and naval forces have played a secondary role, as this competition over maritime rights has not yet become militarized.” The wide range of military and non-military capabilities gives China the ability to demonstrate strong resolve against its weaker neighbors and escalate as needed, which further complicates Filipino and Vietnamese responses. China prefers to use law enforcement capabilities because “their actions are more containable. Given their limited armaments, they are unlikely to escalate skirmishes into significant sea battles and will never engage in a force-on-force clash with navies.” Faced with a non-military force, an aggressive response by Vietnam or the Philippines risks a response from China’s over-the-horizon military capability, and international condemnation.

Militarily, Vietnam and the Philippines have enhanced their security capacity to deter China, although the Philippines only recently made substantive efforts to enhance their military capabilities. Both nations have also sought ties with external powers—India, South Korea, Japan, and the United States—to balance Chinese power. The Philippines and United States maintain a mutual defense treaty and recently signed an agreement establishing rotational U.S. access to Subic Bay. Similarly, Vietnam opened Cam Ranh Bay to foreign navies and pursued arms purchases from India and the United States. While militarily weaker than China, Vietnam has asserted its claims most forcefully, and has a lengthy history of armed conflict with China over various issues. Finally, both nations have deployed forces to garrison the islands they claim including 600 Vietnamese troops, and 500 Filipino Marines to demonstrate their commitment.

In 2011, the United States renewed its East Asia focus, termed the “Rebalance to Asia” or the “Pacific Pivot,” to address its interests. While the military features garnered the greatest attention, they represented only a portion of the policy. Diplomatically, the United States appointed an ambassador to ASEAN, leveraged that organization to emphasize international norms, and initiated several high profile visits. The United States reinforced diplomacy in the information domain by promoting peaceful, multi-lateral dispute resolution. To enhance economic ties, the United States started the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations with 11 other nations (including Vietnam) following the 50 percent drop (20 to 9 percent) in U.S.-ASEAN trade from 1998 to 2010. The United States omitted China—presumably to balance the region’s economic dependence on China, and the TPP’s tough stance on intellectual property protection—and excluded the Philippines due to Filipino restrictions on business ownership by foreigners.

Another key aspect is the U.S.-Filipino Mutual Defense
Treaty, but the United States stays vague about the treaty’s applicability to the maritime disputes to prevent Filipino adventurism. In April 2014, both nations renewed this alliance with an agreement that permits a rotational United States presence, and supports Filipino force modernization and training. Finally, the United States seeks to build Filipino and Vietnamese security capacity through training and arms sales. However, training and exercises lack the substance needed to deter China given the focus on search and rescue, counter-piracy, and counterterrorism, while deliberately avoiding capabilities like anti-submarine warfare or joint air and sea strike operations due to the provocative implications they may carry. Despite the renewed Pacific focus, critics find the U.S. strategy differs little from the last 20 years, while others question America’s commitment and fiscal resources.

**Analysis and Recommendations -- Why Strategic Restraint Should Dominate**

This chapter will explore why the United States should exercise strategic restraint and not arm the Philippines or Vietnam. Not arming these two partners better fits the strategic environment, provides the opportunity to foster strategic trust with China, puts the onus on China to decline an option to deescalate tensions, and exercising this restraint today would still permit future administrations to reverse the policy as required. This recommended foreign policy option is not without challenges, risks, or critics, but when leveraged as a bargaining chip, it furnishes an alternative that may decrease tensions and improve the strategic U.S.-Sino relationship on the South China Sea and other issues.

Strategic restraint better fits the strategic environment from several perspectives. First, it helps undermine the Chinese narrative that the United States wants to contain it, and as such leverages a page from Sun Tzu to target China’s strategy. The containment theme plays well to China’s domestic audience. It galvanizes support for military funding and the government’s actions in the region, and diverts attention away from domestic challenges. Selling lethal arms to Vietnam and the Philippines provides another tangible example that fuels that narrative, and thereby reinforces China’s position.

Policy makers on all sides need to leverage these opportunities to deflabe fears and change perceptions. Although analysts do not fully understand the level of impact the moderate voices have, influencers and policy makers in China with a more cautious, pragmatic perspective might see value in an arms control arrangement as part of a broader compromise. Even so, the United States would also need to adjust its approach to the problem. Currently the United States has great difficulty separating China’s territorial disputes from its rising power status; policy makers view any actions in the South China Sea as proof of expansionist designs in the region. As evidence, writers will term U.S. Navy trips through the South China Sea as Freedom of Navigation, yet they describe Chinese naval trips as patrols. Ultimately, the natural U.S. reaction to build partner capacity and establish redlines to restrain Chinese behavior only wedds U.S. policy to a strategy of deterrence that reinforces Chinese fears.

The challenge then becomes convincing passionate populations that compromise serves everyone’s interests.

Second, China’s “strategic culture” plays another key factor. Historically, China has retained a defensive, non-hegemonic posture, but this “predilection for the limited use of force should not be confused with a reluctance to use force at all… [Chinese leaders] see threats everywhere. The full extent of the siege mentality of China’s leaders is not always appreciated.” China feels surrounded by major and minor powers—many of which China has fought over territorial disputes and other interests—and increasingly a “never again” attitude has developed with regard to territorial sovereignty. Therefore, China often views external moves as threats.

But widespread perceptions of China as an aggressive, expansionist power are off base. Although China’s relative power has grown significantly in recent decades, the main tasks of Chinese foreign policy are defensive and have not changed much since the Cold War era: to blunt destabilizing influences from abroad, to avoid territorial losses, to reduce its neighbors’ suspicions, and to sustain economic growth.

Military confrontation over the South China Sea weakens China’s assertion of a peaceful rise, and would produce negative economic and international effects, and lead to more forceful regional and U.S. responses. All of these run counter to China’s long-term interests and goals, and their own principles for peaceful coexistence.

Next, the perceived benefit of arming partners may ease short-term political pressure to “do something,” but often these actions create or ignore long-term consequences that undermine broader strategic goals. To use golf parlance, this focus by the United States on the short over the long game poses significant obstacles that compound over time. American foreign policy makers naturally want to confront threats with strength—the hallmark of deterrence strategy. However, the history of arms sales over the last 50 years has demonstrated numerous examples where short-term decisions to provide lethal arms created future threats—Iran in the 1970s, and the Afghan Mujahedeen and Iraq during the 1980s. In this case, arming partners will complicate U.S.-Sino relations on strategic issues such as cyber-security, Taiwan, North Korea, Iran, and intellectual property. As one analyst noted, “Hawkish campaign talk about trade wars and strategic competition plays into Beijing’s fears while undercutting the necessary effort to agree on common interests.”

Arming regional partners ignores why China seeks greater influence over its maritime periphery. China’s overriding focus on internal stability drives an equally intense effort to maintain a strong economy, and the sea lanes provide the lifeblood of that economic system.

Following the example set by the European powers, the United States, and Japan, China is expanding its merchant and naval fleets. Likewise, “throughout history, countries that have built up a sustained great economy over decades have also built up their militaries.” Recognizing China’s right to provide sea lane security and honor its great power responsibility for securing the global commons would provide it a matter of satisfaction, and
further challenge the containment narrative.

Beyond the strategic environment, while China's military modernization may appear menacing, a number of non-military factors provide perspective on this hard power. Some weapons carry a sense of prestige that reflect the power of those states fielding them. Nuclear weapons and aircraft carriers come to the forefront as systems that require a large industrial and economic base to sustain them. Some assets are so exclusive, only those nations described as “Great Powers” can field them in any quantities. In certain respects, China's military growth reflects the nation's “coming of age” as it acquires the tangible symbols of other great powers—a strong military.

Finally, this policy offers a relatively low risk alternative for several reasons. The United States still maintains a regional presence to deter Chinese military aggression and conflict. Next, the deterrent value from Vietnam and the Philippines is modest. Even Vietnam's capabilities will remain quantitatively inferior to China given the substantial economic disparity between the two. Third, the United States retains other options for building partner capacity to include training and exercises that do not involve arms sales. Finally, if the policy fails to achieve the desired ends, any administration can reverse it.

Assuming it will compromise, China needs an “honorable out” to satisfy its public. Interestingly, a United States initiated concession might provide the impetus needed for such a solution to occur by furnishing tacit recognition of China's great power status since the United States generally only negotiates arms control agreements with peers.

While beyond this thesis' scope, China is capable of resolving territorial disputes peacefully; China has solved eleven land disputes with six of its neighbors since 1998. China also compromised in the maritime domain as well, having resolved its Gulf of Tonkin disputes with Vietnam in 2000. As M. Taylor Fravel noted, “Although China has participated in more territorial disputes than any other state since the end of World War II, it has settled the majority of these conflicts through bilateral agreements, usually by compromising over the sovereignty of contested land.” While the South China Sea holds greater strategic and emotional importance, the precedent exists nonetheless.

Admittedly, this policy recommendation does not lack critics. Chinese leaders might view such a decision as weakness and a further sign of American appeasement of China's growing strength. The 2008 financial crisis generated perceptions in Chinese political, foreign policy, and domestic circles of U.S. weakness and decline. This could encourage Chinese leaders to underestimate U.S. resolve and initiate actions to assert its influence in the region more forcefully. As one expert stated, “Refaining from these efforts for fear of antagonizing China would send the wrong signal by effectively enabling the Chinese leadership to veto U.S. action.” In fact, some experts contend the May 2014 oil rig incident marked a fundamental change in Chinese behavior from a “low profile, avoid showdowns” approach to one that is more proactive; actions akin to the 2014 Russian incursions into the Crimea. That said, as described earlier, the deterrent effectiveness of Vietnam and the Philip-

Conclusion

The issues, tensions, and history of the U.S.-Sino relationship defy easy resolution given the differing interests and the intensity of those interests on either side. Moreover, nationalism and domestic passions throughout the region will complicate any resolution. Fundamentally, the United States must seek options that deflate fears, an underlying historical cause of conflict, and this thesis presents one possible policy option. While the regional actors other than China lack large militaries, the intensity of interests involved makes conflict a real possibility. American interests and relationships in the South China Sea may yet drag the United States into a conflict as nations seek U.S. assistance and reassurance in balancing China’s growing power. If the United States demurs, China may act aggressively based on a perception of American weakness, while if the United States assists partners in deterring China, such actions may “confirm” Chinese fears of containment. This situation resembles the classic Sparta and Athens dilemma, where status quo and revisionist powers respectively, could not resolve their differing interests. The resulting three decades long armed conflict resulted in their mutual destruction.

The United States tends to view Chinese actions in the region as nefarious, while failing to appreciate its history and economic motivations. The United States must avoid creating an anti-China atmosphere domestically or in the region that inflames the fears and rhetoric. As alternatives, arms races and armed conflict generally do not produce positive results. In fact, they more often “disturb or even exacerbate regional or bilateral military balances, leading to more insecurity and instability in the region” since hostilities often do not resolve the underlying tensions and causes of conflict.

Unfortunately, selling Vietnam and the Philippines lethal arms only exacerbates these tensions and increases the chances of a security dilemma. Those who contend lethal arms may deter Chinese aggression ignore the additional measures—doctrine, training, logistics, command and control, and intelligence among others—needed to create a credible deterrent. In reality, of the two nations explored, only Vietnam offers the possibility of creating a credible deterrent, yet even it faces substantial obstacles: a modest economic base, and the lack of these critical enabling elements needed in modern warfare.
More likely, China will respond to arms sales by enhancing its own military capabilities to counter this threat and enhance its current overmatch. This action-reaction cycle runs the risk of expanding into a true security dilemma and subsequent arms race.

Beyond these challenges, analysis has shown arming partners poses distinct disadvantages and will further complicate the U.S.-Sino strategic relationship. Foremost among these, arming ignores the strategic environment and strategic culture that exists in China. Strong economic growth and internal stability motivates Chinese interests and actions in the South China Sea. China is less concerned about hegemonic control than it is the ability to maintain access through the region to markets and natural resources—the lifeblood of its economy. China also has legitimate security concerns associated with the defense of its territory; previous failures exposed the country to a century of exploitation by foreign powers. This period of humiliation causes China to view external powers with suspicion, or worse as trying to contain and control it.

Arming regional partners naturally plays into these fears and undermines the trust and cooperation needed to resolve other strategic issues—North Korea, Sino-Japanese tensions, Taiwan, cyber hacking, and intellectual property theft. Moreover, “concerns remain that strong motivations, existing tensions, and entrenched positions need only an accident or miscommunication to create an incident or open conflict that subjugates all of these interests.” This is the greatest danger; that a minor incident escalates beyond the ability of senior political leaders to arrest the inflamed passions, fears, and feelings of honor, and puts China and the United States on a path to a potentially disastrous conflict.

An alternative to this scenario, American policy leaders could leverage strategic restraint as an initial bargaining chip toward a broader resolution of the South China Sea disputes and preservation of U.S. national interests. Such a tactic seeks to break the cycle that feeds the security dilemma, and puts the onus on China to decide whether to decrease or expand regional tensions, and whether to become a responsible great power, or violate its own stated willingness to peacefully rise. China has an extensive history of resolving territorial disputes through diplomacy without firing a shot; thus, such a resolution in the South China Sea remains entirely feasible.

Returning to the causes of World War I, as a flashpoint, the Balkans hardly seemed worth the global conflict it helped cause. Will War College students 100 years from now study the South China Sea as they explore the causes of major regional or global conflicts and conclude the same? Will they assess war was inevitable given China’s rising power relative to the United States, or will they assess that policy makers missed off-ramps to deescalate tensions due to domestic pressures, perceptions of fear and prestige, or a failure to evaluate potential outcomes? While these are impossible to answer, the region has the ingredients needed for a future conflict unless all sides take appropriate steps to deescalate tensions.

While recognition of failures after the fact is always easy, the challenge becomes recognizing potential failures in the future, or having the courage to confront them when realized. Strategic restraint on arming does not provide a panacea, but neither does deterrence. The desire to prepare for the worst case can become a self-fulfilling prophecy. If the United States turns this situation into a matter of prestige and honor, China will likely oblige, and the results could be catastrophic. As two China experts noted, both sides need “to exercise restraint in defensive actions that might appear threatening; to enhance transparency to dispel misunderstandings; and to reciprocate positive actions to stimulate a virtuous circle of enhanced confidence.” Only then might a strategic relationship emerge without armed conflict to permit more effective cooperation on a range of national security issues.
Editor’s Note: In the interest of space we publish Captain Sadler’s article without his research notes. To see the full article with all research notes, visit www.faoa.org.

With the US presidential election and this summer’s upper house Diet elections in Japan, our shared alliance has once again become a hot political topic. A security alliance that’s of increasing importance with an assertive China, revanchist Russia and globally metastasizing violent extremists. Facing this reality, both governments have undertaken significant changes, most notably revised Guidelines for US-Japan Defense Cooperation in April 2015, where in the absence of combined command and control, provides the framework for how our two nations’ will employ military forces together.

For the US, the Rebalance to the Asia Pacific as articulated in the Department of Defense’s 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, and reaffirmed in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) remains central. Two years later, Prime Minister Abe issued Japan’s first National Security Strategy in December 2013 and established a National Security Council. Common to both was Japan’s commitment to proactively contribute to regional peace, however, how this as well as the Rebalance is operationalized continues to evolve.

These changes enable opportunities for regional security collaboration and combined operations - and just in time as tensions in the South China Sea and on the Korean Peninsula simmer at a quickening pace. To seize this opportunity will require operationalizing a range of bilateral initiatives.

High Velocity Learning Alliance

Two trends with which our navies must contend act as a backdrop. One is proliferation of precision munitions. Two examples are China’s anti-ship ballistic missiles, and the proliferation of cruise missiles, such as that claimed by Islamic State to attack an Egyptian ship off the Sinai in 2014. Another is the rapid technological advances in artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics that is enabling the creation of learning machines. Failure to adapt and lead in this new reality risks our ability to effectively respond and deter conflict.

In response, the Deputy Secretary of Defense has argued for a Third Offset, which like previous offsets, seeks to deliberately change an unattractive Great Power competition, this time with China and Russia and their rapidly evolving anti-access and area denial capabilities. An Offset seeks a qualitative edge that insures conventional deterrence with four steps. The first is providing our leaders more options along the escalation ladder. Second, flipping the cost advantage to defenders in a ballistic and cruise missile exchange - in East Asia this would make continuation of China’s decades long investment in such weapons cost prohibitive. Third, having a multiplicative effect on presence, sensing, and combat effectiveness of each manned platform through greater employment of autonomous systems. The fourth is to nullify the advantages afforded by geographic proximity and being first to attack.
However, achieving this Offset requires more than investment in technological dream machines. It requires our institutions be nimble and their data secure. Pressures for an Offset will drive the US and Japan to increasingly collaborate in concert across the Asia-Pacific, often with shared Allies such as South Korea and Australia. Achieving this will require alliance institutions that can develop new capabilities while also adapting operations faster than our adversaries, doing this will require our alliance embrace high velocity learning as detailed in Steven Spear’s book “The High-Velocity Edge.”

Challenges

Necessitating a high velocity learning alliance is a challenge that transcends borders and blurs distinctions of hostility. In large part this is due to Globalization, which has shrunk the world but also permeated it, enabling good and bad influences to transcend borders almost instantly. It in this environment our combined navies must succeed and adapt.

In the East China Sea, hybrid or asymmetric actions taken just below the threshold of a military response are alarming – what Prime Minister Abe has called ‘grey zone’ situations. This is an approach the Chinese and Russians have proven adept, most recently in Crimea. While incursions by Chinese vessels into waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands has stabilized at historically high levels, the average displacement of Chinese coast guard vessels has increased – 2,200 tons in 2014 to 3,200 tons in 2015. This trend places Japanese coast guard vessels at a disadvantage during interactions where ramming and shoulder-bumping are most likely. To address this, the Japanese Coast Guard and Maritime Self-Defense Forces have begun a years-long effort to rebalance their forces to the southeast, but resource limited claimant states in Southeast Asia have been less able to respond to Chinese activities.

In the South China Sea, tensions have heightened as China embarked on a rapid and massive land reclamation and militarization effort in 2014. To date, China has reclaimed 3,000 acres of land, more than all other claimants combined; has deployed advanced fighter aircraft and surface to air missiles to Woody Island; and installed a new RADAR system on Cuarteron Reef. These actions are changing the operational landscape of the South China Sea. The frequent coercive maritime behavior by China’s civil agencies is well documented, and is causing region-wide consternation leading to what could be called a regional arms race – with renewed interest in submarines by claimants Malaysia, Vietnam, and Indonesia. Containing significant sea lanes, the South China Sea doubles as a thoroughfare in illicit trade and illegal fishing often times leading to significant ecological damages – also accelerated by China’s land reclamation.

Our two militaries safely and securely operating in this environment will be vital to upholding the norms and regional security obligations. Doing this will be increasingly under threat as the greatly expanded Chinese facilities enable a persistent, extended Chinese civil and military presence across the region.

While there is likely a method to North Korea’s paramount leader Kim Jung-Un’s provocations, that behavior has defied outside understanding or predictions, making for a stability fiction. Most notable is his pursuit of mobile ballistic missile launch systems with their potential to deliver a nuclear warhead; such as the road-mobile KN-08 and submarine launched ballistic missiles. Development of these systems is enabled by a network of illicit cash-generating activities which are also vital to the propagation of the regime.

Too often this is where the conversation on security ends, leaving trends in the central Pacific and Indian Ocean under appreciated. For example, increasing Russian and Chinese naval and air operations across the Pacific potentially put sea lanes vital in an Asian crisis at risk. Additionally, our Pacific Island partners, with severely limited maritime security capacities, are confronting a significant threat to their economies from illegal fishing in their exclusive economic zones. In the Indian Ocean, China seeks a greater role in the region underscored by announcement last year of the “One Belt, One Road” initiative, establishment of a base in Djibouti, and the increasing frequency of naval assets not obviously related to counter-piracy efforts – such as submarines which recently called on Karachi in Pakistan in May and Colombo, Sri Lanka in October last year. That said, piracy and a host of illicit activities are a persistent problem; these include last summer’s Rohingya crisis in Burma, and the spread of terror networks into Southeast Asia. Together these challenges undermine any assumption that these waterways remain accessible and uncontested in the long-term.

As a major hub for US forces devoted to regional stability, threats to Japan and US forces based there have wide ranging impact to global security. Sometimes these threats are not from conflict, but from natural or man-made disasters such as the 2011 Fukushima nuclear crisis. In the early stages of that response, widespread damage to infrastructure had a deliberating effect, that if closer to alliance defense forces the ramifications could have been dire during a military crisis or confrontation.

Addressing these diverse challenges requires a dynamic, capable navy that can seamlessly partner with regional navies. Moreover, as threats rapidly evolve so too must combined operations and the capabilities needed to address them. Doing this has been a focus of the Rebalance and makes clear several priorities for our combined navies.

Investments

Current security practices are inadequate to sustain the rules-based order in Asia. Eight investments that could bolster the foundation of combined regional action to deter illicit and coercive actions.

- Enhanced readiness in the Western Pacific – Forward deployed US forces remain challenged to maintain readiness across mission sets. This is in part due to high operating tempo that strains the platforms necessitating more frequent maintenance, but also the need to train with allies in order to be ready to operate in challenging contested environments. U.S. planners should consider enhancing training ranges in the Western Pacific, such as that being explored by US Pacific Command in
the Northern Marianas, and, expand in-theater maintenance and repair infrastructure.

Moreover, there is a need to develop expeditionary logistics, including alternative fuel options, runway and port repair capacity that facilitate dispersal operations mitigating ballistic and cruise missile threats. Dispersal operations can further be bolstered with mutual and complimentary access agreements by including Japan in current agreements with Philippines, Vietnam, and Djibouti. Likewise, both navies should recapitalize at-sea weapons reload and battle damage repair to mitigate reliance on fixed shore facilities.

- Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR) in contested environments – As the tempo of Russian and Chinese operations in the Indo-Asia-Pacific increases, our shared fleet of sensors will be stressed to meet demand. Addressing this has increased demand for autonomous platforms with longer endurance and stealth. Specifically, long-endurance maritime ISR assets for maritime operations; and new means of detecting submarines, locate deeply buried structures, and track mobile missile systems.

- Regionally deployable maritime patrol capacity – The submarine threat is growing and is challenging assumptions of secure sea lanes. Expanding the fleet of Maritime Patrol Reconnaissance Aircraft, such as the P-8, and developing a role for our partners using Japan's US-2 from austere bases in the Central Pacific and Southeast Asia can mitigate any potential gaps. Doing this requires expeditionary logistics to sustain such operations realized by easily transported fuel bladders, maintenance kits, and safe temporary munitions storage options at expeditionary and civilian airfields.

- ‘Grey Zone’ Options – A way to respond to hybrid war is to expand capacity for vessel board search and seizure or VBSS. Use of VBSS can enable expanded Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) participation while also providing ‘grey zone’ and terrorism related options. Potential investments include: afloat staging bases capable of supporting vertical lift and small boats; and non-kinetic options to disable vessels and dissuade encroachment.

- Nuclear disaster consequence management – The Fukushima nuclear disaster illustrates the need for practicing robust mitigation plans across multiple organizations to better respond and contain radiological spread. Looking across the region, civilian nuclear power capacity is growing, especially in China aiming to double today’s 29 reactors’ capacity by 2020. Should a disaster occur it will likely affect neighbors, necessitating a regional response. Unfortunately, the dialogue and investment needed has been muted and not on international agendas such as the recent Nuclear Security Summit held in DC this past March. Investments in sensors, protective gear, decontamination, and containment resources can better enable responses in Japan, U.S. and contribute in regional crises.

- Interoperable common platforms and systems for maritime security – Some regional partners lack adequate platforms, sensors and training to uphold good maritime governance, most critically in the South China Sea. As Japan increases its participation in regional security cooperation – through sales, transfers, exercise and training – ensuring our efforts remain coherent is critical. With this in mind, several ideas are worth considering regarding sales to partners:
  - Patrol boats with common diesel engines and sensors maintained by a common logistic base.
  - Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) systems easily maintained, operated with resilient command and control. An example of such a low maintenance, commercially available, and easily trained on platform is the TC-90; five of which will be leased by Japan to the Philippines.
  - Sustained in-country institution building, training and maintenance assistance as partners adapt and develop their own maintenance culture and operational routines modeled on Australia’s Pacific Patrol Boat program.

Critical munitions co-production – The ODYSSEY DAWN 2011 intervention in Libya demonstrated the need to stockpile and easily shift munitions amongst allies. Specifically, Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) requires an expansive inventory mitigated in part if high energy weapons and low cost hypersonic projectiles – such as rail gun – can be fielded. Moreover, the current inventory and future weapons should be designed with interoperability in mind, thus standardizing launch systems and fire control for key weapons such heavy and light weight torpedoes, long-range anti-ship missiles, and long-range surface to air missiles.

- Big Data and Information surety – Secure communications and protection of industrial secrets is a prerequisite for combined operations and effective allied collaboration in planning as well as Third Offset capabilities development. Investments should achieve three aims. The first is to seek Big Data analytics to amass and rapidly process extremely large volumes of data to discern trends, identify targets, and track nefarious activities such as those by Islamic State. The second is to develop allied cyber defenses and resilient, autonomous multi-path communications that complicate attacks while ensuring a real-time allied common operating picture; especially critical in ballistic and cruise missile defense. Finally, systems must be backward and forward compatible, so as to enable greater interoperability amongst legacy systems used by partners across the region.

**Enablers**

These eight investments require a significant commitment of resources and leadership. However, recent developments point to key enablers making increased collaboration and effective bilateral approaches likely bolstered by significant institutionnel change and hard money – like $18 billion dollars over the next five years to actualize the Third Offset. These include:

- Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA) with 1400 civilian and 400 uniformed Ministry of Defense personnel, was established in October 2015 to improve program management throughout acquisition program life-cycle. ATLA's International Cooperation Division is notable as it is intended to facilitate greater co-development and production opportunities.

- Vice Minister for International Affairs in Ministry of Defense established in June 2014, is mandated to expand
regional security cooperation efforts. Recent efforts include: maritime security and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief engagement with Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a transfer accord with India regarding US-2 flying boats, and the provision of patrol boats to the Philippines and Vietnam. This has enabled US Pacific Command reaching out to the Vice Minister’s office to attend annual Pacific Command Security Cooperation planning.

Moreover, budgets for capacity building assistance continue to grow in both countries. In Japan, this has been modest starting with approximately $300,000 dollars in 2011 to $2.7 million dollars in 2016. Potentially this can connect with the Maritime Security Initiative announced by the Secretary of Defense at last year’s Shangri-La Dialogue, dedicating $425 million dollars to enhancing maritime security in Southeast Asia over the next five years.

The Alliance Coordination Mechanism is described in the latest Defense Guidelines as a continuously stood-up body intended to strengthen policy and operational coordination. As such, it helps ensure both nations’ proactive strategies remain coherent and complimentary. Together with the establishment of Japan’s National Security Council, it is more likely that sustained resourcing can be achieved to build partner capacities and proactively develop responses ahead of crisis – such as the initially uncoordinated response to the Chinese East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) declared in 2013. By increasing the frequency and depth of policy coordination between US and Japan policy communities, ‘real time’ national policy-making can more closely approach an Alliance of effort.

Bilateral Enterprise – another element of the latest Defense Guidelines, but not a discrete organization, is a commitment to enhance interoperability and develop promising new capabilities. This is further enabled by two cabinet decisions; on 1 April 2014 to expand international transfers and cooperation with announcement of three principles on transfer of defense equipment and technology, and the 19 June 2014 release of the Strategy on Defense Production and Technology Bases to promote equipment and technology cooperation.

The Bilateral Enterprise is charged with enhancing defense equipment and technology cooperation through joint research, development, production and mutual provision of components. To date the most active maritime co-production programs have been SH-60 helicopters, MK46 lightweight torpedoes, and the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM). Examples of cooperative development include: High Speed Multi-Hulled Vessel Operation (HSMVO) for maritime patrol and counter-mine warfare; and the Standard Missile Three block IIA with the US Missile Defense Agency with production expected by 2017. It can also facilitate increasingly integrated maintenance, repair, overhaul and upgrade (MRO&U) programs for cost savings and greater responsiveness thru surge production of key components and munitions during conflict. Notable progress has been seen with Japan hosting regional maintenance facilities for the F-35 and V-22 Osprey.

The Bilateral Enterprise can also help to facilitate intelligence cooperation and information sharing at all levels (to include local authorities), critical in coordinating effective responses to ‘grey zone’ crises. At the same time, new efforts will be taken to deepen education and research exchanges to strengthen communication between each ally’s research and development institutions.

Taken together, the effect is expanded factory floor space that meets critical munitions needs, builds interoperability in design, production and maintenance. However, lingering uncertainty amongst Japanese defense industry and institutional inertia has held back greater regional security cooperation and military sales - Mitsubishi’s recent failed bid to produce Australia’s next submarine is symptomatic of this.

**Conclusion**

In the face of growing security challenges, Japan and the US must act as active regional operational partners in order to remain relevant in shaping Asia’s security environment.

The commitment to fund and sustain a range of regional capacity building activities is promising, but more needs to be done to ensure a sustained regional presence that exercises with a growing network of shared partners – such as India, Vietnam, and the Philippines.

All of this is contingent on the historic national discussion in Japan regarding its defense and regional security role. This is unique and healthy, just as the rhetoric surrounding US presidential elections heats up is good for democracy. Whatever this year’s electoral outcomes, it is clear the Rebalance will persist and Japan will continue to be a reliable ally across the globe.

**About the Author**

Captain Brent Sadler was most recently assigned to the Navy Asia Pacific Advisory Group on the Navy staff. Prior to this he was the U.S. Pacific Command lead for Maritime Strategy and Policy as well as a senior assistant tasked with coordinating execution of the President’s Defense Strategic Guidance – Rebalance to the Asia-Pacific. He is a 1994 graduate of the United States Naval Academy, 2005 Olmsted Scholar to Japan, and a 2011 distinguished graduate of National War College in Washington, DC. He was also a Council on Foreign Relations international affairs fellow in Tokyo, Japan working on the revision of the US-Japan Defense Security Guidelines. He is currently attending JMAS in preparation for assignment to the U.S. Defense Attaché Office, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Does China Have a Looming Africa Problem?

Some of China’s closest partners on the continent are now facing domestic instability

By Porter Morgan and Jason Nicholson

Editor’s Note: From time to time the Journal republishes articles that will be of interest to the FAO Association Journal readership. This article is re-published with permission from the on-line journal The Diplomat and appeared on September 19, 2016. The Association thanks The Diplomat for their courtesy. The Diplomat can be accessed at www.thediplomat.com

Does China have a looming Africa problem? Recently increasing domestic unrest in some of China’s largest and oldest partner states in Africa suggests this is the case. Historically sensitive to any impediments on national sovereignty, China has touted the “Beijing Consensus,” defined as a viable path to realize economic development without the need for democratization. Some of the most ardent supporters of and adherents to the “China Model” can be found in sub-Saharan Africa. Unfortunately, some of these same African states now find themselves mired in ever more complex domestic political crises. China’s apparently recent reevaluation of its relationship with Venezuela, due to that country’s instability, indicates that Chinese engagement in Africa could potentially undergo a similar revaluation.

On the surface, the China Model appears to come with fewer caveats than American foreign aid with its neoliberal economic implications of forced privatization policies and bureaucratic restructuring. The China Model is not philanthropy; it is soft power and commercial ventures in politically delicate countries. On one hand, the widely visible African infrastructure and industrial projects are co-invested with a great deal of the yield on the Chinese end of the balance sheet. On the other hand, an influx of foreign investment may serve to support domestically unpopular governments while fomenting political instability. China may be creating an environment that will threaten its long-term gains, leading to a situation where Beijing will be forced to cease funding and cut ties with countries that their investment helped destabilize.

There are several states in Africa whose political fortunes could radically change in the near and long term, to the detriment of Chinese foreign policy in Africa. First, the largest sustained and popularly supported protests since the end of minority rule have erupted in Zimbabwe. Robert Mugabe’s government has met these anti-Zanu PF protests with force and repression. While Beijing has consistently demonstrated it too has the time-tested ability of any great power to look the other way, the current crisis in Zimbabwe must alarm China. With an estimated direct investment in Zimbabwe of over $600 million by Chinese businesses, themselves often parastatals, China stands to suffer major financial losses.

Growing unhappiness with the latest round of Mugabe’s “indigenization” efforts at further nationalization of the
China may be creating an environment that will threaten its long-term gains, leading to a situation where Beijing will be forced to cease funding and cut ties with countries that their investment helped destabilize.

Economy may cause state collapse in Zimbabwe and imperil these investments. Although the government in Harare is weathering the storm it has created, at some point Mugabe will leave the picture. It is anyone’s best guess what political situation will emerge from the long shadow of authoritarian rule that has suppressed and heightened internal ethnic divisions.

Second, Tanzania, long a favorite destination for foreign investors and aid programs due to its stable government, is facing renewed political crisis in the wake of unpopular repression of dissent by the government. President John Magafuli has implemented a broad range of measures aimed at decreasing governmental transparency and suppressing the primary opposition party. Unlike Zimbabwe, where deep ethnic tensions pre-date independence, Tanzania’s unrest has political origins related to the rise of the opposition party Chadema (the Swahili acronym for Party for Democracy and Progress) as an increasingly viable alternative to the incumbent, Party of the Revolution or Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM).

The CCM has led Tanzania since independence and remained popular following the introduction of multi-party rule in 1992. In fact, CCM is Africa’s longest ruling political party. Chadema’s popularity has grown primarily because of ceaseless campaigning against what it sees as deeply corrupted state institutions associated with the long ruling CCM.

With a roughly $4 billion trade relationship between the two nations, even China, with its immense currency reserves, would be affected by any serious civil unrest in Tanzania. In the event of serious unrest China’s presence itself could become a focal point for public anger. For example, Chinese workers have previously been attacked and abducted by anti-government militants in Sudan and Ethiopia.

For better or for worse, China fills a void in these two countries that desperately need filling. However, if one of its partner country destabilizes, China will likely adhere to the primary pillars of its foreign policy, which Beijing has held for the last 60 years: noninterference and sovereignty. There is a chance that China would be forced to react to events in order to save face, or if domestic sentiments tip against its foreign policy, but don’t bet on it.

At the same time, China must mind its own backyard. Chinese foreign direct investment does not always play well in China. Much like U.S. foreign aid, the perennial argument is made that Beijing should support domestic infrastructure, industry, and commerce instead of giving away billions of dollars to foreign countries. Also, many of these joint ventures abroad are conducted through parastatals. If the investment fails, the Chinese government will likely shoulder the financial burden and make reparations to disenfranchised workers and corporations with an unfavorable public appraisal. All the while, Beijing is under constant pressure by the public to stimulate economic growth through innovative means, which includes these foreign ventures.

Considered individually these events are significant but not momentous; China is a major power with global interests, some of which are in Africa. However, like all great powers China prefers the status quo to any change, particularly chaotic political upheaval. If anti-authoritarian protests begin sweeping sub-Saharan Africa like the Arab Spring, then a key focus area of Chinese foreign policy could be imperiled. In the long term there are significant chances for sustained unrest in several of China’s other significant African partners that are facing increasing challenges to autocratic rule, like in Ethiopia.

One byproduct of an increasingly networked and globalized world is that people are less and less likely to tolerate the politics of repression that represent the outmoded ideals of bygone days. Worldwide there are numerous analogous situations that are simply awaiting a catalyst to initiate change. Seemingly innocuous events can lead to unintended outcomes, as the Arab Spring in North Africa has proven.

Perhaps even more important than what China is doing now will be what course of action China assumes when those forces of change are unlocked. Not only will the citizens of Zimbabwe and Tanzania examine their relationship with China in a new light but also, more importantly, those countries who are currently pursuing development along the Chinese model may decide there are better alternatives in the long run. Undoubtedly these events are commanding attention at the highest levels of Chinese business and government.

About the Authors
Porter Morgan is a doctoral candidate at the University of Utah who specializes in Chinese politics and Chinese society.
Jason (Brad) Nicholson is a Lieutenant Colonel (P) in the United States Army and international relations doctoral student at the University of Utah. He has been selected as SDO/DATT Abuja, Nigeria.
The recent tribunal decision from the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) against China’s claims and reclamation projects have done little to ease tensions amongst the claimants in the South China Sea (SCS). Further, China’s refusal to recognize the ruling or the tribunal’s jurisdiction promotes an aggressive stance and approach to international law, thus posing a threat to open trade and security of the other regional claimants. This threat is not isolated to island reclamation. China has further escalated tensions through militarization of these islands (e.g. building airstrips and forward basing missiles/radar systems) while continuing to deny other nations access to fishing waters and natural resources. These actions place U.S. leadership in a policy laden predicament to determine a proper response.

President Obama’s foreign policy rebalance toward Asia and our mutual defense agreement with the Philippines deepen U.S. interests in the region. The recently adopted Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) initiative brought together a group of nations, including critical partners from Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), to open further trade opportunities amongst themselves and the U.S. Threats to the TPP implementation are in conflict with our economically-focused national interests and could possibly lead to armed conflict between allied nations, potentially forcing the U.S. to intervene militarily to assure swift resolution. To date, the U.S. response to Chinese land reclamation activities have been largely military focused, consisting of readdressing basing agreements, accelerating military sales options, and launching a series of Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) – sailing U.S. Navy ships through the SCS to challenge the Chinese claims of economic exclusion zone rights to the waters.

Interestingly, although these missions were titled “FONOPS,” they really were innocent passage missions. A true FONOPS mission would have sailed a ship within 12 nautical miles (NM) of the island claim and conducted activities such as turning on fire-control radars or launching helicopters from the...
ship. Bottom line, the U.S. FONOPS conducted to date have done little to influence or halt Chinese activities. China views these attempts by the U.S. to introduce military capabilities in the SCS as justification for the Chinese buildup, from a self-defense perspective.

The Chinese have a different view and approach to the current SCS disputes. In spite of the UNCLOS tribunal decision, they have maintained their claims to the territory and waters surrounding the islands and reefs. The Chinese territorial claims are directly tied to the “nine (or ten) dash line,” claiming sovereignty over the region. In 1935, pre-dating the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Republic of China’s Land and Water Maps Inspection Committee produced a map that used eleven dashed lines to show their possession of the South China Seas. In 1949, after PRC was established, subsequent maps “appear(ed) to follow the old maps,” with the exception of only using nine dashed lines; interestingly, most recent maps (2013) have included a tenth dashed line, located just east of Taiwan. Regardless of the name associated with these claims/maps, the historical claims have never been officially recognized by the international community. Because China views itself as the rightful owner of all territory within the “nine-dash line” and many nations seem to be “encroaching” on China’s rightful territory, China often portrays itself as the victim. In fact, China’s true desire is to address the issue with the other claimant nations on a bilateral basis, with no U.S. involvement. China views the U.S. as an unwelcome party to the discussion and a military challenge to their sovereign claims. As such, if they feel threatened, the Chinese believe they should be able to defend their reclaimed features through coast guard actions and establishing Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZ).

The ineffectiveness of current U.S. approaches creates a requirement to explore alternative methods to address the problem. Acknowledging that international law is a very important factor in determining future U.S. courses of action, we will focus on viewing this challenge through a predominantly diplomatic and military lens. Joint Publication 5.0 explains the importance of incorporating sequels (i.e. “what next?” plans) and branches (i.e. “what if?” plans) into one’s operational and campaign planning efforts. Similarly, this concept must be applied at the theater-strategic and strategic levels. In policy language, U.S. political leadership must play both the “short game” and the “long game.” Military planners must always ask the questions: “What if this chosen course of action (COA) doesn’t work? Now what?” Arguably, according to many Asia-Pacific regional experts and international relations scholars, China has been playing the long game very well, in both the SCS and on the geopolitical landscape. The U.S.’ recent attempts to thwart, slow, or stop Chinese land reclamation and militarization in the SCS have failed. As such, we must ask ourselves “Now what?”

Let us be clear, the ideas forwarded in this paper do not suggest that the U.S. should stop confronting illegitimate Chinese claims in the SCS or abandon the international law declarations. Assuming the Chinese continue to reclaim, occupy, and militarize the SCS islands, we believe it is important to propose non-standard methods of limiting Chinese influence in the Asia-Pacific, while preserving international law/norms, maintaining our steadfast regional alliances (Japan, South Korea, Australia, and Philippines), and maintaining access.

Understanding these conditions, and the failure of U.S. rhetoric and freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS) to deter China, the U.S. should accept China’s recent offer to “open these facilities [on recently reclaimed islands] to other countries upon completion” for three main reasons: (1) this option is a non-confrontational way to limit China’s freedom of maneuver; (2) a combined presence on Chinese SCS islands provides an opportunity to more closely monitor and influence Chinese actions and; (3) this option provides an opportunity for regional cooperation and de-escalation of tensions.

Argument
To begin, in light of China’s recent offer to extend its disputed island use to “other countries,” let us quickly sketch what this would look like. We recommend that the disputed territory be utilized as a place to headquarter a combined-nation, foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) organization, notionally titled Asia-Pacific Outreach and Response (APOR). APOR would be comprised of any nations with interests in the Asia-Pacific that seek to help those in need. However, the emphasis would be on getting SCS claimant nations and their key allies/partners to participate. APOR would be focused on: (1) preparing for and responding to disasters; and (2) distributing humanitarian aid. Considering the numerous recent typhoons and tsunamis in the Asia-Pacific, establishing this mechanism to promote cooperation is both logical and appropriate. Furthermore, we recommend that U.S. diplomatic officials engage with their ASEAN counterparts to urge them to join this endeavor. Also, the U.S. should seek to bring as many of China’s trading partners as possible into this proposed FHA apparatus, including Japan ($312.55 billion), South Korea ($274.24 billion, Australia ($136.37 billion), and the U.S. ($521 billion).

So, why should the U.S. accept China’s offer? First, and foremost, this new approach offers a non-confrontational method to limit China’s freedom of maneuver. Placing multiple third parties (APOR) on the reclaimed islands forces China to strictly use the islands for their publicly advertised use – disaster response. Ideally, China would sign some sort of binding agreement with the third party players that detailed the expected use of the island. However, even if this did not occur, there would be some mechanism for accountability (or at least identifying deviations to others). For example, if the Chinese began to use the reclaimed island for military operations, interested parties could be notified early in the process. In theory, China would be softly compelled to use the island for positive, non-escalatory activities, which would hopefully promote regional stability.

When attempting to resolve conflict peacefully, one proven method is to utilize a third party to de-escalate tensions between two or more belligerents; in conflict resolution theory, this outsider/third party is called a “third side.” William Ury, a world renowned conflict resolution author, explains, “The
Third Side is a way of looking at the conflicts around us not just from one side or the other, but from the larger perspective of the surrounding community.” Taking the third side typically means finding a process of cooperative negotiation and finding a wise solution that meets the essential needs of both sides. As Ury succinctly explains, this can be done through the use of a bystander or neutral party. In this instance, an ideal third side candidate would be Australia (AUS), who could place personnel on the reclaimed island, within the FHA institution (APOR). Some would argue that UNCLOS is a third side; however, UNCLOS has no enforcement authorities, and PRC has said they are and will continue to ignore UNCLOS rulings. A third side must be trusted by both belligerents. AUS is a great choice to join APOR for several reasons. One, AUS is a major trading partner of China, and AUS has significant interest in SCS natural gas. Two, and even more importantly, AUS does not have claims to any SCS islands. Three, as a strong, trusted U.S. ally, AUS would likely listen to U.S. inputs or requests for information on Chinese activity on the islands. In short, China would be allowed to “save face” by staking what it sees as its “rightful” SCS claim, while the U.S. and regional players are assured that the island activity will be used for the betterment of all. China’s use of the islands would be severely constrained, by restricting Chinese military staging and power projection activities. Clearly, this is a viable, win-win option that considerably de-escalates the current SCS tensions.

In addition to limiting China’s strategic and operational freedom of maneuver, a combined presence on the reclaimed islands provides an opportunity to more closely monitor and influence Chinese actions. For example, the U.S. could work with third party allies (especially AUS) to gain intelligence on how China is actually using the islands. Our AUS partners could collect intelligence via multiple methods, including employing human intelligence assets, using coast guard patrol vessels to survey (i.e. collect on) the area, and establishing cyber intelligence nodes on the islands. These various data collection methods could provide a clearer picture of the local operational environment, which would aid in revealing China’s strategic intent—thus, better informing U.S. decision makers and military planners. Also, third party players on the islands could be used to influence and shape Chinese thoughts and actions. With increased interaction between China and trusted, third party entities, there will be more conduits to pass information to Chinese leaders, via indirect methods. As we try to influence the decision-making of Chinese leaders, we may find that third party entities can effectively and efficiently pass messages to high level Chinese political officials and military leadership.

Third, accepting China’s offer essentially creates an opportunity for regional cooperation. The 2015 Annual Report to Congress (on China) states, “US policy toward China is based on the premise that it is in both countries’ interests to expand practical cooperation in areas where both countries’ interests overlap, and to constructively manage differences.” Increasing areas of U.S. cooperation with China creates off-ramps for potential high-tension confrontations, such as the SCS issue. China clearly holds similar views on creating avenues for cooperation. In 2012, China participated in its first FHA exercise with AUS and New Zealand (NZ). Cooperation Spirit 2012, which occurred in the cities of Brisbane and Enoggera Barracks, AUS, built on the “respective humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) experiences of the three nations and helped enhance relationships and mutual understanding . . . of HADR health response capabilities.” With more off-ramps, the U.S. and China will have a better chance at de-escalating future confrontations, without overt military action. Other than disaster-related responses, few opportunities exist between the U.S. and China.

All three of these arguments depend on the involvement of third party nations. The more third party nations become involved, the more challenging the entanglement problem is to China. Entanglement is the idea that if several nation-states, commercial partners, and multi-national corporations all share an asset, U.S. adversaries will be less likely to attack said asset, for fear of creating many enemies (vice just one). Entanglement is best illustrated by discussing one aspect of the current U.S. deterrence approach in the space domain. The U.S. partners with numerous nations and commercial entities to host payloads in space. For example, if an adversary were to destroy a U.S.-owned space satellite (that hosted payloads from AUS, UK, and JPN), the adversary would negatively impact relations with all four nations, vice just the U.S.

Entanglement offers the U.S. a way to complicate Chinese decision calculus. Clearly, the U.S. has many benefits, both strategic and operational, if it accepts China’s offer to “share” the islands. In short, other high-profile academics have highlighted that resource-sharing is a viable and prudent approach to the SCS problem. Most recently, Mira Rapp-Hooper, a Senior Fellow in the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, explained that Rodrigo Duterte, the Philippines’ new president, has “signaled that he is interested in pursuing a more conciliatory approach to Beijing and has held out the possibility of resuming negotiations with China over resource sharing in the South China Sea.” Assuming the U.S. takes a more stern approach to Chinese SCS claims, China will likely be compelled to consider off-ramps for two key reasons: (1) they do not seek an overt conflict with the U.S. and; (2) they seek to preserve the benefits of economic trade with the U.S. In another likely scenario, the Philippines could bring the U.S. into a conflict with China. Remember, the U.S. has a defense agreement with the Philippines. If the Philippines enters into conflict with China, the U.S. would be obligated to respond in the Philippines defense. Our proposed approach allows China to save face, in the event of over conflict with the Philippines (and U.S.).

Counter-argument
There are three primary risks associated with our bold proposition of joining the Chinese in a mutual “sharing” of the controversial reclaimed islands in the SCS. First, there is a risk that any nation who joins the Chinese on a disputed island could add to Chinese legitimacy claims of that disputed island, further undermining the recent UNCLOS arbitration ruling. Second,
if the U.S., specifically, joined the Chinese on a disputed island, then despite U.S. strategic messaging otherwise, it may have the unintended consequence of sparking doubt and distrust in allies’ and partners’ confidence in the U.S.’ commitment to its security agreements. Finally, any nation who shares SCS real estate with the Chinese, with plans to monitor and influence them, will conversely be in a situation to be monitored and potentially influenced by the Chinese.

With regard to the first risk, any country that accepts China’s offer of co-use of a disputed reclaimed island in the SCS effectively – though inadvertently – undermines the UNCLOS ruling and adds legitimacy to China’s claim. China has long made assertions of its rightful claim to the disputed territory in the SCS and has made its opinion on the matter very public. China gave zero recognition to the UNCLOS ruling, both before and after the formal decision, and Chinese leadership denied any legal ramifications towards Chinese-claimed islands in the SCS. Allowing China to maintain even a portion of their territorial claims would feed the Chinese propaganda machine and their narrative, further strengthening the Chinese argument against the ruling. This is especially true of any Chinese partnership with the Philippines, who initiated the UNCLOS SCS arbitration in the first place, or Australia, the previously proposed “third side,” due to both countries having ratified UNCLOS. Interestingly, this puts the U.S., which has not yet ratified UNCLOS, in a unique position to explore the potential co-use option with China.

Second, any U.S. alignment, partnership, compromise, or other acceptance of China’s claims could cause U.S. regional allies and partners, especially the Philippines, to lose faith, confidence, and trust in U.S. security commitments. The potential signal inadvertently sent by Washington would be “Instead of holding true to our commitments, the U.S. will selfishly, without due regard to international maritime law, act in a manner that only fits U.S. interests.” Although the U.S. has not ratified the UNCLOS treaty, we have historically been one of UNCLOS’ most ardent supporters, a voice for upholding international maritime law. As the situation in the SCS continues to evolve and develop, does the U.S. want to be in a position of “choosing sides?” Or, do we want to find compromise by working with Chinese leadership, while recognizing international maritime law, and honoring security agreements?

Finally, just as the co-use opportunity gives the U.S. the ability to more closely monitor Chinese operations and maritime capabilities in the area, it conversely offers China the same opportunity to more closely monitor and assess a potential adversary’s operations and maritime capabilities. Also, China could be better positioned to influence other regional actors and the overall situation in the SCS because of it.

Rebuttal / Conclusion

The rebuttal to these valid risks is threefold. First, regarding the claim that any cooperative agreement on the U.S.’ part would further bolster China’s territorial claims, it could easily be argued that the U.S.’ actions and inconsistent messaging regarding “innocent passage” vice FONOPS in the SCS has already added legitimacy to China’s claims. The real danger with the U.S. not taking a firmer stance in the SCS is that despite the UNCLOS ruling, China will certainly continue to work incrementally towards an ultimate fait accompli in the SCS. Unfortunately, we have already legitimized China’s claims, so what else do we have to lose?

Second, regarding the loss of allied confidence in U.S. security commitments, one could argue that U.S. commitment does NOT rest solely on how the U.S. responds to China with respect to the SCS. The assurance equation is comprised of many aspects, including U.S. participation in combined military exercises, amount of U.S. diplomatic involvement, number of key leader engagements, and economic partnerships. In other words, if the U.S. believes that its allies are losing confidence, we have many methods to further assure them of our support.

Third, the fact that China can spy on the U.S. just like the U.S. can spy on China is truly a “straw man” argument. The U.S. personnel that would be working at APOR would most likely be DOS personnel and/or IGO/NGO personnel. These outside-DOD personnel probably do not have significant secrets/knowledge that would be beneficial to Chinese leadership. If the U.S. chose to put military personnel on the islands, then an increased operational security training should be accomplished. This could reduce the risk of inadvertently leaking secrets or critical information to Chinese informants.

To conclude, although China has publicly denied the acceptance of the UNCLOS Tribunal ruling, there does seem to be some gray area where China could be willing to compromise, as long as there was minimal loss of face. The U.S. should exploit this potential opening. Furthermore, the U.S. could help lessen the gray ambiguities by ratifying UNCLOS itself. Yet another opportunity exists in that China has, to date, been capitalizing on primarily bilateral agreements with regards to compromising the use of SCS territory. China’s salami-slicing approach, working with only one country at a time, is to their advantage. However, the time has come for ASEAN to take a greater role, insisting on regional unilateral agreements which hope to achieve “win-win” solutions, while allowing China to save face and not feel pressured by the UNCLOS ruling.

Again, the U.S. should further examine and give merit to more “outside the box” ideas on peaceful resolutions to the SCS conflict. A combined effort, dual-use FHA organization (APOR) on the disputed, reclaimed islands is just one such thought. Many believe the U.S. must act quickly to ratify UNCLOS to add legitimacy to our voice in the arena of international maritime law. There is even a thought that the U.S. should immediately begin building our own islands in the SCS! Regardless of how the U.S. acts regarding the SCS issue, one clear message must resonate both with China and the international community – “The U.S. says what it means, and means what it says.” This is not to imply that the U.S. is willing to go to war with China over disputed island claims in the SCS.

cont. on pg. 86
Toward a 'Normal' Japan

the U.S.-JAPAN Alliance in 2025

by Major William C. Atkins, U.S. Air Force

Editor’s Note: Major Atkins’ thesis won the FAO Association Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters Award at the National Intelligence University. It was also awarded the National Intelligence University Research Award for the overall top thesis. Because of its length, the author provided the Executive Summary and Conclusion of the thesis. To see the full thesis with all research notes, go to www.FAOA.Org. This extract, and the full thesis, have been cleared for release. The Journal is pleased to bring you this outstanding scholarship.

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Acceptance of the thesis as meeting an academic requirement does not reflect an endorsement of the opinions, ideas, or information put forth. The thesis is not finished intelligence or finished policy. The validity, reliability, and relevance of the information contained have not been reviewed through intelligence or policy procedures and processes.
In a region of the world home to an increasingly belligerent North Korea, China’s recent coercion of the seas, and the ongoing risk of non-state terrorism and piracy, Japan remains a steadfast ally of the United States; a critical partner in efforts to provide stability to the Asia-Pacific region. This increasingly complex security environment, combined with the promise of Asia’s future dynamism, requires a strong and coherent alliance between the United States and Japan to adequately address these and other vital issues. After a recent perceived decrease in American primacy, however, Japan has begun a campaign of military modernization and normalization, seeking to rebalance the U.S.-Japan Defense Alliance (henceforth, the “alliance”). This alliance is the bedrock of regional defense cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region; thus, any developments that might alter this relationship must be fully analyzed with respect to U.S. strategic national interests, and subsequently prepared for or avoided.

As a result of such developments affecting U.S. strategic interests, this thesis’ objectives are to (1) determine baseline levels of influence and likelihood for various foreign policy events and actors, (2) explore plausible trajectories for the U.S.-Japan alliance over the next 10 years, (3) anticipate the implications of alternative policy strategies, and (4) illuminate previously unanticipated risks and opportunities for planners, intelligence professionals, and decision-makers.

Consequently, the determination to use a newly created eight-step Alternative Futures Analysis methodology resulted in the following overall research question:

**How will recent Japanese defense normalization efforts affect the future of the U.S.-Japan Defense Alliance in 2025?**

In order to provide policy recommendations for decision-makers, and to properly conduct the analysis, the following research sub-questions were also answered:
1. What actors have the most influence over Japanese defense policy?
2. What are the driving forces behind Japanese defense policy?
3. What are the possible future conditions of Japanese defense policy, based on the identified actors and drivers?
4. What policy tools should be considered to support or deter these future conditions from occurring?

To answer these questions, background information was provided for Japan’s six recent modernization and normalization efforts, such as (1) reinterpreting the Japanese constitution to allow for collective self-defense (CSD), (2) relaxing restrictions on arms exports, (3) increasing the Japanese defense budget, (4) expanding deployments for Japanese Self-Defense Forces, (5) establishing a National Security Council, and (6) updating the 1997 U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines, which delineates the roles and responsibilities of each nation. These six facets of Japanese defense policy have shaped the direction and balance of the U.S.-Japan alliance for 70 years and their recent alteration necessitates a renewed analysis of the future of the alliance.

This thesis also relied on three primary assumptions. First, that Japan would generally continue in the spirit of the Yoshida Doctrine, which outlines the importance of maintaining the U.S.-Japan alliance; second, that Japan desires tier-one status, without which, many of the policy recommendations developed would be unattainable; and third, that crises, conflicts, and incidents should be avoided in the region.

To accomplish the Alternative Futures Analysis, 65 Japanese and English search terms were utilized to data mine 842 news and journal articles, 23 public polls, and 2.9 million Tweets from August 2014 to May 2015 on the topic of Japanese defense policy and the U.S.-Japan alliance. Although these data points were gathered in both Japanese and English, software limitations forced the use of English-only data, reducing the total data set to 304,565 articles, polls, and Tweets from the previous nine months. These data points were then uploaded into the Intelligence Paradigm for Information Retrieval and Exploration (IN-SPIRE) text visualization and analysis tool for content analysis.

By using word patterns and statistical algorithms to identify key themes from within the data set, the visualization software was able to cluster the documents into the 25 most commonly mentioned actors and 20 most-prevalent facets of Japanese defense policy. These facets of Japanese defense policy were then expanded into 29 overall driving forces by manipulating their direction of progress.

An anonymous, online survey was then sent to 254 subject matter experts, consisting of Japanese, American and other nationality participants from the last five years’ worth of Track 1.5 U.S.-Japan Security Dialogues, and 62 international affairs professionals under the age of 35 from the Center for Strategic and International Studies Pacific Forum Young Leaders program.

The resulting 72 participants (response rate = 28.3 percent) were asked to rate the level of influence and likelihood for each of the 29 driving forces, and the level of influence of each of the 25 actors along a five-point Likert scale. The experts were also given the opportunity to provide input regarding the future of the U.S.-Japan alliance and the operational environment, using several open-ended questions related to the most likely, best case, worst case, and least prepared for futures facing the alliance.

Once the results were analyzed to determine validity and reliability (confidence threshold = 95 percent), the data was plotted according to influence and likelihood scores to determine four categories of driving forces. From these categorized drivers emerged four driving forces that exhibited the greatest influence over Japanese defense policy, and several unlikely, but highly influential drivers facing the alliance – a total of eight key drivers. These key drivers were: (1) the Chinese military budget, (2) the implementation of collective self-defense, (3) the level of U.S. primacy in the region, (4) the level of Japanese nationalism, (5) the level of public opinion for collective self-defense, (6) the presence of an armed territorial dispute, (7) the level of public opinion regarding the alliance, and (8) the level of Japan’s military budget.
The manipulation of these eight key drivers in both positive and negative directions, according to various weights, led to the creation of six plausible and distinct futures. These six futures were then amplified with rich, convincing scenarios, describing plausible and distinct circumstances facing the alliance over the next ten years. This process allowed for the identification of 169 different indicators of scenario progress, signaling which of the six scenarios were likely to develop, or already in development.

By analyzing these indicators of progress, 23 policy recommendations were designed to either assist in the development of positive scenarios, or hinder the progress of negative ones. Additionally, a monitoring scheme based on recurring publications was developed, in order to routinize the observation of developing scenarios, allowing planners and intelligence professionals the ability to adjust policy as the operational environment evolves over the next ten years.

This extensive research was ultimately accomplished over the course of nine months, with more than 2.9 million data points, two highly technical software suites, and the critical support of 72 subject matter experts. In the chapters that follow are detailed descriptions of each of the eight analytic steps used to create 23 multi-INt derived policy recommendations for strategic planners and decision-makers to consider. While some facets of the proposed future scenarios are somewhat unlikely, they should still be prepared for with broad-ranging, holistic policy considerations. Such foresight is essential in proactively achieving strategic objectives, while avoiding strategic surprise.

This exhaustive study of the future of the U.S.-Japan alliance incorporates the systematic evaluation of more than 304,000 articles, polls, and Tweets from the previous nine months. This data set led to the identification of 29 driving forces and 25 significant actors, that 72 subject matter experts ranked in terms of likelihood and influence. Once analyzed, these drivers were distilled into eight key drivers, which were manipulated to create six distinct futures and corresponding scenarios, yielding 169 indicators of progress and 23 policy recommendations. This extensive analysis took more than eight months to accomplish, and several areas for further research were identified along the way.

First, many of the indicators of progress identified in Chapter 8 are simply overt manifestations of events and foreign policy widely observed through open source media, such as through the recurring publication of budgets, election results, and implemented legislation. Some of the indicators, on the other hand, infer an ability to predict certain events, or to determine its intent. Such a capabilities analysis was outside the scope of this study, and would require additional research into the ability to monitor such events.

Despite the small numbers of Japanese participants, there appeared to have been some differences between Japanese and American responses, though the statistical significance is unknown. The statistical analysis also revealed several generational differences between the youngest and oldest respondents, which may warrant further investigation, as these young policy professionals will one day become the primary decision-makers affecting the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Regarding the responses themselves, of particular note, think tanks were ranked third to last in terms of their level of influence over Japanese defense policy, despite their relatively high level of influence on American foreign policy. In the United States, many retired governmental officials belong to Think Tanks and provide insight on policy objectives to the public, whereas Japanese citizens primarily hear from university scholars or non-affiliated government officials. As a result, the United States boasts more than 1,800 Think Tanks, compared to only 103 in Japan. Such cultural and professional differences between the relative influence of think tanks over policy could alter aspects of how U.S. policymakers interact with their Japanese counterparts.

Furthermore, several survey limitations could be further mitigated with additional research. One of the earlier discarded options was to utilize Delphi procedures for the zero. Of note, it is arguable whether anyone under the age of 25 could be considered an expert in East Asian affairs, though the potential for these participants to lead policy in the future should not be overlooked.

Conclusion

During the 1960s, NASA astronauts were directed to practice recovering an out of control space capsule by manually firing guidance thrusters, although many of the astronauts considered such an accident too unlikely to waste time and energy preparing for it. Despite the event’s unlikelihood, Neil Armstrong found himself in exactly that position during Gemini 8’s mission in 1966. Because Armstrong had prepared for just such an unlikely situation, he was able to successfully regain control of the module and return to Earth safely. The lesson the astronauts learned was that even the most unlikely events should be prepared for if the consequences are great enough.

Using a combination of case studies, alternative futures analysis, online surveys of subject matter experts, and statistical and content analyses of social and news media outlets, this thesis provides six potential futures for the U.S.-Japan alliance in 2025.

While some facets of the proposed future scenarios are somewhat unlikely, they must still be prepared for with broad-ranging, holistic policy considerations, 13 of which are intended to help guide the development of the best-case scenario for both nations. Such foresight is essential in proactively attaining such outcomes, while avoiding strategic surprise - lest we fail to learn from the lessons of Gemini 8, and neglect to prepare for even the unlikeliest of futures.

About the Author

Major Atkins is a political affairs strategist in Headquarters Air Force – Regional Affairs Division. He is a Sasakawa Peace Foundation Non-Resident Fellow for Pacific Forum – CSIS, and an Adjunct Fellow with American Security Project. He holds Masters degrees in Political Science and Strategic Intelligence, and a Bachelors degree in Electrical Engineering.
Our white Toyota Prado hurdled southwest out of Tashkent along the main road towards the ancient Silk Road city of Samarkand. The Senior Defense Official/Defense Attaché (SDO/DATT) in Uzbekistan was behind the wheel. Entering his fifth year of cumulative service in this Central Asian republic, he was familiar with both Uzbek driving rules and customs and the unceasing attention needed for dodging potholes. The August sun beat down on the dusty Uzbek plains as melon peddlers tried enticing passing motorists to pull over and purchase one of their giant honeydews or succulent watermelons. We kept driving, eventually entering the city of Jizzakh, winding our way past the city center and onto a quiet side street.

The Uzbek Ministry of Defense (MOD) handles access to their military facilities with great care and views foreigners in their country with guarded suspicion. It was only after multiple requests that the Uzbek MOD finally allowed their U.S. defense counterparts working at the U.S. Embassy in Tashkent the opportunity to visit the Uzbek Air Force Academy. The academy is located in Jizzakh, situated approximately an hour's drive northeast of Samarkand. Due to the infrequency of this type of access, meetings like this are critical for gaining a better understanding of the Uzbek Armed Forces and identifying ways to further enhance military cooperation.

The Academy Commander met us after entering the base and led us to a classroom in a small academic building with one hall adorned with shiny information posters of both Russian and Western rotary wing aircraft. In a style reminiscent of tense Cold War negotiations, we sat opposite a sea of blue uniforms – instructors at the academy – while the commander described the academy's history, purpose, and a few details about the training. After the 20-minute briefing he offered to answer questions.

The SDO/DATT and Air Attaché began by asking general questions about the current organization and state of the Uzbek Air Force Academy. While the U.S. questioning was interpreted from English to Russian, for expediency and because of the U.S. officers’ Russian language aptitude, the responses from the Uzbek officers were not translated. Both sides spent the initial minutes of the question and answer session determining the boundaries of the conversation. Despite the halted and sometimes awkward exchange, the one-sided questioning slowly expanded into an open, constructive discussion between the academy instructors and the U.S. officers – a sign of a successful engagement. As the conversation progressed into comparisons between the curricula of the U.S. Air Force Academy and Uzbek Air Force Academy, the disparity between the fundamental purposes of each academy became clear.

As the third different Uzbek academy instructor posed the same rephrased question aimed at learning about the academy’s flight training regimen, the chasm between both sides’ starting points became even more apparent. Surely the academy for the most powerful air force in the world has a robust aviation-training curriculum! But unlike the degree and leader-producing academic institution of the USAF Academy, this “academy” in a small city in central Uzbekistan is a technical military school more like the U.S. Army Aviation Center of Excellence at Fort Rucker, but with some glaring differences. As a former Army aviator who trained at Fort Rucker, the details of Uzbek rotary wing aviation training were particularly interesting to me. Drawing on my knowledge and experiences from my basic branch, I was able to add to the conversation and draw conclusions from what we learned about the current state of the Uzbek Air Force Academy.

Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) are tasked with learning the host nation’s culture and language in order to understand how our allies, partners, or adversaries see the world. Setting aside preconceived notions of what a concept means is often
critical to truly understanding our counterparts. This clearly different view of an air force academy had the two sides of the table briefly talking past each other. Once we were able to recognize the disconnect, the SDO/DATT highlighted the core differences between the USAF Academy and the institution in which we were sitting, which ultimately led to a more complete mutual understanding of the military training and structure of the other.

Five weeks earlier I stepped off a plane into the stifling Tashkent air for the first time. As a young FAO beginning a year of In-Region Training (IRT) working in the Office of Military Cooperation, the learning curve was as steep as Central Asia was foreign. Those first five weeks were peppered with embassy engagements, security cooperation events, and several interactions with our interlocutors at the MOD. Eager to learn and grateful for experiences like this trip to Jizzakh, I valued opportunities to study the dynamics of these interactions and listen to the conversations as well as the thoughts of experienced officers processing the event after the fact.

The U.S. and Uzbekistan share a complex post-Soviet history. Following the events of September 11, 2001, the U.S. sought basing rights in Uzbekistan in support of the Global War on Terror. The air base in southern Uzbekistan near the cities of Karshi and Khanabad, colloquially known as K2, was only operational for three-and-a-half years before the Uzbek government decided to expel the U.S. and shutter the base. In May 2005 an uprising in the eastern Uzbek city of Andijan precipitated a response by Uzbek security forces, which left scores, and possibly hundreds dead. U.S. criticism of the government’s approach to this event and Uzbekistan’s human rights’ record in general soon followed. In addition to K2’s closure, rhetoric between the two sides following the Andijan incident resulted in the severance of military-to-military engagement for several years. However, during this time, U.S. involvement in Afghanistan increased and the need for a northern logistics route to and from Afghanistan emerged. Uzbekistan’s shared desire for regional security became evident in 2009, as attempts to reconcile proved successful. Bilateral security cooperation resumed and the Northern Distribution Network began transiting Uzbekistan.

Advancements in the relationship, however, have moved at a glacial pace. Contrary to security cooperation in NATO countries where the Office of Defense Cooperation is often located within or adjacent to the host nation’s MOD, allowing for greater transparency, collaboration, and a shared understanding, cooperation efforts in Uzbekistan are stilted and seemingly more one-sided. Yet, after several visits to the U.S. military academies and a statement from the late Uzbek president urging increased cooperation in the area of military education, the invitation to visit the Jizzakh Air Force Academy seemed to demonstrate that the Uzbeks were willing to reciprocate, for now.

En route back to the capital that afternoon I pored over a map in the back seat of the SUV. Unbeknownst to me, on the way to Jizzakh we had been forced to reroute briefly because the main highway, while a direct route, transits a peninsula of Kazakhstan’s territory for roughly 20 kilometers. Extending our trip by an hour while we routed around the Kazakh territory, the DATT remarked flatly that this detour is one of many examples of infrastructure in Central Asia that was originally designed and constructed during the Soviet period when these borders mattered far less.

As I thought about the Soviet legacy, I realized how much of Uzbekistan’s system still reflects the 70 years of Soviet rule. From the similarities in their present-day military dress uniform, to the cumbersome nature of their governmental bureaucracy, the Soviet influence is still prevalent in daily military-to-military engagements. The centralized system that replaces low-level initiative with fear and compliance has seemingly changed little from Soviet days. While problems with Soviet-era infrastructure are a tangible example of that legacy, the bloated and ineffectual system that most professional interactions operate within, is a prominent mark of work in Central Asia. When attempting to understand Uzbekistan, it is essential to acknowledge the Soviet influence and how it still manifests itself today.

Several weeks after the trip to Jizzakh I found myself sitting in a tightly controlled outdoor amphitheater as dusk began to paint the sky orange and pink. As I scanned the crowd, I noted that among the throng of suits and dresses was the occasional foreign military uniform. September 1 is the Uzbek Independence Day, each year celebrated by a staged, showy program in the center of the capital. During his 25 years as the Uzbek leader, recently deceased President Islam Karimov would give an annual address lauding Uzbek accomplishments and potential prior to several hours of music and dancing.

As the Uzbek leader, sometimes referred to as “Papa” by locals, delivered his address, I followed along with the script in the program. Consistent with previous addresses, President Karimov reiterated Uzbekistan’s well-known non-alignment policy. Codified into Uzbek law in 2012, the president declared once again that Uzbekistan would not join any political or military bloc, and would not deploy its armed forces outside its borders.

As in Silk Road days, Uzbekistan still occupies strategic terrain, and as a result Uzbekistan is uniquely significant to Russia, China, and the United States. In addition to Uzbekistan’s
Soviet legacy and U.S. regional interests, China is flexing its economic might by investing in Uzbekistan’s infrastructure. Within the framework of its “One Belt, One Road” initiative, China is a main investor in a complex rail project aimed at connecting the Uzbek cities of Andijan and Tashkent. The current railroad route between these two parts of Uzbekistan passes through 110 kilometers of northern Tajikistan, causing a host of security concerns and costing millions of dollars in transit fees. In 2013 Uzbek Railways began construction on an 80-mile long electric rail line that will connect the eastern cities with the rest of the country via the Kamehik mountain pass. China has poured nearly half a billion dollars into the construction of the 12-mile mountain tunnel that connects rail on either side. This initiative strongly demonstrates China’s interest in establishing a foothold in the region.

Despite its strategic location and the overtures from foreign powers, Uzbekistan has managed to keep China, Russia, and the U.S. at an arm’s length. In 2012 Uzbekistan suspended its membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and revoked U.S. basing rights in 2005. Uzbekistan’s non-alignment policy heavily influences the current U.S. security cooperation efforts, as Uzbekistan seeks to extract opportunities, equipment, and training while committing to little. Balancing cooperation with these three powers so as not to show favoritism, while furthering national interests, is something the Uzbeks are fairly adept at doing.

Yet many of the same factors that make Uzbekistan challenging and complex are also what make U.S. engagement here essential. Its Soviet legacy, dominant location in Central Asia, ongoing fight with terrorism, as well as its economic and security potential all contribute to Uzbekistan’s significance in the region. Foreign policy challenges do not lessen the importance of Uzbekistan to the region and to achieving common objectives of peace and stability.

Two months later I was on the same road to Jizzakh, this time to conduct two site surveys for an upcoming U.S.-Uzbek training event. Viewed by the MOD as the most valuable joint exchange of the year, this was the third year a U.S. Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA) would work for an extended period of time with an Uzbek special operations unit. As expected, everything was in order as we visited both locations.

Rain and bitter wind moved in late in the day and the darkness of the November evening seemed to come quicker than usual. As our work-related discussion drew to a close, the Uzbek officers with whom we had spent the day insisted we stay for dinner at the base’s dining facility. Entering the private room off of the main hall, we were greeted by a tremendous spread of nuts, fruits, meats, and cheeses, with several bottles of Uzbek cognac and vodka nestled in the middle of the table.

Punctuating the delicious meal of local fare were toasts to our mutual success and continued cooperation. While service members stateside were enjoying a well-deserved day off as they celebrated Veterans Day, I found myself feasting and laughing around a table of U.S. and Uzbek soldiers. Not even halfway through my year of In-Region Training in Uzbekistan, I realized that in spite of the challenging bilateral relationship with differing goals, some things are universal. FAOs have unique opportunities to forge relationships in similar settings all over the world.

The discussion during this shared meal on an Uzbek military base not far from the Tajik border was not particularly profound, but the fact that it could occur and potentially further U.S. interests made it very significant. Sitting at the table, sharing a meal, and speaking the language are critical aspects of FAO work and vital to maintaining security lines of communication. After surveying an old Soviet base in central Mongolia for possible U.S. use in the future, retired FAO Colonel Tom Wilhelm remarked, “There is nothing we need to build here, except relationships.”

Uzbekistan’s geographic location is significant for security issues on the Eurasia land mass. Chaos and conflict are ravaging Syria, Afghanistan, Libya, and Yemen. Russia is asserting its agenda in the former Soviet space and beyond. A colossal migrant crisis is testing the unity of the European Union. China continues to assert its influence in the South China Sea. Central to a region that is rich in natural resources, on the front lines in the fight against terrorism, and critical to two different Silk Road revival policies, Uzbekistan’s stability is a linchpin in a part of the world that is often unpredictable. Furthermore, the recent assumption of the presidency by former prime minister Shavkat Mirziyoyev provides an opportunity to improve relations beyond the status quo.

Despite the challenges to bilateral security cooperation, the nature of our current operating environment is constantly evolving. Individual relationships and common understanding established and sustained in spite of deliberate roadblocks to cozy defense cooperation could prove vital in the not-so-distant future.

About the Author
Major Timothy Speace is a FAO who conducted In Region Training in the Office of Military Cooperation in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Previously an OH-58 aviation officer, he has held various leadership and staff positions in the 7th Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment at Fort Campbell, Kentucky and in 4/6th Attack Reconnaissance Squadron at Fort Lewis, Washington. He is now a student in the Master of International Affairs Degree program at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs.
The Unbalance to Asia
How Continued Military-to-Military Engagement Empowers Chinese Behavior

BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL MICHAEL BROWN, U.S. AIR FORCE,
LIEUTENANT COLONEL TROY CERNY, U.S. AIR FORCE,
MAJOR JOHN TOOHEY, U.S. ARMY, AND
MAJOR JAMON JUNIUS, U.S. ARMY

United States military-to-military (mil-to-mil) engagement with China is missing the mark, and as a result, is diminishing U.S. influence in the Pacific and across the globe. Since resuming mil-to-mil exchanges with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1993, the U.S. focused on developing a stable and constructive military relationship with China that promotes and sustains regional security and prosperity in Asia, and in the rest of the world. This was designed to serve U.S. interests by ensuring China acts in a manner that is consistent with international norms. However, recent activity by the Chinese in the South China Sea (SCS) demonstrates that the objective of U.S. mil-to-mil engagement is failing, which results in not only a more aggressive China, but also creates the perception of a United States that lacks the credibility to protect its interests and those of our allies. The United States must curtail its current “engagement at all costs” strategy, and begin to use the U.S.-China mil-to-mil program as a means to shape and incentivize future Chinese behavior to meet U.S. strategic interests.

U.S. Strategy for Engagement

According to the 2016 Annual Report to Congress, the Department of Defense’s (DoD) plan for engagement with China focuses on three primary Lines of Effort (LOE): (1) building sustained and substantive dialogue through policy dialogues and senior leader engagements; (2) building concrete, practical cooperation in areas of mutual interest; and (3) enhancing risk management efforts that diminish the potential for misunderstanding or miscalculation. While the mil-to-mil program succeeded in the first two LOE’s, it is failing at the third. More importantly, it negates U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) emphasis on “reaffirming our security commitments to allies and partners, investing in their capabilities to withstand coercion, [and] imposing costs on those who threaten their neighbors or violate fundamental international norms . . .” The execution of U.S. mil-to-mil engagement fails to align with DoD goals, and results in an emboldened China and diminished returns for the U.S.

Despite these shortcomings, the U.S. continues to engage the Chinese through confidence building measures, academic and functional exchanges, ship visits, exercises, and high-level visits designed to shape PRC military institutions and senior Chinese military leaders. This ostensibly allows the U.S. “to exchange views on the international security environment, to identify areas of common interest, to manage differences, and to facilitate common approaches to shared challenges.” While these objectives play an essential role in projecting U.S. foreign policy and national security interests, they are not producing the desired results, thus enabling Beijing to behave in a manner that suits their national objectives at the expense of U.S. interests. The end result is a PRC that is not only undeterred by the U.S., but is actually incentivized to misbehave by the mil-to-mil program. In order to understand this, however, a brief explanation of China’s activities and strategy in the SCS is required.

Chinese Strategy for Military-to-Military Engagement

At the heart of the issue is that the Chinese see a large portion of the SCS -- defined by the so-called “nine-dash line” -- as Chinese territorial waters. These waters overlap with territorial claims from the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, and Taiwan. China’s claims to the SCS intensified with the discovery of large petroleum and natural gas reserves in the 1970’s. These territorial claims became progressively more assertive as China’s military strength increased over the past three decades, with some of the claims directly impacting U.S. allies in the region, such as the Philippines. Furthermore, as China continues to transition from a sluggish state-dominated system to an international economic powerhouse, the protection of trade routes and securing of natural resources become essential to ensuring the legitimacy of the Communist Party among the Chinese people.
Therefore, Beijing sees control of the SCS as absolutely crucial in their strategic objectives of perpetuating Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule and maintaining domestic stability. Successful Chinese management of their mil-to-mil program is a critical element in keeping the United States at bay while seizing control over the SCS.

China is undertaking an incremental strategy, enabling them to slowly change the status quo on the ground while keeping any disputes with other nations below the threshold of military conflict – the United States included. China does this by framing its relationship with the U.S. in terms of the New Type Great Power Relationship (NTGPR). A uniquely Chinese construct, the NTGPR can be described in three broad points: (1) No conflict or confrontation; (2) mutual respect for core interests; and (3) mutually beneficial areas of “win-win” cooperation. Although this appears agreeable on the surface, the Chinese are attempting to impose this onto American policymakers as a way of pursuing their strategic goals. If Beijing can compel the U.S. to accept the NTGPR, even in principle, then they will have succeeded in cornering the Americans into a relationship where the possibility of conflict or confrontation is improbable, and one where the U.S. implicitly recognizes China’s interests in the SCS, all the while leading the U.S. to believe that it is in their interests to do so. This carries the added psychological benefit of convincing the U.S. that any attempt to act assertively to resist PRC claims in the SCS would destroy this indispensable relationship. It is increasingly evident that Beijing’s “win-win” scenario simply means that China wins twice. In China’s eyes, mil-to-mil is a crucial element of this strategy.

In the context of the NGTPR, the Chinese have two main objectives for mil-to-mil engagement with the U.S. The first is a genuine desire to understand how the U.S. military trains, equips, and operates. This is done via high-level visits, recurrent academic and functional exchanges, and joint/multilateral exercises. Exchanges in each of these areas allow the Chinese military to gain valuable insight into U.S. operations -- experience that can be used if ever challenged in the SCS.

The second objective for U.S.-China mil-to-mil by the PRC is to use the program to give the appearance of genuine cooperation with the United States. This has indirect, but intentional effects; it allows China to implement their incremental strategy in the SCS on one hand while seeming to “cooperate” with the U.S. on the other. This enables the Chinese to execute their mil-to-mil objectives while distracting the U.S. from its mil-to-mil objectives, resulting in hesitation from U.S. leaders when their perceived paradigm of mutual U.S.-China security interests is not realized. This hesitation prevents U.S. leadership from taking any decisive action in the SCS, which serves to legitimize Chinese behavior in the eyes of regional actors since the U.S. continues to engage in mil-to-mil despite China’s provocative actions.

In light of PRC goals regarding mil-to-mil engagements with the U.S. military, it is apparent that the United States’ strategy is more conducive to Chinese goals than those of the U.S.. In fact, even a cursory review of U.S. mil-to-mil behavior vis-a-vis China reveals why this is the case, and how the Chinese continue to take advantage of the situation.

Why It’s Not Working
Mil-to-mil engagements with China are not effective in realizing U.S. goals as stated in DoD’s Annual Report to Congress on the Military and Security Developments with China. In fact, Beijing currently has no reason to cease its aggressive behavior, specifically its activity in the SCS, since the U.S. continues to reinforce Chinese behavior through continued mil-to-mil engagement. Senior leader engagements, academic and functional exchanges, ship visits, and exercises that bolster the prestige and legitimacy of Chinese armed forces are occurring simultaneously with aggressive and expansionist PRC activities. These exchanges are

**MIL-TO-MIL EXCHANGES WITH CHINA DO NOT MEET U.S. OBJECTIVES, RATHER, THEY INVITE AN EXPANSIONIST PRC THAT THREATENS TO DESTABILIZE THE REGION.**

then interpreted to sanction and legitimize Chinese activity that is incompatible with U.S. strategy and regional goals. Furthermore, this is being accomplished while the Chinese continue to reap the benefits of studying and learning how the U.S. operates.

Recent history suggests that the U.S. continues to incentivize engagement with China through ever increasing mil-to-mil events, even at the expense of the U.S. and allied interests. While China was busy dredging artificial islands in the SCS, the U.S. invited the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to participate in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) Naval exercise, the first time China had been invited to the multinational exercise. Concurrently, the U.S. rescinded the invite to its oldest Asian ally, Thailand, to express dissatisfaction with Bangkok over its recent military activities. This reinforced Beijing’s perception of the United States’ “engagement at all costs” strategy with China. Later the same year, the U.S. participated in the Chinese Zhuhai Airshow by sending a C-17 to the event, but prevented the Republic of Korea’s (ROK) Black Eagles T-50 aerial demonstration team from participating, despite being on the schedule. Additionally, since 2014, the Chinese Coast Guard has attempted to block (sometimes successfully) regular attempts by our allies in the Philippine Navy to resupply its soldiers on the BRP Sierra Madre with food and water at Second Thomas Shoal. This did not, however, deter the United States from continuing to reward the PRC with continued mil-to-mil engagement. This behavior by the U.S. reinforces the Chinese view of U.S. mil-to-mil “engagement at all costs” strategy and strengthens Chinese perceptions of the value that the U.S. places
on its mil-to-mil relationship with the PRC. In fact, U.S. actions -- or inaction -- and the results thereof, are running directly contrary to its stated regional goals and objectives; a message that is disconcerting to regional and global allies as Beijing leverages a U.S. “say-do” gap.

Despite concerted U.S. mil-to-mil efforts to engage China in a way that encourages responsible PRC behavior, the PRC is still acting provocatively in the region. Examples include: The USS Cowpens incident in 2013 in which a Chinese amphibious ship swung across the bow of the U.S. Naval vessel; the establishment of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in 2013 over territory claimed by Japan and the ROK; land reclamation in territorial waters claimed by both the Philippines and Vietnam beginning in 2014; blocking the resupply of the Philippine Navy ship BRP Sierra Madre on the Second Thomas Shoal in 2015; unsafe intercepts of U.S. patrol aircraft; Chinese UAV flights into Japanese airspace over the Senkakus in 2013; and dispatching China National Offshore Oil Company’s (CNOOC) Rig 981 to the SCS to explore for oil in disputed territorial waters. The lack of resolve or appropriate U.S. response to these persistent activities continues to reinforce PRC views of America’s “engagement at all costs” strategy.

Call to Action
The U.S. must curtail mil-to-mil engagements with China in order to achieve desired U.S. goals in the region. Current U.S. inaction lead the Chinese to believe that the U.S. will overlook any misdeed in order to maintain a healthy mil-to-mil relationship with the PRC. Chinese suspicions seem to be confirmed by the apparent U.S. refusal to modify any planned events or activities in the U.S.-China mil-to-mil program, despite Beijing’s increasingly aggressive behavior in the SCS. This behavior is especially odd considering the U.S. did not hesitate to suspend mil-to-mil with Russia in 2008 over their war with Georgia, and more recently in 2014 over their annexation of the Crimea in Ukraine.

Because PRC leaders perceive that the U.S. values continued mil-to-mil engagement with China at any cost, they are not afraid to use it as a tool to shape U.S. behavior. For example, in 2007 thru 2010, the PRC suspended mil-to-mil ties with the U.S. over U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Additionally, in 2014 the Chinese canceled the U.S.-China Cyber Working Group in response to the U.S. Justice Department’s indictment of five Chinese officers on charges of hacking and economic espionage. These recent examples are indicative of the importance that China attaches to using mil-to-mil in response to U.S. actions to shape U.S. behavior, and may provide insight into enticements that the Chinese might respond favorably to. This provides the U.S. an opportunity to use mil-to-mil as a behavior modification tool, if it will only take advantage of it. If the U.S. continues with an “engagement at all costs” strategy regardless of Chinese activity, then the U.S. will further validate PRC provocations and behavior, while diminishing its own legitimacy and influence. This runs counter to U.S. objectives of “ensuring China acts in a manner consistent with international rules and norms,” and fails to impose costs on those who threaten their neighbors or violate fundamental international norms.

The UN Permanent Court of Arbitration recently ruled that China’s claims in the SCS are inconsistent with international law. This ruling provides the U.S. a narrow window of opportunity to act quickly before China can fully counter U.S. influence and dominance in the region. The U.S. should use mil-to-mil as an incentive to slow and disincentivize intrusive PRC activity in the region before military force becomes the required tool to modify Chinese behavior. China is making rapid strides at gaining quantitative and qualitative military advantages in the region, which will limit future U.S. deterrence options. This becomes more urgent as Beijing continues to use the U.S.-China mil-to-mil program as a tool to increase their own logistical and organizational capabilities while expanding power projection capabilities in the SCS, and thus, further emboldening China’s territorial claims over the region.

Conclusion
Mil-to-mil exchanges with China do not meet U.S. objectives, rather, they invite an expansionist PRC that threatens to destabilize the region. This emboldens and advances Chinese interests at the expense of U.S. objectives. The Chinese have not responded to the U.S. mil-to-mil engagement goals of “enhancing risk management efforts that diminish the potential for misunderstanding or miscalculation.” Furthermore, our mil-to-mil relationship with China fails to emphasize the NSS strategy of “imposing costs on those who threaten their neighbors or violate fundamental international norms,” since Chinese activity continues unabated. The value that China places on mil-to-mil provides the U.S. with a distinct opportunity for leverage. Due to PRC military developments, the U.S. has a limited window to impose tangible costs on the Chinese, or at least stop rewarding them. Therefore, the U.S. must modify the current policy of “engagement at all costs”, curtailing the ineffective aspects of the mil-to-mil program as a means to influence future PRC behavior. A policy that seeks to curtail those aspects of the relationship which the Chinese value, will serve the U.S. by ensuring that China acts in a manner consistent with international norms and is a more responsible global partner. mil-to-mil engagement with China is missing the mark and as a result, is diminishing U.S. influence in the Pacific and across the globe.

About the Authors
Lieutenant Colonel Michael Brown serves at the Defense Intelligence Agency. He was commissioned through the United States Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) in 2000. He earned a BA in Asian Studies from Utah State University in 2000, and an MA in International Relations from American Military University in 2008. Prior to his current assignment, Lieutenant Colonel Brown was the Assistant Air Attaché in Beijing, China.

Lieutenant Colonel Troy Cerny, is the Chief of Plans, Programs, and Scheduling at the Joint Deployment Training
Taiwan’s All-Volunteer Force
Recruitment, Retention, and Identity

By Captain Jason P. Lam, U.S. Army

Beginning in 2008, the Taiwan military began its transition to an all-volunteer force (AVF). This initiative is part of a wider defense modernization program intended to allow the military to effectively meet the challenges of modern day conflict. The transition to an AVF affects the overall combat readiness of Taiwan’s armed forces and their ability to repel an invasion from Mainland China. Although the tension and risk of a breakout in cross-strait hostilities remains low, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) remains focused on re-taking Taiwan in the event of a crisis situation where outright independence is declared.

From its inception during the Nanjing Republic to its eventual retreat to Taiwan, nationalism played a key role in the Taiwan military. Taiwan’s ability to retain and inspire its next generation of ‘warfighters’ should be an area of significant concern, and as the military transitions to an AVF, they also have an opportunity to reinvigorate their ranks. Taiwan offers a unique case study in de-politicization of the armed forces and the effects it can have on organizational culture. The military is feeling the after-effects of de-politicization in the sense that the organization’s identity appears to be in transition. Tangible benefits matter, but people need to believe in what they are doing as well. The message the military uses to attract and retain talent offers a window into what they believe in. Vice versa, the success of that message informs us whether they are in synch with the rest of society. The primary argument this paper posits is that the Taiwan authorities have invested more resources into their recruiting and retention efforts. Although there been positive results in recruiting, the message appears to lack appeal for the general public.

By C a p t a i n J a s o n P. L a m , U. S. A r m y

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author alone. They do not represent the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, Stanford University, or any other entity.

Editor’s Note: In the interest of space, Captain Lam’s article is published here without his research notes. To see the full article with all research materials, visit www.faoa.org. We are pleased to bring you this outstanding scholarship.

Historical Background

Today’s Taiwan military started as a revolutionary army led by the Nationalist Party, otherwise known as the KMT. This fact is important because the military started as a party-army. Modeled on Leninist principles, the army had a political commissar system used to ensure political loyalty within the military. The Northern Expedition, which united China and began the era of the Nanjing Republic, was led by this party. Infused with Sun Yat-sen’s ‘Three Peoples’ Principles’ and nationalistic goals of unifying China to create a modern state capable of competing on the world stage, the army marched north. Spearheaded by political officers who set the conditions for victory, the KMT established dominance in an almost uncontested manner.

After their retreat to Taiwan in 1949, KMT leadership became focused on waging what Colonel (Retired) Monte R. Bullard -- a former U.S. Army Foreign Area Officer -- has termed ‘allegiance warfare.’ He defines this term as “the struggle for the hearts and minds or loyalties (allegiance) of all citizens, military and civilian.” It is a type of warfare that was intended to counter the Communist organizational weapon of internal subversion. Chiang Kai-shek eventually noted that efforts to retake the Mainland were 70% political and 30% military. This statement very much reflected domestic concerns as well. In the years following 1949, the Taiwan military’s main mission was to either prepare to retake the Mainland or prepare for a final PRC invasion. However, in the context of martial law, the bulk of the military’s efforts were spent either neutralizing subversives or leading the way in establishing foundations of citizenship, patriotism, and civic consciousness. Put more succinctly, the Taiwan military retained a warfighting identity but remained more active in internal political work during Taiwan’s martial law period.

The year 2000 was notable in Taiwan not just for being the first peaceful transfer of power to an opposing party, but it marked the beginning of de-politicization of the military itself. Emphasis was placed on military loyalty to the new constitutionally legitimate regime. In the official sense, the military was no longer a party-army. Due to controversial practices during the martial law period, however, there was an inherent distrust among the new DPP leadership towards the armed forces. In an effort to continue the process of de-politicization, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) set policies dictating that political
participation by on-duty military officers and enlisted personnel be prohibited. The effectiveness of this effort is debatable, as former President Chen Shui-bian was eventually accused of selecting and promoting officers loyal primarily to him, a DPP president.

The military has seen power shift twice since 2008. It first went back to the KMT with President Ma Ying-jeou, who worked to bring relations closer with Beijing. Now, power again rests with the DPP and the current president, President Tsai Ing-wen. The major cross-cutting cleavage between both parties remains cross-strait relations; where one party favors closer ties and possible unification with Mainland China, the other favors independence. This dichotomy creates a challenge for the military in carving its own identity and not only selling its message to the population it supports, but to itself. The last lines of the Soldier’s Chant, from a collection of political education materials circa 1951 states, “We will build a new China based on the Three Peoples’ Principles. And live prosperously and strong forever after.” In a commemorative book celebrating the 80th anniversary of Whampoa Military Academy located in Kaohsiung, one of the first quotes listed is from Sun Yat-sen, “Therefore, this is the reason why we found the Academy and create the revolutionary forces so as to save the destiny of China.” In the more recent DPP Blue Paper titled New Generation of Soldiers, the foreword comments state that they seek to “instill a new set of values of national defense – that is, not only to protect Taiwan’s way of life, but also to reflect our societal progress.” The quotes above reflect two differing visions of the military. One is dedicated to a unified China, and the other is something more akin to ‘defender of Taiwan.’ These visions very much impact organizational identity and get to questions of: Why serve, what am I fighting for, and what am I possibly sacrificing my life for?

Explanation of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF)
To a certain extent, the term “AVF” is misleading in the sense that only the active duty forces will be composed of volunteers. Military-age males are still required to attend four months of basic training before they are automatically put into reserve status. Reserve status is for eight years, during which reservists are required to attend training once every two years. This is a stark change from the former system that required that all military-age males serve two years of conscripted active duty service.

Many changes have been underway in making active duty military service an attractive option for recruits. Implemented in 2014, these incentives range from an increase in salary to a broad spectrum of subsidies that cover marriage, having children, death expenses, and child education. Incentives are also provided for assignments in combat units or locations in the outer islands, which may incur added hardship. Education and career advancement opportunities while in the service are also provided to make the military more competitive with the civilian sector. One of the biggest incentives is the post-military service benefits, which include retirement wages, educational assistance, job search guidance, and access to better medical care for veterans. Entrance level pay starts at 33,625 New Taiwan Dollars, which is already above the national average. Taken together, the changes currently underway make for a fairly comprehensive benefits package that would definitely appeal to certain parts of the Taiwan population.

Recruitment and Retention Results
Although it has had a slow start, the transition to an AVF appears to be picking up momentum. In an article from The China Post, a reporter noted that MND Human Resources representative Major General Liu Ching-chung stated “the high application rate shows government-initiated incentives are proving successful.” This assertion, made in November 2014, coincides with the salary increase for volunteer soldiers that started in January of that year. Furthermore, the 2015 NDR displays statistics showing that between January and August of 2015, recruitment reached 11,901 personnel. Also significant within this timeframe is a 70.2% retention rate.

However, critics are also quick to point out that recent success in attracting recruits is a result of “a downward revision of the annual benchmark to an easily achievable number, rather than a case of recruiting efforts meeting staffing needs in terms of quantity and quality.”

For example, in 2011 the recruitment requirement was 12,000 personnel. That year, recruitment only reached 6,500 volunteers. This number contrasts sharply in 2014 when they exceeded the target of 10,000 recruits and attained 15,024 volunteers. In general, success of the AVF concept still remains to be determined, and as the Taiwan authorities institute increased pay and comprehensive benefits, sustainability will also remain in question unless defense spending increases.

AVF Force Composition
Ideally, a nation’s military should represent a broad cross-section of society. Looking back at its history, the original Nationalist army that occupied Taiwan after World War II was composed entirely of Mainlanders who were, for the most part, loyal to the KMT and the idea of a unified China. They were not native to Taiwan, and many soldiers still thought of Mainland China as their home. With a conscription-based system, all military-age males were subject to the military’s egalitarian system and the ‘citizenship training’ that came with it. Colonel Bullard’s study notes that “every soldier was exposed to education...
and indoctrination which made clear what was politically and socially correct as defined by the system.” This had an effect of establishing a foundation of civic consciousness on the part of the population, but it also ensured some level of equity between Mainlanders and Taiwanese. Despite this egalitarianism, it should be noted that upper ranks remained mostly composed of Mainlanders for quite some time.

Looking at the composition of the military today, especially with regard to those who are opting to stay in the active-duty forces, an entirely different picture is arising. In an article analyzing the makeup of the armed forces, Taiwan scholar Wu Yi-nong looked across various criteria and determined that the system is inherently unjust. His data, which is based on information from Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense, its National Statistics Bureau, and city government offices, shows that the AVF tends to attract people from lower income families, aboriginal groups, and individuals located outside of Taipei. On the one hand, the new incentives of increased pay and educational opportunities appear to have some effectiveness. A military career path may appeal to these groups because it provides the possibility of upward mobility in society. However, by that same token these incentives are not enough, as recruitment efforts appear to be missing a significant portion of society. Despite an increase in tangible benefits, it would seem active-duty service appeals primarily to social groups that would benefit most from them.

Organizational Identity

One of the key problems with Taiwan’s military is its shifting organizational identity. To a certain extent de-politicization is still on-going. The military cannot completely shed its KMT roots, as that is where it came from. In fact, a number of senior officers most likely started their careers during that politicized period. By the same token, military leadership cannot spend too much effort reflecting on a past tied to the sacred mission of uniting China under a single banner. That time is long gone; yet the 2015 NDR ‘comic-book’ version, which appears intended for recruitment purposes, highlights this history with its front cover, which depicts pictures of Taiwan soldiers dating back to the revolutionary period. Military parades that celebrate the anniversary of the defeat of the Japanese in World War II also contribute to a sense of confused identity. Stated missions regarding protection of territorial integrity, which still mention the Taiping Islands and Diaoyus, are also tied to a past that is increasingly less relevant.

Incidentally, messaging may be a generational issue. With a growing sense of Taiwanese identity, especially among the youth, it is difficult to sell the image of the military’s past. Most recruitment videos and even documentaries that display Taiwan’s elite forces are trending towards selling the military as a physical challenge or an adventure. This alone is not enough though. An article by J. Michael Cole puts it best by saying, “The principle failure of the AVF effort is that the government and military establishment have been unable to win over enough young men and women who are willing to defend the nation. To do so, a proper definition of what we are fighting for needs to be provided.”

Final Thoughts

Based on the data analyzed in this paper, the tangibles appear in place. Higher pay and more comprehensive benefits have begun attracting more recruits. In order to attract a larger number, the military’s mission and role in society needs to be better clarified. With the DPP again coming to power, the military may see a shift in focus. The DPP Blue Papers (policy documents discussing defense topics) put forth reforms that seem to address the general neglect the armed forces received during President Ma Ying-jeou’s term. A discussion of Taiwan’s military capabilities in 2025 clearly states that “in the military realm, the establishment of effective deterrence and defense capabilities remains the core mission, maintaining stability in the Taiwan Strait by deterring Chinese military aggression toward Taiwan.” This statement is a clearly emphasizes the Taiwan military’s role as a force for deterrence. Of course, now that the DPP is in power, implementation remains to be seen.

To conclude, Taiwan’s transition to an AVF has strategic implications in a situation marked with ambiguity. The Taiwan Strait remains a potential hot spot, and if the Mainland government feels that peaceful reunification is becoming ever more distant, the potential for conflict will increase. To be sure, the U.S. maintains a ‘One-China policy’ and does not support Taiwan independence, but it is in U.S. interests to see peace maintained. By maintaining a robust, unofficial Taiwan policy, the U.S. displays not only its commitment to a vibrant democracy, but to maintaining a stabilizing presence in the Asia-Pacific region. The ability of the Taiwan authorities to recruit and retain quality military personnel factors directly into their ability to field an effective deterrent force and will remain a key defense issue.

About the Author

Captain (P) Jason Lam is a China FAO assigned to U.S. Forces Korea. He recently completed an Master of Arts in East Asian Studies at Stanford University, California. Prior to attending his ACS program, he completed In-Region Training in Beijing, China. He has held multiple assignments as an Army logistically while assigned to units in Korea and Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington. Captain Lam also holds an Associate of Arts degree in Chinese Mandarin from the Defense Language Institute and a Bachelor of Science Degree from the U.S. Military Academy. He speaks Chinese Mandarin and has basic proficiency in Korean.
Editor’s Note: In the interest of space we publish this team article without research notes. To see the full article with all research materials, visit www.faoa.org.

“And across the force, we’re investing in new skills and specialties, because in the 21st century, military strength will be measured not only by the weapons our troops carry, but by the languages they speak and the cultures they understand.”

These prescient words spoken by President Obama in 2009 reflect the necessity for cultural awareness at all levels of national defense in an increasingly interconnected geopolitical landscape. The United States military is a learning organization that constantly reviews its past performance in order to improve its effectiveness and efficiency. In former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey’s work Decade of War, Volume I: Enduring Lessons from a Past Decade of Operations, published 15 June 2012, he reviewed 46 lessons learned from 2003-2012, synthesizing 400 findings, observations, and best practices into 11 strategic themes. Lesson One in the volume espoused, “A failure to recognize, acknowledge and accurately define the operational environment led to a mismatch between forces, capabilities, missions, and goals.” Despite the most advanced tactics and weapons in modern warfare, the U.S. military found itself operating below its full potential primarily due to a lack of deep understanding of its operational environment.

To address this issue in the Pacific theater, General Dempsey introduced the Asia Pacific (APAC) Hands concept (modeled after Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands) in 2012. In his 2014 APAC Hands policy memo, he outlined two goals and one tasking to service chiefs and commanders of each combatant command. First, as the rebalance to Asia continues, the Chairman sought to provide more responsive and focused support to senior decision makers and Warfighters within the Asia-Pacific region. Second, he wanted to eliminate the situation where the availability of commanders and staff with operational experience and deep regional knowledge exists simply by chance. The Chairman wanted to deliberately shape career paths by rotating officers between operational tours in the Asia-Pacific.
region and regionally focused staff tours. The tasking is for each service chief and combatant commander to capture their best regional expertise training practices in order to better steer the APAC Hands concept.

This article analyzes the best practices across the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines Corps in developing language, regional expertise, and cultural (LREC) capabilities. It argues that the Navy is the furthest along in implementing a service-wide program that meets the criteria of the Chairman’s vision, while the Army has the best program in developing comprehensive LREC capability. Additionally, the Air Force offers a unique language enhancement program that could easily be implemented across the force. After identifying these best practices from the service branches, the article proposes a way ahead for implementation of the APAC Hands program.

Differing Service Approaches
Although each service branch trains and utilizes their regional specialists differently, there are some general practices they share: language training, graduate studies, and regional orientation.

U.S. Army invests in focused language and regional-cultural expertise
The U.S. Army has the oldest and most robust Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program to develop language and regional-cultural expertise. Select officers have the opportunity to spend up to four years in language study, in-region orientation, and graduate school. Unique to the Army FAO program is the opportunity to study at top-tier U.S. graduate schools. These eclectic institutions prove to be fertile ground for enhancing creative and divergent thinking – required faculties when navigating through complex geopolitical issues.

This robust program comes with a cost in both money and time. The single-track career U.S. Army FAO program is by far the most expensive and lengthy training pipeline. Consequently, it produces a dedicated cadre of LREC experts to serve in PACOM sub-regional (Southeast Asia and Oceania, Northeast Asia, and China) FAO billets. The U.S. Army FAO program formerly required officers to alternate between FAO and main branch assignments (i.e. dual-tracked), but years of utilization proved the single-track system was far superior in maintaining FAO skills.

The U.S. Army does not have a program to build baseline Asia-Pacific language and cultural expertise. However, in 2014 the U.S. Army Pacific Command established the Pacific Pathways to increase U.S. troop readiness, while strengthening Pacific-nation partnerships and relationships at the tactical and operational levels. The focus of this program is to conduct operational deployments in support of Pacific Command theater security cooperation. The first proof-of-concept iteration brought U.S. troops based in Washington and Hawaii to training exercises in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Japan.

Apart from the Army FAO program, U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) also maintains an independent LREC training program. As part of the SF Qualification Course (SFQC), SF Soldiers receive 26 weeks of LREC training. This training is geared to provide basic skills to enable the SF Soldier to conduct special warfare missions, most notably unconventional warfare. Additionally, a small number of SF Soldiers who demonstrate an advanced linguistic ability are selected to attend a subsequent six-month advanced language and area studies training program.

Following graduation from the SFQC, SF Soldiers can expect to utilize and grow their LREC skills. This is normally achieved through multiple foreign training and multinational exercise program deployments such as Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET), Counter Narcotics Training, or Joint Chiefs of Staff exercises within their assigned Group’s area of responsibility. These OCONUS deployments are usually one to two months in duration, low-visibility, and a full immersion experience that grows the SF Soldier’s LREC skills in support of Special Warfare capabilities development. Such assignments usually rely on the resourcefulness and LREC skills of the SF soldier to solve mission-related issues in these foreign nations.

Moreover, the opportunity to closely and continuously embed with host-nation military forces for such a long duration is a unique benefit of the SF utilization and maintenance system. This provides SF soldiers with access to engage host-nation counterparts on a personal and professional level, while integrated into the local environment. A significant by-product of this model is that SF teams gain experience in the art of obtaining information that might elude other government agencies assigned to the U.S. Embassy. In addition, due to the transient and low-visibility nature of SF deployments, there is potential for developing a diverse range of other skills and effects that support the U.S. country team and combatant commander objectives.

Finally, SF soldiers are routinely utilized within geographic combatant commands as part of theater special operations commands or a temporary joint task force. This extends the
professional experience of the SF Soldier to the operational level and increases the opportunity for enhancing LREC skills in the joint, interagency, and multinational domains.

U.S. Navy is the furthest along in a service-wide implementation program
The U.S. Navy, like the U.S. Army, has a single-track FAO program. Officers having developed a base of experience in tactical navy units can transfer to the FAO career field after seven to ten years of service. All Navy FAOs obtain a master’s degree at the Naval Post Graduate School in Monterey, California. After completing the 12-15 month program, officers usually continue language studies at the Defense Language Institute at the Presidio of Monterey. The most significant drawback to the Navy FAO program is the lack of a formalized in-country or in-region experience. Furthermore, whereas the Army, Marines Corps, and Air Force programs classify LREC experts at the sub-regional level (Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, etc.), the Navy classifies LREC experts at the broader combatant command (e.g PACOM) level. Without careful oversight of the assignment process, the use of such a broad categorization can result in officers being assigned outside the regions where they are most proficient.

For training the broader general-purpose force (GPF) in Asia-Pacific LREC skills, the Navy has jumped off to the quickest start, implementing their version of the APAC Hands program. The Navy used the notional career path in General Dempsey’s policy memo as a guideline to create a comprehensive program to develop regional, cultural, and language expertise. It begins at pre-commissioning Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) and U.S. Naval Academy programs, and has a tiered phase structure based on language and cultural expertise coupled with in-region coded assignments from baseline to expert levels. Other service components have yet to develop such a robust program to develop broad-based expertise and regional focus.

U.S. Air Force Language Enabled Airman Program is a sustainment best practice
Unlike the Army and Navy FAO programs, the Marine Corps and the Air Force utilize a dual-track system, where regional specialists alternate assignments from their core specialty (learned immediately after commissioning) and FAO assignments. The only major difference between these two programs is the timeframe at which an officer can apply to become a regional specialist. Marines can apply three years after commissioning. This is significantly earlier than the Air Force, which cross-trains their Regional Area Strategists (RAS) between the 7-10 year mark.

The intent of alternating assignments is to maintain the officer’s career progression in their primary specialty. This approach has both advantages and disadvantages. A disadvantage is that splitting assignments and time between two different career tracks diverts a complete focus on developing the language, regional expertise, and cultural skills necessary to become a regional expert. Whereas the Army and Navy FAO officers completely change their specialty codes from a previous career and devote 100 percent of their time and effort to becoming a regional specialist, Marine FAOs and Air Force RAS officers spent half as much time studying their region of specialty because they alternate back and forth. However, an advantage to the alternating system is that is keeps officers competitive for continued progression to senior leadership positions. It also keeps the officer relevant in the primary missions of their respective service branches, and allows direct insertion of LREC expertise into mission planning and execution. With a limited number of leadership positions available within the FAO/RAS community, a dual-track system allows multiple avenues for career progression. The notional APAC Hands career path follows this idea, but stipulates most operational assignments should remain relevant to the Asia-Pacific region.

Although not specifically a regional specialist track, both the Air Force and the Marines have Political-Military Affairs Strategist (PAS) and Regional Affairs Officer (RAO) specializations, respectively. These assignment opportunities do not always allow development of the full complement of LREC skills, when compared to the FAO/RAS program, but it does provide middle- to senior-level officers the opportunity to develop regional specific knowledge, with a focus on high-level diplomatic missions.

The development and sustainment of DoD Strategic Language List skills is an extremely important aspect of LREC capabilities. The Air Force takes the lead in this arena. In 2010 the Air Force implemented the Language Enabled Airmen Program (LEAP). LEAP’s goal is to sustain, enhance, and utilize the existing language skills of Air Force personnel by developing a core group of general-purpose force Airmen across specialties and careers that possess the capability to communicate in one or more foreign languages. The program is currently developing methods to assess the language speaker’s true language capabilities beyond DLPT scores (which assess only reading and listening), and aims to develop all four language modalities: reading, writing, speaking and listening. Combinations of online classroom mentoring and language classes, paired with biannual regional immersion, are a few of the methods that will be incorporated into the LEAP program.

Olmsted Scholar and Mansfield Fellow programs present unique in-country immersion experiences
Two additional special programs should also be briefly discussed. The Olmsted Scholar Program and the Mansfield Fellow Program are privately supported special development programs for officers from all service branches. These LREC skill development programs are structured slightly different than service branch-specific development programs, providing more flexibility for the officer to develop their own tailored curriculum.

The Olmsted Foundation’s mission is to “provide outstanding young military leaders an unsurpassed opportunity to achieve fluency in a foreign language, pursue graduate study at an overseas university, and acquire an in-depth understanding of foreign cultures, thereby further equipping them to serve.
in positions of great responsibility as senior leaders in the United States Armed Forces.” Additionally, Congress created the Mansfield Fellowship Program in 1994 for the purpose of building a group of U.S. government employees with proficiency in the Japanese language and practical, firsthand knowledge about Japan and its government. The program consists of homestay language training, cultural activities, supplemental education programs, and study tours with the goal of developing a network of contacts in Japan and an understanding of the political, economic and strategic dimensions of the U.S.-Japan relationship. This program is also open to all Department of Defense service branches.

Both Olmsted and Mansfield programs have a flexible approach that provides a unique opportunity for personal growth and cultural immersion difficult to replicate on a larger scale. This flexibility and uniqueness does come with a cost. On average, the Olmsted Foundation has supported 20 scholars each year for the past decade, split amongst the service branches. The Mansfield program has yet to support more than two military officers in the same year. Although these programs provide a great method of providing a small number of supplemental regional specialists, and sharing the same vision as the APAC Hands program, a training development plan of this kind would be difficult to replicate across the general purpose force.

Graduates from both the Olmsted and Mansfield Scholar program are utilized in different ways by their respective service branches. For example, an Air Force or Marine Olmsted Scholar will graduate from his or her training program, and then enter the dual-track system, alternating assignments between two different specialties. He or she will continue to receive language incentives, stay active in international affairs type jobs, but remain on track for promotion to senior leadership positions through his or her primary specialty. On the other hand, Army and Navy scholars do not receive a FAO specialty code and they return to their previous career field. In this regard, how a service branch chooses to utilize graduates from the Mansfield and Olmsted programs varies significantly amongst the service branches.

In summary, this article explained General Dempsey’s goals and intent behind the APAC Hands program; it analyzed each service’s LREC development programs, and highlighted relative strengths and weaknesses. However, providing a detailed breakdown of LREC training for each service branch is not the principal objective of this article. In the following section, best practices from all the service branches will be extracted and integrated in order to meet the needs of the APAC Hands program and meet the Chairman’s intent.

Proposed Joint Way Forward to Build Expertise

The chart below (Figure 1) is a summary of best practices currently utilized to develop LREC capability. Each service branch should take the above programs and processes into consideration when tailoring its own program. The first stage of development begins at the undergraduate educational level. Both the Chairman’s notional plan and the navy’s version of APAC Hands incorporate this into the training pipeline. A regional focus combined with language instruction in the earliest stages of one’s career is critical in developing an in-depth knowledge base of the Asia-Pacific region.

Language is a key ingredient to fully understanding a culture, and knowing both the formal and informal language of a specific country provides invaluable insight. The first stage of language development should occur at the university level. Programs such as the Critical Language Incentive Program (CLIPP) offer motivations for cadets to study key languages.

<table>
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<th>Best Practices</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Undergraduate LREC development programs in regional studies</td>
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<td>- CLIPP Program for undergraduate level</td>
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<td>2. Language development LEAP Program for language continuation training</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Masters degree in the Asia Pacific (either NPS or civilian institution)</td>
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<td>4. Period of culture immersion in the Asia-Pacific region</td>
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Additional Recommendations

1. Process to closely manage APAC Hand career paths
2. Plug in qualified personnel until APAC Hands program matures
3. Imbed Ph.D. level FAO in each COCOM, OSD, and Joint Staff levels
The program offers monthly stipends for participants and language immersion opportunities.

Once on active duty, we propose using a program such as the Air Force LEAP in order to develop and maintain strategic language capability across the force. The reason why we propose using LEAP over language sustainment programs in other service branches is because it is a flexible program, more comprehensive than other language sustainment programs across the force, and allows continuous educational development throughout one’s career, including during operational assignments. Another alternative would be what COL Richard Outzen refers to as the Ivy-Army Partnership. This was a proposed collaborative effort between top-tiered universities and the Army to establish centers focused on the development of high-level language skills.

Legislation passed in 2010 (Public Law 111-84) permitted this joint project, but it has not been seriously pursued. Furthermore, language skills must be incentivized. DOD regulations allow for multiple languages to be maintained up to a maximum of $1000 per month depending on proficiency levels.

An advanced academic degree in the Asia-Pacific area of study is another important piece in an APAC Hand’s educational development. The Army chooses to send its regional experts to obtain advanced degrees from prestigious civilian institutions across the nation, while the other three branches utilize the Navy Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. Both of these programs are excellent options, and we propose using both avenues as viable routes, depending on the officer’s career timing requirements.

A period of cultural immersion is one of the methods almost every service branch (including the Olmsted and Mansfield Programs) incorporate into their regional expertise development plans. We understand the intent of the APAC Hands program is not to necessarily produce full FAO/RAS officers, but we still consider some period of regional immersion a necessary part in gaining regional awareness. One additional month added to the biannual language immersion training would be a healthy dose of cultural immersion, and although a significantly longer time is preferable, compromises must be made in order to balance training and utilization.

A closely managed assignment and timing plan throughout an APAC Hands officer’s career is imperative in ensuring a continuous, well-rounded development strategy. Unfortunately, there is no specific recommendation we can propose that will prevent unintentional derailments. Each service branch must closely watch and guide their APAC Hands through each step in the development process, fighting the urge to take an APAC Hand off his/her development path to meet short-term Manning requirements. Falling into this habit will most assuredly dilute or disrupt the APAC Hands program before it is given the opportunity to bear fruit.

Finally, this regional expertise development plan starts at the earliest stages in an officer’s career and educational development. Although the development of regional experts is vital to making a program like APAC Hands successful, the proposed long-term development plan may take a generation before we see organically produced results. As such, there should be a way to plug officers into the program who already have the required operational and regional expertise. One example of this utilization is the DOD Military Personnel Exchange Program, in which LREC qualified officers serve in key operational billets assigned to a host-nation military. A more comprehensive approach to LREC for niche communities and general purpose forces development provides commanders with a combat multiplier for greater context of the operating environment and greater support to senior decision makers. Until APAC Hands produces the deep bench of senior leaders with regional expertise, one additional proposal is to imbue a PhD-level FAO for each service at the combatant command (COCOM), Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and Joint Staff levels. In addition to providing priceless regional insight to commanders, these O-6 level FAOs can also serve as senior mentors for FAOs throughout the region. This will provide an additional benefit by further developing the regional specialist forces, and helping build an information bridge between senior leader intent and the ground-level expertise of country team FAOs dispersed across the Asia-Pacific region.

Conclusion

The 2015 National Security Strategy states, “The United States has been and will remain a Pacific Power.” The Asia-Pacific region is home to more than 50 percent of the world population; over 3,000 languages are spoken there. Five of the seven U.S. treaty allies, seven of the world’s ten largest standing militaries, and five declared nuclear powers reside in the Asia-Pacific. As the United States adjusts to rising powers in the region, the geopolitical relationships in the region must be developed and maintained with the utmost awareness and
comprehension by our military leaders. A program that seeks to develop greater understanding of such a strategically important region by primarily utilizing already established programs should be pursued with the utmost sense of urgency.

However, a misguided effort with a sense of urgency has little chance of success. While this article recommends best practices for a joint way forward, the military service components (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines) are ultimately charged with the authority and responsibility for implementing the training and manning requirements of the program. Each component must not only tailor according to its capability requirements, but it must also justify budget proposals. Most importantly, each branch must incentivize individuals to participate in the program. Service members will only invest time to attain and maintain language and regional cultural expertise if it is tied to promotions and evaluations. Programmatically, this can be achieved through skill identifiers, promotion board instructions, requirements, and promotion rates. In the end, what gets measured gets done.

Secretary of Defense, James Mattis, is currently pushing for greater expertise in the Pentagon. He stated that he wants the Defense Department’s regional desks to be able to think in a manner equivalent to how people in their respective countries would think. He wants military officials to read the literature of the region in which they specialize and to genuinely understand their respective countries of responsibility, not merely focusing on the issues that affect bilateral relations with the United States. An APAC Hands model would be a positive step in attaining this desired expertise for tomorrow’s senior military leaders.

About the Authors
Major Ravi Balaram is a Southeast Asia FAO and Army Aviator. His education includes USMA at West Point, University of Massachusetts at Amherst, Georgetown School of Foreign Service, Defense Language Institute, and Royal Thai Army Command and General Staff College. He has served three tours in PACOM, two tours in EUCOM, one tour in SOUTHCOM, and one tour in CENTCOM. Most recently he was Director of Plans and Policy and Security Assistance Officer for Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group Thailand during the 2014 military coup and its aftermath. He is the Assistant Army Attaché-Designate, U.S. Embassy Gaborone, Botswana.

Major Shane Hughes is a C-17 pilot and Southeast Asia RAS. He recently completed a masters degree at Chulalongkorn University as part of the Olmsted Scholars Program, where he specialized in international relations and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Previous assignments include multiple combat deployments to Southwest Asia.

Major Ron Garberson is a Special Forces officer currently serving as a SF battalion executive officer, and maintains an Asia-Pacific regional orientation. He recently completed the Olmsted Scholarship in Thailand while earning a Master of Arts degree in Southeast Asian Studies from Chiang Mai University (Thai program) while conducting three years of regional engagements throughout the Asia-Pacific. Previous assignments include numerous Special Warfare deployments to South and Southeast Asia, and combat deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan.
Nobel Laureate Paul Krugman, noting the flood of hate mail likely headed his way, claims “that globalization, driven not by human goodness but by the profit motive, has done far more good for far more people than all of the foreign aid and soft loans ever produced by well-intentioned governments and international agencies.” Globalization has made the world a richer place, lifting countries out of poverty as it allows them to maximize comparative advantages like cheap labor. Globalization is the buzzword for the integration of the world economy through the unrestricted movement of goods, services, labor, and capital through political boundaries. Despite the glowing reviews and recognized benefits, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has been slow to integrate with the world economy and has been subsequently bypassed by most of the benefits of globalization.

The MENA region’s share of global trade is down, their representation within the World Trade Organization (WTO) is miniscule, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is scarce, external technology lies unexploited, while tariffs restrict trade freedom; all of these problems are indicative of poor globalization. Asia and Latin America have capitalized on globalization, creating growth surges that threaten to upset the existing world order, yet the MENA region has failed to capitalize on its potential. The factors that are responsible for the slow integration of the MENA region into the global marketplace are intrusive governance, lack of security, and poor macroeconomic fundamentals. While these patterns are durable they are not immune to modernity; changes in both governance and resource markets will likely force the opening of these economies in the future and subsequent integration and growth.

Intrusive Governance

Good governance makes markets prosperous by setting and enforcing fair rules, providing public goods, and leveraging inclusive institutions that enable and promote trade. Failures and outright manipulation by intrusive governments in the MENA region have slowed and in some cases totally prevented integration with the global economy. Intrusive governance in the MENA region has manifested as corruption, crony capitalism, and obstruction. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) asserts that good governance is a critical factor for success within economies because it reduces corruption, limits government discretion, and increases predictability. Robert Looney lists the traits of good governance as including a pluralistic elected legislature, independent judiciary, along with protection for civil and human rights, nothing that good governance is a key factor in promoting sustainable growth.

Government corruption negatively affects market integration by creating barriers to trade that can be difficult for new businesses to overcome and lead to poor service delivery, which suppresses growth. MENA region countries have borrowed significantly from foreign powers, but corruption has seen much of those funds end up in the hands of corrupt bureaucrats, while piling responsibility for the debts on the shoulders of the people. Another impact of corruption is the denial of opportunity to others for participation in the marketplace. Corruption obstructs development and is a key contributing
factor to stagnation in economies. The stagnation has hurt growth and limited opportunities for the MENA region economies to expand into global markets. Unfortunately, years of these corrupt systems have created a significant resistance to any change from those who have benefited from the corruption and its profits; regardless, opening the system will eliminate much of the corruption. Nadine Sika blames the corruption on neoliberal reforms and the Washington Consensus that followed colonialism, claiming that is damaged the social contract and limited opportunity for individuals while institutionalizing authoritarianism, but her accusations overlook the fact that countries like Saudi Arabia and Iran who were largely exempt from colonialism still face challenges with corruption.

Crony capitalism is a particular manifestation of corruption wherein the ruling elite and the business elite collaborate to maintain profits and opportunity for themselves by restricting access to and benefit from market economies. Robert Looney points to the problems with internal policies instead of external constraints as the primary limiter of economic growth in MENA countries. Internal policies that favor the chosen elite over the market create conditions where the average business cannot compete with privileged owners, creating fiscal imbalances which can be difficult, if not impossible to overcome. Crony capitalism can also manifest as the over-regulation of potential competitors to the privileged businesses. The military influence in many MENA states and the protectionism it engenders is another damaging form of crony capitalism that is prevalent in the region.

The final area where intrusive governance interferes with integration in the MENA region is through obstructionist policies. Most obstructionist policies exist to preserve the dominance of the political or business elite who are in league with the government. The obstructionism and illiberal political systems have contributed to a decline in total factor productivity (TFP), as less efficient models were sustained based on pedigree over profitability. A key area of government obstruction is in the transparency of its economic dealings. Poor transparency leads to unequal resource allocation with no accountability, and the MENA region is particularly opaque. Obstruction also occurs when governments try to protect elite businesses through prohibitions against foreign or new governance, creating impossible obstacles for competitors.

Since the beginning of free markets, economists have argued for a limited role for governments. Governments must provide fair enforcement and equal access to public goods like security and infrastructure. Yet in the MENA region, corruption, crony capitalism, and government obstruction have interfered with the integration of those economies into the global market.

Security
Security is essential for successful markets and integration into the global economy because it provides risk mitigation, lowers credit restrictions, and encourages investment. No one would argue that the MENA region is a bastion of stability and security. Security is not limited to minimizing armed conflict. Security in property rights is an essential aspect for manufacturing and the attraction of global investment. Poor security in the MENA region has also increased the influence of the military in its controlled sectors within the regional economies. In places like Egypt the military is so invested in economic interests that they were willing to support a coup when political leaders were hurting their bottom line.

A significant security problem for the MENA region is the difficulties many states have demonstrated in maintaining a Weberian monopoly on violence. The lack of control on violence promotes instability and discourages foreign investment. Insecurity has also hurt the region by damaging the tourism industry that many of the countries rely on to supplement their economies. The uncertainty with regards to management of violence in the area has led to reluctance on the part of international lenders and investors to provide capital for expansion. Reducing the uncertainty surrounding the threat of violence would improve investment and economic opportunity. Another negative impact from insecurity is weakening of international desire to visit the region as tourists.

Probably one of the most significant disadvantages of the MENA region in entering the global community is the presence of a very different social contract whereby services and security, maintained by iron-clad militaries and security services, trump freedom. Security challenges in the MENA region inhibit both growth and integration and must be resolved before true integration and the necessary FDI assurances exist to promote growth.

Macroeconomic Fundamentals
Faulty macroeconomic fundamentals are a key reason the MENA region has lagged behind the rest of the world in integration and globalization. Unemployment, subsidies, poor industrialization, non-existent regional trade, and insufficient education have all created weaknesses that are difficult to overcome internally much less integrate with the global economy. Unless the MENA region can overcome these fundamental flaws they will remain isolated from the world economy.

The biggest issue inhibiting economic growth in the MENA region is unemployment, specifically youth unemployment due to structural problems within the economies. The MENA countries exhibit double digit unemployment in most cases, and even worse unemployment among young adults. MENA countries in many cases have tried to offset unemployment through increasing government employment and creating jobs for which the market has not demonstrated a need. Even MENA countries that have experienced growth have still lagged in the employment of youth and women. Despite the presence of higher than normal education levels, employment has not kept pace commiserate with the supposed educational prowess, largely due to non-compliance with international educational standards. Labor participation among women in the MENA region has lagged behind the rest of the world at 15-30%, further limiting the benefit of the investments in secondary and even tertiary education.
Subsidies have helped to maintain the status quo for elites within the MENA region but at the cost of destroying the global viability and competitiveness of the MENA markets outside of their respective countries. The biggest problem with subsidies is that they are fiscally unsustainable and inefficient because they benefit everyone, wasting money. Subsidies were designed as a means of social protectionism, but instead the World Bank has found that the wealthy benefit more from the subsidies than those they were designed to help. The challenge facing the MENA countries is how to reduce subsidies without hurting consumption. Subsidies have led to a failure to capitalize on the investments made into human capital. The current level of subsidies is not sustainable at existing revenue levels.

The MENA region economies are still largely dominated by agricultural or resource based inputs that have limited expansion into more industrial, manufacturing arenas. Michael Porter has pointed to the importance of economies transitioning from resource based to investment based; failure to move past resource-based economies has severely limited growth potential within the MENA region. In the MENA region, oil and agriculture have dominated the economies limiting growth potential and discouraging diversification through the presence of what some have dubbed the resource curse, whereby abundant exports lead to policy distortion, weak institutions, and complicated reform. Looney defines the resource curse as “a dependence on natural wealth that inhibited balanced economic development and sustained a culture of corruption.” Under either definition the MENA has suffered from its failure to eliminate resource-dependent economic means in favor of more manufacturing or production-centric methods.

The lack of regional trade is another strike against the global integration of the MENA region. Poor growth rates have created huge problems in sustaining the employment requirements of the growing young population. The MENA countries would have to grow their economies at a rate greater than 5% to create the four million jobs annually that would keep unemployment stable. Such growth is unlikely, further complicating the integration of MENA nations smoothly into the world economy. Employment in the youth population is further complicated by insufficient education that fails to meet international standards. Additionally, the MENA lags behind every other region in the world in terms of interregional trade. The problems in the paucity of interregional trade are unlikely to improve without concerted efforts to remove regional international trade barriers.

The Inexorable March Towards Progress

The defects within MENA countries are not fatal. Increased liberalization within MENA governments combined with the changes in the resource market, particularly in hydrocarbons, will result in changes to MENA economies and lead to their increased integration into the global economy. The integration is not without challenge as the perception within many MENA countries is that globalization is westernization by another name, representing a loss of independence and a resurgence of imperialism. MENA countries need to reduce subsidies and consequently their debt loads.

Factor-driven, resource-based economies must evolve to remain viable in the global marketplace because no resource is inexhaustible. As oil resources dwindle and prices fall, countries lose their leverage to be able to buy off their populations with hush money in the form of subsidies and social programs. MENA countries like Bahrain have already had to try to make their societies function without sufficient oil resources, and have dealt with instability as a result. Even non-oil countries like Egypt receive money from oil producers as a hedge against instability, but that assistance is subject to the whims of the donors and vulnerable to fluctuations in the price of oil. MENA countries have to figure out how to use their youth bulges to their advantage in the same way that Asian countries did to increase entrepreneurship and reduce the number of people dependent on government handouts. The education system in the MENA needs to be updated to meet the skills of today, reduce rote learning, and increase critical thinking to meet the challenges of a new industrial economy. Even within the resource-blessed countries like Saudi Arabia, failure to diversify coupled with population growth and restrictions on FDI have widened the gap between the wealthy and the poor, setting the
The Korean Peninsula from a PLA Perspective

By Captain (P) Jason Lam, U.S. Army

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this academic paper are those of the author alone. They do not represent the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, USFK, Stanford University, or any other entity.

This paper is a shortened version of an academic thesis produced as part of the M.A. East Asian Studies program at Stanford University. The original document examined Chinese PLA strategic thinking and planning efforts regarding the maintenance of stability on the Korean peninsula and possible contingency scenarios. Due to space constraints, this paper focuses primarily on the PLA’s Northern Theater Command (NTC) and utilizes the 2016 Tumen River flooding, in addition to recent training, as a case study in Chinese contingency planning towards the Korean peninsula. Analysis is based on authoritative documents detailing Chinese strategic thought in addition to PLA media reporting. As the Chinese military continues to modernize and reform, U.S. policy planners and the broader policy-interested community will need as much clarity as possible regarding likely Chinese military responses to potential North Korean collapse or Korean unification scenarios.

The primary argument this paper posits is that Chinese military views regarding the Korean peninsula are largely driven by perceived threats from the United States. It reinforces the longstanding argument that the Democratic Republic of Korea -- North Korea (DPRK) -- functions as a geographic buffer state to U.S. influence, especially when considering PLA concepts of strategic space and forward defense. Preservation of stability along the Sino-DPRK border and establishing an ability to quickly respond to various level crisis situations is the primary mission of the newly formed Northern Theater Command, as evidenced by its more publicly known training. Underlying this mission is that the worst-case threat it faces will be a high-tech military force capable of conducting sustained pressure from long distances. Finally, any further instability caused on the Korean peninsula is inevitably seen as originating by pressure from influential third party countries, namely the United States.

PLA Strategic Thinking

Two of the key primary sources I draw from to gain a PLA strategic perspective are the Science of Military Strategy text (SMS 2013) published by China’s Academy of Military Science in 2013, and the 2015 Chinese Defense White Paper (DWP). The 2015 DWP provides a clear view of Chinese military perspectives regarding the modern security environment. Its description evinces a great amount of concern in maintaining China’s growing regional influence and strength. Although China has thrived in the peaceful international environment, it states there are many challenges that its leaders foresee on the
horizon. The 2015 DWP then discusses some of the specific concerns and challenges China faces. First is the general U.S. rebalancing towards Asia. Second is Japan and the overhauling of its military and security policies. Third is continued provocation from outside countries towards China's territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests. Fourth is the Korean peninsula, which is mentioned as being “shrouded in instability and uncertainty.”

The order in which these challenges are listed is an important point to elaborate on. While the Korean peninsula is listed as a challenge, it is less so compared to perceived U.S. rebalancing and Japanese militarization. Rather, a considerable portion of the 2015 DWP is focused on the maritime domain and more specifically the South China Sea. In describing the Korean peninsula, the maintenance of stability is the primary focus and not much else is mentioned. Evidence of the priority given the Korean peninsula is also seen in the current reorganization program of the PLA. According to principles of protocol order, the Northern Theater Command, which has responsibility for the northeastern region of China, is also specifically listed as fourth. The Eastern Theater Command, which happens to have a greater maritime role, is listed as number one.

The second authoritative Chinese work I reference, and the one I focused heavily on, is the 2013 edition of The Science of Military Strategy (SMS 2013). This work, published by the PLA's Academy of Military Science, is primarily intended for Chinese military officers studying at the National Defense University. It provides insight to a basic framework the military uses in viewing the modern security environment and how to manage it.

Even though it does not touch on the Korean peninsula directly, the SMS 2013 touches on key concepts that can all be applied to analysis of Chinese national security views regarding this region. These concepts are strategic space, strategic posture, forward defense, and effective control. 'Strategic space' is best described as “an indispensable region where a people and country are able to resist outside disturbances or invasion and safeguard their survival and development.” This space expands from the Chinese Mainland and covers both geographic and non-physical areas. The second concept is ‘strategic posture.’ While strategic space refers to expanding areas of interest, ‘strategic posture’ can be looked at as the “first step in the implementation of strategy.” The third concept – ‘forward defense’ – is best described as an ongoing transformation in which the PLA must transition “from the mainland to the borders … they must push strategy forward, expand strategic depth, progressively surround and protect the mainland, radiate towards the periphery … when a crisis occurs, respond effectively, and during war take both offense and defense.” The final concept – ‘effective control’ – should be considered under the backdrop of China's national security situation as a period of both strategic opportunity and strategic risk. It is a broad concept that “encompasses the deterrent, crisis management, and non-war uses of military power in addition to warfighting.”

Should a crisis occur, the Chinese will utilize appropriate measures which not only quickly resolve the situation but place themselves into a better position than before. ‘Effective control’ is important in that SMS 2013 is also very explicit when it notes that an escalating and protracted conflict is detrimental to all sides.

Tactical and Operational Perspectives
What contingency scenarios are the Chinese military planning for regarding the Korean peninsula? By understanding the missions that they may be called upon to execute, this allows further analysis into areas the current reorganization program is seeking to address, and may even highlight new tasks that are taking increasing significance. To take it one step further, what capabilities and training are planned for the Northern Theater Command, and how do they differ from what is already in place or being done?

Based on a review of what has already been written about this subject, most authors cite a 2008 article by Bonnie Glaser, Scott Snyder, and John S. Park. The general consensus among scholars regarding the primary concern of the PLA is maintaining stability and preventing a large number of refugees from crossing the border. Should the situation deteriorate, the 2008 article asserts that “according to PLA researchers, contingency plans are in place for the PLA to perform three possible missions in the DPRK.” These missions include humanitarian aid and disaster relief, peacekeeping and maintenance of civil order, and environmental control for possible nuclear contamination. Underlying these three missions is a preference for working in coordination with the UN. A separate article published in 2009 by the Center for U.S.-Korea Policy cites the missions mentioned above but adds that PLA weaknesses in bureaucratic structure, resources, and training inhibit their ability to conduct such operations. They also note the 870-mile border is quite porous and would be difficult to secure. The three types of missions are also mentioned in a 2012 article written by SinoNK analyst Nick Miller, in which he discusses China’s war plans for Pyongyang. His article adds that the possible reunification of the Korean peninsula would significantly alter China’s strategic calculus considering the close relationship that South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan have with the U.S.

The most recent articles regarding Chinese contingency plans about North Korea came out in 2014 when a supposed PLA planning document was leaked to the press. The DailyNK reported that Japan’s Kyodo News had obtained a PLA plan that called for increased surveillance along the North Korean border, the increasing of troops, and the establishment of refugee camps in the event of a crisis on the Korean peninsula instigated by a third party. While this report remains unverified and the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has denied any such plans, The Diplomat published an article providing some analysis. If they are genuine, the leaked plans reinforce Chinese claims regarding concerns about stability along the North Korean border. They differ in their mention of preempting the establishment of any sort of base within Northeast China by escaping DPRK leadership. The plans also assume a crisis caused by an unnamed “third party,” which is an indirect reference to the United States. Such an assumption might reflect changing perceptions on the part of the Chinese and indicate...
decreased willingness in working through UN procedures while displaying greater propensity for unilateral contingency plans instead.

Based on my review of articles discussing PLA contingency planning and analysis of primary documents in the previous section, the core concern of maintaining stability along the North Korean border is a definite continuity, but there also appear to be changing Chinese perceptions to the overall situation. Although the authenticity of the plans discussed by the articles published in 2014 are speculative, they do not stray far from concerns mentioned by official and highly authoritative Chinese national security documents. SMS 2013 clearly states concern for an active U.S. containment strategy. The 2015 DWP also lists the U.S. rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific as “causing grave concern among many countries” and references the Korean peninsula as being “shrouded in instability and uncertainty.” Also, both the 2013 SMS and 2015 DWP perceive major changes in the international security situation. Finally, the most recent decision by both South Korea and U.S. to deploy THAAD has led the Chinese MFA to publicly state that such an act will “gravely sabotage the strategic security interests of regional countries including China.”

While the PLA ‘contingency plans’ themselves cannot be confirmed, what can be analyzed is the reorganization and type of training occurring in the region. The PLA has been undergoing a major reorganization which can be argued to stem from changing perceptions of the international security situation. The new theater command system is designed to be responsive to these new challenges. By analyzing on-going training, it is possible to then gauge the possible situations that they are prepping for.

**Northern Theater Command Basic Information**

What is known about the Northern Theater Command? Along with the Eastern, Southern, Western, and Central commands, it was established the same day as the other headquarters. Commander and political commissar for each unit were also identified. The commander for Northern region is General Song Puxuan, who served as the former Beijing Military Region commander and prior to that as the president of the National Defense University. He is unique for being the chief commander of the 2015 military parade in Beijing, which celebrated the 70th anniversary of victory over Japan at the end of World War II. This is a high-profile event which typically garners a great deal of attention not only domestically but from international observers as well. A well-executed event has the potential to further propel a senior officer’s career. That General Song is the first commander of the NTC speaks to the level of success he has had not only during that parade but throughout his military career as a whole. General Chu Yimin is the unit’s political commissar. He is also an accomplished officer who recently served as the former Shenyang Military Region political commissar.

The territory that the NTC covers includes a wide swath of land that includes Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Inner Mongolia, and Shandong Provinces. While the NTC would most certainly have primary responsibility for covering the Sino-DPRK border, it would also be responsible for guarding the border between both Mongolia and Russia, a responsibility most likely shared with the Western Theater Command. Based on the 2015 DWP concerns regarding instability on the Korean peninsula, it would be a fair assumption, however, that the bulk of the Northern region’s forces are focused towards the Sino-DPRK border.

Each theater command is composed of several group armies. Under the previous military region system, the Shenyang Military Region had three group armies assigned. They were the 40th, 39th, and 16th Group Armies. Under the new system, the 26th Group Army, based in Shandong province, has been added to the new Northern command. In comparison to the other regions, both the Northern and Central commands have more group armies assigned than the remaining three. Eastern, Southern, and Western commands each have three group armies while Northern and Central commands have four and five respectively. At least based on initial reporting, the resources and capabilities of the Northern command appear to have expanded. More information is of course needed on what specific units make up the Group Armies and whether the newly assigned Group Armies had any relocations of their own headquarters or subordinate units. If assets from the 26th Group Army are relocated towards the Northeastern provinces, it could signal clearer intent on increasing capabilities in that region.

Because the theater commands are all intended to be joint commands, it is also important to note the PLAN (Peoples Liberation Army Navy), PLAAF (Peoples Liberation Army Air Force), PLARF (Peoples Liberation Army Rocket Force), and PLASSF (Peoples Liberation Army Strategic Support Force) forces that will be part of that region. The North Sea Fleet, based in Qingdao, should be expected to play a key role in operations conducted by the NTC. While the North Sea Fleet capabilities do not yet compare to a U.S. Navy carrier strike group, the North Sea Fleet currently has the sole operational aircraft carrier in the PLAN’s arsenal. Considering the strong response of the PLA towards the joint U.S.-ROK naval maneuvers following the Cheonan incident in 2010, the PLAN’s role in North Korea crisis scenarios cannot be discounted. Known PLAAF assets in NE China consist of the Shenyang Military Region Air Force HQ (MRAF HQ), which has one base in Dalian, two fighter divisions, one ground attack division, and one special aviation division. With the recent reorganization and establishment of both PLARF and PLASSF, the assets these branches have committed to the region remain to be seen. Altogether, once the NTC is fully established, it would appear to have significant combat and force projection capability.

**NTC Recent Operations and Training**

The events reviewed in this section all occurred in 2016, following the establishment of the new headquarters units. Sources reviewed include some secondary sources such as articles from The Diplomat in addition to other outside analysis. Primary sources largely come from the Northern Theater Command’s official webpage itself.

While there is still no definitive proof of the existence
of official PLA contingency plans, recent flooding along the Tumen River in Northeast China, which borders the DPRK, provide a glimpse into what these plans may look like. In an article from The Diplomat, Adam Cathcart, a lecturer at the University of Leeds, observed that the “largely effective response by the PRC to the flooding of the Tumen river indicates China’s confidence in its ability to secure the border region in the event of a broader collapse in North Korea itself.” Emergency response operations were conducted while the most recent DRPK nuclear test was occurring and might have even contributed to the rapid response in the region.

Several aspects of this emergency response deserve attention. First is the process of evacuating nearby villages along the river. Cathcart notes that “evacuated locals in Helong and Tumen were swiftly moved into local gymnasiums.” Second is that security along the border would appear to have had a heightened presence, as drones operated by border guards and local police were flown over the Tumen River looking for survivors. Due to these drone overflights, it was noted that several North Koreans were evacuated over to the Chinese side as well.

The third aspect touched on was the visit by the head of the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture, Jiang Zhaoliang. Cathcart asserts that Jiang’s visit was to “check the status of the border surveillance network.” A review of the PRC article that discusses this visit shows that Jiang was present to “survey and direct the disaster-recovery efforts, and express sympathy for those effected.” The article does not specifically mention a border surveillance network, but Jiang does visit the PLA border guards, People’s Armed Police units, and public security who participated in the recovery efforts. He commends them on a job well-done and “emphasizes maintaining high standards in all aspects, having common purpose, and taking disaster recovery as the current important political mission and project of the people.” Accomplishing this would include, among other tasks, execution of government policies, quickly repairing damaged buildings, ensuring safety of the masses by keeping them warm once winter occurs, and ensuring the return to normal industrial production in the area. Maintenance of public services, rapid transportation, and water conservation is touched on as well. Jiang also mentions the maintenance of regional border stability. While he doesn’t seem to articulate a border surveillance network, some of the more specific tasks he discusses seem to give more specificity regarding what maintenance of stability along the border would entail.

Based on the NTC article reviewed, it is possible to put together a rough response timeline of this event. At an unspecified time on August 31, the Yanbian Prefecture issued a Tumen River ‘flood prevention level II emergency warning.’ This alert leads military forces in the region to enter “alert status.” Both PLA and PAP units are mobilized. By 19:30 that day, PAP units are already at several locations along the Tumen River strengthening dikes and embankments. At approximately 21:20, around 300 PLA troops from a second echelon unit are dispatched to further deal with the emergency. All assigned units continue working through the night, and it is mentioned that the Jilin Province PAP Headquarters appeared to have taken overall control of directing efforts by establishing ‘one line of command.’ Also noteworthy is that militia had been called up to assist in the efforts. Whether these militia are actually the reserves is unclear. Other noteworthy PLA units and equipment that were mentioned were a ‘meteorological weather unit’ which provided weather analysis and the utilization of ‘pontoon floating bridges’ and ‘assault boats.’ Multiple pictures on the website display what appear to be PLA soldiers both standing in formation and moving sandbags. Also shown is a long convoy of trucks lined neatly along a road in what can be assumed to be a troop or equipment movement.

While there are a lot of gaps and questions that remain from the above description, the article provided by the NTC allows several insights. First, there is a response plan for various situations which might arise along the border, and there are more than likely different alert levels that might trigger different responses. This is evidenced by the quick deployment of both PLA and PAP following the transition to ‘alert status.’ Second, there is an established procedure in setting up a unified command that can direct disaster response operations. In this situation, the PAP appear to have taken the lead with the PLA following in support. Other situations might be different. However, in the case of a scenario where masses of refugees might be involved, the PAP might still be the lead organization primarily because they are focused on domestic matters. Third, there is an institutionalized relationship between local government, the PAP, and the PLA. Although this does not necessarily reflect the joint warfighting command discussed in the beginning of this chapter, it is indicative of integrated planning efforts.

Review of the NTC website highlights several areas. First is an emphasis on improved logistics capability. One article discusses a particular unit that participated in a recurring PLA exercise, “Firepower-2016.” The author highlights how the unit utilized rail assets moving to an unspecified location. This article is unique in its emphasis on serving ‘hot chow’ to PLA soldiers and officers. Pictures display smiling soldiers as they eat their warm meals. The article notes that in the past, when moving between regions, soldiers primarily relied on instant noodles and bread. This had negative impacts on overall performance, as soldiers would arrive at training sites hungry and tired. From an operational standpoint, this article highlights the dual-use nature of China’s rail systems, and in the event of an actual crisis on the Sino-DPRK border, one could expect cross-theater coordination in the moving of troops to help secure the border. The serving of warm meals to troops is standard practice for the U.S. military, so this article also serves to highlight the current logistics capabilities of the PLA as they continue to modernize their military. As the PLA gain greater force projection capabilities, their force sustainment capabilities will be tested as well.

Another area worth noting is emphasis on improving engineering capabilities. For those who have traveled to Northeastern China’s Dandong and observed the DPRK border, it is not uncommon to observe nearby PLA units in the Yalu River rehearsing bridging operations. One such article on the NTC
website titled “Northern Military Region Army Boat and Bridge Unit Tempers Oneself in Ensuring All-Weather Bridge Crossing Capability” highlights this emphasis. The article discusses the conduct of bridging operations at night and notes that such training plays an important role in facilitating movement of friendly units’ heavy equipment. Being able to conduct bridging operations under low-light conditions directly impacts combat readiness and survivability. In the article, it notes that an opposing ‘blue-force’ that used aerial surveillance drones and sustained fire harassment was part of the training. Further analysis of this article leads one to deduce that the NTC is very likely preparing for combat operations in which they must cross the Tumen or Yalu Rivers. This lends credence to the assertion that there are contingency plans for which the PLA might enter North Korea. Under what conditions this would occur is not stated, but the type of opposing force they are contending with appear in line with a high-tech opponent that has significant long-range threat capabilities. With the already noted PLA concern for a U.S. containment strategy, it is possible they are preparing for the possibility that U.S. forces move north in the event of a North Korean collapse.

The third area worth touching on is an emphasis on rapid mobilization and deployment while ensuring sustainment of basic warfighting skills and soldier toughness. With an emphasis on rapid mobilization, it appears the NTC is prepping more for crisis situations in which they would have to stabilize the region and possibly fight local wars under high-tech conditions rather than projecting force into Korea.

In general, current operations and training conducted by units within the NTC appear in line with strategic concepts discussed in the previous section. The type of training being conducted is very much consistent with preparation for the moderate-scale and low-scale conflicts described by the authors of SMS 2013. Much preparation in the form of logistics and engineering operations is being done to respond quickly to border instability. Streamlining of the orders process so that units can execute movements in an efficient manner is also revealing, and supports assertions that there are active contingency plans for a North Korean collapse or a refugee crisis on the Korean Peninsula.

Conclusion
Based on the preceding analysis, the current PLA reorganization program is intended to improve the PRC’s ability to maintain stability along the Sino-DPRK border. Whether or not Beijing would support or prevent a DPRK collapse is not clear, based on the documents reviewed here. One former Chinese diplomat has noted that there is no reason to oppose unification, only that it is peaceful. Regardless of what does occur, the key concern remains preventing instability on the DPRK side from spilling over into northeast China. Should a crisis or conflict arise, the PLA would seek to respond in a swift and coordinated manner, utilizing joint command structures and various aspects of national power. The key driving factor for this reorganization program appears rooted in a deepening belief that the U.S. seeks to encircle and contain China’s rise. This is hinted at in the 2015 DWP and explicitly stated in the SMS 2013, two highly authoritative PLA documents.

Analysis of the 2015 DWP helps provide a level of importance Beijing attaches to the Korean Peninsula. Described as shrouded in instability and uncertainty, the Korean Peninsula is a concern to the PRC leadership but less so compared to the U.S. pivot to Asia, Japan’s military and security policies, and territorial sovereignty and maritime rights. This is further evident in the protocol order of the newly established theater commands, which lists the Northern Theater Command as fourth.

SMS 2013 provides a PLA lens through which to analyze the Korean Peninsula by laying out principles of strategic space, strategic posture, forward defense, and effective control. These concepts, while not necessarily changing the Chinese policies towards the Korean Peninsula, reflect the multifaceted aspects through which the PLA now analyzes the region. Review of these concepts supports the idea that, at least from a military perspective, the DPRK functions as a convenient buffer against China’s greater strategic opponents. The Chinese response to the U.S.-ROK decision in deploying THAAD to the Korean Peninsula reflects these strategic concepts in play.

From a more tactical and operational perspective, the establishment of the Northern Theater Command and its current operations and training also reflect these strategic principles and overall Chinese policy. Recent flooding on the Tumen River displayed a quick PLA response, supporting the inference that there are contingency plans for situations that might arise along the Sino-DPRK border. Review of PRC media articles that describe training among Northern Theater Command units reinforces the assertion that the PLA rehearses not only disaster management scenarios but more kinetic ones as well. Regardless of what type of training it executes, it appears that such training is related in some way to maintaining or re-establishing security along the border. In summary, the tactical and operational occurrences very much reflect PLA strategic intent and current PRC policy regarding the Korean Peninsula.

About the Author
Captain (P) Jason Lam is a China FAO assigned to U.S. Forces Korea. He recently completed an Master of Arts in East Asian Studies at Stanford University, California. Prior to attending his ACS program, he completed In-Region Training in Beijing, China. He has held multiple assignments as an Army logisticians while assigned to units in Korea and Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington. Captain Lam also holds an Associate of Arts degree in Chinese Mandarin from the Defense Language Institute and a Bachelor of Science Degree from the U.S. Military Academy. He speaks Chinese Mandarin and has basic proficiency in Korean.
The Islamic State (IS) is not isolated to a specific region. European, African, and Middle Eastern foreign area officers need to comprehend IS for this demonstrated truth: a leader you serve will face IS or an IS inspired situation. This book review looks at three themes to illustrate why this volume is a must-own book.

Jihad and the West, Black Flag Over Babylon is structured around nine chapters and an epilogue. A discussion of sorts, this review article briefly looks at how the book promotes a more complete comprehension of the IS today; how the book can aid visualization of what may follow the demise of the quasi-state variant of the IS; and how the book can help FAOs in their work.

Beginning early in 2014, western social media platforms gave IS a newfound weapon and influence: a podium from which to present its recruitment platform of maniacal jihadi violence. The IS’s exploitation of Twitter, Facebook, SnapChat, and other technologies was far more sophisticated than Al Qaeda In Iraq’s (AQI) execution videos or Al Qaeda’s (AQ) Usama Bin Laden sermon tapes. For its part, rebroadcasting bizarre IS atrocities on western media platforms was not the same thing as explaining the roots of jihadi violence. Dr. Silinsky cuts through the disjointed media coverage through a narrative from antiquity through modernity to paint a picture of jihadi continuity that puts IS at the end of a lengthy pipeline of events, personalities, and circumstances.

However, it is in chapters two through six where Silinsky lays out what distinguishes IS from its AQ and AQI forerunners. Silinsky examines the Iraqi DNA strand of IS, then shifts the focal point to Europe and its restive Muslim populations. While many in the west subscribe to the theory that members of IS forces redeployed from Syria and Iraq to mount terrorism attacks in European cities since 2015, the truth is that online IS violence enabled the radicalization of prospective IS adherents where they lived in Europe. The ability of IS to describe the vision of a multi-continent caliphate inspired disaffected European Muslims.

By taking advantage of discontent across the second and third generations of the Muslim diaspora in Europe while playing to fantasies of a 7th century Islamic throwback world, the author depicts the scope of discontent that fuels violence on behalf of IS. Central to the IS narrative is the West in the role of conqueror. The cleverness of IS narrative is that every act of western homeland defense or military offense intended to counter the IS adds more credibility to IS narratives that summon yet more recruits and catalyze more acts of violence in IS’s name.

Dr. Silinsky then brings readers forward to 2017. As western militaries continue their force application to weaken the IS and expedite its contraction, a question arises: what does jihadism’s movement-next look like? IS will be replaced with something else passes for plausible, if not entirely predictable given that western powers are resorting to a similar pattern of force application that weakened but did not eradicate the conditions of radicalization and militant jihadism elsewhere.

The author does not forecast what may follow IS, but he invites readers to imagine the future based on perceived patterns in history. With the destruction of IS underway, does its total defeat matter? Here, Silinsky’s book provides hints at not just the military complexity of defeating IS in Iraq and Syria, but the elusiveness of attaining an enduring IS defeat.

The eventual military-style conquest of IS in 2017 is a western goal and its eventual success is not in doubt. However, in the larger IS narrative of the West versus Islam, the conquest of the caliphate is the end of one paragraph and the beginning of another within that narrative. As Silinsky points out, regardless of how the Islamic State as an entity with quasi-state powers ends, success for IS is that the caliphate as a concept lives on in the minds of future generations of militants.

The epilogue of Jihad and the West is probably the most disquieting portion of the book. In it, Dr. Silinsky lays out six questions that link to related questions guiding American and
international efforts to counter trans-national terrorism and IS. Of those six questions, it is the final two that are appropriate to this review.

The first of those two questions touches on an idea common to western intervention in Iraq going all the way back to 2003. Specifically, can western nations erode support for a [the] caliphate vision by promoting sustainable development? Silinsky replies, probably not. He reinforces that conclusion: “…there is no proven direct causal link between poverty and terrorism…Islamists are often highly educated and well fed.” That statement suggests that in the long run, western nations ought to address other presumed sources of Muslim grievance; for example, inequality in their respective European and Arab societies. Efforts to engineer durable solutions to repair what ought to be addressed in improving domestic situations of youth employment, economic opportunity, cultural identity, etc. will prove difficult given widening pockets of anti-Islamic populism, European nativism, and chronic challenges in Arab societies.

The second of Silinsky’s six questions to be addressed is relevant at this moment: can IS be completely defeated? The author responds, “not in the near term.” Coalition attack results are common in daily Facebook and Twitter feed that documents frequent aerial destruction and special forces direct action raids that are both widening the scope and hastening the pace of IS demise. So, what does victory look like for America and its coalition of the willing? What does victory look like for IS? An IS victory against America and its partners is impossible; however, that is not the point. For IS to “win” it need only continue to exist in one form or another. Given that low bar contrasted to America’s much higher outcome bar, what does the post-IS era look like, and is there a grand plan to thwart the rise of Jihadism 3.0 (AQI being 1.0; IS being 2.0)? Western nations will not fail at devising metrics that purport to show a military defeat of IS. Evidence of tactical IS defeat will be inadequate to the strategic challenge of ensuring that Jihadism 3.0 cannot carve out opportunity space to pose an extant threat to any state or society anywhere.

There is a constant supply of new books, essays, studies, reports, and lectures in the U.S. and Europe on terrorism. The challenge for busy FAOs is, which of these to read. A professional peer review can be a helpful filter, but in the end, that only gets a given text on a short list of what to read. The purpose of this review has been to convince you that Mark Silinsky’s book should be on that list. His economic writing style and the book’s organization make for an effective reading experience. Moreover, the text is packed with hundreds of endnotes that lend credibility and authority to Jihad and the West. However, the main reason to recommend this is rooted in our long view of events.

We are trained to understand yesterday, document today, and glimpse the outline of tomorrow. The conflict between jihadism and the West is still in the early phase of a decades long struggle. This review was written on the morning of the second day after the use of a large truck to kill and injure dozens of innocent German civilians at a Christmas market in Berlin. The use of a large vehicle is not a novel kind of attack, but what occurred and the reactions of the German authorities in these first 48 hours suggest a failure to imagine. This is yet another way that FAOs can provide invaluable assistance to country teams: imagination and imaginative utilization of facts cultivated elsewhere.

Finally, as the military-style defeat of the IS mounts – likely because of it and IS’s desire to make the west pay for that campaign, political pressure is ratcheting up in western capitals to “eliminate the IS problem.” However, we are in an election period and it remains to be seen what the international appetite is to do more to combat IS ideas, proxies, and actors. Against that backdrop and in an example of borrowing facts obtained elsewhere, foreign area officers can see an emergent pattern; one observed in Anbar, Diyala, Salahuddin, and Ninewah during 2007-2009. There, U.S. forces planted a victory flag on the outcome of a pronounced rollback of AQI. That flag became a key component in an argument fashioned in 2010 and 2011 that the U.S. combat mission should be curtailed because AQI was (allegedly) beaten. In that era, U.S. leaders asserted that it was time for the Iraqis to stand up and U.S./multi-national forces stood down. Events in Iraq beginning in late 2013 judged the fitness and rightness of the flawed assertion of viable Iraqi self-sufficiency.

In 2017, as control of Mosul, Palmyra, Deir-e-Zoor, and eventually Raqqa are fully, finally reclaimed from the IS and territorial control is consolidated, the band of warring partners will dissolve and redeploy. Then, as the combat forces depart, foreign area officers—first on the ground to document the rise of the IS, will be again all that remains to document a peace that is most likely not enduring but an interregnum. Buy and read Jihad and the West, Black Flag Over Babylon, by Dr. Mark Silinsky. A caution: do not loan it to your FAO buddy, the one with the box of yellow highlighters. More importantly, if you lend your copy you may not get your book back. In which case, buy two: keep one, give one.
Towards Understanding Post-Colonialism, Strategic Culture, and Sub-Saharan Africa

By Major Michael J. Oginsky, U.S. Marine Corps

Editor’s Note: Major Oginsky’s thesis won the FAO Association writing award at the U.S. Marine Corps Staff College. In the interest of space, here we publish a slightly shorter version of the thesis, without research notes. The full version, including all research notes, can be found by following this link to our on-line website: www.faoa.org.

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In his most recent work, World Order, Henry Kissinger, perhaps the United States’ most accomplished and venerable statesman, devotes remarkably little to the discussion of African nations and their place in that order, especially those of sub-Saharan Africa. Their only mention comes in the form of a list, locations where ungoverned spaces tend to foster the growth of violent extremist organizations. This lack of attention underscores many of the most prominent features of U.S. policy toward sub-Saharan Africa in the post-Cold War era: relative neglect characterized by an episodic, if tangential, interest. Relegated the policy “backwaters,” the region has garnered minimal focused attention aside from that demanded by sporadic, emergent crises.

A starkly negative public opinion of all things Africa-related, informed and inspired by media portrayals of a “dark continent,” reinforces this political milieu. Further, the caricatures, stereotypes, and mythologies that undergird American views of sub-Saharan Africa, coupled with decades of ineffective and ineffectual policy initiatives and failed interventions, form a sort of self-reinforcing negative feedback loop. It would seem that without the backdrop of Cold War great-power politics informing national security interest in sub-Saharan Africa, the interaction of policy failure and public opinion has lead to swift erosion in the processes of effective policy formulation.

Yet as the United States attempts a holistic reengagement on the continent, spurred on by a renewed interest in the security implications regional instability, it risks doing so with the same misunderstandings and misperceptions that have beleaguered its foreign policy for decades. While domestic bureaucracies and political agendas certainly inform U.S. foreign policy vis-à-vis Sub-Saharan Africa, a plague of contradictory interpretations of nation-state domestic politics within the region tends to undermine those policies eventually implemented. In order to devise truly effective policy, and by it achieve a measure of lasting regional stability, U.S. policy makers must seek a more complete understanding of the sub-Saharan African strategic culture. Given the region’s shared colonial history, the most effective means to understand sub-Saharan African strategic culture is through the lens of post-colonialism.

Instability, Failed States, and U.S. Africa Policy

The challenge of failed states, and the consequences wrought about by their collapse – humanitarian crisis, civil war, economic turmoil, and institutional paralysis to name but a few – have continually served as a conundrum to the even the best of statesmen. In that vein, sub-Saharan Africa is Africa’s rise means opportunity for all of us -- including the opportunity to transform the relationship between the United States and Africa. As I said in Cape Town last year, it’s time for a new model of partnership between America and Africa -- a partnership of equals that focuses on African capacity to solve problems, and on Africa’s capacity to grow.

–President Barack Obama, August 6, 2014

State failure, inextricably linked with internal strife and humanitarian crisis, can spread from localized unrest to national collapse and then regional destabilization. And unattractive entities—some hostile to U.S. security interests, others hostile to Washington’s humanitarian and political goals—may rise to fill the political vacuum. Invariably, state failure is accompanied by the victory of guns over normal politics, the rise of corrupt autocrats who thrive on conflict and deny freedom to their people.

–Chester A. Crocker
perhaps the most complex region of the world today beset by the potentiality for failed states. Though there is promise in the region, in the form of emerging and relatively stable multi-party democracies aided by sustained economic growth, regional states still occupy fully sixty percent of the top three fragility tiers (21 of 34 nations) assigned by the Fragile State Index in 2014. Further, all of the most “at-risk” states as evaluated by the Fund for Peace, those assigned the “very high alert” status, hail from the region (South Sudan, Somalia, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Sudan). Unfortunately, the myriad of factors at play that contribute to the frailty of these governments and their respective institutions, and further lay bare ethnic, religious, social, and economic fault lines, form a nearly inexhaustible list, and to some degree, defy comprehensive analysis.

Within the context of American foreign policy, diplomats have often sought to address state failure via familiar historic means – the promotion of democratic institutions, the establishment of free market capitalism, and respect for universal human rights. Some have argued that U.S. foreign policy toward sub-Saharan Africa over the course of the past 50 years has ultimately been framed by multifaceted “humanitarian paradigm.” That is, the region is viewed as a hotbed of social unrest and political upheaval, in need of constant intervention at the behest of one humanitarian crisis after another, the solution to which lies in better governance, centered on western democratic ideals and institutions. Yet, in the period immediately following the wave of African independence in the 1960s, global sentiment toward the region was remarkably positive. Unfortunately, as many authors have noted, “Afro-pessimism” has largely supplanted that positivity. Teodros Kiros described this phenomenon in 2007: For the Western . . . imagination, the condition of Africa is so dystopian that the African self is now a symbol of the worst that could happen to a human being. In this view Africa is not the heart of light, but rather the “heart of darkness.” The Africa that was the center of human civilization is now the originator of HIV/AIDS. The Africa of the Iliad and the Odyssey – an embodiment of hospitality, generosity, and cultural polish – is now a site of perversion and of war. Endless commentaries present Rwanda, Darfur, Ethiopia, and Eritrea as places of brutality and savagery. Everything that is not amenable to change and transformation is considered typically African. The Afro-optimism of the immediate post-independence period has now been fully displaced by . . . Afro-pessimism.

This dystopian view has underscored the evolution of U.S. Africa policy as it has progressed through three distinct phases since the fall of the Soviet Bloc and the end of the Cold War. The chronological division provided by the end of the Cold War is important when considering, specifically, the U.S. stance toward sub-Saharan Africa. Policy toward the region during the tense years of the Cold War reflected superpower political brinksmanship and the containment strategy outlined in George Kennan’s “long telegram”, rather than any genuine concern for sub-Saharan Africa itself. Moreover, the jockeying of U.S. and Soviet leadership for the allegiance of various African leaders during the Cold War did more to prolong colonial dependencies than it did to promote true independence. Further, regional conflict often metastasized into proxy wars between East and West, further exacerbating crisis and fomenting instability. The fall of the Berlin Wall and subsequent end of Cold War tensions brought the first change in American grand strategy in more than thirty years.

As the tides of the Cold War began to ebb, eventually receding in their entirety, the pursuit of a “New World Order” redefined American foreign policy. The rapidity of the Soviet collapse quickly removed the ever-present specter of nuclear war, and fostered a period of unipolarity in which the United States could pursue aims other than those designed to combat communism. In terms of foreign relations with sub-Saharan Africa, a strategic reorientation toward humanitarianism serves as the hallmark this period, most closely identified with the administrations of George H. W. Bush and the first term of Bill Clinton. This reorientation was two-fold. First, domestic pressures to reduce discretionary spending, the lack of clear-cut national interests in the region, and the desire to replace once-supported authoritarian regimes with democracies placed downward pressure on aid packages delivered to sub-Saharan nations. Unfortunately, the death of 18 U.S. Army Rangers during operations in Somalia brought this period to an abrupt end in 1993.

The ultimate failure of peacekeeping operations in Somalia signaled a full retreat from Africa within U.S. foreign policy circles. The issuance of Presidential Decision Directive 25 restricted American willingness to pursue direct humanitarian intervention, instead establishing a preference for the role of financier vice force provider. The failure of the United Nations to intervene during the Rwandan genocide in 1994 was a direct result of this new policy. Though not a root cause of the genocide, political liberalization at the behest of foreign powers, having been associated with increased instability in Rwanda and elsewhere, hindered further U.S. led democratization efforts. As a result, policy objectives moved toward addressing issues symptomatic of instability, vice instability itself, such as poverty, crime, and human rights. It would take the events of September 11, 2001 to truly reorient American aims in sub-Saharan Africa. Though, while envisioned endstates changed, little in the way supported mechanisms changed to suit these new ends.

Prior to the George W. Bush administration and the War on Terror, the notion of “African solutions to African problems” was a rallying cry among members of the Washington elite, even serving as the foundation of President Clinton’s second term Africa policy, though few indicated any belief in such an ethos. Rather, the myriad of policies provided by American politicians demonstrate clearly the conviction that outside observers could, and possibly should, determine the solution to African problems. Unfortunately, the periodicity with which U.S. and other western audiences have heeded the concerns of Africans has only encouraged an episodic approach to policy making, and thus has played a major role in the “quick fix” approach to African security. Unfortunately, by most measurable standards, this approach as failed to improve stability in sub-Saharan Africa.
Africa. Political and security instability continues on the rise, while economically, few regional states fair better than they did a half century ago. Not until well into the U.S. War on Terror would popular thought vis-à-vis Africa shift toward an approach hallmarkked by sustained, multi-sector engagement.

The establishment by President G. W. Bush of a Unified Combatant Command, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), was the first and most visible measure designed to promote sustainable security on the continent. While American media and various government entities heralded the formation of AFRICOM as a positive and proactive step toward stability on the continent, the news of its creation met with suspicion, and to some degree contempt, among the nations of Africa and a wider audience of global intelligentsia. The debates among academia questioned whether African security was now being “defined and constructed according to Western (i.e. United States’) interests, values, norms, expectations and policy preferences.” African negativity to a permanent, though as of yet unrealized, locally based American combatant command was a function of pessimistic views of the Bush administration's forays into Afghanistan and Iraq, prejudiced further by overt and clandestine support of harshly dictatorial regimes during the Cold War.

This dissonance continues today, extending to the broader context of U.S. Africa policy, with notions that American influence serves as a form of subjugation via neo-colonialism, a notion that has been most prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa. The foundation of these attitudes is not difficult to distinguish. For nearly a century, western-European colonial powers ruled nearly the entire continent. The near simultaneous dissolution of those empires in the vestiges of the Second World War has done more to obfuscate the development of independent African states than perhaps any other singular event. The shadow of colonialism and afterglow of rapid independence still inform the collective memory of the continent, colored by the variances and variables peculiar to each fledgling nation-state. Thus, in order to overcome negative public sentiment, and aid Africa in seeking solutions to its own problems, the United States must first seek to understand the strategic perspective and local plight of the peoples it wishes to help. The strategic cultures residing within sub-Saharan Africa, and the instability with which they contend and to a degree foment, are deeply rooted in the processes of decolonization and the colonial legacies inherited by the post-colonial state. Unfortunately, the limits imposed on the concepts surrounding strategic culture do not avail themselves well to the study of instability within sub-Saharan Africa. As such, the scope and purpose of studying strategic culture requires expansion and an appropriate context in order to prove useful to American diplomats and policy makers.

Seeking Understating: Expanding Strategic Culture

Strategic culture, as described within the context of international relations and national security literature over the course of the past three decades, derives its usefulness as a function of predictive and analytic capability vis-à-vis strategic decision making at the level of the nation state. Notwithstanding the various approaches used to analyze strategic culture, most strategic studies scholars argue that the strategic a.k.a. military preferences of any given nation are “rooted in the early or formative experiences of the state, and are influenced to some degree by philosophical, political, cultural, [sic] and cognitive characteristics of the state and its elites.” Moreover, it is a subjective, culturally biased prism through which to interpret objective circumstances informs the ultimate choices made from the “list” of strategic preferences.

Three generations of scholars have delved into the perplexities of state behavior, seeking an explanatory mechanism, or at a minimum an understanding, of the strategic choices made by great nations. For their purposes, most scholars limit the scope of analysis to those strategic choices regarding the use of military force by actors within the national military establishment. While there is fierce debate among strategic studies scholars as to the most effective framework, like any other theory, each of the approaches championed by their various proponents carries both strengths and weaknesses.

Unfortunately, strategic culture remains, almost universally, a tool to describe the grand-strategic decision-making of great powers. There is scant literature addressing anything other than the great powers, i.e. the United States, Soviet Union/Russia, and the collective entities of Europe. Nor is there anything resembling an application of various strategic studies approaches in attempting to understand intra-state decision-making, though some have made use of the technique in an attempt to describe the actions of non-state actors. Holistically, both security studies and strategic studies remain firmly rooted, within the academic and political realm, means of analyzing inter-state competitive behavior; tools of the various schools of international relations theory.

Thus, the notion of using strategic culture as a tool for analyzing instability in sub-Saharan Africa is, at first glance, almost absurd, at least from the perspective of a superpower such as the United States. First, there is little likelihood that any sub-Saharan African state may make a military decision directly jeopardizing American vital interests. Secondly, while there are certainly interstate conflicts or the potentiality for them on the continent, the vast majority of security threats in sub-Saharan Africa emanate from within the state, as a direct result of intrastate actors and institutions. Therefore, to be useful in the context of instability in sub-Saharan Africa, one must adapt and apply the concept within the framework of developmental intra-state instability dynamics. Further, it must be adapted to address issues that are not solely a function of physical security or the use of military force; instability being the result of a confluence of factors – economic, social, environment, institutional, and political.

It proves useful here to step away briefly from the phrase “strategic culture” as a descriptor for the non-military domestic actions of an object state or region under study within sub-Saharan Africa. Use of the term “strategic” typically implies a very realist notion of linking ends, ways, and means within the context of nation-state survival on the international stage. Such an implication, while certainly appropriate in the context of
superpower nuclear standoffs, is not ultimately useful insofar as intrastate security and prosperity are concerned. As the functioning of the object polity and its relationship to state instability is of primary concern, the term “political culture” is more apropos. That is to say, from the perspective of an outside observer, the political culture of various non-great-power nation-states is of utmost importance to U.S. strategic decision making. Much as operational culture concerns itself with aspects of local culture (customs, normative behaviors, etc.) that are important considerations for the military commander, strategic culture consists of those elements of foreign political culture of vital concern for the policy maker operating at the strategic level.

It is the political culture of a state, or more narrowly that of the ruling party or regime, that determines the possible courses of action in any given scenario. What may be deemed perfectly acceptable domestic policy of one nation may be excluded entirely from the list of possible options in another. From a policy formulation perspective, while senior U.S. executives and bureaucrats may generate perfect solutions to mitigate or neutralize the apparent drivers of instability, the actual implementation of such policies is still contingent upon the cooperation of a host/recipient nation. Further, as cooperation is contingent upon such policies being acceptable to that government, it would behoove those making policy to understand what exists within the realm of the possible vis-à-vis the political culture of the nations they wish to stabilize.

A firm understanding of various strategic, a.k.a. political, cultures remains useful even in the event that brokering a mutually agreeable policy between two sovereign parties fails. Knowing the possible course of action a government may take unilaterally in addressing the perceived drivers of local instability would permit, in military parlance, the development of branch plans or sequels to respond in the event of policy failure or incipient crisis. This is not to say that strategic culture can serve the strategic planner in some sort of clairvoyant manner, for as many have quipped, “it’s tough to make predictions, especially about the future.” Rather, in order to devote resources to the protection of national interests, strategic culture can serve as a mechanism to determine possible threats to those interests. In this regard, if U.S. policy makers find themselves unable to influence the course of events in a given foreign clime, understanding that state’s individualized range of options, ascribed to it by its political culture, may at a minimum, prevent strategic surprise.

Strategic culture, as discussed previously, not only defines the solution set for any given security matter, more often than not it defines what constitutes a security matter in need of such a solution. That is, strategic culture provides the lens through which nation states interpret stimuli, determine threats, and appropriate resources in response. Therefore, a broad analytical approach is required to determine macro-level trends within the state prior to assessing individual policies or policy areas at the micro-level. Rarely are the decisions of any particular bureaucratic processes made vacuum. Rather, they occur within the larger context of national political/strategic agendas. This leads again to the dilemma of scope, and the necessity of some sort of middle ground.

Even a cursory knowledge of world history would seem to reveal the appropriate framework for analysis of sub-Saharan strategic culture. Through 1959, nearly the entire continent of Africa was under the colonial rule of various European powers. Yet by 1966, only ten African countries, out of what today amounts to 55 independent nation-states, remained under imperial control. Of those, all of which are located south of the Sahara Desert, Zimbabwe was the last to gain formal independence in 1980. Though diverse in character and culture prior to and during their assorted colonial subjugation, the wave of independence that reshaped the global political landscape in the decades following World War II embarked the nations of sub-Saharan Africa “on a common history as ‘emergent’, ‘non-aligned’, ‘developing nations’.” Given the aforementioned diverse nature of these now foundling nation-states, their common experience and heritage as former colonies would seem a reliable scapegoat for the widespread, and to some degree, endemic problems that seem to plague the region.

While there is certainly merit in an institutional or structural approach to the study of the colonial experience, lacking from it is an incorporation of the very thing we are concerned with, at least from the perspective of strategic or political culture – human agency. The results of any policy decision is as much a product of the people making the decisions and those affected by them, as they are of the environment in which they were implemented. How and why political actors institute various policies is, perhaps, of greater importance than the institutional or environmental variables present in the decision making process. As Bernard Waits notes, the “puzzling feature of post-colonial history is that countries embarking on independence with much the same colonial legacy have followed different trajectories.” Though a further puzzling feature might be that, given these different economic, social, and political trajectories, they have lead to similar predicaments.

These, markedly different trajectories become apparent when considering the case of political institutions in sub-Saharan Africa as well. Upon independence, the vast majority of states in the region instituted fledging multi-party democratic governments. Unfortunately, many of these initial governments failed to achieve meaningful, legitimate governance, and subsequently fell in a spate of coup d’états and takeovers at the hands of military juntas, resulting in unstable power-sharing arrangements and one-party authoritarian “democracies.” The most prominent failures of governance in the region are well known: the Rwandan genocide of 1998 following the failure of the Ashura Accords; civil wars in Sudan, South Sudan, Liberia, and Angola to name but a few; famine and turmoil in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea.

Yet there are success stories. The government of Botswana, a former British colony in Southern Africa, has had peaceful elections and transitions of power since independence in 1965. South Africa, though tainted by legalized discrimination in the form of apartheid for much of its independence, has made great strides since the 1993 referendum disestablishing
the practice. Zambia has maintained a relatively stable political system during its independence as well, though interspersed with periods of one-party participatory democracy and failed coup attempts. Unfortunately, there is little agreement as to what the prima facie evidence indicates with respect to success and failures of governance in sub-Saharan Africa.

Political scientists, economists, and sociologists continue to debate the topic heavily, proffering divergent theories that serve to address empirical observations. Some point toward a lack of egalitarian democratic fundamentals among the populace as an instrument of failure. Others note the correlation between poor public policy and the challenging demographics associated with ethnic diversity. A third school of thought presupposes the artificiality of colonially derived political institutions, positing instances of instability as the product of resultant patronimial politics aimed at maintaining power. Finally, still others have noted the interrelationship between state capacity and perceived legitimacy, and that both seem to correlate with the level of similarity between pre- and post-colonial political institutions.

To understand policy and the processes by which it is formulated, especially those that perpetuate instability in sub-Saharan Africa, we must “understand the belief system, the cognition map and perception of the people concerned.” That is, we must understand the strategic culture of those nations and their ruling elites, and to do so, we must understand their origins. Nowhere more so than sub-Saharan Africa has colonialism served to shape, and to some degree contort, the lens through which politicians view the world and that which would portend to threaten it. Though, as noted in the introduction and follow-on discussion of American policy, “Afro-pessimism” continues today to cloud the ability of western academics to effectively evaluate African issues. Thus, a postcolonial research approach and methodology can serve to both illuminate security as interpreted by those in sub-Saharan Africa, while simultaneously allowing those viewing it from the outside to cast aside biases that distort the process.

Post-colonialism and Strategic Culture

Thus far, we have identified and contended with two important aspects of an analytical approach to discerning strategic culture within sub-Saharan Africa. First, an adaptation and expansion of baseline strategic culture has allowed an application of those ideas to the context of domestic politics within the region. Secondly, we have identified the colonial period and subsequent processes of decolonization as an appropriate framework within which to begin the study. Still lacking, however, are solutions to two fundamental issues: Western bias and the role of human agency.

In reconciling both these methodological issues - perspective biases and the role of human agency - the approaches utilized by postcolonial theorists prove effective. Postcolonial studies are anything but new, and typically well accepted among academic circles as being effectively explanatory insofar as being a descriptive medium for a wide range of social phenomena observed in former colonial states. Though a thorough dissection of all its aspects and applications is beyond the scope of this argument, it is important to note the dissent among academics as to the precise definition of the term “post-colonial,” when its use is appropriate, and the inferences that its use engenders.

Some have argued that “post-colonialism,” as a condition, can apply equally well to both former colonial subjects and their imperial rulers. Others have implied that it describes a discursive process, wherein those under colonial rule formulate a national identity, both separate from and greater than, the identity imposed by the colonizer. Still other authors, like Edward Said, claim that it is most useful to describe the context in which First World and Third World nations relate to one another, both past and present. There is considerable debate even over hyphenation; the un-hyphenated “postcolonialism” is thought to connote a modern, non-ideological understanding, whereas “post-colonialism” elicits a deference to Marxist ideologies that underscored many of the post-World War II independence movements. Still further, the very use of “post” as a prefix causes a ruckus, some arguing that the colonial past and neo-colonial present exist in continuity, lacking the stark division that “post” implies.

As a methodological approach to the study of strategic culture, postcolonialism provides a means to consider colonial history from the perspective of those who lived and struggled under the rule of another, and still experience the effects of such rule today. It seeks to define and then dissect the role of imperial rule with respect to the transformation of indigenous culture, ideology, economics, and political life. In keeping with the model of strategic culture argued for here, a postcolonial approach allows for a methodical study of cognitive influences. Such an approach asks the fundamental question; in what way did colonialism affect the mindset of the colonized, both before and after independence? In that vein, the following are ques-
tions that a postcolonial approach may offer in the pursuit of strategic culture in sub-Saharan Africa.
- In what way did colonial powers attempt to alter the social fabric of individual colonies?
- How did colonizers alter the meaning behind significant cultural symbols and artifacts?
- What colonial institutions remained after independence? What purpose did they serve in the post-independence period?
- What narrative did eventual rulers employ to garner popular support?
- What does self-rule imply? Prior to independence? After independence?
- What aspects of pre-colonial culture, traditions, and ideology remain?

While this list is anything but exhaustive, these questions are indicative of the general methodological approach of postcolonialism. Further, this line of questioning supports what has been argued for herein. That is the utilization of second-generation strategic culture to pursue the attendant processes and inputs central to the formation and modification of strategic culture. Secondly, as they apply to the model of strategic culture posited, these questions, and those like it, directly address the cognitive influences and manifestation variables that exist within specific cultures. A prime example comes from Kenya, and the linkages between the oppressive tactics of the British government during the Mau Mau uprising in the 1950s, and the authoritarian modes of governance adopted by post-independence regimes.

During a seven year declared “state of emergency,” the British employed counter-insurgency tactics composed mainly of widespread violence, rape, mass incarcerations, torture, and murder in an attempt to subdue the populace. As Margaret Kohn and Keally McBride note, this “was an intensification of existing modes of colonial governance that destroyed the remnants of indigenous sources of authority and order and replaced them with unmitigated coercion.” Numerous regulations, namely the Native Courts Regulations of 1897, the Vagrancy Regulations of 1898, and the Emergency Powers Order of 1939, had codified many of the measures used during the “emergency.” Many of those provisions remained in effect, or were reenacted by indigenous regimes in various form or fashion following independence, thereby continuing authoritarian practices of the government.

Using a post-colonial framework, one can discern with slightly more background information that it is likely that years of colonial rule had, in the minds of would be rulers, transformed the notion of legitimacy in Kenya. Prior to colonialism, only the support of the tribe (populace) could confer legitimacy on local rulers. British colonial rule altered that system, such that legitimacy now emanated from above, negating the need for consensus building. Rather, the coercive power of the colonial state became synonymous with legitimacy. After independence, legitimacy, as practiced by the native ruler, continued as a function of the coercive capability of fear, and when that failed, force. Autocracy had become a cultural imperative, and to some degree remains in place today, as evidenced by the widespread international denunciation of recent Kenyan elections.

When we apply this interpretation of events to the adapted model of strategic culture, we see that colonial practices had a definitive cognitive effect on future indigenous regimes. The ability to coerce the populace, being the legitimating factor in governance, identified both the threats to the ruling regime -internal dissention- and the appropriate measures for addressing those threats – incite fear and repress by violence if necessary. Though in the long run this is likely to constitute a negative feedback cycle, the strategic culture of Kenya, as it existed for decades following independence, thwarted any such understanding among the ruling elite.

Applied in this way, one can see the value of a post-colonial approach to strategic culture. The above insights, while cataloged by the aforementioned authors, came from the work of African intellectual Ngugi wa Thiong’o. In this case, we have removed western cultural bias by referencing the thoughts of the very people affected by colonialism. Further, by doing so, we emphasize the human agency of those involved in the development said culture. This is not to imply that Kenyan strategic culture is one-dimensional. Rather, the postcolonial approach proved appropriate due to the colonial context of Kenya’s autocratic policies. In this way, and applied to the varied colonial experiences of sub-Saharan African states, one can holistically understand the strategic cultures resident within the region.

Conclusions
As noted by President Barrack Obama at the opening session of the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit in August, 2014, Africa is a growing area of importance for U.S. foreign policy. Yet, U.S. diplomats risk continuing a trend of ineffective foreign exploits in the sub-Saharan region based on an overly “Westernized” interpretation of history and culture as it exists. In order to counteract this trend, policy makers would do well to adapt the tenets of second-generation strategic culture to the realities of politics south of the Sahara. Further, given the regions shared colonial history, a post-colonial approach aids in a fuller understanding of those strategic cultures. By removing Western biases, emphasizing the role of human agency, and rejecting a myopic structuralist approach to instability, one can gain a truer understanding of strategic culture and the processes by which it comes about.

By fully understanding the strategic culture of the myriad nations in the region, U.S. diplomats and politicians can be better prepared to offer policy recommendations that will meet with approval and excitement in the nations they wish to stabilize and see prosper. Additionally, such an understanding may in fact prevent strategic surprise, by preparing officials for the possibility that policy concurrence between the U.S. government and its various partners may not be in the realm of the possible. Strategic culture, when applied to sub-Saharan Africa through the lens of postcolonialism, can increase understanding, and result in far more effective and efficient U.S. policy foreign policy in the region.
Editor’s Note: Major Jager’s on-scene report is published here as a condensed version of a much longer article with expanded analysis and research notes, available at www.faoa.org.

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed are those of the author and not necessarily the positions of the U.S. Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

15 July 2016

The week of 11 July 2016 began as a fairly typical week in my assignment as the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Liaison Officer to Turkey. My office is in the Turkish Land Forces Training and Doctrine Command Headquarters in Ankara, where I serve as the only foreign officer embedded in a Turkish Land Forces element. I work on bilateral security cooperation initiatives. I closed out the week on Friday afternoon, the 15th of July, chatting with a Turkish general as we departed Turkish TRADOC at the close of business. As my wife was due to come home late from an office party, I was happy to return home for a quiet evening and to go to bed early after the conclusion of another solid week of working to advance the bilateral military-to-military relationship between the U.S. Army and Turkish Land Forces. All seemed normal. ... Then there was a coup attempt.

My wife called me from her office party with a comment that there seemed to be a lot of military jets flying over Ankara and that she’d be coming home soon. She soon called back at 2223 hours: “Jeff, wake up, turn on the TV, there’s a coup going on.” It seemed implausible. “A military coup in Turkey in 2016…..this isn’t the 1980s,” I thought to myself. Urgent reports on the TV indicated this was likely the case: military forces had started to seize key infrastructure in Turkey’s major cities of Istanbul, Izmir, and Ankara. The seizure of the entrance to the national television and radio station, Turkish Radio and Television (TRT), by an element of Turkish military forces consisting of two large busses, one truck, and one minibus full of soldiers, confirmed, for me, the fact of an on-going coup attempt: I watched this occur from the balcony of my apartment at a distance of about 450 meters.

At 2330 hours, a firefight erupted at TRT between the company-sized element of coup forces and counter-coup police forces. This very much reminded me of combat I’d experienced in two deployments to Iraq: small arms and machine guns supported by attack helicopters. One attack helicopter made repeated gun runs against counter-coup forces and civilians on a west-to-east approach to TRT from about 100 meters from our apartment. As we had been observing from our living room and balcony on the twenty-second floor, just 450 meters away and well within the range fan of the firefight, we quickly retreated to our master bedroom, on the other side of the building, for safety. We remained there for the next hour or so as events at TRT unfolded.

By 2325 hours, when TRT broadcast the coup leaders’ declaration that the “Peace at Home Council” had assumed control of the Government of Turkey and instituted martial law, it very much appeared that the coup attempt might succeed. Coup forces had seized and closed the main airports in Istanbul and Ankara, seized the bridges crossing the Bosphorus in Istanbul, taken control of the Turkish General Staff Headquarters, and seized and shut down numerous media and broadcasting stations, among other basic coup plot necessities. There was no news from the Government of Turkey.

This changed just an hour later, at 0026 hours, when Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, appearing on CNN Türk through an Iphone via the Facetime application, called on the Turkish nation to oppose the coup. Other prominent personalities quickly followed, including Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım; former President Abdullah Gül; most political party leaders; the Special Forces Commander, Major General Zekai Aksakall; Turkish 1st Army Commander, General Ümit Dündar; and Minister Mehmet Görmez of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Prominently, by 0235 hours, the Turkish Ministry of Religious Affairs instructed mosques to use their loudspeakers to call on citizens to oppose the coup. Ominously, no message emerged from the Chief of Defense or Service Commanders. We learned mid-morning that they had all been kidnapped and interned by coup forces.

These calls from prominent figures in Turkish society came at a key time in the coup attempt. Within about five minutes of President Erdoğan’s appearance on TV on Facetime, a flow of Turkish citizens began literally marching towards the sounds of the guns at TRT. Within about 30 minutes, the major thoroughfare running in front of TRT, Turan Güneş Boulevard, was blocked with cars abandoned by people who parked in the road, dismounted, and headed towards TRT. With sporadic fighting on-going, coup forces opened fire on the approaching
civilian crowd, wounding at least one civilian. Power was cut to TRT. By 0230 hours, by which time we had returned to the living room to observe events, a large crowd, including a group of armed civilians, had formed in front of TRT and confronted the coup forces. At least ten civilians were injured, and civilians detained ten coupists and transferred them to the police. By 0300 hours, the public, with police support, had seized TRT from coupist control.

The instantaneous flow of the Turkish public inspired by President Erdoğan and other key personalities to oppose the coup activities at TRT was replicated across the country. Unarmed, flag-waving citizens went up against armed soldiers, tanks, armored personnel carriers, attack helicopters, F-4s, and F-16s...and won. With the help of the Turkish National Police Forces, normal citizens established security around key infrastructure, reclaimed broadcast stations, and detained coup supporters.

By 0400 hours, we decided to go to bed, with the assessment that the coup attempt had failed. The Government of Turkey appeared to have reestablished control and was beginning methodical counter-coup operations. We also were cognizant of the very real possibility that we might be evacuated in the following days; with an eye towards this, we’d packed “go-bags.” We remained at home on lockdown based on “shelter in place” guidance for the rest of the weekend, relying on grocery delivery services and thankful our cupboards and fridge were well-stocked. This provided ample opportunity to review the events of 15-16 July. Apart from the security and political implications of the coup attempt, two major themes dominated my thoughts on 16 and 17 July.

First, Turkish direct democracy as executed on 15 and 16 July was incredibly strong. In this conception, democracy as the will of the governed was expressed by the Turkish citizenry, who voted with their feet -- and, for 247 people, with their lives -- to oppose the coup attempt and defend the state. Those older than 35 or so, who had lived through the disastrous consequences of at least two previous coups (1980, 1997), if not more (as coups also occurred in 1960 and 1971), seem to have been motivated by past negative experiences to oppose the coup. Supporters of President Erdoğan and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) clearly responded to calls to oppose the coup attempt. They were joined by significant segments of society: leaders and followers of all three major opposition parties, the intact military chain of command, and religious leaders, for example.

Second, the Turkish nation is impressive and resilient. Despite the incredibly fractured political atmosphere in Turkey, the political sphere seemed to unify, at least episodically, during and following the coup attempt. Anti-coup protests dominated the public spaces in Turkey, night after night, from 16 July through 10 August. These rallies -- planned by the AKP or the other political parties -- drew supporters and leadership from across the political and social spectrum. They provide further evidence of the strength of direct democracy in Turkey. A substantial number of the anti-coup protesters also oppose the ruling AKP and President Erdoğan, demonstrating anti-coup unity across the political spectrum. For example, on 4 August, the opposition CHP led an anti-coup protest in Izmir, garnering hundreds of thousands of supporters, while similar protests were held across 81 different cities in Turkey on the same date. These protests both serve as anti-coup and “Defend Democracy” protests. Another much larger “Democracy and Martyrs” rally was held in Istanbul on 7 August. Between three and five million people, including the President, Prime Minister, and opposition CHP and MHP party leaders, attended the Istanbul rally, with simultaneous rallies held across the country.

The U.S. Army defines resilience, in part, as a characteristic that allows individuals to “bounce back and overcome adversity.” Turks demonstrated incredible resilience in overcoming the coup attempt, and perhaps more so in returning to normal work and life functions by the mid-morning of 16 July. By Monday, 18 July, while uncertainty and instability related to the coup attempt continued, Turks returned to work and life routines. It is hard not to be impressed by the Turkish public.

Along with the Turks, we returned to “life as normal” on 18 July. This was quite eerie, as the overall situation was still quite unsettled and definitely not normal. Regardless, I returned to work at Turkish TRADOC and my wife returned to work at the Embassy.

**Coup Attempt: What Actually Happened?**

With the caveat that history is written by the victorious and that details of the events leading up to and of 15 July are still emerging, it appears that a diverse group of individuals in Turkey’s military forces, security services, judiciary, and spread...
throughout the rest of the government bureaucracy, perhaps led or inspired by Fethullah Gülen, initiated military action to topple the democratically-elected Government of Turkey on 15 July 2016. The coup attempt failed, which became clear by daylight on 16 July. At least 352 people were killed (including 105 coupists) and more than 2,100 were wounded in the coup attempt, with soldiers, tanks, F-16s, and attack helicopters opening fire on crowds of civilians, the Turkish General Staff HQ, Parliament, the national radio/television station, and hosts of other security service and government locations, with levels of violence differentiating this coup attempt from previous coups in Turkey.

Most observers attribute the failure of the coup attempt to a combination of the coup forces’ inability to kill or capture President Erdoğan and Prime Minister Yıldırım; lack of support for the coup from the Chief of Defense and Service Chiefs; ineffective attempts to control media of all types; and, perhaps most of all, the response of the unarmed, flag-waving Turkish public against the coup attempt. It very much appeared that the coup plotters assumed the Turkish public would acquiesce to the coup attempt, perhaps based on the public’s response to previous coups. This was a decisively bad assumption, and perhaps ignored changing demography and urbanization in Turkey.

The coup attempt, because it failed, appeared to have been poorly planned and executed. As more and more details emerge, however, it became apparent that the coup attempt was well planned and supported by not only senior military officers (at least forty percent of Turkey’s pre-coup attempt 358 generals and admirals have been taken into custody, arrested, or dismissed from the military for involvement in the coup) but also a small but not insignificant percentage of Turkish Government employees. More than 13,000 suspected coupists have been arrested and more than 81,000 bureaucrats of all sorts removed from their positions, with more dismissals and arrests occurring almost daily. Turkey convened its National Security Council and Council of Ministers on 20 July, leading to the announcement of a national 90-day State of Emergency, approved on party lines by three of the four parties in Parliament (opposed by the People’s Democratic Party, or HDP, which largely represents the interests of Turkey’s Kurdish minority). Post-coup operations, approved by Parliament through the State of Emergency declaration, have continued since 16 July.

What a Successful Coup Would Have Meant

Counterfactual analysis presents many difficulties, primary among them the lack of concrete evidence to support one’s claims about what might have occurred if one thing or another had or had not happened. In the case of the 15 July coup attempt in Turkey, documentary evidence of what would have happened had the coup succeeded is beginning to emerge. The bulk of this evidence comes from documents published and sent by the coup leaders during their short reign of control of the Turkish General Staff on the night of 15–16 July. According to these documents, the coup leaders would have declared martial law (which they actually did), permanently closed all political parties, and at least fifty prominent public figures, including President Erdoğan, Prime Minister Yıldırım, cabinet ministers, and journalists, would have been executed.

“The fallout would have been seismic for Turkey, the Middle East and the western security architecture, particularly NATO,” as Fawaz Gerges explained. These measures would have resulted in the suspension of the democratic process in Turkey and likely would have led to civil strife or even all out civil war that would have transformed Turkey into a terrorist breeding ground, further destabilizing the Middle East and having a devastating impact on the counter-ISIS fight and coalition support to counter-ISIS rebels.

For purposes of understanding fallout from the failed coup attempt, two major perspectives about the Gülen Movement likely carry the most importance: that of the Government of Turkey, and that of the Government of the United States. The Government of Turkey views Fethullah Gülen as an enemy of the Turkish state, leader and organizer of the 15 July coup attempt, and head terrorist of the Fethullahi Terör Örgütü / Paralel Devlet Yapılanması (in English, Fethullah’s Followers Terror Organization / Parallel State Structure, commonly referred to as FETO). Notably, supporting Turkey’s perspective, the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation designated the Gülen Movement a terrorist organization on 28 July 2016 in a draft resolution. The Government of the United States views Fethullah Gülen as a legal permanent resident (LPR) of the United States, as he lives in Pennsylvania and was granted LPR status by a federal judge, against the desires of the U.S Government, in the mid-2000s.

Understanding the Turkish perspective of the Gülen Movement as a terrorist organization is important because this perspective informs post-coup activities by the Turkish Government. The removal of suspected coupists and Gülen supporters from the government bureaucracy, referred to in English-language press as “Erdoğan’s purge,” is to the Turkish Government simply the removal of terrorists from its bureaucracy. Post-coup, the number one priority of the Turkish Government is defending the existence of the Turkish state. It is quite possible to disagree with the Turkish Government’s labeling of the Gülen Movement as a terrorist organization; however, understanding this perspective helps one understand the post-coup “purge.” Turkey, like every other country in the world, does not tolerate the existence of an entity it considers and formally declares a terrorist organization in the centers of its government’s bureaucracy.

President Obama early on 16 July was one of the first world leaders to condemn the coup attempt, and he followed up with a message of support in a phone call to President Erdoğan on 19 July. The visit to Turkey of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph Dunford on 1 August reinforced the U.S. Government’s condemnation of the coup attempt. This visit was front-page news and received extensive, positive coverage from Turkish news outlets: General Dunford was the first foreign dignitary to visit Turkey following the coup, with the exception of the UK’s EU Minister, who was in Turkey on 16 July. General Dunford’s impromptu visit to the bombed-out Turkish Parliament with
the Turkish Chief of Defense and visits to the Turkish Prime Minister and Parliamentary Speaker were also well covered and indicated U.S. support for Turkey.

Unfortunately, while President Obama’s condemnation of the coup, his telephone call to President Erdoğan, and General Dunford’s visit to Ankara demonstrated U.S. support for the Government of Turkey, they did little to tamp down anti-Americanism rampant in Turkey. Post-coup anti-Americanism in Turkey is largely based on two factors: first, a widely-held belief that the U.S. was responsible for the coup; and, second, the continued presence of Fethullah Gülen in the United States. As in many cultures -- including American culture -- Turks truly appreciate a good conspiracy theory. Turkey’s “Sèvres Syndrome,” born out of the end of the First World War and the envisioned dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire by the Allies in the Treaty of Sèvres, creates a special sense of paranoia in Turkey regarding foreign interest and/or involvement in Turkey.

Post-Coup Status of the Turkish Military
In the weeks following the failed coup attempt, under the authorities granted by the Parliament-approved State of Emergency, Turkey has taken steps to reform the Turkish military. These reforms include establishing full civilian control of the military, reforming the professional military education system, and replacing dismissed and arrested coupists with younger officers.

Impact on Security Situation and Bilateral Military-to-Military Relationship
Many analysts have asserted that the coup attempt and post-coup attempt actions taken by the Turkish government have substantially and negatively impacted Turkish military readiness and effectiveness. Such analysis derives in part from immediate post-coup impacts on counter-ISIL coalition operations at Incirlik Air Base in southeast Turkey, as well as the assertion that the Turkish military’s ability to counter ISIL has been reduced. Additional concerns include potential negative developments in Turkey’s ability to fight the PKK and potential impacts on the bilateral U.S.-Turkey military-to-military relationship.

Turkey likely views threats to its security in the following order: the Gülen Movement, the PKK, and, thirdly, ISIL. Turkey’s security operations are likely to focus on defeating the Gülen Movement. However, this is not likely a zero-sum game: the Turkish security services likely have enough capability and capacity to simultaneously pursue counter-coup operations, fight the PKK, and participate in coalition operations against ISIL. Fighting the PKK likely is a higher priority for Turkey than fighting the Islamic State.

Post-coup uncertainty may impact bilateral U.S.-Turkey security cooperation in the near-term, as Turkey restructures its military, works through promotion and reassignment processes to fill critical billets left empty by the removal of coup leaders from the organization, including more than forty-percent of flag officers, and as newly assigned and promoted generals and admirals establish command priorities. These near-term impacts are most likely to affect security cooperation initiatives that are not codified in bilateral agreements or treaties and that are not linked to long-term security cooperation activities. These activities, like Foreign Military Sales (FMS), are substantial. In 2015, U.S. arms sales to Turkey equaled about two billion dollars. Between 2011 and 2015, arms exports to Turkey represented 6.6% of all U.S. arms exports, making Turkey the U.S.’s third largest arms export partner. These arms sales through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency are established through large, complex, legally-binding multi-year contracts. Therefore, while the post-coup atmosphere provides uncertainty, it is highly unlikely that the range of FMS programs between the U.S. and Turkey, including but not limited to missiles, precision munitions, attack helicopters, cargo helicopters, and air defense systems, will be substantially impacted.

Conclusion
In the near-term and mid-term, the political atmosphere is likely to be ripe for tension in Turkey’s relationships with its partners to the west. These political challenges, based on criticism of Turkey by U.S. and European media and leaders that contributes to anti-Europeanism and anti-Americanism in Turkey, along with the continued presence of Fethullah Gülen in the United States, may potentially spill over into Turkey’s security relationships, including the bilateral U.S.-Turkey military-to-military relationship.

U.S. support to Turkey in the post-coup environment, including President Obama’s condemnation of the coup, Secretary Kerry’s words of support for Turkey, the planned late August visit to Turkey by Vice President Biden, and General Dunford’s visit to Ankara on 1 August are likely to have re-assured Turkey of America’s support. However, short of a deliberate “re-assure ally” effort by the U.S. and the rest of NATO, anti-Americanism and anti-Europeanism may likely continue in Turkey, with potentially substantial impact on diplomatic and security relationships. In the long-term, a return to pre-coup conditions in relationships with Turkey is very much likely to be dependent on how each Turkish ally and partner expresses and demonstrates support for and solidarity with the Government of Turkey.

About the Author
Major Jeff Jager is a U.S. Army FAO with an area of concentration in Europe, and is a Turkish linguist. He has been the Training and Doctrine Command Liaison Officer to Turkey since June 2015. He previously served as the Assistant Army Attaché in Cyprus from 2012-2015 (with six months of service as the acting SDO/DATT). His essay “Turkey: A Misunderstood Ally” appeared in the Spring 2016 edition of the FAO Association Journal.
Editor's Note: Major Landgraf’s paper is published here without footnotes. The full version is available at www.faoa.org or by request from the editor <editor@faoa.org>.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s policy of supporting separatists in eastern Ukraine violates Kiev’s sovereignty, disregards international norms for state behavior, and confounds policymakers in the West. The current situations in Donetsk and Luhansk appear to be the latest episodes in a series of so-called “frozen conflicts” in former Soviet republics in which Moscow plays a murky, if not sinister, role. For the moment it seems Putin has achieved his ostensible foreign policy objective in Ukraine: prevent Kiev’s integration with Euro-Atlantic institutions, namely the EU and NATO, for the foreseeable future.

Understanding how this sort of goal becomes a priority for the Russian government, and resonates with a broad segment of Russian citizens, is important because it helps foster accurate analytical forecasting and prevents unwanted strategic surprise. For U.S. diplomatic and military communicators it can mean the difference between successful engagements and messaging gaffes with Russian counterparts. This task is challenging for U.S. communicators and analysts because they must consciously place themselves in the mindset of foreign audiences, who believe narratives that, from an American perspective, may seem unfounded or outlandish.

Russia considers itself, and its neighborhood in which it used to dominate – the former Soviet Union – threatened by Western advances, and in response has attempted to limit Western influence in the post-Soviet space. A narrative such as this is constructed, in part, through “practical geopolitical reasoning”. Practical geopolitical reasoning is reasoning by means of consensual assumptions about places and things. In Russia, just as in other countries, it helps people shape their own identity and experiences, explains their hopes, fears, and aspirations, and how to make sense of the world and events unfolding around them.
Practical geopolitical reasoning plays an important role in framing foreign policy debates, formulating foreign policy agendas, and shaping how countries behave in the world. Understanding how Russians view themselves and what they consider their country’s role in global affairs helps observers make sense of Moscow’s foreign policy decisions. Putin’s current meddling in Ukraine is influenced by some particular aspects of practical geopolitical reasoning that is unique to Russians. A sense of regret among many Russians over the Soviet Union’s dissolution, popular notions about Russia’s “great power” status, and a siege mentality are powerful narrative constructions which, used effectively, function as calls for political action.

The Tragedy of the Soviet Collapse
The collapse of the Soviet Union is seen by many Russians as a traumatic event. Today, even after more than twenty years living with more individual freedoms than during Soviet times, many Russians long for the past. According to a 2009 poll, 43 percent preferred the Soviet system to the current one (6 percent). Six in ten respondents to a 2011 survey by the Levada Center, a non-governmental think tank based in Moscow, believed the Soviet breakup was “a disaster”. In the West, much has been made about Putin’s 2005 address to the Duma when he said that the Soviet Union’s collapse had been the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century.

However, to view these sentiments as a desire to bring back communism is a misinterpretation. They do not suggest a declaration of a new Cold War. Rather, these attitudes reveal nostalgia for lost Soviet status, and a yearning to have Russia seen as a powerful state. In some ways, these attitudes are justified. In the wake of the Soviet breakup, Russia lost one-sixth of its territory, its economy shrank by 50 percent, and state assets were divided up by powerful oligarchs. The ensuing decade was viewed by many Russians as a time of state weakness. Disorder, corruption, and poverty were widespread; President Boris Yeltsin’s attempts to integrate Russia with the West and its institutions for the most part failed. By the late 1990s, rather than rebuild a new state on the shaky foundation of Yeltsin’s democratic experiment, most Russian elites converged around a status-driven, statist self-image, which focused on building a strong state intent on (re)asserting Russia’s status as a “great power”.

From this vantage point, Moscow’s actions toward Crimea, culminating in its annexation by the Russian Federation in March 2014, can be viewed as an attempt to overcome loss and regain previous glory. It is worth remembering that Crimea was under Russian control for nearly 170 years before 1954, when Nikita Khrushchev transferred it to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. When the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, Crimea was incorporated into newly independent Ukraine, though it retained many of its imperial and Soviet vestiges, such as a large Russian-speaking population, a Russian ethnic majority, and the base for Russia’s Black Sea fleet in Sevastopol. For Putin, Russia’s behavior is not interpreted as a sort of neo-imperial revanchism, rather a thoughtful decision by the residents of Crimea to “return to their native home”.

Derzhavnost’ – Thinking about Russia as a Great Power
The notion that Russia is a great power, and therefore must project that image internationally, is prevalent in Russian geopolitical culture. The roots of this line of thinking are geographically based. “Russocentrism” is the idea that the country’s central location on the Eurasian landmass implies its fundamental importance in determining world politics. From this angle, Russia is seen as a key to maintaining global stability. The idea that Russia should be accepted as a great power is a holdover from Soviet times. The Cold War – itself a global power struggle for legitimacy between the world’s two superpowers – helped foster and justify this great-power sentiment. After 1991 Russia represented a rare instance in which a former imperial polity neither disappeared from the world map, nor reinvented itself as a nation-state. Post-Soviet Russia sought to reconstitute itself as “great”, and behave as other great powers do towards their so-called spheres of influence.

For Russians, ideas on what constitutes a “great power” are wide-ranging, but not unlike beliefs held in other countries. A large and capable military force, a sturdy economy, and substantial natural resources are thought to be some of the generic traits of greatness. In particular, Russia’s territorial vastness, its nuclear capability, its permanent seat at the UN Security Council, and a sense of a unique Russian mentality are others. In an article during the run-up to the March 2012 presidential elections, Putin wrote that Russia’s foreign policy decisions reflect its “unique role on the world political map”. For the Kremlin, there are various ways Russia expresses itself as a great power: independence from the West’s seemingly U.S.-dominated institutions, predominance in the former-Soviet area, and promotion of a multi-polar world in which Russia represents one of several poles. Putin’s 2007 Munich speech denouncing NATO enlargement and U.S. unilateralism in Iraq, as well as then-President Dmitry Medvedev’s 2008 interview proclaiming Russia’s neighborhood as its “zone of privileged interests” are pronouncements of these aspirations. Achievements during the decade of 1998-2008, such as steady economic growth fuelled by large oil and natural gas revenues, the widespread rise in the standard of living, and the military victory over separatist Chechnya, helped encourage self-confidence.

One way Russia shows its great power credentials is by building multilateral organizations, in which Moscow plays a central, if not, dominant role. Since the early 2000s one of Russia’s foreign policy goals has been to become an independent center of power and influence by using various economic, military, and political tools it has as its disposal. The Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), whose rules came into effect on January 1, 2015, is a customs union of ex-Soviet states designed to counterbalance the EU. Besides Russia, its members include Armenia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan plans to join in May 2015. Under the auspices of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) – comprised of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan – Moscow has tried to create a military alliance comparable to NATO, while also checking the latter’s expansion further eastward. Moscow has also strengthened political and military ties with Beijing through...
their co-chairmanship of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), whose members include those of the EEU plus China. The SCO is unlike many multilateral institutions in its inclusion of China.

Yet, despite the Kremlin's efforts at regional integration these coalitions have weaknesses. There are some obvious risks being tethered to a Russian economy beholden to world oil and natural gas prices, impaired by Western-led international sanctions, and whose credit rating was recently downgraded to junk status. The CSTO is supposed to be a joint military force, but in practice is mainly a Russian one that lacks sufficient equipment, logistics, and training to be effective. Compared to China, Russia is an economic lightweight, and Beijing sees the SCO as a way to penetrate the economies of central Asian states by providing them non-Russian energy sources.

The limits of Russian influence are apparent in these clubs. Moscow dropped its plans of creating a Eurasian parliament – a would-be governing body for the EEU – after Kazakhstan objected, and Russia's adeptness at alienating its neighbors has resulted in a third of CSTO's original members leaving the group. Through these institutions Russia seeks to expand its influence in the region while undermining the influence of the West in general, and the United States in particular. Yet it is the appearance of power, rather than power itself that seems to be the main achievement for the Kremlin.

As a self-styled great power, Russia wants to be treated equally; however, some actions taken by the West are interpreted by the Kremlin as showing that it is not. The debate about the prospect of recognizing Kosovo's independence from Serbia is one example. In 2006, speaking on the subject of conferring recognition to Georgia's two breakaway regions, Putin asserted "any proposed solutions should be universal in nature. If someone takes the view that Kosovo should be granted independence, then why should we withhold the same from Abkhazia and South Ossetia?" Two years later, many Western capitals were trying to justify why the former was a unique case that should not set a precedent for the latter. From a Russian perspective, U.S. and (most of) EU and NATO recognition of Kosovo, but condemnation for Russia for doing the same for Abkhazia and South Ossetia, is interpreted by the Kremlin as a blatant double standard. Furthermore, NATO's refusal to establish bilateral ties with CSTO, and labeling it "a waning organization" by the U.S. State Department, are seen as disrespectful to Russia's interests.

More alarming to Russia is that despite assurances from the United States that NATO would not expand after the end of the Cold War, the alliance expanded three times, bringing military infrastructure to Russia's borders. In October 2001, after Moscow granted Washington access to bases in central Asia for the NATO-led war in Afghanistan, Putin's request for Russia to join the alliance was rebuffed by the NATO Secretary General. Since then, much to the Kremlin's resentment, NATO has welcomed several former-Warsaw Pact satellites and former-Soviet republics as members, which has added to Russia's feelings of unequal treatment by and contempt for the West. For Russia, the pervasiveness of a great power ideology – derzhavnost’ – in the minds of many Russians has to do with the idea that Russia is a great power, and as a result, must be treated as such by outsiders.

**Russia as Besieged Fortress**

"Fortress Russia" is a narrative storyline that is one of several rhetorical structures that have tended to guide foreign policy decisions. This narrative depicts Russia as a long-standing victim of aggression by external forces, which are intent on advancing foreign interests and conspiring against the Russian people. According to the narrative, Russia has been a besieged fortress since time immemorial: Russians suffered three centuries of servitude under the Mongols. Since then, assaults have come from all sides; from the Teutonic Knights, to Napoleon, to the Japanese in Manchuria, to the Germans in two World Wars. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the ‘imperialist’ alliance of the United States and Europe has conspired to encircle Russia and make it subservient to the West. The United States seeks to build its missile defense systems within striking distance of Moscow; NATO wants to expand to Ukraine and Georgia so that its bases can surround Russia; and the EU seeks to control former-Soviet lands such as Ukraine and Moldova. Despite these continued assaults, Russia has always withstood external invasions, and defended itself with honor.

Belief in this narrative is held by Russian political elites and among the security, intelligence, and military services in particular – the so-called siloviki. The Kremlin routinely deploys the

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Russia-as-besieged-fortress line to rally public support against perceived foreign encroachment on Russian sovereignty and its interests, in what it sees as its turf. Another way to look at it is that elites use this line to direct public attention towards an external threat, thus diverting their focus from internal problems like the oppressive political climate and rising prices due to the ruble’s devaluation. Nevertheless, the narrative plays on categories that exist in Russian geopolitical culture – feelings of group fear and grievances over perceptions of assaults on Russia by outsiders.

Today, NATO epitomizes the outside threat to Russia’s sovereignty and independence. The way Putin sees it, NATO’s expansion is unjustified in the absence of a threat to the West from Russia. The actions of the United States throughout Europe and Central Asia in general, but in the post-Soviet space in particular, are viewed as an intrusion into an area where Moscow thinks it should dominate. However, broader relations between the West and Russia have been deteriorating since the 1990s. There were two major points of contention during that decade. The first was the extension of NATO to the east, as three central European states that had been part of the Warsaw Pact – Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary – joined the alliance in 1999. The second was increased out-of-area military and peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia – Bosnia, which had UN imprimatur, and Serbia, which did not.

In 2004, NATO added six new members, an event at which Putin asked rhetorically: “Against whom is this expansion intended?” In 2007, the United States and its NATO allies called for a missile defense shield to protect Europe against potential ballistic missile threats from states such as Iran. Tracking and intercepting systems were to be deployed in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Romania. Both Putin and Medvedev sought assurances from the United States that these systems would not be targeted at Russia’s intercontinental ballistic missiles. From the “Fortress Russia” point of view, NATO’s missile defense was intended to undermine Russia’s strategic deterrent, rather than guard Europe against threats which Putin claimed “do not exist”.

At NATO’s summit in Bucharest in 2008, the allies debated extending a Membership Action Plan (MAP) to Georgia and Ukraine, in effect, putting them on the pathway to membership. Although the allies decided to not grant MAPs to Tbilisi and Kiev, they instead made an unprecedented commitment to Georgia’s and Ukraine’s eventual membership. For many in Putin and Medvedev’s foreign policy inner circle, the writing was on the wall: NATO, led by the United States, was intent on encircling and weakening Russia. Putin called the prospects of continued expansion “a serious provocation” which represented “a direct threat to the security of our country”. Less than six months later, Russia’s invasion of sovereign Georgian territory in the name of protecting Russian citizens living in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, in effect ended the prospect of NATO membership for Tbilisi – for the foreseeable future – and sent a strong message to Kiev (and others): membership in the alliance would come only at the expense of territorial integrity.

Although the current conflict in eastern Ukraine was born out of Kiev’s prospects for closer association with the EU – not NATO – Moscow sees the events in a similar light: Western encroachment in its neighborhood, manifested through intensified political and military engagement with Westward-leaning governments like Kiev, threatens Russia’s security. Yet it appears Putin’s aggression backfired somewhat, and pushed Kiev and others into the arms of the West. In June 2014, Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova signed an agreement with the EU lowering trade barriers and promoting democratic reforms, and on December 29th Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko signed a law scrapping the country’s neutral status, potentially clearing the way for eventual NATO membership.

Conclusion

Putin sees Russia’s role in the war in eastern Ukraine as supporting Russian compatriots living abroad in their struggle against an oppressive government in Kiev and its backers in the West. He considers seeming EU and NATO encroachment in Russia’s so-called sphere of privileged interests as threatening, and has taken steps to block it. Putin seeks to change the post-Cold War settlement of Europe’s borders through a propaganda war, and if necessary, through the use of military force. Whether the perceived threat from the West is accurate (it is not) is beside the point. It need not be in order for the Kremlin’s narrative to carry out the political rhetorical “work” of stimulating and legitimizing a powerful response within the Russian populace. For the moment many ordinary Russians back Moscow’s actions in Ukraine, yet that support could erode if the economy worsens as a result of Western sanctions and low oil and gas prices.

Certain aspects of Russian practical geopolitical reasoning influence Moscow’s foreign policy agenda and help shape its foreign policy goals. Together, regret over lost Soviet status, a fixation with power, and fear of encirclement function as an interpretive lens with which many Russians view the world. Putin sees Russia as one of a handful of great powers in an anarchic international system, in which status and power rather than norms of behavior and established channels of conflict resolution are the currency of interstate relations. This approach to dealing with the rest of the world characterizes Russia’s foreign policy during the Putin years, which is a reflection of Putin’s personality.

About the Author

Major Rick Landgraf is a Human Intelligence Collection Operations Manager assigned to the Americas Regional Center, Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC. He was commissioned in 2003 from the McDaniel College (Maryland) ROTC program, where he earned a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science. He holds a Masters in Public and International Affairs from Virginia Tech and a Masters of Science in Strategic Intelligence with a specialization in Eurasian Studies from the National Intelligence University in Washington, DC. He served multiple combat tours in Iraq, and recently returned from a deployment in Afghanistan with the Afghan Threat Finance Cell supporting the U.S. Embassy in Kabul.
Editor’s Note: Lieutenant Colonel Zeman’s thesis won the Foreign Area Officers Association writing award at the Joint Advanced Warfighting School, Joint Forces Staff College. Because of its length, you can find the full thesis on www.FAOA.org. A short version encompassing key sections is published here. We are pleased to bring you this outstanding scholarship.

Disclaimer: The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense. This paper is entirely my own work except as documented in footnotes.

Abstract
Since 9/11, the United States has been acutely aware of the threat presented by terrorist organizations. The focus of this threat has centered upon Al Qaeda and its affiliates. Hezbollah, meanwhile, has developed into a highly capable and multi-faceted organization that has demonstrated a robust military capability, a strong ability to use and manipulate information, while gaining an air of legitimacy, specifically as a voice in the Lebanese legislature. Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) organizations have also gained U.S. attention, largely due to the trafficking of drugs and humans into the United States.

The United States should develop an approach that recognizes the growing relationship between Hezbollah and TOCs, and the threat that it represents. This approach should address root causes, specifically the ungoverned spaces that serve as the operating bases for these illicit groups. The approach must thoroughly integrate all actions at all levels, U.S. Government and international, with specific focus upon second and third order effects with recognition of how actions influence root causes. Further, the focus of this approach will necessarily be upon building the capacity and capability of the nations in which Hezbollah and the TOCs use as their operating bases. For there to be a lasting solution to this concern, address of root causes is fundamental, with the host nations being the key element.

Introduction
Since 9/11, the U.S. Government has aggressively pursued Al Qaeda and its agents across the globe. U.S. media headlines have continually covered the U.S. campaign against Al Qaeda and unsurprisingly, Al Qaeda has captured the attention of the U.S. public. In the twelve years since 9/11, the terror concern has focused upon Al Qaeda with the current U.S. National Security Strategy for Counterterrorism dedicating the vast majority of its prose to discussion of the threat provided by Al Qaeda and its affiliates.

While the U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy focuses upon Al Qaeda, the Iranian backed Shi’ite terror group Hezbollah has quietly diversified and improved its capability into a wide spectrum of legal and illicit activities that give it a unique position in the world. The classification of Hezbollah as simply a terror group does not capture its vast and diverse capability and capacity. It is both well-funded and highly capable, largely due to its strong affiliation with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s Qods Force.

Hezbollah’s elements of power consist of significant
battlefield capability, an established political entity within Lebanon, significant social outreach, highly developed media and information arm, and transnational illicit trafficking. Once a high-profile terror concern of the U.S., Hezbollah has been somewhat less visible since 9/11 as U.S. focus has turned to Al Qaeda. As testament to this reduced visibility, the National Counterterrorism Strategy mentions “Hizballah” only twice while mentioning “al-Qa’ida” dozens of times.

Alongside terrorism, problems associated with illegal entry into the U.S. from Mexico have been frequent points of discussion. This discussion’s loudest voice centers upon illegal immigration, but other elements, such as drugs and the wider impact of human trafficking (such as the sex trade), are also prevalent. At the center of these illicit transit concerns are Transnational Organized Crime 3 (TOC) groups, such as the Mexican Gulf, Los Zetas and Sinaloa cartels, and the Salvadorian gangs Mara Salvatrucha 13 (MS-13) and Calle 18 (18th Street).

Like Hezbollah, TOC groups in Latin America have developed into formidable entities, capable of challenging local, and at times, national governments. Mexican cartels have become wealthy and powerful through the movement of drugs and people (primarily) through transit routes from Mexico into the United States. Similarly, the notorious gangs MS-13 and Calle 18 have also grown in power and wealth through illicit trafficking, largely emanating from El Salvador.

Although terror groups, cartels, and gangs garner significant concern by themselves, they pose an even greater concern when they work together. There are strong indications that terror groups and TOCs have already found common purpose in which to operate and collaborate. “In 2010, 29 of the 63 top drug trafficking organizations identified by the Department of Justice had links to terrorist organizations.” Although concerning, a nexus of terror groups and TOCs is not a new phenomenon, “The failure of the international community to recognize the centrality of this unholy trinity allowed this nexus to flourish in the 1990s and the beginning of this century.”

Interaction between Hezbollah and TOCs produces a grave synergy; “This emerging combination of threats comprises a hybrid of criminal-terrorist, and state and non-state franchises, combining multiple nations acting in concert, and traditional TOCs and terrorist groups acting as proxies for the nation states that sponsor them.” Address of this complex threat will require a detailed and comprehensive solution that spans a wide range of capabilities, “Understanding and mitigating the threat requires a whole-of-government approach, including collection, analysis, law enforcement, policy and programming.” This comprehensive approach to dealing with the criminal-terror nexus will require adaptive thought and action as a Westphalian approach will not encompass the totality of dynamics necessary. “No longer is the state/nonstate dichotomy useful in illustrating these problems, just as the TOC/terrorism divide is increasingly disappearing.” All of these elements taken together identify this new threat as one that requires new perspectives and discussion, “…the new combination of TOC, criminalized states, and terrorist organizations presents a new reality that breaks the

traditional paradigms.”

The anti-American intent and killing capacity of terror groups coupled with the advantageous location, transportation capability, and malign purpose of cartels and gangs presents a real and viable security threat to the United States. With the prospect of a nexus between Hezbollah and the TOCs of Central America, the United States must develop and implement a comprehensive, multi-agency, and international approach to defeat this high priority security threat. Additionally, this approach will need to recognize that Westphalian state-centric concepts are largely ineffective in dealing with this concern. Further, removing their key enabler — their ability to establish operating bases through exploitation of ungoverned spaces and the populations within them — is the crucial point for lasting success. The focus upon lasting success goes beyond Hezbollah and TOCs. The effective models and techniques being employed by these groups should not be viewed as isolated occurrences. Indeed, there is every reason to believe that other illicit organizations will emulate and adapt these models for their own purposes. Thus, an approach that addresses the root causes of current threats presented by today’s illicit non-state groups could serve as a model for degrading and defeating similar threats in the future.

Accordingly, the scope of this paper is to introduce an approach to the identified problem, using the specific case example of the nexus between Hezbollah and TOCs. Taking a strategic view would raise the level of national discussion and preclude discussion of the nuances and requirements of operational activities and the interactions of elements at that level. This paper will address the issue in four primary parts:

- The threat presented by Hezbollah and TOCs,
- The nexus between Hezbollah and TOCs, and the key role played by ungoverned spaces,
- Current U.S. Government activities targeted against these illicit groups and,
- A proposed national approach to combat this emergent threat, which targets these groups through an integrated tier structure with focus upon the root causes of the concerns.

Conclusion

Beyond its recent success and growth in the Levant, Hezbollah also maintains a strong presence in Central and South America. This presence has helped facilitate a nexus between Hezbollah and TOCs, particularly in Central America where Mexican Cartels and regional gangs have gained control over large portions of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. With these cartels and gangs comes trafficking expertise, specifically into the United States. This relationship between TOCs and Hezbollah should cause great concern to the U.S. The Hezbollah-cartel/gang nexus presents a unique threat to the United States largely due to the, “…porous southern border of the United States and abutting Mexico will be increasingly under the sway of hostile TOC groups, some of whom are closely aligned with state actors such as Venezuela and Iran that are overtly antagonistic to U.S. interests and goals.” This relationship takes on even greater importance when factoring
in Iran’s nuclear aspirations, with all of its attendant dynamics. “Further, the standoff with Iran over its nuclear program, and the uncertainty of whether Israel might attack Iran drawing the United States into a confrontation, only heightens concern that Iran or its agents would attempt to exploit the porous Southwest border for retaliation.”

Due to the advanced development and capability of Hezbollah, many have concluded that its leadership will avoid direct involvement in an attack against U.S. soil. While this perspective bears merit, Hezbollah’s capability provides it with options such as the use of a proxy or other indirect approaches to attack the United States. Gangs and cartels may provide just such vehicles. As seen with the recent assassination attempt against the Saudi Ambassador to the United States, Iran’s agents (which Hezbollah is a primary member) have demonstrated a willingness to take action within the United States. Compounding this concern is the willingness of TOC agents, as was seen in the Zeta’s role in the assassination attempt, to serve as the terminal actors in acts of terror in the United States.

The global reach of Hezbollah and TOCs illustrate a vast capability, which expands the threat aperture. “Latin American networks now extend not only to the United States and Canada, but outward to Sub-Saharan Africa, Europe, and Asia, where they have begun to form alliances with other networks.” This reach offers great functionality for all concerned, whether for criminal or terrorist activity, or both.

In the face of the threat presented by a functional relationship between Hezbollah and TOCs, the United States should develop an approach that not only recognizes this nexus, but also sees these organizations, and those like them, as similar. In such an approach, the primary focus should be upon addressing the root causes and factors and strengths of these groups, rather than a focus upon elimination of leadership. The first element of the approach should be to engage the host nation and international community as a whole in order to develop a common understanding of the threat and develop international legal consensus for action. With this consensus, U.S. and international efforts can begin to address the causal factors that enable Hezbollah and TOCs to operate freely and effectively. Critical to this effort is an effort to build the capability and capacity of local governments to confront these illicit groups while also building and preserving their legitimacy with their domestic populations. Once the governments of these nations act as primary guarantor of security and services, with the illicit group(s) discredited and considered illegitimate (or apostate), the effort will have passed the “tipping point” of the struggle.

A methodology designed to combat the threat presented by a nexus of Hezbollah and TOCs must have its focus and preponderance of effort outside of the United States. This is because not only is it desirable to engage this threat outside the U.S., but more significantly, any lasting and effective effort to defeat this concern must address the root causes and base elements. Furthermore, the primary mechanism of success will not be U.S. actions themselves, but rather the actions of our international partners. This relationship is critical to success in this endeavor, for both the U.S. and our current and potential partners.

While terrorism and TOCs are a great concern of the United States, even in the face of a WMD attack, they are not existential. In other nations, such as Lebanon, Mexico, and those of the Northern Triangle, the threat posed by Hezbollah and TOCs is grave, and could lead to state failure. The existence of the narco-state then, in turn, presents a threat to the United States and other stable nations, as well as to the entire international system. “By seeking to embed themselves irrevocably in a country’s political system and win exclusive control over a segment of the population, mezzanine rulers jeopardize domestic stability. When they resort to terrorism, piracy, insurgency, or other means to advance ideological, ethnic, or nationalist agendas, they pose a threat that goes well beyond the borders of the host state.”

The primary utility of U.S. actions will be as enablers to our partners. These enabling actions come primarily in the form of support and development activities that help a nation to gain and/or maintain capability and legitimacy, in the face of illicit actors such as Hezbollah and TOC groups. Direct action, when appropriate is another enabling activity that gains the host nation and other international actors opportunity — either to inject a developing capability or to hold off or reduce the threat for a period. As a point of emphasis, it is important to note that DA is rarely an end in itself, but rather a supporting component of a larger approach.

Getting to the “tipping point” will require significant interdiction and interception efforts, both in prevention of imminent attacks, but more significantly in disrupting the activities of illicit groups and killing and capturing key leaders and operatives. These actions will enable information collection and intelligence generation that can lead to further DA operations while presenting opportunities for the introduction of Engagement efforts, and time for them to take effect with target populations.

For an approach of this nature to work, it will require firm direction from the Chief Executive, along with vigilant supervision, specifically to ensure that effective multi-agency coordination and integration is taking place. This multi-agency approach is critical, requiring vigilant supervision, due to the tendency of agencies to act myopically, potentially losing sight of broader implications of isolated actions.

This proposed approach, with all of its attendant elements, while centered upon Hezbollah and Central American TOCs, supports a wider purpose. The recent growth and success of these groups should serve as both an immediate concern and a long-term warning to the United States and the West. “Any single one of these movements can be dismissed as anomalous, but taken collectively as a phenomenon, they represent a unique long-term challenge to governments, Western policymakers, and the precepts of international law.” Particularly in the case of Hezbollah, there is strong likelihood that others will emulate their organizational model. Although there has been success

cont. on pg. 86
The African Union’s (AU) Peace and Stability Council (PSC) through authority of the Constitutive Act will deploy the African Standby Force (ASF) for a variety of missions “where the PSC decides on a peace support mission or where intervention is authorised by the AU Assembly.” The AU is operationalizing the ASF for these missions, and has slipped its Initial Operational Capability (IOC) deadlines twice over the last ten years. Now pegged to December 2015, these delays indicate the difficulty of this task. Logistics support to ASF missions is a known gap and remains a significant challenge to the AU attaining its vision as well as ultimately employing the ASF. The AU requested support through United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) Logistics Directorate to develop a continental logistics plan to fill this critical gap. Through literature review and strategic assessment, this paper provides a wider look at the AU to provide insights into the development of such a plan given the AU foundational principle of subsidiarity and the complexity of the AU’s challenges in realizing their aspirational vision for the year 2063. The question remains: can such a “Continental Logistic Plan” be developed and implemented by December 2015 and at what cost? Further, what are the principles that should guide the development of this plan to provide the right balance of security and governance, both of which are critical drivers for the realization of Pan-African development goals?

Background

One can trace the origins of the ASF to the genocidal violence between the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups in Rwanda and the Great Lakes Region from 1994 to 1996. In particular, the systematic killing of Rwandans in 1994 spurred two important realizations. First, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) did not have sufficient authority or means to step in and stop the killing. Second, the UN Security Council did not authorize the deployment of international peacekeepers to Rwanda in a timely manner to prevent or stop the genocide. As both the OAU and UN watched, an estimated 800,000 Rwandans, most of them Tutsi, died between April and July 1994.

In the wake of the Rwanda genocide, the OAU Council of Ministers requested in 1995 that the chiefs of each of the member states’ militaries meet to discuss the establishment of an OAU-controlled peacekeeping force and the circumstances under which this force should be employed. In response, the “First Meeting of the Chiefs of the Central Organ” took place in 1996 in Addis Ababa and affirmed the OAU’s responsibility to “anticipate and prevent conflicts.” The military chiefs further recognized that it was the UN’s first responsibility to prevent conflict in accordance with the UN’s charter; however, the chiefs stated that in circumstances where the UN was unable or unwilling to act, the OAU should intervene.

In 1997, the OAU military chiefs, now known as the African Chiefs of Defence Staff (ACDS), met for the second time in Harare, Zimbabwe. During what would prove to be a defining report for the ASF, the ACDS recommended ten actions the OAU should take regarding the establishment of peacekeeping capability on the African continent. The ACDS recommended that the OAU should establish an all-African brigade-sized force in each of the five sub-regions. These brigades should be a mixture of military and civilian participants, standardized across the continent and trained in...
accordance with UN peacekeeping doctrine, of which approximately 500 military and 100 civilians should be on standby at any given time in each region. The ACDS further recommended that the OAU should anticipate conflict and notify the UN while preparing to employ one or more regional brigades to prevent the conflict. If the UN was slow to act or failed to act, the OAU should move ahead with African peacekeepers while continuing to coordinate UN action. Should the UN eventually decide to intervene, the African peacekeepers would form the backbone of the incoming UN forces and hand off command to the UN upon integration.

In 2000, the OAU changed its name to the African Union (AU) and adopted a new charter. One of the goals of this reorganization was to provide the newly-minted AU a means for active military intervention as recommended by the ACDS. In this regard, Article 4 of the new charter, known as The Constitutive Act of the African Union, authorized the AU “to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the (Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union) in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity…” Article 4 also provided a means for “Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security.”

To facilitate the provisions of Article 4 of The Constitutive Act, the AU sanctioned the creation of the ASF under Article 13 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council. This document defined the ASF as “composed of multidimensional capabilities, including military, police and civilian, on standby in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment.” The publication of the Protocol in 2002 touched off a series of continental and regional planning sessions in which military leaders scoped the requirements for making the ASF a reality. In 2003, the ACDS met for the third time. During this meeting, held in Addis Ababa, the ACDS defined the policy framework for the AU peacekeeping force, now known as the ASF. Driving the ACDS’s policy proposals were six discrete scenarios under which the ACDS envisioned the ASF being employed.

1. As advisors to a political effort;
2. As observers in conjunction with a UN effort;
3. As stand-alone observers without UN participation;
4. As peacekeepers in the negotiated end to or aversion of a conflict under Chapter VI of the UN Charter;
5. As peacekeepers in multi-faceted operations involving nation-states and independent hostile tactical forces;
6. As a stand-alone peacekeeping force to prevent imminent loss of life in the absence of UN action.

The ACDS published these recommendations in The Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee, Part I. This document affirmed all of the recommendations from the 1997 ACDS meeting in Harare, and went into greater detail regarding ASF deployment timelines, training readiness, doctrine development, standardization, equipping and funding. As pertaining to the thesis of this paper, The Policy Framework addressed the establishment of logistics processes and infrastructure; however, it only stated that an infrastructure was important and necessary for successful ASF operations. The Policy Framework set out two phases for the establishment of the ASF, with goals for the implementation of Phase 1 in June 2005 and Phase 2 in June 2010. Essentially, Phase 1 called for the establishment of AU strategic mission command capability of Scenarios 1 and 2, and regional force mission command capabilities to handle Scenarios 1-4. Phase 2 called for the ASF to be at Full Operating Capability (FOC), able to handle all six scenarios at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

Beginning in 2005, the AU documented progress toward the ASF in a report called Roadmap for the Operationalization of the African Standby Force. The AU has since published two additional roadmaps, with the most recent distributed in December 2010. According to Roadmap III, the ASF is not FOC and will not be until December 2015. Roadmap III attributes this delay to “an apparent lack of buy-in to the ASF concept both (sic) at the Continental, regional and Member States level.” Roadmap III goes on to state that the ASF needs to resolve a lack of support within the AU Commission as well as resolve “…issues of recruitment of personnel, development of procedures for planning and deploying AU mandated missions, and the creation of a proper work environment.”

To further develop the ASF concept, the AU Commission (AUC) embarked on a series of exercises in conjunction with the European Union (EU) to validate the ASF concept. Dubbed “AMANI AFRICA,” these exercises were intended to be iterative measurements of the ASF’s capability to provide mission command at the strategic level as well as operate at the tactical level. AMANI AFRICA I occurred in October 2010 in Addis Ababa and was a Command Post Exercise (CPX) centered primarily on mission command. The CPX culminated two years of training by EU partners. AMANI AFRICA II was scheduled to occur in October 2014 and was to follow a three year train-up that began in October 2011. Intended to be a Field Training Exercise validation of the ASF’s Rapid Deployment Concept (RDC) at the Strategic, Operational and Tactical Levels, AMANI AFRICA II was to be one of the final gates leading to the certification of the ASF as FOC. Similar to how progress toward the roadmap goals was delayed, the AUC has postponed AMANI AFRICA II until April 2015, and the location has yet to be determined. Table 1 shows the ASF status by AU Region in thirteen different areas. On the key question of whether a regional ASF brigade is operationally ready, none of the five are considered operational, although three of the brigades have participated in actual operations. Moreover, only the ASF brigade from the western region has an operational logistics battalion, and none of the brigades have operational logistics depots.

On 6 August 2014 President Obama initiated the African Peacekeeping Rapid Reaction Partnership (APRRP). This program, known as “A-Prep,” promises “…$110 million per year for 3-5 years to build the capacity of African militaries to rapidly deploy peacekeepers in response to emerging conflict...” Under APRRP, the U.S. supports six countries
initially to provide training and sustainment as well as to build interoperability with non-partnered AU nations. The six APRRP countries are Senegal, Ghana, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. Importantly, APRRP is in addition to activities already in place under the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program. Funded by the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), ACOTA focuses on training military members of AU Member States to participate in UN and AU peacekeeping missions.

Vision

Given the evolution of the AU, their 50-year vision for 2063 is to build, “an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the global arena.” In terms of the ASF and African security, this vision statement incorporates significant and challenging elements. From a logistical planning perspective, the African continent is anything but integrated. The enormity of the continent poses significant time-distance challenges to the most optimized logistics processes. The size is exacerbated by the under-development of roads, rail, air and sea ports. These factors pose enormous barriers to the physical, economic and social integration of the continent, as well as the ability of the ASF to quickly deploy to areas of unrest to achieve the levels of security envisioned for 2063. Furthermore, the AU optimistically seeks to be conflict free by 2020. This aspiration suggests significant investment within and outside of Africa to support intervention and peacekeeping.

Secondly, the vision identifies the means as driven by its own citizens. These words directly refer to subsidiarity, an organizational principle that attempts to place responsibility for problem resolution at the lowest organizational level possible. In comparing the hierarchy of political organizations, the principle suggests that the AU should solve problems before the UN, Regional Economic Communities (RECs) before the AU, and sub-regional organizations before the RECs. UN leaders prefer subsidiarity because it is less expensive to the UN and because of a commonly-held belief that earlier intervention by local governments is ultimately more effective than external solutions from a world body. Africa’s murky colonization history and ongoing resource exploitation informs the AU’s desire to provide African solutions to African problems even if member states lack the capacity to surmount security and development challenges.

There are signs that the AU understands its inferior logistics infrastructure is problematic. During the Dakar Agenda for Action in June 2014, the AU acknowledged Africa’s lack of access to infrastructure and low-quality facilities as barriers to not only the deployment of security and peacekeeping forces, but also to economic development. In July 2012, the African Union Assembly of Heads of State and Government committed to adopting the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) as the integrated strategic blueprint for continental infrastructure transformation from 2012-2040. The PIDA calls for the African Development Bank (AfDB) to initially invest up to USD 500 million and contribute up to USD 100 million for economic development, to include logistics infrastructure projects.

Initial Conditions

Before addressing near and long-term recommendations, the context and understanding that underpins this paper’s recommendations and insights include:

1. The complexity of achieving an aspirational vision compounded by a dearth of economic resources,
2. The challenges of resource allocation and proportion when addressing the competing priorities of security and governance,
3. The will and capacity of African nations to act on, as well as talk about, African solutions to African problems,
4. The legitimacy of subsidiarity in the AU, where many nations are besieged by corruption, poor governance, and lack of capacity,
5. The ASF was conceived to work cohesively with UN security forces through integrated planning and standardized tactics, both of which have proved difficult to achieve during mission handoffs between the two entities.

Realizing Vision 2063 is truly complex. No quick fix or magic lever exists to overcome the challenges. Were it so, that lever or fix would be constrained by the ability of continental leaders in the AU who serve at the will of the member states they represent. Furthermore, its organizational arms have not yet reached a fully operational status. These organizations remain chronically understaffed and under-resourced by the member states, and, as a result, unable to address the myriad concerns that exist on the continent. The ASF and the plan to support it are apt exemplars.

The ASF is planned to be fully operational by December 2015, yet none of the brigades have a logistics plan to effectively deploy forces to areas of conflict. Moreover, none have shown a capability to execute their Roadmap timelines. So it is with the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) developed to provide the AU/PSC with intelligence and forecasting of developing conflict to facilitate early intervention. An International Peace Institute (IPI) study conducted in 2012 discussed the many challenges to making this organization effective. None are without solution, but the same factors listed above stymie progress in building the requisite awareness for AU/PSC leadership to intervene at the right time to prevent more costly and reactive security operations. So, trade-offs in investment between CEWS and Security require delicate assessment and balancing. This assessment must consider that without the ability to deploy intervention forces, the AU loses credibility amongst its supporting African nations, the United Nations (UN), the European Union, and its bi-lateral and multi-lateral partners. This loss of credibility threatens the 2063 vision.

The problem is that developing capability to mobilize and deploy ASF forces and their associated supplies to any point on the African continent by December 2015 is cost prohibitive and unsustainable. Conversely, developing the CEWS into an effective system that feeds intelligence upward to the United Nations Early Warning Program, as well as downward into
regional and local networks, might be more cost-effective and sustainable in the long-term. A risk decision protocol must also be developed to balance accepting near-term risk for long-term gain and to scope ASF employment efforts, and by extension the logistics requirements. Placing too many resources in either side threatens stability of the AU and realization of the 2063 vision.

The science behind development suggests that security without transparent and effective governance at the national and local level is not cost-effective for achieving a long term vision in Africa. One study reveals that achieving security objectives with good governance is the optimal environment for development, which informs investment decisions. As mentioned before, AU aims to eradicate conflict by 2020, which does not seem realistic without sacrificing this balance given the number of conflicts and corrupt national leaders in Africa. This insight guides US investment of limited and inadequate levels of funding, and should guide the AU when considering logistics-related infrastructure development. However, conditions (3) and (4) above complicate implementation of this insight. For the AU to achieve its 2063 vision, all of the member states have to work together and be willing to share in collective security and development. Few of these member states have embraced transparency in government at the national and local levels and are incapable of good governance. This widespread corruption misinforms allocation decisions.

Cost sharing is difficult under the best of times; however, the global recession of 2007 still affects public funding levels in much of Africa, severely challenging the notion and AU foundational principle of subsidiarity. In his paper, The Pros and Cons of Subsidiarity: The Role of African Regional and Subregional Organisations in Ensuring Peace and Security in Africa, Bjørn Møller, states, “Indeed, according to realists the very presence of organisations may produce what may be called “negative synergies”, making the combined strength of an organisation less than the sum of its parts, simply because all members will be tempted to “freeride” on each other… If this holds true it would be preferable to count on initiatives by individual states (e.g. regional or global great powers) acting unilaterally than to unrealistically pin one’s hopes on multilateral and institutional action.”

The principle of subsidiarity applies well to the European Union where the member states are developed countries. In the AU, few, if any, member states are at similar levels of development as the member states of the EU. These nations simply do not have the resources to add to the synergy and potentially weaken the AU. Given the foundational principle of subsidiarity, what are the implications for AU logistics? In the all-important logistical factor of geography, will unequal partners choose to place a logistics base in the best location and country for mission effectiveness if this location is within one of Moller’s ‘freeriders’? Will a base or critical infrastructure be built in a logistically unsuitable country that doesn’t meet the standards for transparency and governance, just because it is a contributor? What makes sense from a doctrinal perspective for optimal logistic support to the ASF from a US perspective will most likely be politically unpalatable, or ill-advised due to corruption or unsustainable due to cost while undermining an equally critical development programme.

Clearly, logistics for ASF is much more than just figuring out where to place REC infrastructure. It is tied into significant challenges and non-intuitive dynamics of a larger whole. Taken as an individual problem set, a continental logistics plan could be developed at great cost that supports reactive deployment of ASF to tamp down violence to the benefit of corrupt regimes, which does little to advance the continent towards its stated objectives and vision. Additionally, simply by virtue of the AU investing in a robust logistics system might actually incentivize its use, not unlike using military power as opposed to diplomatic, informational and economic means, simply because one can. This type of planning construct would most likely create a world-class military logistics system on a continent characterized by corruption and stagnation. This would not significantly differ from the status quo today and would not represent the vision of 2063. If USAFRICOM embraces an isolated approach to put a plan on the shelf, it will not be worth the effort and may even jeopardize the US vision for Africa.

Interoperability of AU and UN forces is essential throughout the planning of UN missions and must be considered while developing any continental logistics plan. Without deliberate planning for interoperability, synergy envisioned between the early intervention of AU forces and a subsequent transition to UN command will be lost, resulting in redundancies at both levels, unnecessary costs, wasted planning efforts and reduced effectiveness.

Near-Term Strategies
In answering the first question posed in this paper, “Can the AU adopt a continental logistics plan by December 2015?” the answer is yes, but only at significant and unsustainable cost. The only way to provide logistic support to AU forces is through airlift capacity as the primary means. The realities of the continent’s lack of transportation infrastructure documented by multiple professional journal articles, UN After Action Reports and the very existence of the requirement to develop a plan, drive the AU to this conclusion. Several scholarly articles provide detailed thought on scalable options for marshaling airlift capacity, posing mixes of heavy lift, short range and rotary assets to move forces and materiel to meet the 30, 60 and 90 day sustainment requirements. These papers could be easily leveraged to develop airlift capability mixes at the minimum cost to get ASF to the conflict.

Moreover, with the recent placement of a continental logistics base on the Gulf of Guinea in Douala, Cameroon, heavy lift options could also incorporate maritime assets similar to the Joint High Speed Vessel currently used by the US Navy for intra-theater lift. Additionally, the AU should consider plans similar to the United States’ Civilian Reserve Air Fleet, which maintains commercial air carriers on retainer to rapidly move personnel and materiel when mobility requirements exceed the military’s organic capabilities. If the AU is rightly insistent on African Solutions to African problems, pursuing these agree-
ments is an essential and sustainable step in developing a near and long-term continental logistic plan.

Another near-term strategy for reducing the cost of airlift is to advocate for the development, integration and resourcing of the Continental Early Warning System in order to anticipate and forecast developing crises to flow resources to areas more proactively. Any plan to develop and leverage CEWS must include deliberate planning and integration with the UN early warning program. The RECs have varying degrees of functionality in their own early warning efforts that must be developed and integrated into the CEWS headquarters in Addis Ababa. On this topic, the 2012 IPI report states, “Conflict analysis and development of response options are at an incipient level in some regions. Together with the need for sharing information with stakeholders, analysis and response options are the biggest challenges. Only IGAD is building up an integrated response mechanism at this stage. The CEWARN response includes elements of mediation at local level. Processes and templates for Early Warning Reports that include policy options are in place at the AU, ECOWAS and IGAD. Substantial efforts are needed to strengthen the way in which policy makers’ access, use and decide upon the response options developed by analysts.”

Furthermore, fidelity and reporting needs to go down to the local level. Models exist that resource communities of interests (women, religious institutions, hospitals) with cell phones and digital media to enable grass roots reporting of developing crises in real time. By analogy, this model is like investing in fire alarms as a low cost measure that complement infrastructure intensive fire departments which approximate ASF logistics footprints. Awareness and leadership present tremendous opportunities to assess risk and allocate resources.

Lastly, any near-term infrastructure development in support of ASF objectives must be integrated with the PIDA. Every dollar spent unnecessarily for the sole purpose of security is done at the expense of development. While security is essential for development, the two must be done in conjunction with each other, and in a balance that is appropriate for the region. The PIDA prioritizes 16 large infrastructure projects in Africa to be supported by the Africa50 fund and the African Development Bank. The continental logistic plan should incorporate ASF infrastructure requirements within those prioritized projects, and at a minimum evaluate the opportunities for synergy.

Long-Term Strategy
At its core, the ASF continental logistics plan problem is an African development and infrastructure problem. Ultimately the only solution for a sustainable military logistics plan is an African development plan. If the United States respects the AU’s collective desire to provide African Solutions to African problems, then the PIDA is the pathway. Efforts such as APRRP and ACOTA focus on providing aid to a narrow subset of AU member states. While these programs may be an effective incentive for other member states to meet the requirements to receive multi-million dollar grants from the US, they do nothing to improve the larger problem of providing logistical support across the African continent. Such programs can only be seen as sub-optimizing the ASF’s mobility problem.

The long-term plan must be based on wise, near-term risk and allocation decisions that favor proactive conflict resolution, and judicious use of limited resources that support transparent and effective governance.

Principles of Action and Recommendations

1. Following the principle of African Solutions for African Problems, USAFRICOM J45 should avoid developing a logistics plan based on American military doctrine simply to meet an AU requirement. Any logistics planning efforts should be undertaken by a combined group of AU, UN, EU and U.S. logisticians in order to accomplish two objectives: 1) ensure interoperability with external partners, particularly given the probable emphasis on airlift capacity and 2) ensure the nesting of the ASF’s continental support plan within the AU’s larger plans for political and economic development on the continent.

2. USAFRICOM J45 must continue to leverage all resources to grow and educate logistics professionals in the AU and RECs. AU logisticians are the key to a successful long-term plan and must be developed and trained to see the problem and offer solutions holistically. J45 should continue their current training programs and consider expanding them to include CONUS-based, EU and UN logistics training programs.

3. USAFRICOM should influence and advocate for infrastructure investment in consideration with the PIDA plan and only to partner with countries that meet the standard for governance.

4. USAFRICOM should advocate for continued development and interoperability of CEWS with the AU organization and externally to the UN, RECs and the local level.

5. USAFRICOM should task US Air Force – Africa to work with AU leadership in developing a plan similar to CRAF in order to support movement of personnel and materiel to areas of conflict to augment US Air Force and EU airlift.

Conclusion
ASF logistics support is but one of many development challenges for Africa, and serves as a root of a larger, more complex problem. As such, taking a smaller component of the problem and trying to solve it without the context of the whole is to commit efforts to futility and resources to waste. Additionally, member state, UN and bi-lateral funding is constrained well below the demand. The AU, with the advice of USAFRICOM and the EU, must make smart choices and develop sound strategies.

The good news is that many AU nations are willing, development theory exists and the AU can make progress cont. on pg. 86
As the “Pivot to the Pacific” becomes even more ingrained within United States politico-military institutions, George Friedman’s recent release Flash Points explains why we should not take our gaze away from Europe.

Friedman brings a personal illustration to the premise of his book: that Europe is a very densely populated, multi-ethnic peninsula, still fraught with instability. Friedman discusses how his father turned down a visa to the United States from late 1930’s Hungary. He explains how his parents’ hometowns changed hands from Austro-Hungary to Hungary, then Czechoslovakia, to Slovakia. Friedman’s successful flight shortly after World War II foreshadows the dilemmas faced by those fleeing failing states around the Mediterranean and its effects on Europe.

George Friedman analyzes Europe as an annex of the greater Eurasian landmass. This fits very well with his narrative about how the decline of the Western and Eastern Roman Empires created space for Islam to emerge from Arabia to dominate North Africa, Asia Minor, and Iberia. This prompted Portugal, a seafaring nation, to venture further into the hitherto unknown Atlantic and discover the sea route to India, thus setting the course for European world domination. That domination was taken for granted in 1913, but in the 31 years between 1914 and 1945, Europe tore itself apart and left its fate to be decided by outsiders — the Soviet Union and the United States.

The author discusses the compromises made to create the European Union (EU) and the European security architecture, underwritten by the U.S. via the North Atlantic Treaty. By citing Europe’s inability to create a security structure without the U.S., he articulates the bold proposition that a wealthy polity cannot exist without military might — a problem wished away during a time of post-Cold War and Maastricht Treaty euphoria.

Friedman also articulates the tensions in the EU between Germany, France, and Britain. He discusses how German reluctance to lead, given its post war guilt, afforded France (which, by the time the Rome Treaty was signed in 1957 was beginning to lose its colonies and sought leadership in Europe) clout it had not experienced since Napoleonic times. Britain, the continent’s “balancer,” however, over time, saw its role diminished as the German economy dwarfed that of both the UK and France, while U.S. influence waned following increased involvement in the Middle East and Asia. For the military audience, Friedman has one of the best explanations why France left the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) military command in 1966.

On the economic front, the author highlights the major shortcomings of the Euro. Friedman describes how European markets were optimized for Germany’s export-oriented economy, thus denying Mediterranean nations like Greece, Spain, and Italy the ability to manipulate that structure to emerge from current woes. Friedman also holistically and artfully weaves China’s effect on recent European events.

Friedman focuses on Russia’s unique geography, which caused its leadership to act aggressively in Georgia in 2008 and more recently in Ukraine – both in Europe’s borderlands. With the ongoing Ukraine situation Friedman reinforces the case for Europe’s earlier 31-year implosion starting at the borderlands in Sarajevo in 1914. He brings great perspective to the borderlands given his family’s origins. He notes interestingly when he traversed a 60-mile (100 kilometer) stretch from Poland to Romania he experienced four nationalities.

Flash Points is highly recommended for national security professionals headed to assignments dealing with European, Middle Eastern, and African affairs.

About the Reviewer
Commander Frank Okata is assigned to Carrier Strike Group Ten based in Norfolk, Virginia. A Surface Warfare Officer with experience in the Atlantic and Pacific, he commanded the San Diego-based guided missile destroyer USS PINCKNEY (DDG 91).
In Oleg Benesch’s *Inventing the Way of the Samurai* the chronological organization of the book focuses the reader on three important time periods regarding the ideational development of bushido. Throughout each of these stages bushido developed into a gradually more influential concept around which Japanese society was organized. First, the medieval and ancient origins of the warrior aristocracy explain how class-consciousness played a role in the development of the bushido ideology. The arts of war and letteredness merge to become the bushido values cherished as virtuous by the Japanese samurai class. Second, the rapid modernization and industrialization during the Meiji period established bushido’s modern foundations. The transformation of bushido from a cultural trait narrowly applicable only to the warrior aristocracy, instead to all Japanese, was largely enabled by the industrial revolution. Third, a survey of the pre-WWII period to the present highlights the depth to which Japanese civil society was penetrated, militarized, and inspired by the ideology of bushido. Despite the human cost of the Second World War the concept of bushido survived and continues to remain influential throughout Japanese society.

The author’s discussion of bushido’s evolution is exhaustively researched. The book describes localized samurai traditions as the microfoundations for bushido. During the Meiji imperial period bushido as a popular conception of identity spread throughout Japan, assisted by industrialization and the printing press. Charting the institutionalization of bushido from the 1860s to the 1920s the ideology’s institutionalization occurred in two distinct waves. Showcasing the role of conflict for consolidating identity and deepening state power, these waves occur analogously alongside the Sino-Japanese War (1894-5) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5). The role of the military and its place in public life is essential to understanding bushido, a highly militaristic concept.

Careful analysis and the use of extensive sources strongly advance the author’s thesis that bushido was an ideological aspect of the industrial revolution that formed the modern Japanese nation. Benesch’s approach makes full use of the available evidence, establishing the veracity of the historiographical interpretation of the bushido discourse. The book demonstrates that identity can change and be changed deliberately. However, the approach does leave some aspects of bushido and Japanese nationalism unaddressed. The primordialist aspects of Japanese language and religious culture are not fully explored in the book. These complimentary research areas could provide greater context for understanding the pre-Meiji roots of samurai bushido, especially since the book focuses on efforts by the state and elites to shape bushido’s discourse, with less attention paid to the ideology’s audience.

Inventing the Way of the Samurai is clearly and precisely written. Benesch’s writing style is easily accessible throughout the book. Each chapter is built around the use of multiple primary texts that advance Benesch’s explanation for bushido’s development and evolution during the Meiji and Showa periods. The detailed sourcing provides an excellent example of the highest standards of scholarship. Benesch convincingly establishes the historiographical roots of bushido and contributes to the overall understanding of the specific subject. The volume’s importance for Foreign Area Officers is that it highlights the role of social construction in identity. Questions of identity and nationalism are likely to dominate the political discourse of the 21st Century. These processes are unfolding from the Ukraine to Syria and beyond. Understanding how and why such processes develop provides a useful paradigm for examining contemporary issues of policy relevance where identity creation and reactions to it are conflict drivers.

The framework of Benesch’s research provides a predictive model for explaining the development of similar ideologies, which just like bushido provide a formative basis for transforming societies into nations through the process of nationalism.
Road to War? Looking to Pre-World War II Japan to Assess U.S. Policy with China


Editor’s Note: This team thesis won the FAO Association writing award at the Joint and Combined Warfighting School, Joint Forces Staff College. In the interest of space we publish this version without research notes. To see the full thesis with all research materials, visit www.faoa.org. We are pleased to bring you this outstanding scholarship.

Disclaimer: The contents of this submission reflect our writing team’s original views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has a flourishing economy, a powerful military, and global presence placing it on a trajectory to be the world’s next superpower. This trajectory bears unmistakable similarities to Japan’s rise to power in the early 20th century. As with Japan leading up to World War II, the rise of China as future superpower likely leads to one of two outcomes with the United States: conflict or concurrence.

“America’s opposition to...expansion in Asia, its insistence on the open-door policy [equal opportunity for trade]...led to mutual distrust and suspicion.” One could easily mistake this statement for a reference to the present-day tension between the United States and China; however, the reference was to pre-World War II Japan. In the years leading up to World War II, the rise of China as a great power on par with the United States and Great Britain was of supreme importance to Japanese leadership. Japan had tremendous ambitions toward expansionism, but relatively few resources to provide the requisite level of self-sufficiency, particularly lacking in coal, oil, and iron ore. The United States aggressively pushed back against Japan’s hegemonic aspiration, inevitably leading to war on December 7, 1941.

Japan’s rise as a regional power began with the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5 and continued with the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, the annexation of Korea in 1910, and alignment with the Allied Powers during World War I. Despite military success, Japan repeatedly felt slighted during treaty negotiations. For instance, the Empire was forced to give back conquered territory, accept lesser levels of reparations, and was unable to insert a clause on racial equality in the Treaty of Versailles.

The Second Sino-Japanese War began in 1937 and brought with it a requirement for additional raw materials to support the fight. The United States adamantly opposed moves to restrict its trade with China (standing strong on its open-door policy). After the United States reduced its exports to Japan, the Empire looked to the European colonies in Southeast Asia to gain much needed raw materials and sought to establish a Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in order to ensure a Japanese-dominated Asia. The Sphere would provide access to the resources Japan needed to manufacture weapons in the event of a protracted war and was ultimately seen as a requirement for self-sufficiency and survival. Japan also sought territorial acquisition in order to improve trade, obtain resources, and improve defense. This plan demonstrated Japan’s clear understanding that economic development and military power were both paramount to achieving its superpower ambitions.

Consequently, the United States and Japan found themselves facing a dilemma; despite the fact neither wanted war, “no Japanese government could accept America’s solution [equal opportunity for trade in China] for the deepening crisis and remain in power; nor would the United States accede under any conditions to the dismemberment of China.” The United States’ refusal to waver on its China open-door policy combined with an unwillingness for European colonies in Asia, pressured by the United States and Great Britain, to trade much-needed resources to Japan left the Japanese with no recourse but to fight.

Present day, China seeks to supplant the United States as the sole superpower. Chinese leaders view their country as a
major player in the global economy as well as a military force to be reckoned with. Given such a vision, there is an expected role of China as a hegemonic influence in East Asia. However, current U.S. involvement in the South China Sea along with its regional partnerships (Philippines, Japan, Republic of Korea, etc.) challenge China’s regional influence (politically and economically) and is generally interpreted by China as meddling. According to the theory of hegemonic war, only one nation state in the international system can be truly dominant at a time. As a subordinate state gains power, it will necessarily come into conflict with the dominant power. Similarly, one’s gain becomes the other’s loss (zero-sum).

A U.S. defense policy adviser and China expert, Michael Pillsbury, set out to understand Chinese military fears in his article The Sixteen Fears in order to better grasp corresponding planning and policy decisions. Of the sixteen fears he addresses, four are directly relatable to U.S. presence and activities in the South China Sea and the East China Sea: fear of island blockade, fear of loss of maritime resources, fear of the choking-off of sea lines of communication, and fear of Taiwanese independence. China’s efforts to counter these intrinsic fears take shape in policy focused on development of anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, aggressive island claims in the South China Sea (Spratlys, Paracels, etc.), build-up of existing land features in the South China Sea, and forward basing of air defense systems and ballistic missiles, all of which appear to U.S. observers as posturing for conflict.

A number of current events in conjunction with the new U.S. Administration led by President Donald Trump seem to suggest an increased risk of hostilities. Despite President Trump’s recent assertion that the United States will continue to support a One-China policy, the President and others in his circle of advisors have suggested it might be time to revisit the policy, which currently prevents U.S. formal diplomatic recognition of Taiwan. In a provocative move, President Trump accepted a phone call from Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen following his election, breaking with more than 45 years of precedent. Additionally, Chinese leadership has outwardly expressed their displeasure with the U.S. plan to deploy a Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to the Republic of Korea (ROK). While the purpose of the system is to defend the ROK against ballistic missile attacks from North Korea, Chinese leadership is concerned the powerful radar will allow the U.S. to look deep into its country, potentially threatening Chinese national security interests in the process.

**An Inconsistent Strategy**

The rise of China as a superpower appears inevitable based upon the current trajectory of economic growth, military projection, and global presence. The United States government’s approach in handling China over the past two decades has been a combination of containment and engagement sometimes referred to as “congagement.” The United States has struggled with maintaining this delicate balance as evidenced by contrasting statements within the 2015 National Security Strategy (NSS). In one instance the NSS states, “We seek to develop a constructive relationship with China that delivers benefits for our two peoples and promotes security and prosperity in Asia and around the world.” However, this is offset by the very next sentence, “At the same time, we will manage competition from a position of strength while insisting that China uphold international rules and norms on issues ranging from maritime security to trade and human rights.” The message conveyed is one of support for a growing China but only within the confines acceptable to the United States. However, based on China’s apparent ability to maneuver relatively unchecked in the region, one might argue that the United States has been unable to manage the competition with China.

China’s influence in the Asia-Pacific region has steadily grown under the leadership of President Xi Jinping since he took office in March 2013. His vision of a rejuvenated China returning to greatness has gained traction among his people and inspired a surge of nationalism also known as the “Chinese Dream.” This, coupled with the demonstrated success in the effective use of all the instruments of national power, has postured China to assume the role of the unrivaled Asia-Pacific leader and eventual superpower. The United States has a vote and as recent history indicates, it is apparently willing to share the stage and relinquish the title of sole superpower.

President Obama’s Administration recognized the need to elevate the importance of the Pacific region and he sought to achieve a greater U.S. presence within the Asia-Pacific from the outset of his first term. In November 2009, he addressed leaders from Japan, our strongest ally in the region, during his first stop along a tour of Asia. He delivered the message of the United States’ increased commitment to the region as an “Asia-Pacific nation.” His vision included welcoming China’s rise and he underscored this sentiment by stating “the United States does not seek to contain China.” Moreover, when speaking on China’s emergence, President Obama stated “nations need not fear the success of another.” The foundation of his policy was couched within this context.

During the past seven years, the United States has handled the complex challenges of the Asia-Pacific region with a balanced approach of diplomacy and economic cooperation. One such initiative was the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement aimed at moving forward in a number of areas to include: environmental protection, labor rights, and economic growth. The signatories included twelve Pacific nations, one of whom was the United States, but not China. The partners failed to ratify the agreement during Mr. Obama’s time in office and the Trump Administration has opted to withdraw.

China has sought to take advantage of this recent development by increasing advocacy for the more encompassing Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) trade agreement, which does not include the United States. The uncertain future of TPP may provide the catalyst to drive nations to embrace the RCEP as the best near-term alternative. While the RCEP agreement has been an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) initiative, China would reap significant benefits to include reinforcing its position as the center of economic power for the region. As observed by six
former U.S. ambassadors to Asia, “walking away from TPP may be seen by future generations as the moment America chose to cede leadership to others in this part of the world and accept a diminished role.”

Other Chinese initiatives have bolstered its global standing and influence including “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The OBOR global initiative, conceived by President Xi Jinping, broadens China’s leverage around the world, reaching as many as 60 countries. The strategy provides the infrastructure and framework for cooperative trade and investment. It connects countries throughout Europe and Asia by land and maritime channels. The AIIB complements OBOR as a new Beijing-based financial institution. At the conclusion of its first year, the AIIB has a list of achievements, underscoring its success such as $1.7 billion loaned exceeding the target of $1.2 billion, 57 founding member nations, and projects and partnerships with three additional big infrastructure banks. In response, the United States Treasury Department criticized the bank for fear it would undercut the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. The Obama Administration’s opposition focused on China drawing Southeast Asian nations closer through economic influence. Implementation of these two initiatives vaulted China into a position of global economic prominence while the United States could only watch and express displeasure.

China has not only demonstrated economic gains but has set out to grow its military might rapidly through increased defense spending and emerging technology fueled by these very gains; ironically, the United States had been a major proponent of China becoming an economic power. China’s push for a more capable military comparable to that of the United States is not lost on the U.S. Department of Defense. As noted in the “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016” report submitted to Congress, “They portray a strong military as critical to advancing Chinese interests, preventing other countries from taking steps that would damage those interests, and ensuring that China can defend itself and its sovereignty claims.” This verbiage is undoubtedly a reference to China’s regional claims within the Nine-Dash line and U.S. actions in the South China Sea.

China’s buildup and occupation of artificial “islands” in the South China Sea are presently the most glaring points of contention with the United States and some of China’s regional neighbors. In July 2016, an international tribunal at The Hague rejected China’s historic claim over much of the South China Sea under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The tribunal ruled that China could not claim small land features and use them to establish economic activities within other nations’ exclusive economic zones. This had minimal impact, as China rejected the ruling and continued with a strategy of delaying confrontation and consolidating gains. There are no means of enforcing the ruling; however, U.S. Administrations under Presidents Obama and Trump have chosen indirect means of challenging the legitimacy of the claims. Continued tacit approval will further strengthen China’s position in the region and give it a geopolitical advantage at the expense of the United States.

China’s narrative has proven effective in swaying regional partners. There is less incentive to maintain allegiance to the United States as the geographically closer and more influential China gains momentum. The Philippines and Thailand are two good examples. The Philippines chose not to follow through on the tribunal’s ruling against China in the South China Sea dispute. President Duterte clearly concluded that working with China ultimately benefits his nation more than working against it. His unwillingness to challenge China’s destabilizing actions is indicative of the chasm developing with the United States, due in large part to the rocky relationship between Duterte and then President Obama. Vocal and public U.S. condemnation of Duterte’s controversial anti-drug program and his personal attacks were additional causes of friction. This tumultuous situation proved fortuitous for China and presented the opportunity for it to court the Philippines enthusiastically with billions of dollars in no-strings-attached loans and infrastructure projects in the execution of its economic dependency program disguised as altruism. Thailand has also chosen to remain neutral regarding the South China Sea tension and has sought to increase purchases of military equipment from China. These events, in conjunction with the actions of other regional states, further complicate the development of a regional unified front in opposition to China’s blatant disregard for the tribunal’s ruling.

The Obama Administration accepted the economic and diplomatic sensitivities in cooperating with China as a partner in an attempt to progress together. Chinese leadership has taken advantage of this acceptance and has postured the country to be a future superpower. China’s promising future may be accelerated by the Trump Administration, which appears to be embracing a new message of U.S. protectionism. An intentional effort to ensure America comes first may result in a tendency to focus inward while the rest of world deals with their own issues. If this message comes to fruition as U.S. policy, it could give China the opportunity it seeks in paving the road to not just regional dominance but superpower status. The international void left by an inward-focused America inevitably provides China a foothold in becoming the unopposed surrogate of partner nations seeking regional leadership and stability. A representative of the Chinese foreign ministry’s office of international economic affairs may best summarize the current situation, “If people want to say China has taken a position of leadership, it’s not because China suddenly thrust itself forward as a leader. It’s because the original front-runners suddenly fell back and pushed China to the front.”

**Countering China’s Rise as Superpower**

If the U.S. leadership aspires to maintain relevance as a Pacific power, it is necessary to develop a solid strategy to display undeniable resolve in countering China’s rise as a superpower. This strategy would require a clear path to an envisioned end state and aggressive pursuit of three key areas: substantial economic ties within East Asia, improved regional diplomatic partnerships, and increased support of Taiwan. Stronger economic and diplomatic ties within the region would allow the United States
to challenge China’s overtures and moderate its growth.

A weakened economic position, vis-à-vis China, poses one of the greatest risks to the United States. It permits China to freely offer a viable alternative in terms of resources and economic partnership to its much weaker neighbors. The development of a mutually beneficial bilateral agreement to counter the RCEP would challenge this agreement and affirm the U.S. commitment to the region. As noted previously, the Obama Administration aggressively pushed for TPP to become a component of U.S. policy. Beyond the obvious economic impact, it would have strategically positioned the United States as an integral partner in East Asia by making it more difficult for China to exert its growing influence on other nations. U.S. withdrawal from the agreement created a void which China is filling aggressively. Although the Trump Administration seems to favor bilateral agreements, pursuing a renewed bilateral agreement may prove more effective in benefiting the collective whole by creating economic interdependencies that could easily be translated into collective security. More importantly, these actions would reinforce U.S. commitment to the region, giving partner nations the backing and confidence needed to resist China’s influence. Chinese leadership chooses to use the carrot and stick method to threaten the regional states while simultaneously extending financial aid. This leads to regional instability, which further creates maneuver space for China to continue its actions.

The United States’ response would have to be swift. Ratification of the RCEP agreement will make it more difficult for the United States to dictate the terms with the nations reaping benefits from the China-inclusive initiative. While the agreements may not be mutually exclusive, the United States would need to stress the advantages of a superior U.S.-led initiative while highlighting deficiencies of the RCEP agreement. This engagement would reassure partner nations the United States has no intention of conceding the economically promising region to China. Strategic messaging like this is a large part of the overall economic leverage the United States can exercise. Another example would include President Trump’s suggestion of a 45% tariff on imports from China. An action of this magnitude would clearly signal to the region, and the world, that the United States refuses to allow China to assert economic dominance without competition.

A second area of concern is the unabated actions by China in what is called the gray zone of conflict; that is, the ambiguous operational zone that exists between law enforcement and conventional war. China has taken measured actions to achieve its objectives without precipitating a military response. Despite The Hague’s ruling against China, it continues its “island” building on disputed territory. The United States’ response includes freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS) in the South China Sea. These operations have openly communicated objection to China’s claim of territorial sovereignty but have not halted or slowed China’s efforts. In order to have an impact that alters China’s direction, the United States would need a more direct approach. Potentially signaling such an approach, Secretary of State Tillerson recently stated, “We’re going to have to send China a clear signal that, first, the island-building stops and, second, your access to those islands also is not going to be allowed.”

The United States and the Philippines are long-standing allies. Despite the recent deterioration of the relationship with President Duterte, the alliance remains very important to U.S. national security. The continued use of five locations within the Philippines along with the rotational deployments of U.S. military personnel to train and exercise with the Philippine Armed Forces under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement hang in the balance. A mending of diplomatic relations with the Duterte Administration and persuasion to disavow China’s intentions would be key in keeping a critical strategic partner within the U.S. sphere of influence. The United States would also need to increase its engagements and relationships with other strategic states in the region. Avoiding similar breaches with critical partners like Vietnam, Indonesia and Singapore would be necessary to limit China’s influence.

Lack of a decisive U.S. response to China’s actions, limited to periodic FONOPS, has shaken the confidence of regional allies and partners, causing them to question U.S. resolve in the face of potential Chinese aggression.

Taiwan is another important regional ally. The United States has based its interactions with Taiwan on the One-China Policy and Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. The One-China Policy recognizes there is one China and that Taiwan is a part of it. The United States has attempted to avoid the perception of treating Taiwan as an equal independent state while simultaneously maintaining “limited” defense ties ranging from arms sales to low-level security partnerships. The 2017 National Defense Authorization Act authorizes the Department of Defense to conduct senior-level military exchanges with Taiwan. The Department could take advantage of this opening by increasing military interaction, especially at the more senior levels, and conducting exercises in Taiwan to further develop Taiwan’s self-defense capability. Additionally, the United States could assist Taiwan with buttressing its air defense capability with systems tailored to counteract China’s deployment of modernized ballistic missile systems. One proposal by analysts from the RAND Corporation is to procure and install “air defense platoons” outfitted with Sentinel radars and AIM-120 missiles as well as fortifying its surface-to-air missiles.

Conclusion

Despite many similarities between the rise of China and the rise of Japan, there are key differences worth noting. China excels at playing the long game, meaning its government is comfortable with planning horizons that approach 50 to 100 years, or more, in order to set conditions for success. Alternatively, Japan was operating with a very compressed timeline prior to its attack on the United States at Pearl Harbor due to an immediate requirement for resources to support its ongoing war in China. Additionally, China maintains total unity of effort. The Chinese Communist Party drives all policy, primarily through its Politburo Standing Committee. Conversely, Japan was awkwardly split between a military that demanded expansion
and a government that often failed to support the same policies. Ultimately, Japanese Prime Ministers were bullied, forced out, or assassinated until the military’s plans were supported. Time and internal politics are on China’s side in continuing down its current path towards superpower status.

When determining the way forward for U.S. policy with China, the present Administration would do well to consider perception versus reality. It does not matter whether U.S. officials believe policy decisions have backed China into a corner. It only matters if China perceives U.S. actions as sufficiently aggressive and restrictive to warrant overt conflict. China does not face the same resource limitations the United States imposed upon Japan nearly 80 years ago; however, China seems to interpret current U.S. diplomatic and military actions in East Asia as clearly intended to limit its power.

Despite U.S. leadership claims that China policy has been consistent and well-coordinated, congegment has failed to convince China to curb its advances in the South China Sea. As a matter of fact, China has seized the initiative, while the United States has been vacillating in a reactionary mode. The United States must move beyond congegment and develop a coherent and decisive policy moving forward: either accept China as a superpower, recognizing that this necessitates a reduction in U.S. involvement in East Asia, or develop a more aggressive policy aimed at preventing the rise of China, understanding that this may ultimately lead to armed conflict.

Given the reality of modern globalization, a reduced role in the Asia-Pacific region is highly unlikely. Despite President Trump’s intimation that the United States will focus inward, economics and treaty obligations will keep the United States inextricably linked to the region regardless of China policy. The Asia-Pacific remains fundamentally important, and U.S. policy towards China will have to become more aggressive in order for the United States to remain a leader in the region. The United States must pressure China on every front possible: economic, diplomatic, and military.

The United States should consider a replacement for TPP, an economic partnership that assures vital trade relationships. U.S. diplomatic efforts should vigorously counter China’s claims to the Nine-Dash Line and “island building” attempts designed to increase influence over the South China Sea. The United States will need to build consensus within the international community to condemn China’s aggressive actions.

Militarily, the United States needs to continue to arm and equip Taiwan while supporting the ongoing advances of the Japanese and South Korean militaries. Exercises with regional partners must continue, in order to emphasize building closer ties, particularly with the Philippines and Thailand. The United States must continue to pursue the concept of Multi-Domain Battle with its Asia Pacific forces in order to maximize flexibility and counter China’s Anti-Access/Area Denial zone. Finally, the United States needs to continue to advance its missile defense systems in order to counteract China’s advancements in ballistic missile technology.

There can be no doubt that China would adamantly protest these actions. It is realistic to conclude that Chinese leadership would feel backed into a corner with limited options. Similarly, the United States cannot afford to concede the region and must have a firm response to Chinese aggression. Both nations desire to avoid a regional conflict; however, converging interests could lead down a similar path from history seven decades prior.

About the Authors

Lieutenant Colonel Elbourne is the Strategic Partnerships Division Chief for U.S. Pacific Command. He earned a BS in Computer Science from Florida State University, an MS in Management Information Systems from the University of Maryland-Bowie State University, an ME in Systems Engineering from Old Dominion University, and a Masters of Military Operational Art and Science from the U.S. Air Command and Staff College. Prior to his current assignment he commanded the Pacific Air Forces Cyberspace Systems Squadron.

Major Matthew Jamison is an Integrated Air and Missile Defense Officer for U.S. Pacific Command. He earned a BA in Political Science from Hampden-Sydney College in 2002. Prior to his current assignment, Major Jamison was Operations Officer for 1st Battalion, 1st Air Defense Artillery Regiment in Okinawa, Japan.

Lieutenant Colonel Miller is the Warfighting Exercises Branch Chief for U.S. Pacific Command. He earned a BS in Accounting from Bucknell University and a Masters in Social Sciences from the University of Haifa. Prior to his current assignment he attended the Israel National Defense College.
Turkey & Egypt

The Military’s Role & Moderation of Political Islam

By Major Andrew Zapf, U.S. Army

Editor’s Note: In the interest of space, we publish Major Zapf’s article here without research notes. To see the entire article with all research materials, please visit www.faoa.org.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Abstract

The Egyptian and Turkish militaries have had two different effects on the development of democracy and the moderation of political Islam within their respective countries. The Turkish military served as a guardian of the secular republic and acted several times to overthrow political parties that veered too far astray of the Kemalist ideal. Political Islam in Turkey evolved in a constrained system that had very clearly defined limits for political ideologies. By comparison, the Egyptian military served as another political actor in a system skewed to favor the authoritarian regime. The military benefited and enjoyed autonomy within the façade of democracy in Egypt, but was not motivated to reform or safeguard an Egyptian ideal. Political Islam in Egypt, specifically in the form of the Muslim Brotherhood, grew under constant oppression. In permanent political opposition, the Muslim Brotherhood had neither motivation nor enticement to adapt toward political inclusion.

The Arab Spring: Five Years Hence in Turkey and Egypt

On 15 July 2016 Turkish army tanks blocked the Bosphorus bridges and F-16 fighter jets flew over Istanbul and the nation’s capital city of Ankara. With Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, on vacation in Turkey’s southwest, Turkey seemed headed for another military coup – the first since 1997. Almost exactly three years earlier, beginning on 3 July 2013. Egypt’s military, led by General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi executed a coup against Egypt’s elected president Mohamed Morsi. History seemed to be repeating itself, a democratically elected leader ousted by military conspiracy.

Turkey and Egypt are two of the most populous countries in the Eastern Mediterranean, and their internal stability and foreign policy activities make them significant actors within the region. Five years after the Arab Spring, the series of popular uprisings that began in Tunisia in January 2011 and spread eastward, have seen the prospects of political Islam in each country trend in opposite directions. In Turkey the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), sometimes labeled as an Islamist party, has maintained power and its founder, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, seeks to secure a more authoritarian presidential rule while residing in the presidential palace. The acceptance of the somewhat secretive Hizmet, or Gülenist Movement emphasizing modern Islam without overt political ambitions, aided the AKP in their ascent to power before they were accused of orchestrating the 2016 coup attempt. By contrast, in Egypt the Muslim Brotherhood secured presidential and parliamentary electoral success only to be ousted by the military and replaced by General al-Sisi. It suffered banishment of its political wing, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), and imprisonment of hundreds of Brotherhood members.

The erstwhile militantly secular Republic of Turkey has witnessed a strengthening of political Islam since 2001 while the Arab Republic of Egypt has returned to oppressing political Islam at the hands of a secular military dictatorship. What can explain the diverging fates of these two majority Sunni Muslim countries? An attempt to answer this question, in part, begins with an examination and discussion of the roles of the militaries of Turkey and Egypt within society, on the political process within each state, and their influence on Islamic political parties.

Turkey & Islam & the Ottomans

Turkey’s tense relationship with politics and Islam pre-dates the Republic’s foundation in 1923. Present-day Turkey occupies the heart of the former Ottoman Empire. The seat of the Caliph – the spiritual leader of all Sunni Muslims – once resided in Istanbul. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founding father and first president of the Turkish Republic, shaped the nascent nation-state into a stringently secular government. He abolished the Caliph in 1924, and established the Directorate of Religious Affairs, Diyanet, to oversee laïcité – state control of religion, modeled on French laïcité. The Diyanet was an administrative institution that controlled all the mosques, paid Turkish imams, and approved religious education curriculum while remaining apolitical. Over the decades, this system depoliticized mosques. Religious activities became the domain of the state, causing
religious organizations to pursue their efforts in private and to likewise change the public tenor of their activities.

Even as the government allowed for an increase in religious education after the 1980 coup, the programs for Religious Culture and Ethics remained under state control. The “good Islam” taught by the Kemalist state created a dichotomy that excluded alternate forms of “bad Islam” that sought inclusion in governance. Within this system, a multiparty elected government since 1950, political Islam failed to flourish in the Kemalist and Cold War eras. However, it allowed for apolitical religious organizations and groups to find space outside of politics; most famously the Hizmet, which partially embraced the state control of religion model, organized its activity in the educational, business, finance, and media fields – but not politics. Islam in Turkey remained forcibly outside of politics for decades, being allowed to exist in strictly private settings. This relationship was framed by the Kemalists’ understanding of Islam’s relationship to the Ottoman Empire and would have profound effects on the development of religiously informed political parties at the end of the millennium.

Egypt & the Muslim Brotherhood

The Muslim Brotherhood has been part of Egyptian political life since the 1920s. Islam was invoked by Egypt’s rulers to justify actions, legitimize their rule, and pander to the masses. Under Nasser, Sadat, and in the early Mubarak years the Muslim Brotherhood swung from severe repression and imprisonment to political participation and civic infiltration. When Gamal Abdel Nasser and a cohort of military officers overthrew King Farouk in 1952, he consolidated his power, in part, by cutting a deal with the Muslim Brotherhood, with which he was a token member. Islam’s role in Egyptian society and governing was uncontroversial and Nasser wrapped himself in pan-Arabism and Islam to mollify the devout among the Egyptian population, but it was the military and security services, not the Muslim Brotherhood, that secured his dictatorial power and eliminate any potential political rivals.

What developed under Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak over six decades was political power balance between the military, internal security apparatus, and the Egyptian bourgeoisie – the Islamists were tools to be used and discarded as needed. In the balance of Egyptian politics, Islamists were political rivals in their ideology and popular support to the military, secularists, and others. The military emerged as the dominant institution in Egypt under Nasser, but between 1977 and 1981, under President Anwar Sadat, the military’s influence waned as the security apparatus of the Interior Ministry grew.

Under Sadat, the Brotherhood was granted general amnesty, imprisoned members were released, and exiled members were encouraged to return home. However, Sadat would not allow the Brotherhood to form a political party for fear of having to bridge the gap between Arab Socialism, which was the foundation of his regime, and his promises for implementing Sharia law. Allowed to register as a social organization, the Brotherhood became vocal opponents of Sadat and the political order. The Muslim Brotherhood sought to utilize the democratic system in order to transform it into a religious one. From the 1970s through the 1980s the Muslim Brotherhood adopted a strategy of gradual, nonviolent change, and never abandoned its illiberal goals of forming an Islamic state based on sharia law in Egypt. Never having a reasonable chance of accruing significant influence in parliament, the Muslim Brotherhood settled into a role as permanent opposition. Without a place at the table the Muslim Brotherhood extended its influence and membership to the realms of academia, the lawyers union, services, and elsewhere to garner support from the population.

In the early 1990s, the Muslim Brotherhood faced increased repression by the Egyptian government as the actions of terrorist and Islamic extremist groups, such as Gama’a Islamiya and al-Jihad, became increasingly violent. Shadi Hamid in his analysis of Islamists political behavior writes, “The fear of repression leads Islamists to deemphasize Islamic law and underscores their democratic bona fides, the hope that this will give paranoid governments less reason to attack them.” In the hopes of reciprocally moderate treatment from the regime the Muslim Brotherhood issued two clarifying statements moderating their positions, held Shura Council elections, and petitioned for legal participation of a newly formed political party, the Wasat Party, as evidence of their political moderation. However, the failure of the Wasat Party became a cautionary tale on the folly of political moderation in the Mubarak era. The goal of the Muslim Brotherhood was to seek to fully exploit the institutions of Egyptian democracy that was really only a façade for authoritarianism. The regime maintained control over all organs of government and Mubarak’s National Democratic Party ensured its dominance over the Muslim Brotherhood in parliament.

Roles of the Military: Turkish Military as a Moderator of Political Islam

Institutionally, the Turkish military had a constitutional mandate to protect the secular nature of the Turkish Republic while the judiciary also acted to ban political parties that threatened the political status quo. Their stated purpose was to protect a secular political ideal defined by Atatürk, not a single ruler, political party or regime. This responsibility dates to the country’s founding, as the early executive and legislative leadership positions were filled by former army officers who had served in war of independence. Atatürk symbolically took off his military uniform before accepting a leadership role in the People’s Republic Party (CHP) and becoming the nation’s first president; afterwards the military has understood that it could act politically to preserve the secular republic, but never rule permanently. The military has overthrown the government in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997 while the Turkish Constitutional Court has acted 24 times to ban political parties. Even the willingness and normalcy of a military coup d’état became a political influence of its own. After each coup d’état Turkish voters would continue to support political leaders and parties that emphasized Islamic values and traditions.

The National Outlook parties have risen and fallen with religiously informed agendas, each iteration a modification of
The entity previously banned. “These banned political parties were able to reinvent themselves under new names, having adjusted their platforms and behavior under the scrutiny of the judicial system. In Turkey, despite its restrictions, party politics has emerged as the main venue for religious groups to demand and acquire more political clout.”

Two factors have contributed to the perpetuation of this system. First, after each coup the military has returned to the barracks and allowed civilian elected governments to return to ruling. Although a political threat to individual parties, the military never threatened to dominate the political system at the expense of civilian control. Second, the National Outlook parties’ acceptance to act within this political system enabled them to survive, adapt, and moderate their religious platforms. The current manifestation of a National Outlook party, the AKP, also represents another increment of moderation of a religiously-informed party platform. The AKP, coming to power in 2002, introduced “conservative democracy” and based their political platform on conservative values, which remained officially undefined, but commonly understood to be Islamic-based. With the omnipresent threat of military coup d’état the incentive for National Outlook parties to self-moderate was strong, but did not discourage participation in government. While managing to appeal to conservative voters, the Islamic parties of Turkey de-Islamized their political platforms and adapted them to the political environment of Turkey that included a politically apolitical, the military bided it’s time until it could regain dominance. From this separated position, the military felt more secure in distancing itself politically from the harsh actions of the Interior Ministry. In fact, the military’s public perception as being the defender of regional stability and national integrity, along with The Emergency Law (162/1958), which has been in near-continuous effect since 1967, permitted the military a certain autonomy to preserve their political power within the Egyptian system. The military ensured the continuity of the presidential system for decades and thus became an important entity to court for revolutionaries during the Arab Spring.

Egypt’s system of government has been described by Steven Cook, from the Council of Foreign Relations, as a “democratic façade.” Parliament, elections, and a judiciary provided the façade for the Supreme State Security Court, High Constitutional Court, and military tribunals, which were at the heart of the authoritarian system. Over the years, within this construct, the state granted the Muslim Brotherhood permission to participate, or alternatively repressed them, based on a calculation of the Brotherhood’s perceived threat and the need to release political pressure. Without meaningful participation, however, the Brotherhood had no motivation to moderate their ideology or the platforms of political parties their members supported. For decades Mubarak had “coup-proofed” the Egyptian regime through frequent rearrangements of military leadership and bodies, enlargement of the Interior Ministry, and manipulation of the Muslim Brotherhood. Therefore, the best political course of action for the military was to secure for itself the largest share of autonomy, economic self-sufficiency, and physical comfort.

Roles of the Military: Egyptian Military as a Political Player

President Nasser and the Free Officers that executed the 1952 coup of King Farouq established their power using the military. Unlike the Turkish military, Egypt’s military sought not to safeguard the regime in an ideal framework, but to reemerge as the dominant political player. The military expedition to Yemen in the 1960s, the Six-Day War in 1967, and the Yom Kippur War with Israel in 1973 would be the last major military actions undertaken by the Egyptian military. The 1967 defeat by Israel in the Six-Day War began a long process of demilitarization of Egyptian politics. The Egyptian military was at its peak strength and effectiveness in 1973. After the peace with Israel, the military’s claim to first priority on the nation’s resources and manpower diminished significantly as Sadat reduced the size of the military by half. The political power of the military would also shrink as the officer-civilian ratio decreased, the high command was shuffled, and relative salaries of officers were ravaged by the failing economy. However, the Camp David Accords and the military aid that came with it enabled the military to expand its influence horizontally across the defense, business, and agriculture sectors of Egypt, as well as to increase training and professionalization as a result of increased security cooperation with the West – disconnecting the military from civilian society and the Mubarak security structure.

Under President Mubarak “Egypt had become a failed state in the eyes of its own people. It belonged to the upper class. Laws were passed only so that a few could enrich themselves by breaking them, while the rest of society suffered the brunt.” The military’s political position weakened further throughout the 1980s and 1990s as Mubarak perpetuated Sadat’s Interior Ministry’s security apparatus and free market economics and globalization devastated the Egyptian economy. Far from apolitical, the military bided it’s time until it could regain dominance. Two factors have contributed to the perpetuation of this system. First, after each coup the military has returned to the barracks and allowed civilian elected governments to return to ruling. Although a political threat to individual parties, the military never threatened to dominate the political system at the expense of civilian control. Second, the National Outlook parties’ acceptance to act within this political system enabled them to survive, adapt, and moderate their religious platforms. The current manifestation of a National Outlook party, the AKP, also represents another increment of moderation of a religiously-informed party platform. The AKP, coming to power in 2002, introduced “conservative democracy” and based their political platform on conservative values, which remained officially undefined, but commonly understood to be Islamic-based. With the omnipresent threat of military coup d’état the incentive for National Outlook parties to self-moderate was strong, but did not discourage participation in government. While managing to appeal to conservative voters, the Islamic parties of Turkey de-Islamized their political platforms and adapted them to the political environment of Turkey that included a politically apolitical, the military bided it’s time until it could regain dominance. From this separated position, the military felt more secure in distancing itself politically from the harsh actions of the Interior Ministry. In fact, the military’s public perception as being the defender of regional stability and national integrity, along with The Emergency Law (162/1958), which has been in near-continuous effect since 1967, permitted the military a certain autonomy to preserve their political power within the Egyptian system. The military ensured the continuity of the presidential system for decades and thus became an important entity to court for revolutionaries during the Arab Spring.

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Role Reversal: Weakening of the Turkish Generals and the Unconstrained AKP

The strength of the Turkish military within the political system is tied directly to the residual strength of the Kemalist outlook. Since the end of the Cold War and the unsettled years of the 1990s, the Kemalist ideology has clung to archaic beliefs that have failed to adapt and prepare Turkey for globalization. The 1997 Post-Modern Coup was the last politically influential act of the military.

Following that, the governments of Prime Minister Mustafa Bülent Ecevit’s Democratic Left Party embarked on a path toward European Union membership and economic reform assisted by loans and oversight from the International Monetary Fund – actions which the Western-oriented military supported. The AKP, with the most updated political platform available to Turkish voters, was able to come to power in 2002
and contributed additional European Union-focused reforms and economic growth initiatives, which brought unprecedented Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth from 2002 to 2007.

With each additional year of growing economic prosperity, the acceptability of a coup d’état against the AKP and their “conservative democracy” platform became publicly unacceptable and unsustainable. Additionally, the Ergenekon and Balyoz investigations, which began in 2006, further weakened the military’s political position in Turkey and signaled their decreased support among the judiciary and media. The lowest point for military influence was the 2011 simultaneous resignations of the military chiefs in protest against AKP’s intrusions on the military’s authority. Public reaction to the resignations was non-existent, demonstrating the military’s weakness vis-à-vis the AKP.

Islamizing practices of the AKP were not able to begin until after the military had been sufficiently weakened and the threat of coup d’état significantly reduced. Social legislation, after 2011 promoted by the AKP, is the clearest indicator of Islam’s influence on the AKP. AKP educational reforms, passed by parliament in February 2012, opened up restrictive legal codes and provided legal standing for primary education in imam-hatip religious schools, while it also was being crafted to mandate religious education for a majority of Turkish youth, according to critics. These reforms continued through additional measures designed to extend the influence of imam-hatip at the expense of secular education.

Expansion and increased politicization of the Diyanet played a vital role in the Islamization of Turkish politics and policies under the AKP—again placing the government in a role of religious promotion rather than secular conservation. Erdoğan also replaced the Ministry for Women and Family with the Ministry for Family and Social Policies, and make speeches undermining gender equality in Turkey. Taken together these policy initiatives, reforms, and increasing reference of Islam and Islamic values in speeches has coincided with the AKP’s increased authoritarian tendencies after the political neutering of the military establishment.

The AKP’s rise has not been without controversy or popular dissatisfaction. The protests at Gezi Park in Istanbul, which began in May 2013, are evidence of the growing dissatisfaction with the AKP, corruption, cronism, and authoritarianism from Turkey’s ruling party. The protestors were also concerned about the perceived attempts by the AKP government to eliminate certain identities (such as the Alevi minority) in Turkey and build a homogenous, conservative society obedient to a more authoritarian government. The AKP has pursued authoritarianism to further cement its position in power. President Erdoğan, having served a self-imposed limit of three terms as prime minister, is seeking to replace the 1982 constitution with a new one that empowers the office of the president with expansive executive power—converting the parliamentary Turkish Republic into a presidential system—and establishing autocratic single-party rule in Turkey. As of 2016, the AKP has demonstrated tremendous electoral success and dominance of the political landscape in Turkey. Economic growth, EU prospectus, and stability—not social change or religious jurisprudence—can be attributed for the AKP’s electoral success and strength.

Role Reversal: President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood in Power in Egypt

The Muslim Brotherhood, which had altered its message to appear acceptable to liberals and moderates under the dictator Hosni Mubarak, abandoned this messaging, reverted to Islamic-themed appeals, and publicly announced intentions of bringing Shari’a law to Egypt prior to the 2012 Presidential elections to ensure Islamist participation. The Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi won the election, placing a popularly elected civilian Islamist in power in Egypt for the first time in its modern history.

Once in power the Muslim Brotherhood did not seek to represent all Egyptians, Islamist and moderates, but began making changes in the judiciary, executive, and legislature to further their oft-stated Islamist goals. On 22 November 2013, Morsi announced a constitutional decree granting him expansive powers beyond judicial review. This was the first step liberals and anti-Islamists feared would lead to sharia law in Egypt. Muslim Brotherhood rule was marred by amateurishness and religious revival at the expense of actual governance. Morsi’s one year of rule was defined by incompetence and naivety.

The military and security establishments, which had not been dismantled during the Arab Spring revolutions, continued to hold considerable political influence and threatened the nascent Muslim Brotherhood government. For its part, the military acted during the Morsi era to secure its own interests. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), as well as the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) moved to block the Muslim Brotherhood from having authority over matters of national defense and security, previously the purview of the military, and to limit the capabilities of the Brotherhood-controlled parliament and presidency. These moves undermined the Morsi government, and taken together with the Muslim Brotherhood’s ineffectiveness at governance, provided an opportunity for the military to reestablish its influence. General al-Sisi represented the military’s reemergence as the dominant political player in Egypt after the Muslim Brotherhood proved ineffective in responding to monumental challenges with limited authorities.

Conclusion

Shadi Hamid, author and Middle East expert, asserts that repression of Islamist parties lead them to pragmatism, but not moderation. In his book, The Temptations of Power, he holds up Turkey as an example of Islamists moderating over time while repression of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt served as a catalyst for regional instability. In Turkey, political Islam has been moderated through successive iterations of political inclusion and military coups. Political parties informed by Islamic values accepted the political structure and adjusted their platforms to achieve their political ambitions. The opposite occurred in Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood moderated in the
face of intense regime repression and was left unrewarded. In the absence of political participation, Islamists reduced their political ambitions within the existing system. The Arab Spring provided an opportunity for the Brotherhood to smash the status quo and implement their original, unmoderated Islamist goals. Morsi was deposed by the military after a year of futility and failing to eliminate the political rivalry between the military and security forces.

Inclusion requires would-be political participants to clarify their positions. The AKP and all its predecessors did this, under the watchful gaze of the Turkish military, until they arrived at a durable and popularly acceptable platform. In Egypt the Muslim Brotherhood espoused moderation and ambiguity to avoid repression by the regime while excluded from the political system, but reversed itself and abandoned moderation upon coming to power – alienating any potential broad-based support. The Egyptian military, as a political rival, had no history of shaping the political environment beyond securing for itself a share of the power. Now that the Muslim Brotherhood has been banned in Egypt it is less likely that the Brotherhood will continue the trend of moderation and democratization as the AKP and Hizmet experience would suggest.

After the divorce of the AKP and Hizmet, the increased conflict with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), and the Syrian civil war on Turkey’s doorstep, the Turkish military has remained relevant and vital in providing input for the security and defense policy of the AKP’s foreign policy. The AKP’s quick shifting of blame for the 2016 coup attempt to the Hizmet and Fethullah Gülen indicates Erdoğan’s desire to pursue all opposition to his rule – whether involved in the attempted coup or not. However, since its political position has been weakened since the early 2000s, the military’s ability to check parties has been dramatically reduced – making Turkey an unlikely candidate for a coup and casting doubt on the extent of the military’s role in planning the 2016 coup attempt. Some observers have even voiced concerns that the coup attempt was an elaborate hoax to enable Erdoğan to purge thousands who oppose his authoritarian designs.

The AKP’s unchecked turn toward autocracy can be viewed as evidence of some benefits of the Turkish military’s role in Turkish politics in decades past. The threat of a publicly supported coup d’état has diminished after the turn of the millennium, but it was believed that the Turkish military could still leverage some control over the political process, especially in the arenas of foreign policy and national security. The AKPs continued purges after the 2016 coup attempt make it even more unlikely that the Turkish military could regain the level of political influence that it had thirty or forty years ago.

Unlike in Turkey, when General al-Sisi took off his military uniform to become president of Egypt the military remained the key to his hold on power. The military had not been relieved of any of their political interests or responsibilities in the al-Sisi regime. The Arab Spring was not a revolutionary event for the Egyptian Military; rather it was an opportunity. The same imbalanced relationship between the established military and political Islamists in Egypt that existed for decades under Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak regimes remains in place after a brief period of disruptive transition initiated by the Arab Spring of 2011. Those events did not provide the incentive for the military to amend its political position nor has another political force emerged to compel such a change. Until a new breaking point is reached the military will remain a political force in Egypt.

The Egyptian and Turkish militaries had two different effects on the development of democracy and the moderation of political Islam within their respective countries. The Turkish military served as a guardian of the secular republic and acted several times to overthrow political parties that veered too far astray of the Kemalist ideal. In the process, religiously-informed political parties moderated their platforms as an accepted cost of political participation – culminating in the AKP’s electoral success and acceptance. The Turkish military acted above politics for decades in service of the state. In today’s Turkey the military’s devolving political influence has enabled the solidification of the AKP’s power and the military’s role in shaping the political future of religiously-informed political parties is jeopardized. The Turkish military’s role is evolving as its political power shrinks under the AKP’s reign.

By comparison, the Egyptian military served as just another political actor in a system skewed to favor the authoritarian regime. The military benefited and enjoyed autonomy within the façade of democracy in Egypt, but was not motivated to reform or safeguard an Egyptian ideal. Political Islam in Egypt, largely represented by the Muslim Brotherhood, sought political survival and influence in a system that deliberately excluded them. Limited political participation in a façade democracy did not moderate Islamist ideology, as demonstrated by the actions of the Muslim Brotherhood after the Arab Spring. The conclusion of this chapter of Egyptian history leaves a politically powerful military, having retaken the reins of power, and political Islam unmoderated by its experiences under decades of military dictatorships. Making educated guesses about the future of both Turkey and Egypt depends heavily on an understanding of their militaries within the ideological identities and political power structures of each country.

About the Author
Major Andrew Zapf is a Middle East/North African Foreign Area Officer, formerly an Air Defense Artillery officer. He is a 2004 graduate of the United States Military Academy and holds graduate degrees from Duquesne University and Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. He has served at the US Embassy – Rabat, Morocco and in NATO Rapid Deployable – Turkey in Istanbul. He currently serves as an Arabic Instructor at the United States Military Academy.
2016 FAOA Academic Research and Writing Awards Program

The Foreign Area Officer Association (FAOA) Academic Research and Writing Awards Program has just successfully completed supporting its fifth academic season with awards at U.S. military professional military education (PME) and national intelligence and defense universities, including Air University, Naval War College, Marine Corps University, Army War College, National Intelligence University (NIU), Naval Post-graduate School (NPS), and three schools under the National Defense University (NDU), including the Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy (formerly ICAF), Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC), and newly added for this 2016 academic year, the National War College.

The goal of the FAOA Academic Research and Writing Awards Program, initiated in the 2012 academic year, is to promote academic excellence and recognize student authors who have demonstrated outstanding academic research, strategic-thought, and professional writing skills on significant international, political/military affairs, or intelligence topics in completion of their graduation requirements.

As in past years, there were many high-quality papers submitted for the competitions, many of which will be featured in current and future editions of the FAOA Journal of International Affairs. Winners received a plaque or inscribed book recognizing their achievement at their graduation or separate award ceremonies, and they also are offered a one-year complimentary membership in the FAOA and subscription to the FAOA Journal.

The FAOA Academic Awards Program is directed by the FAOA Awards Committee, and representatives from the FAOA are normally present at each graduation or awards ceremony to represent the FAOA and present the awards. The Air War College award was again presented by Colonel John Fairlamb, US Army (ret.). Thank you, John. FAOA Board of Governors (BOG) member and Secretary, Major John Krause, USMC (ret.), was a repeat presenter the Marine Corps University graduation and presented the Marine Command and Staff College award. Thanks again John. The Army War College Award was presented by FAOA member and President of the Civil Affairs Association, Colonel Joe Kirlin, US Army (ret.). Thanks for the assist, Joe! The Naval War College awards at the College of Naval Warfare and College of Naval Command and Staff were presented by School representatives this year. FAOA BOG member and “FAO Foundry” representative, COL Mark Chakwin, USA (ret.), again presented the FAOA Award at the Naval Post-Graduate School. FAOA member and NMIA Board Member and Editor of the American Intelligence Journal (AIJ), presented the FAOA award at the National Intelligence University (NIU) graduation.

FAOA has four (4) awards at NDU currently, including the Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy (formerly the Industrial College of the Armed Forces/ICAF), presented this year by Colonel Dennis “Flap” Fowler, USAF (ret.); and three (3) awards at NDU’s Joint Forces Staff College, including the Joint and Combined Warfighting School (JCWS), the Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS), and the Advanced Joint PME (AJPME). Former FAOA BOG member and FAOA Journal Editor, Dr./COL Coyt Hargus, USA (ret.), presented all of these Norfolk-based awards this year.

This year’s FAOA Academic Award winners included

**Air University**

Air War College: Major General Lansdale International Affairs Outstanding Research Award, WINNER: LTC Vicente Donoso, Chilean Air Force, for his paper entitled “Chilean Strategy Towards Antarctica”

**Naval War College**


**Marine Corps University**

Marine War College: None selected this year.

Naval Command and Staff College: COL William Mengel, USA, for his paper entitled: “Untangling the Gordian Knot: The Socio-Cultural Challenge of Syria.”

Marine Corps University

Marine War College: None selected this year.

Naval Command and Staff College: Maj Albert J. Goldberg, USMC, for his paper entitled “Baltic Flashpoint Collective Defense for the 21st Century”
Army War College: COL Samuel W. Curtis, US Army, for his paper entitled, “Fighting to Avoid Conflict: U.S. Counterterrorism Model in Northwest Africa”.

Naval Post-graduate School: FAOA Award for Excellence in International Affairs: Major Amy Roznowski, USMC.

National Intelligence University: Major David V. Sawyer, USAFR, for his paper entitled “China’s 20th Politburo Standing Committee Composition: An Alternative Futures Analysis of 2022”

Eisenhower School: LTC Christopher Love, US Army, for his paper entitled “Containing Salafi-Jihad in a Sectarian Age”

National War College: FAOA Award for Excellence in International Affairs: LTC Stephen T. Shore, USA

Joint Forces Staff College


Joint and Combined Warfighting School (JCWS), 16-01: BG Dawne Deskins, USANG; Col Christopher Harris, USAF; Col Donald Johnson, USAF; and CAPT Jonathon Young, USN for their paper entitled “IS RUSSIA THE GREATEST THREAT TO US NATIONAL SECURITY?”

JCWS 16-02: COL Jeffrey S. Settle, USA; Lt Col Heather A. Cook, USAF; and Lt Col Wayne R. Zuber, USMC for their paper entitled “Patterns of Convergence: Toward Building Better Interoperability Between Diplomacy and Defense.”

JCWS 16-03: Major Ryan L. Stallsworth, USAF; LCDR Jeremy Doughty, USN; and MAJ Geoff Miller, USA for their paper entitled “U.S. Response to Chinese Claims in the South China Sea: Should We Consider a Long Term Hedge Strategy?”

JCWS, Hybrid, November 2016: COL Lowell E. Kruse, USA National Guard (Minnesota) for his paper entitled, “Security Cooperation in U.S. European Command: How can the National Guard best contribute to security assurance and deterrence in Europe-particularly Eastern Europe and the Baltics?”

The FAOA BOG and Awards Committee would like to congratulate all of the winners, and thanks our presenters, as well as recognize the hard work by the selection committees and award administrators at each academic institution that worked so hard to select the winners from very competitive groups. We look forward to collaborating once again next year and sincerely appreciate the hard work, dedication and sacrifices of all the FAOs, other US and international officers, and DoD civilians who submitted papers to compete for this recognition.

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toward their vision: a continental support plan is something the Africans sincerely want. In assisting the AU in this endeavor, nothing is more important than building their capacity through training, building a sustainable plan through partners who demonstrate accountability and governance and to nest infrastructure growth, as it makes sense, within the AU’s infrastructure plan.

Lastly, the plan must be integrated with CEWS and UN partners to ensure a smooth transition from AU to UN missions. Developing logistics plans to support the ASF is squarely within USAFRICOM’s core mission of building defense capability. Embracing this effort allows the US and its partners to meet this mission while also priming the AU for economic development and eventual prosperity, thus giving the Africans a sustainable pathway to meeting the aspirations they espouse in their 2063 vision.

against terror and TOC organizations in recent history, such as the case with the Colombian drug cartels, the Westphalian world has yet to effectively recognize, let alone deal with and eliminate, a non-state group with the breadth and capability of Hezbollah. In building the national and international capacity to destroy or make irrelevant a non-state, terror, political, social, media/information and criminal group such as Hezbollah, the U.S. and international community will go far in facing emergent challenges of the 21st Century.

About the Author
Lieutenant Colonel Zeman was commissioned in 1993 through the Platoon Leaders Course. LtCol Zeman has completed six deployments (three combat) and served in a variety of operational billets including Force Reconnaissance Detachment Commander for the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, Assistant Operations Officer for 7th Marines (OIF 2), and the Battalion Executive Officer for 3d Battalion, 4th Marines (OIF 3). His posting highlights include; Marine Officer Instructor at College of the Holy Cross, Strategic Analyst in the Strategic Initiatives Group at Headquarters, Marine Corps, Executive Officer & Operations Officer for the standup of the Afghan 215th Corps in Helmand, Afghanistan, and as Headquarters Battalion Commander and Plans Officer for the Marine Air Ground Task Force Training Center, Twentynine Palms, California. LtCol Zeman is a graduate of Boston University with a BA in History and holds a Master of Arts degree from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.

Instead, our message must be unambiguous, clear, and supported through all facets of U.S. national power (e.g., DIME). The authors’ proposition meets both requirements explained in this paper – an “outside of the box” idea that cuts across various aspects of DIME!

About the Authors
Major Ryan L. Stallsworth serves as a Strategic Planner at J56, Campaign & Functional Plans Division, USSTRATCOM, Offutt Air Force Base, Omaha, NE. He earned a BS in Meteorology from North Carolina State University, an MBA from Amberton University, Dallas, Texas, and a Masters in National Security Strategies from the Naval War College.

Major A. Geoff Miller is a Crisis Action Planner at J35, Future Operations Plans for the Pacific Region and Adversary Team at USSTRATCOM. He earned a BA in Biology from Rhodes College, Memphis Tennessee and a Masters of Arts in Leadership Studies from the University of Texas at El Paso (UTEP).

Lieutenant Commander Jeremy B. Doughty serves as a Deliberate Planner at J52, Deliberate Plans Division at USSTRATCOM. He earned a BS in Maritime Operations and Technology from the United States Merchant Marine Academy and a MS in Entrepreneurship from the University of Florida.
stage for increased instability and calls for change.

If the Arab Spring demonstrated anything, it was that it is no longer possible to suppress people who are socially interconnected and communicating. The countries that were swept up in the uprisings either toppled or made some concessions to the people they rule. These liberalizations will continue to feed an opening of the MENA countries to the world economy. Springborg notes that the Arab Spring had the potential to be very good for the region by ending autocracy and improving industrialization opportunities. Economic changes are necessary to sustain the political changes that have swept the MENA region. New governments need to focus on inclusive institutions that create growth and equality. Looney has proven that good governance is a key factor in economic growth, more important even than economic reforms, calling for pluralistic legislatures, independent judiciaries, and civil and human rights. The changes after the Arab Spring have led to many of these reforms and it is likely that the changes will not stop at governance.

The MENA region can no longer ignore the fact that the world and its economy have changed. A subsidy-placated populace ruled by an iron fist is no longer sustainable in the modern information-connected age. Intrusive governments, security concerns, and macroeconomic blunders have all limited the integration of the MENA countries with the rest of the world, but none of those issues is a permanent anchor. The MENA region is changing. Recent drops in oil prices have shown that these subsidy regimes are in danger. Changes in governance have increased liberalization throughout much of the region and it is only a matter of time before those changes begin to affect markets. There is much to do, and the MENA countries will have to figure out how to exploit the new opportunities around them instead of just losing ground to foreign competition. The future of the global economy is as bright as it is interconnected. The MENA region must shake off the dust of the past and take its place in the global economy as a partner, not just an outside supplier.

About the Author

Major Chris Townsend is a Middle East Foreign Area Officer assigned in the U.S. Central Command Multinational Logistics Division. He recently completed In-Region Training in Morocco. He served as section sergeant, platoon leader, and company commander during operations in Kuwait and Iraq.

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Center (JDTC), Joint Staff, Joint Base Langley-Eustis, VA. He was commissioned through the Air Force Officer Training School in 1999. Lieutenant Colonel Cerny earned a BS in Computer Engineering from Oregon State University in 1998 and an MS in Space Systems from the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) in 2008.

Major Jamon Junius is the Branch Chief, Antiterrorism/Force Protection/Current Operations within the J34 at United States Pacific Command. His previous assignment was at United States Army Pacific Command, where he served as the Operations Officer, Provost Marshal Division, Operational Protection Directorate. MAJ Junius was commissioned through the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) at North Carolina State University in 2001. He earned a BA in Psychology from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 1996, and a MA in Business and Organizational Security Management from Webster University in 2007.

Major John Toohey is a Joint Aviation Plans Officer within the J3 Directorate at United States Special Operations Command. He was commissioned through ROTC at the University of South Florida in 2001. Major Toohey earned a BA in Criminology from Saint Leo University in 2001 and a MA in Homeland Security from American Military University in 2016. Prior to this assignment he was a Company Commander and Battalion Executive Officer within United States Army Special Operations Command.
The Foreign Area Officer Association (FAOA) wrapped up 2016 with continued support for the highest standards and professional excellence in military education. During the Naval Post Graduate School’s December Graduation Awards Ceremony, Major Phil Sakamoto, U. S. Air Force was presented with the Foreign Area Officer Association Award for Excellence in International Affairs who were part of the JFAOC program. FAOA also provided a working breakfast for the JFAOC Phase I class. In this event, the FAOA organization and its goals of promoting FAO traditions, FAO professionalism, and FAO growth were introduced to the next generation of FAO leaders. FAOA continues to explore other outreach opportunities with the Defense Language Institute and Naval Postgraduate School in order to foster a Joint FAO community, and to introduce the unique professional FAO culture to young officers in transition.

Notes from the FAO Foundry

BY MARK B. CHAKWIN, COLONEL U. S. ARMY (RETIRED)

FAOA sponsored our traditional FAO community reception, “FAO’s on Tap,” as an important ice-breaker. This time, more than 90 new FAOs and their families met and interacted on an informal social level with peers and the dozens of experienced FAOs and International Affairs professionals who were part of the JFAOC program. Major Sakamoto’s award-winning thesis will be posted on the Association’s website, and he has prepared an article that captures the key points for publication in our Journal.

In late January, FAOA joined with the Defense Language Institute’s Foreign Area Officer team to support the semi-annual Joint FAO Orientation Course (JFAOC). In this event, the FAOA organization and its goals of promoting FAO traditions, FAO professionalism, and FAO growth were introduced to the next generation of FAO leaders.

FAOA continues to explore other outreach opportunities with the Defense Language Institute and Naval Postgraduate School in order to foster a Joint FAO community, and to introduce the unique professional FAO culture to young officers in transition.
FAO Association Board of Governors member, Colonel (retired) Mark B. Chakwin introduces the FAO Association to JFAOC officers, Presidio of Monterey, CA

FAOs On Tap Happy Hour, Cannery Row, Monterey CA
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