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Dear FAO Colleagues,

This is an exciting time for our profession and for our association. Let me begin by congratulating our activities committee, comprised of LTC Steve Ayers, USA; Lt. Col. Dan Hicks, USMC; LCDR Rob Woods, USN; and Maj. Michael Bucher, USAF. These gentlemen are responsible for our very successful FAOA dining-out with the theme of “Building Partnership Capacity.” LTG David Huntoon, USA, Director of the Army Staff, was our honored guest and he gave the best presentation I’ve ever heard about the professional foreign area officer corps and the impact that FAOs are making on policy makers. If you weren’t one of the nearly ninety persons in the ballroom at the Army and Navy Club on 14 May 2009 to hear LTG Huntoon, then I enjoin you to read a copy of his remarks that are reprinted in this issue of the FAOA Journal. I also want to thank Raytheon Corporation, Integrated Defense Systems (IDS) for a generous donation to the FAOA, which was used to support our dining-out. In recognition of their assistance in promoting the FAOA, LTG Huntoon; Dan Smith, President of Raytheon, IDS; and Tom Vecchiolla, Vice-President of Raytheon, IDS, have been made honorary members of the FAOA board of governors.

I also want to thank the current board of governors and the membership at large for supporting a number of initiatives to include: the FAOA policy-luncheon series that has featured key speakers such as, GEN Anthony Zinni, USMC, Ret., LTG James Williams, USA, Ret. LTG Patrick Hughes, USA, Ret., LTG Michael Maples, USA, BG Richard Lake, USMC, and Under Secretary of Defense David Chu; reestablishing an annual FAOA formal dining-out; creating a new FAOA web page; updating the FAOA Charter; establishing FAOA Chapters outside of the National Capitol Region; and getting corporate sponsors. Your association is in good shape today and can be even more so in the future.

Steve Gotowicki continues to do a great job publishing the FAOA Journal but he can’t do it without your help. Please commit yourself to write an article this year and submit it to Steve. We need to learn from each other and our journal is the venue for doing this and for you to “be published.”

In April I had the opportunity to visit our embassies in Cyprus, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, UAE, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Ambassadors and senior military officials told me what I have heard many times before; namely, that FAOs are making a difference. There is no doubt that you ladies and gentlemen are the best trained regional experts in the United States Government!

We have elections coming up shortly and I solicit your nominations. If you ever wanted to make the FAOA better, to see it more relevant, vibrant, and helpful to professional FAOs then now is the time to put your name forward. The BoG has nine voting positions, all of which must be filled this summer. The process is simple, the election is straight-forward, and those elected will enjoy the next three years serving an exceptional organization with exceptional people. Let me explain the steps:

--- Any FAOA member can submit their name for nomination. All that is required is one short paragraph with bio information and one paragraph explaining why you want to serve on the BoG. Term limits do not apply and incumbent and former BoG members are also welcome to put their names in nomination.

--- There will be a special link on our web page, www.faoa.org, to do this. Nominations will be accepted until 12 July 2009.

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Good evening, and thank you, Steve, for that introduction. It is a privilege to speak to this organization, and I commend the Foreign Area Officer Association for hosting this event. I am honored to be in your company, and heartened to be in the presence of so many friends, old and new. I am grateful for the opportunity to express my admiration and regard for your work. So let’s approach this as if we were charting the rising and falling action of a play. We will begin by addressing the relevance and value of the Foreign Area Officer in support of the United States. Then we need a villain to offset all that goodness and create some dramatic tension. That would be the budget and the demands on our military too, about which I’ll talk more later. We’ll close with a denouement that brings us back to the whole point of your vocation. Dante wrote that a “tragedy” began in joy and ended in pain while a “comedy” began in pain and ended in joy. Hopefully by the time I’m finished speaking, you won’t be wondering which circle of hell you’re in.

So, first a little history. The foundation of your profession began in 1889 with the first US military attachés sent to London, Paris, Berlin, Vienna, and Saint Petersburg. Attachés established a reputation for relevance early on as observers during the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-1905. That initial group of observers included John J. Pershing, as well as both Douglas MacArthur and his father Arthur. Douglas MacArthur wrote about that time in a way that speaks eloquently to your own work as Foreign Area Officers:

"We were nine months in travel, traversing countless miles of land so rich in color, so fabled in legend, so vital to history that the experience was without doubt the most important factor of preparation in my entire life.... The true historic significance and the sense of destiny that these lands of the Western Pacific now assumed became part of me. They were to color and influence all the days of my life."

The size of your ranks ebbed and flowed in and out of the major conflicts of the twentieth century. In 1963, the system reached its highest numbers with 2,345 attachés stationed around the globe, and two years later the Defense Attaché System was formally established. Attaché accomplishments in that first century established an outstanding reputation for competence in the field, and contributed to the strengthening of American influence and power in every corner of the world. The Foreign Area Officer program as we know it today has evolved over the past two decades.

That role is of critical importance to the armed forces, so let’s briefly review the context in which you contribute. You operate in an era of persistent conflict defined by rapid change across every element of national power: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. You face a sophisticated, well-funded, worldwide threat from committed terrorists willing and able to employ weapons of mass destruction, a foe that pays no attention to the rules of international law, and one that takes a long-term view of struggle. This is a threat that also understands the power of strategic communications as part of its asymmetric arsenal; that understands our democratic system of peaceful and openly scheduled political change, our freedom of the press; and that tracks the current operational demands on our armed forces.

Many other threats define the complexity of your mission in this decade: cyber space ad-
versaries, the deleterious effects of climate change, a weakening of our international economic institutions, and a disaffected, unemployed, youth bulge in the underdeveloped world that already faces so much corruption, despair, and disease.

You serve at a time when America’s unique role as the only true superpower is undermined by mistrust and fear and anger from adversaries and even some allies over our national security strategy seven plus years after 9/11. Most of you have seen this first hand in your roles as attachés or in security assistance.

Other major changes in the world have a more indirect bearing on your capacity to influence and report: the explosion of information technology, the rapid expansion and subsequent influence of the internet, and the attendant growth and availability of PDAs. The unblinking eye of the 24-hour multimedia cycle places increased emphasis on the need for Foreign Area Officers to clearly understand the role of the press, and their own role as strategic communicators.

In your representation of the armed forces of the United States to your overseas audiences, you must be current on the major changes in our force structure, technology, and our personnel policies, some of which are still misaligned with the 21st century. Our military is transforming, but for sixty years our organizing principle had been to succeed in major conventional war. Now we need to be prepared across a spectrum of conflict that includes our current operational focus on irregular war and counterinsurgency, the consequence management attendant to a WMD incident, or the concern for the possibility of a failed state with a nuclear arsenal. And these are just the things we know about. What will come like a bolt out of the blue in the next three-to-five years? How well do we divine the future?

In Iraq and Afghanistan, junior officers and noncommissioned officers are leading their for-
mations with exceptional professional competence, courage, and compassion. They are adept at both the kinetic fight and the use of baseline diplomatic, governance, informational, and economic skills. They have learned to listen well and wisely -- and to respond -- to the disparate voices of local tribal councils. But they are not Foreign Area Officers. They succeed using the computations of algebra, while you are employ strategic calculus.

So what is it that makes you different? You have an exceptional education, a focused experience in your region, strong language skills, an understanding of the culture in which you operate, and an intuitive sense of the political dimension that complements all that you already know about your own service. This is the finger-spitzgefühlen that places the FAO at such a high premium in every senior level staff, embassy, or combatant command. The expression “subject matter expert” is an often overused term, but it accurately applies to the attaché corps and to our security assistance officers. When I travel to Amman or Beijing, the first person I want to talk to is Tarek Mekhail, Robert Faille, Charlie Hooper, or Frank Miller; in Tel Aviv, it’s John Chere or PJ Dermer; in Islamabad, Tom Wahlert; and in London last month, it was Ron Henderson and Anita Domingo. For in that first meeting with a Foreign Area Officer, senior leaders acquire the clearest sense of place and people. Your unique grasp of country or regional complexities as analysts or attachés makes all the difference to decision makers.

Central to your success is something which is hard to measure, and that is your intuitive skill in relationships with key host-country decision makers. Your remarkable capacity to create trust and confidence mirrors the soft power elements that Joseph Nye from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard has coined. He explains it in these terms: "In international
politics, the soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority).” By virtue of your perspective and experience, you understand this kind of power far better than most of us. And you add your own persuasive communication, inspiration, and motivation while representing our nation abroad or serving here in key analytical and policy positions.

Whether you are the attaché in Canberra or Cairo, the aide de camp to the Chief of Staff of the Army, or the plans chief for General Petraeus, the Foreign Area Officer today is a major actor in the war of ideas we face around the globe. In your day-to-day work overseas you are an essential bridge between your host nation and the United States. You approach your work with an inherent sense of the strategic. You understand why Karl von Clausewitz emphasized the political objective in statecraft, and why he reminds us still today that the first act, the most important act of the statesman or general who crafts a grand strategy or a military campaign is to ascertain the nature of its end state. In your work with a country team or a combatant commander, with a chief of service or with a joint staff, you wrestle with appreciating the legitimate needs of the region in which you serve, arrayed against the vital interests of your own nation. You are cognizant of and often a participant in the rational discussion of every key national security policy decision we face. What calling could be more relevant at a time when critics of our strategy abound?

2009 is a watershed year for many of our key international relationships: elections in Iraq and Afghanistan, a resurgent Taliban along the western Pakistani border, an uncertain peril from Iran, a certain peril out of North Korean withdrawal from the nuclear accords of the six party talks, a British government facing tough local elections in June and facing the greatest budget deficit in the west, and of course the beginning of a Presidential shift in U.S. foreign policy. In the face of these dynamic times, the importance of our Allies and Partners cannot be overstated. This makes your work overseas and here in the homeland in building partner capacity critically important. FAOs are the outstretched, open hand, the empathetic interlocutor, the constant, competent, candid, and committed presence in those essential partnerships. You are continuously articulating, and then helping to shape our national security strategy and the National Military Strategy.

In many ways you are the strategic first responders to threats real and anticipated. Your professional and continuous affiliation and dialogue with the nation in which you serve often gives us the first glimpse of trends and crises. Your reports and cables, your calls and emails capture for us here the sense of what is really taking place on the ground. In those reports, you understand well the importance of the precision of language, the nuance of gesture, and the ephemeral nature of strategic timing in decision making.

Your service as a FAO begins and ends with a clear understanding of the human dimension, one that should always precede the physical responsibilities of leadership. Here is where the power of relationships holds sway, those you develop over time, reinforced by your skill with language and underwritten by your simple openness, candor, and competence. In your infinite receptions over chicken salad, spargel, or sushi, you have set the conditions for a common language of trust and confidence. You have declared over time in your daily character that we are connected more than we are separate, and that we have much to gain in collective action. And what is the most important outcome? That in the middle of the night of a grave conflict or in the throes of a high-risk strategic policy conflict, you will be able to communicate face to face, or by phone, or email, with those decision makers who can bring the problem to resolution. So much
begins with the sharing of pasta, with your children playing soccer on international teams, or in your clear willingness to listen first -- and in the native language.

FAOs deeply understand the simple but elemental value of trusting and being trusted in a foreign language. Here is the great key to unlocking so many doors in your world. Language, it has been said, exerts a hidden power, like a moon on the tides. Learn a new language, says a Czech proverb, and get a new soul. For the FAO, the words of Fellini are even more apt - a different language is a different vision of life. It is the vision of your host that you must decipher. Some of you have come to know that Mandarin is a stress timed language whose intonation of the word ma alone has many different meanings. Your mastery of a reasonable amount of its 12,000 characters places you in the company of one-fifth of the people of the world. Others of you are equally conversant in the newly designated critical languages of Dari, Pashtun, Farsi, and Urdu. Even more of you are fluent in the Indo-European languages of our traditional allies. But all of you understand the power of speaking in the native words of your host country, the need for precision in those exchanges, and the amazing power that communication brings to your mission. Some will recall their DLI instructors who predicted that when you begin to dream in Tagalog or Punjabi, then you have fully earned your language proficiency pay. Nelson Mandela noted that, "If you talk to a man in a language he understands, that goes to his head. If you talk to him in his own language, that goes to his heart." FAOs know this firsthand!

All these acquired skills mean that your advice and counsel and analysis are most often welcomed by the country team or the field commander; but not always. There have undoubtedly been times when your critical insights were lost on your audience. Tough and rational critical thinking merits time and thought. We tend to be an impatient society; we have a strong preference for speed at the expense of context. Fast food, fast results, fast forward, so often caught up in the romance of current operations. But there is risk here without pausing to think strategically. In the words of the poet A.E. Houseman describing one of his protagonists: "Three minutes of hard thought would have convinced him of the weakness of the argument. But hard thought is hard and three minutes is a long time." You are often the intellectual brakes to the commander’s ambition.

Foreign Area Officers provide something else that is largely uncommon today in our Western expectation for instant analysis, and that is a sense of context. Your understanding of history is meaningful to your ability to sense change when you are on a mission. It is both the apprehension of what has happened in the past and your critical thinking skills about the present and the near future. That sense of history is often much more important outside the U.S. A popular phrase in Afghanistan is “the American Soldier may have the watches, but we have the time.” Blood feuds, great military disasters, and loss of beloved territory are remembered for centuries, from Albania to Azerbaijan and from Kashmir to Kurdistan. When you understand the sense of their past in context to your own present, then you reinforce the wisdom of Mark Twain who said that “history may not repeat itself, but it often rhymes.”

Yours is exhaustive work when done to standard, and often includes an element of physical danger. One only has to pick up a copy of the FAO Journal to find the stories of attachés in peril that often come close to the early stories of Ian Fleming or John le Carré. And it can be lonely and unsupported work too, far away from the standard affirmations of merit or accomplishment that we are used to in a cohesive unit of soldiers. Here is where your family plays such an exceptional role. For those of you who are fortunate to have family with you on tours over-
seas -- and how fortunate for America -- we know how much they make a difference. Your family sends powerful messages about unconditional friendship and kindness, in both formal and informal occasions. Many of our FAO families sacrifice much in their assignments abroad, far, far away from the commissary, PX, or the military health clinic. In Kigali or Rangoon, you are a considerable distance from 24-hour pharmacies or the on-call, board-certified dentist for that unexpected root canal. We can never repay our families for their own service, but we should always acknowledge their selfless commitment.

The view from Nairobi or Manila is different than that from the E Ring of the Pentagon; you help us to do the kind of cognitive reframing that is essential to meet our national security objectives and guard our vital national interests. Your work also includes a requirement for a kind of resilience that we must all have to manage trauma -- whether real or intellectual -- that comes with serving in this profession of arms. The steady hand of a mature FAO overseas has great unmeasured value because it means preventive leadership, not reactive. In a crisis, there is limited time to wait for the medic to stop the bleeding. Decisions must be made rapidly; your recommendations to senior strategic leaders are on a clock. The resilience of your training, education, and experience as a FAO can make the difference in those crises. We do not complain about the increase in the sophistication of hip replacement surgery, but we would rather focus on ways to prevent hip fractures in the first place. That is the essence of your work in its preventive value to the policy process. You are in the right policy councils early, and you know how to look down the road ahead at the end state. Sometimes this saves lives; often it will build lasting alliances.

So. FAOs help to bring order out of the chaos of the world today by your unique professional competence. Your credentials are in sui generis, in a class by themselves.

If I were truly clever, I would simply stop here and thank you for your patience. But if this is the major view of the senior leadership, why are there still gaps between our strong appreciation and your expectations? The answer in large measure is that there is always institutional risk at play when demand exceeds supply, and when hard choices have to be made, especially in the case of elite organizations.

The role of the FAO is not universally understood or appreciated. All elites bear a measure of healthy skepticism from those who apportion resources, especially if they are well educated, and as professionally sound as yours. Let me use an analogy that alludes to this classic tension.

A man in a hot air balloon realized he was lost. He reduced altitude and spotted a woman below. He descended a bit more and shouted, “Excuse me, can you help me? I promised a friend I would meet him an hour ago, but I don't know where I am.”

The woman below replied, “You are in a hot air balloon hovering approximately 30 feet above the ground. You are between 40 and 41 degrees north latitude and between 59 and 60 degrees west longitude.”

“You must be a Foreign Area Officer,” said the balloonist. “I am,” replied the woman. “How did you know?” “Well,” answered the balloonist, “everything you told me is technically correct, but I have no idea what to make of your information, and the fact is I am still lost. Frankly, you've not been much help so far.”

The woman below responded, “You must be a general officer.”

“I am,” replied the balloonist, “but how did you know?” “Well,” said the woman, “you don't know where you are or where you are going. You have risen to where you are due to a large quantity of hot air. You made a promise, which you have no idea how to keep, and you expect people beneath you to solve your problems. The fact is you are in exactly the same position you were in before we met, but now, somehow, it's my fault.”
We are looking hard within the Army to resolve some of those miscommunications, with the simple intent of ensuring the FAO program remains relevant and useful. Colonel Mike Curci is leading that comprehensive look which includes a review of language requirements, advanced civil schooling, opportunities to reduce the 25% of the population who are in the Trainees, Transients, Holdees, and Students (TTHS) account without degrading the value of that educational time, and ways to improve quality accessions. The Army is also looking at how the FAO can best support the campaigns in Iraq or Afghanistan. After over seven years of protracted conflict, many of you have been in the fight already or are supporting it directly. In attaché assignments, you are engaged in your own way with the worldwide nature of the threat. Should FAOs serve at the brigade combat team level given the autonomous nature of those commands in theater? Should every major field commander have a FAO staff similar to that of the Ambassador? If we increase presence with the war fighter, where do we reduce presence with the diplomat and what is the cost? These are some of the tough questions that all of us will face in this decade.

And it is important to conduct this review ourselves, for you have many new competitors out there. Our armed forces at every rank today are moving aggressively to improve their cross-cultural competence in the wake of our increased overseas presence. This is reflected in our school houses, and in the nature of the scenarios and cadre at the national training centers. Language training is increasing at DLI, and at the service academies and ROTC where most cadets will have participated in an overseas internship or a semester abroad -- as likely today in Kabul as Paris. Rosetta Stone is available on line free to everyone in uniform -- and to family members. There is some thought to the idea that in this era of personnel constraints, the strategist and FAO career fields should be combined. There is a University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies at Fort Leavenworth which brings in officers from all branches for cross-cultural competence. All these initiatives in some manner are fellow suitors in a time of declining personnel resources.

Here is the irony: you have never been more necessary to implement national security strategy, and yet you have never had as much competition for the same general purpose. FAOs are innately wonderful storytellers -- that is an implied competency of your functional area. Today you must also be able to tell your story to your own service, because you are competing with others in a budget that is now on the wane. This is about affirming your relevance. And it means you must have strong advocates at the senior leadership level.

Let me close by noting that the military’s senior leadership is very committed to your work and your professional development. But there are left and right limits in every service today in times of decreasing budgets and with no reduction in demand on our combat units.

The synthesis of these two approaches -- the clear value of your work arrayed against competing demands in the armed forces will take time. Today, we take enormous pride in the professional competence of the Foreign Area Officer. Your work is critical to our national security, essential to our national purpose, and serves a deadly serious mission. We need you.

You pursue this special calling because you care about your profession and your Nation. Because you understand the extraordinary role of the Foreign Area Officer in this time of danger. And because you, as Kipling said, can “talk with crowds and keep your virtue, Or walk with kings - nor lose the common touch.”

Like so many of your predecessors, Foreign Area Officers today encounter mortal danger, disappointment, and tough ethical decisions. But you will deal with all those challenges in the same way that you have done for over a century -- with honor and dignity, with the power of your intellect as well as your arms, and all in accordance with the enduring values that mark our profession. Each one of you charts the destiny of your Nation by doing the right things day to day, underwritten by character, integrity, and selfless service, and by communicating and reinforcing those timeless and enduring ideas that have propelled all great civilizations.

So, look around you and celebrate the company you keep tonight.

I surely do. Thank you very much.
In recent years the social and political popularity of Hizb’allah in Lebanon has continued to increase and today they are in an alliance with a Christian party as an opposition coalition against the U.S. backed majority coalition in the Lebanese parliament. Additionally the Hizb’allah/Christian coalition and the U.S. backed majority party held positive talks this year about Lebanese national unity and the future of their country. Clearly, Hasan Nasrallah as the leader of Hizb’allah has become the most powerful non-elected political actor in Lebanon. Understanding who Nasrallah is and what Hizb’allah believes in will be important for nations that have foreign relations with Lebanon because it seems that far from shrinking away Hizb’allah is gaining support and political power.

This article focuses on four questions. First, what is Hasan Nasrallah’s background and how does it intertwine with Hizb’allah? Second, how much power does Nasrallah have in Hizb’allah? Third, what were Hizb’allah’s initial stated objectives, political positions and relations with foreign states? Finally, how much have Hizb’allah’s objectives, positions, and relations changed since first spelled out in 1985? It argues that Nasrallah is a charismatic and intelligent individual that learned many valuable political lessons while forming Hizb’allah, that he has consolidated nearly all the power in Hizb’allah for himself, and that he will continue to be a political force in Lebanon. Further, this article demonstrates that although some of the objectives, positions and relations have changed; many of the core beliefs and actions that have made Hizb’allah a pariah in the West have not.

The paper is divided into two parts. First, a brief biography of Hasan Nasrallah that provides evidence of his consolidation of power and his development of important contacts with regional leaders that ensure the sustainment of Hizb’allah. The second section is an analysis of the 1985 stated objectives of Hizb’allah when compared to its later aims and actions.

### A Biography of Hassan Nasrallah, the Current Secretary General of Hizb’allah

Most Americans have heard descriptions of Hizb’allah the fanatical terrorist organization of paramilitary thugs headed by Hasan Nasrallah, a fiery anti-Western figure planted in Lebanon by Iran. To better understand Nasrallah readers should move past these daily headlines. I have attempted to paint an unbiased picture of Hasan Nasrallah using facts gathered from scholarly works and many of his own statements to allow readers to examine his life and draw their own conclusions about who Nasrallah is.

Nasrallah was born on 31 August 1960 in East Beirut’s al-Sharshabouk Quarter, which Nasrallah identifies as a poor section of town. This area contained numerous refugee neighborhoods, especially Palestinian who through the PLO controlled the area, and was later a key site in the Lebanese Civil War. Nasrallah lived there with his family until 1974 attending elementary school at al-Najah School. For secondary education he attended Sin el-Fil after his family went into exile there prior to the civil war. At the time he considered himself to be apolitical but was very religious for his young age. He attended mosque at Ursat al-Taakhi where Sayyed Mohammad Fadlallah also prayed.¹

After Beirut became too dangerous, Nasrallah’s family moved to their familial village of Bazourieh in Southern Lebanon where the political parties that where active were mainly leftists and nationalists. Nasrallah notes in 1993 that it...
was noticeably lacking in Islamists. As a young man he joined forces with a respected shaykh in the village outside Tyre and created a library where the youth could congregate and receive lessons about Islam that were led by Nasrallah. Nasrallah's teacher remembers his now-famous student's seriousness and piety as a child. At age 15 Nasrallah completed the eleventh grade in Tyre and became involved with the Amal movement along with many family members. The next step for Nasrallah was to fulfill his desire for higher learning in religious studies so he followed his dream to Iraq.

Arriving in Najaf 15 January 1976 Nasrallah carried the introductory letters from Lebanese scholars for his future teachers. He was not carrying a letter from Sayyed Fadlallah because he could not reach him after he moved from Beirut; instead he had a letter from Sayyed al-Faroui who wanted Nasrallah to meet his friend Sayyed Mohammad Baqer al-Sadr in Najaf. He finally found someone in Najaf who would risk Iraqi intelligence scrutiny to bring him to see Baqer al-Sadr; he was Sayyed Abbas Mussawi a fellow Lebanese citizen. Sayyed Baqer al-Sadr talked with him for 30 minutes discussing Southern Lebanon and Sayyed Mousa al-Sadr. Nasrallah told Sayyed Baqer that he was at his disposal and Baqer al-Sadr charged Mussawi with Nasrallah's care and told him if he had any issues to bring them to his attention.

Nasrallah studied under Mussawi with a group of other Lebanese students. The group only studied in Najaf for one and half years because the Lebanese professors and students were singled out by the Iraqi government for detention and expulsion. This occurred after a run in between the Shi`i marchers and the Iraqi intelligence services during Muharram. Although Nasrallah avoided arrest, interrogation and torture he was expelled from Iraq and like his fellow Lebanese students was unable to travel to Qom to finish his studies because the Shah still ruled in Iran. When the students returned to Lebanon in 1978 Sayyed Mussawi decided to establish a Shi`i school in Baalbek, and received approval from Sayyed Fadlallah and Sheikh Shamseddin to open “The Awaited Imam’s Religious School's” doors. Soon, Khomeini, would aid al-Mussawi, in laying the foundation for a future social movement through Iranian ulema and cadre establishing training bases and religious centers in Lebanon. At the school some key ideas were instilled in the future leaders of Hizb'allah like “revolutionary fervor and the commitment to change their societies.” And “they shared antipathy toward Israel and loyalty to Iran.” The Israeli Operation Litani entering into Lebanon, the UN’s weak actions to make Israel withdraw and the Iranian Revolution would all help to provide impetus for building the foundations of Hizb’allah; religiously, politically and ideologically.

Nasrallah and his classmates continued their studies at Seminary in Baalbek during the Israeli invasion of 1978 and during the ensuing violence and Nasrallah became active in the Amal Movement near the school by performing community organizer activities to raise awareness; this helped him to build relationships with the community. By 1982 studies were ending and with Israel’s second invasion of Lebanon Amal and Nasrallah were no longer in agreement about how to meet the needs of the Lebanese Shi’i. Nasrallah and his friends from the Bekaa valley decided to leave Amal, as he recalls “without any problem,” and they established the nucleus of another movement (Hizb’allah). This group of men joined military camps and benefitted from the arrival of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards who fired them up with “the spirit that prevailed on the front in Iran,” and also by teaching advanced military tactics. The IRG also helped them to determine operational level strategy and to build their new movement and train them in politics. The party of God nucleus also included Sayyed Abbas Mussawi, Sayyed Jimmy al Tufeili, Sayyed Ibrahim al Amin and Sheikh Mohammad Yazbek—all religious scholars from the Bekaa area.

While still in Bekaa Nasrallah, now one of the founders of Hizb’allah took on several roles
within the movement. At age 22, Nasrallah mainly focused on recruiting, organizing and getting men into military camps so they could learn to carry out Israeli-resistance operations after infiltrating into the occupied southern portion of Lebanon. His other aim was on raising awareness among the people to support the resistance; honing his social mobilization messages. During this period Nasrallah was also building the structure of Hizb‘allah and filling the positions within it. By 1985 Nasrallah was asked to leave Bekaa and move to Beirut with two other key members to further improve the organization. In Beirut Sayyed al-Amin would take care of political matters including official spokesman (he was the person who issued the 1985 Open Letter) while Nasrallah focused on the organizational needs and changes for Hizb‘allah. In Beirut Nasrallah says they aimed to mobilize what they saw as two separate but key groups, the youth and the population at large. The Hizb‘allah organization becomes complex at this time and an executive committee is formed with Nasrallah as its President. The committee would handle day-to-day operations and any issues related to “organization, jihad, publicity, culture, social affairs, and extra-curricular activities.”

According to one source Nasrallah also proved himself a skillful guerilla leader and fighter during the 1980s before leaving for Qom for religious studies in 1987. This same source explains that after Nasrallah returned from Qom in 1989, because of increased hostilities in Lebanon, he was involved in a conflict over Hizb‘allah’s direction with Mussawi. It is believed that

Foreign Area Officer Association
Membership Application

Name: ___________________________ Rank: ______
Street: ____________________________
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Nasrallah who supported less Syrian involvement in Lebanon and a more hard-line stance against the U.S. and Israel was sent to Iran as Hizb’allah’s representative so that Musawi would be unhindered in his plan to increase Syrian influence in Lebanon. By 1991 Sayyed Musawi had become the Secretary General of Hizb’allah and Nasrallah returned to his role as President of the Executive Council.

In February 1992, Secretary General Abbas Mussawi was assassinated and Hizb’allah unanimously chose Nasrallah to leapfrog over the Deputy Secretary General, Naim al-Qassem, to the position of Secretary General. Although Nasrallah did not have the religious credentials of past leaders he made up for it by creating a powerful social base though numerous social welfare activities; his past lessons from community organizing had proved useful. In 1993 Nasrallah spoke with a reporter about what was required in a leader to become the Secretary General of Hizb’allah and he outlined some basic abilities. Nasrallah describes the Secretary General as someone that speaks for the party and commits it to action so he feels they look for a leader with “cultural and scientific abilities, political acumen and administrative skills.” He also points out that he Secretary General must have the complete trust of the electing members of the organization. From reading other discussions of the Secretary General selection process it is clear that a close relationship with the Supreme Leader of Iran and relationships with other notable Lebanese social and religious leaders are also useful.

During the 1980s and 1990s two other events shaped the thinking of Hasan Nasrallah. First was the continued battling with Amal for control of the Shia people in Lebanon. His own brother Hussein Nasrallah is a life member of Amal and during the 1980s when the two groups were in their most bitter struggle over the Shia they were confronting each other. The second issue was the constant assassinations and kidnappings of numerous Hizb’allah leaders; these activities had to weigh heavy on his attitude and distrust of the Israelis and the Lebanese government.

In 1993 Hizb’allah called its third conclave where Nasrallah was re-elected as Secretary General and the Islamic Resistance (AKA militia) gained a seat in Shura Council as a reward for their military service against Israel. Also in this year Nasrallah makes it a point in an interview to declare: “[The] “Open Letter,” containing Hezbollah’s first ever complete and comprehensive vision regarding the political situation… contained Hezbollah’s entire political program,” and that “… All this talk today about a new Hezbollah policy is inaccurate” In May 1995, Imam Khamenei appointed Nasrallah as a religious deputy in Lebanon, giving to him his religious duties and the responsibility for and benefits of his Shia Muslim followers, this would lead to a larger part of Hizb’allah’s funding coming from within Lebanon. In July of that year Hizb’allah’s convened its fourth conclave and Nasrallah was again re-elected. He oversaw the enlargement of the Political Council, creation of a Jihadi Council (probably not a good sign for those hoping to see Hizb’allah disarm), and the creation of a Parliamentary Block Council to deal with Hizb’allah’s foray into parliamentary politics in Lebanon.

On 12 September 1997 an event that affected Nasrallah greatly was handled in such away that it greatly enhanced the legitimacy of Nasrallah with the Lebanese followers of Hizb’allah. Hadi Nasrallah, Hassan’s son died fighting IDF in Southern Lebanon and he was not returned for burial until 26 June 1998 during a soldier exchange with Israel. The way that Hassan coolly accepted his son’s death provided a clear example to his followers. During the time of his sons burial the fifth Hizb’allah conclave was held and it ended the rifts within Hizb’allah when Nasrallah was elected for a third term. This required Hizb’allah to amend its bylaws to allow him to be elected to more than two consecutive terms as SG and is clearly a sign that Nasrallah’s political power base in Lebanon and inside Hizb’allah was secure.
After the announcement by the Israeli government that it would withdraw its forces from Southern Lebanon in 2000 Nasrallah again rose in the public’s eye because he was one of the few leaders on either side of the border who was noted for his “clear analysis” and “calm assurances” for the post Israeli aftermath. He stated that Hezbollah would not allow any “retaliatory killings or revenge attacks” and he followed through on this statement after Israel’s withdrawal. He was the only Lebanese leader who appeared calm and clearheaded when the Israelis announced their decision to withdraw from South Lebanon. It should not have been a surprise in July of 2001 after Hizb’allah held its sixth conclave that Nasrallah was reelected for life. Additionally the media institutions were put under the control of Nasrallah to be run by the head of the political council thereby giving them more power over ideological programming. Finally Hizb’allah dismantled the Central Planning Council and gave more clout to the internal audit and accountability councils. This did show that Nasrallah welcomed the transparency and accountability in the organization but also he was comfortable with more power being concentrated in fewer hands.

From June through August 2004, Hizb’allah conducted its seventh conclave where Nasrallah also became the head of the Jihadi council. The participants then decided to divide Southern Lebanon into two administrative positions and place Nasrallah’s close associates in charge of them while filling their vacant positions with more Nasrallah aides. He also tightened the reins on al-Nour, Hizb’allah’s radio station, by placing the political programming director under Nasrallah’s Central Information Office as a deputy to him. Two major events in 2005 involved Nasrallah. The first was a Hizb’allah sponsored and led pro-Syrian demonstration carrying Lebanese flags while Nasrallah made public calls for “national unity, dialogue, and coexistence” in March when around 500,000 members turned out. This event illustrated the appearance of Hizb’allah’s move toward national unity themes and away from strictly Hizb’allah themes by not carrying Hizb’allah flags. The second event was from July through August when Nasrallah and other members of Hizb’allah’s shura council visited Tehran to meet with then president-elect Ahmadinejad, supreme leader Khamenei and other Iranian officials. Here Nasrallah was assured that Hizb’allah would not be disarmed and that it still retained Iran’s support.

The 2006 Israeli invasion into Lebanon seemingly strengthened Nasrallah’s position in Lebanon and expanded the legitimacy of Hizb’allah by allowing it to display its superior social welfare programs while the Lebanese government floundered in the aftermath of the destruction. Although at the outset of the invasion Hassan Nasrallah’s admitted that he would not have authorized the July 12 action if he had known how strongly Israel would react, his superior propaganda machine was able to turn the event into a huge Hizb’allah victory in Lebanon.

At the expense of the Lebanese government “Nasrallah acquired a folk-hero status as his organization was widely hailed both for its military prowess… and for its perceived ability to initiate disaster relief projects far more quickly and efficiently than the regular governmental organizations.” This only enhanced his ability to ward off calls for disarmament and push off Lebanese calls for further investigations into Hariri’s assassination. As one author puts it Nasrallah gains a lot of power during post-conflict times because he is seen as a leader in many circles including “military leader, reconstruction czar, and political participant.”

In the last year or so there has been a flurry of activity surrounding Nasrallah and Hizb’allah because of their heightened position of power in Lebanon. In 2006 and 2007 it was reported by European intelligence sources that Nasrallah and some of his key Hizb’allah cadre were training in North Korea in the 1980s and 1990s and receiving arms from them. This relationship is reported to have been facilitated by Iran. Keeping with this theme in 2008 the Israeli government reported that Hizb’allah was getting...
new longer range missiles from Iran. One author notes that Hizb’allah has admitted to increasing the size of its missile arsenal since the summer 2006 war and cites non-Israeli sources that place senior Hizb’allah cadre and Nasrallah in Iran in April 2007, “where Iran pledged to deliver new medium-range missiles to Hezbollah.”

In October of 2008 an Iranian newspaper reported that Hizb’allah had chosen a replacement for Nasrallah in case of an assassination or untimely death. They said that Hashim Safie al-Deen who is Nasrallah’s cousin had been selected to succeed Nasrallah as Secretary General. The journalist believed that this was supposed to be a message to Israel that Hizb’allah would not be affected by an assassination attempt on its key leadership. Although the story has not been verified by Hizb’allah sources it did come after an Israeli commander in northern Israel stated that in future wars against Lebanon “disproportionate” force would be used to crush Lebanese villages that the Israelis see as military bases. Later in the same month rumors surfaced that Nasrallah was poisoned in an attempt on his life these reports supposedly came through Western Diplomatic channels. It was believed that doctors had to be flown in to treat him for a “highly toxic chemical.” Hizb’allah immediately stated that the rumors were all false, that he was in fine health, and that this rumor was likely a plot by Israel because only they could gain from it. Just a few days later Nasrallah proved that he was among the living by meeting secretly with Prime Minister Hariri where they discussed Lebanese unity. In this meeting Nasrallah joined Hariri in calling for “national unity...civil peace...the need to take all measures to prevent tension...and to avoid strife.” This was the first time the two leaders had met since the summer 2006 war with Israel but they agreed to maintain contact. These talks were especially necessary to reconcile the fallout from earlier in the year when Hizb’allah took over much of Western Beirut by arms in response to the government’s intervention in Hizb’allah’s “private telecommunication network.”

It is clear that the story of Hassan Nasrallah is far from over and that his recent moves toward working with the Lebanese government while still enjoying support from outside actors will provide more complex situations in the future. His views have changed little over the years and he seeks to increase his power as most political leaders do. Time will tell how his story will fit into the larger picture of Lebanon’s fate. Although he holds no official position in the Lebanese government the West needs to understand how popular he is in the region in order to better deal with him. For now we shouldn’t forget that he is much more than a militia or political leader he is “charismatic, highly intelligent, and deeply religious, his face appears on billboards, key chains, and screen-savers; excerpts of his speeches are even used as cell phone ringtones.”

Between 1982 and 1999 Hizb’allah launched around a dozen suicide attacks. Hizb’allah is believed to have had a role in the kidnapings of Westerners in Lebanon and attacks on Jewish sites in Argentina. Hizb’allah is credited with the suicide truck bombings that left hundreds of Americans dead in Beirut and the hijacking of TWA flight 847. Also, Hizb’allah has stated numerous times that Israel needs to be obliterated “from existence.” This section of the paper will highlight Hizb’allah’s 1985 policy toward the West and its Allies, as well as Lebanon, and Iran; then analyze current statements or actions related to those policies to determine if any changes can be found in Hizb’allah’s aims. The first area evaluated is the views Hizb’allah has towards the Western Allies.

Hizb’allah and the West (America, Europe, Israel and Arab Regimes allied to the West)

In 1985 Hizb’allah viewed the West, as broadly defined above, as launching a “tyrannical
arrogant assault” against Hizb’allah and Islam. They saw the West’s aims as depriving Islamic lands of wealth and controlling and exploiting its people. They used words like criminal, and liar to describe America, Israel, the Phalange party of the Lebanese government, France and all international organizations. They reserve their greatest contempt for the United States which Hizb’allah sees as the root of all the evil in West.  

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Hizb’allah then and now

“Imam Khomeini, the leader, has repeatedly stressed that America is the reason for all our catastrophes and the source of all malice. By fighting it, we are only exercising our legitimate right to defend our Islam and the dignity of our nation.”

- from the “Open Letter Addressed by Hizb Allah to the Downtrodden in Lebanon and in the World, 1985

"There was an affirmation of national unity and civil peace and the need to take all measures to prevent tension ... and to reinforce dialogue and to avoid strife regardless of political differences"

- from a joint statement of Hassan Nasrallah, the secretary-general of Hezbollah and his political rival Saad al-Hariri, leader of Lebanon’s parliamentary majority 27 October 2008

“The parliamentary majority is calling for Hezbollah to disarm, in favour of building a stronger Lebanese national army...However, Hezbollah insists that its weapons are essential to a Lebanese national resistance against Israel, its southern neighbour”

- from same article 27 October 2008. Taking “all measures to prevent tension?”

Time has not altered Hizb’allah’s views towards the United States. During the 2004 at two different large Hizb’allah demonstrations the chants soon turned to death to Israel and America even though they were gathered to protest the destruction of religious sites in Iraq and a U.N. Security Council resolution. Nasrallah also continues to portray a negative image of America in his public speeches ensuring that he includes critiques of the social ills of America and criticizes the US Middle East foreign policy.

Beyond the anti-American rhetoric are recent Hizb’allah actions the Middle East that concern the U.S. government. Today Hizb’allah is believed (by both the US Defense and State Departments) to be focusing on anti-Western activities in league with Iran and Venezuela which is in keeping with its earlier message of revolution by the downtrodden. This new effort finds Hizb’allah setting up training camps in Venezuela. Observers believe they are involved in activities such as money laundering and weapons and drug smuggling. Nasrallah vigorously denies all the connections to illegal drug and money activities in

Israel in particular is singled out as the catalyst for causing Hizb’allah to form. They call Israel butchers and tyrants; they speak of Israel as a “myth of the Zionist entity;” and they feel that the Zionists have taken sacred Islamic lands. Hizb’allah’s aims for Israel were simple in 1985--“Israel Must Be Wiped Out of Existence” and therefore saw no room for ceasefires, truces, or mediation because it would recognize them as a state.
This stance towards not recognizing Israel would moderate during Hizb’allah’s fight with Israel from 1982-2000. In order to develop a set of rules with Israel that placed conditions on the fighting Hizb’allah had to theoretically recognize Israel but this did not alter its policy of seeking their ultimate withdrawal from all Islamic lands.

In 2000 the Israelis withdrew from Southern Lebanon, leaving only the small Sheba Farms area under Israeli control. Hizb’allah saw the withdrawal of Israel as the proof of the success of their resistance strategy and now uses Sheba farms as one of the reasons why they cannot disarm. The model of resistance that Hizb’allah employs is constantly being touted as critical to the long-term strategy of ending the Israeli occupation of Islamic land, like when Nasrallah applauded the Hamas resistance against Israel as being responsible for the liberation of Gaza in 2005. A 2008 article highlights a Hizb’allah youth scout camp where the children as young as nine get to learn about the importance of resistance against Israel because “Jews are...cruel, corrupt, cowardly...killers of prophets” etc. They are taught by scout leaders like Ali al-Sayyed who admits that as a young scout he was taught to be devout and to be willing to give up his life for Hizb’allah. Ali also reminds his interviewer by email “As you know, we live in a war with Israel and America... and they want to war us (destroy) in all the way.”

Hizb’allah continues to vilify the West because it aids them in creating the jihad environment they need to ensure the continued support of the organization.

Hizb’allah and Lebanon

The relationship between Hizb’allah and the other Lebanese is one of the most complicated ones this paper evaluated and it shows some progress towards common ground. Hizb’allah’s goals in 1985 were fairly clear in regards to Lebanon. Hizb’allah saw themselves as a resistance movement founded to stop Israeli occupation. Additionally, although Nasrallah in 1993 would try to say otherwise, the 1985 Open Letter Hizb’allah said they did not see how politics and militaries could be separate and saw themselves as a resistance (militia) force with political goals. To Hizb’allah’s credit they also stated in 1985 and have followed through on the belief that the people of Lebanon should choose the system of government they wanted, but hoped that the people would choose an Islamic System and touted their commitment to bring, justice and peace to Lebanon and the world.

They also felt in 1985 that the Christian Maronite political leaders would never lead the nation toward peace because they were bigoted, too focused on sectarianism and closely allied with the West. Today this rhetoric has been overshadowed by action. In 2006 Nasrallah and former Christian General Aoun formed an alliance focused on Lebanese reforms which resulted in a Memorandum of Understanding. The agreement between Hizb’allah and the Free Patriotic Movement is supported by 77% of the Christians. Michel Aoun was seen as a rebel leader in the civil war by Hizb’allah because he was first backed by the French and later the Americans. In this area, there have indeed been some changes for Hizb’allah.

Hizb’allah in 1985 also wanted to develop a Lebanon that was ruled by a just Islamic leadership, completely opposed to America, was not subservient to any Western or Eastern power, or occupied by Israel. They said they wanted to have no part in the government of Lebanon because while it was in a sectarian framework and alliances; not a cabinet seat or control of any ministry. In 1993 Hizb’allah reversed its policy of not being a part of the government by running for and winning seats in the Parliament. The political participation of Hizb’allah in the Lebanese system continues to this day. In 2004 Nasrallah was invited to meet with the Lebanese Prime Minister which shows how far events had pushed Hizb’allah and the Government towards collaboration.
The most critical issue between Lebanon’s government and Hizb’allah is Hizb’allah’s demand to retain its militia. After numerous attempts by the government, Hizb’allah still defies calls to disband its militia and this is one of the most important sticking points for most western audiences. As recent as October 2008 after a positive meeting between the rival parties of Hariri and Nasrallah to bring the country back together after May 2008’s internal violence, the militia issue was still not advanced any farther than it was a decade ago. Touting the meeting as a step toward national unity Hizb’allah still insisted that it could not disarm because the resistance was vital to the defense of Lebanon from Israel; even after the parliament majority called for a stronger Army and the disbanding of all militias.

**Hizb’allah and Iran**

“We the sons of Hizb Allah’s nation… abide by the orders of a single wise and just command currently embodied in the supreme Ayatollah Ruhollah al-Khomeini, the rightly guided imam.”

In 1985 Hizb’allah clearly showed that it had a connection with the Supreme Leader Khomeini when they used his denunciation of America in their Open Letter, to stress “that America is the reason for all our catastrophes and the source of all malice.” Some of the other events highlight in Nasrallah’s biography also show how close the relationship is, such as the Iranian aid to Mussawi in building military and religious training sites in Lebanon in the later 1970s. In 1995 Hizb’allah received a large infusion of religious money when Khamenei appointed Nasrallah his religious deputy in Lebanon. In 2005 Hizb’allah was welcomed in Iran and given assurances of continued Iranian support to the resistance model when calls for disarmament were growing in Lebanon.

In 2007 Hizb’allah leaders were again visiting Iran this time to, among other things, talk about missiles. As recently as 2008 Hizb’allah and Iran have been linked in arms transfers and Hizb’allah does not deny that its missile stocks have increased since the 2006 summer war. Intelligence analysts note that the missiles that Iran supplied have an increased range that is over four times as powerful at the past arsenal. Additionally a recent article shows that the Hizb’allah youth are still taught to revere Khomeini and his revolutionary ideals. It points out that the Mahdi Scouts in 2008 included a picture of Khomeini as part of their uniform and taught the chant “you are our leader…we are your men.” Although Hizb’allah often seeks to distance itself from accusations that it is an appendage of Iran its actions often make this stance less than believable.

**Conclusion**

This research shows that a large portion of the power in Hizb’allah has been consolidated in Hasan Nasrallah’s hands and that he is clearly a cunning political fighter. Additionally it appears that although Hizb’allah has made some positive changes in its behavior and relations with the Lebanese government they have not made many significant changes in their anti-Western and anti-Israeli views.

The most troubling remaining issues that Hizb’allah will need to resolve if they are ever to be treated differently by the West are: (1) their demand to remain as an armed militia instead of disarming and becoming a purely political party, (2) their linkages and seeming allegiance to Iran, and (3) their continuing war of words and alleged actions against the West and Western allies in the Middle East.

**Endnotes:**

2 Ibid., 117.
5 Ibid., 118-9.
6 Ibid., 120-24.
10 Ibid., 126.
11 Ibid., 125-6.
12 Ibid., 127-9.
13 Ibid., 130.
20 Ibid., 89.
21 Joseph A. Alagha, *The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology*, 293.
23 Ibid., 16-17.
24 Ibid., 17.
26 Ibid., 22.
31 Ibid.
35 Ibid., 168.
36 Ibid., 169-72, 186.
37 Joseph A. Alagha, *The Shifts in Hizbullah’s Ideology*, 293.
42 Ibid., 170-179.
47 Ibid., 176-7.
54 Ibid., 279-295.
56 Robert Worth, “Generation Faithful: Hezbollah Marshals the Young via Scout Troops.”
Making the Most Out of In-Country Training
By Major Wayne Turnbull, USA, 48I

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect official policy or the position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense or the U.S. Government

As I look back at my FAO training and subsequent assignments as a Security Assistance Officer in the PACOM AOR, there are some things I wish I had done better during the In-Country Training phase. I am a Southeast Asian FAO with language training in Vietnamese and ICT in Hanoi. My two immediate follow-on assignments were in East Timor and Indonesia in a Security Assistance function.

During the course of ICT, I visited just about every country in Southeast Asia except the two where I ended up serving. That was more a case of bad timing than intent. When I visited other countries in Southeast Asia, I took the time to learn as much as I could of the history and culture of that specific country before I headed out, making sure that I hit all the “hot spots” as listed in Lonely Planet or Fodor’s. I made sure to check in with all the local Attaché, Political Officer, and Economic Officer to provide the requisite background information for what I was as an onerous requirement to write reports at the culmination of each trip. While not engaged in regional travel, I dedicated a great deal of time and attention into being the best Vietnamese FAO I could be, visiting all the provinces, making local friends, and marrying a local. After a year in Hanoi and on the road, I had garnered arcane bits of knowledge about various cultures and nations within the region, wrote many irrelevant reports about that knowledge, had a few FAO “war stories” about where to go and what to see that were not included in the reports, and greatly reduced my chances of becoming the DATT in Hanoi (no regrets) since my new father-in-law was a former NVA officer.

After taking on the job as the only U.S. Military officer in East Timor, I realized that I had missed opportunities for learning from some other key folks in the different embassies. I also realized that I had focused most of my military studies on Attaché centric subjects. I had a lot of information about different places and was reasonably well armed to work as a desk officer somewhere. I also could recommend excellent travel destinations for people heading out on vacation. I knew next to nothing about Security Assistance and Security Cooperation within my AOR. If afforded the opportunity to do it again; I would go into in-country training and do the following:

- Internalize that FAOs are intended to develop regional expertise, not country expertise. This was mentioned several times at FAO orientations and FAOC, but it did not quite sink in until after I finished.
- Read and understand DoD’s Guidance for Employment of Forces (GEF – formerly SCG and another document) and the Combatant Command’s (GCC) Theater Security Cooperation Plan for the various countries and the region. This will give an idea of what we are trying to do regionally and why. In the case of Pacific Command, there are specific regional objectives, such as Maritime Security, that you won’t necessarily understand the linkages if you take a country-by-country approach.
- Be aware of the countries Security Assistance Plans. While not yet focused regionally, these documents outline how assistance under the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act is being employed in the various countries by the local Security
Assistance Office. Though the SAO is a military representative of the GCC, the security assistance plan is not always aligned in an obvious manner with the Theater Security Cooperation Plan. In some countries, the SAO functions are carried out by the Defense Attaché.

- Make the time to visit and talk to the folks performing Security Assistance functions in the country. Get the security assistance perspective. DoD is currently undergoing a realignment of SAO and DAO functions under a Senior Defense Officer. While in some countries Attachés and SAOs are one and the same, in others they are separate offices. Historically, Attachés have answered to DIA while SAOs have answered to the GCC. Regardless of the creation of a single point of contact the two activities yield perspectives on the target country.

- Stop in and visit the local USAID representative. You’ll find that they are invested in a broad range of activities and can give a unique perspective to growth and development within the country.

- Talk to the people doing Law Enforcement capacity building in country. This may be the International Criminal Investigation Training and Assistance Program (ICITAP) rep, Diplomatic Security Anti-Terrorism Assistance (DS/ATA) rep, Legal Attaché (LEGATT), Drug Enforcement (DEA) or other. Governance, security, and defense issues are invariably intertwined and you will not get as good an understanding of the issues if you only talk to the State Dept folks on the country team.

- Analyze the Country Team information, cultural visits, and military research from the aspect of “what does all this mean for the U.S. Government and DoD?” At the end of the day, FAOs need to be able to synthesize information with their regional experience and produce solid recommendations for policy, programs, or action directed at countries or regions with the intent of advancing DoD objectives. This doesn’t mean that all FAO reports need to contain incisive analysis just that one needs to bear in mind that the ICT process is intended as preparation for future employment.

These recommendations may come across as implying that there’s no time for fun in ICT. That is far from the truth. For many officers, the transition to FAO hits at a time when one needs to be a little self-centered after the demands of multiple deployments and Company Command. None of the above points in any way mean that you cannot or should not enjoy your time in-country and come away being able to discuss the effective differences of things such as Theravada and Mahayana Buddhism and their influence on local customs. Many FAOs spend the majority of their time in non-MEL 4 producing staff colleges and are pressed for time to gain first-hand regional experience. These points are intended as a primer. At the end of the day, the process of developing an FAO is intended to produce an individual capable of applying regional understanding and context to situations with the intent of advancing U.S. objectives. Don’t come out of the experience only equipped to write for Lonely Planet.
Ending “Catch and Release” by Land Forces participating in the Global War on Terror
By LTC Robert K. Holzhauer, USA, 48G

Frequently we hear of successful action taken by a land force unit against terrorists or insurgents, only to later hear of the suspects’ release. This phenomenon has multiple causes, and seriously complicates land forces’ commanders’ decision making, especially when establishing rules of engagement for dealing with suspected terrorists or insurgents. Land forces’ involvement is expected to increase due to the paramilitary nature of their opponents and the scope of terrorist operations worldwide.

A serious issue for land forces is whether or not they possess arrest powers. In the United States and several Middle Eastern and African countries, the land forces do not have power to arrest other than on their own bases or on infrastructure. Land forces are accompanied by forces from either the ministry of the interior, the coast guard or police officials, and the suspects are turned over to those authorities when an arrest occurs, or the accompanying officials perform the actual arrests.

A major problem arises when the arrest is performed by the land force component without an official present with arrest powers. This provides an opportunity for a legal challenge to the arrest, which frequently results in the suspect being released. This is a complex legal or constitutional question that requires specific legislation to correct – or until such legislation passes, inter-agency cooperation to guarantee the legality of an arrest through accompanying land forces with officials with the power to arrest on counterterrorism or counterinsurgent operations.

Another issue facing land forces is the overall perception of government fairness in a counterterrorism or counterinsurgency campaign.

If the bulk of the populace believes their country’s judiciary unfair and biased, there is little respect for the rule of law, facilitating terrorist or insurgent operations. In many cases, this means a civil law based, vice a religious or canonical court, which may apply the values of only one segment of the population. A legitimate judiciary can authorize and legitimize land force actions, and is a key contributor to the rule of law.

Laws must be perceived as fair and impartial, not drafted to target a single section of a populace. For example, laws written by a government to address conspiracy to commit terrorism must apply to everyone in the country. Conspiracy laws are necessary so a sovereign nation does not have to wait for attack on its citizens or guests before it can act. These conspiracy laws should include an overt act in the development of the attack or action, so as not to inhibit freedom of expression or speech. IE: You can say what you want, but don’t do anything, and you remain within the bounds of the law. Conspiracy laws allow land forces, courts and civil authorities to prevent attacks, vice react.

Many nations still lack adequate terrorist financing legislation. Terrorist financing or financing of an insurgent group can take many forms, from the diversion of charitable contributions to individual donations, extortion from the populace of an area controlled by one of these groups, or outright taking of assets and resources. Electronic financing of these groups requires considerable computer forensic skill to document the transactions. Laws must be carefully written to prevent misuse against legitimate donors, and the land forces commander has to train his people to recognize potential evidence of
financial transactions during any incident involving terrorists or insurgents.

Sadly, the lack of adequate legislation creates the opportunity for another form of catch and release, as the suspect cannot be tried at all, as what they’ve done is not matched by the legal code of the country of the suspect’s citizenship and the presiding judge has to free them as their actions are not covered by the law. This situation may also impede the transfer of a citizen of said country from the custody of a coalition partner that wishes to try the individual under their laws, as the coalition partner may be loathe to turn someone over to a country that is unable to prosecute the individual.

Other nations seeking international terrorist suspects will frequently ask for an individual to be detained by host nation authorities, requiring a land force action to accomplish the detention. If the country requesting the detention does not supply sufficient justification to that nation for a legal detention, and the suspect is released, the land force component sent to detain the individual may then be perceived as biased, or as a tool of foreign influences. Eventually, no justification for detention will result in a release. Sometimes this is a result of the requesting country refusing to share classified information on the detainee.

Further, there may be constitutional issues where a country will not allow extradition of its citizens to another country. Coupled with inadequate laws, the suspect does not receive a long sentence from the host nation and catch and release occurs again, with the suspect now free, after a relatively short sentence.

Some countries have diversion programs with varying degrees of success. The country tries to co-opt the terrorist or insurgent and get them to advocate nonviolence to their former peers, or obtain information on potential or ongoing operations. The individual in this situation may or may not have had a change of heart and may still be conspiring with others to perform violent or illegal acts. Further, in this form of catch and release, we are asking someone to willingly be caught again, or work with their captors, at considerable risk to their personal safety, something done by only the most devious or most foolish of individuals, or those with no other option.

Ideally, all reintegration, parole or release programs sponsored by any government would require the renunciation of violent methods as a precondition for release. Some governments frankly lack the resources to implement such programs, including the ability to monitor the subjects in the program to assure the renunciation is valid. This can lead to unmonitored freedom of action for an already convicted individual. When a subject is released, it is always better for the host nation to inform coalition partners in advance of the release, not merely as a courtesy, but in order for coalition partners to ameliorate potential adverse reactions to the release by explaining the host nation’s reasons for the release.

The release of a high profile individual by a sovereign nation within the bounds of their legal system may also anger international counterterrorism partners, potentially reducing aid to land forces in that country from those same partners. This has happened more at least once in the past year with a middle eastern partner. The release tainted all security cooperation meetings and negotiations with that partner for months.

So, how do we fix it from the land forces commander perspective? Information and intelligence through interagency cooperation will provide the greatest rewards. The commander needs to know what he is doing, why, and to what end. Further, his people need to be able to perform arrests that withstand legal challenges and the commander has to be able to engage suspected terrorist or insurgents as the opportunity arises, to prevent the worst of all forms of catch and release, the missed opportunity, or never caught and still free.
To do this, land forces commanders need to become part of, or establish, a small inter-agency group with decision making and delegation or tasking authority to both authorize land force actions and to task officials to accompany land forces operations against suspects. Optimally, this interagency group would also develop an informational battle strategy that shows the land forces actions are in the interests of the population at large and justified by legal authority. The land forces also need to publicize these arrests and demonstrate transparency concerning counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations.

When writing rules of engagement concerning counterterrorism or counterinsurgency, the commander must specify the following as a minimum:

Who is in charge, who has the authority to clear, or has cleared, coalition participation in an operation, who has arrest authority, how suspects will be processed, and to whom they are turned over, who will collect and handle evidence gained after contact with a suspect, rules that protect the safety of both the public and the commander’s soldiers while minimizing collateral damage and rules for any coalition land forces involved in the operation. Further, these operations will require specific media engagement and disclosure policies.

To protect coalition forces working in a host nation, it is imperative that status of forces agreements (SOFAs) be put in place for coalition training partners and advisors. A SOFA extends the umbrella of legitimacy over the guest forces, and protects them in the discharge of their official duties. Ideally, this would include advisors and trainers of counterterrorism or counterinsurgency units, or troops assigned to conduct security cooperation activities. Many countries are reluctant to place troops at risk without some kind of protection or mandate from an international or regional organization, and a standing SOFA alleviates this concern. This usually requires government approval and can become a political football in a legislature or governing body that is split along divergent ideological lines.

The challenges of the war on terror and counterinsurgency operations will persist. The early preparedness of land forces commanders for operations engaging suspected terrorists or insurgents will facilitate their ability to respond to opportunities rapidly and will enable the United States and other coalition members to continue the fight with multiple partners, further reducing terrorist or insurgent options.

Lastly, land forces commanders may ultimately have to exert influence to obtain the passage of laws and agreements that allow them the ability to conduct counterterrorism or counterinsurgency operations while still preserving the human rights of the citizens of the country they serve.

Continued from page 3

-- The entire list of nominees will then be compiled and forwarded to the general membership. The nine nominees receiving the most votes will constitute the next BoG.

-- Voting will be done via e-mail and will end at the COB, 14 August 2009.

-- Once elected, the new BoG will select its officers.

Please consider serving on the BoG, it really is a rewarding experience.

With best wishes,
Steve Norton

Ivo Daalder is a noted writer on American foreign policy, and his latest book is a survey of the history, crisis and management of an institution not found in the United States Constitution, the position of National Security Council, and the pinnacle of advisers to the President of the United States, that of Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, also known as National Security Adviser. The book opens with Colonel Edward House, who operated as President Wilson’s de facto secretary during the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, then there was Harry Hopkins who lived and ran the White House for President Franklin Roosevelt, acting as his primary diplomat to the Soviets and the British. The creation of the National Security Council would occur under the Presidency of Harry Truman in 1947, and the designation National Security Adviser would first be used in the administration of John Kennedy. The men and one woman who have occupied the position of National Security Adviser, are charged with the awesome responsibility of defining the daily agenda of the President.

The book reveals the personalities that have shaped the position of National Security Adviser. It was under Kennedy, that the White House communications system would take a rational form, instead of being deluged with cables from around the world, all cables labeled “priority,” or higher was copied to the White House. In 1962, the 24 hour Operations Center was born, designed to keep the President informed of daily developments on the domestic and international front. Decisions in the executive branch involving foreign policy involves what is known as “the interagency process,” and the National Security Adviser is instrumental in bringing a modicum of consensus among the different agencies, most notably the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense. Some National Security Advisers saw their role as policy managers and not policy makers, others viewed themselves as making policy. Dr. Henry Kissinger would be the most influential National Security Adviser, and the only American to hold the office of Secretary of State and National Security Adviser. The authors however are highly critical of the secretive Nixon White House, and the total control exercised by Kissinger over the interagency process.
Perhaps one of the most important observations in the book is that no person should see themselves as depriving the President of his right to decide on matters that impact millions of Americans. This tragic lesson would be learned in the 1980s with the Iran-Contra Scandal. Each chapter covers a National Security Adviser and generally follows each presidential administration until the former President George W. Bush. You will learn how each administration and adviser attempted to change the structure of the National Security Council and the interagency process to suit their peculiar executive styles. Currently, retired Marine Corps General James Jones serves as the National Security Adviser, and will undertake major restructuring of the National Security Council. The NSC is chaired by the President. Its regular attendees (both statutory and non-statutory) are the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (also known as the National Security Adviser). The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the statutory military advisor to the Council, and the Director of National Intelligence is the intelligence advisor. Those with a passion for National Security Decision making will find this book a useful primer.


Potomac Books is publishing a new series of biographies entitled, “Shapers of International History,” this collection will feature men and women who for better or worse made a deep impact in influencing the course of foreign affairs. The first book published this January is on the late U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, a person who shaped not only events in World War II, but was in the middle of negotiations for the Bretton Woods Agreement that set the stage for economic globalization, and evolved into a formidable cold warrior. This volume was written by Ohio State University Professor Robert McMahon and takes you into the inner workings of America’s national policy making from 1941 until his death in 1972.

Acheson arrived in Washington DC in 1919 to serve as a clerk under Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, through this experience he would be shaped by the justice and the Chief Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. Through mentorship and networking including enduring the disappointment of being rejected for Solicitor General of the United States, Acheson was made Undersecretary of the Treasury in 1933. His term
brought him into conflict with President Roosevelt over executive authority; Acheson would resign over the principle of not violating a law passed by Congress through executive privilege. While out of government, Acheson was an outspoken advocate for the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies, a group who saw the danger of Hitler, when most Americans chose to be neutral. He and others drafted a legal opinion and published it in the New York Times, invoking the President’s constitutional authority to sell destroyers to Britain in what would evolve into the destroyers for bases deal. In 1941, he was appointed by Roosevelt to be Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. He used this position to wage economic warfare against the Axis, blocking German commerce with neutral nations. In 1943, he represented the United States to negotiate with Britain, the Soviets and Chinese over the rehabilitation of a post-World War II world.

After World War II, Acheson served as Undersecretary of State for General George Marshall, then appointed by President Truman to be Secretary of State. During this time Acheson advocated the need to infuse massive funds to Greece and Turkey that was fast being drawn into the Soviet sphere. It is here we see Acheson evolution into a Cold Warrior, and the development of the Marshall Plan to reinvigorate a Europe economically exhausted by war. Acheson drafted the 1947 Harvard address for Marshall of the plan for European recovery that would bear his name. The book continues with a tragic period of American political life, the Communist witch hunts of Senator McCarthy, Acheson would be accused of being soft on Communism for the loss of China in 1949, and the Alger Hiss espionage investigation that occurred during his tenure. The book continues with Acheson’s conception of NATO, and the negotiations of which nations to include. Italy was not an Atlantic nation, yet came into the alliance based on these negotiations. It also discusses Acheson’s role as elder statesman, advising Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy. Most notably he was consulted on the issue of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, when the United States and the Soviet Union came within a breath of a nuclear exchange. Those wanting to discover the intricacies of America’s national security policymaking will find this compact biography of Acheson’s an excellent read.

Editor’s Note: Commander Aboul-Enein served as Middle East Country Director at the Office of the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from 2002 to 2006. He currently is a Senior Counter-Terrorism Advisor at the Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism. Aboul-Enein has been a prolific contributor to the Foreign Area Officer Journal.

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After publishing in the FAO Journal articles will be uploaded on the FAOA web site (www.faoa.org).

Please e-mail articles and graphics to editor@faoa.org.

Without your articles the FAO Journal cannot be published!
Key Points in Establishing & Nurturing an Effective “Relationship with Middle Eastern Military Representatives

- Recognize that, what for Americans seems to be extraordinary hospitality and politeness from Host Nation (HN) counterparts, are standard obligations, not indicators of “hitting it off.”

- Present a calm, patient, even-tempered persona. Avoid expressing classic type-A traits. Expect to reach your objectives eventually by effective “influence” upon your HN counterpart. Influence by demonstration on your part is more impacting than lectures. Influence will be accomplished by first gaining respect and trust. This takes time and effort—meaning investing in frequent encounters—even if there is no particular outcome expected other than a pleasant time with a colleague/friend.

- Initial relationships will be characterized by discussions involving the pertinent work issues at hand preceded, interspersed, and concluded with considerable chats on personal, non-work-related subjects, including politics and religion. Family, children, sports, travel, and cuisine are safe subjects to use as vehicles to get to know one another.

- Eventually, politics and religion will be addressed however obliquely/subtly, and one must be sensitive to those opportunities. Revealing personal attributes about oneself is key to advancing the relationship towards increased effectiveness on the job. Belief in GOD, no matter what faith/denomination is a positive aspect of one’s upbringing and moral character. No need to be shy about expressing one’s religiosity—provided it is one of the three Abrahamic faiths: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Avoid theological debates aimed at countering, disputing, or arguing. Allow the HN counterpart to “present” Islam and politely listen with interest. There is no expectation to convert.

- Inevitable chats on contemporary politics and regional history will afford opportunities to appear as a professional service member carrying out assigned duties. Appear sympathetic to morally-based grievances such as the plight of Palestinians. Avoid argumentative discussions. One can “win” a debate and alienate the HN counterpart and thereby sour the relationship or diminish what could be accomplished together.

- Think of the Middle East as the western edge of Asian civilization. Middle Easterners use subteness, indirectness, and politeness to avoid direct confrontation, use intermediaries to resolve conflict, value seniority, and group imperatives over the individual. Gain awareness of what is not said, which can contain important, communicative information. A basic example is a situation in which previous levels of hospitality or responsiveness to favors are now reduced, indicating a possible
problem, even though the actual hospitality is still excessive by American standards.

- Some indicators of a deepening inter-personal relationship are touching (HN counterpart initiating cheek pecks and hand/arm holding) and work-related and/or social off-duty rendezvous. At this stage, expect HN counterpart requests for “favors” typically involving some form of “shortcutting the system.” The good news is you too are expected to call in favors. Use your cards judiciously.

- Be cautious to what you pledge to do. It looks better to subtly indicate you’ll work on it—and deliver—rather than state you’ll do it and fall short.

- Conversation is a vehicle to establish, nurture, and enjoy the relationship. Prolonging positive topics of discussion, exaggerating positive aspects, and portraying the future as vaguely positive, is a communication style that is not expected to be held to one’s word after the encounter as it would be by honorable men in the “West.” One has to learn to discern what is said for the pleasure of the moment among friends, versus what is really meant to be acted upon afterwards.
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