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PURPOSE: To publish a journal for disseminating professional knowledge and furnishing information that will promote understanding between U.S. regional specialists around the world and improve their effectiveness in advising decision-makers. It is intended to forge a closer bond between the active, reserve, and retired FAO communities.

SUBSCRIPTIONS / ASSOCIATION MEMBERSHIP: Subscription to the journal comes with membership in the association. Membership information may be obtained through FAOA, P.O. Box 523226, Springfield, VA. 22152. The office telephone/fax number is (703) 913-1356. E-Mail address is: FAOA@EROLS.COM For those only interested in subscribing, cost is $15.00/year and may be requested at the above address.

SUBMISSIONS: The Association is a totally voluntary enterprise. For the Journal to succeed, we need articles, letters to the editor, etc. Contributors should mail articles to the above address or to the FAO Proponent Office, ODCSOPS-DA (DAMO-SSF), Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20310-0400. Articles are subject to editing by the FAO Journal Staff, to ensure that space constraints of the publication are met.

WEB SITE: The Association Web Site is at — WWW.FAOA.ORG.

ADDRESS CORRECTIONS: FAOA is a private organization. We rely on the membership to update their mailing addresses on a regular basis.
DECISIONS! DECISIONS! DECISIONS!

With apologies to the Air Force, Marine, and Navy members of the Association, I want to devote this quarter's editorial to a personnel issue that critically affects Army FAOs. A major change (OPMS XXI) in how the Army does its personnel business is underway and goes fully operational on 1 October 1998. Key to this change is a one-time career decision that every army officer must make in the next four years.

Army FAOs need to come to grips with that decision -- Will you go FAO or will you go back to your basic branch? The "rumor-mill" has been operating overtime since OPMS XXI was first broached. A lot of the "grapevine" information is confusing and some of it is just plain wrong. One thing that is for sure is that your Career Field Designation (CFD) is a MAJOR decision that will significantly change your life as an army officer.

SO FIRST POINT OF ADVICE: Take any opinion expressed by a buddy (peer or mentor) with "a grain of salt" -- he or she may not know what they are talking about.

TO MAJORS AND CAPTAINS

Considerable time and effort has been expended by the army leadership in trying to "get the word out" to you, on what your decisions mean to your career and to the Army. What do we know about CFD? We know that if a Major or a Captain goes FAO (OP SPT CF) he or she will serve as a FAO from then on -- this does not mean no more service in the TO&E Army, because FAO slots are being opened on every Corps and Division staff. Further, if a Major or Captain chooses the alternative -- the Operations Career Field (OPS CF -- read basic branch), he/she will serve and compete against other single-tracked basic branch officers for S3/XO and Battalion/Brigade Commands. These latter officers might serve in FAO-like jobs when it is their turn to do a branch immaterial job (every basic branch will get a slice of these jobs that gets larger and larger at the senior field grades). Upon promotion to O-5, the OP CF officers have an opportunity to get back to FAO -- BUT ONLY IF THERE ARE FAO SHORTAGES IN THEIR REGIONAL AREAS OF CONCENTRATION (read army needs). Otherwise, they continue serving in non-command and branch immaterial jobs in their basic branch.

SECOND POINT OF ADVICE: If you want to serve as a FAO, make your decision at Career Field Designation.

TO LIEUTENANT COLONELS AND COLONELS

Conversely, very little time has been spent on discussing the impact of the career field decisions by older year groups. At O-5 and O-6, you essentially have the option of declaring "single-tracking" seemingly at your leisure. However, you should realize that under OPMS XXI the basic branches have HUGE numbers of branch immaterial jobs assigned to them at your grades. This could mean that if you are not on a successful command track when a basic branch gets hold of your file, you could get the "dregs" assignments-wise. Further, once they have your file for assignment it will probably be too late to declare "single-track FAO" -- branch won't release you and your choices will be to accept the RFO or retire gracefully.

THIRD POINT OF ADVICE: If doing FAO work is interesting to you, declare "single-track FAO" early. Those who wait may not get in (smaller numbers of senior FAOs will be needed under a "single-track" system.

The Army has spent a lot of money and time to train and educate most of you as FAOs. It needs your FAO expertise badly and it would be a real waste to the Army and the nation for you to play careerist and "straddle the fence" on this issue. For all FAOs, NOW is the time to step forward and be counted!

Joseph D. Tullbane, III., Ph.D., President, FAOA
CORRECTION TO SPOTLIGHT ON SOUTHEAST ASIA . . .

Dear Editor,

On page 16 of your June 1998 FAO Journal listing 48 I majors positions, you omitted the “Deputy CINCPACREP position in Cambodia. This is an army 48I (Southeast Asian) O4/O5 CINCPAC position with a two year duty assignment at the US Defense Attache Office in Phnom Penh.

Regards from Phnom Penh,
Major Paul C. Marks

EDITOR’S NOTE: THANK YOU!! Our quarterly efforts to list the authorized army FAO positions in each regional Area of Concentration are derived from the open-source Army documents that sometimes lag behind reality by as much as a year. If our readers, as did Major Marks, will catch the errors in those lists, we will gladly publish the corrections so that you can all update your lists appropriately. This is what the Association is all about — FAOs helping FAOs! JDT

FAOs in the Real World . . .

Dear COL Tullbane,

My name is MAJ Jon Chicky and I am currently finishing up my studies at the College of Naval Command and Staff of the Naval War College in Newport, RI. I am a tactical MI officer and an Eurasian FAO. The purpose of my letter is to pass on my experiences on how we FAOs are perceived by the "Joint Force."

We have just completed an exercise where each seminar (about 15 officers of all Services and occasionally DoD/DoS/"interagency" Civilians) had to develop a National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, and then develop a force structure to compliment those strategies. We then briefed the solutions to faculty panels. It was brought to my attention that several seminars, in their solutions, stressed the need to increase the number of FAOs as part of the military means for shaping and/or engaging nations. What is truly remarkable about the above solutions is that I am the only Army FAO attending the Naval War College, at any level.

In discussions, in war games, and other activities, I have, when appropriate, brought out the value added that a FAO Corps can bring to the Joint Force. In discussions regarding Eurasia, the instructors have in many instances deferred to me on current issues of regional interest. My research paper on the future military missions in the Caspian region is being used this week as the basis for the Joint Military Operations final for the senior service college here at Newport.

I am not trying to embellish my own achievements, but rather illustrate to you that we can on an individual basis demonstrate our value-added not only to the Army but to the Joint Force, as well. Instructors here, both military and civilian, are familiar with the Army FAO program and wish that the Navy or USAF had one as robust as ours. In discussions ranging from Military-to-Military exchanges to liaison officers in combined operations, FAOs are brought up by the instructors, as strategic level tools that among others (usually SOF) are available to the commander in question.

I hope that you have found this letter useful and informative. Regards,
Jon E. Chicky, MAJ, MI

EDITOR’S NOTE: We published Major Chicky’s letter because it is an example of the reaction that Army FAOs are evoking in the world outside the Army. To have non-Army, non-FAOs recognize that the value of the program is such that it should form part of the overall National Military Strategy should be very gratifying, somewhat daunting, and a real challenge to us FAOs to keep performing as advertised. JDT

Comments on Balkan Articles . . .

To Whom It May Concern:

I am writing this letter to comment on MAJ Dougherty’s recent article regarding a proposed regional strategy for the Balkans (JUN 98). I also did my FAO ICT in Greece, and spent time visiting and studying the entire region. I too once harbored noble ideas about a new modern role for the Greeks, one where they could become a conduit for the region to trade with the EU. I also feel they should, as EU and NATO members assert a leadership role leveraging their prized memberships to move the region forward. However, it is sad to say that Greece is a country barely qualified to be called European. Its culture, religion, traditions and national mindset are not compatible with their northern European partners. Ask any member of the EU or NATO who has tried to deal with them on any number of issues.

I say this speaking from a great deal of experience with these very unique people. I am an American of Greek ancestry (2d generation) who understands the Greek tribe thoroughly and has lived with the culture all my life. However, I am an American first and always , an attitude

(Continued on page 17)
Objective: Nominate Fellow Regional Specialists to serve on the Association Board of Governors.

How large is the Board? The Board includes a minimum of nine (9) elected members and one appointed member (President/Executive Director).

Is there a set distribution for the Board? No, but based on our membership, the Board should be representative of the broadest spectrum of regions possible, as well as include at least one member from each Service, as well as represent Active, Reserve, and Retirees.

What is expected of the Board? The President/Executive Director keeps the Board informed of day-to-day operations, reacting to their suggestions and direction. Major expenditures and new projects are only undertaken after discussion and approval by the Board. Specific duties are kept minimal in recognition that serving on the Board is an “extra duty.”

What does a Board member get for serving? Only gratis membership for the three year term of Board membership. It is a voluntary position.

Who can nominate? Any member in good standing can nominate.

Who can be nominated? Any Active, Reserve, or Retired FAO, from any Service. This include members of the current Board.

Who are we looking for? Since the members of the Board, more than any other element of the Association, reflect our goals and represent the best of our specialty, they should be well-known and well-considered individuals within their individual regions.

What Happens When I Nominate Someone? The Association will get in touch with that individual to see if he/she is willing to serve. If they agree, then their name will be added to the ballot to be shipped to members in mid November.

Where do I Send My Nomination? Send it to FAOA, P.O. Box 523226, Springfield, VA 22152 or E-Mail it to FAOA@EROL.COM by 1November 1998.
Problems in Peace Enforcement

by S.P. Dawkins, Foreign Service officer, ret.

Infantry Doctrine

If an infantry lieutenant takes a casualty from sniper fire when moving his platoon up to a line of departure, the lieutenant reports the sniper’s location to his company commander and moves on. His mission is to get his platoon on line, prepared to attack or defend; not to stop and deal with a sniper in an area he is passing through.

In peace enforcement operations, however, that lieutenant, his platoon, and lots of local people will live and stay in that area. So will the sniper.

A sniper without press coverage presents only a police problem. Yet press coverage of snipers escalates to a political problem splashed across hundreds of millions of TV screens. The link here is often the free lance photographer who specializes in catching on film the agony of an innocent at the moment a sniper’s bullet kills. Infantry doctrine now is not relevant.

Political Realities

The sad political reality is that the people of the world will pay to see on film or in photographs somebody being killed. Next, the press, and then the public, and then their governments will demand that the suffering be stopped. A CINC can find himself dealing with what used to be the minor problem of a platoon leader. The political reality is that snipers must be stopped early in any peace enforcement operation. The problem is political. It does no good to criticize the media.

The Free Lance Photographer

Let us imagine that somewhere in Europe or the Middle East a young man with a camera, no job, hungry children, and a long suffering wife decides that he has to make some money. The way for a free lance (unemployed) photographer to make money in a short time is to shoot scenes of violence. A war or a peace enforcement operation offers the best opportunities. Let us also assume that our young photographer is not an evil man. He needs to support his family and he knows that photo editors around the world will pay for pictures of violence. He has not thought out yet what he has to do. He just wants those pictures. The incidents described below happened; but the photographer is pure fiction and designed to dramatize the sniper problem. I know of no American photographer who did any of these things.

Five Steps to Awareness

This young photographer will go through five steps to awareness. To illustrate this, let us assume that the scene is Sarajevo during the summer of 1995, before the Bosnia cease-fire in October. He hitches a ride into Sarajevo from the coast with an aid convoy and takes a room at the Holiday Inn between the airport and the city. At the bar, he asks other photographers where he can get the best pictures. They tell him to talk to Ratko, or Mohammed, or Dario. Each one coming from one of the three ethnic factions, but all interested and cooperating with each other to make money.

Step One - Our photographer pays his new “associate” 100 German marks, the only currency accepted in Bosnia, to show him a vantage point where he can get good pictures. The associate briefs him on the sporadic sniper fire in that district, and shows him where to sit with his back safely against a good brick wall, and what time of day the sunshine and the light will be best. After three days nothing has happened.

Step Two - The room at the Holiday Inn costs 220 DM a day. The photographer talks to another associate and asks him for help. For 200 DM, the photographer is taken to an area where the associate knows a sniper will be active. The photographer now gets pictures of frightened civilians crouched behind a UN armored car waiting for the sniper to stop shooting. That sells.

Step Three - The associate now offers to arrange a meeting between the photographer and a sniper. The photographer pays in advance, with the understanding that the sniper will not fire his weapon. When the photographer meets the sniper he sees that he has a firing position on the 8th floor of an abandoned apartment building set among many similar buildings. Resting on a table with a filthy mattress, the sniper has his match rifle, spotting scope, windage tables, and can sight through a hole in the building, and through the hole in another building, and get a field of fire on a road not far from the Holiday Inn. The photographer gets pictures he can sell.

The sniper, through an interpreter, now shows the photographer how to look through the spotting scope. The sniper points out two people standing on a street 350 meters away, unaware of the danger. The sniper then challenges the photographer to choose which one he wants to live. The photographer protests that there was to be no shooting, he is not a part of the conflict, and he wants to leave. The sniper then quickly fires two rounds, killing both civilians. He taunts the photographer that he could have saved one. “Who is the war criminal now?” says the sniper.

Step Four - The photographer realizes what is happening. He can pay an associate to set the scene for the most profitable picture of all - a civilian going down at the moment of impact.

(The Sniper and the Free Lance Photographer, Continued on page 5)
The sniper agrees to kill a civilian on order. In Sarajevo, one sniper shot a woman leading a small boy across a street. One shot slammed into the woman’s abdomen. She turned in shock and horror to look at her son just as the sniper’s second round took off the top of his head. (I do not know if a photographer arranged this true incident, but in Bosnia it was always wise not to assume these profitable incidents were a coincidence.) In this case, the sniper was a Serb and the victims were Bosnian Muslims. The hue and cry against this barbaric cruelty backfired against the Serbs and they stopped the sniping at that time.

**Step Five** - The Serbs then pulled back their snipers and the shooting stopped. But, then it started again. The same horrible pictures of civilians under sporadic sniper fire were back on the front pages of the International Herald Tribune and thousands of newspapers and TV screens worldwide. Our photographer produced the dramatic death pictures he wanted.

In the meantime, the French Army units in the sector were suspicious. Their intelligence told them the Serbs had indeed pulled back their snipers. So, French officers located the buildings where the new snipers were active. Next the French moved up armored cars and infantry. When the French were ready, they called the Muslim HQ and explained that they had located the “Serb” snipers and were prepared for an all out assault on them. The French then watched those buildings. Within minutes, the French saw snipers running out of the buildings and scampering to safety.

An operations analyst would say that the French tactic here was putting information into the top of an organization and watching to see where the results come out. The snipers now were, in fact, Muslims shooting their own people. The anti-Serb publicity was just too good to pass up. So, the Muslims assigned their own snipers to kill their own people for the viewing public of the world and blamed the Serbs. It was a fact that during the entire war the Muslims ran a superb public relations campaign while the Serbs never tried.

This time most sniper activity in Sarajevo ended. Both Serb and Muslim commanders realized that it was not in their political interests to commit snipers to killing civilians.

**The Serb Strategy Fails**

Why were the Serbs killing civilians in Sarajevo? Their goal was to terrorize the population and drive the Muslims and the Muslim government north to Tuzla. The Serbs wanted Sarajevo as the capital of their Republika Srpska. The Muslims resisted, however, and refused to flee Sarajevo. By the summer of 1995, the Serb strategy had failed. The Serbs did not know what to do; they did not know how to change their policy of terror. NATO bombing then nudged them to the Dayton peace talks.

However, the Muslims had a problem too. In fact, the press coverage of the Serb snipers killing Muslim civilians had long worked in favor of the Muslim government. The world’s sympathy was with the Muslim victims. And the world's condemnation again turned on the Serbs.

The political reality is that the sniping benefited the Muslim government and hurt the Serbs.

**The Public Demands**

The public demands gory pictures. The photo editors pay and the public buys the newspapers. I heard a correspondent for a major U.S. weekly news magazine try for 15 minutes by telephone one night in a Sarajevo hotel try to sell his photo editor in New York color photos taken by a free lancer of remains exhumed from a mass grave. The photo editor eventually refused because the skeletal feet sticking out of the earth did not have civilian shoes on them. Not dramatic enough.
Our mythical photographer walked through the five steps to awareness of the symbiotic relationship between the free lance photographer and the sniper. They both understand it. Army officers on the ground must understand this relationship too.

Snipers - A Political Problem

Snipers must be stopped in peace enforcement operations. The ability of snipers to time their killing to the needs of photographers ensures that snipers will get far more media attention than almost any other kind of atrocity. Killing snipers rarely solves the problem, however. In fact, the snipers are rarely killed and easily replaced. The solution remains political. The Serbs pulled back their snipers from the Sarajevo suburbs because their political strategy of terror had failed. The Muslims pulled back their snipers because the political benefits were turned against them too.

Since the political objectives of warring factions center on control of territory, the CINC must tie his recognition of their control to respecting cease fire accords and to ensuring that no snipers operate in their territories.

Sarajevo Again

In January 1996, less than one month after the Implementation Force (IFOR) arrived under the command of Admiral Leighton Smith, Jr. USN, Serb snipers started shooting civilians in a Muslim area not far from the Holiday Inn. The Admiral immediately told the local Serb authorities that they were responsible because the fire came from their territory. The Serbs denied any responsibility.

The Admiral then flew to Belgrade and met with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. Explaining carefully what he had told the Serb leaders in Bosnia, the Admiral put the question to Milosevic: “If the sniper fire comes from a Serb area, I think the Serb authorities should take responsibility.” Milosevic thought for a minute or two and then responded. “I agree.” After the Admiral left the lunch (which the author attended) Milosevic called the Serb authorities and summoned the speaker of the Serb parliament, Momcilo Krajsnik, to Belgrade. We do not know what Milosevic said to Krajsnik, but the sniper fire stopped.

Conclusion

Peace enforcement often takes a minor infantry problem up to the level of politics at the chief of state level. Four star admirals, rather than infantry lieutenants, now resolve the sniper problem. The results are more permanent and the political authorities on all sides stop killing civilians. The free lance photographer merely drives the solution.

About the Author: Stephen P. Dawkins, a retired Foreign Service officer, served as the POLAD (political advisor) to the Commander-in-Chief of the Implementation Force in Bosnia from December 1995 to September 1996. Prior to that he was POLAD to the former Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, General Gordon R. Sullivan. From 1958-1961, he served as an infantry lieutenant and platoon leader in the USMC.

Sponsorship Program at the Marshall Center: Money in the Bank

An ongoing program at the home of Eurasian FAO training, the George C. Marshall Center in Garmisch, Germany, has managed to meld the American FAO trainee and his/her family (engaged in the In-Country Training (ICT) phase of their FAO training) with the visiting foreign military and civilian students who attend both the Courses offered to them at the Marshall Center. This bonding program is a simple sponsorship program — the kind that most in the military have experienced during their various tours of duty — but with a twist. The foreign officers and civilians are invited into the homes and lives of the FAO trainees and their families. They are in a real sense adopted! The FAOs that take the most advantage of the program have the foreigners over for cookouts, the movies, out to eat, and just to spend some time at a normal American home, away from their studies and BOQ.

The results have been astounding! American FAOs travelling throughout the republics of the ex-Soviet Union and Central Europe can call on their “friends” from Garmisch days for anything from simple trip help, like setting up room reservations, to arranging visits to the local Ministries of Defense, military installations, etc. And, of course, they are treated to home cooked meals at the foreign officer’s home, being drawn into his family in pay back for the Garmisch hospitality.

Can you imagine a more satisfying, more beneficial long-term relationship for a FAO!!
Careful Not To Give In To Russia’s Nuclear Blackmail

By Dr. Ewa M. Thompson

The World’s attention has been riveted on the economic crisis in Japan, with its potential implications for all of Asia. In the meantime, Russia has been lurching into its own major crisis — also deserving of our attention.

At a meeting in Paris recently devoted to that particular crisis, leaders of the industrialized nations making up the Group of Seven, or G-7, assumed a standby attitude: They stand ready to bail Russia out, should the need arise. Why? It seems that whenever Russia sneezes, the economic leaders of the most powerful Western nations stand at attention. This is a wrong response to covert nuclear blackmail.

After the visit of Anatoly Chubais, chief architect of Russia’s economic reforms, to Washington in late May, President Clinton pledged further aid, and his pledge was couched in the language of solicitation for Russian reforms. The president said that financial support for Moscow would “promote stability, structural reforms and growth in Russia.” The fledgling Russian democracy was in the balance, and the near-collapse of the ruble and of the Russian stock exchange had to be averted.

Also in May, the International Monetary Fund refused, upon inspection, to release to Russia a $700 million portion of an earlier $10 billion loan, justifying its refusal by a perceived failure to introduce reforms. Under pressure from Western politicians, the IMF relented even though reforms have stalled.

Significantly, the raising of interest rates to 150 percent or even budget slashing (both were undertaken in Russia in late May) did not calm the distrust of international investors who left the Russian market in droves. But a mere promise from the G-7 did. The market recovered a fraction of the 40 percent loss incurred in May, only to fall again when the actual transfer of dollars to Russia was delayed.

Two conclusions can be drawn from this course of events. First, the Russian economy is in greater trouble than the spin masters in Moscow and the West are willing to admit. Second, Russian-Western relations are based on covert nuclear blackmail rather than on partnership.

That the politicians do not speak in these terms is understandable. They are committed to the language of diplomatic niceties. But it is disappointing to see no substantial commentary emerging from the American think tanks or from the press. We have helped Russia many times after the collapse of communism, but we did not gain a friend. Not only is the strategic arms control treaty not ratified, but also the Russian elites are turning increasingly hostile to the United States in particular.

Russia, said Napoleon, is a country of the future — and always will be. Dr. Andrew Lehman of the University of Pilzen in the Czech Republic observed that American companies go to Russia but they never get out. That is to say, they do not make profits, and abandoning the enterprise after having invested large sums means admitting failure of judgement. Which executive would take on such a burden on him/herself? Such companies get stuck in the mud ever deeper, year after year. Recovery and profitability seem just around the corner. But for one reason or another, the corner always turns out to be a year or two away.

In Russian culture, and that includes the Russian economy, the phenomenon of the Potemkin village has always loomed large. This expression goes back to the 18th century when Russian official Grigori A. Potemkin built cardboard villages (which looked like the real thing from a distance) to impress Empress Catherine the Great. The “Potemkinization” of Russia tempts American companies to go to Russia in good faith, discovering reality when it is too late. In 1997, Val Koromzay, a Russian economy expert at the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, admitted that the organization’s growth predictions for the Russian economy had been consistently wrong.

“Mea culpa. None of us really knows how to make forecasts for this kind of economy in transition,” he said. He observed that a major problem with making predictions was unreliable statistical data produced by Russian bodies.

The Russian statistics have their share of Potemkin villages.

(Russian Blackmail, Continued on Page 8)

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THE DOG THAT DIDN’T BARK
by Paul Goble

The most remarkable feature of the current Russian economic crisis is one that most commentators have overlooked: namely, that Russian collapse has not spread to the other ex-Soviet states. Even five years ago, most of the former Soviet republics were still sufficiently integrated that difficulties in Russia would inevitably have a large and immediate impact on all the others. Now that has changed. More and more post-Soviet countries have succeeded in diversifying their trading partners so that problems in Russia will not be the determining factor in their development. That is not to say that the problems in Moscow will not have an impact. Rather, the ways in which these Russian problems will affect the non-Russian countries are very different and more indirect than many are now assuming.

First, some but by no means all of the post-Soviet states remain sufficiently integrated with the Russian economy that problems in Moscow will have precisely the kind of impact that some are assuming will happen across the region. Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, for example, will be under enormous pressure to react to Moscow’s current woes. They have become accustomed to turning to Moscow for help and will turn again if they need something.

The most remarkable feature of the current Russian economic crisis is that Russia’s economic woes are not spread across to the other post-Soviet states. The main problem Russia’s economic woes pose for the other post-Soviet states is that they pose a direct threat to Moscow. Moscow devours a lion’s share of taxes, which breeds cynicism in the so-called regions of the Russian Federation. These regions are too diverse to yield to a taxation system imposed by Moscow. On June 1, Russia’s newly appointed tax chief, Boris Fyodorov, said that in order to boost tax collections, the government must lower taxes. This is wishful thinking. The president of Tartarstan (one of the autonomous republics within the Russian Federation) said, “this lean cow (meaning Tartarstan) simply won’t give any more milk.” Many factories in Russia operate on a barter system and do not generate enough cash to pay taxes in any way except as write-offs from government non-deliveries.

The structural problems in Russian industry run too deep for the mythical “tightening of the collection of taxes” to be effective. Yet recently the government used police detachments to facilitate tax collection. An army of Soviet-style militiamen was dispatched by President Boris Yeltsin to milk all the cows in the land. Police intimidation will of course produce short-term results, but in the long run it will thwart productivity.

The lack of revenue means nonpayment of wages to state workers. Like the non-payment of taxes, it has been blamed on fraud and sabotage. In the Kuzbass area, 50 people went on trial for nonpayment of wages to the Kuzbass miners. Related to the unpaid wages (some people call it 100 percent taxation) is the problem of population relocation. No one knows how to shrink the labor force in the artificial cities of Asian North and move millions of people from Siberia (where they were resettled by Soviet fiat) back to the more productive lands of Central Russia where they could be fed and clothed at less expense.

The recent strikes of miners in the Vorkuta region and in Kuzbass were reminders that the migration eastward ordered by the Soviets has been reversed.

There is more to Russia’s woes. The unprecedented criminalization of society thwarts reforms and converts them into another Potemkin village. It has been estimated that two-thirds of the Russian economy is controlled by organized crime. The production of certain commodities, especially luxury items such as caviar, is entirely controlled by the Mafia. In May, a French businesswoman was beaten up and robbed in her room at Moscow’s luxury Metropole hotel situated just a few minutes’ walk from the Kremlin. Virtually anyone of stature in Russia has a bodyguard.

A Russian sociologist pointed out that this level of criminalization is a byproduct of the vast gulag system whose dehumanized victims were suddenly freed, and whose no less dehumanized executioners suddenly found themselves jobless.

Such intractable problems account for the differences between “reforms” in Russian and reforms in Central Europe where populations have a pro-Western orientation and the Potemkin fantasies are given little credence. Whenever the Russian economy nears collapse, signals come out of Moscow about the grave consequences of instability in Russia. Read: If you do not transfer some of your wealth to us, enemies of the West will get to power in Russia and they will aim our nuclear weapons at you.

Owing largely to the swift action of the G-7 countries, the most recent Russian economic meltdown has been averted, but “the fundamental problems are still there,” as one broker put it. Given the nonperformance of the Russian economy, problems can only be compounded in the future, and a reliance on covert nuclear blackmail is likely to continue.

In effect, Russian could live off the wealth of the West for an indefinite period. Russia’s problems also will be compounded by the fact that the Russian Federation is not a homogeneous state but a collection of provinces acquired by the force of arms and not entirely assimilated into Russian culture.

Sooner or later, some Asian leader will attempt to evict the Russian imperialists from Siberia, just as the British imperialists had once been evicted from India. So far, the slogan “Asia for the Asians” is not a household word, but conditions exist for its rise in the future. The ingratiating tone of so much commentary on Russia in the American press obscures these possibilities and makes the American public believe that Russia is a potential ally in the increasingly fragmented world. If the problems are not solved by some miraculous leap forward, the forthcoming Russian crisis will assume proportions of which the present crisis will only provide a foretaste.

This article was originally published June 14, 1998 in the Houston Chronicle and is reprinted with the permission of the Author and the Houston Chronicle. Dr. Thompson is a professor of Slavic Studies at Rice University.
pressure to devalue their national currencies if the Russian ruble continues to fall.

Second, many of the post-Soviet states have not yet completed the reform of their economic and legal systems that would make them able to withstand negative trends abroad. These countries—which are in the majority—thus suffer from many of the same kind of problems that Russia does and for the same reasons. Without reforms, they cannot attract the kind of investment that will help power their future development. Indeed, the exceptions to this general pattern—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—prove the rule.

The three Baltic countries rapidly liberalized their economies and now enjoy some of the highest rates of Western investment and economic growth anywhere in the region. Those that have failed to reform their economies, on the other hand, are in increasing difficulty. But the primary cause of their problems is the absence of reform rather than difficulties in the Russian marketplace.

Third, all of these countries are profoundly affected by the attitudes of Western investors. Because the Russian market is the best-known, many in the West have concluded that all post-Soviet states and indeed all emerging markets are in the same situation. That is absolutely wrong. In the most recent quarter for which economic statistics are available, virtually all the post-Soviet states did better than Russia on virtually every measure of economic development, relative to the size of their markets. But while those judgments are incorrect, they have an impact on the economies of the other countries in the region, an impact that some analysts in both Moscow and the West will undoubtedly suggest shows just how “integrated” the region remains.

To a large extent, this misreading of the economic situation in the post-Soviet states reflects a larger misunderstanding of the situation there. Nearly seven years after the Soviet Union collapsed, all too many in the West continue to refer to the countries there as “new independent states” and to think about the region as a single whole rather than as 12 new countries and the three restored Baltic States.

Such observers thus have missed the broad diversification over the last few years in a region dominated until a decade ago by a single center. If the Russian economic crisis does in the end have an impact across all these countries, it is far more likely to be the result of Western misperceptions than the product of integration left over from Soviet times.

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What’s So “Foreign” About FAO?

by
LTC Paul S. Gendrolis

So why are we called FAOs? A better question might be why not? The first letter of FAO does stand for foreign - foreign country, foreign language, foreign relations, foreign policy. Everything we do is considered foreign - literally and figuratively. And as our logo attests, we are the US Army’s global strategic scouts, its soldier statesmen, its foreign experts, its Foreign Area Officers. In terms of what a FAO does throughout a military career, the most important use of foreign applies to foreign policy.

It is critical that we fully understand everything possible concerning US foreign policy - theory, formulation, decision-making and decision-makers, application, and exceptions to the rule. This understanding enables us to operate in our host country and within our region with a high level of professional knowledge and confidence. Although it is a goal of the FAO training program to develop regional specialists, it is also important to remember that we must have a general awareness and understanding of US foreign policy as it affects other regions of

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(Continued on page 10)

Key West Fiery Foods
AD FRAME
As a FAO, you might be the only US military representative in any given situation and asked to explain or comment on US policy regarding any number of global issues, such as sanctions against specific countries, human rights and arms transfers, and economic aid and most favored nation status. A solid foundation in US foreign policy also enables us to better understand the dynamics of the host country’s foreign policy and that of the other countries within the region, both with each other and with the US.

In our continuing study of US foreign policy, there are five elements we should keep in mind: military, political, economic, historical, and cultural. By focusing on these five factors, we can expand our knowledge base, during graduate school, in-country training (ICT), and in all future FAO assignments.

From the military perspective, it is not enough to know what is happening in our basic branch; we must also be current on all Army programs, from weapons systems development and fielding to tactical and strategic doctrine to training. Additionally, we must have general knowledge of what corresponding trends may be occurring in our sister services. At the very least, we must know which expert to call for the answer when our host nation counterpart asks the question.

More often than not, politics is at the heart of foreign policy decision-making. It is critical to know who the players are and who affects policy formulation. This is true of both the US and host country’s political systems. We must know the respective roles of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the government, where the military fits in, and which political action groups (lobbyists) affect which actions and how. We must be cognizant of the full range of governmental and non-governmental agencies involved in the development of the policies we may be directed to implement.

Although we are not expected to become economists, we must understand the economic system of our host country well enough to project the impact of an economic down turn or boom on our host country and within the region. For instance, say your country’s wealth is measured in terms of the amount of oil it can sell on the world market and it is buying a new major weapons system, such as the M1A2 Abrams tank. What happens if there is a world oil glut? How does this affect the country’s ability to make its quarterly payments to the US or to a US defense contractor? What happens to its foreign balance of payments? The US Ambassador asks you for a military assessment of the situation. You must have the right answers. A “real world” situation exists today with the economic state of Indonesia and the repercussions being felt within the Asian-Pacific region and globally.

For most countries, a knowledge of the past helps us understand the present and to determine the future. The history of a country and its role within its region and on the world stage helps us to understand current dynamics. For example, historically what has been one of Tsarist and Soviet Russia’s major foreign policy goals? To gain a warm water port. How? By gaining control of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits from Turkey. The Crimean War was just one of the many battles fought in the “Great Game” by the major Western powers to prevent Russia from realizing its goal. Turkey continues to temper its relations with Russia today based on this knowledge and experience. We must do similarly in viewing the historical relationships of our host country with the US and regionally.

The fifth element deals with understanding the myriad cultural aspects of our country and region. We learn the customs and traditions, the religious practices, the taboos and what is accepted. We learn the physical and non-physical methods of greeting and showing respect, how to sit on the floor without showing the soles of our shoes, how to manage time where time makes little difference, and how to conduct business without alienating our host. We learn these things not only to keep ourselves out of trouble, but also to help our official visitors and military bosses who visit our country. Our knowledge and expertise enables us to prevent social blunders from sparking international incidents.

In short, we become area experts.

The road to becoming an area expert is long - for some of us, it is a continual learning process. The new FAO has a three leg initial training cycle: language, graduate school, and in-country training.

Language training is the key to the other two legs. It enables us to begin our study and quest for knowledge; it opens doors; it enables us to build enduring personal relationships with our host nation counterparts.

The purpose of advanced civil schooling is to build a solid academic base of knowledge comprised of foreign policy, area, and language studies. It allows time for research, analysis, synthesis, and in-depth study and reading about the target country, the region, and the many aspects of applicable foreign policy. Since language skills are perishable - if you don’t use it, you lose it - follow-on language study is critical and must be incorporated into the graduate school curriculum.

In-country training provides the opportunity to put everything together in a real world setting. This is where the FAO first tests his or her skills and meets the foreign challenges. All the hard work from language study and graduate school pays off as the FAO ventures out on his or her own, often without a safety net. Whether in the host nation’s staff college or assisting the Army Attache or on the road, everything learned to date comes into play.

For FAOs who do ICT followed by graduate school, a very unique opportunity exists. The prudent FAO would be wise to keep the aforementioned five foreign policy elements in mind during his or her in-country time with an eye toward graduate school. While traveling within the host country and the region, talking with the US Ambassadors and the members of the country teams, and visiting host country civilian and military leaders, unique insights and information can be gained for inclusion in the required trip reports. In turn, these reports will serve as an invaluable primary, first hand source for use during graduate school. In essence, this is an extra year of hands on graduate field study. With a little advanced planning and organization, the accumulated trip reports can serve as the basis for several graduate papers, to include a thesis.

Whether FAOs serve as attaches, security assistance officers, political military officers, intelligence analysts, military liaison officers, or educators, the common denominator is the requirement to understand and use one’s knowledge of US foreign

(Continued on page 11)
Colombia: Civil-Military Relations at a Crossroads

By MAJ Jose G. Cristy, USMC, LATAM FAO

The problems facing the Colombian regime today are complex and violent, and they seem to be threatening the legitimacy of Colombia's political institutions. The magnitude of the challenge of coping with ever increasing levels of social violence, civil disorder, corruption, narcotrafficking and insurgency is threatening the very fabric of civil-military relations and civilian control.

The aim of this article is to explore the current state of civil-military relations in Colombia. In this single case study, my central argument is that civil-military relations in Colombia have eroded sufficiently to be a source of concern to students of political-military relations. This paper will discuss how the roles played by the National Front, the current political regime, U.S. military aid and budgetary restrictions have contributed to heightening the tension between civilian and military actors in the Colombian political scene. I will conclude with an appraisal of the possible consequences if the deterioration of civil-military relations in Colombia continues unchecked.

While the Congress and the Executive have done little or nothing to address the current state of the nation, the Colombian Armed Forces have served the country's political forces faithfully and professionally for over 60 years. Even today, as Colombia is experiencing an undeclared internal war on two fronts—the guerrilla movement and the drug cartels—the military remains supportive and loyal to the regime.

However, “the professionalism of the military has not kept them out of politics. Rather it has given the armed forces a strategic political goal— the capacity to influence fundamentally the outcome of internal political conflict—which the contenders seek to diminish” (Maulin 1973, 113). This role of ‘guardians of internal order’ has been one of the several factors in the erosion of civil-military relations in Colombia. Since, according to Wendy Hunter “strong civilian control is difficult to sustain when the armed forces are oriented mainly toward internal conflict (Hunter 1996, vii).” The other significant factor is the question of legitimacy surrounding the Ernesto Samper presidency. His administration has been plagued by serious allegations of presidential involvement with financial contributions from the cartels and continuous guerrilla activity. Nevertheless, it must be noted that on only four occasions has the Colombian military overturned a constitutionally chosen president: 1830, 1854, 1900 and 1953. For Latin America, an area plagued by military coups and military junta types of government, this speaks highly of the legitimacy and control exercised by the political authorities over the armed forces. This deviation from the norm -- if the norm is considered to be the military governments that existed in Chile, Peru, Uruguay, Argentina and Brazil during the 1960s and early 70s -- could be a direct result of a “semiconscious policy by the Colombian upper class to keep the military in its place and prevent any challenge to civilian rule” (Dix 1967, 295). Yet, other factors might have played a more significant role than those discussed by Robert H. Dix in Colombia: The Political Dimensions of Change. A closer inspection of the role played by the National Front in Colombian politics would support this view.

The National Front, an “elite pact”, responded to two threats in the Colombian political landscape of 1956: first, mass mobilization, over which the elites had lost control and was turning to mass violence. Second, to the threat posed by the military government of General Rojas Pinillas, as it attempted to displace the political parties and perpetuate an authoritarian regime (Peeler 1992, 95). In essence, what the National Front provided was a vehicle through which the political elite could exercise dominance over the political, social and economic process, promoting their own interests while avoiding social unrest. Nevertheless, the co-optation of the military by the civilian elite granted officers in the institution vast privileges and virtual autonomy (Otis 1998).

Military professionalism and the reluctance of the political elite to sponsor military solutions to domestic problems also contribute to the current civil-military panorama in Colombia.

(Continued on page 12)
Edwin Lieuwen points out two controlling factors that acted on the Colombian military as early as 1950: first, “the participation of a Colombian battalion in the Korea conflict, which stimulates the army’s sense of nationalism and gives it a sense of mission; and second, the influx of U.S. military aid” (Dix 1967, 299). However, the Brazilian experience with the return of its military contingent from the European theater in World War II and the recent de-certification of Colombia seem to refute both of these factors. In the Brazilian case the increase in the professionalism of the armed forces caused by their participation in the European theater of operations seems to have precipitated the institutions taking part in government. Furthermore, the U.S. de-certification of Colombia, seems to indicate that other factors, in addition to military aid, need to be present in order to increase the armed forces professionalism. Richard Maulin, in 1973, stated that U.S. military aid served two objectives: first to raise the military’s effectiveness in counter-insurgency operations and internal security missions; and secondly to promote the military’s contribution to social and economic progress (Maulin 1973, 100).

Nonetheless, today the insurgency problem continues to plague the nation, and social and economic problems seem more acute. Antonio Caballero, writing in Semana, directly accuses the military for the increase in subversive acts in the country. He wrote “They [the military] are in fact the principal cause for the increase. For decades Colombia’s government has given the military a free hand to put an end to subversion and the subversion has merely increased” (Raymont 1996, 3). Peru, Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil have had to confront a leftist threat. However, “the repression of the Colombian left and the magnitude of its losses [over 30,000 left wing militants, activist and sympathizers killed] are unparalleled in modern Latin American history” (Castañeda 1994, 116). By the late 1980s, it was obvious that the military had lost control over both the subversive forces and the drug cartels. With regard to the issue of military participation in nation building, according to Wendy Hunter, military participation in civic and developmental roles contribute to create a positive image for the military, while it underlines the development of civilian institutions and contribute to a greater military role in government (Hunter 1996, 6). In the Colombian situation, the military’s expanded involvement with civic and developmental programs in the country would further weaken the Colombian government in terms of efficacy and efficiency. This would lead to further erosion of civil-military relations, as civil society would perceive the regime as being unable to meet, through the use of civil institutions, the social, economic and security objectives of the population.

The fact remains that “a fear of an upsurge of militarism is spreading [throughout the area] at a time when the Latin American community is committed to demilitarizing the region and strengthening civilian society” (Raymont 1996, 9). Nonetheless, an analysis of the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database on Colombia’s military spending from 1986 to 1995 clearly shows that militarism, at least for the Colombian military is not on the rise. On the contrary, Colombian armed forces have experienced a significant decline in their operating budget since 1993, at which time it was 1.1 billion dollars; 1994, 900 million; and 1995, 825 million dollars (SIPRI Database, 1996). Furthermore, according to the National Planning Department, military expenditures during the period from 1990 to 1994 totaled 3.4 billion dollars. This is during a period in which Colombia’s long-running war with leftist guerrillas claimed more than 17,000 lives at a cost of about 12.5 billion dollars between 1990 and 1994 (Reuters 1996). For example, according to the National Defense Council, combined income sources yield an average income of 70,000 dollars per guerrilla, compared to 900 dollars per soldier in the Army (Raymont, 1996). These budgetary cuts have done severe harm to political-military relations, since not only have they affected salaries, pensions and benefits, they have impacted on the military’s operational capabilities as demonstrated by the institutions failure in the recent combat in El Caguan.

 Colombian columnist Clara Nieto Ponce de Leon, writing in El Espectador, points out that “the military do not need a coup in order to exercise power; the government--more debili-
IN-COUNTRY TRAINING SITES

Argentina (Buenos Aires) - 2
Chile (Santiago) - 1
Ecuador (Quito) - 2
Mexico (Mexico City) - 2
Uruguay (Montevideo) - 1
Bolivia (Cochabamba) - 1
Brazil (Rio de Janeiro) - 2
Colombia (Bogota) - 1*
Guatemala (Guatemala City) - 3
Peru (Lima) - 1
Venezuela (Caracas) - 3

* Currently not filled due to security considerations.

ABBREVIATIONS

A/ARMA - ASSISTANT ARMY ATTACHE
ARMA - ARMY ATTACHE
CAC - COMBINED ARMS CENTER
CHF - CHIEF
DAS - DEFENSE ATTACHE SYSTEM
DATT - DEFENSE ATTACHE
DCSCMO - DEP C/S (CIVIL-MIL OPS), USARSO
DCSOPS - DEP C/S FOR PLANS & OPS, DA
DIA - DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DSAA - DEFENSE SECURITY ASST AGENCY
DUSA-IA - DEP UNDERSECRETARY OF THE ARMY FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
IADB - INTERAMERICAN DEFENSE BOARD
IADC-INTERAMERICAN DEFENSE COLLEGE
JMUUSDC-JOINT MEX-US DEF COMMISSION
MAAG-MILITARY ASST GP
NDU-NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
ODC-OFFICE OF DEFENSE COOPERATION
OOTW-OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR
SAO- SECURITY ASSIST OFFICER
SMA-SENIOR MILITARY ANALYST
SMIO-SEN MIL INTELL OFFICER
SOA-SCHOOL OF AMERICAS
TIPA-TREATY IMPLEMENTATION/PANAMA

CURRENT POSITIONS

O6 / COL
ARMY POSITIONS

SOA COMMANDANT - FT. BENNING
USAWC DIR, AMERICAN STUDIES - CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA

JOINT POSITIONS

DSAA CDR, MILGP - ARGENTINA
DSAA CDR, MILGP - BOLIVIA
DSAA CDR, MILGP - COLOMBIA
DSAA CDR, MIL LNO OFF - ECUADOR
DSAA CDR, MILGP - EL SALVADOR
DSAA CDR, MILGP - HONDURAS
DSAA CDR, MILGP - GUATEMALA
DSAA CDR, MILGP - VENEZUELA
DSAA CDR, USMAAG - PERU
DSAA CDR, USODC - PARAGUAY
DAS CHIEF, DHOS5 - WASH, DC
DAS DATT / ARMA - BRAZIL
DAS DATT / ARMA - COLOMBIA
DAS DATT / ARMA - ECUADOR
O5 / LTC

ARMY POSITIONS

CAC     INST/AUTHOR, STRAT STUDIES DIV-FT LEAVENWORTH
CAC     INSTR/AUTHOR, OOTW - FT LEAVENWORTH
DUSA-IA LA REG DESK OFF x 2, REG INT/ASSES DIV - WASH, DC
DUSA-IA CHF, TOUR BR, FOR LN DIV - WASH DC
DCSINT-DA SENIOR LATAM ANALYST, ANALYSIS DIV - WASH, DC
DCSOPS-DA FAO REG MGR, FAO PROP DIV - WASH, DC
SOA     CHF OF STAFF - FT BENNING
SOA     DIR, JOINT/COMBINED OPS - FT BENNING
SOA     CHF, STRATEGY DIV - FT BENNING
MIL REVIEW EDITOR, PORTUGUESE EDITION-FT LEAVENWORTH
MIL REVIEW EDITOR, SPANISH EDITION - FT LEAVENWORTH
HQ,ASCC SOUTH CHF, TACTICAL TNG BR
HQ,ASCC SOUTH CHF, PLANS DIV
TRADOC   PROG MGR (LATAM) - FT MONROE

JOINT POSITIONS

DSAA    CHF, ARMY SECT, USMLO - BRAZIL
DSAA    CHF, USMLO - JAMAICA
DSAA    MIL LN OFF, USMLO - HAITI
DSAA    CHF, USMLO - TRINIDAD & TOBAGO
DSAA    ARMY REP/TRNG OFF, USMILGP - CHILE
DSAA    SR ARMY REP, USMAAG - PERU
DSAA    LNO (NATIONAL GUARD), USMILGP - VENEZUELA
DSAA    ARMY REP, USMILGP - VENEZUELA
DSAA    ARMY REP, USMILGP - URUGUAY
DSAA    ARMY REP, USGO CEN - HONDURAS
DSAA    ARMY REP, USMILGP - GUATEMALA
DSAA    ARMY REP, USMILGP - PARAGUAY
DSAA    CHF, USO CEN - COSTA RICA
DSAA    CHF, ARMY SECT, USMILGP - COLOMBIA
DSAA    CHF, ARMY SECT, USMILGP - BOLIVIA
DSAA    SEC ASST OFCR, USMILGP - ARGENTINA
TIPA     DEP FOR OPS - PANAMA
NDU FACULTY, JT/COMB STF OFF SCH - WASH DC
OJCS OPS OFFICER, CNOD ADMIN - WASH, DC
OJCS STAFF OFF (IADB/JMUSCD) - WASH DC
OJCS POL-MIL PLNER x 2, N/S AMER BR - WASH DC
OJCS POL-MIL PLNER, CARIB BASIN BR - WASH DC
OJCS WESTERN HEMI PLNR, CONV WAR DIV - WASH DC
SOUTHCOM SPEC ASST TO CINC - MIAMI
SOUTHCOM CHF, POL-MIL AFFAIRS DIV - MIAMI
SOUTHCOM CHF, SECURITY ASST DIV - MIAMI
SOUTHCOM CHF, GRND OPS DIV - MIAMI
SOUTHCOM CHF, REG BR - MIAMI
DIA DEP SEC FOR CONFERENCE - WASH
DIA CH, AMERICAS' BRANCH - WASH, DC
DAS ADIO (LATAM)
DAS DATT / ARMA - BOLIVIA
DAS DATT / ARMA - HAITI
DAS DATT / ARMA - BARBADOS
DAS DATT / ARMA - PARAGUAY
DAS DATT / ARMA - SURINAME
DAS ARMA - DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
DAS A/ARMA - ARGENTINA
DAS A/ARMA - BRAZIL
DAS A/ARMA - COLOMBIA
DAS A/ARMA - HONDURAS
DAS A/ARMA - MEXICO x 2
STATE DPT SPEC ASST FOR PLANS, ONDCP - WASH DC

MAJ / 04

ARMY POSITIONS
HQDA ODCSINT REG ANALYST x 2, ANALYSIS DIV - WASH, DC
III CORPS HQ PLANS OFF x 2, PLANS SECT - FT. HOOD
USMA INSTR x 3, FOR LANG DPT - WEST POINT
USMA INSTR, SOC SCI DPT - WEST POINT
DLI TNG OFFICER - MONTEREY
USAF ACADEMY INSTR, HISTORY DPT - COLORADO SPRNGS

JOINT POSITIONS
IADB XO TO CHRMN, IADB - WASH, DC
IADB XO TO DIR, IADC - WASH DC
DSAA COUNTRY MGR - WASH DC
DSAA REG OPS/PLN OFF, SA SEC - DEF REP, PANAMA
DSAA TNG OFF - EL SALVADOR
SOUTHCOM POL-MIL OFF x 6, POL/MIL DIV - MIAMI
SOUTHCOM SEC ASST OFF, SEC ASST DIV - MAIMI
SOUTHCOM CINC AIDE-DE-CAMP - MIAMI
SOUTHCOM MIL AFFRS OFF, WASH FLD OFF - WASH, DC
SOUTHCOM OPS OFF, GRND OPS BR - MIAMI
SOUTHCOM STAFF OFF, REGIONAL BR - MIAMI
SOUTHCOM COUNTER-DRUG PLANS OFF, CD PLANS DIV - MIAMI
SOUTHCOM  HUMANITARIAN ASST OFF, LOG RES/READ DIV - MIAMI
DIA       LATAM BR INTEL OFF x 3 - WASH, DC
DIA       LATAM REG ANALYSTS x 7 - WASH DC
DAS       A/ARMA x 2 - BRAZIL
DAS       A/ARMA - CHILE
DAS       A/ARMA x 2 - EL SALVADOR
DAS       A/ARMA - GUATEMALA
DAS       A/ARMA - HAITI
DAS       A/ARMA - HONDURAS
DAS       A/ARMA x 2 - MEXICO
DAS       A/ARMA - PANAMA
DAS       A/ARMA - PERU
TIPA      OPS OFF x 2, OPS DIV - PANAMA
HQ ACSS SOUTH  OPS OFF, OPS DIV - PUERTO RICO
HQ ACSS SOUTH  OPS OFF (FAO), EXERCISE DIV - PUERTO RICO
HQ ACSS SOUTH  PLANS OFF x 2, PLANS DIV - PUERTO RICO
PERSCOM  PERSONNEL ASSIGNMENTS OFF, FAM-D - WASH DC
DSAA      OPS/PLANS OFF, USMILGP - COLOMBIA
DSAA      TRG OFF, USMILGP - EL SALVADOR
DSAA      ARMY REP, USMILGP - GUATEMALA
DSAA      OPS/PLANS OFF, USMILGP - BOLIVIA
LANTCOM  JNT TNG OFF, USMIL LNO (E. CARIBBEAN)
LANTCOM  SEC ASST OFF, USMIL LNO (W. CARIBBEAN)

48B Snapshot

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Total 148
AFRICAN OUTREACH: A Successful Experiment in Social Interaction
by CPT Steve Parker, Sub-Saharan African FAO

On Friday, 3 April 1998, at 1600, a social was held for US Sub-Saharan African FAOs and the many African exchange officers attending the Naval Post-graduate School in Monterey, CA. The gathering was very successful and heavily attended by both FAOs, the African exchange officers and their spouses. Although targeted at the NPS, a visiting African studies student from the Monterey Institute of International Studies was a welcome addition to the function.

The reason for this brief article is to illustrate what a little initiative can accomplish and to draw other FAO trainees into the concept of “making foreign contacts” even during their graduate schooling phase of training. Whether it is planned on a grand scale or as a small intimate gathering, taking advantage of exchange students visiting from your target countries is a quick way of establishing friendships and professional contacts for the future. Remember that most exchange students studying in this country are the “best and brightest” that their respective countries have to offer — they come from the elites of industry, military, academia, and the government. If your graduate programs have social interaction between US and foreign students as a part of their curriculum then you need to take advantage of them, but if not don’t let that stop you from taking that first step to making regional contacts.

The genesis of our African get-together was just that — an effort to meet people from our region of interest before we became stationed there. In this case, the school administration (represented by the International Student Affairs Office at NPS) were very supportive of the effort and provided E-Mail addresses and a distribution list of African exchange officers on campus. Of course, being located in Monterey, adjacent to the Defense Language Institute, allow us to also take advantage of the good graces of the FAO Liaison Officer at DLI for administrative support.

The focus of the event was simply meeting people and exchanging addresses and business cards in a relaxed, informal environment. Now that we have been successful in putting together this first social (and realize that it isn’t quite as tough as it appeared at first) we plan to have other functions to further the ties with our new foreign friends. Future events/socials may be planned as “ice breakers” for the in-coming students of the short security courses held at NPS. And thereby integrating these students into our circle as well. We have even talked of initiating a regular sponsorship program for foreign students that would span all of the regional specialties taught at the school.

A GREAT OPPORTUNITY FOR PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN FAOS AND THEIR FUTURE REGIONS!
recently reasserted his leadership as Commander-in-Chief with denies the turning over of the country to the military forces and lence, questions the legitimacy of the state. President Samper belongs to the state, then Colombia, with its proliferation of vio-

Linz is correct in asserting that the monopoly on the use of force than ever--will give them free rein” (Raymont 1996, 4). If Linz is correct in asserting that the monopoly on the use of force belongs to the state, then Colombia, with its proliferation of vio-

ence, questions the legitimacy of the state. President Samper denies the turning over of the country to the military forces and recently reasserted his leadership as Commander-in-Chief with his handling of disgruntled officers over concessions to guerrilla groups in the peace process. There is no doubt that in the war to eradicate guerrilla violence and drug traffic, the armed forces enjoy the support of both the business and political sectors. But, after four decades of fighting guerrillas, the armed forces are still in search of a national and military strategy that will bring a peaceful solution to the conflict.

In conclusion, Colombia’s “pattern of control in which civilians respect military autonomy over operational matters in exchange for voluntary military subordination to civilian authority on other matters” is experiencing severe strain (Snider and Carlton-Carew 1995, 5). The civilian elites’ use of subjective civilian control, which originated with the creation of the National Front, has been successful in co-opting and politicizing the armed forces. However, it is no longer effective in dealing with Colombia’s current political challenges. The military aid provided by the U.S. gives the Colombian military the means by which to protect its autonomy, but has failed to meet its objective of increasing military effectiveness in promoting internal security, social and economic progress. Furthermore, the tension between civil and military elites continue to rise due to the failure of the current regime to frame a solution to the insurgency problem based not only on the use of military force, but also on social, economic and political justice. Another factor contributing to the erosion of political-military relations is the question of legitimacy that plagues the Samper presidency. Finally, the budgetary reductions suffered by the armed forces have made them ‘non-combat effective’, which threatens the institutions ethos - its professionalism.

One can categorically state that the armed forces in Colombia remain supportive of the political system and under firm governmental control, although tensions are high. Thus, they are not in a position to act as a main protagonist in any move to stifle the continual development of democratic institutions. Yet, NOTIMEX has reported, and U.S. Ambassador to Colombia, Myles Frachette confirmed, that civilians have approached the U.S. Embassy in Colombia in order to explore relations with the U.S. in case of a coup. The Colombian military as a supporting actor is a case of a coup. The Colombian military as a supporting actor is a "pattern of control in which civilians respect military autonomy over operational matters in exchange for voluntary military subordination to civilian authority on other matters" is experiencing severe strain (Snider and Carlton-Carew 1995, 5). The civilian elites' use of subjective civilian control, which originated with the creation of the National Front, has been successful in co-opting and politicizing the armed forces. However, it is no longer effective in dealing with Colombia's current political challenges. The military aid provided by the U.S. gives the Colombian military the means by which to protect its autonomy, but has failed to meet its objective of increasing military effectiveness in promoting internal security, social and economic progress. Furthermore, the tension between civil and military elites continue to rise due to the failure of the current regime to frame a solution to the insurgency problem based not only on the use of military force, but also on social, economic and political justice. Another factor contributing to the erosion of political-military relations is the question of legitimacy that plagues the Samper presidency. Finally, the budgetary reductions suffered by the armed forces have made them 'non-combat effective', which threatens the institutions ethos - its professionalism.

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SWISS CHEESE: Life of a United States Attaché to Switzerland

By Colonel Bob McBride

Editor's Note: Have you ever wondered what the life of an Attaché is like? COL Robert McBride kept a journal for his first months in his new assignment as the Defense and Army Attaché to Switzerland. That journal gives us a glimpse into the life of an attaché. After six months as a geographic bachelor, his family joined him in August. Following are some of his impressions and experiences as a new attaché to a traditionally neutral country that is experiencing some historic changes in outlook.

As I read back over my journal, I recalled often wondering just what the business end of being an attaché was all about. In choosing some of the highlights to illustrate what I do for a living, I was amazed at how quickly a new defense attaché gets involved in the nuts and bolts of the political-military relationship. Being a defense attaché forces allows you to use virtually all of your past military experience to the benefit of the country team as well as the host country’s defense and military community. The other surprising reflection is how much happens in one year in the assignment, how quickly that first year goes by, and how short the remaining two years appear compared to the goals and objectives we have set. Don’t pass on attaché duty if it comes your way.

2 Feb 97

My official accreditation to Switzerland is a week from tomorrow. I will meet with the Chief of the General Staff, the J-2, and with the new Chief of Staff of the Army, LTG Dousse. General Dousse is one year younger than I am and was just promoted to Lieutenant General on the first of January as he took his new post. He was hand picked by the Minister who is trying to get some younger officers into the senior positions in the Swiss Army.

The 13th is my welcome reception at the ambassador’s residence. 200 people were invited, and we expect about 100 to come, including several of the ambassadors of friendly countries, and much of the senior leadership from the Swiss MOD, General Staff, and the services. I’m thinking about wearing my dress blues, since I will be the only U.S. Army officer in the room.

The Air Attaché said to me tonight, "You're the DATT. You can wear whatever you want."

28 Feb 97

Just returned from the Swiss Army ski week for attachés and families. Many of the attachés who cover Switzerland from Paris, Rome, Bonn, or Vienna also attend this annual event. I spent the entire week not only learning to ski but also interpreting all of the instructions and training from French into English. The Swiss Army instructors for the beginners’ group only spoke French, and the other folks in the class only spoke English or German. Sometimes I had to interpret from French to German because the Turkish boy speaks mainly German. This all meant that I got everything twice, so it probably helped me to learn better how to ski.

Breath taking beauty is a rare thing. Merle Haggard sang, "If God doesn't live in Colorado, I bet that's where he spends most of his time." I don't know how much time Merle ever spent here in Switzerland, but, after the last two days, I would beg to differ with him.

Toward the end of this week, the sky cleared off over all of Switzerland for the first time since I arrived eleven days ago. The scenery surrounding Bern is dominated from the southeast to the southwest by the snow crested Alps of the Berner Oberland and, most prominent among them, the peaks of the Eiger, the Munch, and the Jungfrau, three of Switzerland's most famous mountains. This beautiful setting dominates the skyline from any high or open terrain in or around Bern and makes a house with a southern view and a large window one of the most important attractions to those who can swing it.

Saturday morning I drove southeast from Bern toward Interlaken. The city takes its name from its place on the Aare River between two huge lakes called the Thunersee and the Brienzersee. Interlaken is "between the lakes." As I entered the Berner Oberland and approached the beautiful mountains on either side, I came over a rise in the freeway, and then I literally drew in my breath in surprise. I was looking at the entire valley floor filled with clear, beautiful water and reflecting the surrounding peaks in the morning sun. This was the view from the western end of the Thunersee, twelve miles long and three miles across, looking southeast toward its other end and the higher mountains beyond.

It was so beautiful I had to stop the car at a little restaurant parking lot right down on the water just to be able to enjoy the stillness of the lake's beauty for a few minutes. Continuing my drive, I bypassed Interlaken and drove south into the mountains to a little town called Interkirchen that is almost at the headwaters of the Aare River. That high in the mountains, the Aare is clear, rambling stream with a white stone creek bed and is lined by beautiful trees. I stood on the small bridge that crosses it at Interkirchen and enjoyed the sun reflecting of the water and the rocks. The pleasant sound of the rather quick running stream was one I think I will drive back to hear again and again. In winter months, the road south from Interkirchen is closed because of the snow. In the spring I can drive that way to go on through the Grimsel Pass to get into the Valais, the next east-west valley, south of the Bernese Alps.

9 Feb 97

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The Crans-Montana is a famous ski and mountaineering resorts in the Valais region. It sits about half way up the southern slope of

(Continued on page 21)
Board of Governors Election

On or about Nov. 1, 1998, the Association will mail out ballots for the election of new Board of Governors (who will serve for the next three years, beginning in January 1999) to all FAOA members. A slate of candidates will be offered to the membership for their approval or disapproval. The objective of building a slate of candidates was to ensure a balance in the representation of the association membership. Members will have the option of “writing-in” choices other than those on the slate of candidates. Ballots can be returned by mail, fax, or E-Mail, but must be received before 15 December 1998 to be counted. Results of the election will be compiled in time for publication in the December issue of the FAO Journal.

What’s Next With FAOA?

- **College Scholarships.** Our Charter requires that the Association return some of its income to the community in the form of College Scholarships to encourage the study of regional or international relations within the United States. A College Scholarship Committee has been approved and a volunteer chairman named. He will shortly begin to establish the requirements and criteria for our scholarship program. We will also make any changes necessary in our By-Laws to support the new program. Our initial thoughts are to support two annual scholarships of $1,000 each, to be awarded to a winning association member (or member of their family). If this is successful then we will expand from there.

- **Corporate Sponsorship.** As we grow — and we are now at about 1,000 members — the need for a “real” staff is becoming more concrete. The volunteer staff has done great work up to now, but as a few of you know from experience it makes mistakes. A part-time staff (membership, accounting, and journal as a minimum) will guarantee good service to the membership for the future — especially as we continue to grow. Individual member dues alone will not “float the boat” (they cover the journal publication and mailing, the web-site rental, phone and fax service, etc.). Only Corporate memberships (for companies that use regional specialists) and Corporate donations can solve this problem. For now we only ask that you give some thought to how your company could help FAOA.

- **Seminars and Socials.** Believe it or not, we have been working on concept plan for developing a series of regional seminars and socials (initially in the Washington, DC area and if successful there then in other locations too). We are negotiating with both DIA and AUSA as possible co-sponsors for such professional development events. The concept is to have an all-day seminar, focusing on a specific region of the world, with speakers from academia, business, and the government, followed by a reception or dinner at a local ethnic restaurant. Your ideas and inputs are welcome.

Current Addresses

While we have mentioned it again and again, you need to get your address updates to us as soon as you move. You are the only source of current addresses for us. Members phone in constantly, demanding to know why they have not gotten the latest journal. When we research their complaints, nine out of ten times they failed to update their address when they last moved. The issue here is monetary. It cost only 19 cents for us to send your journal out in bulk (using our non-profit status), but it costs $2.05 to send them out singly. We are willing to do this if necessary, but it is not a good way to spend your dues.
Swiss Cheese, continued from page 19

the mountains on the north side of the valley. The closest large towns are Sierre and Sion. When you get high enough in the cable cars to see further to the south over the tops of the mountains, the impression is much like looking West over the Rocky Mountains when taking off or landing in an airplane in Denver. The mountains simply go on forever, as far as you can see. Switzerland truly is "the roof of Europe" and has some of the most beautiful mountain scenery I have ever seen in my life.

15 Mar 97

Went shopping yesterday in Bern. The altstadt (the old part of the city) is so fun, because it is like a rabbit warren of small shops and covered sidewalks. I ended up going down toward the point of the bend in the river and then made my way back up by the cathedral (the Munster). I walked out onto the terrace above the river. It is a favorite meeting place in Bern, with lots of people just enjoying the sun and having something to eat or drink. The paths are hard dirt, so it is the favorite place in town to play Boules, Bacci, lawn bowling, or Petanque. I'll have to take the kids down there to play sometime. I know I'm not good enough to compete with the regulars.

I stepped inside the cathedral just to look and heard the choir beginning their warm ups for a practice. I sat down to listen into a free concert. They were getting ready for the Saturday evening and Sunday morning services. It is a Protestant cathedral, so in their services they tend to sing a little more than in a catholic service. They did everything a capella. The director would give them the tone and off they would go. It was very, very lovely. I want to go back sometime to hear them singing with the organ. Next Sunday afternoon is a performance in the cathedral by the Bern Oratorio society, so I am trying to get a ticket for that.

30 Mar 97

I attended a very interesting luncheon with the Deputy Chief of Mission last week. We had two staff officers down from HQ, US European Command. They are staff experts on the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. Switzerland joined PfP last fall, and they prepared their first years program based on the list of possible events from NATO. US EUCOM spends a lot of time arranging bilateral PfP exercises between the US and one or more other PfP member countries, so that entire effort is outside the bounds of the "NATO sponsored" fist of PfP exercises. We wanted the Swiss Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs to understand the difference between the two efforts and to start looking at the possibility of US-Swiss bilateral exercises or Swiss hosted NATO sponsored exercises. We had two ambassadors, one from each from the two ministries, both responsible for Swiss national security policy.

The EUCOM briefing was an eye opener for them. The Swiss are trying to keep a low profile in their first year of participation. Any thing that sounds like a Swiss soldier saddling up and going "down range" for a military exercise outside Switzerland is too politically sensitive to be in the first annual report going to parliament. Since all PfP exercises can only be based on peace enforcement at the tactical level, the Swiss can use their expertise in such areas as search and rescue and peace keeping. Frankly, we were surprised at their lack of detailed understanding of the program they just signed up for. It was a good effort. The next move is to take the guy from the General Staff who actually sits down and drafts the annual program for the Swiss up to Stuttgart to brief the Operations and Policy guys on the Swiss Program and his political constraints. This kind of effort is a good example of our representational role for DOD, JCS, and the Unified Command.

I finally got a weekend to get away and study some more about Switzerland. I drove up to Zurich for two days of museum hopping. Saturday was 5 hours plus in the Swiss National Museum. I stayed as long as my back could hold out. It is a very impressive museum, and I seem to remember parts of it from back in my FAO trainee days in 1984. The large weapons hall portrays the history and evolution of infantry weapons from Roman times up to the 19th century. I remembered the display of six life size figures dressed in their medieval half armor and forming a defensive square with pikes and long spears. It is a very impressive display of their armor, their weapons, and their tactics for defending themselves against the mounted horsemen. I'm a heavy cavalryman at heart, but I would hate to have to ride my horse into such a formation.

(Swiss Cheese, Continued on Page 22)
I had to go down to Lausanne for a day and a half Tuesday and Wednesday. This was for an OSCE demonstration by the Swiss Army of their new "Piranha" armored personnel carrier. I was one of two U.S. representatives. I learned more about the Swiss Army (Training, tactics, Mechanized Infantry, Artillery, and outlook) in 24 hours than I had learned in the last six months. It was fun to put my BDU's on and actually get my boots dusty.

15 APR 97

Thursday was an organized visit for the foreign attaches to the Swiss Army Engineer School. More good stuff, and more insight into how they train. The lieutenant, platoon leader, in charge of a pontoon bridge demonstration (six sections with two end ramps making a 100 meter, 60 ton bridge across a river) told me he had been a lieutenant for six months. This time last year he was a corporal in Engineer Officers' School. Half way through every basic training course, several soldiers are singled out to become corporals. They finish their basic training with that in mind. Of those, a select few are tapped to go to Officers Training. Understand, this is all militia, similar to our National Guard. They go to basic training for 15 weeks, but that includes what we do at Advanced Individual Training after basic. Then they come back for three weeks active duty every two years until they are 42 years old, or 52 in the case of officers. Only about 3,500 Officers and NCOs are full time active duty. The entire force, if mobilized, would be 450,000. Every Swiss male citizen is liable for military service. Quite a system.

MAY 97 - Appenzell

Major General Markus Rusch (who is now serving as the Swiss Defense Attaché in Washington) and his wife, Ruth, invited a few of us to their home canton of Appenzell to see the annual exercise of direct democracy known as "Landsgemeinde." This event always takes place on the last Sunday in April.

At 12 noon sharp, the cantonal ceremonial band and the seven color guards escort the members of the government and the fourteen judges from the cantonal court down from the government house to the Landsgemeinde Platz. They do a traditional slow march, with the color guards doing the circular waving of the flags as you often see in movies about Europe. The members of the government and the judges are all dressed in their dark robes and all marching carrying their hats in their hands, because the hat is the symbol of their authority. They have to be re-elected in order to continue to wear it.

Once they and all invited official guests have taken their places, the head of government (the Landemann) takes over as the master of ceremonies. All the official greetings are spoken in high German, because many of the official visitors are from Germany or from other cantons of Switzerland where the local dialect of Appenzell would be hard for them to understand. Once the main business begins, however, the Landemann reverts to Appenzell.

The first official act is to re-elect the government or for the citizens to propose new members for any of the government posts, primary among them and first to be voted on, the Landemann himself. (In Arizona we would call him the chairman of the board of supervisors. Sorry, it's hard for me to think of him as the governor of a State, but in fact by law, that is his equivalent level.) The Landemann goes down off the stage and faces away from the citizens so he can't see their votes. His deputy gives the Landemann's name and says that it is proposed that he be retained in office for another year. Then he asks if any citizen has another candidate to propose, (None did.) Then he says, "this being the case, the Landemann is re-elected." The Landemann returns to the stage and takes over for the rest of the ceremony.

Each of the names of the other six members of the government is approved by the same process, each of them going down from the stage in their turn. Once this is done, the fourteen judges all have to step down and face away at the same time. Each of them is re-elected in the same way and they resume their places one at a time in turn on the stage in front of the citizens.

Now is when the Landemann takes his oath for the coming year, and then he reads the citizen's oath, that they all repeat back to him with their thumb and first two fingers held in the air (representing the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost).

From here on it is less symbolic and more down to business. The only two real votes were on the fiscal proposals for the coming year and a proposal that retail establishments be allowed to have "sales" more than twice a year. Both proposals passed, with the Landemann asking, "all those in favor of this proposal, please show it by raising your hand, and all those opposed please show it." You can imagine my emotions at watching this. I told Markus the last time I had seen anything like that was in my church. He found that very interesting.

The weather was miserable, with rain most of the day, but that did not hamper the solemnity of the ceremonies in any way. The judges and members of government stood uncovered in the rain until they were re-elected. At each point when the citizens knew they were going to be called upon to vote, they would lower their umbrellas. Then they would come back up again after the vote.

Markus said he remembered an issue being controversial from when he was a little boy, and that the vote was so nearly split that the Landemann had to ask the citizens to go to one side of the square or the other depending on how they wanted to vote and then he had to try to count the votes.

That was it. The band and color guards escorted them back out, this time wearing their hats proudly, the Landemann's just a little bit taller (almost a conservative stove pipe) than the others. As he passed the two police officers who had been escorting him earlier they saluted. He grabbed the brim of his hat and removed it down to his waist to return the salute. I was so impressed I said, "Markus, did you see him return that salute properly." He said, "Yes, of course. He commanded a company in my battalion."
June 97

I recently got to visit the factory of the MOWAG corporation, the manufacturers of the Pirhana Infantry Fighting vehicle. During the MOWAG visit, I met a Corporal White, Swiss Army. I was staring at his nametag and he was staring at mine. I said “How did you end up in the Swiss Army with a name like White. He said, "My dad was from Scotland. You have a Scottish name too, don’t you." He has been in Switzerland for five years, so he had to do his military service or leave. He is starting officers training, so he will be a lieutenant a year from now. We were speaking French to start with and he didn't recognize my uniform so he was surprised when I told him about my great grandfather going to America from Scotland in 1856. Once we got it straight that I am a U.S. colonel, we enjoyed the coincidence. I gave him my card and told him to call me the next time he makes it to Bern.

This past week we enjoyed the visit of Dr. John White, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense. He is a very friendly man whom the Swiss enjoyed visiting. In the country team meeting before his meetings with the Swiss Chief of Staff and the Swiss Minister of Defense, I was able to brief him on Swiss government efforts to relook their National Security Strategy and their place in Europe over the next twenty years.

I also brought him up to date on our efforts to resolve the dispute over work done by the Swiss on artillery cannon for the United Arab Emirates but using U.S. technology which they did not have permission to release. I was able to begin the process of negotiating offsetting work which will resolve the dispute. The U. S - Army arsenal in Watervliet, New York will forge cannon barrels that will come back to Switzerland and be used by the Swiss Army to upgrade their own weapons. This solution was the result of my working with the chief of artillery systems in the Swiss Armaments Procurement Agency on proposals to get the negotiations started. The second time I sat in his office, I told him, "Peter, if this problem has a solution at all, you and I are the guys who can make it work." We sat for two hours and drafted a letter for his boss, the Swiss Armaments Director, going back to General Kicklighter in the Army Secretariat in the Pentagon (Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for International Affairs). It stated the Swiss proposal for offsetting work. General Kicklighter's folks liked it (I was calling them on the phone from Peter's office as we drafted the Swiss letter), and he signed a nice response within the following two weeks.

This dispute was brewing as I came to the job here. Each week the Political officer would mention the M109 Howitzer dispute and the latest nasty notes between the U.S. and the Swiss government. I finally got tired of it and asked the Ambassador if there was anything I could do besides "wring my hands." That began my direct coordination with General Kicklighter's office.

July-August 97. Most of this time was taken up with helping my family move from Virginia to Switzerland. I also attended my son’s high school graduation and traveled across the U.S., via the northern route, to a big family reunion in Oregon. Got back with everyone in place by mid August.

August 97

The highlight of this past week was a cocktail party and reception to say hello to Sharon. Since she got to meet most of the attaches and wives in February, we concentrated on the Military Department, the General Staff, the Army Staff, and the National Armaments Agency. Ambassador Kunin insisted on stopping by, in spite of eight houseguests and a dinner of her own. Mr. Wicki, the Swiss Armaments Director and number three in the MOD also joined the group. He is in better spirits lately since the U.S. Army Staff in the Pentagon is really trying hard to help resolve the howitzer barrel dispute. George and Carolyn Walton, the Air Attaché couple, hosted the event in their 15th floor penthouse, since my dayroom furniture doesn't look too cool in our house. We had about 50 people and it was a nice evening. The group also included over a dozen Major Generals and wives, from the General Staff and Army Staff and two division cdrs.

Friday, I attended a memorial ceremony for LTG Jean-Rodolphe Christen, former Chief of the Swiss Army (Ground Forces), who just retired last December. It was sad to see him go so soon after his retirement. While there, I saw and spoke to Mrs. Schlup, the widow of the former Swiss Defense Attaché to Washington. Sharon and I want to go pay her a visit soon. She and her husband, MG Hans Schlup, went on all the attaché trips I organized in my foreign liaison job in the Pentagon.

Out in front of the cathedral, I got to introduce myself to MG Max Riner, one of the division commanders in the Swiss Army, and a graduate of the U.S. Army War College. I had seen his picture and knew he was a War College grad, but had not yet had a chance to meet him. I made sure he was invited to our 4th of July event, but he was out of town. As I introduced myself, in German, and he looked at my uniform, he smiled and said, "Sie sprechen unheimlich gut Deutsch." (You speak unusually good German.) That made my day, of course, and then I made his by telling him that War College grads have to stick together. He is class of ’89. He also knew what I meant when I told him I did it "the hard way." I look forward to inviting him over for dinner and getting to know him better. He seemed like a very friendly guy and insisted that I come pay him a visit.

Next Thursday, Sharon and I are hosting a barbecue luncheon on our patio for the Swiss Military Protocol Office. This is the equivalent of our foreign liaison offices in the Pentagon, but they have the protocol function on top. I feel sorry for them. Not a very big office, and they take wonderful care of the attaché community (very small by comparison to D.C.) and do all the traditional protocol functions. Our office hosts them to lunch every week (very small by comparison to D.C.) and do all the traditional protocol functions. Our office hosts them to lunch every week.

Sep 97

My West European DATT conference this week is at the embassy in Madrid. Two days discussing the emerging European security architecture, and then we get to spend some cultural time...
down in Toledo. I told the kids how impressed I had been with Madrid and Toledo 13 years ago when I was traveling through as a FAO trainee. Can't believe it has been that long since I was there, but indeed, our Jeannette was a brand new baby then, and she just turned 13 this summer.

We are happy to be getting some U.S. Marines and Navy SEALS, and perhaps some National Guard Special Forces troops, to come to Switzerland in October to participate in an international airborne and patrol competition for "elite" troops. Looks like we will get U.S. C-130's for them to jump out of. This will be a first for the U.S. and is a warm up for further similar events in Switzerland under the Partnership for Peace umbrella.

It looks like the howitzer barrel negotiations between the U.S. Army and the Swiss Armaments Agency went well. I am happy to have had a hand in getting them to the table and making it turn out right. Now if the Army can get the State Department and Congress to lay off the Swiss, we may have the beginning of a very lucrative cooperation agreement for U.S. industry to sell U.S. upgraded M-109 howitzers with Swiss cannon. Both sides make money and the customer gets the weapon he wants.

Today was the first day of school for Jeannette and Sean. Their bus (van) comes at 0725. Jeannette has about 12 classmates in 8th grade, three of whom are American. Sean has about 21 classmates in 10th grade, and they are split into two groups. They both are taking English, French and German at the same time. This is the mandatory language program at the school, in addition to their normal math, science, social studies, etc. I am glad they are having this opportunity at their age.

Oct 97

Yesterday, I was the guest U.S. officer at the annual meeting of the Swiss Fort Benning Club. The organization is composed of all Swiss Army officers who are graduates of the U.S. Army Infantry Officers Advanced Course at Fort Benning, Georgia. I took them personal greetings from MG Ernst, the CG at Fort Benning, and gave them an info paper on what's happening there and in the U.S. Army in general. They were particularly proud this year with the new promotions in the Swiss Army that reached out and touched the "Fort Benning Mafia" particularly well. The new Chief of the General Staff, the new deputy chief of staff of the ground forces, two new division commanders, a new corps chief of staff, and the new chief of operations (J-3) on the General Staff are all Fort Benning Grads! Two of them are going from Colonel directly to Major General to assume their new functions. Good stuff for our Professional Military Education program!

One recent highlight was two days spent with the Swiss Army Logistics Troops, hosted by Major General Hans Pulver. The guy likes to sing! He organized a male choir twenty-five years ago composed of civilian employees (and Swiss Army militia members) who work for the Federal Office for Logistics. At the dinner on the first night, his old choir came in to sing to the attaches and other guests, including LTG Jacques Dousse, Chief of the Swiss Army, who was the surprise guest. The choir sings a capella and only in Swiss German. The songs are beautiful and the two lead singers are the yodlers. It was so beautiful I could hardly keep myself in the chair I wanted to sing with them so much. General Pulver looked at me and said, "You like to sing, don't you." I admitted that it is true and told him I had been wondering if a non-Swiss person would ever be allowed to sing in a traditional Swiss folk music choir. He smiled and said, "I certainly think it is possible. I will get back to you on that." After dessert, he even got up and joined his old choir, singing bass for three of their numbers. Their songs were so beautiful that there is no way I can express it in words. We all simply had the feeling that we were seeing a rare piece of the real Switzerland.

Nov 97

Tomorrow the embassy is closed for Veterans' Day, but lots of folks are working, because the Secretary of State is coming to town this week. This seems to be a history-making event. As far back as they can trace the records, the American Secretary of State has never come to Switzerland for a bilateral visit with the Swiss Government. Previous visits have been to Zurich or Geneva and have been related to the U.N. or to other international negotiations, with Switzerland only providing the
NEW RESERVE FAO PMO

Major Dan Hawk recently assumed duties as the Reserve FAO PMO at AR-PERSCOM, St. Louis. His email address is: Daniel.Hawk@arpstl-emh2.army.mil. The commercial phone number to his desk is (314) 592-0000, extension 4472. The 800 and DSN numbers are (800) 325-4987 and DSN 892-0602. The latter two numbers tend to place in a voice-mail queue. If you are a Reserve FAO, MAJ Hawk is your best contact to resolve any and all Reserve personnel issues.

NEW ASSISTANT CHIEF, STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP DIVISION

Colonel Robert G. Tregaskis recently succeeded Colonel West as Assistant Division Chief. COL Tregaskis was assigned to ODCSOPS in 1993. He spent five years as a DIMA with the Politico-Military Division (DAMO-SSM) before his assignment to Strategic Leadership (formerly FAO Proponent Division).

RESERVE POSITION VACANCIES

The Strategic Leadership Division is seeking qualified candidates to fill three positions. IRR Augmentee positions are available for a 48 D/I and a 48 G/J. A 48 F/H will vacate in FY 99 as the incumbent reaches his MRD. If you know a Reserve FAO who might qualify, have him contact Strategic Leadership Division. FAOs leaving Active Duty and entering the Reserves may also be interested. Reserve assignments with the Army Staff are a promotion board plus. Officers leaving Active Duty can leverage their years of service with a Reserve retirement with 20 qualifying years at age 60.

RECORDS UPDATE

Reservists are encouraged to contact the Reserve FAO PMO, MAJ Hawk, to update their records. AR-PERSCOM and Strategic Leadership Division can not contact you if YOU don’t maintain contact with AR-PERSCOM.

COL Tregaskis, Assistant Chief, Strategic Leadership Division
Email: rtregask@erols.com

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**Foreign Area Officer Association (FAOA)**

**MEMBERSHIP APPLICATION**

Name: ________________________  Rank _______  Telephone: ________________  Regional Specialty: __________

Street: ______________________________   City:  ___________________  State:  _______   Zip:  _________________

E-Mail: ______________________________________

Membership Options: (Check Appropriate Box)

- [ ] 1 Year - $15.00
- [ ] 2 Years - $28.00
- [ ] 3 Year - $36.00

[ ] Active  [ ] Reserve  [ ] Former Service

Signature: ______________________________   Date:  __________________

Mail with your check to: FAOA, P.O. Box 523226, Springfield, VA. 22152; Tel/Fax: (703) 913-1356
First, Salutations to one and all! Now on to business. This quarter I wanted to deal with a couple of issues that are always of interest to Army officers -- Promotions and Specialty Development.

**LTC Board Selection Analysis**

The promotion list to LTC was published in July and as always, the Proponent Office analyzed the results for the Director of Army Strategy, Plans, and Policy (our boss) and his boss, the DCSOPS of the Army. That analysis follows --

The FY 98 FAO LTC primary zone (PZ) selection rate was 71.5% compared to the Army average of 67.8%; 3.7% above the Army average. Seven of 51 FAOs were selected "Above the Zone (AZ)," 63 of 88 - PZ, and 2 of 81- BZ. Directed floors by Area of Concentration (AOC) were: Latin America - 2, Europe - 10, Eurasia - 7, Middle East/ N. Africa - 9, Northeast Asia - 4, Southeast Asia - 2 and Sub-Sahara Africa - 4. All floors were met. When combined with the particularly large number of AZ officers, attainment of all "required" floors for the AOCs illustrates both an increase in requirements for FAOs at this rank and a need to find qualified people to fill these billets. The results of the board continue a ten year trend at LTC (starting with YG 73) where FAO selection rates in the PZ to LTC have averaged 4.67% above the Army average. It is reasonable to say that FAO did very well this year.

An informal review of the ORBs of the selected officers shows 72% had branch qualifying field grade assignments and 97% are MEL 4 graduates. The ORBs of the non-selected officers show 75% had not served in branch qualifying field grade assignments and 29% had not achieved MEL 4. A blindingly obvious conclusion that can be drawn from these latter statistics is that MEL-4 (Command and General Staff College attendance) in some form -- either resident or non-resident -- is still a critical factor in getting promoted to LTC. The issue of branch qualification as majors will change somewhat as we enter OPMS XXI. Under OPMS XXI, branch qualification as a FAO, i.e., serving in two FAO tours in two of the FAO Skill groupings (Attaché, Security Assistance, Pol-Mil, Teaching, or Army-to-Army Liaison), becomes a key element contributing to promotion potential.

**Organizing to Better Serve**

About a year ago, I wrote to you concerning changes that were being made in the FAO Proponent Division to serve you and the Army better than before. The changes entailed expanding our capabilities to manage the specific regional AOCs. Those changes are finished and in place. Now on to phase two. Our Division has been renamed the "Strategic Leadership Division." The name change implies a very real change in our posture and we have added a number of functions and still more people in our division. We have added proponency for one of the newest army specialties (SC 59 - Strategist and Planner) to our plate, as well as the army fellowship program, JPME, and the Harvard strategist program. These additions come with the people to run them, so they will not require a lessening of emphasis on FAO. In fact, the new changes have given us the flexibility to again improve our FAO office organization and I now have an officer, LTC Dick Pevoski, dedicated to managing all cross-regional matters, as well as our regional desk officers.

Bottomline is that I believe that we can serve you better than ever before, offering mentoring to the FAOs in the field and more detailed policy oversight of the program than ever before.

**Career Field Designation (CFD)**

Three year groups (YG80, YG86, YG89) go before the CFD early next year and must make their choices of career field/functional area/branch in the Oct-Nov time frame. I honestly believe that there are real career advantages to single-tracking FAO, under the new personnel system. If you decide to go FAO, then make it your first choice to ensure that you get it. Call the regional desk officers here at the Proponent office for pros and cons. The more information that you have the better decision you'll make.

Thanks for reading and keep your comments coming.

Regards,

COL Chuck Doroski

Chief, Strategic Leadership Division
The summer turnover is complete here in the Unified Commands and International Issues Branch. COL Brendan Kearney is the new Branch head, coming from a tour at J-5, PACOM. LtCol Jake Graham has taken over the Japan desk after a tour in Okinawa. LtCol Paul Billips reported from a tour as the Asst. Naval Attache in Beijing, and handles PACOM (less Japan) issues. And, LtCol Mike Brooker has taken over the CENTCOM duties, coming from New River, NC. Maj Jay Torres is still with us working SOUTHCOM/ACOM issues, and LtCol Vic Dutil is here for a few more months handling Western Europe. Vic’s replacement has not yet been identified, so if there are any 9947’s or 9948’s who might be interested in duty at the Pentagon, give Vic or me a call to get the details. Maj Jose Cristy (article by him on page 11) is finishing up at NPS, and will be arriving here in January. He will be taking over from Jay Torres, and will also be the Deputy FAO Coordinator. He will be the continuity for the FAO program following my (planned) summer 99 departure.

The process of narrowing down which billets should be coded as FAO billets continues, with a goal of having an internet page by Spring 99 which will list the billets, a brief synopsis of the duties, the incumbent, and availability information. In the meantime, it’s still a matter of calling the regional desk officer or me to find out what’s out there. As we refocus the program towards providing regional expertise to MAGTF and component commanders, expect to see more internal (USMC organization) billets in the future, although many of the external billets will still exist. Work continues on developing the structure for the planned 1999 activation of the Marine Liaison Groups (MLG) at I and II MEF’s. Since the MLG mission will include providing regional, linguistic, and cultural expertise to commanders, FAO’s will be in high demand for the MLG.

We continue to receive many applications for the FAO and RAO designations based on past experience. The amount of foreign expertise among our officers is much greater than many people imagine. As you know, the Marine Corps order regarding the FAO program is being revised, and one significant revision is that experience-track applications are now accepted and considered year-round. I encourage all FAO’s to talk about the program at any opportunity, and refer interested officers to me. Additionally, officers with some regional background who desire information on billets which will give them the necessary experience to be designated as a FAO should call as well — there are more billets out there than we can fill with our designated FAO’s right now.

**FLASH!! FLASH!! FLASH!!**

_Eurasian Foreign Area Officer Program Receives Graduate School Accreditation_

The American Council on Education has granted nine semester hours of graduate credit to military officers and civilians who complete the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies 18-month Eurasian Foreign Area Officer Program. “This accreditation is extremely important for our Foreign Area Officers,” said Dr. Gary Guertner, Dean of the College of International and Security Studies. “They may apply these credits towards the advanced degrees many will be pursuing when they leave the Marshall Center. The accreditation also recognizes the quality of our instruction and gives due credit to the professionalism of our professors and language teachers.”

Credits include three semester hours in Russian history/Russian military history with an emphasis on the history of the Soviet and immediate post Soviet era, three semester hours in political science (comparative politics/international relations), and three semester hours in internship credit/field experience. Apart from the formal curriculum, the ACE recognized the additional professional experience gained by FAO trainees through their close interaction with the foreign students of the executive course and attendance at selected Marshall Center conferences.

The accreditation resulted from an August on-site review of the Center’s program conducted by the American Council of Education Military Course Evaluations Division. The Military Evaluations Program, which evaluates military training programs in terms of academic credit, publishes evaluation results biennially in the Guide to the Evaluation of Educational Experiences in the Armed Services. This is the standard reference tool used by the majority of U.S. colleges and universities to award credit for military learning. According to comments made to FAOA by the Army FAO Proponent regional desk officer for Europe and Eurasia, Major Eric Hartman, "the news out of Garmisch is really good. The next step in the process is for us to contact the approved graduate programs on our list and determine how many credit hours they will accept of this accreditation effort. As a minimum, I would expect that they will accept the standard six transfer credit hours.”
place. We are hoping her visit will go a long way in smoothing over the hard feelings created by the Nazi Gold / Holocaust issues.

December 97

Last night we went to the "change of command" reception for the new Chief of the Swiss General Staff. It was a very nice event down at the Bellevue Hotel (Bern's finest). Didn't get much chance to get to visit with the new guy (soon to be Lieutenant General Hans-Ulrich Scherrer), because so many people were surrounding him after the receiving line. Wasn't too worried, however, since he is stepping into a special relationship with the United States, as Switzerland looks more and more toward peacekeeping and military support to European stability.

He went down to Naples last week with the Defense Minister and a group of other Swiss General Officers to visit the NATO Southern Region Combined Air Operations Center. George Walton took them down, since he is the Air Attaché and had arranged the visit with USAF LTG Betherum, who is NATO's COMAIRSOUTH. Scherrer was very impressed, and he mentioned the trip to me last night when I was shaking hands with him in the reception line. The Defense Minister, Mr. Ogi, was so pleased with the regional air defense concept and capability that he wants to increase Swiss cooperation with NATO in this area. George and I are on his calendar to discuss it further with him.

A glimpse in '98:

March 98

Last week, Sharon and I drove up to Zurich and spent the night in a nice little hotel in Staefa, where I gave a speech to one of the Swiss Officers Association chapters (Zurichsee Rechtesufer). This was the fourth time for my speech on U.S. Defense Trends and the QDR. It was a fun evening. The group was very interested in what I had to say, and the timing couldn't have been better. The Iraqi decision to deal with the UN Secretary General illustrates the utility of our strategy.

The other highlight of the month was the official release of the Swiss MOD's study on Switzerland's strategic situation. It starts a debate that will last for most of this year, but makes some historically astounding recommendations for Swiss Foreign and Defense policy. They are recommending a full-time active duty quick reaction unit, trained in peace support operations, and deployable in 24 hours, with their own organic ground and air transportation capability to support operations in Europe and Africa. THAT is RADICAL for Switzerland, as is the recommendation that Switzerland join the EU as soon as possible and then look at an even closer relationship to NATO beyond PfP. This is good stuff.

April 98

Spent two days this week in Stuttgart and Vicenza with 28 Swiss officers who will be the next group of new generals. They were visiting NATO, SHAPE, U.S. EUCOM, and the NATO Combined Air Operations Center (for Bosnia) as part of their "charm school" similar to the U.S. CAPSTONE program for new generals. I was with them for the EUCOM and CAOC portions. It was a good visit, and another example of rapid, historical changes that Switzerland is making in trying to come out from behind its traditional neutrality and contribute to European security. When they were at SHAPE, General Karstens said, "something must be happening in Switzerland." That about sums up what we are experiencing by being here in this particular period.

I hope that this brief glance at the life of an attaché has been of some help to the reader. This job is a delight, with something new and amazing literally around every corner. In a real sense, you are your own boss and must find imaginative ways to solve a myriad of different problems that face any attaché.

Colonel Bob McBride, the U.S. Defense and Army Attaché to Switzerland, arrived in Bern in January of 1997. He has extensive background at higher level staffs and within his region. He last served as a Division Chief in the U.S. Army Foreign Liaison Directorate, ODCSINT-DA.

(Colombia, Continued from page 18)


Major Jose G. Cristy is a member of the U.S. Marine Corps’ FAO Program and is currently attending Naval Postgraduate School in National Security Studies with a specialization in Latin American Studies.
F. Y. I. — Active/Reserve FAOs

Army FAO Proponent Office

COL Charles F. Doroski - DIV CHIEF
(703) 697-3600 / DSN 227-3600
EMAIL: DOROSCF@HQDA.ARMY.MIL

LTC Richard Pevoski - FAO PROGRAM COORDINATOR
(703) 697-4013 / DSN 227-4013
EMAIL: PEVOSRJ@HQDA.ARMY.MIL

MS. Pat Jones - BUDGET/RESOURCE MANAGER
(703) 697-6317 / DSN 227-6317
EMAIL: JONESP@HQDA.ARMY.MIL

MAJ Eric Hartman - 48C/E REGIONAL MANAGER
(703) 697-6794 / DSN 227-6794
EMAIL: HARTMEM@HQDA.ARMY.MIL

MAJ Humberto Rodriguez - 48B REGIONAL MANAGER
(703) 614-1766 / DSN 224-1766
EMAIL: RODRIHU@HQDA.ARMY.MIL

MAJ Comer Plummer - 48G/J REGIONAL MANAGER
(703) 6i4-2336 / DSN 224-2336
EMAIL: PLUMMCO@HQDA.ARMY.MIL

MAJ Phuong Pierson - 48D/F/H/I REGIONAL MANAGER
(703) 695-1266 / DSN 225-1266
EMAIL: PIERSPT@HQDA.ARMY.MIL

LTC Paul Gendrolis - FAO PROPOINENT LIAISON,
DEFENSE LANGUAGE INSTITUTE,
(408) 647-5110/DSN 878-5110
EMAIL: GENDROLP@POM-EMH1.ARMY.MIL

Army FAO Assignments Team, PERSCOM

LTC Dave Wreford - Assgmts Off (48C, E),
(703) 325-3134/DSN 221-3134
EMAIL: WREFORDD@HOFFMAN.ARMY.MIL

LTC Chris Reddish - Assgmts Off (48D, F, G, H, I),
(703) 325-3132/DSN 221-3132
EMAIL: REDDISHC@HOFFMAN.ARMY.MIL

(703) 325-3134/DSN 221-3134

Email: BROWNJ6@HOFFMAN.ARMY.MIL

MS. Fran Ware - ACCESSIONS/TRAINING PLANS
(48B, C, F, H, I),
(703) 325-3135/DSN 221-3135
EMAIL: WAREF@HOFFMAN.ARMY.MIL

MS. Aundra Brown - ACCESSIONS/TRAINING PLANS
(48D, E, G, J),
(703) 325-3132/DSN 221-3132
EMAIL: BROWN Ao@HOFFMAN.ARMY.MIL

Army Reserve FAO Program

MAJ Dan Hawk, (314) 592-3042/
DSN 892-3042 or 800-325-4987
EMAIL: daniel.hawk@arpstl-emh2.army.mil

USMC FAO Proponent

LT COL Chuck Owens, Program Sponsor and FSU
amd Eastern Europe, ext. 5347.

LT COL Joe Koen, Middle East and SWA, ext. 5350.

LT COL Vic Dutil, W.Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa,
ext. 5349.

LT COL Paul Billups, Asia less Japan.

MAJ “Jay” Torres, Latin America, ext. 5345.

LT COL Jake Graham, Japan.

Contact these officers at (703) 614-3706 or DSN:
224-3706/8/9. E-Mail is: COWENS@NOTES.HQI.USMC.MIL

US NAVY FAO Proponent

CDR Mike Foster, Headquarters, USN,
(703) 695-5869, FAX (703) 695-6166.

US AIR FORCE FAO Proponent

LTC William Huggins - USAF Attache Office
(703) 588-8309/8348.