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PURPOSE: To publish a journal for disseminating professional knowledge and furnishing information that will promote understanding between U.S. regional specialists around the world and improve their effectiveness in advising decision-makers. It is intended to forge a closer bond between the active, reserve, and retired FAO communities.

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ARE WE OUR OWN WORST ENEMIES?

Sometimes observing FAOs from the various regions over a long period of time leaves a person with a very jaundiced view of the members of our specialty. We all agree that and have agreed for years that selling the benefits of our specialty to the army is an uphill battle, which requires that every member of the FAO Community pitch-in and become a proponent of the specialty. Unfortunately, what I have observed over time is an inability or an unwillingness to understand how others view our specialty by some in our community. The old quote that says “I have met the enemy and they are us” is appropriate to the FAO specialty. Without understanding this key factor – the non-FAO middle grade commander’s view of an a-typical career specialty – none of us can adequately counter their arguments. I also understand that often our expounding on the benefits of our specialty to the army does not fit neatly into the “sound bite arguments” that sell well to decision-makers. Even so, it only takes a few FAOs, who cannot see the forest for the trees to cause enormous confusion and detriment to the positive image of the community far in excess of their actual numbers.

Is there a place in the army for whining, bitching, and generally complaining about the cards dealt you by “the system.”? Of course there is! Among friends and fellow FAOs we should and must discuss the ramifications of personnel changes, of impact of boards and promotion rates, and a whole string of professionally interesting and important matters. But there is boundary which, if we want to sell the rest of the army on our program, we cannot cross. Crossing that barrier leaves all of us open to having the army leadership miss good, important points because they are lost in the “clutter” of seemingly unwarranted complaints.

Among the older FAOs, we joke that, concerning the value of the FAO specialty to the Services and to Defense, Flag Officers “get religion” at three-stars. There is a valid reason for this “tongue in cheek” comment. Division Commanders and below rarely see or work with FAOs, and therefore have little experience with the benefits that these officers bring to the Army. From their viewpoint, the specialty is a drain on the main mission of the army – fighting and winning wars. Worse yet, it is this very set of middle managers (O-6 through O-8) that serves on the promotion and selection boards. At some point we need to begin a dialoguing process within the community that deals with methods of getting the word out to the middle management of the Army. FAO is recognized as a potential force multiplier at the highest levels of the Army leadership. They understand that a few quality FAOs serving overseas can ease the entry of our combat forces into a country or a region with results that can be objectively measured in saved lives or resources, or even better still, prevent the need for force deployment at all. What we need to do now is spread this story to the rest of the army.

However, the entire FAO Community must keep the mission clearly in focus. One or two people, who forget what we are selling and go off on a tangent, negate the hard work of hundreds of positively oriented FAOs. We need to keep our story before the army, through writing in professional journals at all levels and through performance when it counts. At the same time, we all need to remember that actions don’t always speak louder than words – sometimes we are our own worst enemies.

Joseph D. Tullbane, III.
President, FAOA
Regarding Language Training . . .

EDITOR’S NOTE: Since the last issue of the Journal we have had a number of members who wrote in stating that the LingNet was having some problems. We asked the FAO Proponent and their answer is below.

In the last issue I mentioned DLI's LingNet as an outstanding resource for FAOs to use in keeping their language skills current. Since then, we were notified by FAOA that there were lots of rumors about LingNet having financial problems and ceasing operations. In fact, the folks at DLI tell us that they are actually pumping funds into expanding their services. They're still on line and doing great work. Try them.

— FAO Proponent Office

Regarding the Spotlights on Regional Positions . . .

In regards to the Regional Spotlights on existing positions that we in the FAO Proponent have been providing to the FAO Journal, we've received a lot of great comments and questions from the field. As you know very well, the data bases we use to build those lists are less than perfect. They sometimes lag by up to two years behind reality. The never-ending search for the all-inclusive and accurate data base of Army and Joint positions, both FAO and otherwise, continues. Thus, we do have some inaccurate and outdated information in each of the AOC's position listings. Our intent is to provide as accurate a picture as we can to help Army FAOs plan for future assignment possibilities.

All Association members, irrespective of AOC, should scrub the Highlights and let us know when they see something that doesn't make sense. In some cases it is a valid oversight, where in others it may be caused by the owning-unit failing to update its MTOE or TDA to reflect current duty titles or grade requirements. In any case, we always appreciate help in making our data bases as accurate as possible. Working together we can build a more accurate data base, for use by the community.

Finally, I'd remind folks that the Proponent program managers aren't assignment officers. We keep track of positions and manage the ICT sites but don't work assignments or know, necessarily, when a position is opening. That's what our comrades in FAO Assignments at PERSCOM do. While we coordinate on a daily basis, we here in DAMO-SSF can't, and won't, talk about individual assignment possibilities.

— LTC Mark Volk

Regarding the Mentoring Editorial . . .

Dear Dr. Tullbane,

Thank you for your insightful and very relevant editorial on mentoring in the previous issue of the FAO Journal. The vast majority of our senior FAOs serving in attaché, security assistance, and political-military positions that have contact with and responsibility for supervising and mentoring young FAO trainees or those in initial assignments take this mission very seriously. As you stated, the future and "health of the FAO community" demands that this mentoring mission be accomplished successfully.

Your comments on the in-country training (ICT) program were also timely and appreciated. I have personally worked with several attaches to restructure three of our sixteen European programs this past year. Occasionally, I still get the request to standardize and "spoon feed" all aspects of an ICT program from Washington. This would do a disservice to our senior FAOs, attaches, and the young trainee. I am reasonably convinced that if a cookie-cutter approach were used for all ICT programs, we would soon see that our new FAOs would be joining the FAO working pool without having gained the insights, unique experiences, and special knowledge that a tailored program with large doses of personal mentoring from a senior FAO would have provided them. It would not be long before the funds to this very expensive, but widely recognized and lauded program, would be in jeopardy. The seasoned FAOs serving as Defense and/or Army Attaches are the true experts, and it would be presumptuous of us to tell them what a FAO trainee really needs to learn in his or her country and region. Believe it or not, we don't have all the answers here at HQDA. Occasionally, on a good day, we may have some of the answers. Beyond ensuring that the ICT program fill several basic needs - such as language immersion and improvement; exposure to security assistance, attaché, country team, and political-military operations; some type of host-country formal military instruction; and targeted country and regional travel - it is up to the attaché supervisor to flesh out the individual programs.

This past January, as the Proponent's FAO Program Manager for Europe, I had the opportunity to travel to Brussels, the Hague, Bonn, Vienna, Prague, and Stockholm and visit with our attaches and FAO trainees there. I think that much of our Army leadership is still not
Dear Editor:

As a non-FAO, having served in a number of FAO tours, I would like to add my voice to that of LTC Bob Faille. My personal experience has been that in terms of knowledge of the country, personal contacts, etc. I was definitely behind the power curve. At the same time, I had a good reputation with the host nation because of my combat arms background (infantry). The problem I had was incommunicating my experiences to my hosts. I found that until I finally improved my language significantly I could not work well with my counterparts (it took two years to get there). It seems to me that the real secret would for FAOs to stay greened, then they could take advantage of both my experiences and of having the contacts and background of the host country. Of course, when a FAO is advising a commander, he needs to be able to speak the same language as that commander. The best advice will probably fall on deaf ears if there is not bond of trust between the advisor and his boss.

— COL(R) James P. Smith, Inf.

Regarding the Cyprus Problem . . .

President, FAOA

I found the remarks by COL Norton and Mr. Bright interesting, and I would welcome more comments from others who are familiar with the Cyprus problem. I have watched for over 40 years developments in Cyprus, and the situation on the island has deteriorated whenever Greece or Turkey interfered in Cyprus’ affairs. Greece and Turkey have used the Cyprus problem to promote their own national agendas and not necessarily for the benefit of Cyprus. Clerides and Denktash started negotiating a solution in 1968; therefore, after 30 years, it is time to look for drastic new approaches. The complex Zurich agreements which established Cyprus as an independent country did not promote conciliation and unity, but maintained and accentuated the division and separation of the two ethnic groups. Since after three decades of negotiations, the two parties have not reached an agreement, it should be obvious that if the problem is to be solved an outside party must step in to impose a solution.

Thank you.

COL (Ret) Andonios Neroulias

ODDS AND ENDS . . .

E-Mails Arriving on Proponent Notes . . .

Interesting Army Proponent Notes this month. It is good to know that someone is looking at the future. Can we also get something sometime on what the Proponent does and how it interfaces with us in the field? —

What is the difference between the FAO Proponent and the Assignments branch at PERSCOM? —

(Continued on page 22)
A Deconfrontation Agreement Reached in Cyprus: How U.S. Army Foreign Area Officer Expertise Complemented a Diplomatic Initiative

By Ambassador Bill K. Perrin and Colonel Stephen R. Norton, USA

President Clinton has recently announced that former Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Holbrooke, will be responsible to lead the United States’ efforts to find a solution to the Cyprus problem. He will assisted by a newly appointed Special Cyprus Coordinator, Ambassador Thomas J. Miller, the former Deputy Chief of Mission at the American Embassy in Athens, Greece.

While this article deals with events that happened seven and eight years ago; it has applicability for those dealing with the Cyprus problem today for several reasons: deconfrontation, and security in general, remains an element of the overall problem; it contains personal observations of some relevant individuals and positions; it demonstrates how issues of this type can be successfully orchestrated in a complex politico-military milieu; there are insights into the workings of U.S. foreign policy which illustrate the importance of using a non-traditional approach in certain cases; and finally, it is an example of why “instincts” are still important in foreign policy decision making.

The politico-military situation in Cyprus is complex, tense, highly emotional, and involves soldiers from two NATO allies (Greece and Turkey) facing each other across a so-called Green Line in a neutral, non-aligned, island nation in the eastern Mediterranean. The Green Line runs east to west across almost the entire island, cuts through and divides the Cypriot capital city of Nicosia, and is a direct result of the events of 1974 when the ruling military government in Athens overthrew the Cypriot leader, Archbishop Makarios, and installed Nicos Samson, a man known for his desire to unite Cyprus with Greece over the objections of Turkey. This Greek-sponsored coup ultimately led to a Turkish military intervention and the current division of the island. Where the Turkish army stopped in August of 1974 is known as the Turkish Cease Fire Line and is the northern boundary of the Green Line. Where the Greek and Greek Cypriot forces stopped is the Greek Cease Fire Line and marks the Green Line’s southern boundary. The area between the two cease fire lines is known as the “buffer zone” or “no-man’s land” and is the responsibility of the United Nations Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP).

Observation posts (Ops) are maintained along the Green Line by all three forces: Turkish (including Turkish Cypriot), Greek Cypriot, and United Nations. Since 1974, there has been remarkably little cooperation between the two opposing military commanders with one notable exception – a UNFICYP sponsored deconfrontation agreement reached in 1989, which called for the demanning of a number of Greek and Turkish Ops in the middle of Nicosia where the buffer zone is at its narrowest and where incidents between the military forces are highest. In this area, UNFICYP increased its Ops to compensate for the loss of the Greek and Turkish presence.

This paper looks at the period 1988 to 1989 when the Deconfrontation Agreement was reached. The 1989 agreement was the last significant military one reached on Cyprus. UNFICYP is currently trying to negotiate a package of confidence building measures between the two military antagonists, including the demanning of more Ops. Then, like now, negotiations became seriously bogged down. Without an intense effort by the American Embassy in Nicosia, there would not have been an agreement signed nine years ago.

The Military Command and Control Situation

There are six separate military commands in Cyprus, five of which are directly involved in the Cyprus problem. The sixth, British Forces Cyprus (BFC), is confined to two sovereign base areas that were retained when the United Kingdom granted independence to Cyprus in 1960. The commander BFC, reports directly to the British MOD, is not officially linked to the British High Commission in Nicosia, and does not actively engage in military activities with either the Greeks or the Turks. In the northern part of the island, known as the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)” (a self-proclaimed sovereign state headed by Mr. Rauf Denktash and not recognized by the United States), there are two forces: a Turkish Army Corps commanded in 1989 by Lieutenant General Esref Bitlis, and a Turkish Cypriot Security Force (TCSF), commanded by Brigadier General Ali Yalcin. Yalcin was a regular Turkish Army flag officer who was seconded to the TCSF and nominally reported to the “MOD” of the “TRNC,” but who cleared his actions with General Bitlis. This is a key point that will be discussed later. Bitlis reported directly to the Deputy Chief of the Turkish General Staff in Ankara.

On the Greek Cypriot side, there are also two distinct forces. The Greek Cypriot National Guard (GCNG) then commanded by Lieutenant General Panayiotis Markopoulos, and a regular Greek Army contingent commanded by Colonel Dimitrios Dimou. Markopoulos was a retired Greek officer who was seconded to Cyprus and reported to the Cypriot MOD. However, no serious military decision would be made without the concurrence of, or at least notifying, the Hellenic National Defense General Staff (HNDGS) in Athens. Colonel dimou’s regiment was kept under the direct command of Athens except in times of emergency when command was transferred to General Markopoulos.

Between these forces is a multinational United Nations Force, UNFICYP. From 1981 to April 1989, UNFICYP was...
commanded by an Austrian Major General, Gunther Greindl. He was followed by a Canadian Major General, Clive Milner, who commanded UNFICYP until 1992. The UNFICYP commander reported directly to UN HQ in New York.

General Markopoulos’ relationship with the HNDGS in Athens, the President of Cyprus (George Vassiliou), the Cypriot MOD, and the Greek national contingent did not pose any problems during the discussions on deconfrontation. He was clearly in charge of the GCNG and had the latitude to negotiate with UNFICYP over the particulars of the proposed plan. In the “TRNC,” however, it was a different matter. We will see later how personalities, strict Turkish military protocol, and the politicization of the deconfrontation plan by Mr. Denktash almost precluded getting any agreement at all.

**General Greindl’s Confidence Building Measures (CBMs)**

General Greindl was a very experienced hand at peacekeeping and his specialty was Cyprus. No one has ever served in Cyprus in a significant military capacity longer than he has. Simply put, General Greindl knew all the personalities involved with the Cyprus problem and knew what was “possible” for his UN command to pursue. He developed a close working relationship with the U.S. Defense Attache, Lieutenant Colonel Stephen R. Norton. Shortly before the new American Ambassador, Bill K. Perrin, arrived to take up his post in April 1988, General Greindl discussed three initiatives with Colonel Norton that he was working on: the first, and most difficult, was the reopening of the resort town of Varosha under UN auspices; second was the opening of the Nicosia Airport; and third was the demanning (deconfrontation) of part of the Green Line in Nicosia where the proximity of Greek and Turkish Ops led to consistent problems, including fatal shootings.

Opening Varosha and Nicosia Airport were low-probability but high-gain CBMs. Deconfrontation would be an easier CBM, but even that was considered a long-shot. General Greindl was very cognizant of the fact that there had never been any military-to-military agreement on Cyprus since the events of 1974 and he knew the difficulties involved in making any of his CBMs a reality. His plan was to explore the possibility of the Varosha and airport ideas on the political level with President Vassiliou and Mr. Denktash while pursuing the deconfrontation idea with the two military commanders, Bitlis and Markopoulos.

Altering the status quo on Cyprus is extremely difficult, yet Greindl pushed his CBMs at every opportunity. President Vassiliou had many concerns and questions about the Varosha and airport initiatives, but he nonetheless supported continued UNFICYP negotiations on these issues. As for the deconfrontation, General Markopoulos saw it as an opportunity to make the Green Line safer without weakening the Greek-Cypriot political position. But could he trust his Turkish counterpart? And how could he make that judgement?

Mr. Denktash was supportive of the Nicosia Airport idea because it would provide a convenient and legal way for tourists to enter into the economically troubled “TRNC.” As for Varosha, he was less motivated to change its control from the Turkish Army to UNFICYP and showed almost no interest, either way in the early discussions on deconfrontation.

**Negotiations on Deconfrontation Begin**

As noted earlier, General Greindl, the consummate professional on the intricacies of Cyprus, saw deconfrontation as the easiest of the CBMs to achieve and one which could be worked largely at the military level. He already had support in principle from General Markopoulos so he focused on selling his idea to the “TRNC.” But where to begin? For him the answer was simple. The Turkish Corps Commander, Lieutenant General Bitlis, was clearly the most powerful official in the north on all matters pertaining to security issues and Turkish policy vis-à-vis the Green Line. He began there.

The U.S. Defense Attaché Office (USDAO), consisting of two Army Foreign Area Officers (FAOs), Lieutenant Colonel Norton and Major Wade O. Popovich, had established a routine of meeting with Generals Bitlis and Markopoulos on a bi-weekly basis. After many meetings, hours of conversation, and
necessitated deep trouble with Mr. Denktash and the “TRNC.” Mr. Denktash provided some information to the general – which was meant to be “privileged” – on an incident in the buffer zone. Unbeknownst to General Greindl, another U.N. official shared this information with the Greek Cypriots. “TRNC” officials assumed that it was the UNFICYP Commander who has betrayed their trust and General Greindl came under intense criticism in north Cyprus. The campaign against him included extensive negative press coverage in “TRNC” newspapers, banners across the main streets in north Nicosia reading, “Greindl Go Home,”9 and the refusal of the “TRNC” to even allow him to enter north Cyprus. Among other things, this terminated his ability to continue meeting with General Bitlis.

General Greindl’s deputy was a newly arrived British Brigadier, Walter Courage. With Greindl unable to continue his initiative in the north, he asked Brigadier Courage to see General Bitlis. These meetings were short lived. General Bitlis told the USDAO that the UNFICYP Deputy Commander was a little to rigid in his approach and that he (Bitlis) felt that he should deal only with the UNFICYP Commander. Bitlis referred the Deputy Commander to the TCSF Commander, General Ylcin, because it was more appropriate for a “one-star” to deal with a “one-star.”

To keep things at the same level, General Markopoulos also had the UNFICYP Deputy Commander deal with a one-star officer. As the Greek Commander told Colonel Norton, “working any agreement in the Near East is a little like buying a carpet in the bazaar. There is a lot of posturing to get the best deal.” The UNFICYP Deputy Commander and his staff worked hard at getting an agreement, but they were working in a very different milieu from what they were used to. For various reasons, deconfrontation began to become unraveled.

The American Embassy Gets Involved

When Ambassador Perrin held his first meeting with his country team, he announced that we were not in Cyprus to record events for Washington officials to read; rather, we were there to positively influence events which furthered U.S. interests in the region. For the embassy in Nicosia, Ambassador Perrin saw these as lowering the tensions between the Greek and Turkish sides and promoting a mutually-agreed solution to the Cyprus problem. He invited any member of the country team who had ideas in this regard to see him directly. He was ready to lend himself, his position, and the prestige of the United States to any positive idea that helped strengthen U.S. interests.

Colonel Norton saw Ambassador Perrin immediately after this meeting. He explained the merits of General Greindl’s deconfrontation plan, the problems that had developed when General Greindl was forced out of the issue and the unique access enjoyed by the USDAO with the various military commanders, and suggested that he (Norton) and Major Popovich try to keep the initiative alive.

The Ambassador was new to Cyprus and was still “feeling his way.” Others in the embassy believed that the USDAO should not involve itself in UNFICYP negotiations and, in any event, felt that direct discussions with the Turkish Corps Commander were inappropriate. They preferred to limit U.S. involvement to supporting UNFICYP proposals with Cypriot and “TRNC” civilian officials. The Ambassador went with his instincts and told Norton and Popovich to press on and keep him and the UNFICYP commander informed.

General Milner Takes Command of UNFICYP

General Greindl’s tour of duty came to an end and he was replaced by Canadian General Clive Milner, who took command bursting with energy and focused on getting Greindl’s deconfrontation agreement approved. Like his Greek and Turkish counterparts, he too came from a NATO country and a good, close bond developed among these three officers. He believed that it would be a good approach to keep Brigadier Courage working the details of the plan at the one-star level with both sides while he would meet, as required, with Generals Bitlis and Markopoulos.

Quite naturally, General Milner looked to his deputy commander for advice in his early months in command. The brigadier was protective of UNFICYP’s prerogatives and roles in furthering the peace process in Cyprus and he viewed the American Embassy’s involvement in the deconfrontation process as inappropriate. Neither Generals Greindl nor Milner seemed to share this view, and they welcomed whatever advice or insights the Americans had to offer.

The USDAO contacts with Generals Bitlis and Markopoulos were now increased based on the latter’s wishes. Milner was letting his deputy commander do the negotiating without undue interference on his part. Bitlis and Markopoulos, however, were convinced that without the direct and active participation of General Milner the initiative would be lost. They made all this abundantly clear to Norton and Popovich on numerous occasions.

Colonel Norton passed on the views of the Greek and Turkish military leaders, as well as his own views, to General Milner. He explained that Ambassador Perrin was very interested in helping and that he, himself, was going to continue to meet with Bitlis and Markopoulos. The USDAO would be glad to pass on any information to General Milner out of these meetings that would be useful in his mission. General Milner did, in fact, step up his contacts with the Greek and Turkish Commanders, however, he also kept his staff engaged on both sides at the lower level.

Establishing Some Trust Between Generals Markopoulos and Bitlis

(Continued on page 19)
To kick off Navy FAO participation in the Association officially, the Journal went to visit RADM Route, the Director of the Political Military Division (N52) of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans, Policy, & Operations)(N3/N5), who is the coordinator for the Navy FAO Program. FAOA Appreciates the Admiral’s patience and kindness in granting this interview.

FAOA: Admiral Route, first I’d like to thank you for taking the time out of your busy schedule to talk with me about the new Navy FAO Program.

RADM R: I personally appreciate the chance to get an opportunity to put more information out on this new exciting program to the field. As you know, the Navy FAO program is relatively new, certainly when compared to its Army counterpart. We began to put the program together in 1996 and in July 1997 our first FAO selection board convened.

FAOA: Sir, can you tell me more about the board and what was its intent?

RADM R: I had the honor of being the President of the selection board and found it to be a very interesting. First, we were surprised at the number of applicants – almost half again what we had expected. Second, I was very impressed with the expertise and background of the applicants, as well as the high quality of their files. About 440 applied for FAO and we, on the board, wound up selecting just over 300 for the program. Officers applied from every specialty within the Navy, even the medical service corps.

FAOA: What size force is the Navy looking to fill?

RADM R: We have identified over 200 Navy FAO billets so far and are screening them with our personnel people to ensure that they are valid positions. The truth is that our major thrust is to fill Naval Attaché positions around the world. It has amazed me that the folks we have working in the attaché system now are doing so well – it speaks to their dedication and professionalism – but our goal is to put officers, who have the regional and language background, into those positions in the future. It seems to me that if an officer and his or her family are part of a program such as this by choice and have a better understanding of career opportunities from the beginning, then the Navy can minimize the hardships and difficulties that these assignments can impose on our senior officers later in their career without broad range preparation.

FAOA: Will the way the Navy manages its program differ greatly from the other Services? Can you describe it for our readers?

RADM R: The Navy program that we implementing now is less structured than that of the Army. Rather than a sub-specialty, Navy FAO will be listed as an additional qualification identifier. I think that this will give our program greater flexibility. However, we intend to manage the program almost like a specialty – that is we intend to keep the billet list updated and the follow the careers development of our officers very carefully. The challenge for the Navy will be to closely monitor the career progression of the selected officers. We must manage their careers to ensure that they get through the required XO, commanding officer, and other leadership assignments to keep them upwardly mobile and competitive.

FAOA: What do you see as the strength of the Navy officers who opt for this Program?

RADM R: The real strength of these officers is their personal dedication to learning about regional and global issues.
Each of the officers who were selected had done their studying and training on their own, using the limited time that they had available to better themselves. This is the real strength of the program right now. These officer want to serve and those of them who have already served need to recognized and validated for their efforts and their past service.

FAOA: Will this change over time?

RADM R: I think that in the next few years the quality of the officers applying to become Navy FAOs will remain relatively high. There appears to be a large pool of qualified officer interested in the program. Over time this will change somewhat. Younger officers, entering the program, will logically look to it as a method of getting one of the Navy’s limited graduate school billets or as a method of learning a new language. These young officers will still give us a high quality product, but their motivation for this program will be a little different from their predecessors.

FAOA: Other than having run a selection board, where is the Navy FAO program now?

RADM R: We are actively beginning to man the force. Further, we have eight officers in graduate school as we speak and are working to increase our graduate school quotas even more over the next few years.

FAOA: Sir, any closing remarks?

RADM R: Just a few. The Navy leadership is behind this program. It is growing rapidly, but it will be a continuing challenge to manage it in such a way as to take care of the officers who have been selected into it. I am confident that we are on the right track and will provide the Navy with the best officers for these critical international jobs.

FAOA: Once again, sir, thank you for this opportunity to speak with you.

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Foreign Area Officer Association (FAOA)

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Understanding Culture Shock

By Thomas J. Milton, MAJ., US Army

Whether you are a new or an experienced FAO, or a retired FAO now working overseas as a civilian, you are acutely aware of the differences and challenges of living in a new culture. As a FAO, your ability to work with or around “culture shock” is key to the success of our mission as FAOs. The Army, our superiors and our peers that work along us all rely on our ability to understand the culture of the host country and to be able to work through the subsequent differences in the two cultures. In addition, I have experienced that both organizations I worked for overseas (OMC, Cairo and OPM-SANG, Riyadh) often relied on my understanding of the host country to assist new personnel, and old hands with burn-out, in adapting so as to be able to better perform their missions. Although trained to work with foreign cultures, I also found that an important part of my work was being the “adaptation expert” for other US personnel assigned to the country. The following information is designed to help FAOs understand the underlying reasons for culture shock, both for your own use and to help others. References are given so that if needed, you can become the adaptation expert for your organization.

In 1954, Karl Oberg coined the term "Culture Shock." Since that time the term has not only been widely accepted, but most people in our society also think they understand the concept. However, many articles and research indicate that not only is a definition of culture shock not completely agreed upon, but more importantly, means to cope with the symptoms of it are likewise not universally accepted.

Definitions of culture shock are numerous. Since the idea of culture shock is not quantitative, the best definitions tend to be nebulous; they give descriptions and ideas about the condition instead of hard facts. Furnham and Bochner state that culture shock is "...when a sojourner is unfamiliar with the social conventions of the new country, or if familiar with them, unable or unwilling to perform according to these rules." This definition neglects to mention that culture shock also involves a powerful disruption of one's routines, ego and self-image. These concepts are quite important, and will be discussed later.

Culture shock happens in different environments. An individual may experience a form of it in an intra-national move, such as moving from one region of the country to another or when one changes jobs. Probably one of the more dramatic examples of intra-national culture shock occurs when an individual joins the military and undergoes basic training. Tourists abroad also experience a form of culture shock; however, this is usually quite mild and even can be part of the whole excitement of traveling. The most severe, and costly, cases of culture shock occur to individuals who live outside of their native country for an extended period of time.

People who plan to live and work overseas should understand the concepts behind culture shock. If it is ignored the cost, in numerous ways can be very expensive. If you, as a FAO, becomes a "causality" of culture shock the damage done to the Army far exceeds the monetary cost necessary should you PCS sooner rather than later. If you stay in the country, but never adapt to the culture, not only will job performance suffer, but the Army loses goodwill and influence in that country.

An individual that cannot cope with living in a foreign environment also will suffer a personal cost. All individuals, especially those who have been successful enough to be chosen for an overseas assignment, possess a sense of self-worth and a healthy ego. To not be able to function in a foreign country, and thus one's job, can be a crippling blow to one's self esteem. In addition, this can also ruin one's family life. Numerous marriages have ended because of the strain of living overseas.

Early definitions of culture shock tended to look at the condition as a mental aliment. In 1969, Bowlby described the condition as one similar to grief, mourning, and bereavement. These are the same conditions that a human goes through when one losses a loved one. The difference here is that the loss now is of such items as relations, and objects; in short, one's culture. These early ideas of culture shock led researchers to adapt a "pseudo-medical" model to help people adapt to a foreign culture. Much of the thought stemming from these ideas on cultural adaptation techniques still is in use today. One of the most well-known contributions from this school is the idea of the U-shaped curve. In this theory, people who cross into other cultures will experience three phases of adjustment; elation and optimism, followed by frustration, depression and confusion, finally an adjusted state of adaptation.

More recent experiments still try to quantify cultural

(Continued on page 10)
shock, the implication being that if it can be identified as such then, like mental illness, it can be "cured." For instance, in a 1988 experiment researchers tried to simulate culture shock in individuals who were to become counselors for foreign students in the United States. The concept was that if they could simulate culture shock in an experimental setting, then the trainees would be more emphatic in their future roles as counselors. Such experiments tend to view culture shock as an event which can be duplicated and quantified.

For other researchers, who had examined the experiences of individuals who had lived in a second culture, two problems developed with the above model of adaptation. The first, is that it ignored a person's social and cultural background. By doing so it alluded that those people who did not adapt to the new culture were somehow mentally ill. The second problem lies in the idea of "adjustment" which the people are supposed to accomplish. This idea, in the pseudo-medical model, means that a mental transformation must be accomplished in the individuals' mind; again, the idea that culture shock is more akin to a mental illness than a cultural difference. This idea also contains the implication that one culture is superior to another. If an individual could be persuaded to give up his old idea and adapt the new ones, then all the problems would be gone.

During the 1970s and 1980s researchers developed a new idea of how to cope with culture shock. This model, called "culture-learning" by Furnham and Bochner stressed that an individual only needs to learn and adapt to key features of the new society. Instead of adapting to a new culture, the individual learns how to operate in the new culture; he does not have to embrace all, or even most, aspects of the society. This is a significant change in thought. Under the old ideas, if one adjusted to the new culture, that culture would become a part of the individual; almost as if the person developed two cultures. Furnham and Bochner think that by adapting, upon return to one's native land, one can then discard those features that one learned in order to function in the new culture.

An individual experiencing culture shock may undergo a wide variety of "symptoms." These range from the physical to the psychological. As part of the orientation course for personnel going to Saudi Arabia, the Army compiled a list of symptoms which some exhibit early upon arrival. They include:

- Unwarranted criticism of the culture and the people.
- Constant complaints about the climate.
- Utopian ideas concerning their previous culture.
- Continuous concern for the purity of water and food.
- Fear of touching the local people.
- Refusal to learn the new language.
- Preoccupation of being robbed or cheated.
- Pressing desire to talk with people who "really make sense."
- Preoccupation of returning home.

This extensive list is only part of what culture shock can induce in people. What it does not show is the various thoughts and adaptations that individuals go thorough as they display these or other signs of culture shock.

The reason that culture shock is so hard to define, and also to quantify, is that it is composed of numerous different elements. In addition to tangible items, such as weather, food, etc., it usually is part of the numerous intangible ideas, biases, and values of a culture. All of these elements will effect each individual in a different manner. So, while one can make stereotypical statements about an individual undergoing culture shock, each individual experiences the feeling in a unique manner.

Both external and internal factors govern how much and how long a person may experience culture shock. Three external factors are; Cultural Toughness, Communication Toughness, and Job Toughness.

Cultural toughness is simply that some cultures are more similar to one's own than others. For an American, a move to Canada would not be nearly as different as a move to Sudan. Black lists, in descending order the hardest regions for Americans to adapt to. They are:

- Africa
- Middle East
- Far East
- South America
- Eastern Europe/Russia
- Western Europe/Scandinavia
- Australia and New Zealand

Communication toughness is more than the degree of difficulty of learning the host country's language. It also encompasses the amount and type of language needed to perform ones job. A job requiring constant face-to-face communication will be more difficult than one in which memos are the primary communication means. The last factor, job toughness, is the same as if one was promoted to a new job within ones own country. However, new jobs difficulties can compound an person's adjustment to the new country and its environment.

The communication process can be severely hampered by a person undergoing cultural shock. In the above list of symptoms of culture shock, there is the refusal to learn new language. Studies at the Defense Language Institute, shed a different light on this problem. Researchers there have found that a reason that many of the students have problems learning their assigned language is due to a subconscious fear that they will either lose their own culture, or develop traits of the new language culture. The study also showed that the more "exotic" the language, or if the student had negative stereotypes of the language's culture, the more severe this fear.

Just as there are many symptoms of culture shock, there are also different methods in which individuals try to cope. Likewise, those who do not adapt to their new surroundings, also have different ways in which cultural shock effects them.
most severe and costly cases are those who return early to their home country. A less severe effect of culture shock is found in those individuals that have "gone native." These individuals have become so enthralled with the host country that they have tried to adopt the country's culture as their own. Not only is this detrimental to the US Army, whom they are suppose to represent, but individuals usually do not fully integrate a culture as their own. They pick and choose what they want, the result being that they don't fit into either culture properly.

Numerous individuals who have "gone native" can be found, both in the civilian world and in the military. In Saudi, one officer who was assigned to a remote unit, would habitually wear either a Saudi thobe and ghutra, or else the unit's PT outfit. While he had great friendships in the unit, he accomplished little actual work, as his days were spent drinking tea and socializing.

In between the two extremes, early returns and those going native, are the more common "brownouts." These individuals neither return early nor try to adopt the native lifestyle. They cope with assignment, counting the days until returning to the USA. They usually perform to the bare minimum in their jobs and usually spend the majority of their off-duty time in their homes or some other safe haven.

As previously mentioned, a more encompassing definition of culture shock contains the notion of ego and routine. All people use stereotypes and routine as a matter of daily life. Since it would not be feasible to process an infinite number of issues simultaneously, "routines and the certainty they provide create a kind of psychological economy." When a routine is disrupted, an individual experiences frustration and/or anxiety. Similar to this idea, is that people also have developed stereotypes that also allow them to operate more efficiently in their culture.

When a person begins to experience a new culture not only do the ingrained stereotypes not necessarily hold true in the new country, but one's routines are also disrupted. The severity is dependent upon the scope, magnitude and criticality of the disrupted routine. As mentioned by Black, "It may be inconvenient to have to give up the handshake for a bow in greeting someone, but it can be quite upsetting to have to alter most of the dimensions of how one delegates authority...."

The failure of stereotypes to continue to work in a new culture is widely documented. It is in this area that much of the literature on how to cope with culture shock is written. Stereotypes can be both helpful and harmful. But, even with the helpful stereotypes, people are often unconscious of the fact that they hold a stereotype. Adler gives an interesting example. People are told to read the following sentence:

> FINISHED FILES ARE THE RESULT OF YEARS OF SCIENTIFIC STUDY AND THE EXPERIENCE OF YEARS

When people are then asked to count the number of F's, native English speakers usually respond with three, non-native speakers with the correct number of six. The difference is that native speakers have stereotyped such as of, as "non-important" words and learned to discard them. Hence they miss the three F's.

While the above is an innocuous stereotype, others can cause more severe repercussions. Because such items as using one's left hand or showing the bottom of one's shoes are "non-important" in our culture, to continue to do the same in the Middle East may cause more serious repercussions. This idea of learning to identify both one's own stereotypes and the host country's is part of many orientation courses for individuals going overseas. It is a key part of what Furnham and Bochner call Culture Learning.

In this concept, one is to learn the salient features of a culture in order to more effectively function in it. A person will still experience frustration, bewilderment, etc. but, the idea is that by learning key parts of the culture one can work around the difficulties caused by culture shock. This technique uses both information giving and cultural sensitization to help in this endeavor. If people are made aware of the cultures differences as well as its values, and understand their own biases then they are more able to adapt to a new culture.

The problem with relying on only this type of program is that one is not able to duplicate, nor truly depict, the exact conditions or types of problems that an individual will face. When going to Egypt, both military and State Department
personnel undergo a cultural awareness program. The program contains a wealth of information concerning Egypt, the various do's and don'ts of the culture, customs, living conditions and other information. In addition, every newcomer is assigned a sponsor who contacts the new person before his and helps the individual around for the first week in country. Still, even with this comprehensive program, with the initial shock of experiencing Egypt, almost all individuals experience culture shock.

Most of these individuals adjust with time, but some become "brownouts." The difference among individuals seems to lie in both internal and external traits. Internal factors which can effect how well one adapts to a culture include, a strong, yet flexible personality, and personal experience. Studies have shown that people with prior overseas experience adapt better than those without overseas experience. However, this correlation is not as strong as one would suspect. Both the time interval between assignments and the type of assignment can greatly influence the new experience.

Personnel differences concerning external factors begin at how well the individual absorbed the information provided prior to entering the new country. It is one thing to tell someone that Cairo is a dirty city. But, if one listener has been to Lagos while the other has lived exclusively in the United States, the former will probably be less appalled at the garbage in Cairo. Other external factors include one's job, and social support systems. These two are often closely related. Either the job or a expatriate network, usually DoD or embassy provided in the case of FAOs, provide the necessary link back to one's native culture.

Over-dependence upon either of these institutions, however, can actual produce a negative effect. Studies have shown that those managers who suffer little culture shock often are not as good in their new jobs as those who have undergone a more strained adjustment. The evidence suggests that culture shock is an adaptation of a new culture; those who willingly try to adapt will suffer more as their internal routines and stereotypes are altered. But, after the adjustment they will be better able to understand and therefore work in the new culture. Conversely, there are numerous individuals who only interact with the host country when they must. While they are safe in their routines, they never are able to function completely in the new country. This seems to be especially prevalent among individuals sponsored by the United States Government and large corporations which have a strong presence in a country. These individuals have a comfortable lifestyle, one that the government or corporation tries hard to make as "normal" as possible. In Saudi Arabia, all live on a compound that in essence is a "Little America." For many people assigned to Saudi Arabia the only contact that they have with a native citizen is their domestic help, or those who work on the job site. While stationed in Cairo and Riyadh, I knew many individuals who lived, what I considered, a very sheltered lifestyle. They virtually never left their homes and compounds. Yet, they complained constantly about the country and the culture; classic culture shock "symptoms." For these individuals, their routines and self-confidence had been disturbed. They were coping as best they could; unfortunately at the expense of the Army, the host country and themselves.

These individuals, many of whom had served overseas before, received the same briefings and support as others, yet they did not adjust to the new culture. Part of the reason is internal. As mentioned, individual personalities play a large role in one's ability to adapt. In the military especially, many are use to being in charge. To live and work successfully in an environment in which many aspects are outside their control, forces them to compromise the leadership style which previously had garnered them success. Other internal differences may include phobias and one's family members.

Even with these internal differences, the improvement or the better use of the external factors may have helped these individuals adjust to the new culture. A very important external influence is the use of a sponsor or mentor to a new arrival during the first few weeks of his adjustment. If the sponsor is a "brownout", then the new arrival will be negatively influenced. This frequently occurs among the United States government employees. The orientation packet for individuals going to Saudi Arabia devotes a page to warning new arrivals to beware individuals who try to unduly influence their perception of the host country. It sums up the warning by stating; "Beware of the person who says to you, 'I will give you the straight scoop on surviving in this country.'"

Journals and literature on the subject give little practical advice on how what steps to take in country to help ease the transition. Almost all has been taken from individual's experience and therefore may or may not work for others. Some of the more common advice found is:

- Be aware of Jet Lag and avoid making evaluations or important decisions during the first week in country.
- Be cautious of the judgments and advice given by fellow workers who have been in country.
- Develop a routine that works.
- Be flexible.
- Continually assess your assumptions and attitude.
- Use a "Safe Haven". An area or routine that gives you a respite when the stress becomes too much.
- The stress will become to much at some point.
- Keep a sense of humor, but not at host's expense.
- Plan trips in the country. Experience the culture.
- Clearly define job and priorities.
- Look for the positive.
- Do not give up or unduly criticize your own culture.

In summary, it would appear that those individuals who understand the nature of culture shock and its repercussions are better able to handle the stress of its effects. Knowing that if you adjust to a new culture does not detract from your own personality, but rather is an indication of flexible strength seems to be a key in the adaptation process. It is also important to realize that everyone will experience some form of culture shock. Be ready, be aware and be flexible.

**ENDNOTES**

(Continued on page 17)
Information provided is based on data that is continuously changing. The listing of positions in the 48D inventory is provided only to help you determine what assignment possibilities are available.

**THE REGION.** The Army’s South Asia Area of Concentration (AOC 48D) covers the countries of India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Nepal, Bhutan, and the Maldives.

**IN-COUNTRY TRAINING.** The capstone phase of the FAO training process, In-Country Training (ICT), is usually a 12-15 month long accompanied tour. Current 48D ICT sites and number of slots in each country are: Bangladesh – 1; India – 1; and Pakistan – 1.

**CURRENT POSITIONS**

The following information provides an overview of currently listed 48D positions. The first chart provides a breakdown of the positions of army and joint slots, and gives you an idea of the number of joint requirements that must be met. The subsequent list of 48D positions is grouped by grade and provides the command or agency and a basic description of each slot.

**48D SNAPSHOT**

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<tr>
<th>Cmd/Agency</th>
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<td>India</td>
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**ABBREVIATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<td>A/ARMA</td>
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<td>ARMA</td>
<td>ARMY ATTACHÉ</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAC</td>
<td>COMBINED ARMS CENTER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAS</td>
<td>DEFENSE ATTACHÉ SYSTEM</td>
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<td>DSAA</td>
<td>DEF SEC ASSIST AGENCY</td>
</tr>
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<td>DUSA-IA</td>
<td>DEP UNDERSECRETARY ARMY FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAAG</td>
<td>MILITARY ASSISTANCE ARMY GRP</td>
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<tr>
<td>MLO</td>
<td>MILITARY LIAISON OFFICE</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAPA</td>
<td>U.S. ARMY NATIONAL ASSISTANCE SP/PLAN ACTIVITY</td>
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<td>NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY</td>
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<td>OFFICE OF DEF REP</td>
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<td>SAO</td>
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**COLONELS**

**Joint Assignments**

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<td>Country Director</td>
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### LIEUTENANT COLONELS

#### ARMY

**CAC/Strat Div**
- Ft. Leavenworth
- Instructor

#### JOINT

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### MAJORS

#### ARMY

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#### JOINT

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<td>OFFICE OF DEF COOP</td>
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Information provided is based on data that is continuously changing. The listing of positions in the 48J inventory is provided only to help you determine what assignment possibilities are available.


**IN-COUNTRY TRAINING.** The capstone phase of the FAO training process, In-Country Training (ICT), is usually a 12-15 month long accompanied tour. Current 48J ICT sites and number of slots in each country are: Botswana – 2; Cameroon – 1; Ivory Coast – 1; Niger – 1; Zimbabwe – 1.

**CURRENT POSITIONS**

The following information provides an overview of currently listed 48J positions. The first chart provides a breakdown of the positions of army and joint slots, and gives you an idea of the number of joint requirements that must be met. The subsequent list of 48J positions is grouped by grade and provides the command or agency and a basic description of each slot.

**SNAPSHOT**

**ABBREVIATIONS**

A/ARMA - ASSISTANT ARMY ATTACHÉ
ARMA - ARMY ATTACHÉ
CAC - COMBINED ARMS CENTER
DAS - DEFENSE ATTACHÉ SYSTEM
DSAA - DEF SEC ASSIST AGENCY
DUSA-IA - DEP UNDERSECRETARY ARMY
FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
MAAG - MILITARY ASSISTANCE ARMY GRP
MLO - MILITARY LIAISON OFFICE
NAPA - U.S. ARMY NATIONAL ASSISTANCE PLANNING ACTIVITY
NDU - NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

**O6 / COL**

**ARMY**

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE
CARLISLE, PA
CARLISLE, PA
CHIEF, AFRICAN STUDIES
NGIC
CHARLOTTESVILLE
FAO

**JOINT**

DSAA
KENYA
CHIEF, U.S. LIAISON OFFICE
DIA
ETHIOPIA
DATT/ARMA
DIA
NAIROBI/KENYA
DATT/ARMA
DIA
NIGERIA
DATT/ARMA
DIA
SOUTH AFRICA
ARMA
DIA
IVORY COAST
DATT/ARMA
OSD, INTNL SEC AFFAIRS
WASH DC
ASST, CENTRAL AFRICA
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(Culture Shock Continued from page 12)
2Furnham and Bochner, p. 250.
4Two of the better known companies that specialize in cross-cultural training for people moving overseas, International Orientation Resources and Runzheimer International, both were founded by women whose marriages ended after overseas assignments. "International herald Tribune" 19 Dec 92 and "Crain's Chicago Business" 25 May 92, both from Lexus/Nexus.
6Ibid., p.234.
8Ibid., pp. 235-244.
9"Culture Shock," Orientation Packet given by Project Manager - Saudi Arabian NG (PM-SANG), US Army, Wash, D.C.
10Black et. al., pp. 97-110.
12Black et. al., pp. 43-45.
13Ibid., pp. 44.
14Furnham and Bochner, pp. 235-244.
15Many Cultural Awareness programs, which are designed to ease a businessman's entry into a foreign country seem to be aware of this point. Even though they charge as much as $500 per day for the course, they still offer advice and help after the businessman arrives in country. See "Services help Newcomers to Japan," Los Angeles Times, 22 March 1992, p. A8, and "Bridging Cultural Barriers ForExecs," Crain's Chicago Business, 25 May 92, p. 15.
16Black, et. al. p. 124.
17Ibid. p. 124.
18The adjustment of one's spouse and children to a foreign country is extremely important. Most studies show that wives have a much harder time adjusting than husbands. Suffice it to say that if an individual's home life is not happy, he will not be happy.
19Part of my job in Cairo was to assign sponsors for new arrivals. The true "browouts" were easy to identify and not assign as a sponsor. Among the individuals in the sponsor pool, some were either close to the end of their tour and pre-occupied with getting home. Others lacked personal characteristics which make a good sponsor; i.e. personable, possessing initiative, giving. The few individuals left made wonderful sponsors.
20PM-SANG orientation packet.

Major Thomas J. Milton is a Middle-Eastern Army FAO and an Infantryman. He did his In-Country Training in Saudi Arabia. He currently works for the Politico-Military Division, Office of Army International Affairs, Army Secretariat at the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. Major Milton has authored other articles for both our Journal and other military professional publication.
ASSOCIATION BOARD
ELECTIONS – First Notification

Our current Board of Governors finishes its three-year term in December 1998. This is the first call for those who are interested in serving or in nominating someone to serve on the Board. Board Membership requires only minimal work and most correspondence is accomplished by fax and/or phone. A slate of nominees will be submitted to the membership for approval in the September 1998 issue of the Journal. We ask that nominees be restricted to individuals who are know within the community for their service as FAOs or for their efforts to help FAOs. There is no serving limit, so you can also nominate current Board Members, as well. The idea is to elect a slate of officers that represent all three segments of our population – former service, active service, and reservists. The slate should also represent a broad spectrum of our regional specialties. The current Board of Governors has members from every the active, reserve, and retired communities, as well as Europe, Eurasia, Latin America, China, Africa, the Middle East, and Korea/Japan. We did not have anyone from the South or Southeast Asia region this time. SEND YOUR NOMINATIONS TO FAOA Headquarters.

RESUME SERVICE on Web Site!

A resume service for our members has been introduced on the Association Web Site (WWW.FAOA.ORG). The rules for its use are self-explanatory, but can be outlined as follows: (1) Interested members send their resumes to either the Web Master (at the above internet site) or to the Association office at P.O. Box 523226, Springfield, VA 22152 or by e-mail to FAOA@EROLS.COM; (2) the Association will handle any interface between the member and the potential employer, to protect your personal data (address/phone number/etc.) until you release it; (3) the resume would be run for six months (less if you request) at a handle charge of $10.00 (to cover maintaining and processing requests).

The Association is not a headhunter or a job locator. This Resume Service is showcasing the type of backgrounds available from our membership to show firms around the country. Negotiations, interviews, and so on are the responsibility of the individual and the relevant firm. We will only endeavor to link the interested parties up initially.

TO MAKE THIS EFFORT SUCCESSFUL, WE NEED THE ACTIVE SUPPORT AND PARTICIPATION OF OUR RETIRED/FORMER SERVICE MEMBERS. You all have contacts within the business community – mention our service and get them interested.

The Association will contact headhunters and various firms that normally hire FAOs, but we need you to get the word out also (to your own firm’s human resource departments, etc.). Hopefully, nature will take its course and job possibilities will arise from this idea.

VOLUNTEERISM!!

First, Thank you to those of you out there that have been responding to our plea for volunteers. Someone will be getting in touch with you shortly. For the rest of you, who are busy riding on the gravy train – things don’t happen on their own. To build FAOA into something significant we need help. But let me be more specific – We need someone to ultimately take over as membership chairman, to edit and layout the journal, and to put together an initial social in the Washington, D.C. area. These tasks look huge, but believe me they are manageable.

-- MEMBERSHIP CHAIRMAN. As our membership has risen to 800+, this job has become increasingly difficult to do, while also putting together the journal, etc. There are four aspects to the job: (1) recruiting new members, i.e., running a membership drive, at least once a year; (2) renewing memberships; (3) update addresses, and (4) maintaining the membership data base. The person who volunteers for this job needs to have e-mail access, so that he/she can ship updated data bases to the person running the journal. This job could easily be a husband/wife combination job. The only restriction on the job would be that it ought to be someone with vehicular access to the Springfield, Virginia, Post Office on Rolling Road. If you might be interested give us a ‘holler and we can talk more – a phone call does not commit you – but we do need some additional help.

-- SOCIAL COMMITTEE. To kick off the social aspects of the FAO Association, we need someone to honcho a cocktail party/meeting, in Washington, D.C. The idea would be to get the membership together to develop a social program for the future – we could have sign ups for regional dinners, for lectures or discussion groups, and other smaller scale functions. We envision a guest speaker, to attract attendance; a brief association business meeting; and food /drink in a congenial atmosphere. The function could be held at Ft. Myer or McNair, and the Association would provide the seed money. We need someone to do the groundwork and find out and set the where’s, how’s, and when’s for the function. If you are interested please call us.
Deconfrontation Becomes Political

General Bitlis was a very competent and self-assured officer. Neither Norton nor Popovich ever saw him lose his composure, except once. During one of their regular calls with Bitlis, he received a phone call from the TCSF commander, General Yalcin. Yalcin reported that UNFICYP had brought the deconfrontation issue to the “TRNC” Minister of Foreign Affairs and Defense, Dr. Kenan Atakol. Atakol saw a political side to deconfrontation that had, theretofore, been missed by him and Mr. Dentkash. If UNFICYP could be made to work deconfrontation solely through the “TRNC” chain (Yalcin as TCSF commander, Atakol as “TRNC MOD” and Dentkash as “TRNC President”) it would lend credibility and subtle recognition of the “TRNC” as a sovereign state. Bitlis was furious!

General Bitlis had pushed the UNFICYP Deputy Commander to work with General Yalcin. This was not a big problem since Yalcin really reported to the Corps commander and only nominally to Dr. Atakol. But, now that UNFICYP had brought in Atakol, it created a new dilemma for Bitlis, one that he didn’t enjoy. The more that the “TRNC” leaders got involved with deconfrontation, the more they were convinced that the UNFICYP plan should be approved by them and not by the Turkish General, Bitlis. For President Vassiliou, however, the Greek Cypriots would never sign an official agreement with a government they refused to recognize. When UNFICYP got deconfrontation out of purely military channels they almost doomed it to failure.

One evening, the chief of intelligence for the GCNG (a colonel in the Greek Army) came unannounced to Colonel Norton’s quarters in Nicosia. He said that General Markopoulos would not be able to deliver on his promises to support deconfrontation as long as Mr. Denktash insisted that negotiations be headed by his “MOD,” Dr. Atakol. He wondered if there was anything General Bitlis could do and could the American Embassy help? Once more Ambassador Perrin met with his USDAO team to look at the options. The Ambassador was upset with UNFICYP for its naivete in discussing this with Dr. Atakol in the first place. The military discussions, while drawn out and needing a lot of behind the scenes help from the American Embassy, were almost at the point of completion. The Ambassador was already thinking beyond the deconfrontation agreement and was working on ideas to capitalize on this UNFICYP CBM with more significant movement on the political level. But, deconfrontation was an important, and maybe even a necessary step towards discussions on more complex issues. Unless a way could be found to get this back into a military channel, this initiative would fall into the category of “missed opportunities.”

Norton and Popovich were asked to work with General Bitlis while Ambassador Perrin would engage President Vassiliou and Mr. Dentkash in an effort to salvage the deconfrontation plan. President Vassiliou could not let his MOD work with the “TRNC” “MOD” and Mr. Dentkash wouldn’t agree to any plan not worked with his “MOD.”

General Bitlis Finds a Way Out

General Bitlis’ position was being made very uncomfortable by the “TRNC” officials. Bitlis agreed with UNFICYP that deconfrontation would lower incidents between Greek and Turkish soldiers without hurting the security of either
As part of the recent redesign of the Army Staff, the Foreign Area Officer Proponent Division (located within the Directorate for Strategy, Plans and Policy, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans) has been restructured to better respond to both the current and future needs of FAOs around the world. The FAO Proponent has always been tasked with working policy issues in all eight elements of the personnel life-cycle management (structure, acquisition, individual training and education, distribution, deployment, sustainment, professional development and separation), however, with just two officers dedicated to running the FAO Program, our full-fledged efforts were directed to either the highest priority/must-do issues or HQDA/Joint actions. Tasks traditionally accomplished by other basic branch or functional area proponents had to be undertaken by an already overburdened FAO assignments cell at OPM, PERSCOM, or simply not fully addressed. By Summer ’95, we intuitively knew we weren’t “being all that we could be,” added to this, in May ’96, I received orders for a six month TDY as U.S. Commander, Military Coordination Center, Zakho, Iraq. The result was that we were not doing nearly enough for you in the field. Even accepting that we might have been overly critical of our own performance to date, we saw plenty of room for improvement.

Now for the good news. In mid-’96, at the direction of the DCSOPS of the Army, then LTG Shinseki, we redesigned our organization to better cope with the tasks of proponent life-cycle management. The key element of the restructuring was the creation of regional Area of Concentration (AOC) program managers to handle all policy, planning and execution aspects of in-country training. The initiative was approved in the Fall of ’96 and since Dec ’97, all our new regional desk officers have been on board helping manage accessions, training, education, revising outdated policies, and overseeing the “care and feeding” of both FAO trainees and serving FAOs in the field.

Our new AOC managers handle each regional area of concentration (or groups of them) and all of the actions relating to those regions. Although the Army Staff restructuring effort is still not complete, and our final structure could still change, we are in far better position today to do our job than ever before. Some of you have already experienced first-hand the improved service to the field. It will get better and better as we get our feet on the ground. Frankly, some of the missions outlined in Army Regulation 600-3 as the life-cycle elements are a bit nebulous and need redefining as we tackle them. Others can and are being addressed as this is being written. Such projects, as a full review of the Advanced Civil Schooling Programs acceptable for FAO training are already being worked, and we hope to be able to provide the FAO Community a revised list of graduate school programs that is both authoritative and defensible in any forum, in the near future. Also, the reorganization has allowed us to improve our coordination with the various FAO programs of our sister Services, creating a synergy between us that will, hopefully, result in the strengthening of all our programs. [Of note, with the added manpower came added tasks. Not only do we continue as Proponent for the Schools of Other Nations and Personnel Exchange Programs but we’ve picked up the added responsibility for three CSA Regional Conferences (Asia, Central Europe, Latin America) plus one International Defense Board.]

Ultimately, our goal at the Proponent Office is to create a climate of teamwork, work hand-in-glove with any other office involved in FAO issues and thereby better serve you, the community — One Team, One Fight.

Regards,

C.F. Doroski, COL, Proponent Chief
First, congratulation are in order to our two FAOs and one RAO (Regional Affairs Officer) who were just selected for promotion to Colonel: Maurice Hutchinson (Chinese FAO); William Kellner, Jr. (Latin America FAO); and Richard Mills (Western Europe RAO). The statistics haven’t been officially compiled yet, but it appears that with the low number of FAOs we had in the zone this year, the percentage selected will be very close to the overall percentage.

For many, if not most, study-track FAOs, their in-country training is a series of memorable and exciting experiences. That is certainly true for CAPT Jeff Allen, a Former Soviet Union FAO-in-training who has gotten a little more excitement in the past two months than he probably expected. After attending DLI, he arrived at the Marshall Center in Garmisch, GE last summer. When the Marine Corps was tasked with providing an officer for six months of duty with the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), it looked like a great opportunity for CAPT Allen and he enthusiastically volunteered.

If the anti-terrorism indoctrination, helmet, flack jacket and imminent danger pay weren’t sufficient clues that this was not going to be a vacation, he found out for sure shortly after his arrival in-country. Alone one night in the quarters that he shared with several other UNOMIG observers, he was awakened by several men armed with AK-47s and a grenade launcher breaking in. After tying and roughing him up, they proceeded to loot the house. Once they left, he was able to free himself, and fortunately suffered only bruises in the incident. By the way, there are no indications that the assault had any terrorist or political overtones in the breakin.

CAPT Allen was then transferred to another sector, where he was the only American observer, and continued his duties. On February 19th, four UN Observers in his sector were taken hostage by a group believed to be responsible for the recent assassination attempt on the President of the Republic of Georgia — Eduard Shevardnadze. As one of the few UN Observers in the sector speaking Russian, CAPT Allen was soon recruited to work at the sector headquarters, assisting in the hostage negotiations. After a few days, however, he was pulled away from this task as higher headquarters ordered all American observers moved back to the capitol, Tbilisi, due to concerns for their relative safety. Whether he ultimately returns to observer duty or not remains to be seen as I write this — but regardless, I doubt that Capt Allen will soon forget his experiences of the past two months.

At Headquarters, Marine Corps, we are in the process of publishing the policy guidance for the tentatively-named MARINE LIAISON GROUP (MLG). Yes, in this era of downsizing, we are actually creating a new organization.

During the recent Marine Corps Force Structure Reviews a significant need was recognized in the area of foreign liaison. Specifically, commanders need an organization that can provide them with regional, linguistic, cultural, and military expertise to facilitate command, control, communication and coordination with military or civilian foreign/international organizations in expeditionary operations across the full spectrum of conflict. The emphasis is on support to the warfighters, and MLG personnel will routinely deploy, especially with the Marine Expeditionary Units. Additionally, the total force MLG will be responsible for tracking all Marines with regional or linguistic expertise, regardless of their MOS or assignment. This will give deployed MLG units a “reach-back” capability when necessary.

As readers of the FAO Journal undoubtedly realized on reading the above paragraph, “regional, linguistic, cultural, and military expertise” and FAOs are essentially synonymous. Thus, it is expected that many, if not most, of the officers eventually assigned to the MLG will be FAOs. Although the actual structures still to be determined, the active component will probably have about 100 billets (both officer and enlisted); the reserve component approximately 500. The MLG has tremendous relevance to both our national and Marine Corps strategies, as well as providing new opportunities for our FAOs and RAOs. I will keep you informed as the MLG progresses.

If any of you have any questions, feel free to give me a call at DSN 224-3706 or commercial 614-3706.
Observation Along the Peru/Ecuador Border

By CPT Troy Busby

As members of the 1942 Rio Protocol, Argentina, Brazil, Chile and the United States serve as guarantor nations assisting in the resolution of border conflicts between Ecuador and Peru. Named Operation Safe Border, the U.S. role in the Military Observer Mission in Ecuador and Peru (MOMEP) is to provide four observers to supervise, observe, report and verify the implementation of the 1995 Treaty of Itamaraty. This treaty ended the 1995 border conflict between Ecuador and Peru in the Upper Rio Cenepa Valley. Additionally, the U.S. provides communications, mess, weather forecasting and C27 air support to MOMEP. Other support roles such as aviation, transportation, logistics and medical support as well as observer duties are performed by the other guarantor nations.

The U.S. fulfills these requirements mainly with personnel from the 7th Special Forces Group (SFG) and United States Army South (USARSO). As a FAO observer I filled the slot of a 7th SFG O-3. Actually, OPN Safe Border has five positions that could be filled by Latin American FAOs. These positions are an O-6 U.S. Contingent Commander, an O-4 Senior Observer position, two O-3 military observer positions and an O-3 U.S. Contingent Executive Officer position.

In completing my military observer mission of observing, reporting and verifying Peruvian and Ecuadorian military activities along the disputed border region, I periodically rotated from the MOMEP headquarters in Patuca, Ecuador, to remote platoon sized outstations in Coangos, Ecuador and PV1, Peru. These outstations are located in a demilitarized zone supervised and observed by MOMEP and were positions occupied and utilized in the 1995 conflict. Duty at the bases consisted of a weekly troop and post inspection to verify that weapons and personnel status remained constant and reporting daily activities at the posts such as re-supply or flight operations as well as general observation of the areas and air space around the posts.

In addition to duty at the outstations, (half of my time at MOMEP was spent at Coangos or PV1) I performed aerial observation missions of the demilitarized zone and troop and post verifications in a separate border region named the Alpha Zone. These two zones were established as part of the separation of forces in the Treaty of Itamaraty. When not executing these duties the other observers and myself assisted the U.S. Contingent Commander in whatever capacity required.

As a Latin American FAO I feel fortunate to have participated in the peace process and enjoyed the assignment a great deal. I was able to meet and work closely with officers and soldiers from the five participating Latin American nations as well as the 7th SFG and USARSO. The DLI basic course more than adequately prepared me for the mission and I know that the time spent here improved my language skills and experience base in preparation for my studies this coming year at La Academia de Guerra in Santiago. The cooperation between the MOMEP participants made the mission both rewarding and fun. For FAO training and experience there is no other opportunity in Latin America which provides the broad multinational peacekeeping setting found in MOMEP.

CPT Troy Busby served as a MOMEP Observer from October to December 1997 after completing his language training at DLI. He is currently undergoing his in-country training in Santiago, Chile. Any FAO interested in participating in MOMEP should contact MAJ Rodriguez at FAO Proponency Office. FAO's are (Continued from page 3)

Thanks to your Journal I’ve now made contact with my proponent desk officer (LTC Robles). Would like to know more about how they are organized. —

Except for what has appeared in Journal, I have heard nothing from our Marine FAO Proponent. Thanks for the good work! —

The New Web Site . . .

Excellent Site! Outstanding collection of Links! Anxious to see the Resume Page up and running. Will review my own data base for some good MidEast regional links to add. — Mark Yates

NOTE: If you haven’t seen the resume page yet, take a look for yourself. Also see the Association News on page 16 of this issue, for more information on this service.
community. He made commitments to General Markopoulos (through the USDAO) that he would support and honor the UNFICYP plan, and he didn’t want “TRNC” politicians encroaching on issues which he felt were his responsibility.

While he didn’t work for Mr. Dentkash, neither could he publicly disagree or question policy statements made by the Turkish- Cypriot leader. When Mr. Dentkash raised deconfrontation talks to the political level, he didn’t ask General Bitlis. General Bitlis made it known to the USDAO that he felt his hands were tied by Mr. Dentkash. Without some kind of outside intervention, Bitlis felt that Mr. Dentkash would never voluntarily give up a chance to promote the “TRNC’s” legitimacy. The military benefits of a deconfrontation agreement (lower tensions, fewer incidents between armed guards, etc.) were important to Bitlis but were secondary ones for Dentkash.

General Bitlis suggested that Ambassador Perrin might want to host a dinner at Tatli Su,12 his house in north Cyprus. A small gathering with Mr. Dentkash, the Turkish Ambassador, and General Bitlis was recommended. Colonel Norton was asked to tell Ambassador Perrin that Bitlis was optimistic that such a dinner would produce positive results.

The Tatli Su Dinner

Ambassador Perrin pondered the idea. Some embassy staff thought that it was too risky and doubted that General Bitlis’ optimism was well founded. They argued that Mr. Dentkash would not bow to U.S. pressure and that he had more power over the Turkish Corps Commander that General Bitlis wanted to admit. Besides, permission from Wahsington would be needed and that would take time.

Again Ambassador Perrin went with his instincts. He had spent more time with Mr. Dentkash than any of his predecessors and knew him well. He also had met with General Bitlis many times and greatly trusted his judgement. If Bitlis thought this would work, he must have thought it through well. As for Washington guidance, Ambassador Perrin felt he had all he needed and knew full well what points had to be made. In the end, he asked Colonel Norton to arrange the dinner, and limit it to five people, the “TRNC President,” the Turkish Ambassador to the “TRNC,” the Turkish Corps Commander, Ambassador Perri, and Colonel Norton.

When the five were seated for dinner, the Ambassador raised the deconfrontation issue with Mr. Dentkash. He explained how it was not a politically risky idea, that it would lower tensions in Nicosia, possibly save some young soldiers’ lives, and had the full support of the United States Government. He went on to explain that there were rumors that the “TRNC” would look very bad the next time there was an incident in the area under discussion and the “TRNC” would get a lot of criticism. There are times, he said, when UNFICYP needed support for their initiatives. This was one of them and the Ambassador asked if the “TRNC” was ready to support deconfrontation.

To everyone’s surprise (except possibly General Bitlis”) Mr. Dentkash said the Green Line and “TRNC” security are largely the responsibility of Turkey and he deferred to the Turkish Ambassador. The Ambassador turned to General Bitlis and said these were issues under military jurisdiction. Ambassador Perrin then asked General Bitlis if he was ready to agree to the UNFICYP plan. After the general gave a quick and short affirmative answer, the American Ambassador turned again to Mr. Denktash and asked if it was all right for him to call General Milner the next morning and tell him deconfrontation was approved from the Turkish side. It was, Mr. Dentkash replied.

Shortly thereafter, General Yalcin signed the deconfrontation agreement on behalf of the Turkish side. General Bitlis purposely obfuscated General Yalcin’s link to either himself (Turkish Army) or to Mr. Atakol (“TRNC”).

Some Conclusions

UNFICYP (especially General Greindl) should get full credit for the idea of demanding Ops. However, left to their own devices, UNFICYP would never brokered a deconfrontation agreement in 1989. Both UNFICYP commanders during this period (Greindl and Milner) were supportive of discreet involvement by the USDAO and the American Ambassador, but their staffs were not. It is doubtful that the American Embassy’s role would have been successful without the support of the two UNFICYP commanders.

Direct involvement by the American Ambassador was necessary to keep deconfrontation on course politically and to ultimately get it approved. However, he left the majority of the military discussions to his USDAO team and trusted their judgement as to when he should interject himself into the process.

Generals Bitlis and Markopoulos persevered in their goal to get a deconfrontation agreement. Their commitment to the idea kept the proposal alive when there were problems. The time spent convincing them of the merits of the plan in the early stages of the process was time very well invested.

The personal relationships forged with President Vassiliou and Mr. Dentkash by Ambassador Perrin proved invaluable. For example, Mr. Dentkash agreed to end the previously mentioned anti-Greindl campaign as a result of the Ambassador’s personal – not official – request.

The FAO training, background, and experience was crucial for Norton and Popovich to establish themselves with the Greek and Turkish commanders. Their knowledge of the area, the issues, and the culture, were absolutely essential for their role in the deconfrontation plan.

Any issue in Cyprus can be easily stopped by making it politically unacceptable to one side or the other. As seen in this article, it is also possible to “depoliticize” certain issues as well.

Bill K. Perrin was appointed by President Reagan to be Ambassador to Cyprus in 1987. He also served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East and Asia, Regional Director for Peace Corps Africa, and President of the Inter-American Foundation. Ambassador Perrin is now retired and living in Florida.

Colonel Stephen R. Norton is a Army FAO and is currently the Defense Attache to Greece. He has had previous attaché tours in Turkey and Cyprus. In 1991/1992, he served as SACEUR’s Special Assistant for the Eastern

(Continued on page 24)
Mediterranean and was the Politico-Military Planner for Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus for the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1984 to 1986. He holds a Master’s Degree in International Affairs from the American University, Washington, D.C. and is a 1990 graduate of the Army War College.

1 Rauf Denktash is the “President” of the “TRNC” and has been the leader of the Turkish Cypriots since 1974. He is highly respected by the Turkish Cypriots, is a master politician, and continues in his leadership role to the present day.

2 Esref Bitlis was promoted to full General in the summer of 1990 and left Cyprus to command the Jandarma in Ankara. He was subsequently killed in a plane crash in Turkey.

3 Ali Yalçin has been promoted to Lieutenant General and is serving again in Cyprus, this time as the commander of the Turkish Corps.

4 Panayiotis Markopoulos was the commander of the Hellenic First Army before being assigned to command GCNG. Hellenic First Army is the premier command in Greece and Markopoulos had a reputation as an excellent soldier, trainer, and visionary.

5 Dimitrios Dimou has recently been promoted to Lieutenant General and is now commanding Hellenic First Army. He was not directly involved in the deconfrontation agreement but probably gave Athens his independent appraisal of the concept.

6 Varosha was the major seaside resort town in 1974 and was the centerpiece of the Cypriot tourist industry. It is next to the medieval city of Famagusta and is better known internationally by that name. When the Turkish Army arrived at Varosha, they found it completely deserted and sealed it off with barbed wire. With minor exceptions, it remains uninhabited and sealed off to the present time. It represents the single most important territorial “bargaining chip” that the “TRNC” has to use for a Cyprus solution.

7 The Nicosia Airport ended up in the buffer zone after the 1974 fighting and has remained closed since that time. The Greek Cypriots compensated for its loss by enlarging Larnaca Airport, while the Turkish side converted a former Royal Air Force field into a commercial airport called Ercan Havaalani in Turkish. Greindl’s idea was to reopen Nicosia Airport and allow incoming passengers to then enter either the Turkish or Greek side of the island.

8 Major Popovich served a four year tour on Cyprus and was with Colonel Norton for virtually every meeting with the UNFICYP, Greek, and Turkish commanders. He was a key member of the team that got the deconfrontation agreement approved. He has since been selected for promotion to Colonel and is currently serving in European Policy, OSD.

9 Ambassado Perrin privately asked Mr. Denktash to remove the banners and end the campaigning against General Greindl. He explained that it was totally unfair to tarnish a man who worked so hard to promote peace in Cyprus over an insignificant incident not of his making. It made the “TRNC” look petty. The signs came down a few days later and Mr. Denktash even hosted a farewell reception for General Greindl when he left Cyprus.

10 The Star and Crescent are integral parts of the flag of Turkey and the “TRNC.” It is traditional for Turkish military units to construct large replicas of this symbol, or quotations from Kemal Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey, on hillsides. What was done at this particular OP was not unique, but it was recent.

11 Office calls with General Bitlis generally consisted of just Norton, Popovich, and one Turkish Cypriot reserve officer as interpreter. Bitlis always selected Turkish Cypriots who had advanced degrees from either American or British universities and were totally bilingual. The length of these calls varied from one and a half to three hours.

12 Tatli Su means “sweet water” in Turkish. It was the name of the American Ambassador’s residence in north Cyprus. Because the Green Line divides the island, Turks and Turkish Cypriots could not visit the Ambassador’s residence in Greek Nicosia. Therefore, several embassies kept houses on both sides in order to conduct diplomatic business.
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