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A PUSH FROM BELOW —
The only way that a Joint FAO Program will ever be built

Over the past few months, I have had the honor of observing, at least tangentially, the creation of the Air Force and Navy FAO programs, in response to the demands of a DOD Directive ordering the Services to form programs to certain minimum standards. In theory, all the Services will finally step up as full partners in manning the international arena. My observations of the progress being made are not all that positive. I have now seen a huge quantity of flashy slides, with all the right buzz words in them, that at best illustrate the problem and offer only the most basic theoretical solutions to it.

On the plus side of the ledger, Navy has already had two assessments boards identifying and choosing volunteers for the program from the ranks. Predictably, while the first board reviewed a fairly large number of candidates, the second board dealt with a much smaller population, and if there is a third board the numbers will be smaller still — there are simply a finite number of officers in the Navy with the requisite skills to be FAOs. On the negative side, the Navy is devoting only a single part-time officer to the problem of creating a FAO program from scratch. He needs to identify worldwide Navy FAO needs (to include fighting it out with Navy Intel for Naval attaché billets), develop a system to run the program and manage its assets, and build a viable FAO training program, all while creating a base force from officers already serving in the Navy who have the minimum FAO qualifications. No matter how good he is — one guy — part-time — GIVE ME A BREAK!

In the case of the Air Force, it is approaching the problem differently. They have manned their office with at least three officers (so they have a reasonable work force in the proponent office). However, they are only just getting in the game, beginning to fashion a solution and are way behind the power-curve in creating a program that will work in the long-term.

So the bottom line is that the creation of a joint FAO program (or multiple Service FAO programs) is not coming along very quickly or smoothly. What can you do about it? If you are a Navy or Air Force FAO, make your voice heard at the headquarters. Good ideas can and should be generated in the field. It is you the serving FAO, that understands best why some FAOs do the job at hand better than others — it might be their language ability, their in-depth knowledge of the region, their contacts within the region, or some other factor. The new Services cannot simply clone the existing Army and Marine Corps programs — these older programs were developed to operate within very specific strictures of their own Service personnel systems. Each Service, because of its uniqueness, must have a different type of FAO program. But it is you, the serving FAO, that can identify the key elements of success that each program must address. Finally, a little pushing from below never hurt any program manager!

Are the Army and Marine Corps absolved of doing anything to improve their programs because they are fully functioning — the answer has to be NO! Just because a program has been around for a long while does not mean that it shouldn’t be periodically reviewed, revised, and reinvigorated. Neither of these operational Service programs can afford to rest on their past laurels. A constrained fiscal environment and an uncertain and rapidly changing world demand that these programs must find new and better solutions to doing their business — and that also requires a PUSH FROM BELOW!

Joseph D. Tullbane, III., Ph.D., President, FAOA
From the Field

ARMY FAO’S NOTE MARINE ADVANCES IN THE FIELD . . .

Dear Editor,

I noticed in the USMC Proponent news last quarter, that the Marine Corps is creating Marine Liaison Groups at I and II Marine Expeditionary Forces. It strikes me that this is a huge leap forward in the use of FAOs for tactical and operational missions. Why isn’t the Army looking into some of the same ideas? Clearly, a pol-mil planning/operational cell attached to a division or corps would enhance its ability to operate in a foreign environment. Is anything being done about this at DA? All we hear about in the field is cuts and more cuts — is the Army really more strapped for cash and people than the Marines?

Regards from a Curious Army FAO

EDITOR’S NOTE: Interestingly, something like the Marine Corps idea seems to have been tried in Bosnia, first by the 1st Armored Division, then by the 1st Infantry Division, and currently by the 1st Cav Division. They are using the FAOs that they have for similar purposes to those proposed for the Marine Liaison Groups. Unfortunately, they are an ad hoc response to the situation and appear to have all the problems that such solutions have (not the right mix of regional specialists, incompatible languages, etc.). The Journal will try to get someone who knows more about the subject to write a letter about what the Army is doing, or at least respond to your thoughts.

JDT

THOUGHTS AND COMMENTS ON THE JOURNAL SEPTEMBER EDITORIAL . . .

I understand your comments about the Year Groups that are involved in the OPMS XXI transition and even the comments on those Year Groups that will have to live with OPMS XXI in its “Stable State,” but what about those of us that are in Year Groups earlier than YG80 (like mine – YG79). Can you tell me if it is smart to submit my paperwork and single-track FAO or not? And if so, when?

EDITOR’S NOTE: The idea of the Editorial last month was to get people talking about the issues facing the Army officer corps as it enters a new personnel system. Each person is ultimately going to have to decide for himself or herself what is best for their individual career. In your case, there are some key bits of information that might help you with your decision. First, your Colonels’ Board will be conducted under the OPMS 2 guidelines, so at least through that board you need to stay as dual-tracked as possible (to ensure that you remain competitive). Second, if you do not get promoted on your primary zone look, you need to consider the guidance for YG80’s Colonels’ Board — and that is under the OPMS XXI guidelines. It might enhance your competitiveness at that point to be a single-track FAO. Third, even if you are promoted in the primary zone during your board, you should think carefully about the types of jobs that will come your way — as a basic branch officer (and that is how you will be treated unless you declare single-tracking) or as a single-tracked FAO. In these cases, I believe that my comments in the Editorial to your rank are appropriate. Fourth and final point, as of FY 00, the days of FAO O-6’s doing nothing but back-to-back overseas tours will be gone. The recoding of the 48A slots has realigned the CONUS-OCONUS imbalance of the past.

JDT

E-Mail Comments Received —

Thanks for the Editorial on CFD, it was most helpful. BBF

I think that the decision about whether to go into the Ops Career Field or the Ops Support Career Field (and I wish you would use the proper terminology in your editorial) is up to the individual officer and your magazine should not be promoting specific outcomes. TML

Great Editorial! It helps to hear as many thoughts on these issues as possible. DP

Would it be possible to get one of the PERSCOM Gurus to write an article about the Career Field Designation process. It would add greatly to my understanding of the new process and I’m sure to that of others, too. KF

I’m not in YG80, 86, or 89 and am having a very hard time finding out about what is going on in the CFD Process. But since it will affect me to soon, I am interested in knowing more about what people are selecting, etc. Do you have any intelligence on the CFD?

EDITOR’S NOTE: Points well taken. We will ask one of the PERSCOM officers to write about CFD and OPMS XXI in the near future. With regards to the question on the CFD process and its results so far, we’ve found that they are very close-hold. What we do know is that the FAO specialty is doing very well in terms of volunteers (in one year group it has reached 190% of the minimum needed), and that is with only about 50 percent of the initial
The purpose of this paper is to make the point that a political approach to mine clearing can achieve more results faster than any technological approach. The basic principle is: those who laid the mines must lift them.

BACKGROUND

Anti-personnel mines, at $3. each, remain an attraction for opposing sides in any ethnic conflict or civil war. All sides lay those mines for military and political reasons: to restrict movement of military units, and to restrict the movement of civilians for political reasons. This paper will cover the political approach to clearing mines, both during hostilities and afterwards during a cease fire.

Lifting mines as an occupation neither pays well nor offers steady employment. Few civilians are willing to expose themselves to the risks of mine clearing. Most governments, including the U.S. Government, offer to train the trainers, but not lift the mines with their own people. The media bewails the loss of life and limb to land mines, declaring all but the media guilty. And the mines remain armed and ready.

THE MILITARY RESPONSE

Since soldiers know more about mines than anybody else, they are the experts on mine clearing. They know that two vastly different standards apply: military clearing which permits the passage of troops in restricted lanes; and humanitarian mine clearing which demands a 99.6% clearance. Even the latter would leave four AP mines for every thousand cleared.

Soldiers also know that the wide variety of mines, about 700, makes it extraordinarily difficult to train people to lift mines unless they know just what they are lifting. Dealing with variety, therefore, is a key to the solution. And that solution must include efforts to get the soldiers that laid the mines to lift them. They are the best informed and most capable at lifting the mines they themselves laid.

On all sides in the Bosnian war, the soldiers of the former warring factions who laid the mines were called engineers. In fact, they were those men too old for infantry duty. They were given the option of laying mines or joining rifle platoons and the prospect of casualties. Weighing their options, they became mine engineers and laid mines all over Bosnia. These same men are the most qualified to lift them even at this late date.

HIGH TECHNOLOGY AND ALL THAT

The New York Times of December 16, 1997, page F1, devoted a special article in its Science Times Supplement to the problems of lifting mines. The article takes the technical approach for granted: only advanced technology will move us forward in lifting the 110 million buried mines around the world. Among the promising technologies cited are “ground-penetrating radar, infrared heat sensors, devices that detect vapors from explosives, gadgets that generate and analyze sound waves reflecting from objects, and bombarding the ground with radiation or radio waves to set off signals characteristic of the explosives.” Nowhere in this article does the Times discuss the political approach to lifting mines: the people who laid them must lift them.

I would also add that the common perception that all mines are underground is false. “Death Lurks Under the Ground” says the Times. Not so. I saw minefields in Bosnia, near the far end of the Sarajevo airport, where the mines, which looked like small dirty green pineapples, were about 4” above ground on wooden stakes. They were designed not only to slow attacking infantry, but to discourage those infantry from attacking in that sector. The defending Muslims felt more secure with their mines visible and above ground to deter Serb attackers. Small boys playing in the mine field, and daring us to join them, knew their way around. I believe that the soldiers who laid those mines could pick them up without much difficulty.

II. Clearing Mines during Hostilities

United Nations forces in Bosnia before the October 1995 cease fire proved able at times to convince the former warring factions in some cases to cross back into terrain they had defended and lost to lift mines they had used in their defense. A Danish brigadier general told me that he had done just that in the Krajina area of Croatia.

(Mines — A Political Approach, Continued on page 4)
With the Serbs and the Croats a few miles apart in new positions, the Croats faced Serb mines left behind in Croatian territory. The Danish brigadier convinced the Serbs to return to their old positions to lift their mines left behind, if the Croats would also lift their mines in what was then Serb territory. Done without fanfare or publicity, the engineer troops of both sides returned and lifted their mines.

III. The Political Reality

The political reality is that governments lay mines for, as cited above, military and political reasons. Outsiders, however, make the mistake that the governments that laid those mines share the same enthusiasm as the outside world to lifting them once hostilities have ended. Not true. The governments that laid those mines in almost all cases want them to remain right where they are even after a cease fire.

BOSNIA – INITIAL EFFORTS

The Muslims, Serbs, and Croats planted between 3 and 4 million AP mines. Lifting those mines as part of the peace process became a high priority in Washington. The Congress allocated several million dollars and State’s Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs was tasked to coordinate a mine lifting program with the Government of Bosnia. The State Department office director who headed that effort, Colonel Dan Layton, USA, was one of 42 U.S. Army officers detailed to the Department of State. About 14 State Department Foreign Service officers, the author included, were on detail to the Department of Defense. This exchange program dates back to 1960 and demonstrates how closely State and Defense work together.

Other European countries, such as Finland, sent trainers to Bosnia to help with the mine clearing effort.

One of the first priorities was to develop a computer data base to provide information for training mine clearing teams. It seemed a simple matter to get the Federation Government headed by Muslim President Alija Izetbegovic to sign the standard aid agreements that provided for free custom entry for the computers and related equipment, to hire local citizens, and to enjoy the cooperation of the local government.

By early winter 1996, plans for a Bosnia-wide mine clearing campaign were firm ed up and approved. Hitches developed, however, that made it look as though the State Department did not know how to get the program moving.

THE REALITY

By summer, however, mine clearing was moving too slowly to have much effect. IFOR HQ estimated that if each of the three former warring factions put 1,000 men to work lifting mines, it would take 33 years to clear the 3-4 million mines in Bosnia.

We saw that soldiers of the Republika Srpska Army were promised 5 DM a day for lifting mines, but rarely saw the money. They actually received one hot meal and one cold meal a day. Croat soldiers rarely lifted mines and the Muslims demanded more and more money to do anything. The initial demands of the Muslims were for an annual salary of $80,000 for each soldier so engaged. The annual per capita income then was less than $400 a year for Muslims and about $300 for Serbs. Izetbegovic’s people “softened” their demands and agreed to $8,000 per year for a limited number of people to get the program moving.

Nothing happened!

By the summer of 1996, IFOR HQ noted that the Muslim Army was trying to buy mine components in bulk in Europe and was starting up production in secret land mine factories under-ground in Gorazde and in the Tito Barracks area of Sarajevo.

By August 1996, the lack of any movement on clearing mines brought then Secretary of State Warren Christopher to Sarajevo. He found that Izetbegovic was demanding a 94% income tax on all Bosnians working for the U.S. mine clearing program, and was also demanding 90% customs duties on all equipment entering Bosnia.

Foreign Service officers in the field found it difficult to explain to Mr. Christopher and to Washington that the Muslims wanted those mines to remain right where they were. They were willing to talk about mine clearing, but came up with one excuse after another to avoid having to actually lift mines. The Administration just assumed that all Bosnians wanted to lift those mines, and the Congress just assumed that State was not competent to administer the program. The fact, is, and remains, that Muslims, Croats, and Serbs do not believe in a peace settlement coming out of the present cease fire and therefore want those mines to remain.

THE STATE DEPARTMENT COLONEL

(Mines — A Political Approach, Continued on page 5)
Col. Layton then put forth a proposal that combined the political and military realities. He reminded all sides that if they put 1,000 men to work it would take 33 years to lift all the mines. So why not, he said, start on those mine fields meeting two criteria: not important either in a military or political sense; and the people have requested that mines in certain areas be removed.

The results proved encouraging. The respective army staffs decided which mine fields were not really necessary. And it was easy to find out from local officials which areas should be cleared to benefit the local people. These were areas such as river banks, country roads, wooded paths, old markets, and schools that had been mined during the war and were still too dangerous to enter. It was a novel approach for the former warring factions with their communist mentality to ask their people their views on anything. When they did, and the military staffs then lifted those mines in selected areas, the party officials -- Serb, Croat, Muslim -- were astounded to see that the people gave them credit and were grateful.

So, de-mining when treated as a political issue can do some good. The goal here is not the humanitarian standard, but the what is possible. And if mines are cleared in areas important to the local people that is at least a measured success.

IV. Conclusion

Stephen P. Dawkins, a retired Foreign Service officer, served as the Political Advisor to the CINC of the Implementation Force in Bosnia from December 1995 to September 1996. Prior to that he was POLAD to GEN Gordon R. Sullivan (CSA, Army). He was a Marine infantry lieutenant and platoon leader (1958-62).

Training FAO’s for the Newly Independent States
By Mari K. Eder

In the short time since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 14 new embassies with defense attaché offices have opened in the newly independent states (NIS). In many of these states, security assistance programs, military-to-military contact programs, and joint exercises are being planned and conducted, when less than a decade ago there were no military contacts. In most cases, these new programs have been the responsibility of a lone military officer, usually a foreign area officer (FAO). Their function epitomizes the US engagement strategy.

The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies is the in-country training (ICT) base that helps produce these officers in the Eurasian area of concentration. The curriculum, taught in Russian, focuses on regional and military studies, as well as advanced Russian and Ukrainian language instruction.

During the last three years, FAO trainees have completed internships as army attaches and their assistants in most of the NIS. Their service has been so successful that Marshall Center continues to receive additional requests for FAO inter-
Balancing the ICT Experience

By CPT Ted Bowling and
MAJ Frank Mastovito

The Foreign Area Officer In-Country Training (ICT) program is a critical phase in the development of our Foreign Area Officers. ICT complements a graduate school and foreign language training system designed to create regional experts, capable of serving in critical assignments in a variety of environments requiring complex international skills, knowledge, and experience. The FAO may be the only officer on a CINC staff with first-hand knowledge of relatively obscure trouble spots within a given region. Achieving such a high level of broad professional competence is only possible if one takes full advantage of both advanced civil schooling and ICT as they compliment one another. We note however, that too often FAOs are leaving ICT, as “one-country experts”, not having had the opportunity to take advantage of the program’s regional aspects.

ICT is a selfish time in the professional life of an FAO. It has to be that way. FAOs are not in-country to be part of anyone’s engagement plan, but rather to grow professionally, focusing upon the “sacred seven” ICT objectives: language proficiency, knowledge of host-country and regional militaries, geographical, political and economic orientation, and developing interpersonal skills and contact. Only through meeting these objectives can we ensure that the broader goals of the three-phase FAO training program are achieved. If the ICT program is symbiotic with an engagement plan, everyone wins. However, in some countries, we may be “robbing Peter to pay Paul”. ICT participants in one year programs who are attending twelve month schools, have virtually no travel opportunities. Should school attendance take precedence over travel?

Attendance of a host-country military school is very important for the FAO. At least four of the “sacred seven” objectives are accomplished through participation. The immersion in an academic environment forces the FAO to sink or swim linguistically. Additionally, one acquires a profound military vocabulary which is only available in such an environment. Schooling also gives the FAO the types of cultural understanding and inter-personal skills which could not be achieved elsewhere. The school environment allows for a very didactic approach to the national security issues of a country and thus provides great insight into the national psyche. Regional concerns may also be discussed in detail.

What is school not? First of all, it is not a place to get an in-depth understanding of a country’s military capabilities. As is sometimes the case in our own Army, what happens in the class room and what happens in the unit environment are often distinct. Many foreign militaries maintain a strict “protocol en-vironment” in their schools. The purpose of the school is not to teach, but rather to establish orders of merit which are then critical to assignments and promotion. Whether a school of infantry teaches chemistry or small unit tactics is really immaterial in the sense that either provides a means to evaluate and establish an order of merit. This means that the material that is used to evaluate a student may or may not reflect the host-country military’s operational reality. Even if instruction is realistic, most countries in which ICT is conducted use modified modified U.S. doctrine, limiting the FAO from learning much “new” information. What else is host-nation schooling not? It is not intended to be a MEL4 qualifier. School attendance during ICT rarely results in educational credit officially recognized by the U.S. Armed Forces, and those courses which are recognized, are part of an attendance selection process not connected with ICT.

Lastly, the importance of building personal relationships in the school environment should not be overestimated. Although the FAO will make contacts, any future benefit outside the development of interpersonal skills, rests upon the assumption that the officer will interact with that same country in a future assignment, which is not common. Furthermore it is of no immediate benefit, since FAOs participating in ICT are, by regulation, prohibited from participating in collection activities.

Travel during ICT is at least as important as military schooling, because it bears upon all seven ICT objectives. It is travel that provides professional confidence for a regional specialist. Perhaps even more important though, it provides context. We all know people who, after traveling outside the United States for the first time, reflect on how they finally “saw” America. For the FAO, the perspective that travel provides is not a luxury, it is essential; domestically and internationally. The generous allocation of funds for FAO travel by our Army’s leaders demonstrates their conviction that travel is an essential component of the ICT program. There is no substitution for being on the ground and getting first hand experience. Complimenting the travel experience are the excellent country-team briefings which most US Embassies provide with minimal coordination.

(Balancing Continued on page 7)
These briefings provide a very effective snapshot of current issues.

What then is the appropriate mix of regional travel and schooling? Any solution to this problem must be based upon the notion, previously defended in this journal, that ICT programs are independent, and that program requirements must not be dictated to FAO Coordinators in country. To the best of their ability, FAO Coordinators should seek military courses for the ICT participant that do not monopolize the entire ICT tour. Sometimes, this may mean attending an off-beat course rather than a primary professional development course. Based on the above assessment of what schooling does and does not accomplish for the FAO, the level of study is immaterial. If a course shorter than twelve months cannot be arranged, a “unit exchange” type experience might be appropriate. For example, one recent ICT participant who could not arrange schooling, conducted a series of extended host-country unit visits which were arguably more effective than classroom training. If an FAO Coordinator determines that twelve month courses are the only viable alternative, proponency should consider tour extensions of three to six months to facilitate regional travel. Of course, many 12 month courses offer several week-long breaks and/or periods in which foreign students are not required to attend classes. However, while the frequency and length of these breaks may provide an opportunity to travel domestically, they are normally not adequate for effective international travel. The “whirlwind” multi-country, one week tours attempted by ICT participants under these circumstances may be better than nothing, but they arguably limit the objectives of the travel program.

Every FAO that leaves ICT without regional confidence and context gained from first-hand travel experience, represents a failure for all involved, most critically, the FAO in question. As FAOs, we are all in the business of becoming regional experts; not single-country specialists. Foreign military school attendance plays an important role for each of us, but it must not be allowed to eclipse the broader objectives of a great program.

Captain Bowling is a 48B currently completing ICT in Caracas Venezuela. Captain Bowling will be earning his MA in Latin American Studies at the University of Alabama. As a participant in the ICT program, CPT Bowling traveled frequently and graduated from the Field Artillery Officer Advanced Course of The Venezuelan Army.

MAJ Mastrovito currently serves as the Assistant Army Attaché in Caracas. MAJ Mastrovito completed ICT in Spain where he attended the Combined Arms Training Course in Zaragoza. Prior to his current assignment he served with ODCSINT as a Western European Desk Officer.

On 1 August, the once mighty Black Sea Fleet, which was founded 302 years ago, celebrated Russian Navy Day. With overflights by helicopters and strike aircraft, a massive procession of cruisers and frigates thundered out salutes for guests assembled in Sevastopol, before heading out to sea for high-speed maneuvers. The same day, Ukraine’s fledgling navy celebrated its second birthday. Undoubtedly, a naval tradition takes time to develop. “But without any question, our main problem is shortage of funding,” Nikolai Savchenko, Ukraine Black Sea Naval Forces spokesman, told RFE/RL. “The government simply does not have the resources to support even a minimum of operations.” Which was why on Ukrainian Navy Day none of Ukraine’s 44 major combat vessels budged from

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The Armed Forces in the New Indonesia

by Colonel (Retired) John B. Haseman

Indonesia's Armed Forces recently celebrated their 53rd anniversary, but in vastly different circumstances than one year ago. Six months after the forced resignation of President Soeharto in May 1998, Indonesia is in political, economic, and social turmoil. Its armed forces establishment remains an important leadership element for the country, but its reputation has sunk to a very low level of esteem.

In addition to its missions of national defense and maintenance of domestic stability, Indonesia's armed forces (known by the acronym ABRI) must now regain the respect of the people, lost by revelations of major human rights violations. ABRI has important missions to perform at an important turning point in the nation's history, and its senior officers, speaking privately as well as in public, show a determination to respond to a new set of political and economic circumstances.

Maintaining National Defense and Internal Stability

The primary responsibility of ABRI, like any nation's armed forces establishment, is to counter any threat, foreign or domestic. Indonesia is fortunate in that it does not confront a significant external threat. ABRI's leaders have always identified internal instability as the country's greatest security problem.

Indonesia is an inherently centrifugal country. With its fragmented geography of more than 17,000 islands, more than 300 separate ethnic and linguistic groups, religious diversity, and a glaring imbalance in economic and social levels, the nation needs a strong central government.

At a time in which economic chaos has contributed to more than two years of unrest and violence, maintenance of internal stability is even more crucial. This means both physical security -- the maintenance of law and order and resolution or suppression of violence when it occurs -- as well as political stability.

The social pressures caused by economic depression will cause repeated, sporadic, and widespread outbreaks of violence in Indonesia. Food riots have broken out all over the archipelago and will continue to be a major security problem. President Habibie and ABRI Commander-in-Chief General Wiranto and have both stressed that the security forces will crack down hard against such violence.

ABRI's contribution to the nation's political stability is its steady support for the interim term in office of President B.J. Habibie. The relationship between Mr. Habibie and the military establishment in the past was not close. The military viewed him as an erratic wasteful spender of uncounted billions of rupiah, and resented his dominance of the military procurement system and close tie to then-president Soeharto.

Despite those differences, the senior ABRI leadership is committed to President Habibie as the country's constitutional leader and to the reform process the president has set in motion. As one senior officer said privately, "We have only one president at a time and we will support him."

ABRI's own political stability is firm. General Wiranto repaired the most destabilizing fracture when he the removed controversial and ambitious Lieutenant General Prabowo from command of the country's largest military organization; Prabowo was later forced into retirement by his admitted involvement in the kidnapping of anti-government activists. Prabowo's closest loyalists have been sidelined to powerless staff positions.

Economic Recovery

ABRI's leadership is intently aware of the need for stability to restore economic viability and attract the return of outside investment to the country. Military leaders have directed the verbal focus of their commitment to the most restless of the country's population -- the urban poor, and student activists.

ABRI feels that it has a special relationship with the students even though it is often criticized by them. ABRI's greatest fear is that the student movement will spin out of control and force a confrontation with security forces that could result in heavy casualties. It is for this reason that ABRI has so strongly counseled the students to show patience as the country tackles economic and political reform.

ABRI has a professional interest in returning the country's economy to a sound footing. Throughout much of the Soeharto era the military had a low budget priority, which meant few purchases of modern equipment and weapons systems as well as low salaries for the armed forces. These problems have worsened in the economic downturn. Not only are new purchases unlikely now, the armed forces' extensive off-budget business network suffers from the same problems as private industry. Reduced income from ABRI's commercial enterprises has meant reduced social welfare funds for military families. Readiness suffers from the lack of funds for training and logistics.

As in other armed forces in the region, ABRI will be forced to cancel bilateral exercises with regional neighbors, resulting in reduced communication among senior military leaders in the region. It is an ideal time for outside powers such as the United States and Australia to step forward with additional training and education assistance. Not only will it meet their own strategic interests in the region by buttressing ABRI's defensive capability, it will demonstrate trust and friendship toward ABRI as it struggles to throw off the legacy of 30 years under the control of a autocratic strongman.

Political Reform

ABRI's senior officers have been in the forefront of political reform in Indonesia for many years. In many cases their careers were sidetracked because they were perceived as giving less than full allegiance to Soeharto and the military leaders of that time. For a variety of reasons including personal and professional differences with the rising stars of the Soeharto period, they were shuttled to powerless assignments and denied promo-
Now many of these officers have gained senior positions commensurate with their professional abilities, intellectual sophistication and maturity, and reformist attitude. ABRI’s current leadership resented the use of the armed forces as a political tool by the Soeharto regime. They cite frequent examples of misuse of the armed forces for political purposes. These include the use of the territorial structure to collect information on political opponents and subsequent use of the intelligence structure to persecute opposition.

In an Armed Forces Day speech the armed forces commander-in-chief conceded that ABRI had been a political tool of Soeharto for 30 years, and pledged to change. The military recognizes that its role in Indonesian society has changed, perhaps forever, by the country’s rapid move toward openness and democracy.

The “dwi-fungsi” (dual function) doctrine of the armed forces reflects ABRI’s history as a popular army forged in the fight for independence. That struggle blurred the distinction between civilian and military, as much of the populace supported the guerrilla fight against the Dutch.

Indonesia’s military doctrine still stresses guerrilla warfare and low-intensity conflict, unlike western armed forces for which such combat is a sideline to doctrines of conventional warfare. The Indonesian territorial structure, which parallels civilian government down to the level of a non-commissioned officer for every village, is based on the army’s guerrilla warfare background, in which intimate knowledge of the terrain, population, and resources was vital. There is a firm belief that this doctrine remains valid today.

Senior military officers feel that ABRI has a legitimate role to play in the country’s socio-political development in the post-Soeharto era. They concede that many aspects of the controversial dwi-fungsi system must change. For example, they have said that the number of military officers in parliament and in the civil government structure will decline.

Another change will be the removal of military support for the government political party, Golkar. In the past Golkar enjoyed a full commitment of ABRI rhetoric, manpower, and intelligence support. This will end. ABRI will withdraw from institutional involvement in party politics. And while ABRI will fully support the institution of the presidency and its incumbent, whoever it may be, it is most likely that its involvement in future elections will be limited to providing security for all political parties and to the electoral process itself. Senior active and retired officers have said privately that many of them will give their support across the spectrum of political parties; some retired officers have already been appointed to the governing boards of opposition political parties.

The Search for Respect and Prestige

Overarching all of ABRI’s priorities is the need to regain public respect. The well-publicized series of revelations of atrocities allegedly committed in the past has stunned the rank and file of the armed forces just as it has outraged the public at large.

The military leadership is in a quandary. They know it is essential to investigate crimes against civilians in Aceh and elsewhere. They feel it is essential that those investigations be transparent and perceived to be fair and complete. General Wiranto has made a plea to the nation to allow the armed forces to conduct its investigations in an orderly fashion, and has pledged to cooperate with parallel government inquiries.

There are major difficulties involved in this aspect of military reform. General Wiranto has made the very valid point that military operations such as those against separatists in Aceh, Irian Jaya, and East Timor were authorized by the legitimate government of that time, by legal orders of that time, and under procedures demanded by the leadership of that time. It is neither fair nor appropriate now to judge the actions of units and individuals then, by the new rules in effect today. But he has also agreed that violations of ABRI’s orders and procedures in effect at the time of those human rights abuses are grounds for punishment.

The armed forces played the key role in the removal of Soeharto from the presidency. General Wiranto is widely praised for his insistence on constitutional change. When the moment of crisis came the armed forces supported the will of the people and the dictates of the constitution rather than the will of the man who was president. ABRI’s leaders effected the constitutional removal of the world’s second-longest-serving strongman without taking up arms against the people.

ABRI remains the single most influential and powerful
THE ANDEAN RIDGE: The Perfect Training Lab for a Latin American FAO  By Colonel Bill Spracher, Latin American FAO

As hot spots around the world increasingly compete for the attention of U.S. newsmakers and the commitment of scarce defense resources, the comparatively tranquil region of Latin America usually is relegated to a back seat. Yet, maintaining alliances with the U.S.’s hemispheric partners, many of which are striving to hold together fragile democracies, is a difficult challenge that tends to go unnoticed in the narrowly focused American lens, and Latin America Foreign Area Officers are at the forefront of that effort. Within the hemisphere, the most problematic region in recent years has tended to be the so-called “Andean Ridge,” consisting of the countries of Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia, all linked by the immense Andes mountain chain.

Personally speaking from the viewpoint of an attaché recently departed from that system, I have served tours in two of these Andean countries and have visited the others on several occasions. To one degree or another, virtually all of the Andean Ridge nations are suffering from one or more of the multifaceted threats of drug trafficking, insurgency, paramilitary violence, kidnapping, and common crime. Spillover effects on neighbors are growing, as are expectations of U.S. government (USG) capacity to assist in reversing the negative trends. LATAM FAO’s (48B specialty, within the Army) are challenged throughout the region to ply their trade and maintain tight relations with host nation militaries, while at the same time having to be careful not to overstep the bounds of current USG policy regarding the sort of assistance that is authorized.

The term “lab” is used in the title somewhat facetiously, since drug trafficking is what pops into most people’s minds whenever the Andean Ridge is mentioned. It is true that it is difficult to discuss the other problems in the region, be they guerrillas, political instability, or economic viability, without taking into consideration the narcotics factor. In a way, that is why the region is so fascinating to follow. The problems of individual countries cannot be studied in isolation since they impact on their neighbors; most of the threats are truly multinational in nature and do not respect national boundaries. This is one region of the world in which the traditional focus of a FAO in political-military issues and security assistance melds extremely well with the role played by intelligence, and especially counterdrug intelligence. I have always felt that being both a FAO and an MI officer was a terrific combination, though there are a few observers who argue that intelligence, representational duties, and security assistance should not be mixed in any way. My personal experience in Peru as the Army Attaché and in Colombia as the Defense and Army Attaché during extremely difficult periods solidified my admittedly positive opinion. There is probably no better “lab” in the world than the Andean Ridge for a FAO trainee to benefit from the crosswalk of his/her area expertise and the employment of intelligence skills, with an excellent chance to apply some crisis management tools along the way.

Colombia and Peru are two neighboring countries in which the tasks of an intelligence officer and a FAO come together quite nicely. They are also high-priority, high-threat countries in which a FAO can work security assistance with a heavy dose of counternarcotics support mixed into the equation. Some of the offices in which I worked alongside outstanding FAO’s (or young officers aspiring to be FAO’s) included the DAO, the MILGP (with its Tactical Analysis Team or TAT; Military Information Support Team or MIST; and Joint Planning and Assis-

(Andean Ridge, Continued on page 11)
...tance Teams or JPAT, among other elements); and even the Political/Economic Section at the Embassy. For two years running cadets from the U.S. Military Academy served as embassy interns under the daily tutelage of that section’s Political/Military Officer but under the overall control of the DATT. In addition, Army FAO’s in such positions were exposed to “jointness” through their collaboration with Marine, Air Force, and Army Special Operations elements. Some of these TDYers worked at ground-based radar sites as part of the counterdrug effort while some others were involved in Joint and Combined Exercises for Training (JCETs), working shoulder-to-shoulder with their allies in a real-world conflict training environment.

Even non-DOD uniformed personnel got into the act, creating not only a joint collaborative effort but also an inter-agency one. DAO Bogota was the first such office anywhere in the world to have assigned an accredited Coast Guard Attaché (COGATT), and here again this was due to the heavy counternarcotics/law enforcement nature of his duties. In more recent years, a COGATT position was established in Venezuela, another in Mexico, and a USCG Liaison Officer position (not under the DAO) in Panama. Being dually accredited as Police Attaché, the COGATT in Colombia is one of the linchpins for fostering armed forces/police cooperation in the counterdrug effort, a crucial U.S. policy objective and criterion for receiving additional security assistance.

Venezuela is the other South American nation having almost as long and uninterrupted a democratic tradition as Colombia. Nevertheless, this country is suffering spillover effects from Colombia, and the government in Bogota has been by and large unsuccessful in convincing its counterpart in Caracas that it can control its borders. Panama has experienced similar effects. Consequently, FAO’s in Colombia have been in close contact with their own brethren in neighboring countries trying to get a handle on regional instability. FAO’s in Colombia insist routinely collaborate with Joint Interagency Task Forces East, West and South (the JIATFs); DEA; CIA; ONDCP (the Drug Czar’s Office); and the State Department’s Narcotics Affairs Sections (NASs). High-level visitors within the past couple of years have included such key officials as the DCI, the Drug Czar, DEA Director, the FBI Director, the DIA Director, the SOUTHCOM CINC, and the Chairman of the Inter-American Defense Board, not to mention a steady stream of Congressmen and their staffers. FAO’s really earn their pay whenever such an official makes a visit at a critical time and wants to get an unvarnished appraisal of what is going on within the region.

Colombia has received a lot of high-level attention of late, in part because it seems to be in more dire straits than its neighbors, but also because U.S. – Colombian relations have always been so inextricably linked. What happens in Colombia is often viewed by the region as a bellwether of what might occur in the other countries in the future. Colombia takes on added importance when one considers that it is the fourth largest Latin American nation in terms of population and the fifth largest in terms of land area (while its southern Andean neighbor, Peru, is fifth and fourth respectively in those categories). Bolivia is much smaller and poorer, but it to has garnered considerable attention over the years as one of the principal coca-growing countries of the world. Both Bolivia and Peru have now been surpassed by Colombia on that unenviable score (at least in terms of acreage under cultivation if not in actual yield). Likewise, both Bolivia and Peru have had much more success in establishing alternative development programs and getting control of the security situation in their countryside. Colombia is truly a country in crisis, though it has some success in eradication and aerial interdiction efforts. That country is producing a great deal of concern in Washington (not to mention in Miami at SOUTHCOM Headquarters), since the amounts of both cocaine and heroin ending up on the streets of the U.S. are now at record levels.

Preoccupation over the human rights situation in Colombia is also high on the agenda of U.S. lawmakers and certain NGO’s.

Not far to the south, the other long-standing Andean problem that still engenders much interest in Washington is the border dispute between Peru and Ecuador. [EDITOR’S NOTE: In the time since this article was written, the two countries in question have settled the border dispute, by treaty and the last FAO is probably now serving in MOMEP mentioned below]. The U.S. as one of the original treaty’s guarantor nations has been an active participant in the MOMEP peacekeeping force, which has proven to be another excellent training ground for LATAM FAO’s looking for action. Without a doubt, a number of these issues will be discussed in the coming months in Cartagena, a popular tourist attraction and port city on the Caribbean coast of Colombia.
which will be the site of the third Defense Ministerials of the Americas (DMA).

Also this year in Bolivia is tentatively planned the first-ever in-country seminar of the seminal Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies of the U.S. National Defense University. This institution was founded in 1973 as a product of the DMA process and with the stimulus of former Secretary of Defense Perry. The Center was designed to foster mutual understanding and to provide a forum for sharing ideas among Latin Americans involved in the defense sector, the majority of its fellows being civilians, regarding the principles of defense management and resource planning. Several FAO’s have been involved in this exciting development, either from the faculty end in Washington or from the participating countries’ end by helping to recruit and vet potential fellows in-country. The nearby and decidedly more military Inter-American Defense College is another training “lab” where 48B’s over the years have demonstrated their regional skills either as advisors or students (receiving full SSC credit even though the IADC, as part of the IADB, is categorized as a foreign educational institution).

Homing in on the Andean country with which I have the longest and most recent connection, Colombia has proven to be an intriguing, though at times frustrating, place for FAO’s to live and work. Within DAO and a large embassy milieu, there were two permanent card-carrying 48B attaches with additional temporary help showing up from time to time, not to mention other FAO’s working in the mission as part of the MILGP. The AARMA in DAO was able to focus on the tactical level, quickly becoming the resident expert on ground order of battle, guerrilla strengths and weaknesses, and the associated variables of the paramilitaries and the narcotraffickers. This allowed the DATT to concentrate on the national-level political-military hierarchy, civil-military relations, and the strategic commitment to a multinational, regional collaborative effort in the counternarcotics field.

The DAO has also managed FAO trainees while they were involved in their in-country training and regional orientation travel. Unfortunately, the last such young officer to serve in Bogota suffered the same fate many other FAO’s have experienced in recent years; he was passed over for promotion to major while in the midst of his training course with the host nation. It is always difficult trying to explain to foreign officials how a bright young officer who is professional enough to be a successful company commander and bright enough to be selected as a FAO cannot make the cut to field grade officer. This is a U.S. Army personnel malady that needs to receive some high-level attention soon if U.S. credibility with host nations and Army leadership credibility with its own young officers are not to be eroded further. In the interim, host nation officials voice their disappointment with the U.S. Army and indirectly hint that this is just one more example of U.S. policy and practice lacking consistency.

(Ukrainian Navy, Continued from page 7)

their berths. Its 10,000 uniformed personnel and 10,000 civilians mostly in shore-side installations were paid in July on time, but June paychecks remain outstanding. Aside from NATO-funded maneuvers, most Ukrainian vessels have not moved from dock this year.

“Jane’s Navy International” said only a part of the Ukrainian Navy—44 fighting ships, 80 auxiliary vessels, and 60 helicopters and airplanes—is battle-ready. But it also said that even this is aimed more at showing the flag than serving military purposes.

The Ukrainian naval command deploys maritime aviation, coastal rocket and artillery troops, marines, special assault units, and logistic support troops. Most are at cadre strength, with little more than personnel and rusting equipment to contribute to national maritime combat-readiness. Five hundred small vessels survive on the “patronage” of chronically cash-strapped riverside and seaside municipalities. Only two Ukrainian ships, the “Slavutych” and the escort ship “Hetman Sahaidachny,” have regularly sailed the Black Sea this year.

(Ukrainian Navy, Continued on page 14)
Despite the advances in medical technologies in the West, it is extremely difficult to apply and/or deliver these technologies to conflict zones under the auspices of the UN peacekeeping mission. The most difficult challenge is the delivery by UN medical personnel of appropriate technology which is easily transferable and can be operated by trained professionals. Such transference involves overcoming political, religious, ethnic, cultural and bureaucratic obstacles.

The UN Observer Mission in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, despite excellent military leadership, experienced disastrous medical consequences due to political maneuvering, the lack of quality of key personnel, and clearly defined responsibilities. Local misunderstanding of mission purposes led to unrealistic expectations of available medicine and equipment.

Nevertheless, the UN observer mission in Georgia helped avert a full scale armed conflict. Especially in medical emergencies and other life threatening situations, mission personnel would pull together and overcome personal, political and cultural differences in order to prevent loss of human life.

Due to my experience in dealing with the Former Soviet Union, I was selected to be a US Navy representative to the United Nations Military Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). UNOMIG's mission was to observe, monitor and prevent an armed conflict between the Georgian government headed by the former Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, Edward Shevernadze, and the break away Republic of Abkhazia. As a consequence of the collapse of the Soviet Union and a proclamation of the Georgian independence, the conflict erupted in August, 1992. The resulting unrest and the killings continue to this date despite the presence of the international military observers and the Russian military peacekeepers. This conflict covered a vast area along the shore of the Black Sea and the Caucasus Mountains involving a variety of different nationalities that lived in that area. The initial outbreak of hostilities produced a 250,000 refugee population consisting mostly of Georgians, Mingrelians, Russians, Armenians, Greeks and Jews. A majority of refugees are concentrated on the Georgian side, living in make-shift refugee camps. The number of killed and injured on both sides varies depending on the source. It is, however, very clear that this once popular Soviet resort and prosperous farming community is in total ruins.

Over the past four years, the infrastructure of the self-proclaimed Republic of Abkhazia has been in total devastation, partially due to the economic blockade imposed upon them by the Russians. Most of the Abkhazian territory is scorched and its population lacks the most basic necessities. The collapse of the Soviet Union, combined with a lack of a functional economy, deep rooted ethnic rivalry, civil and territorial wars, and a strategically important location (Caspian Sea oil reservoir) has brought unrest and instability to the neighboring regions in the Caucasuses: Dagestan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Ingushatia, Chechnia, and Ossetia.

To resolve the conflict, the United Nations Security Council deployed an international-UNOMIG contingency (unarmed) and a Coalition of Independent States-Peace Keeping Forces (CIS PKF) consisting solely of Russian troops (armed) to the area to maintain law and order until a peaceful settlement could be reached. Unfortunately, the UN Security Council’s good intentions were very difficult to enforce. Difficulties arose because the UNOMIG and the CIS PKF lacked a clear understanding of their responsibilities, of the local culture, of a knowledge of the deeply rooted historical reasons that led to the conflict, of the national interests of the countries involved in settling the conflict, and of the unfriendly terrain.

The UNOMIG includes several components. It reports to the UN HQ in New York via the representative of the UN Secretary General who resides in Georgia’s capital, Tbilisi. UNOMIGs military HQ is located in Abkhazia’s capital, Sukhumi. The civilian support HQ operates out of the former KGB Black Sea resort compound located in the town of Pitsunda near the Russian border. Two UNOMIG Sector HQs are in the bordering towns, one on each side of the Cease Fire Line (CFL). Also, two Team Bases are located on each side, reporting directly to their respective sector HQ. The distances between the military contingencies (Georgian Peacekeeping, Continued on page 15)
What has been done to many FAO’s in recent years, not just in Latin America but in other regions as well, sends the wrong signal to our allies who wish they had even a fraction of the resources and the talented young officers to establish their own cadre of regional specialists. Since the individual mentioned above departed Colombia for civilian life, no more FAO trainees have been assigned to that country, allegedly because of the other countries have passed through Colombia and benefited, if only for a short while, from exposure to this fertile training ground, a veritable laboratory for present and future soldier-statesmen.

In conclusion, young FAO’s looking for demanding career opportunities are encouraged to seek out those who have served in the Andean Ridge and pick their brains. Meanwhile, aspirants should focus hard on learning the languages, diverse cultures, and politics of these disparate nations, in addition to studying their current affairs in order to gain an appreciation for the complex dynamics, both international and domestic, that make the Andean Ridge such an intriguing test-bed for the dedicated LATAM FAO.

COL Spracher, a 48B/MI Officer, has returned from back-to-back attaché tours in South America (1994-98) and is currently serving as Military Professor and Executive Officer, Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, NDU.
patrolling the area of responsibility (AOR) and the civilian UN support base is enormous. Communications between the civilian and military UNOMIG personnel were troubling because of the broken down infrastructure, the non-existence of safe roads, isolated hostile territories and poorly functioning equipment.

The UNOMIG consisted of 124 officers from 22 different countries and belonging, at different levels, to six religious groups. Linguistic and cultural differences combined with a variance in the military and civilian mentalities and a strange and hostile territory made mutual understanding of the mission somewhat arduous. Consequently, even when the equipment functioned properly and the parties were in the right place, it was still likely that the parties did not sufficiently understand the English language, creating a perfect environment for Murphy's Law to prosper. Some of the officers and the civilian employees came to the Mission not because of their military and/or linguistic achievements, but because they are "cousins" of some "Minister of Ideological Induction" in their respective country. Furthermore, in some cases, the pay and the living conditions for some of the UN employees mentioned above were much better and safer in Georgia then in their own country.

The military component of the UNOMIG consisted of two major groups. The officers from the NATO countries served for six months, mostly in key positions. The rest served for one year and it was difficult for them to secure postings in the leadership positions. Once again, it was not necessarily the officers' talents and/or experiences that dictated the assignment at the UNOMIG, but rather political intrigues and pressures from the participating countries, thus forcing the Chief Military Observer (CMO) to appoint "westerners" to leadership roles. Internally, this created animosities among the UN officers and civilian personnel.

The UNOMIG civilian staff consisted of career UN employees, mission specific employees hired by the UN specifically for this mission, and local hires. The UNOMIG had a well trained and equipped German Medical Team, consisting of two medical officers and four medics. One of the doctors operated out of the Sukhumi HQ and the other one out of the Sector HQ on the Abkhazian side. There were two well-equipped ambulances, but because of the vast AOR and mountainous terrain, the ambulances were not always capable of performing their intended mission. The most appropriate vehicle for medical assistance at this mission would have been a helicopter. All parties agreed that the helicopter is a necessity in the mission.

Unfortunately, once again due to bureaucracy and politics, the mission remains without a helicopter to this day, and therefore, without proper medivac capabilities for medical emergencies.

The Russians have a helicopter available at their base. However, when a soldier was seriously wounded by a mine in a mountainous area and needed to be evacuated by helicopter, the Russian pilots were found to be so inebriated that they could not even walk out of their quarters and navigate themselves to their own helicopter on the ground. UNOMIG officers, referred to as United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs), had to put the wounded soldier on the hood of their vehicle and drive for six hours through the mountain passes until they were able to reach a local hospital. In another incident, the Russian Force Commander, a Major General in command of all the CIS PKF, was seriously injured in a car accident. Once again the helicopter crew could not medivac him to the military hospital in Russia. This time, the Russians did not have any fuel to operate their helicopter. As a result, the UNOMIG ambulance and its German crew had to transport the General to Russia. Fortunately, this time the trip was only four hours long. Presently, the UN has contracted a Ukrainian helicopter and its crew to be deployed to the area. However, this most needed asset has been sitting in Russia for several months awaiting country clearance and proper visas, among other things, before it can be operational in Georgia/Abkhazia. It is unfortunate, but somewhat understandable that a helicopter contract between the UN and the Ukrainian government would be a very political issue. However, UNOMIG had just as much trouble getting first aid kits for their patrol vehicles. At one point, one of the more aggressive and dedicated German doctors demanded an adequate supply of the First Aid Kit Boxes for the UN patrol vehicles. After six months of his perseverance and reasoning, the Mission received the long awaited First Aid Kit Boxes. Correct, that is exactly what they were, First Aid Kit Boxes --just boxes, nothing inside of them.

The German medical crew rotated medical officers from the former East German Armed Forces and the former West German military. The West German doctors were highly trained professionals who did everything by the book, and were very much aware of the budget constraints, as well as the potential legal problems of treating the locals. The former East German medics, on the other hand, were not as friendly or neat as their new countrymen. They had difficulty understanding that there was a limit to the medical supplies when it was needed for a patient, even if the patient was a local bandit. After all, in their eyes the UN has plenty of items to waste, and in certain way it did.

(Continued on page 16)
The former East German medics would not act in a friendly manner when treating the local population; in fact, they were outright rude. On the other hand, they did not make polite excuses why they could not help local people with their health problems.

When UNOMIG personnel brought a local to the Russian field hospital, the Russians always treated them, and in most cases they would do an outstanding job by improvising for some of the essential medical supplies. Most of the Russian physicians had experience in the Afghanistan war. Once, a local nine year-old boy picked up a flair which was connected to a trip-wire. Naturally, the flair exploded in his hand, ripping off his fingers and palm. UNMOs took the boy to the Russian military hospital where the Russian surgeon amputated the boys hand. All of the boy’s arm functions remained in tact, with almost no damage to his arm’s skeletal/muscular structure. Some of the western physicians examined the boy several months later and concluded that the surgery was skillfully performed despite the field conditions.

Unfortunately, humanitarian agencies were functioning less than effectively. The country had more leg prosthesis in stock than the population of the country in general. The local population would use the leg and foot prosthesis for building material. Unfortunately, there was not even a single artificial hand prosthesis to be found anywhere in the country and no means for getting one.

Some of the humanitarian aid agencies had various problems of their own. For example, they were not eager to deliver their goods and/or services to the areas of potential danger. Instead, they would contract local “actively strong” and ambitious entrepreneurs to do that job. As a result, the black market thrived and the people in need of real help were left without much hope. It was obvious that the local population was frustrated by observing the humanitarian agencies present in their towns, because the goods they delivered to the agencies were on the black market in the cities at prices beyond their reach. Unfortunately, most of the people in desperate need of help were usually very old or very young. Many children appeared to be suffering from malnutrition. The animal stock did not appear healthy at all. However, the vegetation, particularly fruits, grew everywhere, hence the vitamin supplementation should have been simple. The negative effects were most likely related to poor hygiene and parasite infestations of both humans and animals, contrary to the popular belief in the West that poor diets were due to a lack of food staples. So, instead of educating proper infant/child nutrition intake and basic hygiene tectonics, these same agencies would deliver high-tech medical equipment to the local hospital. Meanwhile, this hospital would not have essential things such as water, surgical gloves, cleaning/disinfecting material and basic drugs.

Some of the material and equipment used in the hospitals dates back to WW1. Open top IVs, leaches, fifty year-old needles and syringes are in use at these hospitals. Often bandages are washed and used again, sometimes even on a different patient. One of the hospitals, frequently visited by the UNOMIG personnel to transport a patient from the AOR, was partially a refugee camp. The hospital lawn was adopted as feeding grounds for pigs and chickens. The windows in the surgery suite were open for lighting and ventilation. The family of the patient undergoing surgery were present in the surgery suit during the surgery, in case the surgeon needed something to be purchased on the black market, and later to witness that it was put to use on that patient. A covered body of a deceased human was laying on the floor of the surgery suit, probably waiting to be transported to the morgue. In one instance the surgeon could not get out of the surgery suite because a two hundred pound pig was leaning against the door on the other side.

The physicians and the nurses at the hospital are getting paid around $25 per month and, therefore, are forced to treat only patients who can pay them money or trade goods like food or services for treatment. In one instance, a humanitarian agency operating under the UN umbrella donated two kidney-dialysis machines to one of the hospitals. The administrators and the practitioners of this hospital certainly know what these machines are intended for. Unfortunately, they have no means for correctly using them. For similar reasons, they would not be able to sell this high-tech medical equipment on the black market.
The population of the region suffers from a high rate of drug abuse. Particularly this problem affects the younger male population. The cemeteries are filled with men in their late teens and early twenties. Most of them did not die during the heavy fighting, but rather shortly after. These young men usually never had a chance to finish secondary school. Most of them had to quit their studies and go out to fight in the war. After the heaviest fighting was over, the ones that survived the war most likely went back to their burned out villages. Unfortunately, most of the former soldiers are no longer interested in their education or occupying themselves with productive labor. No social state is available to take care of its veterans. However, there is no shortage of war-scored and overly aggressive angry young men with no hope for the future. Meanwhile, for the most part of the year the area is very fertile and produces an abundance of fruits and vegetables, as well as all kinds of other vegetation. The production and the consumption of drugs becomes the main occupation for many of the young men in the region. As a consequence, this type of lifestyle leads to their demise due to overdose or a shoot-out.

Keeping in mind the above-mentioned problem and the availability of free high-tech medical equipment donated to the regional hospital by the "rich West", the following occurs: hospital administrators with the help of local "scientists" alter the function of the kidney-dialysis machine by filling it up with something that looks like an activated charcoal. Then this new "invention" is marketed as a detoxification apparatus. According to the medical "professionals" operating the altered kidney-dialysis machine, the desire to use drugs and/or alcohol ceases to exist after three blood transfusions, but only if it is performed by them on the high-tech Western machinery, and only after their "scientific" adjustments. Unfortunately, no study nor any records of the success rate of the treatment is available for public scrutiny. Also, the price of such treatment is highly "classified" and the payment plan is difficult to understand.

The major threats to the UNOMIG personnel were mine warfare, abductions and ordinary banditry. The Russian troops were armed and could protect the UNOMIG from being taken hostage or being looted during the patrols. Unfortunately, the Russians were not considered impartial in this conflict and quite often were targeted by the different local fighting formations. Therefore, the UNOMIG did not conduct joint patrols with the Russians who were supposed to provide protection for UNOMIG. This left UNOMIG as open prey to the profusion of criminal groups in the area, especially, if the UNOMIG was not familiar with the local culture, terrain and did not speak Russian. Nevertheless, it was still safer to conduct patrols without Russian escort. The banditry was boundless and if local bandits spotted disoriented and confused UNOMIG, they would most likely rob them of everything of any remote value. An UNMO, who was proudly serving the United Nations very far from his home-country, was looted of his watch and wallet during one of the patrols. According to this officer, he was stationary inside of the UN vehicle at a crossroad, when a local man came up to him and pointed with his right index finger to his left wrist. The UNMO did not speak Russian and understood it as an attempt to rob...
him of his Seiko watch. He did not feel the necessity to escalate the situation and expose himself to further unnecessary danger, and therefore, handed over his watch along with his wallet. The looter took the goods, thanked the officer and left. Surprisingly, the local authorities did not display any enthusiasm to investigate this incident. Unfortunately, other incidents were not so humorous. A gang of local thieves broke into an American accommodation and stole over $3,000.00 worth of equipment and personal belongings. Also, the bandits abducted an American officer and threatened to kill him. Fortunately, because of the Force Protection Training that all Americans receive before deployment, coupled with the personal stamina of this officer and knowledge of the Russian language, this officer was able to come out of this ordeal with just a few bruises.

The deadliest threat to the UNMOs was the constant escalation of mine warfare. Some of the mines were left from the fighting and some were continuously planted on a daily bases. Maps were never made of the mine fields and mines were planted by both sides indiscriminately. Four years ago, most of the mines planted were pressure release anti-personnel and anti-tank mines. Many of them dated back to WW II production. One UNOMIG UNMO was killed when his vehicle struck an anti-tank land mine during a patrol. After this unfortunate incident, UNOMIG obtained previously used South African Anti-Mine vehicles called MAMBAs. These vehicles were not appropriate for a mountainous terrain, but did provide good anti-mine and small arms protection for the UNMOs. Nevertheless, several UNMOs and local interpreters working for the UNOMIG were injured due to different mine incidents. The mine warfare progressed in sophistication and lethality as the conflict progressed. Fighting groups applied deadlier and more accurate techniques. Several times, remote control mines such as MON-50 and MON-100 were deployed against local authorities and the civilian population. Recently, radio controlled mines were deployed against the CIS PKF. In one case, the chief of the local Abkhazian police force found a limpet naval mine with a timing mechanism attached to the bottom of his car. Fortunately, because of the grave road conditions, his car struck a pothole causing the timing mechanism of the mine to malfunction, hence disarming the mine.

The easiest way to plant a mine was to place it in one of the many potholes on the only major road in the area and preferably after the rain. The water would cover the mine which is hermetically sealed and not affected by water. Some of these potholes were unavoidable; therefore, this combination of
When I reflect back on the last eight months and my time in Argentina, I will remember a number of things. I surely will fondly remember the great officers and non-commissioned officers I worked with in the embassy, the highly dedicated Argentine, Venezuelan, El Salvadorian, Korean, Paraguayan, and Brazilian officers I served with in the Escuela de Guerra, and the rich experiences I had while living abroad. However, I believe the thing that will be most poignant in my memory will be the incredible travel experiences that I was fortunate enough to have. If one was to look at my life in 1998 they might think I was a businessman, a historian, or a diplomat. One might even assume that I had won the lottery or had a rich mother or father. But the reality is that because I am training to be a FAO I have had an unparalleled opportunity to travel and learn about the area in which I will soon be working. While all this travel sounds like great fun, and it is, it also requires a lot of hard work. The keys to successful travel are thorough preparation and attention to detail.

When I look at the ICT experience from a travel perspective, I would say that there are four distinct steps that lead to success: (1) long-range planning; (2) short-term preparation; (3) the travel, itself; and (4) post-travel clean-up. The following are some observations regarding traveling.

**Long-range Planning**

- Develop a solid travel plan as part of your ICT Program of Instruction (POI). While this takes a lot of time and work to balance your travel wants against the realities of the Service (to include budget, time available, and school requirements), a solid POI will certainly reduce the “wheel spinning” syndrome that many FAO’s experience during ICT.
- Budget sufficient time and money for each trip.

**Short-term Preparation**

- Research the areas you want to visit. There is a ton of information on the internet, at the embassy travel office, and of course from other FAO’s. Some of the things a FAO might want to see during a trip would include the U.S. Embassy, the capital and national centers of government, the economic center, and any host-nation military units available.
- Plan for the technical aspects of international travel. There are a number of things that have to be done when you are traveling abroad. Some of these things include:
  — Calling ahead to the target country to verbally clear the proposed travel dates with the local DAO. This should be done prior to the submission of your country clearance.
  — Obtaining country clearances (NLT 30 days prior to target travel dates).

*(ICT Travel, Continued on page 21)*
Board of Governors Election

On December 15, 1998 the polls closed on the Association's first Board of Governors election (recall that the original Board was appointed as the organization was started from scratch. The new Board will serve for the next three years, beginning in January 1999. While the votes are still being tallied, it is interesting to note a few facts about this election. First, 462 of the 887 eligible members voted. Considering that the election was held during the Christmas holiday period this was an excellent turnout. The initial review of the ballots revealed two other interesting things —

(1) a number of very well qualified candidates for the Board were written-in. While this illustrated the strength of the pool of potential candidates, it was at the same time unfortunate because the Association staff had hoped that these very candidates would have been nominated during the 9-month nomination period leading up to the election. The logic in nominating a worthy candidate was to ensure that if elected they would serve (something that could not be done with the write-ins); and

(2) a number of very good ideas were surfaced for changing the organization Charter and/or By-Laws to improve the election process the next time around. Among the suggestions was to offer the membership a list of candidates instead of a slate (most votes win), to set an upper limit to the number of governors on the board as well as the current lower limit, to earmark some board positions to specific representation — such as a reserve rep, four service reps, a junior officer rep, and a retiree rep, for example. These are great suggestions and we will act on them in the near future!

Results of the election were originally to be published in the December issue of the FAO Journal, but are still being counted and the results independently verified. The results will therefore appear on the FAOA Web Site in January and be published in the March issue of the Journal.

A Successful FAO Course Cocktail Party

Once again this year the Association sponsored a welcome cocktail party in honor of the new FAOs entering training through DLI/FLC. It was held in conjunction with the semi-annual FAO Course taught out at Monterey, CA., and had about 90 people in attendance. Guests included the Deputy Director for Strategy, Plans, and Policy of the Army (BG Swannack), the DLI Commandant (COL Devlin), and former Ambassador Peck. The cocktail party is the first real recruiting opportunity that Association has with the new FAOs and pays a regular dividend in members to the organization.

What’s Next With FAOA?

- **College Scholarships.** As noted last issue, our Charter requires that the Association return some of its income to the community in the form of College Scholarships to encourage the study of regional or international relations within the United States. The College Scholarship Committee is now working on establishing the requirements and criteria for our scholarship program. We will also make any changes necessary in our Charter and By-Laws to support the new program. Our initial thoughts are to support two annual scholarships of $1,000 each, to be awarded to a winning association member (or family member). We will also contact some of the defense contractors or internationals to see if we can get them to sponsor these scholarships on a regular basis. Look for some-thing in the next issue of the Journal on this topic.

- **Seminars and Socials.** The plans for a DC area FAO get-together may be coming out of mothballs. Options being considered are: a series of regional dinners, a mega-cocktail party with speaker, or both. More information to come once we actually form a committee from the new board.

***We Need Regional Editors for the Journal!!!***

A great idea surfaced at the FAO Course. If we had a regional editor for each of the FAO Areas of Concentration, or a combination of them, the Journal could break new ground. An editor, say for Europe/Eurasia would scan the professional pubs from his/her region to identify worthy articles for the journal and for the web site. Many such professional publications have extremely limited distribution, but would be of interest to all of our membership. Once identified, we can get permission to reprint the articles in question. What we are looking for are experienced FAOs who are voracious readers, probably internet users, and are willing to search the political and academic communities for a broad spectrum of professional pubs in their region.

Initially we are looking for a Europe/Eurasia editor, an Asia Editor, a Middle East/Africa Editor, and a Latin American editor. Once you volunteer, we can talk about benefits to doing this service to the Association. **CALL US!!**
ICT Travel, Continued from page 19

— Submitting visa applications.
— Making plane and hotel reservations. Ask DAO staff for recommendations on hotels that give an embassy rate.
— Developing a set of questions and a good knowledge base for your embassy discussions. Do not show and say “brief me.”

Traveling

• When packing for a trip, ensure that you take the appropriate military uniforms and civilian suits.
• Take impeccable notes of your travel experiences. After 10 days on the road, everything begins to look the same.
• Keep better than impeccable financial records of your trip. If you forget to write something down, you won’t remember it later and you won’t get paid.
• Be careful of the “good deal” when traveling. Use only licensed tour agents.

Post-travel Clean-up

• Write your trip report as soon as possible following your return to your homebase. If you have a lap-top computer it might be possible to get a draft done on the airplane while returning home. The longer the time between the trip and the report, the fewer details there are remaining in your head. Include in the trip report information about good and bad hotels and worthwhile sites that should be visited by other FAO’s.
• Submit your travel claim in a timely manner. Usually this is not a problem, as you will want to receive your money as soon as possible. KEEP ALL RECEIPTS AND MAKE A COPY OF BOTH THE TRAVEL CLAIM AND SETTLEMENT.
• Tell other FAO’s about your experiences to help them make their future trips good ones.
• Advise the travel office in the embassy (if you use them) of any problems you might have encountered during your trip. This will assist future travelers and prevent repetitive bad experiences.

While this article is not intended to be an all inclusive guide to traveling, I hope it will assist FAO’s in their ICT experience. Ultimately, the most important aspect of traveling on ICT as a FAO is good planning and meeting all required deadlines. Lastly, besides your own embassy officers, I recommend that you use the Army Attache, AARMA, and FAO in the country to be visited, as sources of information in planning and executing a trip plan. Their help will go a long way toward making your trip a good ICT experience. In that light, if you are planning a trip to Argentina in the near future, I would be happy to “show you the town.”

DID YOU NOTICE SOMETHING MISSING THIS MONTH????

The listings of regional positions is no longer carried in the FAO Journal. Current listings can be found in either the FAOA Web Site (www.faoa.org) or the Army Proponent Web Site (http://fao.army.mil).
ANNOUNCING !
The Formation of
The Defense Intelligence Alumni Association, Inc.

Greetings
Prospective DIAA, Inc. Members

We are very excited by the opportunity to continue a close association with retired and current DIA employees in a formal organization, the Defense Intel Alumni Association, Inc. This association will be a non-profit organization incorporated by the end of this year. As an initial program we will sponsor two luncheons in 1999 and publish two newsletters. We are looking forward to the Director, DIA speaking at the spring luncheon. Hopefully, we will have a membership directory available by the end of 1999.

As a fledgling organization, we need you to volunteer your ideas, time, and abilities. Each of us has skills, expertise and experiences — writing, art design, computer, desktop publishing, legal, financial — which would help the association from its beginnings. As we grow in membership, we will be able to expand the activities of DIAA, Inc.

You can make this organization what you want it to be. Your are DIAA, Inc. And your Leadership is crucial to its success. Tell other current and former DIA employees, military and civilian, about DIAA, Inc., and give us their names and addresses.

Our sister organizations have very active programs and provide their members a link with their former careers. With your commitment DIAA, Inc will succeed. The start-up expenses to lay the organizational foundation are significant. That’s why it is so important for you to make a donation in addition to your dues.

Become a Founding Member of DIAA, Inc!!

Annual Membership Dues: $30.00
Make checks out to DIAA, Inc. and mail to: DIAA, Inc.
P.O. Box 86
McLean, VA 22101-8600.


**The Conflict in Kosovo – A Primer For The Layman**

**EDITOR’S NOTE:** The following article was published in COSMOS, a journal of the Institute of International Relations, Panteion University, Athens. While it is written from a Greek point-of-view, it still can serve as an excellent primer on the background of the Kosovo Conflict. JDT

It has become one of the paradoxes of history: the battle of Kosovo, on 15 June 1389, was an Ottoman victory which led to the conquest of the medieval Serbian kingdom. In the folk memory of the Serbs, however, it was transmuted into a spiritual victory and has since been regarded as a source of national pride. The progressive enfeeblement of Serbia allow Albanians from the north to weigh more heavily on Kosovo until they became the majority in the early 18th century. The numbers of ethnic Albanians continued to grow, especially after World War II, when the region became increasingly unfriendly for Serbs causing overtime some 400,000 to depart from the area.

The recent phase of the conflict started in March 1989, when Kosovo’s autonomous status was abolished. Serbia has since inaugurated a policy of “serbinization” of property and population: discriminatory new measures resulted in the transfer of public property, infrastructure, industrial and other resources to the state of Serbia or to Serbian companies. About the same time, the Parliament the Republic of Kosovo in June 1990 and in the May 1992 elections, Ibrahim Rugova, a professor of Albanian literature, was elected President. Slowly but steadily the Albanian society formed parallel institutions and even a separate taxation system.

Apart from the fundamental causes of the dispute, economic considerations are also prevalent: Kosovo is rich in mineral resources vital to Serbia’s economy. The ultimate Kosovo Albanian goal appears to be secession and independent statehood, and eventually, possible merger with Albania. Their claims are based on self-determination: they make up 90% of the nearly 2 million inhabitants of the region. If their birthrate remains at 23.1 per 1,000 (the highest in Europe) Serbs will become an ethnic minority within Yugoslavia by the year 2020! Ethnic Albanians also regard Kosovo as Albanian soil, claiming that their Illyrian and Thacian ancestors were the first to settle the region, long before the arrival of the Slavs. Serbia, on the other hand, insists that Kosovo is an integral part of Serbia and the Albanian constitute an ethnic minority rather than a nation with a concomitant right to self-determination.

In the early 1990’s, the moderate line prevailed with Rugova’s Democratic League of Kosovo pursuing a policy if non-violent resistance to Serbia’s authoritarian government. In the midst of the troubling Yugoslav wars, this was expected by the Kosovars to expose the Serbian “terrorism” and thus gain Western support for their nationalistic cause. However, the Dayton accords were a turning point for this region: Croatia retook the Krajina region, forcing 120,000 Serbian refugees to flee to Serbia; Serbian officials forcibly resettled them in Kosovo, provoking the Albanian majority which saw in this resettlement an orchestrated attempt to take a firmer Serbian hold on the region. More importantly, the total omission of the Kosovo question from the Dayton accords disillusioned the Kosovars who began questioning Rugova’s pacifist stance. The first mention of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) originates during this period in early 1996. In the next three years it managed to gain control over an estimated 30% of the region’s territory and caused Serbia to commit 40-50,000 police and troops to counteract the separatists’ armed struggle.

The international community has concentrated its activities largely on the human rights situation. Otherwise, there are essentially two major impediments to any mediating effort: One is discord within the six-nation Contact Group. Apart from Realpolitik considerations, Washington fears a general Balkan war, if Albanians in the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and Albania itself are dragged into the conflict. FYROM would then disintegrate, Turkey might send supplies and Bulgaria or Greece might feel compelled to pursue their perceived historical interests with regard to the situation. Furthermore, a US Information Agency representative office was established in Kosovo which was viewed by the Kosovars as a quasi-embassy. Washington also pressed for collective intervention by NATO, promising plans to deploy troops or launch air strikes against Serbian operations in Kosovo. Most recently, Richard Holbrooke, the head of a US shuttle-diplomacy mission to the region, brokered a temporary peace settlement. Russia, on the other hand, objects to the American lead in these affairs: its international prestige and its influence in the Balkans are literally at stake. Moreover, a strong pro-Serbian lobby within Russia identifies with a Slavic and orthodox group in conflict with a Muslim community. Finally, the Russian leadership fears a precedent for troublesome minorities in its own territory (for example the Chechens). Irrespective, the six major powers imposed an “outer wall of sanctions” on Yugoslavia in the Spring of 1998, blocking its entry into world financial institutions and organizations.

New mediating efforts are also restricted by intransigence of the parties involved: Milosevic (the President of Yugoslavia) has been stubbornly rejecting further foreign mediation as an unacceptable interference in a strictly internal matter of his country. Similarly, the KLA and its political allies have made a point of not reducing their demands for independence.

However, it is possible that an unofficial, non-governmental approach by an organization that has the confidence of the parties involved might achieve considerable head-

(Swiss Cheese, Continued on Page 24)
The leaders of Russia’s immediate neighbors—the 11 former Soviet republics and the three Baltic States—appear confident that the ongoing political turmoil in Moscow will not have a negative impact on either their internal development or their bilateral relations with the Russian Federation. Some even have suggested that the return of Viktor Chernomyrdin might bring Russia some stability, allow it to recover from its current crisis, and thus make it possible for relations between Moscow and their countries to improve.

But a few have indicated that they are concerned that Moscow’s problems could become theirs either directly, if Russian politicians try to exploit nationalist themes, or indirectly, if Western governments and investors decide that the entire post-Soviet region is now at risk.

Such a range of judgments would not surprise anyone if it came from the neighbors of any other major country going through difficulties. But it undoubtedly will surprise many who still think of the post-Soviet region as a single unit and who believe that the leaders of all the countries there still focus first and foremost on Moscow.

Across the region once occupied by the USSR, presidents, prime ministers, and foreign ministers reacted calmly to Boris Yeltsin’s decision to bring back Chernomyrdin as prime minister and the latter’s willingness to cooperate with Communists in the Russian parliament.

The statement of the Kyrgyz presidential press secretary earlier this week was typical. Kanybek Imanaliyev said the change is

(Continued on page 25)
“Russia’s internal affair,” a statement echoed in Tajikistan and other Central Asian capitals.

Latvian President Guntis Ulmanis reflected the views of most when he said the change in government in Moscow will have no impact on Russia’s relationship with his country. The return of Chernomyrdin, the Latvian leader said, is “in no way linked to relations with Latvia.” And he pointed out that at the present time, whatever some citizens of his country may think, “Moscow is least of all thinking about Latvia.”

Most leaders were inclined to put an even more positive interpretation on developments in the Russian capital. Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze said he hopes Chernomyrdin’s return will enhance stability in Russia, which, he said, is now “crucial for everybody” but “especially for Georgia.” Moldovan President Petru Lucinschi said he believes that Chernomyrdin’s “experience and influence will help overcome the severe financial crisis” in Russia. He expressed confidence in the future of Russian-Moldovan relations on the basis of their development during Chernomyrdin’s earlier tenure as Russian prime minister. And Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus said he is confident Chernomyrdin has the skill to “stabilize the situation” in Russia, which, he added, would promote the continued expansion of bilateral ties “in the right direction for the benefit of our peoples.”

But in the midst of this generally upbeat set of assessments, there were some who indicated that the problems in Russia might spread to their own countries. In contrast to his president, Latvian Foreign Minister Valdis Birkavs was one such person. He suggested that the deepening of the economic crisis in Russia could lead to problems for Latvia. That conclusion, Birkavs said, reflects the fact that “Russia unfortunately uses Latvia in its domestic political games.” But even he said that Moscow now faces so many domestic problems that it is unlikely to focus its attention on any of its neighbors anytime soon.

Others expressed concern that Russian political and economic problems could have a serious impact on Western assessments of their countries. Estonian President Lennart Meri, for example, said he does not believe that Chernomyrdin’s appointment will have a negative impact on Estonian-Russian relations. But he indicated that the devaluation of the ruble and the declines in the Russian stock markets could lead some in the West to draw more sweeping conclusions about the region. In every case, at least some of the confidence reflects the requirements of diplomacy. But equally, if not more, important, this confidence also reflects the extent to which these are 14 independent and very different countries, significantly less dependent on Russia now than they were only a few years ago.

EDITORS NOTE: Dr. Goble is the editor of RFE/RL Online daily Information service. The article was reprinted with his permission.
GREETINGS. MERRY CHRISTMAS AND HAPPY NEW YEAR TO ONE AND ALL!!
May 1999 bring you all the rewards and challenges you deserve!

Now, for this quarter's Proponent News. As it is year's end, I thought I'd review what we've written in our Proponent News section up to date. In March '97, we covered our #1 requested and/or talked about topic, PROMOTIONS AND SELECTION RATES. This was followed in Jun '97 with my personal favorite, the "unofficial" HISTORY OF THE FAO PROGRAM. Next, in Sep '97, we published a synopsis of an article written by the request of the DCSOPS, then LTG Shinseki, entitled "FRONT-LINE SOLDIERS IN PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT -- THE ARMY'S FOREIGN AREA OFFICER." This article covered topics ranging from Army-to-Army Contacts to Peace Operations to Country Teams. Our fourth article, Dec '97, gave what I called an "azimuth check/program appraisal" validating current initiatives in light of past history and vision for the future. It was presented in briefing format and titled, "FAOs - YESTERDAY, TODAY AND TOMORROW." This year's first article, Mar '98, laid out the new FAO PRO-PONENT DIVISION -- REDESIGNED TO ADDRESS THE FUTURE. It explains how we redesigned our organization to better cope with the eight elements of proponent life-cycle management: structure, acquisition, individual training and education, distribution, deployment, sustainment, professional development and separation. The key piece of the feature, however, explains the creation of the regional Area of Concentration (AOC) program managers to handle all policy, plan-nig and execution aspects of in-country training. In Jun '98, we addressed "WHAT DO YOUR FAO PROPONENT MANAGERS REALLY DO? A DAY IN THE LIFE OF A FAO REGIONAL MANAGER." And lastly, Sep '98, we once again addressed PROMOTIONS AND SPECIALTY DEVELOPMENT. Between the latest promotion board results and the effects of OPMS XXI, this info proved timely.

Now, one might ask, "Why the trip down memory lane?" Actually, there are two answers. First, I feel it is important to show where we've been, where we are and where we're going. Also, it shows what you might have missed by not being a member of our Foreign Area Officer Association.

Secondly, it leads into my next topic of where one can find additional data on the FAO Program. As of this month, we've reestablished our website; www.fao.army.mil. Of significance, this website is neither in competition with the Association's homepage nor is it in competition with PERSCOM's FAO homepage. It works in-conjunction-with the truly superb FAOA website (thank you LTC Steve Gotowicki), as well as the PERSCOM FAO site and does not duplicate either.

Lastly, I would like to share with all of you my introductory message to our FAO website.

Message from the FAO
Proponent Chief

Welcome to the Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Homepage! We are pleased you signed on and hope you find the information you need. We've enjoyed putting this page together for you and have tried to present our material in an informative and useful manner, with relevant information for both the novice and the thirty-year defense professional as well. So again, welcome and good surfing.

Since 1947, the FAO has been an integral part of our Army. This will not change in the 21st Century. As the Army Chief of Staff, GEN Reimer, has stated, "FAOs perform a critical function for our Army and our nation. They always have and I think they are more important during this period of our history." As our force structure continues to change, the conceptual, doctrinal and physical changes will require modification in Army missions and training. These changes will understandably be reflected in changes to the FAO Program.

During the next century, a competitive FAO must be proficient in FAO skills --- Language, Regional Expertise, and U.S. Political-Military Policy. A smaller force will have to accomplish more missions in less time. In most cases, FAOs won't be eligible for refresh-er training. Once qualified, FAOs will have to maintain and improve their professional skills on their own.

Two further items: First, the Foreign Area Officer Association. A $15 annual fee entitles you to membership and a subscription to a great FAO Journal. The Journal's purpose is to disseminate professional knowledge and furnish information that will promote understanding between U.S. regional specialists around the world and improve their effectiveness in advising decision-makers. It is intended to forge a closer bond between the active, reserve and retired FAO communities. Bottom line: it's your Journal. It answers questions from the field, prints your articles, keeps you informed on the latest FAO specific and/or personnel issues and could assist you in your job search when you leave the military.

Lastly, I solicit not only your help but welcome your thoughts and advice on the status and direction of the FAO Program. Either call or write the FAO Proponent Team. We are your advocates on the Army
USMC FAO Notes
LT COL Chuck Owens, USMC

Not as much to put in this quarter, but wanted to make sure that you Marine members of the Association did not feel slighted, so . . .

When a FAO starts to think about their next FAO tour, the first thing that comes to mind is often duty as a Marine Attaché or Assistant Naval Attaché. While there are a number of other rewarding, interesting, and challenging FAO assignments, few have the same visibility or even aura of Attaché duty.

In order to be selected for Attaché duty you should understand that there are three main players in the process at Headquarters, Marine Corps:

1) my office (the FAO Sponsors),
2) Capt. Dave Reynolds (703-614-6561) in C4I (billet sponsors), and
3) the primary MOS monitor.

To find out more about specific assignments, you can start with any of the three, but as you do this you need to keep two things in mind — First, all three are intimately involved in the process, so no matter with which one you start, touch base with all three. Second, your primary MOS monitor will make the final decision on whether or not you get the assignment.

The following is a recap of assignments with training starts in the next 24 months:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Tour length</th>
<th>Training Starts* In-Country Report</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>0-4</td>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>36 mo.</td>
<td>9901/9907</td>
<td>0007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Spanish</td>
<td>36 mo.</td>
<td>9901/9912</td>
<td>0008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>TBD</td>
<td>24 mo.</td>
<td>ASAP</td>
<td>TBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>0-5</td>
<td>Russ/Georg.</td>
<td>24 mo.</td>
<td>9901/0001</td>
<td>0007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0-5</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>TBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>0-4</td>
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<td>36 mo.</td>
<td>001/0010</td>
<td>0106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0-4</td>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>36 mo.</td>
<td>0006/0101</td>
<td>0107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Polish</td>
<td>36 mo.</td>
<td>9911/0011</td>
<td>0107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>0-5</td>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>24 mo.</td>
<td>9901</td>
<td>9907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0-5</td>
<td>French</td>
<td>24 mo.</td>
<td>9902/9910</td>
<td>0006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0-4</td>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>36 mo.</td>
<td>9812/9906</td>
<td>9912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0-4</td>
<td>Russ/Ukr</td>
<td>24 mo.</td>
<td>9908</td>
<td>0005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United King.</td>
<td>0-5</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>36 mo.</td>
<td>0001</td>
<td>0008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>0-5</td>
<td>Vietnamese</td>
<td>24 mo.</td>
<td>9906</td>
<td>9912</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 1st date is w/o language qual; 2d is w/ lang qual.  
NOTES: 1—nominee “pencilled in;” 2—New Billet; 3—Pilot Req; 4—Urgent fill.

NAVY FAOA MEMBERS!!!

The Navy FAO Proponent had no news for the Journal this quarter. Hopefully, this will change in the near future.

The Association will continue to work to try to get Navy FAO news out to you!
As our contribution to the FAO Journal, I want to offer a brief overview of the Air Force’s new FAO program.

**Air Force FAO Program: Genesis**

Our FAO Program is built on the premise that Global Engagement, including shaping, preparing, and responding to events in distant lands, requires officers with military expertise, as well as intimate knowledge of regional languages, cultures, and security issues. With this goal in mind, Air Force senior leaders, in 1996, set a formal goal for 2005 of building a pool of 10 percent of its officers with foreign language proficiency. These officers would need to “become knowledgeable in political-military, economic, and cultural aspects of the country or region associated with that language.” They also represent the primary pool for the Air Force’s new Foreign Area Officer Program. The following year the Department of Defense gave added impetus to AF FAO development, publishing DoD Directive 1315.17, Service Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Programs. This DoD directive tasked each of the services to formalize its Foreign Area Office Program, if it had not already done so. Formal stand-up of the Air Force program began on 1 June 1998, when Air Force published Air Force Instruction (AFI) 16-109, Foreign Area Officer Program.

**Why a FAO Program?**

When Air Force senior leaders tasked SAF-IA to establish a service FAO Program, they were reacting to clear evidence (e.g., DoD and AF Inspector General reports, AF Process Action Teams recommendations, etc.) that the Air Force needed to do a better job of recruiting, developing, managing, and employing officers with foreign language proficiency and international affairs expertise. Furthermore, they were responding to the new, complex global security environment in a post-Cold War world.

Under these new security conditions, our Air Force will be asked to operate as coalition partners in joint-combined and regional operations. To do this effectively, we must understand and relate to our coalition counterparts—especially as we find ourselves operating across a broad range of traditional and non-traditional military missions. Since the demands of effective Global Engagement touch many operational and support specialties, the AF FAO Program seeks to cultivate and integrate officer language proficiency and foreign area expertise as broadly as possible across the AF officer corps. In this context, our FAO-qualified officers constitute a valuable resource, uniquely suited for engagement duties based on foreign language proficiency, pol-mil duty experience, and focused academic background.

**FAO Game Plan**

The Air Force FAO Proponent Office, which officially stood up in June 1997, initially focused on creating a comprehensive game plan for establishing this new Air Force program. These efforts culminated a year later with the publication of AFI 16-109. The AFI lays out the three pillars of the AF program: (1) foreign language proficiency at the professional level; (2) a postgraduate degree in International Relations/Area Studies; and (3) in-region political-military duty experience. During the first year of its existence, the FAO office also focused on resources, obtaining the funding necessary to implement a robust, sustainable program. With these two major achievements, the FAO Proponent Office has now turned its attention to the day-to-day business of implementing a dynamic FAO program.

**Air Force FAO Program: A Reality**

Currently, the FAO Proponent Office is aggressively working three major program initiatives: (1) convening the first-ever FAO Selection Board; this process will culminate in the identification of an initial pool of 150-200 FAO-qualified officers; (2) providing functional support to Personnel/Manpower specialists who will be recoding 250-350 existing billets as 16FX/FAO positions; and (3) hosting the first-ever AF FAO Conference, held in the Washington DC area on 8-9 December 1998. The goal of the conference will be to develop an AF vision of how to develop a service FAO Program that meets Air Force needs in a smaller, leaner Global Engagement environment. Of course, the FAO conference merely lays the groundwork. Each of the above initiatives, to some degree, contributes to formalizing and integrating the Air Force vision of FAO support throughout the Air Force. In the months to come, the FAO Proponent Office will continue to work these—and other—issues energetically as we strive to develop a FAO program that supports and enhances current and future aerospace operations.
F. Y. I. — Active/Reserve FAOs

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