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Dear FAO Colleagues,

It is a pleasure to write this first letter of the New Year. The FAOA Board of Governors is greatly looking forward to moving forward into 2010 with the implementation of several new initiatives. We are already off to a terrific start with the launch of our new website, thanks to FAOA Webmaster Major Mikey Bucher. Check out www.faoa.org where you can find several new features such as a "Members Only" section. You can access the FAOA Membership Directory where you will be able to locate other members and view their profiles. The directory is a great way to get in touch with old friends and colleagues, and network with other members. You will also have access to the on-line version of the FAO Journal, regularly updated job announcements, a FAOA discussion forum, and a number of other terrific new features.

Later this year, we look forward to unveiling a brand new FAOA logo and a redesigned FAO Journal, thanks to the initiative and tremendous efforts of Mr. Coyt Hargus, FAOA Editor. The official launch for both items will take place at the Annual FAOA Formal Banquet, which will be held on May 20 at The Army and Navy Club in Washington, DC. Regarding the dinner, I am pleased to announce that Mr. Brian Hobbs, a retired U.S. Air Force International Affairs Specialist, has stepped forward to chair the Banquet Planning Committee. Brian leads an enthusiastic group of fellow volunteers who are committed to organizing a truly first class and memorable event. Please join us if you are in the National Capital Region on May 20.

Other activities planned for the year include holding our regular policy luncheons with guest speakers who can address current and relevant topics (we were at maximum capacity for the fall luncheon with columnist Ralph Peters), affiliating with other professional organizations in the diplomatic and intelligence communities, and conducting corporate outreach to explore possibilities for sponsorship and other forms of support. President Emeritus Mike Ferguson and Vice President Colonel Kurt Marisa lead our corporate and strategic outreach efforts. Please let me know if you have suggestions for other activities. Your input is always appreciated.

In closing, allow me to make one observation. FAOs have a truly unique set of strategic tools – regional political-military expertise, foreign language proficiency, cultural awareness, interagency experience; the list goes on. However, these skills do not make us value-added if we do not use them correctly. In our day-to-day work we typically provide advice. We make recommendations to senior leaders and decision-makers – military and civilian – in the National Capital Region, a combatant command, embassy, and elsewhere. In providing advice, our responsibility is to provide senior leaders and decision-makers with information that they need to hear, which is not always what they want to hear. This is our responsibility. We possess strategic tools that others do not have. Simply put, we play chess while others play checkers.

My most sincere thanks to all FAOs, wherever you are, for the good work that you are doing – especially those who are serving in harm’s way.

With best regards,

Gary Espinas
Colonel, U.S. Army
A dilemma for Washington is that whenever the United States pushes for elections in the Middle East and Muslim countries, Islamist parties often perform well—better than liberal, nationalist, and secular parties. For instance, in the Palestinian, Lebanese, Egyptian and Iraqi elections of 2005 and 2006, Islamist parties either finished first or did well enough to scare their secular opponents. Even in Turkey, a democracy ruled by secular parties since 1946, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), a party with Islamist roots, defeated secular, liberal, and nationalist parties in the elections of November 2002 and then in March 2007.

If Turkey’s example represents the future of the democratization of Arabs, are America’s efforts to promote democracy in Muslim countries as well as block the rise of Islamists doomed? Not quite. Islamist parties perform well in elections because they already possess the necessary ingredients for electoral success: an exciting ideology, and substantial support (particularly financial) from anti-American forces around the world. This is not the first time the United States has faced a situation in which international support threatens to catapult anti-American forces to power at the ballot box. Washington encountered just this scenario in Italy after World War II, with Soviet-supported communists poised to take power through elections. Yet Washington managed to prevent the communist takeover of Italy.

The Italian case indicates that U.S. efforts to shape the Middle East and Muslim countries through electoral politics are not doomed—but Washington will have to learn and apply the lessons of its accomplishment in Italy that began over sixty years ago.

At the end of World War II, Italy’s powerful communist movement received significant support from the Soviet-sponsored Communist International. In the 1946 Italian election for a constitutional assembly, the Italian communists (running in a coalition with the socialists) emerged as the most powerful legislative block, winning 219 seats to the rival Christian Democrats’ 207 out of 556 seats in the assembly. Money from the Communist International helped the communists establish grassroots structures, obtain arms, and carry out propaganda to win the hearts and minds of ordinary Italians. At that time, Italy appeared a lost cause to Washington. Yet by 1958, the Christian Democrats won 273 compared to the communists’ 140 seats in the chamber of deputies, establishing a political ascendancy that would last until the end of the Cold War. How did this happen?

Some might view it anachronistic to compare Italy with the Arab world. Italy today differs greatly from the Arab world. It is wealthy and has a large middle class, which forms the bedrock of Italian democracy, while the Arab world is poor and lacks a significant middle class. Yet the Italy of 1947 looked a lot like the Arab world of today. Back then, Italy was as poor as Egypt is today. Italian GDP per capita in 1950, adjusted to today’s prices, was $4,100, less than Egypt’s current GDP per capita of $5,800. In 1945, life expectancy at birth in Italy was 66 years. In Egypt today, that number is 70.

How did the U.S. prevent communists from taking over Italy at the ballot box? First and foremost, Washington made a decision that in the case of Italy, the battle was one in which politics was the continuation of war and international conflict by other means, and that such political warfare could not be won without a massive plan. Communists could be defeated only with bold initiatives. A statement by George Kennan, the founder of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, demonstrates such thinking:

“Political warfare will be the employment of all means that a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives. Such operations are both covert and overt as political alliances, economic measures, and wide propaganda to such covert actions as clandestine support a friendly foreign element of black psychological warfare and even encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states.”

What this statement underscored first and foremost was the need for a fundamental restructuring of the U.S. government.

The first step was to set up the National Security Council (NSC). The NSC’s first directive, NSC 1/1, aimed to prevent Italy from becoming communist. Within the State Department, the Policy Planning Staff was specifically established to combat
communism at the ballot box in Italy. The other departments followed suit in the 1940s and 1950s.

The strategy was to use not just the government but also the collective wisdom of the American people in creating policy, so Washington rallied American NGOs to the struggle. For instance, the AFL-CIO promoted the idea of non-communist labor unions and transformed the Italian labor landscape from one in which communists had been dominant. There were massive campaigns by American civil society: Italian-Americans wrote letters and sent cables to Italy (10 million in all) discussing their commitment to the U.S. and asking their compatriots back home to follow the successful American model. These steps effectively the anti-communist message across in Italy.

On the public diplomacy front, the U.S. government used its immigration policy as a weapon. Italians at that time would have been as desperate as Egyptians today to migrate to America, and the United States made it very clear: those Italians that voted communist, would be unable to emigrate from Italy. Italian-Americans wrote letters saying, “Uncle, if you vote communist, I cannot bring you here.”

The government also used measures to isolate communists in power. In this regard, it made U.S. assistance conditional on being non-communist. Moreover, all money going to contractors in Italy was screened to make sure that none would end up in the hands of contractors with communist connections, those who employed communist subcontractors or worked with communist unions. American money was used intelligently to make sure that it would not enrich communists.

The U.S. government was creative in its use of the media. It employed white propaganda (talking up the benevolence of American efforts), such as sending its ambassador on highly publicized tours. It also used black propaganda, such as exposing the communists’ connection to the Communist International which as critical to communicating the message that the communists thrived through foreign support.

American methods were not always so naively benign. Bags of money were flown into Italy and given to Christian Democrats and liberal parties to strengthen them against the communists. The U.S. government identified non-communist political leaders, such as Alcide di Gasperi, and supported them financially for about ten years. On the less benign side, the U.S. was prepared to deliver secret shipments of arms to Italian security forces so they could crack down on communist uprisings and strikes.

In the end, this campaign of coordinated effort worked, and the communists were defeated. In the elections of 1958, they received only 22.7 percent of the vote compared to 42.3 percent for their main liberal democrat rivals, the Christian Democrats.

Even if some U.S. actions to defeat the communists at the ballot box in Italy were specific to the Italian landscape, the lessons of post-World War II Italy are still important. The Italian example not only provides food for thought, but also shows that with the right policies, America can overcome the challenge it faces at the ballot box in the Middle East:

**Identify allies: Muslims versus Islamists**

Who should America support in Muslim countries? This is crucial, because only with the right U.S. allies can Islamists be defeated at the ballot box.

Today, there is an ongoing struggle in Muslim majority countries between Muslims who are Islamists and Muslims who are not Islamists. This is a battle more important than the struggle between the West and Islamists, as it will determine the future of Islam. Washington and the West should support Muslims who believe in liberal democracy and its values. America’s allies within Muslim countries are all Muslims who are not Islamists.

How about moderate Islamists? Are they potential U.S. allies? No. The term “moderate Islamist” is offensive to all Muslims; any attempt to forge alli-
parties and organizations have billions of dollars from countries such as Egypt can be won over. This is the only way away from the communists in thirteen years, at the expense of billions of dollars. This is neither a battle involving a few hundred million dollars nor a short struggle. Such a step would weaken U.S. to engage Muslims who are liberals while creating rifts between them and the communists. Washington should study what Islamists are doing to challenge regimes, as well as the secular, nationalist, and liberal parties in predominantly Muslim countries. Washington should study what Islamists are doing to build local support—and then outperform them. This will require the United States to fund what Islamists are funding, and fund such activities better. If Islamists are pouring money into political parties, media, NGOs, charities, and free schools, Washington ought to do the same, and with even more money. This is neither a battle involving a few hundred million dollars nor a short-term struggle. Italy was weaned away from the communists in thirteen years, at the expense of billions of dollars. This is the only way countries such as Egypt can be won over.

Financial support is crucial. Given that Islamist parties and organizations have billions of dollars from their state and institutional sponsors, it is difficult for nationalist and secular political parties, who have no such international support, to counter them.

Sound financial backing has helped catapult Islamist movements to power by a variety of channels. Thanks to their wealth, Islamist parties are able to organize more efficiently than secular parties. Accordingly, these parties have better grassroots appeal. In Egypt, for instance, Islamists reach down to district and village levels, and establish themselves in ways secular/liberal parties cannot due to lack of funds.

Islamists financially support like-minded political prisoners and their families. Liberals do not have that luxury and are therefore less willing to risk imprisonment. Accordingly, a fund for political prisoners who fight for liberal democracy should be established to support them and their families.

With money in hand, Islamist parties are providing Turkey, Arab world and other Muslim countries with social services that governments no longer provide, such as quality free education and healthcare. The population bulge of the 1980s in Turkey, as well as the one currently hitting the Arab world and many Muslim countries, has created a situation in which the infrastructure of state social services, built decades ago to serve a smaller population, is crumbling. In the fifty years since its education and healthcare systems were set up, Egypt's population has grown by 50 million. Egyptian public services have not coped with the increase. In areas where states are failing, Islamist parties, organizations, and charities are moving in to provide those services at minimal or no cost.

Islamists who set up free schools are able to win the hearts and minds of parents and indoctrinate children at a young age. In the 1990s, Turkey's political showdown between the Islamist Welfare Party government and the secular bloc was fought over the issue of free Islamic education. Secular forces, with the help of the military, were able to either bring Islamic schools under strict regulations or shut them down altogether. Such strong political action is unlikely in the Arab world; only with significant financial support that allows secular parties to establish free, quality secular schools will they be able to challenge the appeal of Islamist parties and the efficiency of their grassroots organization.

**Apply Different Speeds**

In formulating policy, the U.S. ought to distinguish the political differences between Turkey and the Arab world and other Muslim countries, and even make nuanced distinctions among Arab countries. In
Turkey, as was the case in postwar Italy, liberal democrats have political room to maneuver and have generally advocated freely. This is not the case in Egypt and most Arab countries. Repressive Arab regimes often limit the activities of liberal democrats. In Egypt, where emergency law has been enforced for the last twenty-eight years, secular liberals face huge challenges. The media and judiciary are closely aligned with the regime, and it is extremely difficult to obtain a license to establish a political party. Freedom to express one’s political opinion is severely limited, rights to demonstrate or strike are not officially permitted, and students and non-Islamist political parties are prevented from engaging in political activities on campus. These statutes are upheld by Law 79, which is actively being challenged by students and political parties. Meanwhile, Islamists use campus mosques to promote their agenda. The task is momentous, but unless strong pressure is exerted to ease some of the constraints on political participation, it will be difficult for liberal forces in Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab world to flourish.

Islamists, however, are able to bypass legal restrictions prohibiting the existence of religious parties. By relying on the mosque, Islamists disseminate their message to large groups of individuals. Moreover, given the underground nature of Islamist political structures, Islamists are less vulnerable to the regime’s efforts at control and persecution than the legally organized secular democratic opposition groups. Unlike underground Islamist organizations, legal secular liberal parties are exposed to regime interference when choosing their leaders or formulating policies. Legal status also means that liberal parties face tight government control of their finances. Islamists, meanwhile, do not have a government body overseeing their funding or expenditures.

Another difference between Egypt and Turkey is that the Egyptian regime, like most Arab governments, benefits from an Islamist threat. It is in the interest of authoritarian Arab regimes to demonstrate that Islamists are the only viable alternative to their rule. This argument is used as a pretext to avoid liberalizing the political space and to blunt American efforts for regional democratization.

In Turkey, liberals already have political room and roots in civil society. Arab countries like Egypt need more aggressive efforts to open the political space for liberals to succeed, while Turkey requires a more subtle approach. In each country, U.S. policy will need to be formulated and implemented at different speeds, calibrated to local conditions.

**Create a cost for being Islamist**

Once the U.S. has identified its allies, funded them properly, and out-assisted the “Islamist International,” the next step in battling the Islamists will be to create costs for being an Islamist political party or figure. Currently, there is no such cost for Islamist activity vis-à-vis the United States. In fact, Islamists benefit from the way Washington deals with Muslim countries. For instance, when Washington grants contracts to build schools and gives money to businesses and NGOs, some of that money goes to Islamist businesses, helping fund their activities. When exchanges are organized and people visit the United States, Islamists benefit at least as much as the liberals do. And little of the U.S. money spent to support local media actually ends up in the hands of liberals, nationalists, and secular types.

There are many ways to create a meaningful cost to being an Islamist in the Middle East. Washington might, for example, consider banning the immigration of Islamists. During the Cold War such restrictions were both acceptable and practiced when it came to the immigration of communists into America. Immigrating is a privilege that should be granted only to America’s friends.

Along this line, Washington ought to stimulate creative thinking to find other ways to make Islamists across the world understand that their activities will be cost worthy, including loss of access to American opportunities and finances. Such policies would make non-Islamist Muslims feel privileged and create a benefit for being a liberal democrat in a Muslim country, a benefit that does not exist in most places today.

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**Voice Your Views**

The Journal strives to publish a variety of opinions, views, observations and analysis from tactical to strategic. We encourage you to express your voice by submitting articles, book reviews and Op-Ed pieces. Letters to the editor with both opposing and supporting the views of those expressed in published articles are encouraged. Submit your writings by either going to your association’s website at www.FAOA.org website, or via email.

editor@faoa.org
Take bold steps at home

There are also steps that the U.S. can take at home to help defeat the Islamists in the ballot box overseas. Some other steps include the following:

Restructure the U.S. government: The lesson of postwar Italy is that a reorganization of the government is necessary in fighting the Islamists at the ballot box. The United States cannot defeat the Islamists with institutions and agencies built to fight the Cold War. Washington needs to create new bodies to focus its energies on a belt stretching from Morocco to Pakistan and beyond. In doing so, it is acceptable for the United States to make occasional mistakes. Indeed, many of the agencies Washington established at the beginning of the Cold War to manage the situation in Italy did not work and were shut down. But new institutions were set up in their stead. The government was able to learn from its mistakes. This strategy should be employed for dealing with the Muslim majority countries today.

Invest heavily in area and language studies of Muslim countries: Even though some such agencies are already established, Washington is unable to staff them with the right people. The number of Turkish, Arabic, Pashtun, Urdu, and Farsi speakers in the U.S. government today is dismal. Alleviating this problem requires a massive effort of not hundreds or thousands, but, in the short term, tens of thousands, and in the long term, hundreds of thousands of Arabic, Farsi, Pashtun, Turkish, Uzbek, Swahili, Azeri, Malay, Bengali, and Urdu speakers, among other languages. Washington needs a vast cadre of people who are fluent in these languages, as well as the political and social affairs of the countries where these languages are spoken. To this end, the United States ought to fund exchange programs to the region to send hundreds of thousands of people there, as well as fund university and research programs to facilitate the study of these countries. A strategy is needed to create tens of thousands of experts who are fluent in the politics and languages of Muslim countries. Only these people can successfully staff the new departments and agencies necessary to fight and defeat the Islamists in the ballot box and beyond.

Be bold: One of the ideas developed to fight the communists in Italy was called Psychological Strategy Board Plan B, which came out in 1951. Until that time, the United States had been fighting communists with economic measures, which were not working. The communists were becoming more powerful in elections. Hence, at the height of communist power in Italy in 1951, Plan B laid out a strategy to “isolate and weaken the communists with any means possible,” as well as “outlaw[ing] communist parties.” Washington was bold in its determination to defeat the communists at the ballot box. Unless the United States also takes bold steps today, it will not win the current battle.

An Uphill Struggle

In addition to the work of “Islamist International,” other factors explain the demise of secular, liberal, and nationalist parties in Turkey, Arab world and other Muslim countries. In Turkey, secular parties that ruled for the last sixty years are fragmented, due to the leader-driven nature of Turkish politics. Today, Turkey has many center-right, center-left, and nationalist parties that vie for the same secular voter base. Not much can be done from outside to change this dynamic unless the secular leadership takes action to unite its forces or Turkish voters force them to do so. Hence, even if at first glance Turkey seems an easy case because of its functioning democracy, it is actually a tough nut to crack due to the vicissitudes of its political culture.

In Muslim majority countries, Islamist parties are doing well because they promise change. The revolutionary utopian promise of a bright new tomorrow that the Islamist parties offer stands in sharp contrast to the tired rhetoric of the secular, liberal, and nationalist parties. In this regard, non-Islamists have much to do to produce and successfully market a new, attractive political vision that captures the imagination of the masses. However, unless the United States takes an active interest in supporting such a strategy, it will not work against the exciting, well-funded program of Islamism.

For too long dictatorial regimes in the Arab world have oppressed secular, liberal, and nationalist parties. While Islamists have been able to bypass the restrictions of authoritarian regimes in the safety of the mosques, liberals have been jailed and weakened, and their grassroots structures mostly shut down. As a result, the playing field between Islamists and non-Islamists is not level — and will not be so for some time. This is one key reason why elections within Arab countries produce Islamist victories over secular, liberal, and nationalist parties. The U.S. needs to understand that the struggle to
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defeat the Islamists at the ballot box is not only a costly and daring endeavor, but also an uphill march that will require great patience. It is a strategy that results in elections — it does not start with them.

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The authors offer their recognition to Daniel Fink for his assistance with this article.

Die Mauer Muß Weg!
Reflections on the fall of the Wall
By: Maj Michael Tyson, USAF, Eurasian FAO

I was sound asleep, having just finished day 11 of a 12-day shift. I could not wait until tomorrow was over. Three full days off awaited me, before returning to work on the fourth day at 1400 to start the swing shift. “East Berlin is on fire! The East Germans are climbing over the Wall!” My neighbor in the barracks woke me to these exaltations, as I was stupid enough to leave my door unlocked. He didn’t stay long, just enough time to scream these words then slam my door. I could hear him making his way down the hall of the barracks, opening any door that was unlocked and banging on any whose owners were smarter than me. Of course, I went back to sleep. I had to get up at 0500 after all. East Berlin would probably still be on fire after I got my sleep.

I have no idea how much time went by between when my “friend” woke me up with the natural disaster warning and my mind actually grasping what he said. All I know is, I suddenly sat up in bed and thought, “If what he said is true, surely it’d be on AFN.” So I turned the television to the one channel we were lucky enough to get: the American Forces Network. There, on my tiny television screen was an even tinier Tom Brokaw at Brandenburg Gate, only a few miles (kilometers, I mean) from my barracks in Tempelhof Airport. I managed to turn on the TV at the top of the hour to hear him say, “Ladies and Gentlemen, the Wall is no more. At midnight tonight, Berlin-time, East Germans can travel freely.”

Berlin is Where?

I arrived in Berlin in January 1988 after a year and a half of Russian language and technical training. I was the lucky one in my class as I got my first choice. Many of my fellow Russian linguists were lucky if they got any assignment on their list. I was public school educated, and thus chose Berlin because I knew for certain it was a city that straddled the border between East and West Germany. Imagine my surprise, after getting the assignment, when I looked at an atlas. What’s Berlin doing in the middle of East Germany? When did they move it? It’s closer to Poland than West Germany!

Further study revealed the island-like characteristics of Berlin. One couldn’t just drive from Berlin to West Germany. One couldn’t jump on a train and check out Poland. Berlin was not only encircled by an actual wall, The Wall. It was also surrounded by air corridors, within which aircraft from the West had to remain. There were three corridors through which
The aircraft could get into or out of Berlin: north, central, and south. Additionally, if you wanted to drive to West Germany, you had to go through Checkpoint Bravo in Berlin. There you presented your military identification card and flag orders. Flag orders contained your identification information and the dates your commander authorized you to travel outside of Berlin. They were called flag orders because at the header of the page was your nation’s flag. The military police at Checkpoint Bravo would check your ID and flag orders, give you a binder describing the route you were to drive, and stamp your orders with the time. You had to make it to West Germany within a certain amount of time. But you weren’t done at the American side of Checkpoint Bravo. You then had to drive a couple hundred meters to the Soviet side of Checkpoint Bravo. There you would present yourself to a Soviet private, a young 20-something man obviously happy to not be serving in Afghanistan. You and the private would salute each other (as both forces were still considered allies at this time), and you would present the private with the flag orders and ID for each person in your car. He would then hand the documents back to you and direct you to a small trailer, in which the Soviet officer in charge was stationed. But before you made it to the trailer, the private would try to sell you uniform accoutrements, buttons, ribbons, sometimes even hats. Within the trailer was one slot in the wall in which you slid the flag orders and IDs. There were a couple of chairs and some pamphlets, in English, on the glories of communism and the Soviet Union. After a couple of minutes the orders and IDs were returned. One more trip to the private, who would look to see that your flag orders were stamped (again with the time). You and the private would salute each other again, and then you were on your way. As long as you followed the directions in the binder, and didn’t stop or turn around in East Germany, you would make it to the Soviet’s Checkpoint Alpha with no problem. There followed a repeat of what happened at Bravo, then you got to the American Alpha, where you turned in your binder.

Interestingly, if you arrived at the Soviet checkpoint in fewer than two hours, you were given a speeding ticket, which was marked on your flag orders. If you took longer than three and a half hours, the Soviets sent someone to find you.

This “island” living was what I had to look forward to. Fortunately, as Allies we were authorized to travel in East Berlin, under certain conditions. We had to be in uniform, Class Bs. However, we did not wear name tags. Part of the in-processing in Berlin included a tour of East Berlin. There we were, fifty newly-arrived Airmen, a mass of blue visiting Brandenburg Gate, the Soviet World War II memorial, and Alexanderplatz, every month. The travel office in Berlin ran biweekly shopping trips to East Berlin, called Bummel tours (supposedly because “Bummel” meant “mad shopping spree” in German; for some reason, my German dictionary says it means “promenade”). Every two weeks about 40 U.S., Brit and French service members and their families flooded into East Berlin, where the exchange rate was 13 East Deutsche Marks per dollar, intent to buy everything not nailed down. At Natasha’s you could get a one-liter bottle of Stolichnaya vodka for 10 marks. At the Carl Zeiss optics shop, you could get a pair of sport binoculars for about five dollars, the equivalent of about 100 dollars state-side. You could have a three-course Russian meal, complete with borsht, kasha and vodka, for approximately three dollars per person. A nice simple lunch, complete with a third of a liter of wonderful East German Weizen, for a dollar. There was a wonderful bookstore in Alexanderplatz with a huge section of Russian books. My fellow linguists would walk out of there with about 15 pounds of books each, with our wallets lighter by two dollars. It was wonderful.

My job in Berlin as a Russian linguist was to monitor electronic emissions from East Germany. My coworkers and I spent our long shifts in a building atop the highest point in Berlin, known as Teufelsberg, or Devil’s Mountain. Teufelsberg is a 300-foot mountain created from tons and tons of rubble by the
Allies after World War II. And, while I was stationed in Berlin, it had a ski slope. (You can just see it in the picture below.). It was situated in the British sector of Berlin and was home to British and American Army and Air Force personnel.

More than 100,000 allied forces and their families made their home in West Berlin. We were the vanguard, outnumbered and outgunned, entrusted by our countrymen and freedom-loving people in Western Europe to deter the superiorly numbered and equipped Communist forces. There were some scary nights, enough to warrant the quarterly, eight-hour shifts in MOPP Level Four. We had our eyes and ears attuned to the Fulda Gap, hoping against all hope that we wouldn’t see or hear anything.

But hear things we did. In May, 1989, the Hungarian government opened up their border with Austria. This freed up a route for East Germans to “escape” to the west. East German chancellor Erich Honecker tightened controls over his people, ordering a crackdown on protesters in Leipzig, the sight of massive protests in favor of Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika. Thankfully, Honecker’s own government realized that times have changed, and removed him from power the next day. The new government tried to assure East Germans that reforms were coming, but the East Germans saw through the party’s lies. On November 4, 1989, half a million East Berliners protested in what became the largest such protest since 1953. Czechoslovakia next opened its border for East Germans, and 30,000 emigrated in the next two days. Three days later, after the entire East German government resigned, the Wall came down.

After Tom Brokaw announced to me, and millions of Americans back home, that the Wall was no more, I stuck my head out into the hall of my barracks. Two of my friends were in the hall, and when they saw me, we all looked at each other and said, “Taxi, 5 minutes.” What followed was the most exciting night of my life. We made it to Brandenburg Gate just before midnight. What we saw were masses of people, and of course Tom Brokaw. The water cannons from the East side had not started yet. In fact, the top of the Wall at Brandenburg was a ghost town. However, about an hour after our arrival, some Germans tested the water. That was enough for us. I started to boost a friend of mine to the top of the Wall. Unfortunately, an unidentified Army officer pointed to every short-haired American-looking person on the Wall and told them to get down, now. Shortly after this incident, the few Germans on top of the Wall started to get the water cannon treatment from the East.

If my parents had they watched NBC at the exact right moment would have seen their son in the front row right behind Tom Brokaw. I had my hand up over my eyes, trying to block the television lights so I could read the teleprompter. My girlfriend managed to get the first page of the teleprompter news, signed by Mr. Brokaw. We stayed there until about 0300. I went back to the barracks, thinking I could take a quick nap before work, but to no avail. I was drunk with excitement. and couldn’t wait for this day to be over so I could go back downtown to guzzle from the keg of history. That is exactly what I did. After my last day shift, I had a three-day break to spend in Berlin soaking up the history. I started the second night at Checkpoint Charlie, welcoming in East Berliners in their cardboard Trabants, banging on their cars with West Berliners, Americans, Brits and everyone else. East Berliners who chose to walk through Checkpoint Charlie searched for the Kurfürstendamm. “Wo ist der Ku’damm?” was heard repeatedly that night. Only later did I learn that the bars on the Ku’damm were giving beer away to East Berliners.

After spending a couple hours crying for joy with the Berliners, East and West alike, I made my way to Brandenburg Gate. Quite a different scene from the night before. The Wall at Brandenburg Gate
was flat on top, unlike the rounded top over the remaining 99% of the Wall. Tonight, the top of the Wall was full of at least 100 people, like a busy nightclub. My friends and I managed to get on top and even move around a bit. Looking into the East, about three meters from the Wall, was a line of Volkspolizei (East German “People’s Police”), each in uniform and carrying their weapon. A little after my arrival, a young German woman fell off the Wall into the East side. The place got silent in a progressive wave. Seconds later, two of the east German Volkspolizei officers approached the girl, shouldered their rifles, put their hands together, and boosted her back up onto the Wall. A cheer went up, and smiles appeared on the usually stoic Volkspolizei officers.

Two years later my father came to visit me and my wife. We walked around Berlin and ended up at Brandenburg Gate. Between the gate and where the Wall used to stand was a 100 meter wide field, a field irrigated with the blood of freedom-loving individuals, East Berliners who attempted to escape the toil and struggle of communist life, shot and left to bleed on the field by East German guards. And there we were, only two years after the Fall of the Wall, looking at a line of people willing to pay 100 deutsche marks to bungee jump from a crane over the killing fields at Brandenburg Gate.

Quotable Quotes …

“Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them.”

-- T.E. Lawrence, 20 Aug 1917

Announcing … the New FAOA Membership Website!

On the first day of the New Year, the FAOA proudly introduced the new Membership website. With expanded content and members-only sections, the FAOA can now better serve you by providing members the ability to review and update their own contact information, profiles and membership status on-line. Members can login and search the membership database, send emails to other members, receive emails on events and items of interest, and access members-only content.

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Turkey has not traditionally boasted strong popular support for Hamas, or any other groups with a violent Islamist agenda. Turks generally have had an attitude of benign indifference towards their country’s ties with Israel. Lately though, this is changing. Whereas anti-Israel demonstrations would have typically attracted only a few thousand people in the past, today pro-Hamas and anti-Israel demonstrations attract hundreds of thousand of Turks, and the country is witnessing drastic changes in popular attitudes towards Israel, Hamas and the Palestinian issue.

These changes are rooted in the transformation of Turkish views of the world and the accompanying transformation of Turkish foreign policy: the Turks’ view of the world is changing, with the Turks taking a negative view of the West: today, few in Turkey care for the West, most people oppose EU accession, many Turks hate America, and almost no one likes Israel. At the same time, Turkey’s foreign policy towards the West is also changing, with Turkey becoming friendlier with Hamas, Sudan and Iran.

Why are Turks turning anti-Western? Why do they view themselves in contrast to the West – meaning the U.S. around the world and Israel within its own neighborhood? Examining the development of Turkish policies towards Israel and Hamas over the past seven years, since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002, can provide many lessons.

When the Palestinian Issue becomes a Domestic Dynamic…

In the 1960s and later, various Arab regimes initiated policies that turned the Israeli-Palestinian dispute into a domestic issue. In this regard, the Arab regimes invited radical Palestinian groups to visit their capitals, and provided them publicity and the ability to build networks, allowing the radical Palestinian rhetoric and agenda to penetrate the minds of common Arabs, where it stays. Now, Turkey is going through a similar process under the leadership of the AKP government, except this radical Islamist rhetoric is penetrating the minds of Turks. Since the AKP took office in November 2002, the party’s pro-Hamas rhetoric and conduct—including successive visits to Turkey by Hamas officials, as well as government-sponsored Hamas fundraisers and gatherings—have for the first time brought Hamas’s rhetoric to Turkey. Consequently, pro-Hamas websites are proliferating in Turkey, traditional Turkish sympathy for the Palestinians is turning into sympathy for Hamas. Additionally Turkish attitudes towards Israel are heating up significantly, where according to a BBC World Service poll; only 2 percent of Turks today have a favorable view of Israel, while 23 percent view Israel as a threat.

Enter the AKP and September 11 Attacks

For a long time, the primary goal of the attacks of September 11 appeared to be that al Qaeda
The FAO Journal

wanted to hurt America. Now, this does not necessarily seem to be the case. The attacks took aim at America, but perhaps, that was not their primary goal. Rather, the primary goal of the attacks seems to have been to rally Muslims around the world to unite under the concept of a "Muslim world" in a perpetual conflict with the West—meaning Israel in the Middle East and the United States elsewhere in the world.

The attacks, of course, did not create the idea of Muslims; nor did they create the "Muslim world." There is a preexisting cultural view among the world's Muslims, as in all religions, that believers are unified. The attacks have not created this view; rather they have introduced a Manichean political layer to it, calling on all Muslims to join the new and politically-charged "Muslim world" that al Qaeda defines as having a violent confrontation with the West. This appears to have been the primary goal of the 11 Sep attacks. By creating and sustaining this view, al Qaeda can attack and hurt America and West many times over.

Enter the AKP in Turkey in 2002. As Al-Qaeda was calling on all Muslims everywhere to unite around this new and politically-charged "Muslim world" to oppose the West and attack it whenever possible. The AKP, a party with an Islamist pedigree came to power in Turkey, promoting its vision of a political "Muslim world" and suggesting that Turkey and the Turks belong to this singular religio-political world. It is the power of this Manichean trajectory which explains the Turks' changing foreign policy and their new relationship with Israel and Hamas.

Indeed, on October 11th, Turkey cancelled Israeli participation in the Anatolian Eagle air force drill, a military exercise that has been going on for 15 years. The AKP asked the Israelis not to participate in the exercise citing Israeli behavior towards Hamas-controlled Gaza. This was a shock because the exercise is symbolic of close military cooperation between Turkey and Israel. The AKP’s cancellation of military exercises with Israel is the beginning of the end of Turkish-Israeli ties. What is more, the AKP’s cancellation of Israeli participation in the Anatolian Eagle exercise because of its evaluation of Israel’s behavior towards Hamas demonstrates that the AKP sees Turkey as responsible for defending Hamas’ agenda as opposed to Israelis.

After chiding Israel for months for "committing atrocities and genocide", Turkish Prime minister and AKP leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan defended Sudanese leader Omar Hassan al-Bashir. UN reports documenting al-Bashir’s atrocities notwithstanding, Erdogan even said that al-Bashir "could not have committed genocide in Darfur, because he is a Muslim and Muslims do not commit genocide." Turkey and Israel have a long history based on mutual respect and cooperation within the region and have viewed the relationship through the prism of Turks and Israelis; the AKP’s behavior towards Israel and Sudan shows that the party views Israel through a new, Islamist prism: Muslims (who are always right even when they kill their own kind) vs. non-Muslims (who are always wrong when they confront Muslims even when acting in self-defense)

Making of the “Us Muslims with Hamas” versus “the Others” Mindset

Internally, the AKP has promoted the Islamist mindset of "us Muslims" in conflict with "the bad others" through the media and also by spreading Hamas’ views throughout Turkey, whether through official Hamas visits to Turkey or in AKP-supported conferences and fundraisers.

Through the Media: Recent changes in media ownership in Turkey under the AKP are closely related to the spread of anti-Western sentiments in the country. Turkey is a country with free media. Media independence in Turkey, however, is increasingly under threat. Turkish media remains free (in that it is not illegal to produce journalism), but the AKP is trying to curb media freedoms by transforming media ownership through legal loopholes. Such happened in Dec
2005 when the AKP took over the Sabah-ATV conglomerate, which represents around 20% of the Turkish media market, selling this conglomerate to a media company of which Turkish Prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s son-in-law Berat Albayrak is the CEO. The AKP has also brought a $3.2 billion tax fine against Dogan Yayin, a conglomerate that owns around 50% of the Turkish media. This excessive fine exceeds Dogan’s total net worth—is political, because Dogan’s news outlets promote secular, liberal and nationalist views that often criticize of the AKP.

The transformation of the Turkish media is not an esoteric issue, for it affects the future of Turkish democracy and also has a bearing on Turkish views of the world. Where there is no independent media—as in Russia—there is simply no viable opposition to government. Whenever Turkey goes through a political spasm, analysts warn of the collapse of Turkey’s democracy. Despite this, Turkey has survived numerous crises in the past thanks to the balancing power of its fourth pillar.

As Turkish media becomes less free, there is a higher likelihood that it will become a tool for the government with which to shape an anti-Western public opinion. What is bad for secular liberal western Turks is bad for the West. Turkey’s free media needs to remain free because if it is all either state-owned or owned by pro-AKP businesses, anti-Western and anti-Israeli viewpoints will spread through the media as we have witnessed since 2002.

A recent show on Turkey’s publicly-funded Turkish Radio Television (TRT) network is a perfect example. The debut of the series, entitled “Ayrilik” (Separation), came on the heels of Turkey’s cancellation of Israeli participation in the Anatolian Eagle exercises. The TRT, whose head is appointed by the AKP, and which is entirely funded by Turkish taxpayer money, ran “Ayrilik,” a show with an anti-Israeli stance, including one which depicts an imagined situation in the Palestinian territories where a newborn baby is intentionally killed by Israeli soldiers.

How do 18-year-old Turks view Israel now? They hate it, and they will do so because of images depicted in shows like “Ayrilik”. These are the images they have been seeing for the last seven years and this is what they’ll continue seeing. A Turk who has come of age under the AKP is now more likely than not to hate Israel and the West after seven years of such propaganda. Unlike Turks now in their forties or older who came of political age in a different Turkey, younger Turks have more radical and negative views of the West as a result government-controlled media and media owned by pro-government businesses.

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Through Conferences: While government-controlled media promotes an evil image of the Israelis, international Hamas conferences in Turkey build legitimacy for Hamas and other extensions of the international Muslim Brotherhood movement. Before the AKP came to power, Turkey had never hosted a Hamas conference. Now, such conferences render the Hamas and Muslim Brotherhood agenda more accessible to Turks, making Hamas’ violent struggle against Israel a part of daily political debate.

In the last three years there have been seven Hamas conferences and fundraisers in Istanbul. The first one, held in July 2006 and attended by one of the spiritual leaders of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Sheikh Yousef al-Qaradawi, was given the title, “Muslims in Europe.” Qaradawi’s visit was funded by the British Foreign Office, and Hamas and the MB came to talk about Muslims in Europe, exposing Turk and European Muslims to Hamas and its ideology.

The list continues: other Hamas, Muslim Brotherhood conferences in Turkey include a November, 2007 conference called “Jerusalem Day,” co-organized by an NGO, Turkiye Gonullu Tesekkuller Vakfi—Association of Turkish Volunteer Organizations, (TGTV), close to the AKP and Islam Dunyasi Sivil To-
plum Kuruluslari Birli–Association of Muslim World Non-Governmental Organizations (IDSB). This conference entitled, “Jerusalem Day,” called for “liberating Jerusalem through jihad from the Zionists.”

Other conferences followed in February 2009, April 2009, May 2009, and July 2009. What is interesting is that the frequency of these conferences has been steadily increasing, with four such meetings alone held in 2009. Moreover, these meetings have started to espouse a violent agenda. For instance, at the February 2009 conference, Hamas members called for a jihad centered on Gaza. The April 2009 meeting was a “Masjid al-Aqsa symposium” which called to “liberate Masjid al-Aqsa” and it was organized by the “Istanbul Baris Platformu—Istanbul Peace Platform”, which includes a number of NGOs close to the AKP. The symposium called on all Muslims to liberate al-Aqsa through violence, if necessary, and also claimed that Israel has plans to demolish it. The “Palestine Collaboration Conference” in May 2009 called for “continued resistance to liberate Palestine.” Conference participants included former Sudanese President Mushir Sivar Ez-Zeheb, President of the International Union of Muslim Scholars Yousef al-Qaradawi, and Hamas Representative and Spokesman in Lebanon Usame Hamdan. In his speech at this conference, AKP deputy Zeyd Aslan said that Israel “commits genocide in Palestine.”

On the other hand, the “Environment Conference” in July 2009 was organized by the Earth Centre of Dialogue Partners in cooperation with the Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the city of Istanbul, and the Fatih University in Istanbul. The conference, attended by al-Qaradawi, concluded with the declaration of a seven-year-action plan on climate change. The conference also served as platform to bring Hamas and MB members to Istanbul.

These conferences are organized by NGOs close to the AKP government. Although they appear to be civil society initiatives, the meetings are held in city halls of Istanbul or convention centers under the control of the AKP city government, which in essence means that taxpayer funds helps pay for these events with young people in their teens or twenties who have come of age under the AKP.

Various Hamas and Muslim Brotherhood meetings in Istanbul show the efforts of the AKP government and its supporters to cultivate a virtual network, usually funded by government money. These meetings held for any occasion, from a call to jihad to a call to save the environment; act as platforms to bring Hamas and Muslim Brotherhood members to Turkey. The meetings fulfill two additional purposes. They expose Turks to a worldview of “good Hamas versus evil Israel,” while whitewashing Hamas’ violent actions. Secondly, the meetings bring Hamas and Muslim Brotherhood members from across the world and connect them with the Turks, promoting the notion that these people and groups all belong to the new, politically-defined “Muslim world” whose charge is to fight Israel and oppose its policies and presence in the Middle East.

What to do?

One could look at the rise of pro-Hamas and anti-Israeli sentiments in Turkey and dismiss them as a problem pertaining to Israel, and not to the United States. Others might even add that anti-Semitism in Turkey is not an American problem. Both of these approaches are short-sighted. Islamist thinking, as well as anti-Semitic, anti-Israeli and anti-American sentiments are all closely linked. The Islamist thinking goes along the following lines: “The Jews are evil, therefore Israel is evil. The Jews control America, and therefore America is evil.”

This thinking is the background to the post-September 11 call that all Muslims should unite around the new and politically-charged Muslim world to oppose Israel and the United States. The problem in Turkey is not that the country’s foreign policy towards the West is changing, for such changes can be reversed under a new government, but rather that under the AKP, Turkish attitudes towards Jews and Americans, and Israel and America are changing. In the Manichean post-September 11 world, once the Turks cross the line from the West to the “Muslim world” such changes may prove to be irreversible.

One suggestion for countering the transformation of Turkish public attitudes is a zero tolerance policy by the United States and Israel on the related anti-Semitic, anti-Israeli and anti-American rhetoric and meetings sponsored, funded and nurtured by the government. Just as the United States and Israel do not put Turks in a negative light in publicly-funded shows
or international meetings, the Turkish government should not be doing the same about the United States or Israel. This is really not asking a lot. It’s basically saying: “Do as we do, and not as wouldn’t.”

A second suggestion would be calling out on American Muslims, European Muslims, and Muslims elsewhere to recognize that the spread of anti-Western, anti-Semitic, anti-Israeli and anti-American sentiments is a manufactured and politically-masterminded process.

If Muslims do not recognize this problem now, then down the road as more and more people adopt these sentiments, eventually others (including those in the West) will forget that the spread of such attitudes is a politically-manipulated process. The danger here is that some of these people might then actually turn and blame all this on Islam’s reputation. People who deny that radicalization is a politically-manufactured process are actually helping give Islam a bad reputation.

About the Author …

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

South Asia has for centuries been a strategic crossroads, an experience which continues today with the ongoing struggle in Afghanistan. This fight was at one time known as the “Great Game”; we are now engaged in a “New Great Game” in the region. Moreover, the Game is being waged as an emerging, new form of warfare, often referred to as 4th Generation Warfare. Given the complex set of relevant elements, collection of timely, accurate information by all operators is essential; collection using local assets who know the region, the language, and who act as facilitators is advisable, and has a long history in the region. This paper paints a set of developing pictures for the reader: 1) how a real intelligence arm [of the British] developed, concentrating on the South Asian intelligence mechanism; 2) the importance of South Asia, its people and strategic location; 3) historical parallels of importance today; 4) the nature of 4th Generation Warfare; 5) the nature of the “New Great Game”; and finally, 6) how modern operators can learn from the provided information and apply it to today’s war in Afghanistan and the region, using native assets to assist in complex information collection.

INTRODUCTION

The 21st Century’s War on Terror extends the fight waged almost continuously over the last 2500 years. Given this lengthy historical backdrop, many lessons learned exist for the current Special Operations Forces and Foreign Area Officer operators—and other potential information collectors in the field and on staff. Yet the history must be adapted to the realities of Fourth Generation Warfare to be successful—an extension of the “Great Game” paradigm (waged between the British and Russian empires throughout the 19th and early 20th Centuries). As field experts, often deployed in low-density situations, the SOF or FAO (and in the homeland, the law enforcement or other intelligence officer) operator is ideally placed—and hopefully prepared—to collect information vital to the success of our nation’s over-arching War on Terror missions. Thus, an excellent starting point to capture these lessons learned is the British experience [in “information operations”] in Central and South Asia in the Great Game, as the region extending from Iraq, through Iran, and into Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India provides a common operational backdrop [over several centuries] relevant to today’s U.S. operator as 1st-Line information collector.

In order to properly develop this historical snapshot, this article begins with a brief overview of British intelligence. This overview is then brought into sharper focus for Great Britain’s South Asia operations. Continuing, the article then draws historical parallels with that [English] historical backdrop combined with a regional overview applicable for today’s fight. From that process, the author draws lessons for today’s special and foreign area operators. Throughout, the author uses endnotes—not for referential purposes, but rather to provide the reader with a short list of recommended reading to enhance the article’s introductory, baseline knowledge. To begin, an understanding of the development of British intelligence is useful, so that one has a starting point for further [historical] discussion on intelligence operations in the region, which ultimately sets the stage for discussion and applications concerning the current situation.

A SNAPSHOT OF BRITISH INTELLIGENCE

Because this paper draws parallels between the long-term British intelligence experience in the region and the 21st Century US experience, it is nec-
necessary to provide a brief historical backdrop of that British experience. The three sections which follow: a) first establish a long-view of the British information collection experience across the world and centuries; b) then draws a picture of the importance of South & Central Asia; and then 3) narrows that broader British intelligence view into one focused on the region. The three overviews simply serve as a foundation for the concluding sections by taking a snapshot view of the state of British intelligence by using key historical figures over time. The author counts on the reader of these century-centric “Dots” to then connect them—allowing for the emerging image as perspective through which the 21st Century War on Terror becomes clear.

16th Century—Walsingham & Elizabeth

One of the first professional intelligence services was that of Francis Walsingham, the 16th Century “spymaster” for Queen Elizabeth I. Walsingham combined the roles of both espionage and domestic security, along with a smattering of code-breaking—the three elements which remain pervasive in the organization of the Realm’s current intelligence line-and-block chart. Moreover, he had a direct role in the “Irish Problem”, a role avoided by the Services in the more recent past. Shortly after Elizabeth ascended to the throne in 1558, Walsingham was elected to the House of Commons and then became England’s Ambassador to France in 1570. He was named to that position after he had successfully curbed the Ridolfi Plot. After the failure of the Northern Rebellion, a Catholic Florentine banker, Roberto Rodolfi, conspired with the Duke of Alba to invade England; seeking support, Rodolfi engaged Mary, Queen of Scots; the Duke of Norfolk; Pope Pious V (who had earlier excommunicated Elizabeth); the Duke of Alba, who was the Governor of the Netherlands; and King Philip II of Spain. When this plot failed, was rewarded with the ambassadorship. His efforts led Walsingham to be named as Elizabeth’s “Principal Secretary” (think Secretary of State).

Walsingham later uncovered the Throckmorton Plot, similar to the Ridolfi scheme, in that it involved the assassination of Elizabeth along with a Catholic uprising in England, and an invasion by Henry I the Duke of Guise. A third major plot against the Queen was the William Parry Plot. Parry was employed as a spy for Walsingham, but had gone into debt, his reason for becoming a double agent. He confessed to the Queen and was pardoned. Later, however, he hatched a similar ploy, uncovered by Walsingham, and was executed in March, 1585. The last significant Plot was named the “Babington Plot”, and resulted in the execution of Mary, Queen of Scots. Anthony Babington, a noble from Derbyshire, had involved himself with a plot to murder the Queen. Walsingham discovered and turned a fellow conspirator, Gilbert Gifford. Gifford was a courier between Thomas Morgan, who was a go-between for Mary and the Netherlands, and Mary. These messages, encoded by Morgan, were deciphered by Walsingham’s code-breakers, and ultimately used to identify and punish all of the conspirators, to include Mary.

These four examples show the strategic importance of intelligence. From a broader perspective, Walsingham’s service is also noteworthy for several other reasons. As stated previously, his use of a code-breaking service extends into the efforts in the 20th Century—where ENIGMA AND ULTRA changed the course of the Second World War. He collected information from a much wider community than predecessors; one example is that of Anthony Standen, who as a member of the merchant class, was able to collect much high-value information concerning the Spanish Armada. He also engaged Great Britain on a much broader world stage—with agents, or “intelligencers”, in Spain, Italy, Constantinople, and Aleppo. Just as
importantly, Walsingham set the precedent for the linkage between the diplomatic world and that of intelligence, seeing the unbroken chain between emerging threats, global alliances, and markets. He set a high bar for the unofficial secret intelligence services which followed in the next two centuries.

17th Century – Thurloe & Cromwell

John Thurloe, the son of a Protestant rector, was not involved in the English Civil War, but was named Oliver Cromwell’s Secretary of State in 1652. A year later he officially became Cromwell’s head of intelligence. He quickly established a wide web of international spies. He also established a formal code-breaking department, headed by the mathematician John Wallis. Wallis’ efforts led to the unraveling of the “Sealed Knot.”

The “Sealed Knot” conspirators were Royalist conspirators, who sought the restoration of the monarchy from Cromwell’s Interregnum. The group’s efforts included no less than eight attempts to restore the King between 1652 and 1659; the largest of these, uncovered and thwarted by Thurloe was the “Penruddock Uprising” in 1655.

Later Thurloe was made the chief of the post office. This enabled his security services to intercept and read the mails, another enabler of his widespread spy net to curb intervention in his government. After the Restoration of Charles II in 1660, Thurloe was arrested for high treason, but never tried. The restoration, of course, ended his period of control of the intelligence services.

19th Century—The Second Boer War: Intelligence Failures

The Boer War—by this we mean the second war of 1899-1902—revealed serious flaws in the British approach to the war and the country in which it operated. These lessons, as the article’s paper on intelligence operations in South Asia highlights, ran counter to the experience in Central Asia. More importantly, the mismanagement from a cultural and intelligence collection perspective offers numerous Lessons Learned for current War on Terror operations in both Iraq and particularly Afghanistan. Boers had drifted away from British control first in Natal, then in the Orange Free State and the Transvaal.

With the discovery of gold in the Transvaal in 1896, many foreigners entered. Under the guise of “foreigner rights”, the British mounted an expedition, the Jameson Raid, which was failed. The British still insisted that foreigners be treated properly, which the Boers thought would ultimately lead to absorption into the British Empire. An ultimatum was issued by Lord Chamberlain and the Boers issued a counter-ultimatum. When both sides ignored both political efforts, war followed. Initially, the Boers routed the British. In a following phase, massive British troop increases led to numerous tactical victories. The third phase, an extended guerrilla war began. The British, now led by Kitchener, began a brutal scorched earth policy. They simultaneously: 1) placed Boers in concentration camps, where death rates were atrocious, and 2) isolated themselves in fixed blockhouse positions out of native contact.

Several factors contributed to the lack of British military (and intelligence collection) success. First, the British counted on neither local support, nor on “knowledgability” of the land, peoples, and culture. For that reason, native information collection operations were few and far between and notoriously ineffective. Second, the British isolated themselves from the natives. They maintained themselves in strategic blockhouses, which were easily avoided by the Boer commandos. This had the effect of ensuring the British had no placement, no access—thus no intelligence of value. Third, the British drew Boer civilians into the fight; then they placed them in concentration camps where many died. So, British abuses of the local population further estranged them from the natives. While the British may have contained the enemy, denied some degree of mobility to him, and won some tactical battles through harassment action, the net result was the division of the British from the people of
the country they had “invaded”. The parallels (and Lessons Learned) from this experience are clear. Success here led to similar operations in Asia, during the British experience in Malaysia; however, as a positive model for the collection of native information in an occupied land, the Boer War failed miserably.

**Early 20th Century**
- **The End of the Great Game** -

By the turn of the century, British intelligence operations were becoming increasingly systemized. The military had established the Intelligence Department in 1886. To counter its most worrisome threat—Russian movement toward India in Central Asia—it has organized the D Branch, which focused on Central Asian information operations, using a frontier screen of intelligence collection capabilities, often based on native assets. The Navy opened its Naval Intelligence Division in 1886. These human intelligence efforts paralleled those conducted by the War Office Library, which collected and collated information in the foreign Press, much as the FBIS tool does today. The DMI at the turn of the century, Sir John Ardagh, used this collated material and his network of on-the-ground informers to significant advantage as the Great Game wound down. In 1901 the DMI reorganized again, replacing Section H with Subdivision 13; Section A within Subdivision 13 was responsible for “Secret Service.” Section 13’s head, Colonel J.K. Trotter, stated his belief that a permanent intelligence staff was needed to “run agents”. Even so the intelligence apparatus was formally dismantled shortly after, only to be reborn in the 1903 establishment of the Director of Military Operations and Intelligence. It is of interest to note the organizational sharing and co-importance of operations and intelligence, a struggle that continues today, and one highly important in 4th Generation Warfare and the New Great Game.

By 1907 the military had established its “Special Section” to run sources, out of MO5. As problems with Germany increased, a nation-wide intelligence organization was needed. Many difficult Lessons Learned came from the Boer War at the turn of the century. The former Commissioner of Police in Johannesburg during the War, Colonel Fraser J. Davies, prepared a summary on intelligence failures in South Africa for the Committee of Imperial Defense. This led to the establishment of a new body, divided into a home and a foreign section. The home section was quickly designated MI5, and led by Captain Vernon Kell. The Foreign entity, designated MI6, was led by Commander Mansfield Smith-Cumming.

Cumming’s early efforts concentrated on the growing problem with Germany. He sent agents to German dockyards and Zeppelin hangars. He ran the long-term agent Sigmund Georgievich Rosenblum, better known to many readers as Sidney Reilly, “Ace of Spies”, code named ST-1. Cumming continued the use of native agents, notably Otto Krueger, Code-named TR-16, who spied for decades in Germany. Before Cumming gave up the helm at MI6 in 1924, he had native agents in Holland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Russia, Egypt, Greece, Romania, Salonika, Malta, the US, Switzerland, France, Italy, South Africa, Spain, Portugal, and several South American countries. Simultaneously he fought with native and British agents to control German destabilization efforts in Persia, India, and Afghanistan—bringing the two Great Game players, Russia and England, onto the same side for a period of time. As Captain Reginald Teague-Jones extended his pre-war intelligence work, he led native agents who collected against both the Germans and Russians in Central Asia. After the war, a renewed focus on Central Asia led the Delhi Intelligence Bureau Chief, Colonel Cecil Kaye, to re-establish the use of many native assets, this time also focusing on native Indian insurgents, in addition to the Bolshevik threat in the region. These efforts were to continue until the loss of India to the Crown in 1947.

**Strategic Importance of South Asia: Topographical & Human**

South Asia is a resource-rich area, which has made it an historically relevant target for great powers with conflicting interests. Its strategic geography has been historically important—the steppes from the North allowed Huns, Mongols, Cossacks, and Russians fast access to warm water ports in the South. From the East, the demographic and cultural power of successive Chinese empires pushed into South-Central Asia. Similarly, the demographic and cultural influence of India [and Great Britain] pushed into Central Asia’s Tibet, the Hindu Kush from the Southeast. And from the Southwest the Middle East applied expansionist pressure—especially in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

It is divided from Central Asia by some of the highest, most difficult mountains in the world. Cross-ing these complex geographic features were numerous strategic passes, allowing for effective lines of trade, expansionist, and military lines of communica-
tion. The Wakhan Corridor allowed passage through the Baroghi Pass between Tajikistan/Turkistan and Pakistan on the sub-continent. The Khyber Pass linked important cities in Afghanistan (Kabul) and Pakistan (Peshawar) into India. The Dorah and Shandar Passes allowed the same Afghanistan-to-Pakistan penetration farther north. The Torugart Pass allowed movement between Turkistan and Xinjiang. The Nathula and Jelepa Passes linked India and Tibet. The Khunjerab Pass tied Pakistan and China. And southwest Khajak and Bolan Passes allowed passage from Kandahar into India south of Lahore.

Its lines of communication include, further segmenting the region, several strategic river systems—the Indus, Ganges, and Oxus. The region combines high, barren valleys; oases in vast deserts; and tropical environments. It is crisscrossed by numerous caravan and other land-based trade routes—most notably the "Silk Road". At the base of the region lies India—Great Britain’s “Jewel in the Crown”, which offered warm water port access to the region’s riches.

Its people offer the same strategic and tactical human complexity. Familial, clan, and tribal relationships are clear; loyalties to those entities are strong. Regional, Nation, and State ties are each progressively weaker. That has a profound—and often divisive—influence on the politics, history, culture, religious, and ethnic differences inherent in this region, divided geographically as previously described.

When adding the strategic riches, the passes and other routes to the sea through India, and water routes, with sub-nation-state ties that bind, it is plain to see why the region is a nexus of struggle still—as it has been for centuries. The region, especially the area now known as Afghanistan, is perfectly situated as a buffer state. As the Monroe Doctrine of the United States sought to provide buffers to our nation, the Russians saw Afghanistan as a buffer to its south, as well as a road to India and its sea lanes of communication. Similarly, Britain’s “Jewel” needed a buffer to its north; again, that was Afghanistan. When one then adds the final piece to this puzzle—the numerous passes in Afghanistan connect to north and south, and even the east and west, the potential for struggle in the region is magnified. That occurred in a region stretching from Turkey, past Iraq and Persia (Iran) with the Caucasus and Caspian Sea on the north through to Afghanistan—with the Punjab buttressing against India on the northwest, and with China, Tibet, and its routes penetrating into India on the northeast.

Picture this strategic region with Russian dominance north of the 40th parallel, with British dominance south of the 30th parallel, and with a vast, 2,000-mile-long buffer zone running in a debated region between the 30th and 40th parallels. That set the stage for the British struggles in the region—struggles which are in many ways reflected in the 21st Century.

**BRITISH INTELLIGENCE IN SOUTH ASIA**

At this point we have reviewed British information collection operations conducted globally over several centuries, and followed that with an overview of the region—Central Asia—where much of the 21st Century’s War on Terror is fought. Narrowing the scope from global information operations to a regional view constitutes the next step. Once the historical backdrop of both information operations and information collection in South Asia is provided, that leads to the heart of the paper—and understanding of 4th Generation Warfare, the past’s Lessons Learned for info ops, and suggested ideas for the operator who must “fight” and win in the New Great Game.

British information operations in the 19th and early 20th Century were marked by the quest for “knowledge”. Fresh off of their triumph in the Napoleonic Wars, Great Britain sought to solidify its realm, especially in the Orient, with its prized possession, the “Jewel in the Crown” of India. That was complicated by the buffer between India and Russia, the site of the Great Game. These vague frontiers frightened the British Realm, and they sought to solidify their knowledge of the area over the next century.

Knowledge operations—the buzz word of the Realm—depended upon native sources. England needed human assets able to move seamlessly between the two worlds of the sahibs and the natives. That spurred an intelligence capability with men and women from the target region, fluent in local languages, who knew the region, its culture, and could easily penetrate any circle required—whether merchants, surveyors, or the representative offices of foreign, competing powers. This early system in South Asia [successfully] used political and diplomatic bribes, and a wide range of listening and screening posts for over a hundred years.

In the immediate wake of the win in the Napo-
leonic period, the military dwindled in size, and the intelligence apparatus followed. In 1803, the small military intelligence operation on the Imperial War Staff was the Depot of Military Knowledge. By 1815 that had been replaced by the Topography Department; under that aegis, the standard cover for status and action was established—that of British survey teams, which was ideal as the mapping of the blurred region was paramount in gaining the knowledge needed to control Central Asia between the 30th and 40th parallels. The key principal aides to these survey expeditions were natives, collaborators of the British military topographers.

Aside from the travelling spies, the military also manned posts in key frontier towns and cities. British political officers, often military men, were present in places such as Teheran, Kabul, and Kandahar. These officers used local spies with incredible natural placement and access to collect and provide information for the Crown. These early native spies were known as *newswriters*, and were successful and key information providers for the entire century.

In addition to those permanently-placed information providers, the military used travelling agents. They listened, mapped, and conducted reconnaissance as they became knowledgeable about the vast terrain which divided the two major powers involved in the Great Game. These assistant surveyors and disguised travelers—often acting as holy men or merchants—were known as *pundits*. There use was equally successful for the British in the Great Game of South Asia.

Adding to this network of collectors were native *intelligencers*, at many numerous listening posts throughout the frontier—in places such as Peshawar, Gilgit, Chitral, Kandahar, and Meshed. These sources provided forward-based capability, providing a screen, often acting as boundary commissions’ native representatives. Combined the newswriters, pundits, and intelligencers spread the limited capabilities of British officer collectors in ways the British could never hope to achieve without the native assistance.

The excellent Small Wars academic, C.E. Caldwell noted of these native spies, “The people are far more observant than the dwellers in civilized lands.” This was perhaps due to the isolation and endemic distrust of outsiders common in the region, then and now. Caldwell continues, “Intelligence flies from mouth to mouth...The enemy has no organized intelligence department...yet he knows perfectly well what is going on.” Thus, the native source was commonly and successfully used throughout the Great Game in South Asia due to his anthropological and sociological understanding of the region of his birth, due to his ease of communications and observation, due to his ability to move most places in a manner less apparent and vulnerable than his British master. The knowledge gained via British collaboration with the population of the region, using native sources, was invaluable to the Crown during the period. Specific examples taken from the century of the Great Game in South Asia illuminate these general observations.

The British used the established, historically efficient Mughal system to spread its influence. Asians provided services in their roles as envoys, couriers, negotiators, interpreters, and linguists—most of which readily translate into 21st century roles and capabilities. In addition, they acted as *dak* carriers, the ancient postal system which allowed access and fairly wide travel in the blurred region separating the two great powers.

**Early Efforts: Political Officers N.P. Grant, Henry Pottinger, and Charles Christie**

One of the earliest intelligence collection efforts was by a “political officer”, Captain N.P. Grant. He began extending the understanding of the region with an assessment in Persia. In 1809 he was tasked to discover if a border route was available to the French or Russians along the coast to reach Karachi. He discovered that this was possible. In a follow-on assessment, designed to extend from Isfahan to Baghdad, Grant was murdered.

Two other officers continued these early effort. Lieutenant Henry Pottinger and Captain Charles Christie travelled to Baluchistan—disguised as Muslim
horse traders working for a Hindu merchant—tasked to: 1) determine the strengths of the tribes; 2) determine the nature of the terrain; 3) find and assess potential invasion routes; and, 4) find, cultivate and determine the strengths and weaknesses of local rulers with whom they came in contact. For some readers, this looks much like the modern Special Forces Operational Directive. In these endeavors, Pottinger and Christie were greatly assisted by their native contingent for access, language skills, cultural understanding, and natural cover. Their efforts were published in 1813 by Captain John MacDonald-Kinneir, in which he concluded that a landward invasion of India would have to be made via Central Asia and Afghanistan; this would flavor the following efforts of British intelligence for decades—and is reflected in the importance of Afghanistan that remain in 2008.

The Early Native Spy for the Crown: William Moorcroft and Mir Izzet Ullah

A Persian munshi, or translator, Mir Izzet Ullah, was instrumental in the efforts of another British agent, William Moorcroft. Moorcroft, with Ullah’s assistance, determined that if the French or Russians established an embassy at Bokhara, that would reveal their intentions of a potential invasion through the Hindu Kush into India.

Mir Izzet Ullah then was the key native asset for a second mission, led by Hyder Young Hearsey. This pair entered Tibet, disguised as religious pilgrims, using the advice of the expedition’s pundit, Harbalam. Based on their expedition, the British established a security screen with a Moorcroft associate, George Tribeck establishing a post as a commercial agent in Teheran, with Moorcroft establishing himself in Yarkand, and Hearsey assisting the local emir’s anti-Russian efforts from his post at Bokhara. This was the first British screen of listening posts along ancient caravan routes, routes which could be used by Russian forces entering the buffer area between the 30th and 40th parallel. Moorcroft expanded these three posts with strategically-placed newswriters to fill out the screen.

Early Efforts in Afghanistan: Arthur Connolly and Syed Karamut Ali

Captain Arthur Connolly, who coined the “Great Game” expression, ran a long-term mission in Afghanistan from Kandahar. He thought that the Russians would continue to push south into the blurred zone that separated the British in the south from the Russians in the north—using the endemic lawlessness of the khanates as an excuse to occupy the border regions. Connolly has initially been charged with a survey over land from Russia into the region. He travelled through the Caucasus and into northern Persia into the Karakum Desert to measure Russian influence there. He moved from Persia into northern Afghanistan, using his new guide and interpreter, Syed Karamut Ali, a reportedly tireless collector of trade, people, passes, and rout information for Connolly. Connolly and Karamut Ali completed a reconnaissance of over 4,000 miles along the route most likely for any Russian advance, both a remarkable feat and an essential intelligence collection task. This task would not have been possible without the use of native assets, Syed Karamut Ali key among them in this endeavor. Based on Connolly’s observations, the British established further posts, extending their screen into Peshawar and Afghanistan. These posts would provide early warning of Russian troop movements, as suggested by a Connolly contemporary, Colonel George de Lacy Evans. This actualized the policy proposed by the President of the Board of Control In India, Lord Ellenbourough, a proponent of the British “forward policy”.

These several listening posts soon proved advantageous, in the British view. Sir John MacNeil, the British minister at Teheran sent Lieutenant Henry Rawlinson to recon along the northern Persian border, where Rawlinson encountered Cossack forces, who the lieutenant thought were enroute to attack Herat. Another officer, Eldred Pottinger, was inside Heart, and reported Russian activities there. Their observations led to the first Afghan War of 1838. The British took Kandahar and Kabul. While the British ultimately left these two cities, their native intelligence networks were most important in the War’s intelligence efforts.

Intelligence Operations in the Mid-1800s: India and the Native Newswriters.

By mid-century the British intelligence system in South Asia was growing in numbers and successes. The British had placed their newswriters strategically inside the Mughal rulers. The British adapted these established intelligence mechanisms to their benefit. These were supplemented by the dak chaukis (postmen), who could travel and collect without suspicion. This was a significant enabler for the British, who found it continually difficult to unravel the complex social structure they found in the disputed region. These native assistants became essential cogs in the knowledge operations (read intelligence
collection) of the Crown.

One example of this organization is that of Warren Hastings. He used a contact of the East India Company’s Bengal administrator Robert Clive, Mohammed Reza Khan to gain knowledge of commerce, revenue systems, and the internal workings of the Indian diplomatic system. Hastings used a landed magnate, Krishna Kanta Nandy for information. An entrepreneur, Ramchandra Pandit, added his skills to the network of sources. Courtiers with access, such as Taffazul Hussain Khan and Ali Ibrahim Khan assisted in the gains in “knowledge” in India and the north.

Now the knowledge system for intelligence operations became even more formal, even though details remain few and sketchy. For example, Colonel William Fullarton developed an asset validation system, in which he tested the information his sources provided by asking them about fictitious places they might have visited during a collection operation. Those who failed an operations test, by providing details about such fictitious locales were revealed and often booted. Recruitment began, often now concentrating on certain tribes—identified during [informal] target assessment as being susceptible, knowledgeable, and useful to British information needs. One such example is the secretary, George Cherry, to the governor general—who skillfully used native pilgrims, merchants, exiles, and other travelers as sources along the border and through the disputed regions in Central Asia.

Focused, Native-Based Intel Operations: William Henry Sleeman and the Thugees

The primary intent of this paper is to encourage/focus the information collection efforts of the on-the-ground operator in the 21st Century. Providing clear examples of how this worked in the past, its effectiveness, and its applicability to the present day means providing a specific example of a specific, native-based collection operation. The selected example is that of William Henry Sleeman and his native assets who compromised the activities of the Thugee adversary.

Thugs were notorious in India as highway stranglers (phansighar). Thug was the literal translation of “deceiver”. These two words defined the activities of the Thugees. They would encounter travelers on isolated roads, deceive them, acting as fellow travelers, then ritually strangle them, most often with the Thug scarf. The similarities of language, culture, family and clan ties, and the ritualized religious aspect of the Thugs stymied the British, who desperately wanted to rid the roads of this menace. It was to Sleeman that the task fell.

William Henry Sleeman was the magistrate of Nursingpur. He determined that Thugs were responsible for over 40,000 deaths a year in the Jewel. The ranks were tightly-knit family groups, protected by landed persons bribed to provide protection, and often included former military men. Sleeman began a careful intelligence operation, using many volunteer natives. He also used confidential informants pressed into service. With the assistance of these native sources, he began to draw a picture of the gangs and their familial linkages. His first informant, Kalyan Singh, helped in the conviction of 98 Thugs.

Using sources he called approvers, Sleeman extended his initial network, compiling extensive lists of gang movements, names, and other identifying data. Armed with this information capability, Sleeman managed to bring to weight the martial and law enforcement capability of the Crown against the Thugs. By 1837, Sleeman recorded the use of 483 sources; they provided information that resulted in 412 Thugee hangings between 1829 and 1837. Later, Sleeman used the same methodology—including the use of native sources—to curb dacoit gangs (highway robbers). In his papers Sleeman identified these native sources as intelligencers and, for the first time, spies. Sleeman’s work for the Crown against the Thugs and the dacoits demonstrates the value-added of using native sources.

Native Intelligence in the Great Mutiny of 1857

Many European officers failed to maintain close relationships with natives as they had before, they began to live apart and look at the natives with disdain. The ultimate result of this loss of knowledge and cultural sensitivity was to serve as an underlying contributor to the Great Indian Mutiny of 1857.

Instead of using native sources as they had before, they began to look down on the use of “local
gossip”. As the British distanced themselves from the Raj, they missed the signals of impending crumbling of the Indian-British relationship. The chapattis heralds who moved from town to town spread the insurgency faster than the British could contain it, often carrying the news and directions 200 miles per day.

As the insurrection spread, native intelligence helped turn the tide in the British direction. The Agra magistrate, William Muir, used well-paid agents to observe the rebel lines and report and maintain open lines of communication. He used the Gwalior news-writer to great effect, as he did with his asset Mukdum Bash, his commercial spy in Delhi. A similar effort was conducted by Lieutenant Herbert Bruce, an Inspector of police, who used native assets, Man Raj among them, in the same successful manner.

Interestingly both of these two British officials, and joined by Major William Hodson, the Assistant Quartermaster-General and official chief of intelligence, used careful reading, summaries, and well-crafted journals reflecting article of interest in the local press. This effort is similar to the efforts that current intelligence officer use by reading and using insights gained in the international press, as reflected in the daily Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS).

Pundits and Intelligence

In the wild, often unknown [from a European perspective] area between the 30th and 40th parallels in Central Asia, exploration and mapping parties used of topographical parties to develop knowledge and intelligence. Inherent in these adventures were the use of Asian surveyors, known in the enterprise as pundits. The pundits and their British masters were not merely geographers, but information collectors for the Crown.

Captain Thomas G. Montgomerie was one such early geographer. He began his task in the region with a survey of Kashmir from 1855-1864; at its conclusion it had mapped over 7,700 square miles. One of Motngomerie’s first native spies was Adbul Majid. He collected information on Russian influence in the Peshawar and around Khokand, where Russian influence had [reportedly] begun to infiltrate.

As British surveyors, often disguised as pilgrims and traders, began their work, they mapped the region as they concurrently collected on Russian imperial expansion. One such mission was the pundit mission to Yarkand. A native, Abdul Hamid, actually led that survey and collected much associated intelligence on the Russians, assisted by another native source, Mohammed Amin. Although Hamid died on the expedition, his efforts produced much-needed information for the British. Similar efforts by Major Smyth in Tibet used a pair of cousins, Nain and Mani Singh, to extend knowledge operations into Tibet along the northeast border region, where information had yet to be developed.

Filling in the knowledge blanks continued with the operational work of “The Mirza” on the northeast frontier, Mirza Shuja, who mapped the Pamirs beginning in 1868 He discerned that all routes along the Russian frontier were fortified, among his other notable intelligence observations. The northwest frontier was scoped out by Hyder Shah, known as “The Havildar” (Sergeant). Shah provided needed information, primarily on unknown passages in the Hindu Kush—passes of significant historical relevance linking Afghanistan, through Pakistan, and into India. He was ably assisted by another code-named native asset, “The Mullah”, Ata Mohamed. This team constructed an accurate route survey map of the northern provinces, again demonstrating the efficacy of the native source in British intelligence operations. The pundits were a highly successful native asset base, who added much-needed knowledge in the “Blank Zone” as the Russians and British edged ever closer to each other throughout the 19th Century.

Formalization of Central Asian Intelligence Using Native Assets

By the late years of the 19th Century, the British clearly saw the need for a more formal intelligence establishment, largely based on their experiences in Central Asia. The collection efforts of this expanding system would again depend upon native sources.
They could move extensively to find information on food and water resources, political infrastructure and intrigues, location of strategic passes, strength and efficacy of native forces, and Russian movement in and around the buffer areas.

The establishment of a more extensive intelligence screen fronting the Russian menace, as the British perceived it to be, began a formalization process. Several agents for the first time received formal written collection objectives, similar to the Special Forces Operational Directive or the Foreign Area Officer in the Defense Attaché's role with Intelligence Requirements. Lord Lawrence, the Viceroy of India, personally drew up these requirements.

Three agents merit mention as exemplars. Faiz Baksh went to Bokhara, where he gained access to much-needed information. The Pundit Munphool completed similar tasks in Badakshan; he also acted as the newswriter. Another asset, known as a political named Bozdar, assisted Sir Robert Sandeman in Baluchistan.

As the intelligence apparatus of the British continued to mature it took on new forms and names. By 1870, it was known as the Topographical and Statistical Department, a bow to the primary [cover] mission of its operatives, both British and native. The new Intelligence Department was formed in May, 1873. The ID quickly continued its operations in Central Asia, refining the intelligence screen it used to gain knowledge on all strategic, geographical and political matters in Central Asia.

Intelligence Division & the Northern Screen

The Intelligence Division's formalization provided a continuing opportunity to refine the information operations along the Asian frontier of the Crown in the late 1880s. That principally meant the continued use and refinement of the intelligence screen extant along the northern border of the South Asian possessions. A solid exemplar of this effort is that of Biddulph and the Himalayan Screen.

Captain John Biddulph extended knowledge of the Himalayas for the British. He re-explored from Sinkiang to Karakorum, through Kashgar, into the Taklamakan Desert, the first to do so since Marco Polo. Later, Biddulph was sent to confirm the status of the northern flank inside Afghanistan, where he determined the vulnerability of attack through the Khyber Pass.

Intelligence operations continued in the Pamirs with the efforts of Ney Elias in 1886. His intelligence mission included the improvement of trade and political contacts with the Chinese in Sinkiang, exploration of the upper Oxus River, search for other routes through the Pamirs, and monitor Russian movement in the region.

At the same time General Stewart expanded the spy network and solidified the intelligence screen on the West at Meshed, using a native asset, Abbas Khan. Interestingly, Abbas Khan actually acted in the general's stead for intelligence matters when the British officer was unavailable, a significant expansion of the use of a native intelligence asset. On this end of the screen, the objectives were to establish and maintain good relations with the locals, gather information, and keep a close watch on the local rulers. Native assets were critical to meeting these intelligence requirements. Of interest, the Meshed intelligence operation also conducted frequent operations tests of its assets and their information, a validation system which remains advisable today.

Pushing into the Pamirs & the Hindu Kush

As the 19th Century edged toward closure, so had the distance between the two powers involved in the Great Game in Central Asia. The first Chief of Military Intelligence, Henry Brackenbury, began his tenure in 1886, and quickly began the process of writing formal “assessments”, a process which transfers to modern information reporting—with Intelligence Assessments and the SOF Area Assessment key among them. One of the early assessments revealed Russian plans to commandeer India in three phases. In the first phase, the Russians would move to the northern Afghan border. The second phase was the Afghan penetration, with Russia’s movement to Kashgar, Kabul, and Kandahar. The penetration to India’s north would be coupled with Russian advanced Constantinople, matched with advances into Persia. Little by little, it appeared in Brackenbury’s professional intelligence office assessments,
India would be surrounded--from Turkey, through Iraq then Persia coupled with penetrations from Afghanistan, and completing the landward encirclement with movement through the Pamirs. Further assessments revealed Russian agents in Persia, Afghanistan, and China--as suspected in the earlier assessments.

Shortly after Brackenbury began his work, new trouble rose with the French, who sent a [successful] expedition through their Baroghil Pass; while the French party was troublesome, the real concern was that it showed the ability to move from Russia to India through the Pamirs and the Hindu Kush. In 1888 the feat was repeated by the Cossacks. Of interest in the context of this paper is the effectiveness of the local Indian agents forward-deployed in the intel screen for the Empire.

In order to find other potential passes allowing the same penetration toward India, Captain Francis Younghusband began his Intelligence Department survey. He crossed the Gobi Desert in 1887. While exploring the Mustagh Pass late in that year, he crossed paths with a Russian completing a parallel survey. By 1889 Younghusband and his local sepoys, Balti guides, interpreter, cook, and native surveyor (a human menagerie of spies for the Crown). By mapping the area and its passes, and also tracking Russian penetration as it occurred simultaneously, Younghusband and his native contingent had extended the Great Game--gaining knowledge of the land, its leaders, and its peoples as Russia continued to close the gap between the opposing players in the Game. Later, in a Pamir expedition of 1891, Younghusband used a similar native, the half-Chinese George Macartney, with the pair also acting as traditional political and acting as official envoys as they simultaneously collected the intelligence mission they had been tasked with. Younghusband then moved into the Kush, using a screen of his spies to observe continued Russian penetration.

Ultimately the British government sought to seek an agreement, an accommodation with the Russians. That required space between the two actors in the Great Game. Unfortunately, the region remained only partially explored, and centralized authority was impossible to develop in Afghanistan. That meant that Afghanistan as a formal, diplomatically agreed-upon solution eluded England and Russia as the century turned.

While some historians minimize or entirely dismiss the British intelligence system which used a range of native sources in a variety of manners, the fact is that by the 20th Century they has established a fairly complex, complete ring of [often native] agents that extended from Constantinople and the Caucasus, through northern Persia, crossing Afghanistan and the Hindu Kush, and marching right into the Pamirs into Chinese Central Asia all the way to Gilgit. This physical capability was matched by an official reorganization of the Intelligence Division--whose D Branch organization included Russia, Persia, all of Central Asia to include Afghanistan, and through India all the way to Burma. The Great War was to continue through

**Member Profile … FAOA Board of Governors**

**COL Michael Ferguson - FAOA President Emeritus - Africa FAO - USA (Ret)**

Twenty five years as an Army African FAO 48 (1976-2009) capped his 40 year career. COL Ferguson has been an enlisted Medical Platoon Sergeant (Viet Nam and Korea) an Infantry Officer (Germany and Turkey) and has extensive executive and hands-on experience in intelligence collection, operations, planning, and training. He is a recognized expert in African affairs with broad inter-agency experience as an African analyst, including five tours in Africa as a Defense Attaché (Ethiopia, South Africa, Tunisia and Cameroon). He served two years as the first Chief of HUMINT Training and Professional Development as well as the Dean of the Defense Attaché School with added responsibility for the STC program and the Defense Debriefing School. COL Ferguson has a BS in History, a Masters in National Security Affairs, and a Darden Executive Program Certificate.

He is a published author on Africa and lectured at a number of Universities. He is a member of the Defense Attaché Hall of Fame, the Infantry OCS Hall of Fame and is a member of the Board of Directors, National Military Intelligence Association. COL Ferguson is a life member of the FAO Association, was a charter member of our Board of Governors, and served as this Association’s second President. He is currently a Senior VP for Operations at HSA, Inc (formerly Harding Security Associates) in McLean VA.
the Russian Revolution and the 1947 end of British colonial rule in India.

Whether identified as pundits, newswriters, daks, munshi, approvers, intelligencers, chapattis, spies, assets, sources, or politicos, it is clear that the use of native sources and recruited assets by the British in the Great Game of the 19th Century was instrumental in Great Britain's knowledge, or intelligence, operations. The message of success indicates that a similar use of native information networks is advisable for the New Great Game in the 21st Century, as numerous parallels exist.

**HISTORICAL PARALLELS & ASIA TODAY: INFO OPS IN THE 4TH GEN GREAT GAME**

It is simple to draw parallels of Central Asia's past with its current and likely future state. This section shall paint a picture of: 1) the continued importance of the region as a strategic crossroads; 2) the importance of understanding 4th Generation Warfare in the context of the region, and; 3) the New Great Game in Central Asia—all of which provide numerous Lessons Learned for the 21st Century operator [presented in the concluding section].

**Central Asia as Strategic Crossroads**

Central Asia is as important as ever, if for different reasons. It serves as a geographical bridge for many of the world's non-state belligerents. In that capacity it links the Middle East's key actors of concern—Iraq and Afghanistan—with other key 4th Gen War belligerents in the Far East, such as Indonesia and the southern Philippines. Second, it serves as a nexus of power and struggle. This time, unlike the Great Game between British and Russian, this struggle is between non-state actors (comfortably ensconced in the historically lawless yet strategic heart of the region in Afghanistan), Russians, Chinese, Americans and its closest allies, Pakistan and India. Making it worse, several of the state actors possess nuclear arms, possess historic animosities toward each other, but with new non-state belligerents thrown into the mix (who all suspect seek nuclear capability as well). Terror reigns. Oil and other resources define potential conflicts. Ethnic mini-
mization, if not cleansing, is rampant. The region remains fragmented, and loyal to sub-nation influences. This dynamic region continues as a strategic crossroads.

**Understanding 4th Generation Warfare**

A fourth generation of warfare emerged in the post-WW II era. As former great powers colonies began struggles for independence, they quickly discovered that they could not sustain their fight against bombers, tanks and indirect fire weaponry. Instead, they came to rely on secrecy, confusion, guerrilla tactics, and eventually the tactic of terror to reach their desired end-states. This approach quickly blurred the lines between: 1) state and non-state belligerents; 2) war and politics, at a level even Clausewitz didn't address; 3) soldier and civilian interface; 4) the field of war, that is a clear division between battlefields and areas of safety; 5) state and non-state actors, with the decline of influence of the nation-state in many cases, and; 6) the complex blurring of demarcations between peace and conflict. At the root of 4th Generation Warfare is the concept that it occurs in any conflict between a major nation-state participant must deal with a non-state actor—often a grouping of violent ideologi-
cally-based groups or net-
works (sometimes built on family ties that bind; at other times built on a charismatic leader; and, in the most diffi-
cult cases, built on religion).

While many limit their mind-
set to exploration of the new FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, expanding that Tactics, techniques, and Procedures manual into a larger framework (4th Gen War) is a logical next step in understanding and succeeding in our first great clash of the 21st Century.

The characteristics of 4th Generation Warfare are simple to map. A stateless entity fights a State. The stateless actor does not attempt to actually overthrow rule, in most cases, or defeat stronger state actor adversary. Rather, it seeks to disorganize, confuse, and delegitimize the state with whom it is in conflict. That means that the more powerful [and rich] state actor must expend all time, people, money, po-
itical, and economic resources—often in a belligerent,
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high-handed manner. This leads to the third set of characteristics. 4th Gen War consists of three elements. They are not the tactical, operational, and strategic elements—which serve to define the first three generations of warfare. Rather they are physical, mental, and moral. The **moral component of 4th Gen War** is by far the most important. Even so, it is one which creates the most difficult challenges to the state actor. The fourth characteristic is that the traditional centers of gravity disappear in 4th Gen War. That makes for a difficult definition of martial and the following diplomatic success in this type of war. That translates into situations where state decision-makers are hamstrung with unachievable goals too costly for the desired outcome.

One can complete the picture of what 4th Gen War is by looking at its common **elements**. These include:

- Long-term conflicts
- Complex conflicts
- Non-state--often transnational--base
- Perceived to attack a non-state culture
- Highly-sophisticated PYOPS and media manipulation
- Cultural intelligence is essential to win long-term
- Sometimes low-intensity, with actors from all networks
- Networks used most effectively by the non-state actors include political, economic, social, and martial
- Non-combatants are embedded, and create awesome tactical dilemmas for the solider on-the-ground
- Places the state actor at significant moral risk.
- How one acts after the battle is won is as important as what one did to win it.
- 4th Gen War marks a return to the way wars were fought pre-State--and mark a continuing crisis of the State with no end in sight.

While many senior leaders have yet to embrace this Fourth Generation concept, it offers greater hope of understanding our recent failures [and fewer successes] in the War on Terror than other explanations. Understanding the 4th Generation Warfare model lies at the heart of the 21st Century's New Great Game in Central Asia.

The 21st Century Great Game in Central Asia

The Great Game continues in Central and South Asia. Whereas the “Great Game” as we know it consisted of a 19th and early 20th Century competition between the Russians and England, the New Great Game involves those players plus Turkey, Iran, China, India, and Pakistan. Most importantly for this audience, the 21st Century Great Game involves the newest-comer, the United States—who first arrived in a significant manner on this geographic stage after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and continues there today in the region’s role in and nexus for the post-9/11 War on Terror. Today’s Great Game includes aspects of counter-terror, oil and gas access and construction, and marginalization of some ethnic groups.

The **New Great Game’s goals** are disparate and competitive. First, the Islamic revolution’s use of the region as a religious and geographic stronghold forms the underlying basis for the interest by other nations. Second, that moves naturally into the United States and its allies’ goals—the use of the region for forward-basing for the War on Terror. Third, the rise of regional independence finds common interest in the several newer countries that have emerged in this century. Kyrgyzstan since 2000 is typical. It first sought assistance from the United States; when the U.S. did little to help the nation—based on the failure of human rights and democratization efforts in the country—they turned to Russia. At present, both powers have a toe hold in Kyrgyzstan, with air bases, and a balanced approach to both the US and Russia.

Uzbekistan followed a similar route. When the West attacked the policies of the Uzbek government, the country turned to Russia, India, and China. Both Russia and China currently seek basing rights in the country—Uzbekistan survives independently by steadfastly refusing to depend on any single state as a supplier, investor, or export consumer.

Kazakhstan has similarly balanced its contacts. The Great Game players in that country include Israel, Europe, Japan, and South Korea. It is interesting to note that Kazakhstan publicly noted its moderate Islamist state status, and its support to Israel and its right to exist, a dangerous and surprising
balancing act for any Central Asian nation. At the same time, Kazakhstan is in the middle of strong competition from Europe, China, and India for its relatively secure energy resources.

Tajikistan is similarly a stage for the 21st Century Great Game. It has allowed Russia military basing, China investment in its telecommunications company, and Indian basing rights as well. The United States has performed War on Terror operations, including strikes in Pakistan, using Tajikistan as a platform. The nation is carefully balancing the interests of China, Russia, and India in its policies.

Turkmenistan is also involved in a regional Game. But it has taken an entirely different route. It has openly declared itself as neutral. Even so, it has allowed the use of its airspace since 2001 for the War on Terror in Afghanistan. Practically speaking, this was probably to allow Saparmurat Niyazov to continue his reign [prior to his death] using a cult of personality and direct suppression of any form of dissent. While carefully managing Russian penetration, it has allowed the development of the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline, which will provide that resource to China, Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, and Austria. Japan and Italy both have petroleum interests in Turkmenistan.

The worrisome view of the region as the heart of global terrorism forms a pillar in the great states’ interest in the region as the century opens. Harking back to the buffer state argument of the first Great Game, reflections of that Game continue with the New Great Game, as China makes continuing noise about the U.S. attempting to encircle China to isolate them; sounds familiar. At the center of these efforts are numerous nation-state actors who use a combination of political, economic, and cultural projects to penetrate into the region. Much of the penetration is made possible by careful intelligence and information operations, for interests much greater than purely military ones, which also reflects the purposes of the initial Great Game. As the reader can readily discern, the region remains poised a strategically significant region for the 21st Century’s New Great Game.

**Lessons for Human Collection Operators: Effective Information Operations**

The current special operations or foreign area operator has many roles—warrior principal among them. But these men and women are ideally placed—and suited by temperament, aptitude, and training—as front-line “strategic scouts” as information operations, dirty-boot collectors. This article indicates, from centuries of experience, both global and regional as it applies to the War on Terror, several key lessons for current operators in the information collection role.

First, as Washington’s quote from 1777 and the more recent quote by David Owen clearly indicate, *timely, accurate information is key*. Tactical information most likely to be gathered; however, it is not outside the realm of possibility that the individual war-fighter on the dirtiest, sharpest point of the spear may at times uncover information of strategic value. Regardless of the primary role assigned these personnel, one must always recognize the potential for the collection of information as a mission by-product. This information is only of value when it is collected early and reported in a timely manner. The ability of the most forward-deployed forces to collect information that no one else can get to must not be under-valued. So, no matter what one’s orders clearly stipulate as the “mission”, never forget the positive function of every person as an on-the-ground intelligence siphon.

Second, the importance of this article lies in the fact that it depends on the picture of the past, and how that is relevant to the present. That means the past is replete with precedents. Precedents of culture. Precedents of family, clan, tribe. Precedents of language. Precedents of routes used by merchants or the military to traverse a country or region. Precedents of strategic country associations. Precedents of warfighting groups’ alliances or animosity. Precedents of diplomacy. In short, **remember the precedents**—they may enhance or limit one’s endeavors. Understanding them, and applying that understanding to assist one in unraveling the often-conflicting threads of information one must sift through is a tool of immense value—and one embedded in the psyche and preparation of all special operators and other foreign area specialists, regardless of the brass each wears. This paper is largely designed to assist the reader in learning the precedents in Central Asia and learning from those situations.

Third—**Prepare, Prepare, Prepare!** Preparation—language, culture, history, diplomacy, economic

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**Intelligence can play a crucial role in defence decision making, which is literally a life or death affair.**

—David Owen
affairs, and more—all of the threads that form the fabric of cloth one paints current information on—is your strongest weapon in the fight on terror. Nowhere is preparation so apparent than in the young soldier who can speak directly to a local tribal leader, who understands his inherent distrust of outsiders, who can relate to historical differences or ties that bind or separate to local to/from each other. The problem with preparation is apparent; it cannot be accomplished overnight. Preparation for country and regional expertise involves a lifetime of work. That preparation was and remains instrumental in the lessons of the past—SOE and other British intelligence and martial entities, the OSS and the CIA, Army Special Forces, and the Foreign Area Officer corps all rest on that common concept of the absolutely undeniable need for prepared regional specialists, able to communicate at the lowest level to the success of our military endeavors. One cannot put this preparation off for even a day. It is not a mission detractor; it is the key to mission success in your chosen field of duty. “Knowledge” of area was a repeated theme of the intelligence services in South Asia, as detailed in the third section.

Fifth, in preparation it is important to see potential human contacts as bridges …
- To places you can’t get to without assuming unreasonable risk;
- To people you cannot access in those places you cannot reach;
- To events outside of your cultural circle;
- To ideas outside of your understanding without proper historical, cultural, regional-centric interpretation by the source.

Intelligence Inflation: A Case Study
As the on-the-ground source of information, one is only as good as one’s word. When one’s word is questioned, or when information is intentionally inflated to prompt a desired course of action, everyone suffers. The danger and damage of incorrect, inflated intelligence product is nowhere better exemplified than in the case of the British Secret Intelligence Service’s report, augmented by the serving Prime Minister’s staff that both prompted and late justified British involvement in Iraq in 2003.

In September 2002, a document prepared by the Joint Intelligence Committee, with a forward by Prime Minister Tony Blair, surfaced that indicated: 1) Iraq had a continuing program to produce WMD, and 2) that Iraq’s WMD weapons could be launched within 45 minutes (the latter claim was made in a February 2003 document).

Ultimately, problems with these documents arose. First, the source materials were proven forgeries. Second, the latter document was an altered [at 10 Downing Street] version of a previous JIC assessment. As these documents were proven less-than-accurate, the back-benchers in Parliament complained that they had voted for war based on the faulty intelligence estimate [apparently engineered by the Prime Minister’s Office].

Later, the problem spiraled, as U.S. President Bush used some of the reports’ information in his February 2003 State of the Union speech.
Remember, harkening back to the third lesson, that the beauty of a local source is that his preparation almost always come to the collector ready-made. As such, local sources are perfectly formed, pre-made access points. Never lose sight of the human asset as a bridge to access; understanding; and, most importantly, information—when you are a stranger in a strange land, as one will often be as a SOF or FAO operative.

Sixth, in order to build these bridges, the present day operator must always man the moral high ground. Acting as one would expect to be treated if roles were reversed is central to this requirement. Attempt to be, in so far a mission allows, of the people. Attempt to be embedded in the people; live with them, share their experiences, their hardships. That allows one to be a part of the solution, not a part of the problem. It will help curb the temptation for conflict escalation on a daily basis.

“The U.S. does not apologize,” [said one young Marine captain in 2001.] What he did not realize was that U.S. bombings of civilians, kicking down village doors, breaking the most sacred taboo in Afghanistan, the sanctity of a man’s home, ransacking it, frisking women, putting hoods over men and taking them away in handcuffs, humiliating them, destroying their pride; all for being Taliban suspects; for believing as they have always believed, and their fathers before them, only created enemies.

That is escalation at its simplest. But, the concept of de-escalation works. Ask the local beat cop, the London “Bobby”, the Marine in the CAP Program, the successful counter-intelligence or human source operative. Being a part means always “doing as we say”, a sure fire method to assume moral ascendancy. That leads people of all walks of [local] life to interact with the operator, clearly the best method to get early, accurate information of value.

Seventh, test your sources. They may have partial information; it may be incomplete or false. It may even have been fabricated to please you. Numerous examples from the British experience in Central Asia demonstrate that they knew that the veracity of their sources varied greatly. Ensuring that the information received is not only timely, but is accurate.

Finally, a caution and the most important single lesson learned, from the author’s perspective. Tell the Truth as you see it—your greatest singular responsibility. Some will fault your information. If you have had a chance to place that information in context (perhaps in the applicable portion of a DIIR), they will fault your initial analysis. Some will fault your collection techniques, your strategy, your sources. In short, others will find fault. One’s best defense is to prepare to be a good listener, a listener who understands what he is hearing (see the third Lesson), and then tell it.
like it is to the best of your ability given your preparatory understanding. When collectors, analysts, and their leaders (whether they are intelligence professionals or others engaged in the informal process of information collection) break that rule—as we observed in the case of the British experience with Iraqi WMD as a pretext for war—the results are catastrophic, both disheartening to the public and useless to decision-makers as they foster distrust in all intelligence efforts. Don’t do that; do not fall into that trap. One’s best defense is simple. Use your brain, call it like you see it with unvarnished honesty and leave it to the others to add to the broader picture. Being honestly wrong is forgivable; deception in information reporting, whether for individual or corporate gain, will be neither forgiven nor forgotten.

CONCLUSIONS

The Lessons Learned from our staunch, near-permanent allies, the British, in the area of intelligence—and particularly those Lessons hard-won in South Asia—are particularly relevant to the current American SOF and FAO operator. The prudent 4th Generation warfighter will consider these Lessons and perhaps internalize those identified as worthy of application in our 21st Century’s 4th Generation Warfare fight against terror.

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Mark Your Calendars …

March - “Policy” Luncheon - w/ Speaker
20 May - Annual Banquet Dinner
July - “Policy” Luncheon w/ Speaker
Sep - Fall Reception - Evening Mixer
Nov - “Policy” Luncheon w/ Speaker

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News … From the US Army Proponent

FAO Vision:
Army Foreign Area Officers are Soldiers who are regionally-focused experts in pol-mil operations with advanced foreign language skills and cultural understanding who advise senior decision-makers throughout all phases of military operations.

FAO Key Development billets:
- In-country Security Assistance billets
- In-country Attaché/SDO-DATT billets
- Advisory positions on a senior staff
- Deployment/Combat billets
- Command (TT, PRT, etc.)

FAO Functions:
- Advise senior leaders on pol-mil operations with other nations.
- Provide cultural expertise (regional and JIIIM) to deployed commanders throughout military operations.
- Build and maintain long term relationships with foreign leaders.
- Develop and coordinate security cooperation.
- Develop and execute security assistance programs to build partner nation capacity.
- Collect & report foreign nation DIME activities.

FAO Core Competencies:
- Advisory
- Capacity Building
- Intelligence collection (overt)
As our nation begins its eighth consecutive year of conflict, the Army finds itself transforming and conducting operations within a variety of ambiguous and diverse post-modern environments. Rules and conventional wisdom are now openly questioned (even by those within the institution) enabling new ideas to emerge which often outpace the capacity of the institution to capture and implement them. To remain this flexible, today’s officer has learned to be adaptive, perhaps more so than at any point in the history of our Army. Yet to ensure retention of this leadership component, mentorship must be reintroduced as a cornerstone of officer development.

General Dwight D. Eisenhower was once asked, "How does one develop as a decision maker?" He responded, "Be around people making decisions." General Eisenhower’s answer echoes an idea that successful leaders are molded by their superior officers and peers. Historians acknowledge that nearly every successful leader was significantly influenced by at least one mentor who sacrificed time and energy to coach and counsel.

The origin of the word “mentor” can be traced back to Greek mythology and Homer’s epic poem, The Odyssey. The term was derived during the Trojan War from the name of a wise and trusted counselor, Mentor, to whom the hero Odysseus entrusted his son Telemachus. While Odysseus fought, Mentor took over the responsibility of educating and guiding Telemachus into adulthood.

The idea of mentorship evolved throughout the centuries and has taken various forms. In the Middle Ages, craft guilds formalized the system with Apprenticeships and today Academia still uses the process to produce professional scholars. There are similar methods in law firms, scientific research organizations and the medical field. Even thought mentoring has garnered significant corporate attention because of associated benefits, it is still not mentoring is not commonly understood.

Mentoring is many things to many people. For some, a mentor it may be an individual who provided a powerful example (Minister, Sports Hero, Político). To others, it may be a senior individual who “favors” a subordinate and provides the development and connections necessary for advancement. And to others, a mentor simply provides a checklist for what to do and how to do it properly so that the neophyte is able to correctly negotiate professional obstacles. In the context of today’s Army, mentorship must focus on the unique partnership between a more experienced officer who provides guidance and advice to a more junior officers so that they may be prepared to be stronger leaders of tomorrow.

There is no exact formula to mentorship, but the practice must be rooted in a specific value set that includes authenticity and selflessness. Regardless, time and commitment are an essential element and cannot be “wished away". Additionally mentorship is not a self-validating experience; the growth of the mentee remains the focal point of this unique partnership. The understanding of situational leadership is fundamental in creating a successful bond with a mentee and finding the right tools to tap into their potential. Below are some guidelines for success:

- Mentorship requires a vast amount of time; your most precious resource, and this endeavor requires you to dedicate wholeheartedly. Ensure your mentee is aware of time required and that the endeavor requires you to dedicate wholeheartedly. Ensure your mentee is aware of time required and that the mentee follows through with their commitment to this venture. Ensure meetings between the two of you are focused and not have developed a pattern of cancelling meetings.

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Announcing …

The New FAOA Membership Website!

On the first day of the new year, the FAOA proudly introduced the new Membership website. With expanded content and members-only sections, the FAOA can now better serve you by providing members the ability to review and update their own contact information, profiles and membership status online. Members can login and search the membership database, send emails to other members, receive emails on events and items of interest, and access members-only content.

If you have not logged in yet, we encourage you to do so and stay connected with the FAO community. Any problems or questions should be sent to our webmaster at webmaster@faoa.org.
Mentoring is a challenging process that requires patience and an understanding that not all attempts at mentoring will be successful or that your counsel will be utilized.

Trust is an important component in this relationship and ought to be integral to shape the mentee. Mentee’s must feel free to admit mistakes and express a lack of confidence to the mentor. Trust is a two-way street and the mentor must share their experience of success and failure to allow for an open dialogue in this dynamic relationship.

Military courtesy and a professional relationship are imperative with no exception. Any hint of favoritism could shatter the reputation of the mentor and leave a dark cloud over the mentee.

Once trust, confidence and the parameters of the relationship have been established, the mentee may ask for counsel in aspects of the Army you know little about. This is an important junction. The mentor must show humility; admitting your lack of knowledge in certain facets of the Service will strengthen the relationship. Mentee’s do not expect their mentor to know all – they do expect/demand frankness and the sharing of experience to help them find the right path. Candor makes you approachable.

Understand your role as the mentor; you are there to facilitate the learning of the mentee, not to provide solutions. Realize that as the mentor, you cannot assume you know what the mentee needs. Listening is a very important tenet in communication, especially to questions that may initially appear ambiguous but may be the underlining issue in the mentee’s ability to have self-confidence in them. Ensure you answer the question and in order to do so, listen to the question in its entirety. Utilize the Socratic Method, to foster learning for the mentee, but also for yourself as the mentor. By cultivating an atmosphere of inquiry and debate, this promotes the tool to critically think and develop a holistic approach to problems.

Honest and important criticism is essential in an effective mentoring partnership. However, mentors may feel obliged to lessen the constructive criticism and feedback in order to avoid diminishing the mentee’s confidence or the mentoring relationship. Honest feedback is important to the mentee followed by positive reinforcement. Criticism needs to be considered as an honest assessment not just a negative evaluation. Feedback has to be conducted immediately and only in the presence of the mentee to have a lasting impact.

Finally, all officers to include senior officers must dedicate themselves to continuous learning. As our operational environment adapts to change, we should be identifying alternative ways of approaching issues and developing solutions to ever increasing complex problems.

Mentoring benefits everyone; the junior, the senior and the Army at large. It provides a better understanding of job opportunities, career pathways, and attainment of key skills. Yet most importantly, it allows room for the growth of respect and tradition. Mentors also benefit for they can share in an increased sense of personal pride, worth which provides a revitalized outlook. Last of all, the mentor gets the benefit of knowing that by sharing he has established a legacy. Mentorship can be the most rewarding experience of any senior leader.

Additionally, the corporate organization also benefits. Not only does mentoring contribute to personal growth, but also it has been instrumental in the professional growth of the United States Army’s officer corps and to the strengthening of its values. Mentoring improves morale, enhances the experience and competence of the organization, opens lines of communication and has proven to be an instrumental retention tool for junior officers. Mentorship is a basic responsibility of every leader in the Army and it is our duty to develop the next generation of leaders, strengthen the culture of the officer corps, and prepare every officer for uncertain times ahead.

About the Author …

Captain Brian J. Scicluna is a strategic plans and policy officer currently attending the Institute of World Politics, Washington DC studying Statecraft and National Security Affairs. He holds a BA in history from Towson University. CPT Scicluna has served as a FA59 Proponent Manager and as a Battalion S-3 and Company Observer/Controller Trainer for 3-362 AR, 1st Army (AR/RC). He is a graduate of University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies (Red Team Members Course) and the Defense Strategy Course.
More than ten years ago I wrote an article for the December 2008 FAO Journal entitled “The Armed Forces in the New Indonesia,” in which I predicted:

“In addition to its major missions to maintain national defence and domestic stability Indonesia’s armed forces...must now meet the challenge of regaining the respect of the people, lost by revelations of major human rights violations in the past. Its senior leadership is mindful of the need to restore lustre to its image. [The military] has important missions to perform at an important turning point in the nation’s history, and its senior officers, speaking privately as well as in public, show a determination to respond to a new set of political and economic circumstances.”

Within a year after that article was published, Indonesia conducted an “act of choice” vote in the province of East Timor, where for almost 25 years a low-level insurgency against the Indonesian armed forces had persisted. Instead of a peaceful political event, the year 1999 turned violent, as civilian militia forces armed and supported by the military carried out a campaign of brutal intimidation against the population. When the East Timorese voted 78 to 22 percent for independence, the intimidation turned to revenge. The U.S. Congress mandated an end to almost all relations with the Indonesian armed forces to protest egregious human rights violations, and as a result the military-to-military relationship fell to its lowest level in decades.

Now, ten years later, in one of the most remarkable political transformations in history, Indonesia is the world’s third largest democracy (after India and the U.S.). Energetic presidents in the U.S. and Indonesia have agreed to a “comprehensive partnership” across many aspects of private and public society, and the two countries have restored almost all elements of a mutually beneficial military relationship. How this happened is an instructive lesson in cooperative politics and illustrates the importance of the security component in country-to-country relations.

Why is the relationship with Indonesia so important? Because the country is a logical strategic partner for the U.S. The two countries share much in common. Both are large multi-ethnic, multi-religious societies. The U.S. is the third most populous country in the world; Indonesia is fourth. Both countries fought for their independence from colonial powers in struggles that remain iconic periods in their history. Both cover huge geographical expanses and are similar in size. There are important international investment and business ties and both countries have huge stores of natural resources. Indonesia’s location astride the major sea lanes between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and as the land bridge between Australia and Southeast Asia, give it a vital strategic location.

The Indonesian armed forces establishment (Tentara Nasional Indonesia – TNI) has changed greatly since former President Suharto was forced from office in May 1998. The change from autocracy to vibrant democracy has been amazing. The entire country has embraced democracy and gradually instituted the difficult changes that come with such a dramatic political transformation. As part of this process the TNI has changed from being an enforcement tool of the Suharto government to becoming a nonpolitical professional military establishment seeking a respectable place in a democratic society. Describing Indonesian military reform on the 10th anniversary of Suharto’s resignation, an Indonesian journalist noted: “Although much remains to be done...there has also been much progress.”

The TNI remains the most cohesive and powerful element of Indonesian society, not only by virtue of its traditional military ethos, but also because of its unique position in Indonesia’s history. Yet the changes implemented in the past ten years have removed the TNI from its formerly intrusive role in the daily life of most Indonesians, dramatically lessened its dominant position in governance and politics, and relinquished its primary responsibility for internal security to the national police. Its efforts have gained it...
popular trust at home and earned the TNI the right to a normal military relationship with the U.S. Mindful of a troubled past, its leaders have committed the TNI to reform and support of democratic civilian leadership.

From Nothing to Something – Restoration of the Relationship

Three important factors enabled the two countries to restore a viable, mutually beneficial military relationship from its nadir in 1999.

- First Factor: Election of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as Indonesia’s President

Indonesia’s 2004 parliamentary and presidential elections were an incredible success story. The April parliamentary election was the first truly free and open election in Indonesia in more than 40 years. In sheer numbers it became the single largest free election in world history, with more than 120 million voters going to the polls at the same time.

The presidential election process was equally significant. Seven political parties passed the parliamentary voting threshold required to nominate a presidential candidate; five candidates emerged to contest the presidency. These included incumbent president Mrs. Megawati Soekarnoputri and incumbent vice president Hamzah Haz. The dark horse candidate, retired Lieutenant General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, was supported by the small Democrat Party. He won a plurality of the vote but less than a majority in the July first round. In the September run-off election he defeated Mrs. Megawati with more than 60 percent of the vote.

During his military career Dr. Yudhoyono was regarded as the leader of a moderate faction of the military that competed for promotions and top assignments against a much smaller faction composed of staunchly conservative Suharto loyalists. Internationalist in his thinking and experience, an intellectual recognized early in his military career as a supporter of military reform, his victory insured that meaningful democratic reform at the national level, as well as military reforms, would go forward. Dr. Yudhoyono is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), where he also earned a masters degree from Webster University. He earned his doctorate in agricultural economics from the elite Bogor Institute of Technology.

Dr. Yudhoyono’s accession to the presidency ended more than five years of chaotic Indonesian presidential politics after Suharto’s resignation. He was easily re-elected to a second term in July 2009.

- Second Factor: The 2004 Boxing Day Earthquake and Tsunami in Aceh; Leading to Peaceful Settlement of the Aceh Insurgency

On 26 December 2004 a powerful and destructive earthquake struck just offshore of Sumatra’s northern tip. As shaken residents in the cities and towns of Aceh were helping neighbors clean up debris, devastating tsunamis crashed ashore and killed almost 200,000 people.

Though the tragedy had enormous costs for Indonesia, it had one important benefit: it set the stage for a peaceful political settlement of the decades-long insurgency by the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka – GAM). Casualties to both rebels and government forces and their families were so devastating that both sides accepted outside mediation and within months the insurgency ended through a peacefully negotiated political settlement. Now Aceh is governed largely by former insurgents fully integrated into the democratic political process, without adversely affecting the stability or territorial integrity of the Republic. The peaceful end of that insurgency, which carried with it significant human rights issues important to U.S. political leaders, underscored the progress made by Indonesia’s nascent democratic process.

More germane to the issue of military relations between the U.S. and Indonesia, the international response to the tragic tsunami provided the playing field for resumption of contacts between American and Indonesian military personnel at every level. From national level leaders to soldiers and sailors on the
ground, military personnel of both countries quickly found themselves working together for a common good. Indonesians saw American marines, airmen, sailors, and soldiers rescuing traumatized civilians, providing medical care, providing food and shelter, and reconstructing buildings and infrastructure. Americans found their past friendship with Indonesian military personnel had residual benefits despite many years without contact.

American participation in the tsunami relief operation showed the population and the leaders of both countries that their two armed forces should restart a robust cooperative relationship despite lingering political issues that had caused a hiatus in most military-to-military contacts for more than a decade. Indonesian military personnel soon changed their feeling of resentment over training and equipment embargos to friendship, with thanks and appreciation that the two countries’ armed forces were working together again. The relationship began with donation of relief supplies and equipment, a process of policy moves in the U.S. to eliminate restrictions on the relationship, which then led to resumption of education and training programs, and a resumption of sales of military items and equipment.

- Third Factor: Reform in the TNI

Political change and the post-tsunami relief operation played important roles in creating conditions conducive to restoring U.S.-Indonesia military relations. But the most important factor in moving the relationship forward was conducted entirely by the reformist government and military leadership in Indonesia.

By the late 1990s most of the Indonesian military’s small core of moderate reformists, almost all of whom were graduates of U.S. military courses funded by the International Military Education and Training program (IMET), had reached mandatory retirement age, stymied in many reform efforts during the Suharto years by a military leadership considered hard line on the issue of reform and who were firm supporters and beneficiaries of Suharto’s feudalistic system.

Suharto’s resignation provided an opening to younger moderates in the TNI to implement significant reforms. These reforms were essentially self-initiated and had little to do with U.S. pressure, as the many years of estrangement and arms embargoes had by the early years of the new century left the U.S. with virtually no influence or credibility with TNI officers.

General Yudhoyono was the principal author of the TNI’s new doctrine that jettisoned the dwi-fungsi policies that had enmeshed the military into most elements of civil government and society. The new doctrine, called Tri Dharma Eka Putra (Three Missions One Deed), applies to all three branches of the TNI (the “Three Missions”). The TNI gave up its quota of reserved national and regional parliamentary seats.
Military personnel now must retire before taking civilian government posts or running for elective office. This is a huge contrast to the Suharto years, when thousands of military personnel occupied civil government and societal positions at all levels. The most important structural change was the separation of the police from the TNI, with each service given separate but sometimes overlapping security responsibilities.

While far from complete, reformasi has already produced remarkable changes in the TNI. The National Defense Law (No. 34/2004) ascribes to the TNI the ideal attributes of a military in the service of a democracy. The preamble directs the TNI to respect “civilian supremacy, basic human rights, international legal obligations” and to be funded from the national budget in a “transparent and accountable way.” A presidential instruction also directs the TNI to emphasize “operations other than war” in its training and equipment acquisitions. These new missions include a robust return to United Nations peacekeeping missions, training to prepare for disaster relief, maritime security, and resource protection.

Military reforms are by no means complete, but the record of accomplishment is significant. Important remaining tasks, however, are largely dependent on more far reaching political changes in the civilian government itself. For example, while a civilian Minister of Defense has been in office since 1998, the TNI operational chain of command still runs from the president (Supreme Commander of the TNI) to the TNI commander in chief; the Minister of Defense is outside the operational chain of command. However, the Department of Defense has gained considerable authority over the TNI budget – including allocation of funds to the services and thus a strong say in strategic defense priorities – as well as arms purchases. The Department also prepares the defense establishment White Paper on strategic policy and priorities.

The primary reason the U.S. reduced its military relationship with Indonesia was the TNI’s involvement in human rights abuses in East Timor and elsewhere. Thus it is very important to note the improvement in the TNI’s human rights record since 1999.

Since the fall of Suharto the military has regained prestige in the eyes of the Indonesian populace that it lost when a flood of revelations about human rights violations began to pour out after the lifting of press restrictions. The majority of Indonesians – as well as the foreign diplomatic corps – were not fully informed of these issues during the Suharto era. The worst of these abuses occurred in East Timor, starting in 1975 with the invasion of the former Portuguese colony by inadequately trained Indonesian forces. Reports about the dark side of Indonesian occupation became known only after the province was “opened” in 1988, and reached a crescendo in the months prior to, and then after, the 1999 act of choice vote.

In an effort to ameliorate its bad reputation on human rights, the TNI invited the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to lecture routinely at military schools on respecting human rights in combat zones. While a laudable effort to influence army doctrine and behavior, it foundered at the “point of the spear” – implementation in the field. In order to reach more of the rank and file, the TNI asked the ICRC to expand its role. The ICRC now conducts regular training on human rights and military behavior at the tactical unit level as well as throughout the TNI education system. This had immediate effects in Aceh, where the military’s behavior was far better than had been the case in East Timor.

The human rights issue as it relates to the TNI must be kept in perspective. Most of the worst incidents, for which the TNI must justly accept criticism and accountability, are a decade in the past. The military’s recent human rights record is far better than that of past history. This is partly because of human rights and sensitivity training, and partly by firm directives from the military leadership. It is also in large part because East Timor and Aceh are no longer on the TNI’s counterinsurgency operations map. Concern about the mistreatment of civilians, once directed mainly at the TNI, appears to have migrated to the police, which have assumed responsibility for internal security and many of the duties involved in responding to ethnic and religious strife (which break out with amazing swiftness in Indonesia) and other law-enforcement duties previously shared with the army.

The TNI’s stronger sense of responsibility and maturity on human rights issues is illustrated by its response to the final report issued by the Indonesia East Timor Leste Commission on Truth and Friendship (CTF) and released to the public in July 2008. The Commission was formed in part to respond to international criticism of Indonesia’s failure to prosecute human rights violators, and in part to put to rest the years of acrimony between the two countries. The report, skillfully and patiently overseen by retired Lieutenant General Agus Widjojo (who attended several U.S. military schools, including the Army War College), pulled no punches. The lengthy (over 300 pages) report placed most of the blame for the vio-
ience on the activities of Indonesian military and military-supported militia forces, government and institutional entities, as well as on both Indonesian and East Timorese individuals.

When Indonesian President Yudhoyono and Timor Leste President Ramos-Horta accepted the report in a joint ceremony in Bali it marked the first time that Indonesia had officially accepted responsibility for the East Timor violence. This change in policy was in marked contrast to the attitude of the TNI commander in chief at the time of the East Timor violence, who had repeatedly denied that the TNI bore any responsibility for the depredations of civilian militia groups.

An earlier Indonesian ad hoc human rights court process convicted more than a dozen senior Indonesian military officers and civilians for their involvement in the East Timor violence. The credibility of the judicial process was irrevocably compromised by inept (probably deliberately so) prosecution efforts and further weakened by repeated efforts by the TNI leadership of that time to intimidate witnesses and block progress on the cases. All of the convictions were eventually overturned on appeal. Most of those accused, but acquitted, are no longer on active duty. Although there are persistent demands in U.S. human rights circles (and within Congress) that those officers be punished, the democratic principle of protection from double jeopardy means that no re-trial is likely to occur. The acceptance of the CTF final report by President Yudhoyono and the TNI commander-in-chief explicitly repudiates the behavior of those who were convicted, but through successful appeal, escaped punishment.

The TNI has not totally eliminated the occurrence of human rights abuse incidents (neither, for that matter, has the U.S. armed forces). But it has been successful in reducing their incidence.

President Yudhoyono has carefully selected the men chosen to lead the TNI and the three military services. He has selected for top leadership officers that he knows personally and with whom he worked during his active duty career. These officers hold similar views on the need for military transformation, support for democratic principles, and professional development of the armed forces. Setting the example of integrity, professionalism, and vision was General Endriarto So Gutiarto. As Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief from 2002 to 2006 he was a staunch supporter of a peaceful political settlement in Aceh (against the wishes of several powerful senior army officers). His personal telephone call to the U.S. Pacific Com-

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mander started the flow of U.S. military support for tsunami relief, and his international vision enabled him to manage the resumption of military relations with the U.S. for the Indonesian side.

Significantly, none of the TNI’s leaders has a human rights blemish on his record even though all served in Indonesia’s trouble spots as junior officers. In short, they are strong, well regarded professional leaders who want to move the TNI forward both as a military institution and as a firm pillar of democracy.

While there is no doubt about the professionalism and moderation of the TNI’s top echelon, this cohort shares one characteristic that offers little comfort to the U.S. – most of these officers have no prior first-hand U.S. experience. They are part of the “lost generation” that resulted when the U.S. cut IMET funding in 1992 and the two countries went for 13 years with barely any personal contacts derived through the U.S. military training and education system. Almost all officers who had U.S. experience prior to the IMET suspension are now retired, or near mandatory retirement age. Younger officers who are now returning to the U.S. for a variety of education and training courses will not enter the leadership echelon for several more years. Indonesia’s military stagnated for a decade without the benefit of close contacts with their American counterparts. Now, with those relationships restored – albeit at less than prior levels of engagement – the U.S. has an opportunity to help the TNI attain a higher degree of professionalism and readiness.

Rather that rushing to acquire new weapons systems and sophisticated fighter aircraft, Indonesian leaders have identified improvement to sealift and airlift capacities as the single most important priority for defense modernization. Former Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono said that Indonesia needed “to come up with a better strategy for the defense budget to focus on transportation and mobility, because the TNI for the time being can really only deal with non-military responses, including civil defense disasters. We are focusing the bulk of our defense spending on land, sea and air transportation because … these forces keep the country together.”

There is no doubt that Indonesians attending U.S. military schools gain important general knowledge about modern planning, management skills, and technical know-how not available in Indonesia. However, the program produces other, more important benefits that address the national security interests of both the U.S. and Indonesia. Immersed in American
society while attending courses in the U.S. military schoolhouse, Indonesian officers observe the place of the military in a democratic society.

While a student at CGSC I sponsored an Indonesian officer. At the end of the year I asked him what his most lasting impression was during the time he lived in the U.S. The answer was a simple but important revelation: “Everyone obeys the law.” He went on to explain what he meant: there was no separation between military and civilian – American officers had no special privileges, they had to pay taxes and bring their vehicles to a halt at stop signs like everybody else. It was an important lesson for a young officer who went on to a senior position in the TNI after his U.S. schooling, and was certainly a topic of discussion as that officer shared with his colleagues the impressions he gained while in the U.S. Human rights and proper military behavior are also part of this experience. Visiting officers learn it either through formal classes or simply seeing how American military personnel deal with the civilian public.

The Role of Foreign Area Officers

One of the strategic rewards of military-to-military contact is the formulation of longstanding interpersonal relationships. U.S. and foreign classmates get to know each other, gain understanding of each others’ country and armed forces, and establish personal friendships that – depending on the level of the courses attended – could mature into significant contacts in future years. Indonesians have a concept that, poorly translated, means “we know you.” It means far more than having met someone; the concept means, I know who you are, I understand you, I trust you, and these feelings are reciprocated. The significance of personal contact and relationships in the bilateral relationship cannot be understated. There simply is no substitute for personal contacts and friendships established between often-young military counterparts and cultivated over the years. This concept is extremely important in working professionally with the Indonesian military. It is fertile ground for regional FAOs, whose understanding of culture, ability to form interpersonal relationships, and continued military acumen are important ingredients in success – and a significant factor in the successful restoration of military relations with Indonesia.

As a modest example, when I served as Defense Attaché in Jakarta from 1990 to 1994 I had the invaluable advantage of hundreds of friendships made with Indonesian officers that started when I was a student at CGSC in 1976 and continued during two earlier assignments in Indonesia.

When I returned to Jakarta as Defense Attaché in 1990, my contacts spanned the military’s ideological spectrum, from hard line conservatives to moderate reformers. Those contacts gave me quick access to Indonesia’s most senior military leaders. Our ambassador frequently sent me as the embassy’s voice on human rights and labor issues in its dealings with the military. I was able to deliver the official U.S. position to senior officers who had known me for years, and trusted me to present accurately the embassy’s views, and accurately to transmit their responses. Though there was frequent disagreement and criticism between the two countries in those years (particularly on human rights issues) the privilege I had of quick access to the top level of the Indonesian armed forces, and thus the opportunity to speak forthrightly at the policy level to communicate sometimes-unpleasant news – in both directions – was crucial to many aspects of the bilateral relationship.

FAQO 2010 Annual Banquet Dinner

Date May 20, 2010
Time 07:00 PM - 10:00 PM
Location Army Navy Club, Washington DC

The FAQO Annual Dinner will take place in May 2010 at the Army and Navy Club in Washington DC and we need your help! We are looking for a small group of volunteers to help plan, organize and conduct this premier event. If you live in the National Capital Region, have a passion to support international affairs professionals, and are interested in serving, please contact our FAQO President by email at president@FAOA.org
My successor FAOs working in Indonesia have set a terrific example of leadership under difficult circumstances. My immediate successor, Colonel Don McFetridge, maintained important personal relationships in a period of declining programs and was a pillar of strength and heroic reporting activity during the chaotic violent period surrounding President Su-harto’s resignation. Colonel Joe Daves maintained a professional relationship with the TNI after virtually all military programs ended after the 1999 violence in East Timor. Colonel Joe Judge was a key manager of the civil-military response to the Aceh tsunami, and was the tactful guide to resuming military programs in its aftermath. The current Defense Attaché, Colonel Kevin Richards, worked difficult Indonesian policy issues during three years on the Joint Staff in Washing
ton, and has for four years managed the exciting and explosive growth in mil-to-mil programs as a plethora of training and education activities has grown steadily during his tenure.

In short, the past 15 years have highlighted the skills and tact of a series of FAOs placed in a difficult policy environment. Their range of skills have been an important ingredient in the implementation of U.S. foreign policy, and one for which our corps of military FAOs is particularly well qualified to carry out.

Given the many significant strategic interests the two countries have in common, it is important that the U.S. do what it can to increase its contacts with the current and future leaders of the TNI, while at the same time building capacity and improving professionalism and performance. Expanding funding for Indonesia’s IMET program addresses both of these goals. The cost of expansion is relatively modest when compared of other components of the total military-to-military relationship—but the dividends, now and in the future, make IMET perhaps the most cost-effective ingredient in a well-structured cooperative security relationship.

President Yudhoyono and his military leadership are moderate elites who are changing the way Indonesia looks at the world. The president’s foreign policy spokesman, Dino Patti Djalal, acknowledges a “brittleness of the Indonesian psyche” to lack of confidence. In his recently published account of the Yudhoyono presidency he notes that people with this mentality are those who still “look at today’s challenges with the spectacles of 20 years ago” when Indonesia was still heavily burdened with problems and poorly thought of by other countries. They do not realize that Indonesia is now an important player in international affairs with many opportunities still lying ahead. Mr. Djalal is confident, however, that the younger generation will be more receptive to ideas from the outside world.

It can be observed with considerable accuracy that some U.S. political figures still look at Indonesia with those 20-year-old spectacles. The changes in Indonesia during the past decade are of such a magnitude that to some, it may be incomprehensible that basic policies, attitudes, and political reality can change so much in such a short time. The military relationship has managed to overcome the occasional political setbacks and move on, thanks to the patience, forbearance and resolution of the individuals in both countries entrusted with its management.

About the Author …

COL John Hasean (a serving member of your FAOA Board of Governors) entered the Army FAO program shortly after it was established. From 1974 through his retirement in January 1995 he “single tracked” as a FAO, with assignments on the Department of the Army Staff in the Pentagon, professional service schools and language training (Indonesian, Thai, Burmese), security assistance, and the Defense Attaché System (DAS). His relevant FAO assignments included (among others): three tours at the US Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia; the US Embassy in Rangoon, Burma; the US Army Udorn Field Office in Bangkok, Thailand; and Senior and Analyst for Southeast Asia, Army HQ in Washington, DC.

**The Global Mufti: The Phenomenon of Yusuf al-Qaradawi**

By Bettina Gräf and Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen  
December, 2008, 256 pages, $35.00  

A widely respected legal scholar, Islamist activist, and renowned host of Al-Jazeera's most popular religious program, *Sharia and Life*, Yusuf al-Qaradawi is an extremely controversial figure in contemporary Islamism. When he was a young man, Qaradawi attended a lecture by Hassan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, and immediately joined the organization's youth wing. After earning his degree in theology at al-Azhar University in Cairo, Qaradawi settled in Qatar, where he played a pivotal role in establishing a system of Islamic higher education.

When the Muslim Brotherhood was forced underground in the 1960s, Qaradawi eschewed a formal position with the movement, opting instead to pursue a career as a major writer and ideologist of contemporary Islamist thought. Beginning in the mid-1970s, Qaradawi became one of a handful of Islamist ulama (Muslim scholars) who were accepted as authorities on doctrinal and political matters, both by Islamists and within the wider Islamic resurgence.

Bettina Gräf and Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen provide the first book-length treatment of Yusuf al-Qaradawi in English. Since the 1990s, Qaradawi has cleverly exploited new media to reach a global audience. He was one of the first Sunni scholars to launch his own Web site and is heavily involved with Islam Online. Having just celebrated the ten year anniversary of *Sharia and Life*, Qaradawi is unquestionably the most important Sunni religious figure in the world today, and these essays initiate readers into his immensely influential speeches and thought.

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**About the Book’s Authors**

**Bettina Gräf** is an academic assistant to the director at the Centre for Modern Oriental Studies (ZMO) in Berlin. She is currently completing her Ph.D. on the production and adaptation of fatwas in the era of electronic media with reference to the works of Yusuf al-Qaradawi.

**Jakob Skovgaard-Petersen** is the director of the Danish-Egyptian Dialogue Institute in Cairo and the former head of the academic program at the Carsten Niebuhr Institute of Near Eastern Studies, University of Copenhagen.

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**The 4th Annual FAO Conference**

**Dates** - 08-09 April 2010  
**Location** - Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey CA

The FAO Association of Monterey, an entirely student-driven organization of officers from the Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Army, hosts this event every year. It is our way to build upon our ongoing professionalization and education as warriors, scholars and diplomats at the Naval Postgraduate School and the Defense Language Institute by bringing in voices from the armed forces, the diplomatic corps, the academic world, and elsewhere.

For more information, please visit the FAOAM website at [www.faoam.wordpress.com](http://www.faoam.wordpress.com) or go to your FAO Association web site for details and the link. [www.FAOA.org](http://www.FAOA.org)
Editor's Note: FAOA members have recently requested a graphic displaying the by-country breakdown of the various regional specialists. Although exactly which country belongs within which region is constantly under adjustment, this map reflects the most recent US Army designation. It is available electronically on your FAOA portal... www.faoa.org. If you have other graphic to share with the international affairs community, email them to editor@faoa.org.
1. **New USMC International Affairs Officer Program (IAOP) Coordinator.**

   Effective 14 August 2009, Major Seth Folsom replaced Lieutenant Colonel Chris Sill as the IAOP Coordinator at Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (HQMC). Major Folsom is a South Asia FAO who is returning from an operational assignment with the 1st Marine Division. Lieutenant Colonel Sill remains in the International Affairs Branch at HQMC as the Eastern Europe and Africa Desk Officer.

2. **Desk Officer Adjustments.** The 2009 summer rotation of International Affairs Branch officers is complete. New joins include LtCol David Holahan in the North East Asia/PACOM Desk; Maj Tom Esposito in the Middle East/CENTCOM Desk, Maj John Krause in the Latin America/SOUTHCOM/NORTHCOM Desk, Maj Brian Boyce in the Western Europe/EUCOM Desk, and LtCol Dan Hicks as the Head for Security Cooperation Issues.

3. **FAOs outbound to commence In-Country Training (ICT) in spring 2010.** Twenty-seven USMC FAOs will conduct ICT during 2010. Of these, fourteen will execute orders this spring.
   a. **Latin America (MOS 8241).** Three FAOs will complete language instruction at Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) (two in Spanish and one in Portuguese) and will execute their ICT this spring. Two FAOs will be based in Lima, Peru and one will be based in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Both Lima and Rio de Janeiro are new ICT posts for the USMC FAO program.
   b. **China (MOS 8243).** Three FAOs will complete Chinese language instruction at DLIFLC and will execute their ICT this spring. All three officers will be based in Beijing, China.
   c. **Middle East/North Africa (MOS 8244).** Three FAOs will complete Arabic language instruction at DLIFLC and will execute their ICT this spring. Two FAOs will be based in Cairo, Egypt and one will be based in Tunis, Tunisia.
   d. **Sub-Saharan Africa (MOS 8245).** Three FAOs will complete French language instruction at DLIFLC and will execute their ICT this spring. One FAO will be based in Dakar, Senegal and two will be based at Headquarters, U.S. Marine Forces Africa (MARFORAF) in Stuttgart, Germany. Posting at MARFORAF is a departure for the USMC FAO ICT program, and we are anxious to see how it works out for these two officers.
   e. **East Asia (MOS 8248).** Two FAOs will complete Indonesian language instruction at DLIFLC and will execute their ICT this spring. Both officers will be based in Jakarta, Indonesia; one will attend the Indonesian Naval Command and Staff Course, which convenes in December 2010.

4. **IAOP Order Rewrite.** The 2005 version of the IAOP Marine Corps Order (MCO 1520.11E) is currently under revision. The final order will incorporate changes to program criteria that in turn will ensure the USMC’s International Affairs Officer Program is in full compliance with DoD Directive 1315.17.

5. **New FAOs and RAOs.** The Marine Corps recently concluded its FY09 4th Quarter FAO/RAO Experience Track Board. Each quarter the Board reviews packages of officers who have met the requirements for graduate level regional study, in-country experience, and language proficiency. The Board awarded the following four FAO/RAO designations:
   - 1 FAO-in-training (MOS 8240)
   - 1 Sub-Saharan Africa FAO designation (MOS 8245)
   - 2 East Asia RAO designations (MOS 8228)
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