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A Commander’s Asset

It has been my experience that sometimes as we FAO’s go through our very individualized training and “out of the box” assignments, we forget just why our Service is making a substantial investment in our training and education. It is not because we are great guys! The higher-ups in the DoD and Service leadership appear to understand that FAO’s can be real force multipliers in the various theaters of war. At a time when Defense is facing critical trade-offs, such potential force multipliers are very important. Hence the continued high funding of FAO training and the continued efforts to improve the personnel system so that it will promote “out of the box” types like FAOs to O-6.

The problem is that the Services can’t afford failures when they are diverting funds from other training activities and investing in their FAO programs. They expect results, and frankly on a macro-level, given the money and time that they are investing in the program, are justified in those expectations. This is where we as individual FAO’s comes into the picture. FAO training varies between Services, but in none of the Services is it so good that it punches out fully qualified regional specialists (directly out of training). Each FAO has to work throughout his career to become competent in his regional specialty. In fact, we must really work doubly hard because FAOs need to retain their competency in their basic military skills, even as they strive to become better and better in their regions.

I believe that the success demanded by our Services requires a certain mind-set of each FAO. WE SERVE THE COMMANDER. Our advice and analysis affect real world events. While our brother officers are training for war at Ft. Hood, Texas, on a range in the Mojave Desert, or manning a ship in the Indian Ocean most of us are involved in a day-to-day OJT in out of the way places in Africa, Asia, or Latin America. We often are required to operate alone with little or no direct supervision. Even when we work within the institutional framework of a major headquarters, we are often the only specialist in our particular region and, therefore, on our own. Because it is a real world environment, the results of our every action have potential real world consequences. Failures can be quantified in terms of lost opportunities (for the Command or even for the Nation), and in extreme cases, in terms of lost lives of our brother officers and men. This sounds unnecessarily melodramatic, even to my ears, but it is really serious. Every time a FAO makes a decision or advises a commander he/she needs to ask the question “Have I prepared myself sufficiently to advise my commander?” The answer, if we are honest, will almost always be no, but we also need to answer that we are as well prepared as possible.

This mind-set demands that when in graduate school we will take the extra course; that we work to perfect our first language and try to add a second or third to our repertoire; that we read everything available relating to both our regions and to our Service; and that we build and use networks of contacts to back up our “expert” opinions to the commander. The reason for this overachieving, workaholic mind-set is simple. The commander involved might actually listen to you and act on your advice – and that makes you at least partially responsible for the consequences of his action or inaction.

Joseph D. Tullbane, III., Ph.D., President, FAOA
ADDRESSES —One More Time . . .

Dear FAO Journal,

I have not received a FAO Journal since June 1997 and want to know what’s going on. I moved from Leavenworth in July and haven’t heard hide nor hare from the association. Are you still in existence or have you folded your tents, taken the money and run? I guess it is possible that they were not forwarded, but I doubt it.

Please Respond!, “Annoyed”

EDITOR’S NOTE: After a discussion between the Journal and “annoyed,” he agreed that others might find his experience enlightening.

WE ARE A PRIVATE ORGANIZATION, and just like Newsweek, Ladies Home Journal, or Army Times we need you to update your addresses regularly. If you don’t, then we have no way of getting material to you. Once in a while, PERSCOM helps us with new addresses — the process is that they give us your new unit and we call the post locator, phone you at your office, and then mail your Journal to you based on the home address you give us. Some of you have experienced this phenomena. It is TIME CONSUMING and FRUSTRATING for us volunteers. Further, if we then have to send you special editions of the Journal, it costs the association an added 68 cents per magazine (poor stewardship of your money, to say the least). OH! and by the way, many even forget to send new mailing addresses in to PERSCOM — that means NO official army info either.

Like “annoyed,” we all want things to work like clockwork, but an Association such as ours can only do so with every members help. Send address changes by mail or E-Mail JDT

OPMS XXI and the Future . . .

Sir,

Opms XXI promises to bring the Army’s officer management system into a new age where command is no longer the criterion for success. This mentality has been the stumbling block for many, especially in the FAO community, not achieving their goals because of other requirements such as the long training process needed for certain individual functional areas.

My concern is more on the macro level. FAOs mission requires an interaction between the FAO and foreign military services in a variety of positions. One of these positions is as an advisor to a foreign service’s senior leadership. I wonder what the perception will be among our allies and friends overseas when the US Army cannot provide them attaches that have had command and primary staff experience in the various of a military organization? This concerns me because foreign militaries are not so different in their beliefs that “a successful military leader is one who has commanded at every level.” The US Army may be changing its traditional position on this issue, but why should we expect our allies and friends to do the same?

I am aware that at the rank of major, under OPMS XXI, “officers from all career fields will continue to serve in units and other organizations throughout the Army.” This is published in a pamphlet that was distributed among the Army, What is OPMS XXI and other frequently asked questions. But, if I understand the system correctly, once an officer chooses his career field, he or she will remain in that field throughout their careers unless (in the case of the Operations CF) they become noncompetitive. At this point the officers has the option to “single track” to the appropriate CF representing their functional area. This would mean that if an officer decides to remain a FAO, his only experience in a command billet will be as a company, troop, or battery commander. Further experience will limit the officer to only assistant staff positions at levels above brigade since XO/S3 billets are reserved for the Operations CF officers. Every job is a good job and we learn from each position appropriately. However, we cannot disregard the valuable experience an officer takes from a position where he or she is not in the “hot seat.”

Perceptions are everything and misconceptions can cause strains in relationships, especially between governments. I wonder if the problems the FAO community had were not so much who they competed with but the way in which it managed its officer corps throughout the training process? The reason I say this is since time was always a factor in FAOs missing the “windows of opportunity,” why didn’t we try to reduce that time by being more vigilant in the ACS process and the ICT. You cannot change the time in language preparation but we can definitely tailor the graduate school and ICT requirements. I only hope that in fixing one problem, we have not created another. The FAO’s mission is extremely important in the “New Strategic Age,” it would be a shame if it is weakened.

CPT Artur Loureiro, 48C

EDITOR’S NOTE: As you say, perceptions are everything. Discussing your letter with members of both OPMS XXI and the FAO Proponent I came away with some interesting explanations/rebuttals.

(Continued on page 17)
Objective: Nominate Fellow Regional Specialists to serve on the Association Board of Governors.

How large is the Board? The Board includes nine (9) elected members and one appointed member (President/Executive Director).

Is there a set distribution for the Board? No, but based on our membership, the Board should be representative of the broadest spectrum of regions possible, as well as include at least one member from each Service, as well as represent Active, Reserve, and Retirees.

What is expected of the Board? The President/Executive Director keeps the Board informed of day-to-day operations, reacting to their suggestions and direction. Major expenditures and new projects are only undertaken after discussion and approval by the Board. Specific duties are kept minimal in recognition that serving on the Board is an “extra duty.”

What does a Board member get for serving? Only gratis membership for the three year term of Board membership. It is a voluntary position.

Who can nominate? Any member in good standing can nominate.

Who can be nominated? Any Active, Reserve, or Retired FAO, from any Service. This include members of the current Board.

Who are we looking for? Since the members of the Board, more than any other element of the Association, reflect our goals and represent the best of our specialty, they should be well-known and well-considered individuals within their individual regions.

What Happens When I Nominate Someone? The Association will get in touch with that individual to see if he/she is willing to serve. If they agree, then their name will be added to the ballot to be shipped to members in mid November.

Where do I Send My Nomination? Send it to FAOA, P.O. Box 523226, Springfield, VA 22152 or E-Mail it to FAOA@EROLS.COM by 1October 1998.
“Threads of History Weave the Fabric of Tomorrow”

The mid-nineteenth century saw a young United States expanding its territory rapidly westward at the same time as it found itself in the throes of creating the vestiges of a mature nation state – a standing modern national Army and a country-wide economic infrastructure. Rapid expansion westward and developing the infrastructural sinews of a new powerful nation state defined much of the United States’ history during this century.

The Frontier. As the new nation pushed its frontiers past the Mississippi River and turned its eyes and feet westward, its settlers increasingly encroached on native American tribal lands, driving these earlier residents farther westward out of their traditional territories. While this continued the forced resettlement process that had begun with the landings of the first European settlers in the new world, it also accelerated that process exponentially. The small professional Federal Army, responsible for protecting both the advance of the prospectors and settlers, as well as later their settlement became involved and embroiled in a conflict of significant duration called the Indian wars. A line of infantry, cavalry, and artillery regiments was stretched increasingly thinly to protect and defend an ever widening area of settlements and settlers moving west. Tiny, isolated forts dotted the west, held together only by tenuous threads of telegraph wires and rough trails. The forts, manned by platoon, company, or sometimes up to regimental elements, covered designated regional segments of the frontier with small patrols of soldiers winding their way through the forbidding wilderness. The potential that a sectional crisis could develop into a major regional war was enormous, requiring the American Army to first make the most of its limited local resources and then be able to respond with a major force concentration of its own with which to counter the specific regional native American threat.

The position in which the U.S. Army of the western frontier found itself forms an interesting parallel to that in which the U.S. Army finds itself today, but with regards to the global situation. Much of the world looks to us as the only force capable of policing the unstable regions of the world. To accomplish this unprecedented mission requirement, we are stretched extremely thinly, with large and small contingents of our Army deployed literally half-way around the world. It is again critical that the country first make the most of its limited local resources and then be able to respond with the appropriate level of force from its relatively limited CONUS based active forces, its national guard, and reserves. The parallel between the two periods forms the basis of this discussion of propriety of calling Foreign Area Officers “Strategic Scouts.” I ask the reader to enter into my imagination for a few moments as I spin a tale of the wild west.

At a small isolated adobe and mud-brick fort in west Texas (call it Fort Phantom Hill) a cavalry lieutenant is preparing to mount a regular patrol of his area of responsibility. His cavalry platoon will be out in the field for at least two weeks just covering a segment of the command’s area of concern. Along with his cavalry troopers he takes a native scout with him to act as his eyes and ears while on the trail. Even though his main goal is the interdiction and suppression of roving bands of Comanches, his native scout is a Cherokee from a reservation farther to the north in Oklahoma. The typical native scout was recruited from friendly tribes and was the equivalent of a common soldier, but one who brought specific skills of knowing the land, understanding trail signs, and an ability to translate simple discussions between the cavalry commanders and the local tribes. The cavalry lieutenant in our scenario, having been at his western post for almost three years, understood the tactical limitations in the abilities of his scout. The officer would use the information provided by the scout as a factor in his decision making - but probably not an overriding factor.

During the early spring of the same year as the above local scenario played itself out, larger forces are being assembled farther to the southwest for a major campaign against the Apache tribes that had begun to be a significant threat to the miners and prospectors in the Arizona and New Mexico Territories. The command consists of two regiments – one cavalry and one infantry -- and the overall campaign was to be commanded by a two star general. The campaign objective was to decisively defeat, to capture the opposing warriors, and then drive the remnants of the various Apache bands onto reservations.

The usual contingent of native tactical scouts was present, but the campaign also had one or more white chief scouts – paid civilian professionals hired into military service for the period of the campaign. These men, including such famous...
personages as “Kit” Carson, Jim Bridger, and “Buffalo” Bill Cody knew the land, understood Indian fighting tactics and operational art, spoke a number of Indian languages fluently, and had contacts and reputations at the highest levels of the Indian tribal hierarchies.

I would submit that the paid professional civilian scout used by the Army in this role provides a more applicable model for a FAO’s contribution to warfighting, than does the native scout (they really fit the mold of a frontier FAO). They served as personal advisors to the expedition and, while with the expeditions, were intimately involved with campaign planning and execution of those plans. It seems reasonable to use these men as one of the starting points for any consideration of and exploration into the question of what role the FAO plays in the force projection Army of the 21st Century.

**Observer / Liaison Missions to Foreign Armies.** Coincidental to the moves westward by the frontier Army, was a continuing effort to both regularize the practices of and generally professionalize the American Army. We sought to observe and emulate the great European armies as they practiced the art of warfare. Beginning before the Mexican War, liaison officers were dispatched to observe the operations of foreign armies in peace and war (the converse was also true with England, Germany, France, and other European powers sending observers to serve with both the Confederate and Union sides of the American Civil War). There are a number of famous examples of such missions. In the early 1840s, CPT Phil Kearny (who later in his life commanded at least one major western expedition) attended the French Royal Cavalry School and then served with the French Chasseurs D’Afrique in an Algerian campaign. On his return to the United States, he wrote the first U.S. Cavalry manual (used as late as the Civil War). Beginning with the Jefferson Davis (the then Secretary of War of the United States) Commission to the Crimean War, U.S. Army officers can be found as observers on either side of battle lines in every major European conflict, and with many European and Asian military armies, from the Crimean War through World War II. Often these officers spoke one or more of the local languages or dialects and had numerous personal contacts in the Army that they were observing or serving with as liaison officers. During the nineteenth century, the goal of these officers was to gather and catalog information about tactics, logistics and support, and command and control. By the mid-twentieth century, especially during and since the Second World War, the goal had changed to one of offering military aid and support. Officers such as Pershing, Patton, and Stillwell all served with distinction in this roll. As the roles of these officers evolved one constant stood out throughout the history of these missions. Their success hinged on a working knowledge of foreign language, elicitation, and negotiation skills, all built on a solid tactical military foundation.

As officers returned from Europe and then served in the western theater, the lessons learned in each interwove to improve the development of the American Army. Quite literally, these twin elements of professional scouts and observer-liaison officers roughly form the foundation and lineage of today’s FAO program. But the relevance of these developments is more significant to today, given the interesting aforementioned similarities between the situation in which the western Army found itself then and the global situation in which the Army finds itself now.

**The Modern Operational Evolution of the “Frontier Scout”/ “Observer-Liaison Officer”**

As the 21st Century dawns, our force projection Army requires the same expertise from today’s successors to Kit Carson and Buffalo Bill Cody, as did our frontier Army in the last century. The intimate knowledge of potential allies and enemies alike, combined with the ability to turn that knowledge into concrete advantages for an American Army forced to enter a regional crisis or conflict, must be considered a major force multiplier. Any operational commander worth his salt will welcome anything that will give him an advantage in a crisis environment, especially if that advantage can be translated into more efficient, successful operations that result in fewer friendly
FAOs in Bosnia, where three Eurasian FAOs served as that described above. We have already seen examples of such planning and execution process. The addition of FAOs at the staff would be an integral part of every facet of the campaign today’s regional specialist assigned to the Division or Corps frontier campaign commander’s decision-making process, the same way as Bill Cody might have participated in the arms or combat support within our own Army to the table. In his frontier predecessor, brings a strong background of combat opponents? More importantly, the FAO in question, much like as well as knows the various militaries – both allies and potential people of the region, the idiosyncrasies of cultures and politics, campaign planning process (before departure from CONUS) Army suddenly finds itself behind the power curve in an area units in support of their deployment missions overseas. The one served on the division staff as a liaison for the commander Brigadier (two served day-and-night with the Russian unit, while FAOs serving at a Division or Corps headquarters as a commander’s POLAD (political advisor). But the fact is that by using the frontier FAO of by-gone days as our example, it should be apparent that the regional expert assigned to a Division or Corps headquarters could and should play a much more diverse role than just POLAD. Force projection combined with our smaller force structure strongly implies participation in coalition warfare. As our combat systems become more and more modernized and digitized, the potential separation from our allies at the most basic tactical level of interoperability (who are not digitized and who are using less modern combat systems) increases exponentially. The idea of re-equipping every alliance participant with compatible, modern material is simply unrealistic. The only viable realistic solution is to create a robust liaison structure made up of officers who can easily communicate with our allies, thoroughly understand their armies, and have strong personal ties (with the resultant mutual confidence) within the allied command hierarchy. The requirement is really for a combination of the skills of both the frontier scout and the observer-liaison officer. The only specialty in the Army that comes close to achieving this is the Foreign Area Officer Specialty (Career Specialty 48) and it is an obvious fill for the regional/trans-regional requirement such as that described above. We have already seen examples of such use of FAOs in Bosnia, where three Eurasian FAOs served as the liaison between the US division and its subordinate Russian Brigade (two served day-and-night with the Russian unit, while one served on the division staff as a liaison for the commander in his interaction with the Russians). Whether the Army chooses to create independent regional liaison cells residing at the Corps level that can be attached to a Division or Brigade level deployment overseas or simply augment the one or two FAO staff planners that would already be resident in the deploying unit is a question to be considered later and in a different forum. However, it should be noted that the Marine Corps has already recognized this need and is at present preparing to create liaison units in support of their deployment missions overseas. The Army suddenly finds itself behind the power curve in an area that has always been the leader of the other Services. Frankly, who could participate more effectively in the campaign planning process (before departure from CONUS) than someone who is familiar with the region in question, the people of the region, the idiosyncrasies of cultures and politics, as well as knows the various militaries – both allies and potential opponents? More importantly, the FAO in question, much like his frontier predecessor, brings a strong background of combat arms or combat support within our own Army to the table. In the same way as Bill Cody might have participated in the frontier campaign commander’s decision-making process, today’s regional specialist assigned to the Division or Corps staff would be an integral part of every facet of the campaign planning and execution process. The addition of FAOs at the Division and Corps level has the significant by-product of making the FAO even “greener” on one hand and on the other it reintroduces a valuable mission asset to the Army operational level of war and to its middle-grade leadership (remember that Army officers who serve exclusively within the tactical Army structure really have no opportunity to observe FAOs in action and to learn what these specialized officers can do for their commands). Until now, FAOs have normally been used at the strategic level, within the national arena and more as a defense/joint service asset than as an Army asset. As we all know, FAOs have served and continue to serve successfully as military attaches and security assistance officers around the world. As such they support the local ambassador and the theater CINC with timely political-military advice and by playing an active role in negotiating basing and nation-to-nation defense agreements at all levels. They are the “man on the ground” in areas that often have no other U.S. military presence. They have successfully fulfilled the function of strategic pointman for numerous small and large scale operational deployments of U.S. forces to these foreign lands. In addition, they also continue to serve successfully on the joint staff, DoD, and with the major Unified Commands as political-military analysts. More than 80 percent of the Army’s FAO Colonel (O-6) positions currently reside within the Joint/DoD community. Therefore tying FAOs to the strategic level is no great stretch. With the above in mind, we return to the basic question posed here -- “does the mission of the modern FAO warrant the moniker “Strategic Scout?” For that matter, what does this concept of “Strategic Scout” really mean? Is it just a nice sounding phrase that really describes nothing of significance or is it an accurate symbol of the future use of the FAO in the next century? We have established that FAO historical antecedents show distinct similarities to the present day FAO, but that is not terribly persuasive nor is it very objective. To delve further into this question, we must examine the basic premises of the modern cavalry scout, his missions, and skills, as well as whether these skills and missions can be readily translated into FAO missions and skills at the operational and strategic level of war. What Does a Scout Do at the Tactical Level? Reviewing a number of official and unofficial Army publications (including FM 17-98, Cavalry Scout Platoon) allows the reader to get more than a glimpse of the modern cavalry scout's primary missions -- reconnaissance and security in support of the parent unit. Scouts conduct reconnaissance to provide their commander with information that has tactical value concerning terrain, the enemy, and the effects of weather within an area of operations. Scouts reconnoiter the terrain to determine movement and maneuver conditions. When they find the enemy, they determine his strengths and weaknesses. A scout provides the information necessary to allow combined arms elements to maneuver against the enemy, strike him where he is most vulnerable, and apply overwhelming power to defeat him. Based on their commander's intent and guidance, scouts
Scouts are trained to:

- Perform quartering party duties.
- Provide traffic control.
- Conduct chemical and radiological survey and monitoring ops.
- Conduct pioneer and demolition work.
- Evaluate bridges.
- Participate in area security.
- Reconnaissance and security ops.
- Identify threat and ally equipment.

* FM 17-98 Cavalry Scout Platoon

Scouts are trained to recognize “threat” organizations and equipment specifically related to the reconnaissance and security phase of offensive and defensive battlefield tactics. Scouts must thoroughly understand how an opponent deploys its reconnaissance and security forces, as well as the sequence and timing of their entry into battle. The scouts' accurate and timely reporting of enemy locations and strength may be the difference between winning or losing the main battle. It is very important that scouts do not lose sight of their reconnaissance priorities and become decisively engaged in direct confrontation because this limits their effectiveness to their parent unit. Scouts must continually maintain an awareness of tactical developments and the environment within which they operate. They must have the confidence and the initiative to react quickly and appropriately to unexpected situations. When contact is made, they must seek to develop the situation at the lowest possible level, retaining the ability to maneuver and continue the mission, as needed.

Developing a situation rapidly is a key to good scout work. Whether scouts run into an obstacle or the enemy, they must quickly determine what they are up against and bypass it or, if appropriate, execute or assist in a breach. This all must be done quickly, with a minimum of guidance from higher. Time is the scout's most precious resource; he cannot waste it if he is to achieve mission success.

Scouts employ methods that achieve a balance between the acceptable level of risk and the security necessary to ensure mission accomplishment. Often this is expressed as a tradeoff between speed and security. The quicker the reconnaissance required, the more risk the scout takes and the less detailed the reconnaissance he can conduct. Scouts must use all available resources in the conduct of their mission.

A scout's primary tools for reconnaissance are his five senses; his equipment supplements and complements those senses. The following are some examples of what a scout must be able to determine about the enemy through the use of his senses.

**Sight. A Scout looks for —**

- Enemy personnel
- Enemy vehicles and AC
- Unusual movement
- Signs of enemy
- Activity of locals

**Hearing. A Scout listens for —**

- Running engines
- Track sounds
- Voices
- Gunfire sounds
- Unusual calm/silence
- Dismounted movement

**Smell. A Scout feels for —**

- Cooking foods
- Burning petroleum, etc
- Vehicle exhaust
- Age of trash
- Human waste

Scouts can employ several reconnaissance methods. They must use their experience, professional judgment, and common sense to analyze a given situation and employ the appropriate method. Usually, a mission will require that these methods be applied using a variety of techniques, combinations, and variations. To reduce their vulnerability on the battlefield, scouts use reconnaissance methods that they have trained and rehearsed in detail. They take every opportunity during peace-time and on the battlefield to hone their skills. Scouts, by the nature of their mission, cannot achieve perfect security and still accomplish their mission; however, thorough knowledge of the various reconnaissance methods and their employment, combined with an understanding of a mission's particular requirements, allows the scout leader to mix and choose the reconnaissance methods that maximize security and mission accomplishment.

In security operations, security forces protect the main body from enemy observation and surprise attack. They provide the main body commander with early warning, allowing him to concentrate his combat power at the right place and time to defeat the enemy. Scouts can and do conduct screening missions independently of the larger maneuver force. To do this, they must understand the main body commander's concept of the operation and scheme of maneuver.

**What Does a Scout Do at the Level of Operational Art or Strategy?**

As described above, Scouts conduct reconnaissance forward of other friendly forces to provide current, accurate information about the terrain, resources, and enemy within a specified area of operations. Do these tactical activities translate to the Operational and Strategic levels of war? The short answer is yes they do -- a FAO does something very similar at the
OK, now that I have your attention, let’s talk about Advanced Civil Schooling (ACS). From my perspective, as the Army Proponent POC for ACS, this is one of the most misunderstood aspects of the three-phase FAO training program. My purpose here is to clear the air about ACS as well as to dispel some of the more popular myths. Finally, I hope to be able to provide some information that will make the ACS experience easier and more rewarding for FAO trainees.

As Military officers, we all come from structured organizations. Thus, we are used to having fairly definitive sets of rules or guidelines to use when doing things. There is always a regulation or a manual we can go to for an answer. Even language school is a fairly regimented process where we are assigned to a military organization, have a set schedule and a chain of command to answer to if we don’t meet standards. ACS signals the start of a major change in the development of a FAO. Once trained, FAOs normally operate in situations with little guidance and oversight. The successful FAO takes broad guidance and intent and translates that into decisive action. “Egg-sucking guidance” is a term not often heard from attaches and security assistance officers. Survival depends on clear, logical thinking laced with a huge dose of initiative.

Making the jump from the structured cocoon of the “green” Army to the civilian world of ACS proves a challenge for many officers. Perhaps it is because we are stepping out of our secure safe-havens that many of us tend to lose our capabilities for rational thought. Whatever the reason, there are some strange things going on out there.

MYTHS

In my nine months here at the Proponent it seems that several myths are being perpetuated. They generally appear in the following forms.

a. The FAO Proponent or PERSCOM will tell me where to go for ACS.

b. The rules don’t apply to me. This normally means:

(1) The GRE Issue in its several sub-sets.
    -- I really don’t have to take them.

(2) The 5-year rule for valid test scores was meant for everyone but me.

(3) I can ignore grad school application deadlines.

(4) The Proponent or PERSCOM will get me accepted into the school I want.

(5) Just because I applied the ideas above, everyone will jump through hoops to process my ACS application or find me a place to go to school.

c. The real criteria for determining where to go to school is: (1) The closest school to my hometown; (2) The closest school to my current location so I don’t have to PCS; (3) Any school with a top 10 football team; or (4) The most expensive school I can find since the Army is picking up the tab.

d. Once I get accepted to a school, I can take whatever courses I want to, even if they don’t apply to my regional focus. And, I can forget the language that the Army just paid me to learn.

While most of you look at these myths and think “who would ever think that stuff?” I can assure you that a significant number of our young trainees do just this.

DISPELLING THE MYTHS

All FAOs are required to have an advanced degree. Most will obtain their degree through the Army’s ACS Program. Typically, officers are programmed for ACS after they have successfully completed language training. Approximately 50% go to ACS immediately following language training and the rest following In-Country Training. In coordination with the PERSCOM training technician, the trainee begins the process of application after receiving a copy of the Proponent’s Approved
The Proponent identifies the programs that meet the needs of the FAO Program. Items considered in placing a program on the list include: Strength of curriculum, strength of faculty, length of program (18 month max), cost, language requirement and flexibility. Schools are further broken into High Cost (currently over $14,500/year) and Low Cost categories. Officers are required to apply to three schools, two of which must fall into the low cost category. An officer is free to apply to any schools listed for his/her AOC. Remember, though, that PERSCOM will not let you attend a school that is not on the Proponent list!

We don’t tell you which school you have to choose or even which is best. Every school on our list is a quality program that will provide the necessary advanced education our officers need. However, the officer must be accepted to the school on his/her own merits. How do you select the best school for you? First, look at each program. Don’t focus on the name of the school – some of the best regional programs are in State Schools. Second, if there aren’t many courses being offered in your region (even if the school is on our list), it is probably a good indication to look elsewhere. Remember that programs can change faster than we can keep up with them. Three, if a school doesn’t appear on our list, it probably doesn’t have an applicable program that meets our requirements. Many schools will tell you they can “tailor” a course of study to fit your needs (because they want your money!) regardless of what they can really do. However, we also recognize that we may have missed a program. If you think you have found a quality program not on our list, contact the Proponent for guidance.

The #1 reason for choosing a school should be to get the best possible education you can to prepare you for future assignments as a FAO. The Proponent has provided a range of schools to select from which meet all of our requirements. It is now up to you to select from that list. While things like family considerations are important to the choice, they should not normally be the driving forces in your decision. Look for the program that meets your desires and needs to progress professionally. Check out course catalogs and program evaluation reference works, look at web sites, talk to admissions counselors and department chairpersons and, if possible, visit the schools you are interested in attending. The Army is about to invest a substantial amount of money and time in your education. It is the least you can do to ensure the program you choose be a good fit.

We can’t force a school to take you. While many schools will make allowances for military officers since they have the motivation to complete the degree requirements (like losing their careers), there is no guarantee that an officer will be accepted. A sensible approach just like most officers used in applying to undergraduate schools should be applied here.

The application process for ACS is more involved than it appears. While schools have certain requirements, PERSCOM has others. In some areas, PERSCOM requires more information than the schools. FAOs must remember that it is PERSCOM that ultimately approves an officer’s application for ACS after being accepted to a graduate school. So, even though the school of your choice doesn’t need GREs, PERSCOM requires it. Not only that, PERSCOM uses GREs as a measure of potential success so low scores don’t help an officer’s chances even though he/she may have been accepted to a school. In the end it is Army money paying for the education and before it will commit to the investment, it must have reasonable assurance that the officer will succeed. Thus, it is critical that FAOs entering into the ACS application window ensure that they have valid, acceptable GRE scores. This may mean taking some refresher courses or investing in a GRE study program. In any case, waiting until the last minute to take the test is not a smart approach.

A smart officer will start the process early. It is easier to ask for delayed admissions than trying to push through a late application. Few schools will waive application deadlines. Proper planning must be made to account for things like being overseas during the application process, allowing time to take the GREs and having a fall-back plan if your top choice school stiffs you. Don’t expect the Proponent or PERSCOM to drop

We are looking for a Mandarin Chinese or Taiwanese language speaker for a possible position in Taipei.

Ideal candidate will have defense policy, intelligence, and attache experience.

Contact Dr. Dorothy Fontana or Tom Adams at (703) 907-0572 or 0866.
(Advanced Civil Schooling, continued from page 9)

everything for you at the last minute just because you didn’t follow directions or allow sufficient time to process your application. Typically, there are 10 to 15 officers ready and willing to jump into your ACS slot if you drop the ball.

Once you have received your acceptance letters and chosen school you must submit the completed Graduate School Acceptance Packet to PERSCOM. Your application will be boarded and, if you have met all the requirements, approved. This process takes about three weeks after your packet has been received. After approval of the packet, PERSCOM will cut orders sending you to ACS.

Once you have successfully mastered the process of applying for the program and have begun your education, don’t forget why we sent you there. You are supposed to be in a program that enhances your REGIONAL expertise. This may sound like basics to most of you but, if you are a Sub-Saharan Africa FAO we expect that you would take courses that deal with that part of the world rather than Europe. Anyone who doesn’t understand that concept should feel free to call me for further explanation. Also, don’t just take the minimum courses to get by. Max out the course load you can take, staying within the tuition allowances, so you can gain the best possible educational background. Also, remember that the Proponent requires that you work on your language skills during ACS. In most cases, the schools on our list require language courses or thesis work in a target language. In several cases, it is up to you to take additional courses to meet this requirement.

MYTHS DEBUNKED

The ACS experience is a critical juncture in the training of a FAO. It marks the point where an officer is turned loose to fend for himself/herself in determining which school to choose and then to maximize the educational opportunities he/she has been given. There is no “rocket science” here, only good old-fashioned common sense, following rules and guidelines and applying a solid work ethic. Both the Proponent and your PERSCOM training manager are there to assist you through this period but, in the end, it is the individual officers who are responsible for their academic success.

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EYES OF THE ALTIPLANO
by CPT Ted Bowling, Latin American FAO

Assuming the absense of any critical mechanical failure, the train ride from Cuzco, Peru, to Puno on the western shore of Lake Titikaka takes about nine hours. The train winds its way across the golden 13,000 foot high Altiplano which flows unimpeded by the great lake into Bolivia and falls precipitously into the canyons of La Paz. The “curing touch” of the Fujimori government has yet to reach this enclave of pre-Colombian culture. The simple adobe igloos and colorfully dressed Native Americans tending their llamas on the vast free range of the Plano do not betray the year in which they live. The train stops occasionally in pueblos (small villages), but nobody actually gets on or off. The train just stops, then slowly begins its journey south again, its antique mustard colored locomotive belching black smoke and straining to achieve enough momentum to reach its next mysterious halt. As we roll through this surreal world, children steal a moments rest from their 7,000 year old chores and glance up at the glass windows of the great iron wagons and somehow directly into our eyes. In their eyes is infinite time and space. There are wars 5000 years old, struggles so brutal that the suffering populations built floating islands of reeds on the great lake, where they could live without the pain and loss that war has always brought. Through their eyes marches Huayna Capac escorted by 10,000 guards, aides, and personal servants making his way south across the Altiplano with us, attending to affairs in his 3,000 mile long Inca Empire. His children Huascar and Atahualpa at his side; his children who would be so deeply embroiled in internecine warfare upon the arrival of the men on horses, that their fate would be sealed and the destiny of a great people changed forever. I see in these children’s eyes the passing gaggle of untrained Spanish cavalry, fresh from the effortless conquest of precious Cuzco, plodding their way southward. Eventually, they will reach Potosi where they will discover untold wealth, which in a twist of fortunes (played out so many times in the history of kings) will seal the fate and fall of Spain as a world power. Through those eyes I see “the fate,” I see El Librador marching south with his lieutenants. He marches deliberately and without enthusiasm on his long journey to La Paz where he will reluctantly grant independence to a country that he knows cannot be governed; a country that will be his namesake for the next two centuries as the continent struggles to judge him. The train speeds by and the last blur of recognition is death. The children will return to their chores, only faintly understanding the urgency of every task in preparation for the great drought which El Nino will soon bring; too young to remember the last visit, when famine’s only competition in the reaper’s morbid game was the illogical slaughter by Sendero Luminoso’s butchers.

Some day I will take the trip again. I think what bothers me most is not the fear of what I may see the next time I look, but rather that I do not know what I want to see.
Triangulating Security and Defense in the Southern Balkans

By MAJ Tim De Vito, 48C

“Military victories are not gained by a single arm - though the failure of any arm or service might well be disastrous - but are achieved through the efforts of all ... welded into a team.”
- General of the Army George C. Marshall

Do you realize that there are US Army majors who are charged with managing multi-million dollar security assistance programs in emerging democracies? Well believe it; it has been happening for quite some time now. Together with the other members of their country teams, they are advising defense ministers, ambassadors, and senior foreign military officials, as to the priorities, goals, and methods recommended for developing an armed force. In doing so, they obviously face a multitude of challenges.

Recently, during my regional orientation to the southern Balkans, I had the distinct pleasure of meeting four small teams of people (in Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, and in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) who are literally doing the work of legions. These teams consist of three separate entities, each of which must synchronize its activities with the others, in order to achieve the common goals established by key US governmental and military organizations, such as — the US ambassador to the respective country, the US European Command (EUCOM), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), US Army Europe (USAREUR), and other agencies empowered to work in the area. This does not even include the “security contractors” operating in the region, such as those mentioned in MAJ Tom Milton’s article in the December 1997 issue of the FAO Journal.

The complementary in-country teams that I visited generally consisted of: a Defense Attache (DATT), in the grade of O-5 or O-6; a Military Liaison Team (MLT), led by an O-6 from the Reserve Component; and a Security Assistance Officer (SAO), an Army FAO in the grade of O-4.

NOTE: IN FYROM and Albania, the DATT happens to be an Army FAO (COL and LTC, respectively); whereas in Bulgaria and Romania he is an Air Force O-6. The MLT to Albania has not returned since its evacuation during last year’s turmoil there, however the SAO and DATT are both back on the ground.

Using the word team is not meant to imply, however, that everyone works together, or even for the same headquarters. In fact, each of the three elements works for a different agency and has a distinctly separate mission in the area. Rather, the team-work to which I refer is exercised on-site, by professionals who clearly understand the US goals and objectives for the region.

Figure 1. The triangular relationship that provides US representation, defense advice, security assistance, and familiarization with US programs in partner countries.

Several factors make this relationship an intricate one. First and foremost to this observer is the issue of rank. As one SAO pointed out to me, the fact that the DATT and the MLT chief are both colonels, while the SAO is a major, can give the host country the perception that the SAO is an entity of lesser importance, which can undermine mission effectiveness. The same situation can occur at the embassy, if the rest of the country team looks to “the highest ranking guy in the room” for all military related issues.

In actuality, however, the DATT has little to do with the SAO’s day-to-day mission. He does not rate the SAO, nor does he decide on the expenditure or priority of security assistance. The same is true of the MLT chief. The DATT is the senior defense representative in these countries and intuitively then, one would think that he would have the responsibility, and the authority to ensure that the SAO and MLT are delivering security assistance in accordance with his outlook. Again, I suggest that teamwork and professionalism, such I observed in these four countries, is the reason why this relationship is working, despite its somewhat ambiguous hierarchical design.

In other words, while the DATT is advising the Ministry of Defense (MOD) to focus on uniforms as a first priority, for example, one would hope that the SAO’s and MLT’s programs were harmonized with that philosophy, and that the country is not trying to purchase F-16s before boots for its soldiers. In fact, in one of the countries that I visited the DATT hosted a meeting with the SAO and MLT to ensure that the entire year’s agenda was synergetic. That is an example of leadership, cooperation, and professionalism required for this triangulation to produce a unity of effort.

Another interesting point is that the SAO, the major, is
“the one with the money.” After professionalism and teamwork, this is the safeguard which guarantees that the triangular relationship functions properly, despite the disparity in rank. This reality demands that the SAO be treated as an equal member at the country team table. Further, US defense policies governing security assistance dictate that the MOD deal with the SAO and MLT directly, and independently. For example, the MLT handles “familiarization” with US defense programs, while the SAO offers security assistance in IMET, Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Financing, Excess Defense Articles, and Humanitarian Assistance.

As one SAO poignantly observed, MODs in these emerging democracies tend to look straight to the highest level, probably because it is incomprehensible for an army major (in their own centralized systems) to be charged with so much authority. Once they understand that they are required to deal with the SAO, however, he is quickly elevated in status to one of the most important officers in the embassy, regardless of whether the rest of the country team recognizes it.

Furthermore, since many key host-nation leaders attribute the individual actions and initiatives of US military officers to our government as a whole, or to the US embassy (as the national symbol or “agent” in country), it is even more imperative that all the “team members” speak with one voice and act towards common and well-coordinated objectives. Form that perspective, there is little difference between this “triangle” in emerging democracies and the more traditional Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) and Defense Attache Office (DAO) relationships, found in countries where more mature security relations are established with the US.

There are obviously many issues that these teams have in common. For instance, they are all in Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries that aspire to future NATO membership. One of the DATTs has suggested that a regional get-together would be a good opportunity to share perspectives. Each of the SAOs, for example, is currently working issues such as the Regional Airspace Initiative (RAI), the Air Sovereignty Operations Center (ASOC), and the fielding of the PIP Information Management System (PIMS) in his respective country. In the broader context, they are all aiming towards the common goals of interoperability and eventual NATO membership. In fact, another DATT fittingly remarked that the lessons coming out of NATO’s three invitees (Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic) would be very useful to those countries yet to be invited. This expands the triangular concept into a star across the entire European continent, with NATO, EUCOM, and USAREUR being the center of it.

With so many defense and security issues ongoing simultaneously, as is the case in the four Balkan countries that I visited, it is absolutely essential that “every car in the train” be moving in the same direction, at the same time. The DATTs in those respective countries have an enormous responsibility as the ambassador’s, hence our nation’s, senior defense representatives. Perhaps the role of advisor is a task inapplicable to the rest of the attaché world, but in these countries (especially at the present time) it very well may be that DATT’s most important contribution to US security and defense objectives in the region.

REMEMBER!!
YOU are the only one who can UPDATE YOUR Mailing ADDRESS
We are a PRIVATE, non-profit Professional Military Association
**SPOTLIGHT ON CHINA(48F)**

Information provided is based on data that is continuously changing. The listing of positions in the 48F inventory is provided only to help you determine what assignment possibilities are available.

**THE REGION.** The Army’s China Area of Concentration (AOC 48F) covers China, Mongolia, Tibet, and Taiwan.

**IN-COUNTRY TRAINING.** The capstone phase of the FAO training process, In-Country Training (ICT), is usually a 12 month long accompanied tour. Current 48F ICT is based out of Beijing and supports 4 trainees.

**CURRENT POSITIONS** The following information provides an overview of currently listed 48F positions. The first chart provides a breakdown of the positions of army and joint slots, and gives you an idea of the number of joint requirements that must be met. The next list of 48F positions is grouped by grade and provides the command or agency and a basic description of each slot.

### COLONELS

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<td>PACOM</td>
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### LIEUTENANT COLONELS

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**SPOTLIGHT ON N. E. ASIA(48H)**

Information provided is based on data that is continuously changing. The listing of positions in the 48H inventory is provided only to help you determine what assignment possibilities are available.

**THE REGION.** The Army’s Northeast Area of Concentration (AOC 48H) covers North Korea, South Korea, and Japan.

**IN-COUNTRY TRAINING.** The capstone phase of the FAO training process, In-Country Training (ICT), is usually a 12-18 month long accompanied tour. Current 48H ICT is in: Korea – 8 and Japan – 5.

**CURRENT POSITIONS** The following information provides an overview of currently listed 48H positions. The first chart provides a breakdown of the positions of army and joint slots, and gives you an idea of the number of joint requirements that must be met. The next list of 48F positions is grouped by grade and provides the command or agency and a basic description of each slot.

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Mutual Def Asst Office  Japan  Dir, Grd Forces Prog

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</tr>
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<td>ROK/US CFC, Ops &amp; PIn</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Operational Plans Off</td>
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**SPOTLIGHT ON SOUTH EAST ASIA (48I)**

Information provided is based on data that is continuously changing. The listing of positions in the 48I inventory is provided only to help you determine what assignment possibilities are available.

**THE REGION.** The Army’s South East Asia Area of Concentration (AOC 48I) covers the countries of Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Brunei, Singapore, and Myanmar.

**IN-COUNTRY TRAINING.** The capstone phase of the FAO training process, In-Country Training (ICT), is usually a 12-15 month long accompanied tour. Current 48I ICT sites and number of slots in each country are: Indonesia – 1; Malaysia – 1; Singapore – 4; Thailand – 2; and Philippines – 2.

**CURRENT POSITIONS.** The following information provides an overview of currently listed 48I positions. The first chart provides a breakdown of the positions of army and joint slots, and gives you an idea of the number of joint requirements that must be met. The next list of 48I positions is grouped by grade and provides the command or agency and a basic description of each slot.
COLONELS

JUSMAG-Thailand
JUSMAG-Philippines
HQ, PACOM
DAS
DAS
DAS
DAS
DAS
DAS
DAS
DAS
DAS
DAS
OMADP-Indonesia
State Dep

Thailand
Philippines
Hawaii
Vietnam
Malaysia
Thailand
Philippines
Australia
Burma
Cambodia
Singapore
Indonesia
Indonesia
Washington, DC
Chief
Chief
Chief, S.E. Asia Br
DATT/ARMA
DATT/ARMA
ARMA
ARMA
DATT/ARMA
DATT/ARMA
ARMA
DATT/ARMA
Chief
Pol-Mil Off

LIEUTENANT COLONELS

USACAC
JUSMAG-Thailand
DAS
DAS
Asia/Pac Ctr
SAC-Malaysia
OMADP-Indonesia
HQ, PACOM
HQ, PACOM

Ft. Leavenworth
Thailand
Indonesia
Thailand
Hawaii
Malaysia
Indonesia
Hawaii
Hawaii
Chief
Instr/CBT CMD Div
Sec Assist Prog Off
A/ARMA (C-12)
A/ARMA
Admin Spec
Chief
Army Training Chief
Sec Assist Prog Off
Policy/Plans Off

MAJORS

USCAC
Ctr USA Intel, PAC
USARPAC
JUSMAG-Thailand
DAS
DAS
ACTUSAE PACOM SUP
OMADP-Indonesia
DIA
DIA

Ft. Leavenworth
Hawaii
Hawaii
Thailand
Philippines
Papua/New Guinea
Hawaii
Indonesia
Bolling AFB
Bolling AFB
Instr/Strat Div
Geopolitical Analyst
S. E. Asia Desk Off
Army Training Off
A/ARMA
DATT/ARMA
Regional Staff Off
Training Chief
SMA-Mil Capabilities
Regional Analyst
Further than battalion level staff as primaries, but serve on Army, Joint Staff, and CINC/MACOM staffs throughout their latter careers. While your comments on staff experience are certainly true in a TOE unit, they breakdown at echelons-above-corps. Attaches over the past 5 years were 70% non-battalion commanders. I think that we forget that regardless of who is appointed as an attaché, that person in the eyes of the local government “is the United States.” I would worry less about their perceptions than about the possibility of loss of efficiency by our appointees. Still the loss of experience in the “green” army is a concern to everyone in the establishment and because of this they are working to increase FAO positions in the TOE Force.

And finally a personal issue. I know that it is the vogue to say that an officer is “noncompetitive” when he or she is not picked up for command, but the truth is that with as few commands as the Army has now that characterization is just not true. Plenty of top quality officers whose files are considered competitive for command never get the opportunity to command.

Hopefully, just by airing your questions and comments we have helped fuel the professional discussion about this extremely important topic. The Journal welcomes other comments and questions. There is still considerable confusion as to just how this new personnel system will shake itself out. We will try to get the OPMS XXI guys to put another update in our magazine in the near future. — JDT

**NURTURING OUR INVESTMENTS – The Attaché and the FAO In-Country Training (ICT) Program**

*by LTC John Adams (DATT/ARMA, Croatia)*

Most FAOs who have served as attaches would agree that one of the most challenging responsibilities of any attaché is stewardship of the FAO In-Country Training (ICT) program and the mentoring of the FAO-ICTs under their charge. This article will provide practical information for attaches to foster a productive FAO ICT program. I will draw on my own practical knowledge of the ICT program in Europe, having just completed a three-year assignment as the Assistant Army Attaché at DAO Brussels. There, it was my privilege to work closely with seven FAO-ICTs assigned to either Belgium or Luxembourg, and to meet dozens of other FAO-ICTs and their families as they conducted their visits to Belgium. This article will also draw on my experience organizing and executing the 1997 European FAO-PEP (Personnel Exchange Program) Conference in Brussels. More than 35 FAOs, PEPs and their spouses attended this conference, which drew together in one five-day period the European FAO-ICT Community, and gave us an excellent opportunity to take the pulse of the Program. Healthy it is, but there is room for improvement.

**The Professional Component of Mentoring**

Centered on the FAO-ICT’s approved Program-of-Instruction (POI), the professional component of mentoring leaves considerable room for imagination and initiative on the part of both the attaché and the FAO-ICT. In this regard, the attaché should provide the FAO-ICT with the maximum opportunity to interact within the Embassy Country Team and with host-nation officials. The attaché can also play an instrumental role in brokering FAO-ICT introductions to others in the Embassy who may play mentoring roles as well.

The attaché should take an active role in suggesting and advising the FAO-ICT on all elements of the POI. The attaché is in the best position to advise the FAO-ICT how to achieve the maximum degree of cultural and linguistic immersion. In the majority of FAO-ICT programs, which include attendance at host-nation military schools, the attaché’s close contact with the school personnel can make the difference between a routine program and a truly focused one. For example, at DAO Brussels, our frequent interaction with the FAO-ICT’s host-nation school course director was a major benefit to the FAO-ICT’s progress at the school. We were fortunate to have FAO-ICTs who excelled outright. However, the attaché’s close liaison with the school ensured that he was always well informed about the trainee’s progress. The attaché could focus on preventing problems, rather
A Modest Proposal Concerning Post-SFOR and Post-TFAS Strategy: A Regional Approach

Editor’s Note: Major Dougherty submitted this article before the recent and ongoing fighting in the Kosovo region, but I feel it even more applicable now than when it was originally written. JDT

by MAJ Kevin Dougherty

As U.S. Policy makers struggle to determine what to do in the post-SFOR (Stabilization Force) and post-TFAS (Task Force Able Sentry) scenarios, one course of action might be to view the situation in a more regional context rather than as two separate country issues. From a vital U.S. national interest point of view, the concern in the Balkans has always been Bosnia. The interest in Bosnia was always largely a human rights one. With the fighting in Bosnia stopped, and along with it most of the atrocities that brought the U.S. to Bosnia, the U.S. has an opportunity to develop a policy that is more in keeping with U.S. vital interests, allows the Bosnian people to take more responsibility for their own future by gradually reducing U.S. presence, achieves both containment and flexible response, and helps long-term stability in the Balkans as a whole. This course of action is to increase the U.S. presence in FYROM as that presence decreases in Bosnia.

FYROM. The UNPREDEP mandate expires in August, and an extension in the face of Russian opposition is unlikely. However, analysts such as those at The Economist have noted that “An explosion in Kosovo may not be preventable, but it may be contained . . . The decision to withdraw UNPREDEP next August therefore seems ill-conceived” (24 Jan 98, 16). Therefore, prudent planners have begun to develop options that are built around a large U.S. presence in post-TFAS FYROM.

FYROM has an extremely porous border, tensions of varying degrees with all its neighbors, no ability to defend itself, and a 23 percent ethnic Albanian population. It borders Kosovo, containing 90 percent ethnic Albanian, as well as Albania itself. If a Serbian crackdown in Kosovo generates a mass exodus of Kosovar refugees, as many as 400,000 could head for FYROM. FYROM simply has no capability for handling such an influx.

One plan is for FYROM to establish a corridor to move refugees into Albania. However, Albania’s current deteriorating situation makes this a complicated solution; nor is it certain FYROM even has the capacity to execute such a plan. Furthermore, in such a situation, there are indications that Greece would move into FYROM to establish a buffer zone in order to keep the refugees from entering its territory. Another threat to FYROM sovereignty comes from the possibility that Serbia might conduct limited raids across the border to attack UCK (Kosovo Liberation Army) elements that Serbia believes are operating out of FYROM.

Lastly, FYROM has a weak economy, a poor transportation network, and an uncertain leadership future after President Kiro Gligorov steps down. On the positive side, FYROM has Kivolak Training Area, the largest in the Balkans, which it has suggested might be leased or rented for use by the international community (it should be noted, however, that Kivolak is currently in less than perfect condition). The nation’s other selling point is its location within the Balkans Region — it offers a suitable location for an “over-the-horizon” reaction force in case the Bosnian crisis were to flare up again.

Albania. Albanian is making painfully slow progress toward recovery from its 1997 implosion. In fact, a strong case can be made that Albania is moving toward the situation that Martin van Creveld describes in The Transformation of War in which the state loses its monopoly over armed violence and crime reigns supreme. Certainly the scenario is ripe for chaos with tenuous central government control, weapons everywhere, crime already virtually unchecked, and the economy in shambles. Add this to certain Albanians’ dream of a “Greater Albania” and the situation is extremely dangerous. An eruption in Kosovo could easily trigger a sympathetic reaction in Albania that could greatly destabilize the region.

What is largely keeping Albania in check are the strings attached to the massive amount of international aid that is currently keeping it afloat. The Economist points out that “Part of the price of all this help is that Albania play its part in promoting regional tranquility” and Prime Minister Fatos Nano has announced that “Albanians will play their role to prevent [regional destabilization] from happening” (24 Jan 98, 17).

While diplomacy and inner turmoil has done much to contain Albania, the “poor and violent country remains on the edge” (The Economist, 24 Jan 98, 17). An international military presence in nearby FYROM would be a valuable assurance to regional stability in case events take a turn for the worse.

Greece. After initial problems, Greek relations with FYROM have shown improvement. In spite of whatever tensions remain, Greece has some vested interests in a stable FYROM. The first is the already mentioned desire to keep Kosovar ethnic Albanians out of Greece. The second is that Greece likes Serbia, and an improved transportation network in FYROM would greatly increase Greek trade opportunities with Serbia.

(Continued on page 19)
Greek Prime Minister Kostis Simitis is a Europeanist who has taken steps to increase Greece’s regional engagement. He has shown a willingness to commit troops to places like Albania in order to help some European problems, especially those that pose potential refugee threats to his own country. He would likely support a U.S. presence in FYROM that would lessen the danger of ethnic Albanians entering Greece and improve stability and trade opportunities.

Moreover, the nearby U.S. presence would be a reassurance to Greek fears of Turkish aggression. Greece wants to modernize its military, especially by purchasing F-15s. It also supports Greek Cypriot plans to position SA-10s on Cyprus, but many view this as more of a diplomatic than a military gesture. The U.S. could use its increased presence in nearby FYROM, albeit though not directly related to Cyprus, to convince Greece that such deployments as the SA-10s are no longer necessary. If Greece is looking for a face-saving way to turn off the SA-10 deployment, this might be it. It would also save Greece much needed modernization money that it could devote to the more valuable F-15 purchases. The NATO base planned for Larissa (located in northern Greece) could also have a contribution to make in such a scenario.

**Turkey.** Turkey is going to be suspicious of anything that hints at additional U.S. or NATO support for the Greeks, but promises of U.S. pressure on Greece to forego the SA-10 purchase (and the accompanying increase of Russian presence in Cyprus) should ease their reservations. Additionally, Turkey would like to see NATO expansion not just in central Europe, but in the east as well. Invitations to Bulgaria to participate in training exercises at Kivolak could help Turkey’s agenda here and also improve FYROM-Bulgaria relations.

A last option to make this regional strategy more palatable to the Turks is to offer them a role in Albania helping their fellow Muslims. This would give Turkey a chance to reengage Europe after the recent EU rebuff. Turkey’s feelings are currently hurt by the snub, but it also still hopes to join the EU and a commitment to Albania might show it has not given up on Europe.

The Albanian option also poses the exciting possibility of a multi-lateral exercise involving Greece and Turkey in a Kosovar refugee scenario. The scenario would be that in the event of a mass refugee situation, Greece would set up its buffer zone to contain the exodus, and Turkey would establish the corridor to direct the refugees toward Albania proper. Other countries such as Albania and the U.S. could likewise participate. Not only would such an exercise between the Greek and Turkish militaries, something much more difficult to achieve in the more contentious Aegean or eastern Mediterranean. This would be a rare instance in which Greece and Turkey could cooperate in a win-win situation.

**Bosnia.** The U.S. can’t stay in Bosnia forever. It must gradually disengage. However, a U.S. over-the-horizon force in nearby FYROM would be close enough to deter or stop a restoration of hostilities, yet far enough away to allow the FWFs to start taking more ownership and responsibility for the situation. Additionally, FYROM would be an excellent base for many of the airborne intelligence platforms that would monitor the situation and give the indications of any renewed fighting. A U.S. over-the-horizon force would still keep the U.S. engaged in the problem. However the U.S. shift to FYROM must be explained in terms of a regional strategy — not an abandonment of Bosnia. Thus the pattern would transpire from the current U.S.-led/Europe-supported operation to a Europe-led/U.S. supported operation to a European operation to a Bosnian operation.

Throughout this transition, the U.S. would maintain an incrementally lessening safety net in FYROM. The idea would be to shift forces from Bosnia to FYROM, though not in a one-for-one or like-kind fashion. The mission in FYROM would be very different than in Bosnia. The FYROM mission would be one of containment and nation assistance in FYROM, with a secondary focus on Bosnia. Neither of these missions has to begin tomorrow, but they should begin soon.

Thus, the NATO force in Bosnia does not have to be drawn-down immediately, nor does the FYROM force have to be stood up immediately. The point is that there should be a well-thought out, coordinated, and synchronized relation between these two events.

**Serbia.** It is probable that even Serbia could be convinced that such a plan is in its own best interests. One reason is the already mentioned ability to improve regional trade, particularly with Greece, through improved transportation systems in FYROM. The second reason is that obviously Serbia would like the U.S. to get out of Bosnia and certainly some diplomatic concessions could be exacted from that desire. What those concessions might be I don’t exactly know, but an obvious candidate would be an increased respect for the minority rights of the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. Many analysts perceive Kosovo to be the real flashpoint of the Balkans, so anything that alleviates tensions there would go a long way toward establishing regional stability. Currently, Serbian relations with Kosovo are extremely tense, and many predict a Serb crackdown in the near future [Ed Note: Readers will recall this was written more than two months ago, and since then Major Dougherty’s predictions have come true].

Finally, though the U.S. force in FYROM would not be in a direct counter-terrorist role, its presence would allow the FYROM government to focus more attention on the UCK which would be welcomed by Serbia. Gligorov would face some political pressure from ethnic Albanians against such a step, but the law and order necessity of such action is easily supportable. Cooperation between FYROM and Serbia in this regard would be mutually beneficial.

**The Force.** Not much U.S. combat power would be required in FYROM to deter aggression. The success of the small and lightly armed TFAS is proof of that. It is the presence that is the key.
STATE OF THE ASSOCIATION MESSAGE

As the FAO Association gets close to its third year of existence, I think it is important to let you know where we are and look ahead to a vision of where the FAO Association should be going as it enters the 21st Century. Too many of the military professional associations have, over time, degenerated into little more than organizations that produce monthly or quarterly professional magazines. I believe that the FAO Association can be much more. We have had an active and continuing dialogue between a number of members on just how to accomplish this. I have tried to synthesize these random conversations into specific concepts/ideas to share with you.

Generally, the challenge facing the Association is to serve all its membership – regardless of their Service affiliation or work status (active, reserve, or retired). To meet this challenge the Association must make advances in a series of broad categories. These are Social Interaction and Networking, Organizational, Membership, Community Service, Fiscal Resources, and Permanent Staffing. I will deal with each of these briefly.

Social Interaction and Networking. We have Internet connectivity and we produce a quarterly journal. Past that ideas have been suggested, including placing e-mail addresses of members on the FAOA Web Page, having regionally oriented dinners periodically for the membership, and have an annual convention/conference.

-- Of these ideas, the first is doable almost immediately, with permission of the individual members concerned.

-- The second is possible, particularly in the Washington, DC metropolitan area, if volunteers come forward to coordinate each of the separate functions. The idea would be to have ethnic/regional dinners at local restaurants with the meal being restricted to a maximum of 40-60 attendees. In a sense the Association co-sponsorship of the last FAOC reception constituted a fledgling attempt in this direction.

-- Accomplishing the third idea is a bit more complicated. Any conference must span all the regions and appeal to all Services. The potential attendance, if the event were held in Washington, DC for example, could top 2000. This is way beyond our capacity at this time. However, a cocktail party/business meeting open to members only might be possible if we can get the volunteers to coordinate/manage the function.

Organizational. Some areas (Leavenworth, Germany, Washington, and Monterey for example) have a large number of FAOs locally and lend themselves to the creation of Chapter organizations. As of right now our Charter does not allow for their existence, but we are studying other military professional associations to see how they do this and could revise the pertinent section of the Association Charter easily, if there is interest. Local Chapters could solve some of the social interaction issues as well.

Membership. We have about 840 members and are still increasing in size, but more slowly now than before. Our target population is between 5000-6000, but because we are a private association, running membership drives is always a problem. The solution is YOUR CHRISTMAS LIST. Dig out that list of old buddies and passing acquaintances and let us send them applications to join our stalwart band. Word-of-mouth is our best sales pitch.

Community Service. Our Charter states that we will do things to GIVE BACK TO THE COMMUNITY OF FAOS. So far, we have busily kept our organization’s collective head above water – so much for community service. However there are ideas, including college scholarship program for the children of our members and promoting memorials and displays at Army installations that foster a better understanding of what FAOs do and of the history of the program.

Fiscal Resources. We have a “war Chest.” It is pretty small at present, but grows with each new member and advertiser. According to our sister military associations, there are two paths to financial viability. One is through corporate sponsorship/membership and the other is through advertising. We need to explore this avenue. Corporations utilize our “graduates” and should, therefore, be willing to promote the professional association of these grads. Sounds simple – but it is not! We have to find the key to getting these firms to understand that backing the Association makes fiscal sense. Ads can completely fund the Journal (including quality upgrades, etc.) and corporate memberships could fund our future staffing requirements.

Permanent Staffing. YOU GET WHAT YOU PAY FOR!! And right now that is a very small dedicated staff of VOLUNTEERS. Eventually, we must hire a few part-timers to maintain membership rolls and run membership drives, to organize and coordinate future social functions, to edit and publish the Journal, and to do that myriad of tasks that keep an organization operating.

So, Where are we now? Getting there. Where do we need to be? A lot farther along! Can we get there? Yes, with your help!
Given the current situation, a mechanized infantry battalion task force in the FYROM and a mechanized brigade task force in Bosnia might be a good starting point for discussion.

After a couple of months, the next iteration might transition to a mechanized infantry battalion in Bosnia and two mechanized infantry battalions in FYROM. The final phase would have no U.S. combat forces in Bosnia and reduce those in FYROM to a single mechanized infantry battalion. The U.S. would probably have to commit to a two-three year program of assistance to FYROM in order to build FYROM up to the desired level of a sustainable, defendable, viable nation without any U.S. presence. However, perhaps only a year of this period would involve a substantial deployed U.S. military involvement.

What is really needed beyond the U.S. combat power is the nation assistance piece. Much of this must come from non-military instruments of power, but the military can make a considerable contribution here — engineers to upgrade roads and airfields, JAG and CA to provide education on minority rights, SF to train a FYROM army, intelligence assets for I&W, and an array of different specialties to help the NGOs to prepare FYROM for a potential refugee crisis. The U.S. would also have to commit to an active diplomatic role that might include equipping the FYROM army (in a program similar to the Train and Equip program in Bosnia), and economic aid, as well as border patrol, customs, and police training. An additional presence could come from units rotating through Kivolak for training. As mentioned, many of these could be international units. Construction projects from these training exercises could build up FYROM in the same way Honduras was built up in the 1980s.

Conclusion. If we are looking for a regional strategy, the U.S. vital interest in the Balkans lies in protecting NATO’s southern flank. The better place from which to do that is FYROM, not Bosnia. If a couple years from now fighting erupts again in Bosnia, the U.S. would be disheartened and a lot of hard work marginalized, but no vital national interest would be threatened. If, on the other hand, a variety of internal and external factors combine to dissolve FYROM, the frontline of the Balkans problem then becomes Greece and NATO’s southern flank — a much more serious situation. Furthermore, a U.S. force such as the one described in this paper could deploy from FYROM to Bosnia if needed. A force located in Bosnia would be much harder pressed to disengage and address any instability in FYROM.

Perhaps more pragmatically, in the long-term a U.S. contribution can fix the problems in FYROM. Few would say the same is true in Bosnia. Additionally if the elusive success in Bosnia could be realized, the FYROM problem would still exist and would still need to be dealt with.

Thus, I suggest that the U.S. needs to view the problem regionally, commit itself to strengthening FYROM and therefore NATO’s southern flank, gradually disengage from Bosnia with an accompanying strengthening in FYROM, and turn the required diplomatic, military, economic, and informational instruments of multinational power toward FYROM.

The author, Major Kevin Dougherty, is a European FAO, did his training in Greece and is currently assigned to Ft. Bragg.

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than waiting for them to develop into something significant.

The attaché can also play an invaluable role in assisting the FAO-ICT to gain maximum opportunity to travel and learn within the base country and the entire region. Wherever possible, the attaché should include the FAO-ICT in briefings and visits to host-nation military units. The attaché should encourage the FAO-ICT to judiciously schedule available time (e.g., school breaks) for visiting neighboring countries. However, the attaché should also ensure that the FAO-ICT does not get professionally burdened “on the margins” with non-productive (i.e., non-FAO related) tasks – ultimately the FAO-ICT needs undistracted time to plan and execute a high quality program of region coverage. The attaché cannot afford to allow even the most eager, well-meaning FAO-ICT to become expensive office help or to assume duties which do not advance FAO training. Even more important, the attaché must guard against FAO-ICT involvement in duties specifically prohibited by the program. The attaché must assume an advocacy role within the Country Team, both to ensure that the FAO-ICT has the best access possible, and to ensure that the other members of the Country Team know both the opportunities and the restrictions of the training program.

Certainly, the attaché’s other DAO and diplomatic contacts are particularly valuable in arranging unique access to other embassies in the region. For example, at DAO Brussels, we arranged for our Belgium FAO-ICT to conduct a six-week orientation program at the US Mission to NATO. From this unique platform, he discussed issues with numerous senior military and civilian diplomats, and had the opportunity to watch American policy-makers address critical issues of national policy at close-hand. The role of the attaché is important in ensuring access, as well as the quality of the program.

The Personal Component of Mentoring

The personal component of mentoring complements the formal ICT experience, making the difference between a formalistic program and one which has the potential to inspire and change lives. If the attaché is to be successful at the personal component of mentoring, then he or she should encourage frequent social interaction between attaché and the FAO-ICT families. These contacts are rewarding for all involved. Indeed, the attaché’s associations with the FAO-ICTs must not only consider the FAOs potential to the Pol-Mil world (the professional environment), but also to the larger world of our associations (the personal or social environment). As an attaché, some of my most rewarding friendships – and to this day most enduring – were formed with the FAO-ICTs and their families, through frequent DAO social contacts.

Nothing communicates concern for the soldier or the soldier’s family like a good sponsorship program. Simply stated, the FAO-ICT deserves a caring, competent sponsor. The attaché does not have to be the actual sponsor, but the attaché must ensure that one exists and that the job is done well. If this personal component of mentorship is lacking, the attaché’s subsequent efforts at mentoring – personally and professionally – will be crippled by the FAO-ICTs impression that the attaché does not care. The attaché, whether as direct sponsor or sponsor’s overseer, has a golden opportunity to start the FAO-ICT program with the spirit of genuine concern for this important young soldier’s welfare. The attaché should welcome the FAO-ICT and family with open arms and sufficient resources to assist in getting on with their all-too-brief year abroad.

The attaché, by creating numerous social opportunities for inclusion of the FAO-ICTs and their families, can greatly enrich the experiences of the FAO-ICT, family members, the DAO, and the Embassy. The inclusion of the FAO-ICT family as members of the DAO Team should begin upon initial assignment and continue throughout. The FAO-ICTs and their families should receive as much opportunity as possible to participate in DAO functions. At DAO Brussels, for example, we conducted several Staff Ride/Family Days at Waterloo, the World War I battlefields at Ypres, and the World War II fortress of Eben Emael. These obviously featured significant professional development components, but more importantly, gathered the DAO personnel – and in particular, the FAO-ICTs and their families – for an outing together. We designed the Staff Rides/Family Days specifically with the FAO-ICTs in mind, and although most other DAO personnel attended enthusiastically, the FAO-ICTs and their families (as well as alumni of our FAO-ICT program) were unsurpassed in their eager participation.

Making the Most of an All-Too-Brief Experience

In conclusion, the FAO-ICT program is too brief to do without a good plan and continuous resourcing – and judicious mentorship should be one of those resources. The professional and personal capital involved is just too valuable not to stoke the FAO-ICT fires with great care. Attachés should assist by:

- Fostering professional development in the core FAO skills – language, regional expertise, and US Political Military policy.
- Encouraging continued ICT involvement in branch-related skills to ensure that trainees remain technically and tactically competent.
- Fostering interactions between the FAO-ICT and foreign armies to give them practice now for their future responsibilities.
- Emphasizing the personal component of the mentorship process. Transfer excitement and expertise to the FAO-ICTs and their families. Encourage mentoring in turn from those you mentor by showing the example.

Finally, just as we should not be reluctant to pass on our experiences to those who follow us, we should not fall into the trap of thinking that we have all the answers. Our mentorship should include a generous listening component as well, because we can and should learn from our junior colleagues. We will profit, and they will grow. We cannot lose the focus on our investment — the FAO Community of 2010 — we have the chance to shape it today.
strategic level (and the operational level, too, if our projections of future Army needs are reasonably accurate). Actually located in or near the host-nation/entrance point for a prospective overseas military operation, the FAO busies himself with all the preliminary coordination necessary to smooth the way of the entering U.S. force. He is justifiably expected to “grease the skids” for the incoming force package, as well as to welcome that unit’s commander performing all of the necessary functions of introducing him to key host-country officials and translating his wants and needs into action. In this capacity, the FAO becomes an extension of the commander’s reach in the host-nation. This “on the ground” asset is expected to work both overtly within the constraints of the local government rules and covertly outside the local rules and policies to search out obstacles to the operation, get a “feel” for the environment within which the operation must take place, and translate all of these source materials into a concise, accurate picture of the current situation for his commander. The need to tread carefully through a physically dangerous environment often requires all the personal contacts and skills that the FAO attaché, liaison officer, or security assistance officer has gained over multiple tours of duty within the region.

As planners, other FAOs lend their “on the ground” background and regional expertise to the operational planning process itself. Their job, like their in-country brethren, is to ensure that the command successfully enters a region as efficiently as possible and with the fewest possible casualties. Once successful entry is achieved their job (like that of their tactical cavalry scout counterpart) is to further ensure that follow-on support and sustainment packages flow smoothly and rapidly through the country in question (seemingly innocuous issues to us like military female drivers might be far more significant to a host-nation in the Middle East and actually become a show stopper if not carefully considered and negotiated during the initial phases of a deployment).

Scouting methods and training increase the individual’s natural abilities to perform the mission and improve the professional results of the various scout missions. With the U.S. Army well into an era of coalition or combined warfare/operations, the training of a FAO for duty in the international arena is no less important. Language training, graduate education in a regional discipline, and in-country experience (beginning with an in-country training tour) form the FAO training cycle. These elements are the first rung on the ladder toward gaining the necessary skills to becoming a well qualified FAO regional specialist.

Obviously, language training forms the base from which the other phases of FAO training proceed. To say that it is the key to the world of the FAO is an understatement. Level of language skill is one of those areas that ultimately sets the FAO O-6 apart from his/her contemporary in other military career specialties. The FAO Colonel is expected to be able to operate without a translator at a level of language skill that would allow him/her to negotiate on an even footing with their foreign counterparts. The fact that a foreigner speaks English does not necessarily obviate the need for this skill. Nuances and critical second meanings are regularly lost when relying on a foreign officer to use his secondary language or relying on a translator to interpret the thoughts and concepts passing between two highly articulate commanders. The loss of those subtle differences in meaning often lead to misunderstandings that create very real obstacles to the successful completion of the mission. Success can even hinge on something so simple as using an officer who speaks an educated form of the language in question vice have good skills but in the language of the rural. Truth be known, the FAO should be able to do both, depending on the situation in which he finds himself. Language lets him in the door, while the other skills and training let him take full advantage of his quality language.

Graduate schooling in their regional discipline is more than a rubber stamp on the way through a FAOs career. The issue is not so much getting the degree, as getting the background that allows a regional specialist to put countries and their actions in the framework of the regional or even global politics, economics, social, or military contexts. The degree simply codifies the attainment of the needed education. Similarly, attaining a degree in some other field does not really go far towards building the necessary skills to perform as a FAO (a mechanical engineering degree does not make you a regional expert). The ability to classify actions toward one ally or opponent in a context of how that action will be perceived by other allies, neutrals, or opponents is significant. When working in the coalition or combined environment a misstep can send misleading and conflicting messages to both allies and enemies alike, resulting in at best reduced efficiency and at worst complete command breakdown. It is an interesting phenomena that to be a better regional specialist, the FAO ultimately has to become a globalist – understanding how his region relates to the rest of the world at all levels.

As noted above, the in-country experience portion of FAO training is only the first regional rung on the ladder to really operating as a qualified FAO later in an Army career. Most FAO in-country experiences include a military school phase (usually a host-nation General Staff College within the region), an internship phase, and a travel phase. To say that the old-school
ties and networks are alive and well in most of the world is an understatement. Officers who attend these schools are the cream of the nation’s crop and will almost assuredly become its senior military leadership corps of the future. This is true of the host-nation attendees and those attendees from neighboring nations as well. The FAO trainee enters a “club” for life by attending these schools. Internships that follow or are interspersed with the school attendance allow the young FAO to get his first taste of the realms of defense attaché or security assistance work. Lastly, the regional travel phase of his training introduces the officer to the other countries within his region. Travel is tightly controlled by the Army Attaches of the countries involved, to ensure that the trainee sees and learns about the other military, industries, cultures, social differences, and governments that compose the region in question. The travel firmly sets the foundation for future assignments in the region.

With these tools, and after multiple tours both in the region and as analysts of the region, the senior FAO is well prepared to operate on his own as a pointman for any entering U. S. force. He can search for the tell-tale signs of change that might affect a well considered plan. He will be able to get out into the countryside, operate in isolation, hearing, seeing, smelling and touching the pulse of the host-nation – not just the military and the bureaucracy, but segments of the population and the environment that can indirectly influence mission success or failure.

How about obstacles or pioneer work equating to Strategic Scouting? A FAO must locate obstructions (host nation laws, our own laws, cultural misperceptions, budgetary constraints etc…) at the strategic level placed by “the opponent” and develop the situation rapidly. Replace “Scout” with “FAO” and see if the description fits. The FAO combines with the S2’s (intelligence agency) work and adds to this work creating a operational friendly, usable product for the commander. He, as the man on the ground, is in one of the best positions to identify any possible obstacles and restrictions to the commander’s scheme of maneuver within his area of operations. The FAO’s ability to deal with an obstacle or restriction is somewhat limited in the conventional sense, but this is where his career-long efforts to build intimate contacts within a host nation military establishment really pay off. He has the capability to clear small diplomatic and bureaucratic obstacles quickly and to influence the clearing of larger, but similar obstacles. The FAOs most important function is reconnaissance of deliberate obstacles, including supporting enemy positions and possible breaching sites. At a strategic and operational level these obstacles can take the form of anything from something as large as the necessity to abrogate a standing nation-to-nation treaty to something as small as dealing with local customs officials. The FAO has to know and understand his region thoroughly (including customs and cultural oddities), so that in time of crisis he can steer a commander through the complexities of entering a foreign nation with a significant armed force.

The point of this section has been to illustrate that if you replace the word scout with Foreign Area Officer in the Army doctrine that describes what a scout is and does at the tactical level, there is a resultant and obvious parallel between it and what the FAO is expected to do in Operational Art and Strategy. The moniker “Strategic Scout” appears both to be valid and appropriate for the U.S. Army of the 21st Century.

Dr. Tullbane is a retired Army European/Eurasian FAO and a Military Intelligence officer. He served as a cavalry platoon leader, troop XO, and troop commander in the 1/6th Armored Cavalry and the 1/7th Cavalry. He remains a cavalryman at heart.

MAJ Harvey is an Army European FAO and Armored Branch officer. He has served almost exclusively in Armored Cavalry units. He now works as a political-military analyst for the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for International Affairs. This summer he rotates to Ft. Leavenworth as permanent party.
Notice of Vacancies: We have four vacancies: 48C, 48D/I, 48E, and 48 G/J. These are IRR Augmentee positions (12-day Annual Training). Applicants must be O-4 or O-5, and hold a designated MOS. Preference is given to applicants living in the DC Metropolitan region (DC, VA, MD) though not required. Send letter of application, bio summary, ORB, and civilian resume to: COL Robert G. Tregaskis, 2007 Highboro Way, Falls Church, VA 22043, Email: rtregask@erols.com

Below we provide a variety of INTERNET sites offering information helpful to Reservists participating in the RESDRO program. They are intended only as a starting point.

Federal Emergency Management Agency Home Page: www.fema.gov/ The Federal Emergency Management Agency -- FEMA -- is an independent agency of the federal government, reporting to the President. Since its founding in 1979, FEMA's mission has been clear: to reduce loss of life and property and protect our nation's critical infrastructure from all types of hazards through a comprehensive, risk-based, emergency management program of mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery.

Emergency Management Institute: www.fema.gov/emi/ EMI provides a nationwide training program of resident and non-resident courses to enhance U.S. emergency management practices. Individuals use EMI distance learning programs such as Independent Study courses and the Emergency Education Network (EENET) in home communities.

National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve: www.ncesgr.osd.mil/ The National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve (NCESGR) is a Department of Defense organization. It works with employers, reservists, military leadership, and 54 volunteer committees to build and maintain a strong base of support for the role of the National Guard and Reserve in our Nation's defense. It provides info on Federal job protection specific to Guard and Reserve.

U.S. Army Home Page: www.army.mil/ This home page accesses senior leader biographies and current news stories. Links connect to the Army Reserve, National Guard, Soldier*

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What do your FAO Proponent Regional Managers really do?

I’d like to follow up on COL Doroski’s notes in the last issue of the Journal that provided you with a great overview of DAMO-SSF’s missions and roles in the FAO life-cycle process. In it he discussed the evolution towards an enhanced FAO Proponent Division structure and the critical support of then LTG Shinseki (previous DCSOPS) that enabled us to adequately man the Proponent office, improve service to the FAO community as a whole, and, in addition to the Schools of Other Nations and Personnel Exchange Programs, added the CSA’s multilateral international conferences in Asia, Latin America, and the NATO Central Region to our mission rucksack.

Having just left the position of European FAO Program Manager, I’d now like to go a step further and provide you with a glimpse of what it is that the Regional FAO Program Managers (in this example, the European Program Manager) do. In our travels to the regions and to the FAO Course in Monterey, we frequently receive questions about our jobs, including if we do assignments (OF COURSE, WE DON’T), what the work hours are, etc. The following typical workday schedule should answer most of these questions. I hope that this information will also generate interest on the part of serving FAOs to consider an assignment in the Proponent Division at HQDA. These positions are professionally rewarding and are vital to ensuring the health and future of the Army FAO Program.

As a review, the Proponent Office consists of the FAO Division Chief (O-6), a GM-13 Personnel Exchange Program Manager, a GM-13 Budget Analyst, a GS-7 Schools of Other Nations Program Tech, and, of course, the four or so MAJ/LTC Regional Program Managers. There are two other important individuals that the Proponent works with on a daily basis – the LTC who serves as FAO Program Coordinator at DLI, and Dr. Joseph Tullbane, a Civilian Consultant, conducting a number of special projects for us and who is also the Executive Director and President of the FAO Association.

The key responsibilities of the Regional Managers are:

- to manage the FAO in-country training programs within their region(s);
- to work closely with our Defense and Army Attaches, Security Assistance Officers, and those individuals who support our FAOs during their training;
- to assist in organizing and teaching the FAO Course;
- to plan and organize regional visits by Proponent personnel;
- to plan and coordinate FAO conferences in region;
- and, in the case of the Asian, European, and Latin American Regional Managers, to prepare and travel with the CSA or his representative to the international conferences already mentioned above. Remember, the PERSCOM FAO Team, besides being responsible for assignments, is also a key player in the training process since they schedule personnel for training and cut the RFOs. The relationship between the Regional Manager and the Assignments Officers and Training Techs must be a close, friendly, and positive one for the system to work.

With this information as background, here’s a typical day that I may have worked during March or April prior to some key reoccurring events – the CSA’s participation in the NATO Central Region Chiefs of Army Staff Talks (CR CAST) in May, the FAO Course (June), and European FAO Conference (July).

0615 Depart home and drive to Park and Ride lot.
0635 Depart Park and Ride lot on Pentagon Express bus (fare about $2.50 each way).
0710 Arrive at Pentagon, turn on the computer, and provide some friendly harassment to Mr. Pahris (Personnel Exchange Program Manager) and LTC Volk (48G/J Regional Manager) about why the coffee isn’t on yet.
0720 Coffee’s up! Spend 20-30 minutes around the coffee pot with folks as they arrive to work and discuss last night’s sports, current events, key tasks for the day, etc.
0800 Work email responses to individual FAOs, PERSCOM, keeping in mind the time zone difference with Europe (business in my AO has to be worked prior to about 1100 hours).
0930 Call LANDCENT HQ in Heidelberg and get update on CR CAST attendees, itinerary, and any issues affecting CSA’s participation. Update slides with any new data for the CR CAST IPR Brief that I have to give to the Director of the Army Staff (DAS) in two days. Also, email the CSA’s staff to update them on any key changes to travel or conference planning. Provide updated briefing slide copies to Division Chief.
0945 Coffee’s up! Leave and spend 30 minutes around the coffee pot with folks as they arrive to work and discuss last night’s sports, current events, key tasks for the day, etc.
1030 Prepare draft tasking memo / message that will request info papers, slides, and country scenesetter messages from the Army Staff and DATT/ARMAs from NATO Central Region countries. Send out after receiving DAS’s guidance at IPR.
1050 Call DATT/ARMA in Europe who is hosting the July FAO Conference (just caught him before he departed for a wine-tasting party). Do a coordination cross-check and update on planning status.
1115 Dr. Tullbane says it’s time to grab a bite to eat. We go to the snack bar for a bowl of soup and a soda, and discussing the latest on FAO OPMS XXI issues. I also get harassed about my FAO Journal article being late.
1130 Back in office and check email / voice mail again.
1215 Receive call from a FAO studying Czech at DLI who

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When making the decision to apply for the FAO program, many officers receive unofficial advice on the effects that being a FAO may have on career potential. The facts are different from some of the common perceptions. For example, the selection rate for FAOs in the primary zone for Lieutenant Colonel this year was 80% (12 of 15), versus 65.8% (227 of 345) for non-FAOs. However, because we have relatively few FAOs in the Marine Corps, promotion statistics for any one year have little statistical validity. It is more useful to look at the figures over a period of time, for example the last four years. For FY96-99, FAOs were selected for Colonel at a rate of 45.9% (non-FAOs at a rate of 41.2%) and for Lieutenant Colonel the FAO rate was 63.8% (while for non-FAOs it was 63.2%). In both cases, FAO and non-FAO rates are “statistically” equal, due to the size of the populations involved.

The issue that needs to concern a FAO when thinking about his or her career is the timing of FAO assignments. While a FAO tour should be, and usually is, very rewarding personally, each FAO needs to carefully consider the timing of those assignments. Each case is unique, but in almost every case, a FAO should be having an active dialogue with the MOS monitor, the career counselors at MMOA-4, and the FAO Program sponsor when contemplating a FAO assignment. Through these dialogues, the officer will get a much clearer picture of the situation, and make a more informed decision.

Organizationally, we are also paying closer attention to matters of timing. ALMAR 113/98 which announced the FY99 FAO/RAO selection board has an important change in that regard. The Years Commissioned Service (YCS) requirement for FAO is now 4-11, and we are particularly encouraging officers who will be completing an FMF tour to apply. While we continue to encourage senior Captains/junior Majors to apply for the FAO program, this change will allow senior 1stLT’s and junior Captains to be accessed at the end of their first FMF tour. The concept is that they will complete their FAO training, and be able to return to the FMF as a Captain. They would then serve their first FAO utilization tour, and have time as a Major for ILS or, depending on MOS, a return to FMF. Selecting more junior officers for the program also allows opportunity for more FAO tours in the course of a career, while successfully balancing other career requirements.

Other changes in the FAO selection process include a realignment of quotas to meet Marine Corps needs, with a greater emphasis on the Pacific region (though Serbo-Croatian and Persian/Farsi quotas make their appearance for the first time, at least in recent years). One frequently-asked-question is why we rarely have quotas for Latin America or Western Europe. Both are important regions; however, we have a very healthy pool of FAOs in these regions due to the number of officers that receive their FAO AMOS through the experience track. We simply don’t need to utilize our scarce and expensive training quotas on these regions when we already have enough officers with both language proficiency, and in-country duty experience to meet our requirements.

As a final note, we are in a period of personnel transition here at the proponent. See the list of officers below or on the inside of the back cover, and don’t hesitate to contact any of us if you have any questions.

USMC FAO Coordinators

LtCol Chuck Owens – PROGRAM SPONSOR AND FSU/E. EUROPE COORDINATOR Ext 5347.

LtCol Joe Koen – MIDDLE EAST, SWA. Ext 5350.

LtCol Vic Dutil – WESTERN EUROPE, SUBSAHARAN AFRICA. Ext 5349.

Maj Jay Torres – LATIN AMERICA. Ext 5345.

Vacant until 8/98 (call LtCol Owens or LtCol Koen) – CHINA, E. ASIA.

Main phone number for all officers is DSN 224-3706, Commercial (703) 614-3706. E-Mail is COWENS@NOTES.HQI.USMC.MIL
asks about his choices for graduate school. I review the approved low-cost schools list with him and make recommendations on three schools that have good Central/East European Programs that also provide opportunities for further Czech language training.

1250 Read Early Bird.
1330 Depart for the Pentagon Athletic Center with MAJ Heston (Asian Region Manager). Do a quick stretching session and abdominal work before taking a short jog across Memorial Bridge, around the Lincoln Memorial, and back. Relax for 15 minutes in the steam room, shower, and head back to the office.

1500 Check email / voice mail. Call DLI FAO Coordinator and fax copies of two updated In-Country Training Program information papers for the FAO library there. Recently worked with the in-country FAO trainees and the attaches there to change portions of those training programs. Also, email copies to Ms. Fran Ware, PERSCOM FAO Team Training Tech for Europe. LTC Volk departs for home (just kidding).

1600 Meeting at DAMO-SSW (War Plans Division) to receive latest information on the Crisis Action Team Exercise to be held in the Army Ops Center in two weeks. Most of the Proponent Division will have to pull shifts as Strategy, Plans and Policy Directorate representatives.

1645 Check with other Regional Managers and the Division Chief on a proposed change to the FAO Course curriculum. Call DLI FAO Coordinator again, and inform him of the approved changes.

1715 Final check of email. Shut down computer.
1720 Depart office for bus terminal.
1728 Depart Pentagon on Express Bus.
1755 Arrive at the Park and Ride lot and depart for home.
1810 Pull in driveway at home.

Again, I hope this answers some of the many questions about what your Regional Managers really do. Any one of them will have days similar to this, working issues with you, with the other FAO Support Team members (PERSCOM, Attaches, SAOs, etc.), and for the Army leadership. I appreciate the opportunity to provide you this information.

“STRATEGIC SCOUTS!”

LTC Tom Hansinger, 48C
F. Y. I. — Active/Reserve FAOs

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Vacant til 8/98 (call LtCol Owens/LtCol Koen), China, E. Asia.

MAJ “Jay” Torres, Latin America, ext. 5345.

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