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Dear FAO Colleagues,

On 8 October we will have our next FAOA Policy-Luncheon at the Ft. McNair Officers’ Club (in the larger room upstairs). Our featured speaker is General Anthony Zinni, USMC, Ret. and former commander of USCENTCOM. This promises to be an extremely interesting event and one that, I’m sure, you will benefit from and enjoy. You will find a copy of General Zinni’s biography and a link to make your reservation at www.faoa.org. Click on the “Events” button.

LTG Patrick Hughes, USA, Ret., and former Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency will be our featured speaker at the Policy-Luncheon subsequent to the one on 8 October. We are planning to hold this one in early December and I will announce the exact date in the near future. General Hughes has prepared a thought provoking, sobering and visionary “One over the World” presentation on the many issues that beset us: social, economic, environmental, political, and security. He will touch on all geographic areas so no matter what your specific regional FAO specialty happens to be there will something of interest for you.

Finally, I would like to encourage all of our members, active, reserve, and retired, to consider writing an article for our FAO Journal. You all have interesting, unique, and compelling experiences that are worth sharing with our community. Please contact LTC Steve Gotowicki, USA, Ret. at editor@faoa.org for more information or to submit your article.

I look forward to seeing as many of you as possible on 8 October Policy-Luncheon.

Best regards,

Steve Norton
Drug-related violence in the border town of Nuevo Laredo, the major portal for U.S.-Mexican commerce, left the city of 350,000 without a police chief until printing-shop owner Alejandro Dominguez Coello valiantly accepted the post on the morning of June 8, 2005. "I'm not beholden to anyone. My commitment is to the citizenry," stated the 56-year-old father of three. Within six hours, he lay in a thickening pool of blood after hit men believed to belong to Los Zetas paramilitary force fired more than 30 bullets into his body. Their message was clear: narco-traffickers control the streets of Nuevo Laredo. "They are openly defying the Mexican state," said Mexico City political scientist Jorge Chabat. "They are showing that they can kill anybody at any time. It's chilling."[1]

The brutal, daylight murder of Dominguez provides an insight into why Mexican scholar Raul Benitez insists that "Los Zetas have clearly become the biggest, most serious threat to the nation's security."[2] Meanwhile, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration advises that these brigands "may be the most technologically advanced, sophisticated and violent of these paramilitary enforcement groups."[3]

ORIGINS:

The several dozen drug bands that operate in Mexico furnish the lion's share of cocaine, marijuana, heroin, and methamphetamines that enter this country. They also accounted for more than 4,500 deaths during the past two years—with the figure spiraling to 961 by April 18 of this year. These facts have spurred the White House to urge furnishing $500 million as the first tranche of a $1.4 billion, multi-year security cooperation package. This "Merida Initiative" would include aircraft, software, hardware, communications technology, training to strengthen the judicial system, intelligence instruction, and advice on vetting new law-enforcement personnel (ubiquitous police corruption is the Achilles' heel of Mexico's battle against the production and transport of drugs). A reluctant U.S. Congress, which is now pondering the program, may not act until after the November election.

Of narco-trafficking organizations, two stand out in terms of suborning officials, amassing resources, and authoring violent acts: the Gulf Cartel, headquartered just below Texas in Tamaulipas state, and its chief rival, the Sinaloa Cartel, centered in Sinaloa state that nests between the Sierra Madre Mountains and the Pacific Ocean.

In early 1997, the Gulf syndicate began to recruit military personnel whom General Jesus Gutierrez Rebollo—Mexico's "drug czar" who was imprisoned for corruption—began to assign Army officers as representatives of the Attorney General's Office (PGR) in northern states. In the late 1990s, Osiel Cardenas Guillen, who was in a no-holds-barred fight for leadership of the notorious organization, sought out members of the Army's elite Airborne Special Forces Groups (Gafes) to provide protection and perform other vital functions. His top recruit, Lieutenant Arturo Guzman Decenas, brought with him approximately 30 other deserters enticed by salaries substantially higher than those paid by the Mexican government.[5] The original defectors, whose nicknames include "El Winnie Pooh," "The Little Mother," and "El Guerra," had belonged to the 15th and 70th Infantry Battalions.
and the 15th Motorized Cavalry Regiment.[6] Once Cardenas Guillen consolidated his position, he expanded the role of Los Zetas to collecting debts, securing cocaine supply and trafficking routes known as plazas, discouraging defections from the cartel, and executing its foes—often with grotesque savagery.

After the military killed Guzman Decenas (November 2002) and captured his second-in-command, Rogelio Gonzalez Pizana (October 2004), ex-Gafe Heriberto "The Executioner" Lazcano Lazcano ascended to the apex of the paramilitaries. The arrest (March 2003) and deportation to the United States (January 2007) of Cardenas Guillen emboldened Lazcano and his number-one henchman--Jaime "The Hummer" Gonzalez Duran--to act independently of the other vicious contenders to head the cartel: Osiel's brother Ezekiel and former municipal policeman Jorge Eduardo Costilla Sanchez. "The Gulf cartel created the lion, but now the lion has wised up and controls the handler," stated a U.S. law enforcement official. "The Zetas don't ask the Gulf cartel permission for anything anymore. They simply inform them of their activities whenever they feel like it"[7]

Los Zetas emerged as the most dangerous force in the cities of Matamoros, Reynosa, and Nuevo Laredo in Tamaulipas. In addition to conducting activities along the border, they are visible throughout the Gulf Coast region, in the Southern states of Tabasco, Yucatan, Quintano Roo, and Chiapas, and in the Pacific Coast states of Guerrero, Oaxaca, and Michoacan, as well as in Mexico City.[8] They are also active in Texas and, possibly, other U.S. states.

RESOURCES AND ORGANIZATION:

Los Zetas' training as a local version of the Green Berets constitutes their foremost asset. In cooperation with their U.S. counterparts, the Mexican military created the Gafes in mid-1990s. Foreign specialists, including Americans, French, and Israelis, instructed members of this elite unit in rapid deployment, aerial assaults, marksman ship, ambushes, intelligence collection, counter-surveillance techniques, prisoner rescues, sophisticated communications, and the art of intimidation. President Felipe Calderon, who took office in December 2006, has placed the Army in the forefront of the war against drugs. It is ironic that loyal Gafes helped to capture kingpins such as Cardenas Guillen, whom Gafes-turned-Zetas were hired to safeguard.

Los Zetas have set up camps in which to train recruits aged 15 to 18 years old, as well as ex-federal, state, and local police officers. In addition, they have invited into their ranks ex-troops from Guatemala known as Kaibiles. Reviled as "killing machines," these tough-as-nails experts in jungle warfare and counterinsurgency adhere to the motto: "If I advance, follow me. If I stop, urge me on. If I retreat, kill me."

Their arsenal includes AR-15 and AK-47 assault rifles, MP5s submachine guns, 50-mm machine guns, grenade launchers, ground-to-air missiles, dynamite, bazookas, and helicopters.

When conducting operations, they wear dark clothing, blacken their faces, drive new, stolen SUVs, and delight in torturing victims before administering the coup de grace. Some criminals carry images of bandit Jesus Malverde, the "Narco Saint" known also as the "Generous One" and "The Angel of the Poor" because of his fight for the downtrodden against a nineteenth-century dictatorship.

There are several other Los Zetas groups in addition to commandoes. Los Halcones (The Hawks) keep watch over distribution zones; authorities have found 80 members, equipped with radio-transmitters, in Matamoros alone. Las Ventanas (The Windows) comprise bike-riding young-
sters in their mid-teens who whistle to warn of the presence of police and other suspicious individuals near small stores that sell drugs. Los Manosos (The Cunning Ones) acquire arms; Las Leopardos (Leopards) are prostitutes who slyly extract information from their clients; and Dirección (Command) are approximately 20 communications experts who intercept phone calls, follow and identify suspicious automobiles, and even accomplish kidnappings and executions.[9]

Furthermore, Los Zetas have forged links with "La Familia" enforcer gangs in Michoacan, the venue for cocaine imports and methamphetamine laboratories, which regularly crosses swords with the Sinaloa Cartel and its allies.

Los Zetas may number between 100 and 200 men and women, most of whom are believed to be in their early- to mid-twenties. Although the Army has detailed information about deserters, even key law enforcement agencies must guess at their size and composition because small-time criminals identify themselves as "Zetas" in hopes of exciting fear in their victims. "It's gotten to the point where you get drunk, shoot at some cans and paint your face black, and that makes you a Zeta. . . . A lot of it is image and myth."[10]

To enhance their esprit de corps, Los Zetas go to great lengths to retrieve the bodies of their fallen comrades-in-arms. In what pundits labeled the "invasion of the body snatchers," in early March 2007 four armed men broke into the graveyard in the town of Poza Rica, Veracruz state, tied up a security guard, smashed Roberto Carlos Carmona's gravestone with hammers, and carried off his ornate coffin containing their comrade's corpse.[11]

They also honor their dead. Three months after authorities killed Guzman Decena in late 2002, a funeral wreath and four flower arrangements appeared at his gravesite with the inscription "We will always keep you in our heart: from your family, Los Zetas."

In addition, they retaliate with sadistic savagery against their enemies. Witnesses claim that the paramilitaries set fire to four Nuevo Laredo police officers inside barrels filled with diesel fuel. Their remains were buried there the next day.[12]

For security purposes, Los Zetas have adopted a cell-like structure to limit the information that any one member of the organization knows about his associates.

MAJOR OPERATIONS:

Los Zetas most notable strikes over the past several years include the following:

* June 2007: Robbed casinos in the states of Nuevo Leon, Veracruz, Coahuila, and Baja California in a move to gain a share of these businesses.

* May 2007: Kidnapped and later murdered Jacinto Pablo Granda, a Mexican infantry captain near Chilpancingo, Guerrero.

* April 2007: Gunned down local police chief, Ernesto Gutierrez Moreno as he dined at a restaurant with his wife and son in Chilpancingo. *

* March 2007: Believed to have attempted to murder the secretary of public safety in Tabasco, Francisco Fernandez Solis.

* February 2007: Dressed in military uniforms, they disarmed and massacred five police officers and two administrative assistants in Acapulco.

* March 2006: Forced the resignation of Nuevo Laredo police chief, Omar Pimentel, after eight months in office. He stepped down hours after police found three charred bodies dumped by the side of a road leading into the border city.

* June 2005: Killed Alejandro Dominguez Coello, the police chief of Nuevo Laredo.

MAJOR SETBACKS:

President Calderon, who has compared Los Zetas to Al Queda, has made combating the drug mafias his highest law-enforcement goal. Some of his successes and those of his predecessor, Vicente Fox, include:

* April 2008: Army units apprehended Armando Gonzalez Lazcano, police chief of the Apan, Hidalgo, and his brother Alberto "The Red" Gonzalez Lazcano, who are believed to be linked to Los Zetas (they are nephews of the local director of public security) and who possessed a fragmentation grenade, an AR-15 rifle, and a 45-mm pistol.

* April 2008: Guatemalan authorities caught and imprisoned Daniel "The Basher" Perez Rojas, one of the first Zetas to sign up with the Gulf Cartel and a confidant of Costilla Sanchez.

* April 2008: Secretary of Public Security Genaro Garcia Luna reported that his agency had spearheaded the capture of Jose Alberto Martinez Medrano and four accomplices, who had had $6 million in their possession, in Nuevo Laredo; the following day, the Ministry of National Defense issued a communiqué, indicating that the 5th Motorized Cavalry Regiment had accomplished the April 2 arrest and that the amount seized was $6.1 million. (Defense Secretary Guillermo Galvan Galvan’s dislike of Garcia Luna sparks such turf battles and impedes cohesion within Calderon’s Security Cabinet.)

* March 2008: The Army and the PGR took into custody Raul "Dutchman 1" Hernandez Barron, believed to be a founder of the Zetas who controlled the Gulf Cartel’s drug trafficking in Northern Veracruz.

* February 2008: Military forces discovered a weapons cache in Nuevo Laredo that included eight military uniforms to be used as disguises.

* February 2008: Soldiers raided the "El Mezquito" ranch west of Reynosa and found one of the largest illegal arsenals in recent memory: 89 assault rifles, 83,355 rounds of ammunition, and plastic explosives capable of demolishing buildings.

* January 2008: The Ministry of Public Security (SPP) announced the capture of former municipal police director Hector Izar Castro in San Luis Potosi, where he is believed to have been a leader of the local cell of Los Zetas. His cache of supplies included an AR-180 rifle, three hand guns, 100 cartridges, 65 packages of cocaine, and three paddles bearing the letter "Z", which were used to beat foes.

* January 13, 2008: The SPP reported the apprehension of 11 people, most of whom were former military men, in San Pedro de las Colonias, Coahuila. The Zetas had been using an auto workshop to dismantle stolen cars. The federal police also arrested the town's police commander and four police officers, while seizing 23 walkie-talkies, 17 cell phones, nine cars, one motorbike, 28 kilograms of marijuana, and weapons, including five semi-automatic rifles, one shotgun, one revolver and one rifle.

* April 2007: The Attorney General’s Office announced the capture of Eleazar Medina Rojas and nine other Zetas in Nuevo Laredo. Identified as a top killer and kidnapper for the Gulf Cartel, Medina Rojas had a stash of weapons, including an AR15, a Colt .223, a Belgian-made PS90, a Beretta, and various cartridges, as well as cell phones, radios, bulletproof vests, and a collection of vehicles.

* April 2007: Authorities apprehended Nabor "El Debora" Vargas Garcia, a founder of Los Zetas, and 20 allies after a shootout in Ciudad del Carmen, Campeche. The government claims that
Vargas Garcia, who admitted to serving in the Presidential Guard's assault battalion, ran Los Zetas in Tabasco, Campeche, and Chiapas.


* September 2006: The Army arrested three former Guatemalan soldiers and five presumed Zetas in Aguililla, Michoacan. They found in their possession 12 assault rifles AK-47 and AR-15; one 9-mm pistol, and three thousand rounds of ammunition; three fragmentation grenades, blacks fatigues, tactical vests and 10 Kevlar ballistic helmets.

BILATERAL ISSUES:

President Calderon has pledged to pursue all of Mexico's criminal organizations. To this end, he has dispatched 25,000 soldiers, marines, sailors, and federal police to more than a dozen states and cities. Limited resources mean that he will have to set priorities. Although the Sinaloa Cartel remains an important enemy of the state, it is less violent than its Gulf/Zeta counterpart; it does not have a paramilitary capability; and the inter-marriage of the families that work under its umbrella invest it with a cohesion lacking in the Gulf/Zeta mafia, which suffered the loss of its capo, Cardenas Guillen.

Moreover, the recent success of Mexican law enforcement agencies aside, Los Zetas pose a more serious threat to citizens on both sides of the border.

First, many of the commandos have homes north of the Rio Grande where they seek safe haven and where they attempt to lure young Americans into their clutches.

Second, drug distribution routes run through the United States, which means that the narco-gangsters have no respect for international boundaries. The U.S. Justice Department bulletin has warned that: "The violence will spill over the Mexican border into the United States and law enforcement agencies in Texas, Arizona and Southern California can expect to encounter Los Zetas in the coming months." In March, the Justice Department said the Zetas were involved "in multiple assaults and are believed to have hired criminal gangs" in the Dallas area for contract killings, according to the Dallas Morning News.[13] In fact, Los Zetas are believed to have carried out executions in Texas and other American states. The Dallas police have launched a search for Maximo Garcia Carrillo, a suspected Zeta who owns a house in the Oak Cliff suburb of the city, who is believed to have killed police officer Mark Nix. Known as a "second-generation" Zeta, the 34-year-old Garcia Carrillo travels with bodyguards armed with automatic weapons and grenade launchers. Reportedly, Los Zetas, who consider Dallas a key point for the transportation and distribution of drugs, also pursue their criminality in Houston, San Antonio, Brownsville, Laredo, and Del Rio.

Third, the FBI has reported that Los Zetas have control over such U.S.-based gangs as the Mexican Mafia, the Texas Syndicate, MS-13, and the Hermanos Pistoleros Latinos.[14]

Fourth, Los Zetas allegedly conduct training at locations southwest of Matamoros, across the border from Brownsville; just north of the Nuevo Laredo airport; near the town of Abasolo, between Matamoros and Ciudad Victoria; and at a place called "Rancho Las Amarrillas," near a rural community, China, that is close to the Nuevo Leon-Tamaulipas border. To the degree that the Calderon administration achieves more successes, the paramilitary criminals may move their boot camps into the U.S.[15] The escalating violence at the border prompted Ambassador Tony Garza to close temporarily the United States Consulate in Nuevo Laredo.
Fifth, the armed forces, with which the U.S. enjoys unprecedented cooperation, are especially eager to track down Los Zetas because of the embarrassment they represent to their institution. In fact, the Defense Ministry has requested that the Mexican Congress authorize both the trial in military courts of deserters who cast their lot with cartels and the imposition of prison sentences of up to sixty years for such soldiers.[16]

Finally, as mentioned earlier, Los Zetas are involved in myriad criminal activities. They have branched out into kidnappings, murder-for-hire, assassinations, extortion, money-laundering, and human smuggling. At the right price, these bloodthirsty mercenaries could move into terrorism focused on vulnerable targets in Texas and throughout the Southwest. With or without the Merida Initiative, authorities on both sides of the border should concentrate on curbing the growth of these lethal paramilitaries.

George W. Grayson is the Class of 1938 Professor of Government at the College of William & Mary, an associate scholar at FPRI and a senior associate at the Center for Strategic & International Studies. His latest book, Mexican Messiah (Penn State University Press, 2007), is a biography of Mexico’s self-anointed “legitimate president,” Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador. The New York-based Foreign Policy Association will publish Grayson’s monograph on U.S.-Mexican narcotics relations.

Endnotes


[4] The Mexican Army has several special forces units, including the regular Gafes, who are deployed in the twelve military regions; and the extremely select “High Command Special Forces Airmobile Group,” whose cadres report directly to the Secretary of Defense.


On 20 May 2008 at Patch Barracks, Stuttgart, Germany, the home of the US European Command (EUCOM), I participated in my retirement ceremony 30 years to the day that I was commissioned. The ceremony was presided over by my boss, the EUCOM Deputy Commander VADM Richard Gallagher. It was also attended by the Commander of Stuttgart’s other COCOM - AFRICOM, GEN William Ward, as well as many other general and flag officers, colleagues, and guests.

I don’t want to bore you with my career summary nor with most of my remarks at the ceremony. I did however, want to share with you the remarks I presented to those assembled which had to do with being a Foreign Area Officer. As one General Officer noted after the ceremony; “Mike, that was the most succinct rationale and “sales pitch” for being a FAO that I have heard. You should share your words.” With his encouragement that is what I am doing here.

“...MY FINAL TAKE AWAY MESSAGE FOR YOU HAS TO DO WITH MY PASSION WHILE WEARING THE UNIFORM – SERVICE AS A FAO.

MY RETIREMENT CERTIFICATE NOTED THAT I WAS COMMISSIONED A MEMBER OF THE ORDNANCE CORPS. WHILE I’M NOT WEARING ORDNANCE BRASS TODAY... I AM PROUD OF MY ORDNANCE SERVICE. BUT IT IS BEING A FAO, NO, NOT “FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING OFFICER”, BUT A “FOREIGN AREA OFFICER”, THAT I HAVE MOST RELISHED, THAT HAS MOST INSPIRED ME, WHERE I BELIEVE I’VE MADE THE GREATEST CONTRIBUTIONS IN UNIFORM. WHERE I BELIEVE I’LL CONTINUE TO CONTRIBUTE AS A GOVT CIVILIAN.

- I’VE BEEN A FAO SINCE 1985, 23 OF MY 30 YEARS. I WASN’T EVEN SUPPOSED TO BE HERE TODAY AS A FAO.
- BACK IN 1985 I WAS TOLD BY MY DIVISION SUPPORT COMMANDER (DISCOM) AT FORT POLK THAT BY TAKING FAO AS A FUNCTIONAL AREA, I’D NEVER MAKE COL, NEVER RETIRE WITH 30 YEARS.
- HE WAS WELL INTENDED...HE HAD A SUCCESSFUL ORDNANCE CO CDR HE WAS LOOKING OUT FOR. BUT DESPITE HIS WARNING AND IN SPITE OF THE CAREER RISKS, I FOLLOWED MY PASSION. I BECAME A FOREIGN AREA OFFICER.
- DOING SO HAS GIVEN ME JOY DURING MY CAREER. DOING SO HAS PERMITTED ME TO HAVE A VISION, A BELIEF AND TO GO ABOUT IMPLEMENTING THAT DURING VARIOUS ASSIGNMENTS. MY BELIEF IS A SIMPLE ONE – THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO TALK, TO DIALOGUE, TO COMMUNICATE AND IDEALLY, COOPERATE WITH NATIONS AND THEIR MILITARIES. I BELIEVE A FAO IS PARTICULARLY WELL-SUITED TO MAKING THOSE TYPES OF OUTREACH OVERTURES. AND I CAN THINK OF A NUMBER OF TIMES I’VE BEEN ABLE TO DO JUST THAT DURING MY CAREER AND BOTH WITNESS, AND IN A WAY, INFLUENCE HISTORY:

1. FROM VISITING WITH THE THEN HEAD OF GAZPROM, NOW PRESIDENT OF RUSSIA MEDVEDEV, IN THEIR GLEAMING, GLASS HQ IN MOSCOW FOR THE PURPOSE OF DISCUSSING ENERGY SECURITY AND FOLLOWING THAT WITH A VISIT TO LAKE BAIKAL IN SIBERIA WITH A SENIOR US SENATOR.

2. TO DISCUSSING ISRAELI SECURITY ISSUES WHILE BEING SHOWN THE GOLAN HEIGHTS AND HIZBOLLAH SNIPER POSI-
TIONS (AND AS A BONUS, ALSO WALKING IN CHRIST’S FOOTSTEPS ALONG THE SEA OF GALILEE) WITH MEMBERS OF THE ISRAELI DEFENSE FORCES...

3. TO ADDRESSING A ROYAL THINK TANK IN LONDON ABOUT OUR EUCOM “CASPIAN GUARD” INITIATIVE

4. TO SURREPTIOUSLY MEETING WITH A “CONTACT” IN A CEMETARY IN DENMARK AND OBTAINING AERIAL PHOTOS OF THE THEN LITTLE KNOWN COUNTRY CALLED AFGHANISTAN AND ITS CITIES OF KANDAHAR AND KABUL, ONLY DAYS AFTER 9/11... ALL WHILE REPRESENTING MY COUNTRY AS AN ATTACHE IN THE KINGDOM OF DENMARK, MY “ANDERSEN” ANCESTRAL HOME

5. TO BEING PROUD OF ORGANIZING A “CAVALRY CHARGE” BY MOUNTED SOLDIERS OF THE 1ST CAV DIV, AS THEY IMPRESSED THE HECK OUT OF VISITING ISRAELI GENERALS AND SLICED WATERMELONS WITH THEIR SABRES.

6. TO ORGANIZING IN 2004 THE FIRST AFRICA CLEARINGHOUSE FOR COORDINATING SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO AFRICAN NATIONS – THIS AS A EUROPEAN FAO NO LESS... IN LUXEMBOURG WITH A GATHERING OF FORMER COLONIAL POWERS... AND THEN PROUDLY HEARING THAT THE INITIATIVE WAS SO-WELL RECEIVED THAT THE G8 ADOPTED AND NOW CHAIRS IT.

7. TO CONDUCTING TOWN HALL MEETINGS WITH VILLAGERS AND MAYORS OF SMALL, POOR TOWNS AROUND TASZAR AIR BASE, HUNGARY, TO EXPLAIN WHY OUR US RECEPTION AND STAGING OCCUPANY OF THE FORMER SOVIET AIR BASE WAS AFFECTING THEIR WATER SUPPLIES - DURING THE 1995 IFOR MISSION INTO BOSNIA

8. TO TRAVELING THROUGHOUT AND CLANDESTinely REPORTING ON LIFE IN THE GDR, EAST GERMANY ...TO MEETING SOVIET OFFICERS AND EAST GERMAN SOLDIERS, TO SEEING AND HEARING THINGS THAT I THEN REPORTED ON ... A FULL 6 MONTHS PRIOR TO THE FALL OF THE BERLIN WALL IN 1989

9. TO ESTABLISHING THE SOUTH CAUCASUS CLEARINGHOUSE, BY SEEKING OUT THE BALTIC STATES, AS RECENT NATO INDUCTEES, AND AFFORDING THEM THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE CONTRIBUTORS TO REGIONAL SECURITY AND NOT JUST RECIPIENTS, TO PERMITTING THEM TO TAKE A LEAD ROLE IN COORDINATING SECURITY COOPERATION IN GEORGIA, AZERBAIJAN AND ARMENIA.
10. To founding in 2003 a US-Russian Colonels Working Group for Coordinating all military to military activities between the US Armed Forces and Russian Armed Forces – talk about dialogue with a challenging nation, but the right thing to do.

11. To finally, and perhaps most importantly, to inspiring many who worked for me, from all services, to also become FAO’s.

So you can see, I am most proud of having been a Foreign Area Officer, a soldier-statesman, putting into practice my own “vision thing”, a vision that says that we are best as a nation, as a military, when we are prepared to communicate and “outreach” to the militaries of other nations...

COL Mike Anderson retired from active duty service on 1 Sept 2008. A FAO for 23 of his 30 years of service, Mike has remained in Europe. He now works as US European Command’s Strategic Outreach Coordinator. He continues to serve in a FAO-like capacity responsible for the Command’s international and interagency outreach engagement efforts. He can be reached at andersmi@eucom.mil.

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 Attaché Risk Versus Reward  
By LTC Michael Janser, USA

R&R may mean “rest and relaxation” to a Foreign Area Officer’s brethren—the commercial attaché—but for the hard working military attaché it refers to risk versus reward. FAOs are frequently heralded as strategic scouts. We are also in a unique position because our mistakes can have a significant negative impact. In executing their duties in the field, FAOs must carefully evaluate the risk versus reward of their actions as it can have consequences far beyond the specific act itself. Unfortunately, there are inherent flaws in how this “risk analysis” is carried out in the field; these flaws, however, can be mitigated through a structured and organized approach to risk analysis.

In Attaché School, the concept of risk-versus-reward is taught from the beginning and continually reinforced. Two vignettes of US attachés that had been detained and expelled from their host nations are analyzed and discussed in depth. The take-away lesson is that the person on the ground decides what risks are worth taking and then applies common sense and professional judgment to the specific situation. There is one major problem with this method: everyone has their own opinion of what constitutes common sense.

In the field, this can play out like the following scenario: an attaché does something that he believes is smart and based on common sense, but the Defense Attaché (DATT) disagrees; the attaché on the ground loses. This situation could be avoided if the DATT gave exact guidance on every possible situation that an attaché might encounter, but this is not possible. What is possible, however, is for the DATT to have a better understanding of situations that might arise and for attachés to have a better understanding of the DATT’s guidance.

As the head of the office, the DATT is in the best position to assess the high-level political climate and is thus responsible for setting priorities. With the assistance of the collection manager he can assess home office requirements in light of the current climate. After taking this top-down approach to prioritizing missions and deciding what degree of risk is acceptable for each, he then communicates his priorities and guidance to the attachés in the office. Experience has shown that error can work its way into this system in several areas. One is within the DATT’s understanding of the risks and options available to attachés during travel. Many DATTs come to the job with no prior attaché experience. Even if they have prior experience, it may have been in a different country or during a different time period in the country’s history. Once in country, the DATT’s opportunity to engage in operational travel is limited due to support requirements for high-level talks and delegations. The result is that the DATT is not always aware of what attachés are doing or can do.

A second major source of error is in communicating guidance from the office to traveling attachés. Because on any given trip an attaché can encounter many different targets and many different situations, it is impossible to give concrete guidance that will apply to every possible instance. Only during very unusual situations, such as an ongoing crisis or the imminent visit of a significant Very Important Person (VIP), will there be specific guidance to be more aggressive or purposely hold back. In general, the guidance resembles “keep it safe out there,” which is so vague as to be practically useless.

Most attachés have their own level of common sense (or willingness and capacity) to handle the risk of detention and/or expulsion. Within a large office, there can be in excess of ten attachés. Within this large group, there can be attachés ranging in rank from O3 to O7. With this wide range of pay grades also comes a signifi-
cant variance in age and experience. Additionally, other differences such as gender, martial status, family status, and military service and branch cultures add dynamics that must be considered. Conventional wisdom holds that younger people will take more risks than older people; single people will take more risks than married people; and people with more roots in a community, e.g., with kids in school and spouses with jobs, will take fewer risks than those without school-age kids and more mobile spouses. In addition, service- or branch-specific culture can affect one’s risk profile. Besides natural self-selection, the attitudes of a Navy fighter pilot toward risk may be different based on training and experiences than that of an Air Force logistician. The combination of all these factors contributes to a wide variance in risk-seeking/risk-avoidance personalities within an office.

LTC (Ret.) Roy Peterson, in his book *American Attaché in the Moscow Maelstrom*, recounts his experience as an assistant Army attaché and collection manager from 1983-1985. In the book, he provides good detail on not only what information he targeted, but also the general methods he used to collect information. In describing the various situations he also provided insight to the risk-versus-reward calculus he used. Using this as an example, some recommendations can be provided to improve Defense Attaché System (DAS) operations. In describing what he was collecting, LTC Peterson also described collection priorities. His prioritization system specified military targets as the most important followed by political and economic issues and lastly socio-cultural issues. Applying Peterson’s methodology to the specific examples cited in his book yields the complete list of 91 collection requirements prioritized from top to bottom as shown in Appendix 1. (The actual list off of which he was working was undoubtedly longer.)

While this list is long, it is not impossibly long in light of the mission’s importance. In addition, by combining similar items such as the location of Navy facilities and the location of Army facilities into simply the location of a static military facility, the list could be shortened substantially. Below is a representative sample from that list:

1. Are there any terrorists present?
2. What are the current military activities?
3. What camouflage techniques do they use?
4. Identify equipment signatures?
5. What military equipment is there?
6. Where are the naval facilities?
7. Which vehicles are in a convoy?
8. What is the level of soldier morale?
9. What defense industries exist?
10. What is the political situation?
11. Where is the IBM production plant?
12. Who is working late in government offices?
13. Has host nation CI stolen any items?
14. What is the availability of meat in markets?
15. What are the future assignments of attachés?

In his book, LTC Peterson also addresses collection techniques. In reading the book, we learn that an American officer is killed by the Soviets and that there are several opportunities for physical violence, car crashes, detentions, and formal written complaints. Using the logic that an attaché’s mission is to remain in-country and continue to perform his duties, the various collection techniques can be categorized by risk. Those that have the greatest likelihood of death, detention, or expulsion are the most risky. The complete list contains 84 different activities and is shown in Appendix 2. Again, this is a long list (and the actual list is probably longer), but given the importance of the mission and the ability to combine similar activities, a workable list could be created. Below is a small representative list of activities:

1. Engage in a dangerous high speed chase.
2. Drive off road to avoid a roadblock.
3. Look in the desks in government offices.
4. Use specialized equipment.
5. Take photographs using the viewfinder.
6. Take pictures without using the viewfinder.
7. Bribe a sales lady in a military clothing store.
8. Go on a collection trip outside the capital.
10. Take a railroad spike.
11 Take written notes.
12 Use elicitation techniques.
13 Take a civilian led tour of a city.
14 Attend a diplomatic gathering.
15 Mentally note place names for significance.

By juxtaposing these two lists (see list A), an attaché is more able to discuss the risk-versus-reward of different collection targets and different collection activities.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>L</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Are there any terrorists present?</td>
<td>What are the current military activities?</td>
<td>What camouflage techniques do they use?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engage in a dangerous high speed chase.</td>
<td>Drive off road to avoid a roadblock.</td>
<td>Look in the desks in government offices.</td>
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<tr>
<td>L</td>
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<tr>
<td>Is what is the level of soldier morale?</td>
<td>What defense industries exist?</td>
<td>What is the political situation?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Go on a collection trip outside the capital.</td>
<td>Buy a telephone directory.</td>
<td>Take a railroad spike.</td>
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<tr>
<td>L</td>
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<tr>
<td>Is what is the availability of meat in markets?</td>
<td>Where is the naval facilities?</td>
<td>Identify equipment signatures?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mentally note place names for significance.</td>
<td>Which vehicles are in a convoy?</td>
<td>Take photographs using the viewfinder.</td>
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<td>L</td>
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<tr>
<td>Who is working late in government offices?</td>
<td>Has host nation CI stolen any items?</td>
<td>Where is the IBM production plant?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Take a civilian led tour of a city.</td>
<td>Attend a diplomatic gathering.</td>
<td>Use specialized equipment.</td>
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<tr>
<td>L</td>
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<tr>
<td>What are the future assignments of attachés?</td>
<td>What is the political situation?</td>
<td>Identify equipment signatures?</td>
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<td>A</td>
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<tr>
<td>A</td>
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A more useful application may be to make the lists so that they adjust independently such as one finds on a slide rule (see List B next page). For example, if an attaché is attempting to determine the location of a naval facility, then based on the DATT’s determination, everything below the line—or less risky than and including the use of specialized equipment—is authorized and encouraged.

As previously discussed, the DATT should set the risk tolerance for the office. In this situation, an attaché could be open to reprimand for using overly aggressive techniques such as a high-speed chase for a limited value target. Likewise, an attaché who takes the overly conservative position of not using photography or not taking written notes is also open to criticism.

The actual construction of this training aid could take many forms. Printed out lists from a word processor could be taped side-by-side on a briefing board. There are also magnetic strips for white boards that hold one easily erasable bullet comment. The most useful application may be to keep a complete list of both targets and activities in a shared folder of the office computer system. These lists could then be updated as needed. The collection manager could then create and maintain a subset of representative lists that could be used to facilitate discussion. Maintaining the activities list on a share drive would allow for anonymous updating. This could be important for attachés that have engaged in activities or have considered certain activities that they may be embarrassed to admit in front of their senior rater.

Getting this complete list that spans the entire range of possibilities is important for two reasons. First, it may show collection activities that other attachés had not thought of. Second, activities that may be damnable under normal conditions may be commendable in times of crisis.

A related tool that the DATT could use in addressing the collection environment is some sort of thermometer of political tensions. LTC Peterson cites several incidents that allude to the political climate. These include the Soviet inva
sion of Afghanistan, the killing of an American officer in Germany, and the visit of Vice-President Bush. Thinking of other Russian examples could yield a chart such as:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BAD</th>
<th>AVERAGE</th>
<th>GOOD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Invasion of Afghanistan</td>
<td>5 Cooperation with NATO</td>
<td>8 SecDef Visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Killing of American Officer</td>
<td>6 Salt II Treaty</td>
<td>9 Vice-presidential visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Support for Saddam Hussein</td>
<td>7 Cooperation in Bosnia</td>
<td>10 POTUS visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Support for Fidel Castro</td>
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A final tool that could increase an office’s understating of risk-versus-reward is a database of host nation detentions. By reviewing two expulsion cases, the Attaché School shows that it recognizes the value in this teaching method. However, reviewing two dated cases prior to an assignment does not provide enough current material for offices to discuss ongoing operations. Detentions occur with regular frequency, and offices should treat them as a normal risk in doing business and not as an embarrassing, need-to-know, OPSEC issue. Detentions can occur even when no mistakes are made. Additionally, expulsions—especially when you account for allied third country attachés—also occur. Capturing the facts of these cases and using them as vignettes and case studies to discuss risk-versus-reward could enhance an attaché’s understanding of opera-
tional hazards as well as the DATT's guidance. In this manner, the veil of secrecy can be lifted and incidents resulting in detentions and expulsions can be studied and analyzed for lessons learned rather than leaving attachés to guess at what went right and what went wrong.

LTC Peterson's book is insightful in its depiction of attaché life and is useful in analyzing that life. He correctly points out many of the risks and rewards in being an attaché. These risks include upsetting delicate bilateral relations should an attaché be detained or expelled. The decision on how much risk to take should be made by the DATT with an eye toward the potential strategic implications. That decision and its understating within an office can be aided by the use of discussion tools such as a political climate thermometer, a risk-versus-reward slide rule, and past detention vignettes. By fine-tuning operations, FAOs can continue to contribute to the mission, but from a more finely tuned risk-aware perspective.

Appendix 1. Complete List of Collection Requirements

1 Are there any terrorists present?
2 What are the current military activities?
3 When did a political leader die?
4 What camouflage techniques do they use?
5 What military units are there?
6 Which unit is in a specific location?
7 What types of exercises are taking place?
8 What are the operational signatures of different equipment?
9 What is the host nation order of battle?
10 Where are the locations of military installations?
11 What recent weapons have been produced?
12 What is the state of the military?
13 What are the military equipment levels?
14 What are the military's training needs?
15 What are potential military activities?
16 What are likely military activities?
17 What military equipment is there?
18 Where are the naval facilities?
19 What types of naval vessels exist?
20 Where are the naval embankments?
21 Which ships are in dry dock?
22 Where is the local garrison located?
23 What is the number and types of vehicles in a convoy?
24 What branch of service is located at a facility?
25 What specialized equipment is at a particular facility?
26 Where is the airborne division located?
27 Which ships are in dry dock?
28 Where are the major airfields?
29 What is the level of soldier morale?
30 How are cities protected?
31 Which cities are fortified?
32 What defense industries exist?
33 Which vehicles are entering and exiting a facility?
34 What are the economic conditions?
35 What is the political situation?
36 Where are the power stations?
37 Where are the government buildings?
38 What are the ports entry, exit, winds, currents, and bottom?
39 What ships are in port?
40 Where do the ships come from?
41 What do the ships carry?
42 What size are the ships?
43 What types of ships are present?
44 What are the shipping schedules and routs?
45 What are the political structures?
46 What is the current propaganda?
47 What is the crime level?
48 Where are the power lines?
49 What kinds of trolleys exist?
50 What kinds of buses exist?
51 What kinds of trains exist?
52 Where are the train tracks?
53 Where is the IBM production plant?
54 Where is the military truck factory?
55 What is the level of discontent with the political leadership?
56 What is the quality of indigenous steel?
57 Where are the dry docks?
58 What are the license plate numbers?
59 What is the condition of hospital facilities?
60 What is the nature of patients in the hospitals?
61 Are there any foreign troops present?
62 What is the condition of the host nation's
space shuttle program?
63 What is the host nation doing in another part of the world?
64 What sympathies do other countries have for the host nation?
65 What types of research is being done by the host nation?
66 What is the status of the host nation’s space program?
67 How are troops rotated?
68 Where are the underground tunnels and trains?
69 Who is working late in which government offices?
70 How is the host nation’s leader’s health?
71 Who is visiting government offices?
72 What are the different general officer’s personalities?
73 How has the host nation attempted to intimidate attachés?
74 Has host nation CI stolen any personnel items?
75 How do the local police treat attachés?
76 When where and how does CI formally protest attaché actions?
77 What is the price of eggs?
78 What goods are available for sale?
79 What are the local crops?
80 What goods are scarce and plentiful?
81 What are local religious beliefs?
82 How do people live?
83 What is the system of justice?
84 What are the local customs?
85 How is the population distributed?
86 What is the money?
87 What is the availability of meat in markets?
88 How are civilians reeducated?
89 How is religion controlled?
90 What are the future assignments of third country attachés?
91 What is a third country attaché’s home addresses?

Appendix 2. Complete List of Collection Activities.

1 Engage in a high speed chase that risks killing surveillance or pedestrians
2 Attempt to physically fight surveillance
3 Purposely crash a car
4 Drive off road at high speed to avoid a surveillance roadblock
5 Steal a host nation military officer’s briefcase
6 Purposely drive into a restricted area
7 Look in the desks of government offices when no one is present
8 Steal telegrams
9 Use specialized equipment
10 Bring non diplomats on collection trips
11 Take photographs of a target
12 Conduct surreptitious photography against laws, predilections and taboos
13 Purposely lose surveillance
14 Take pictures without using the viewfinder to focus
15 Bride a sales girl for items you can not buy
16 Drive the wrong way on one way street
17 Drive in an area that may have a road block
18 Use a local car with local license plates
19 Bribe a sales lady in a military clothing sales store
20 Allow surveillance to get a photo of you collecting information
21 Allow surveillance to know what you are collecting
22 Receive a formal host nation complaint (AKT)
23 Conduct collection travel with a British attaché
24 Go on a collection trip outside the national capital
25 Go directly to a target without reconnoitering the surrounding area
26 Tour an area by car
27 Do not thoroughly research an area before travel to it
28 Buy a telephone directory
29 Take a railroad spike
30 Split up attachés to confuse surveillance
31 Visit other cities
32 Take a photo from a bridge
33 Go to social clubs/bars
34 Walk along a railroad line
35 Buy items in military clothing sales store
36 Dash up a hill unexpectedly
37 Take photographs at night
38 Drive suspiciously
39 Take written notes that can not be easily destroyed
40 Lie when confronted by surveillance
41 Take a civilian led tour of a city
42 Ask a local for directions
43 Conduct a recon of a target
44 Use elicitation techniques
45 Use a foreign car with diplomatic license plates
46 Visit a city archive
47 Take written notes that can be easily destroyed
48 Take a tour boat
49 Observe a convoy
50 Walk past facilities of interest
51 Use a civilian tour guide
52 Take trains to observe targets on the route
53 Visit hospitals
54 Wander around without knowing surroundings
55 Talk to expatriate businessman
56 View parades
57 Photograph leaders at public events
58 Observe who is working late in which government offices
59 Observe planes on local roads at night
60 Go to a military clothing sales store
61 Take a picture while traveling in a cab
62 Conduct a box recon of a target
63 Use a foreign car with diplomatic license plates
64 Avoid military installations when not the collection target
65 Tour a military museum
66 Visit restaurants in target area for cover
67 Ask locals about jokes
68 Buy local stamps
69 Attend a party
70 Attend a lunch
71 Attend a reception
72 Listen in on others’ conversations
73 Attend a diplomatic gathering
74 Play tennis with another attachΘ
75 Don’t take photographs
76 Memorize mileage to targets
77 Observe surroundings
78 Do not allow surveillance to know what you are doing
79 Avoid a minor host nation complaint
80 Don’t use specialized equipment
81 Don’t lose surveillance
82 Study maps, drawings
83 Note place names for significance
84 Thoroughly research target area before travel

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FAO articles written by FAOs!

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After publishing in the FAO Journal articles will be uploaded on the FAOA website (www.faoa.org).

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Without your articles the FAO Journal cannot be published!
During the 1930s, Saudi relations with the Great Powers of Europe entered an extremely tense phase. Being the only formally independent Arab state not linked to England via treaty, no British bases existed on Saudi soil. As the growth and expansion of the Third Reich became increasingly important to German security, the Nazis expressed its own strategic interest in the Arabian Peninsula. As custodian of two of Islam’s holy cities, Mecca and Medina, King Ibn Saud initially regarded a policy of neutrality as the most suitable course for the country in the event a regional conflagration erupted (1, 2). Although mistrustful and cautious of both sides, Saudi Arabia eventually found itself having to play a delicate balance of collaborating with both Axis and Allied interests. This brief historical overview should shed light on the role of the Middle East in determining the outcome of World War II, in addition to serving as an excellent example of the complex interplay between geopolitical and economic interests.

Dissatisfied with the quality and quantity of arms supplied by the British government, the Saudi king looked to purchase arms from alternate source and expressed his readiness to establish diplomatic relations with Hitler’s Germany. During his stay in Baghdad in November 1937, the king’s private secretary, Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, and other confidential agents asked Otto Wolff, a major German arms industry firm, if it would supply the king with 15,000 rifles on cash credit. The same year, Ibn Saud’s personal physician, Syrian-born Sheikh Madhat Al-Ard, contacted the Office of Foreign Relations (Aussenpolitisches Amt [APA]) of the National Socialist German Workers Party in the king’s name. Approaching these Saudi contacts with great caution, the APA—which was strongly inclined to entertain a more active approach to Arab affairs—pointed out that that Germany could not reveal publicly its admiration for Ibn Saud; at the same time, Germany had no issue entertaining Saudi representatives at its party rally in Nuremberg. It is possible that this cautious attitude was imposed on the APA by the adverse position taken up by the German Foreign Ministry (Auswärtige Amt) regarding the various arms deals in the Near East proposed by the office of Nazi theorist Alfred Rosenberg(3).

It is likely that the Germans wished to avoid taking any steps which might increase Ibn Saud’s prestige, especially in light of the fact that Ibn Saud sought a significant leadership role in the Arab world as well as the Jewish question in Palestine. To support Ibn Saud could be perceived as unwelcome meddling in internal Arab disputes; as a case in point, political leaders of other Arab counties, particularly in Iraq, had warned the Germans against Ibn Saud, whom they charged with servility to Britain and ready to execute all her orders. They even maintained that the Saudi king’s opposition to the formation of a Jewish state in Palestine was insincere. Furthermore, in accordance with their entire policy towards the Arab countries, Berlin did not wish their contact with Saudi Arabia to worsen relations with Great Britain or arouse Italian suspicions.

Early in 1938, Khalid Al-Hud Al-Qarqani, a Libyan adviser to the Saud family, visited Berlin, where he conducted general negotiations with various German firms (with APA serving as intermediary) for the purpose of purchasing arms. Al-
Hud proposed to buy rifles, automobiles, and place an order to build a cartridge factory. He also relayed his monarch’s wish to employ the assistance of German engineers and specialists for the purpose of road-building. Although Al-Hud obtained some promises for the supply of arms, they remained unfulfilled until the summer of 1938, when the Saudi Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Fuad-bey Hamza, a Lebanese Druze, arrived in Berlin. As a result of his month-long visit, the Germans concluded that the King of Saudi Arabia was indeed interested in establishing diplomatic relations and wished to host an official German ambassador (3).

Fuad-bey Hamza presented to the Germans a fairly truthful picture of his country’s situation, stressing his ruler’s limited freedom of action, particularly in relation to British regional power. He maintained that his monarch could not afford to be drawn into a conflict with Britain, and that Saudi Arabia could be compelled to cooperate with Britain under certain circumstances. He further clarified the question of Saudi-Italian relations: although there had been some improvement, and the king counted on receiving arms from Italy, the lack of confidence in that country’s intentions had not yet been overcome. Fuad-bey also expressed his king’s hope that Germany harbored no imperialist interests in the Arab world.

Agreement was reached with the High Command of the German Armed Forces (OKW) on the provision of arms to the Palestinian rebels via Saudi Arabia, as well as a sum of money intended for the Palestinian cause. (The money apparently never reached its destination.). Ultimately, the German government made no decision on the sale of arms to Saudi Arabia or on accrediting diplomatic representation to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia’s commercial capital. To the Germans, it was still uncertain whether Saudi Arabia would really remain neutral in the event of war; thus, the supply of arms on credit could not be justified. Berlin also feared that Ibn Saud desired closer relations with Germany in order to play the British and Italians against each other.

In the end, Ibn Saud’s appeals compelled the German government to arrive at a decision, for they were afraid that by ignoring him they would throw Saudi Arabia solidly into the camp of Germany’s enemies. German party officials, particularly from the APA, pressed for energetic involvement in Arab affairs. When the Nazis pushed the world to the brink of conflict in September 1938 with their demands on Czechoslovakia, the APA demanded with special insistence a decision on relations with Saudi Arabia. It was then decided not to conclude any agreement on credit transactions for provision of arms, but only to establish diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia so that, in case of war, Germany’s Baghdad envoy could withdraw to a neutral country with ease (4).

In the meantime, the German Foreign Ministry took the shrewd action of informing the Egyptian and Iraqi envoys that even if their governments were compelled under British pressure to sever diplomatic relations with Germany and take measures against German citizens, the Reich government would not retaliate. At first, this decision was of small significance since evidence suggests that the Germans still had little confidence in Ibn Saud, especially in light of intelligence pointing toward Fuad-bey Hamza serving as a paid British agent. In particular, two transports prepared for the Palestinian rebels—one of them to be shipped via Saudi Arabia and the other by agreement with Baghdad—were held up by British authorities, arousing a lack of confidence toward Ibn Saud and his emissaries on the part of German authorities (5).

Nevertheless, in January 1939, the German government proceeded to establish official diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia. On 17 January, the German envoy to Baghdad, Dr. Fritz Grobba, flew to Jeddah via Cairo to serve as a dual envoy also accredited to Jeddah. For the Saudis, the question of diplomatic relations with Germany was one of great significance, as only a very small diplomatic corps (consisting of British, French, and Italian envoys) was accredited to
Saudi Arabia, with the Dutch, Turkey, and Iraq maintaining permanent chargés d'affaires. Despite their meager presence, much of the activity of these diplomatic representatives was concerned solely with Muslim hujjaj conducting their pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina (5). Unsurprisingly, the British envoy possessed the greatest political role in Arabia, for Great Britain already possessed treaties (signed in the 19th century) with the eastern and northern coastal states which granted Great Britain the responsibility for their foreign affairs, thereby limiting indirectly Ibn Saud's contact with the outside world (6).

In February 1939, Grobba had two audiences with the king and three with Sheikh Yusuf Yasin. From Germany, Saudi Arabia expected moral, technical and material support, mainly in the form of weapons deliveries. Ibn Saud also considered it essential to obtain German support for the Arabs on the Palestine issue. In return, Ibn Saud proposed a permanent treaty of friendship and a limited trade agreement. In addition, he asked for German diplomatic support in regard to several territorial claims on Aqaba (a Red Sea coastal town in Jordan) and Najran (a disputed city on the frontier with Yemen) (6).

The Saudis also revealed their lack of confidence in Italy and its dissatisfaction with the Anglo-Italian agreement regarding certain African territories bordering the Red Sea. (The Saudi king earlier protested against the conclusion of that agreement, issuing a statement challenging its validity after its ratification by Great Britain and Italy.) It is likely that Ibn Saud turned to the notion of establishing relations with Germany because he feared the political division of Africa's horn, thus limiting his ability to maneuver politically. Saudi politicians also made it clear to Grobba that, if confronted with choosing between Britain and Italy, the Arabs would favor the former. (6) In return for German political support and matériel, however, Ibn Saud and his advisers promised neutrality in the anticipated war.

Saudi officials also pointed out that, despite pressure on Saudi Arabia to side with Great Britain on the Abyssinian conflict, the king refused to apply sanctions against Germany’s ally, Italy, even going so far as to sell food, sheep and camels to Italy. Moreover, in March 1937, Ibn Saud was the first to recognize Italy’s annexation of Ethiopia and receive the Italian envoy as the representative of the King of Italy and Emperor of Ethiopia. In return, Italy sold Ibn Saud arms on favorable terms and provided aircraft, training Saudi pilots at their own expense (7).

Grobba, positively impressed by his visit to Jeddah, concluded that Ibn Saud would not be a willing tool of the British. The king nevertheless pretended to remain an ally of Great Britain, all the while despising the British. Having stressed previously the necessity of Arab unity to German war strategy, Grobba intensified his efforts to interject Germany into Arab affairs. As a result of his talks with Ibn Saud and other Arab leaders, Grobba was convinced that the Germans had greater opportunities in Saudi Arabia and other Arab nations than did Italy, which the Arabs considered weaker than the British, despite Italy’s increasing political influence over the Red Sea region. (7).

Although the Division Pol VII, the political section of the German Foreign Ministry, began to engage itself in Middle Eastern affairs, the German Foreign Ministry as a whole (along with various military leaders) did not share Grobba's views on strengthening relations with Ibn Saud, insisting that Germany should not establish closer ties with the Saudi king because of his previous relationship with Britain. Moreover, Germany could not undertake efforts to supply Saudi Arabia with arms since the countries of the Arabian Peninsula were the domain of Italian interest. For example, Italy's position had an even stronger influence on Germany's relations with Yemen. Germany attempted economic penetration of Yemen, but its efforts met with dissatisfaction in Italy. Thus, by April 1939, the opinion prevailed in
the German Foreign Ministry that any change of policy toward Saudi Arabia was out of the question (8).

The situation soon changed to such an extent, however, that Germany stopped hesitating about committing itself in the Arabian Peninsula. That same month, Otto von Hentig, Director of Division Pol VII, visited Palestine and Iraq. This trip effected a change in Berlin’s views on strengthening relations with Saudi Arabia, and Grobba repeated his argument regarding Ibn Saud’s basic hostility to Great Britain and stressed the possibility of Germany using strategically vital Saudi territory in the coming war (9).

This attitude change in Berlin toward Saudi Arabia was felt when Khalid Al-Hud Al-Qarqani made another visit to the German capital in June 1939. This time the Saudi king’s adviser conversed not only with representatives of the German Intelligence Organization (Abwehr) but also the Reich’s top leaders, such as German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop. They discussed the shipment of rifles, anti-aircraft guns, and armored vehicles as well as the building of a munitions plant in Jeddah. Ibn Saud’s emissary stressed that the fulfillment of the king’s requests would ease his dependence on Britain, and Ribbentrop expressed Germany’s sympathy for the Arabs and commissioned von Hentig to conduct further arms negotiations (10).

On 17 June 1939, Hitler received Al-Hud at Obersalzberg. Al-Hud delivered to Hitler a personal letter from Ibn Saud, and the Fuhrer regaled him with his sympathy for the Arabs, which he said began in his childhood, and declared that active assistance be extended to the Saudis. By this time, German policymakers no longer cared much about endangering relations with Britain unnecessarily, but had to reckon more with the Italians. Conversations with Rome had already been held on the question of the supply of arms to Yemen, which German firms wanted to undertake. In these conversations, Rome stressed that Yemen was in their sphere of influence; as a result, Germany ceased negotiations with Yemen despite serious reservations. Considering their budding military relationship with Saudi Arabia, the Germans considered future expansion in the Arabian Peninsula an open question, although they were convinced that they would have to contact Rome before actually cooperating with Ibn Saud. They had no illusion that Italy would not be informed promptly of any eventual transaction with the Saudi monarch. During Italian Foreign Minister Count Ciano’s visit to Berlin on occasion of the signing of the Pact of Steel (22 May 1939), Ernst Woermann, chief of the German Foreign Ministry’s political department, informed Italian Ambassador Gino Buti that Saudi Arabia had made countless attempts to buy arms from Germany, and he pointed out the advantages of friendly relations with Ibn Saud in the event of war (10).

Thus, the Nazis were confronted with a basic dilemma in their policy toward Saudi Arabia. On the one hand, the Arabs possessed a deep dislike for Germany’s closest ally, fascist Italy; on the other hand, Italy held a deep-seated aversion to independent German action in a region which it regarded as its exclusive sphere of influence. Nevertheless, in its negotiations with Al-Hud, Berlin showed a willingness to please Ibn Saud. In opening talks, Germany offered a 1.5 million Reichsmarks credit for the purchase of 8000 rifles, 8 million rounds of ammunition, and the construction of a small cartridge factory. In the Saudi counter-request, the Saudi representative asked for a 6 million Reichsmarks credit and privileged prices. As a compromise, the High Command of the German Armed Forces offered Ibn Saud the rifles as a gift (11).

The deal was finalized on 17 July 1939 in form of a letter to Al-Hud, sent on a plain sheet of paper without signature. It contained three points:

- A declaration of Berlin’s readiness to express its sympathy for Saudi Arabia by supplying her with goods.
- A gift to Ibn Saud of 4000 rifles of the latest
construction, as well as 2000 cartridges.

- An agreement for the Saudi king to order war matériel on credit from German firms to the value of 6 million Reichsmarks, with payments to be made in seven annual installments.

This deal was never fully implemented since World War II broke out just over a month later, making it extremely difficult to transport arms to Red Sea ports.

The German agreement to ship arms to Saudi Arabia was one of the few preliminary approaches by the Third Reich to establish a diplomatic mission in Saudi Arabia. Additional attempts were made as the presence of American oil corporations in the region expanded, bringing to the fore the possibility of diplomatic relations being established between Saudi Arabia and the United States. Encouraged by the California Texas Oil Company-Caltex oil consortium, which had purchased extraction concessions from Saudi Arabia, the US government sent an envoy to Saudi Arabia. As the number of Americans in the region increased considerably, Saudi Arabia was brought firmly into the Allied fold, thus removing permanently any further economic or political penetrations by the Axis powers for the duration of the war (12).

2nd Lt Basil Aboul-Enein is an Air Force Biomedical Service Officer and a graduate student of Public Health at the University of Texas Medical Center. He works as a Dietetics Professor at San Jacinto College.

LCDR. Faisal Aboul-Enein is a Clinical Assistant Professor and Nurse Practitioner at Texas Woman’s University and a Family Nurse Practitioner/Nursing Instructor at MD Anderson Cancer Center. He is enrolled currently as a doctoral student pursuing a degree in Public Health at the University of Texas Health Science Center. He was recently commissioned into the United States Public Health Service Commissioned Corps (Inactive Reserve).

The Aboul-Enein brothers share a passion for Middle East history and Arab political affairs.

References

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After so many years of trying to understand it, we are still not clear of what is and is not terrorism. For decades—or most likely even centuries—numerous scholars, psychiatrists, politicians, soldiers and many other very smart individuals have been trying continuously to define terrorism. After two years of serving as Deputy Director and Dean of the International Staff at the Center of Excellence-Defense Against Terrorism (COE-DAT), I am still not any clearer on the issue of terrorism. On the contrary, I would say that a common approach by different nations to terrorism appears to be quite far away from being realized. Dealing with and learning from more than 48 different countries which participate at the events in our center, things are very foggy, confusing, and controversial at best. At the conclusion of each event, participants from all over the world agree that the dialogue must never stop and that all parties involved must continue the ongoing discussions at the next meeting, to be held preferably somewhere by the sun near the beach.

Recently, I have learned that the latest thing in the DAT arena is to understand what makes or motivates people to become a Human-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (HBIED). What makes medical doctors, elementary school teachers, mothers, and grandmothers strap explosives around themselves or their children merely to kill as many innocent people as possible? Furthermore, there is movement afoot to better understand the terrorist mind and de-radicalize that paradigm. I am all for the implementation of such a hypothesis, but no matter how hard I try, I fail to understand it or appreciate the rationale for terrorist actions. I fail to see any sanity or natural human instincts in these acts that go directly against “survival of the fittest” and against basic human nature. I am not a scholar; however, there is an abundance of think-tanks filled to the brim with very smart people who come up continuously with complicated concepts, theories, and specialized vocabulary that are related directly to the problem of terrorism. Supposedly, this academic approach to the difficult reality of terrorism explains the problem and, in the long run, should make us feel better and safer. Now that you know that I am not an intellectual or a scholar, please allow me to express my understanding of the concept of terrorism in my own simple words and sober perceptions.

I believe it was Napoleon who said that success to war is simplicity. A 39-page memo recovered three years ago from an al-Qaeda laptop computer in Pakistan read like an Idiot’s Guide to Bomb-Making. It convinced the budding terrorist to forget about military explosives, GPS, laser-guided weapons, ICBMs, or even
fancy detonators. Instead, the manual advised a simple shopping trip to the hardware store or pharmacy, places where all the necessary ingredients for a terrorist attack are freely available. “Make use of what is available at your disposal and make it to fit to your needs, (improvise) rather than waste valuable time becoming hopeless over that which is not within your reach.” I thought very hard about the statements made centuries ago by a great military general and a recent al-Qaeda training manual, and I decided to simplify things and create a DAT for Idiots manual.

Point #1
What is it?

Improvised Explosive Devise (IED) - I am pretty sure that in my younger days we used to call it a homemade bomb. (The ones of us who wanted to sound more sophisticated than the others called it a homemade explosive, but it was still a bomb.)

Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devise (VBIED) – A “car bomb”? That would be too simple, because it could be a car, bus, truck, airplane, ship, or any other vehicle. Even a golf cart.

Human-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (HBIED) – A “suicide bomber”? I think we are all aware that it is against animal instinct to commit suicide, especially to kill innocent humans at random—what an absurd concept, suicide is. Unless, of course if some humans wrap explosives around some poor animal and send it to ride a metro full of civilians. I wonder what we would call that device just to make it more difficult? Perhaps, an ABIBHED—Animal-Borne Improvised by Humans Explosive Device? Not bad. Maybe I am an intellectual . . .

Anyway, you all know what I am talking about: A bomb is something that goes BOOM! and brings death, injury, and destruction to all unfortunate enough to find themselves within its blast radius. Not too hard to understand, even for someone like me. Nevertheless, some scholar at some think-tank will surely ridicule my simple-minded approach. It’s okay; after all, I think these are the same people who, after 9/11, came up with a Color-Coded Threat Level idea. I remember how much better I felt when the Color-Coded Threat Level regime was introduced to American society.

Point #2
About whom am I talking? In short, you know very well about whom I am talking.

• When I am talking about football (soccer for U.S.) hooligans, am I talking about all of the British citizens or all of the soccer fans around the world? No, I am not. Do I offend soccer fans or British citizens? I don’t think so. They know to whom I am referring when I say football hooligans, mainly, because it is not them.
• When we talk about the West and Western values, do we exclude Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea, or do the citizens of these countries get offended because they know they do not reside in the West? Again, I don’t think so. We all know to whom we refer when we say that someone has “Western values.”

• When I am talking about Muslim Militants, Muslim Radicals, or Muslimists (even though there is no such word in the dictionary), am I talking about my fellow Turkish military officers, who are exceptionally dedicated to upholding and protecting democracy and, at the same time, consider themselves good Muslims and decent people? No, I am not. Am I talking about the brave women who speak out and call upon the rest of the Islamic world to unite in their protest against the abuses of women and children in some parts of the Islamic world? No I am not. I admire these people and pray for their safety. I only wish that there would be millions more like them to object vocally the exploitation of their religion in the form of terrorist acts and human rights abuses. You know about whom I am talking. Thus, there is no reason for some sensitive or politically correct individuals to blame me of Muslim-phobia and demand that I drop the word Muslim each time I refer to Militants, Terrorists, or Radicals who cowardly hide behind the religion of Islam. Denying the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (freedom of speech) is much more than offensive to some people—it is lethal.

Is this really so hard and complicated to comprehend?

Point #3
Who qualifies to be labeled as “terrorists”?

Terrorist – Anyone who directly or indirectly, but knowingly, kills, injures, brings destruction, or attempts to do such things at random and without any regard to innocent lives. For example: someone who purposely tries to obliterate innocent civilians at the club, bus, restaurant, school, street, or any other civilian entity as they may or may not include themselves into the company of victims. Anyone who fires indiscriminately with deadly force into wherever in an attempt to hit, kill, and utterly destroy whomever or whatever (e.g., Hassam rockets fired into Israel)

• Terrorist – Targeting both military and civilian targets.

• Terrorist – Anyone who knowingly supports the two categories above financially, administratively, and even spiritually.

• Terrorist not – Anyone who targets military or official government representatives of the enemy state, occupying forces, or even their own state authorities while doing its utmost to avoid collateral damage. These are “freedom fighters” and partisans.

• Terrorist not – Anyone who kills his boss, mother-in-law, or a store clerk to conduct robbery; these are criminals (not that terrorists aren’t criminals). Someone targeting a head of state or any other po-
Political leader while avoiding collateral damage is a political assassin.

• **Terrorist not** – Anyone—most likely is an emotionally and/or mentally ill individual—who machineguns his fellow classmates or post office co-workers.

I think you have an idea of what I am trying to say. Some people would point out to me that if I showed the above statements to lawyers, they would have a field day with me. But what I am not told is why should I show it or involve any lawyers at all? Do the lawyers control everything in our lives, including such things as common sense? Is this really that complicated that we cannot agree—without lawyers—on a basic concept of terrorism?

**No Point**

In the UK, several young Britons of a certain gender stuffed their backpacks with high-power explosives and, along with themselves, murdered scores of innocent people riding the London buses and the metro. Britons call them the “London Bombers” not “terrorists,” supposedly in order not to offend, agitate, or “label” an entire community of people living in Great Britain. Well, now I am getting just a little offended myself because my grandfather, in the winter of 1942, was called a “Stalingrad Bomber.” Are my freedom-loving brothers of the UK comparing these murderous killers to my heroic grandfather!? He and others like him built IEDs called “Molotov cocktails” and set German Panzers afire killing many Germans. Notice that they inaccurately called the enemy “Germans.” At the time, many of grandpa’s comrades were not aware that the appropriate identity of the enemy was “Nazis,” not “Germans,” even though my grandfather said that the enemy wore German uniforms and spoke the German language. But guess what? Back to point #1. Albert Einstein, Dwight Eisenhower, and millions of others were not offended by my grandfather’s generalization and “labeling” at all, and that in spite of their own strong German heritage. Somehow, these people were able to figure out that grandpa was not talking about the German rabbis, priests, intellectuals, homosexuals, and millions of other simple, decent Germans whom the Nazis thought were undesirable. Somehow, they knew that he was talking about, and subsequently killing, the ones who were trying to destroy the entire world. Ironically, he was not even a Russian by any standard; yet, even today, my American-born children are called “Russians”—no offense taken. Millions of people are referred to as “Russians” just because at one point the lands where they reside or resided belonged to the USSR. See what I am saying?

**Point #4**

All terrorists are stupid

Usually I get a bombardment of protests for making such statements, and I am never given a chance to elaborate on it. I am told that some of the terrorists are extremely educated and industrious, and there is no point to continue the conversation with someone as stupid as I.
• Yes, I know that some terrorists are brain surgeons, teachers, and nuclear engineers. However, education and wisdom are not the same. My grandmother—who lived to be almost 100 years old and lived through several wars, political purges, and forced migrations—had zero education. Yet, she was one of the most literate, intelligent, and wise individuals I’ve ever had the pleasure to know. She lived a very long, but very hard, life; still, she remained loving and compassionate to the last days of her life. She was smart. Terrorists are bitter, twisted, and murderous; they and their acts are STUPID!

• If a terrorist act targeting the killing of innocent civilians is conducted to reach a final goal of either:

  1. The withdrawal of an occupying foreign force, or
  2. A fundamental change in government and, through brutal force, the installation of their own rule-of-law.

then the result that they will obtain by applying terrorist tactics is sheer STUPIDITY.

  1. The withdrawal of an occupying foreign force, or
  2. A fundamental change in government and, through brutal force, the installation of their own rule-of-law.

Is this so difficult to understand?

Multiple choice test:

1. What statement is offensive to you?
   a. Christian radicals blow up a Family Planning clinic
   b. Jewish radicals attend Holocaust Denial Conference in Iran
   c. Muslim radicals hijack a school bus
   All Romans in Europe are thieves

2. Which of the following is a terrorist act?
   a. My grandpa throwing an IED at a Nazi tank
   b. Planned attack on the U.S. president
   c. Shooting your boss in his office
   d. Blowing up a discotheque and a café with civilians inside
   Blowing up King David Hotel
      (Hint: Jerusalem’s King David Hotel did not host tourists visiting the Holy Land. It was the British military HQ)

3. Who cannot be a suicide bomber?
   a. A man
   b. A woman
   c. A doctor
   d. A cow
   A university student

Blowing yourself up with a school bus full of children is a stupid act? T or F

Bonus Question (extra point)

Strapping a suicide belt onto your young child and sending him or her to kill some people at an Israeli check point is a very stupid and perverted act? T or F

If you got 3 answers right, you passed the test. If you, in addition, answered the bonus question correctly, then feel free to apply for the position of Secretary General of the United Nations.
Dear Colleagues,

My name is COL Michael Curci, YG82 and I’m the new Division Chief for the Army’s Strategic Leadership Division, G-35F. I join the Foreign Area Officer (FAO) proponent office and leadership development division after spending most of my career serving on or alongside international units and organizations based primarily in Europe. During my last assignment I served as the Army Attaché in Berlin, where I found the job nothing short of exciting and extremely rewarding. Nothing changed in that regard, I’m sure many of our former attachés and readers of the Journal would agree.

Today I’m privileged to be part of the Army’s Strategic Leadership Division and look forward to working with such a dedicated staff and supportive community. Since my arrival I met many of my counterparts with whom I will work closely with over the next few years -- particularly as we take on a Army Chief of Staff directed FAO top down review aimed at assessing key areas of our program, accessions, training, and utilization.

My first few weeks on the job confirmed what I sensed in the field, that our Army FAO community is strong, vibrant and the example to emulate. My team of regional managers are traveling to Combatant Command headquarters and visiting FAOs in the field. The news they bring back remains highly positive. The increasing demand of FAOs we’re witnessing across the spectrum of operations, from the tactical to the strategic level, is indicative of the appreciation of what unique skills sets our FAO officers bring to the fight in support of national, regional and operational objectives.

As we conduct this review, leading to periodic in-progress reviews (IPR’s) to our Chief in November, I ask each of you to visit our website on Army Knowledge On-line; send comments to myself and to my regional managers; and look for additional avenues to participate and provide a voice. As a top to bottom review, it requires full participation of all FAOs -- wherever deployed.

I look forward to working will all of you and our sister service FAOs as we continue to enhance a program vital in this era of persistent conflict.

Michael Curci
Colonel, USA
U.S. Army FAO Proponent Office

COL Michael Curci - Div Chief, (703) 602-8183
DSN 332-8183 Email: michael.curci@hqda.army.mil

Mr. Charles Reimer, Deputy Division Chief, (703) 602-8179
DSN 332-8179, Email: charles.reimer@hqda.army.mil

LTC Dennis Fiemeier - 48B Regional Manager, COM 703-602-8191
DSN 333-8191, Email: dennis.fiemeier@hqda.army.mil

LTC Nicholas Lovelace - 48G/J Regional Manager, COM 703-602-8188 / DSN 332-8188 , Email: nicholas.lovelace@hqda.army.mil

LTC Patrick Keane-48D/F/H/I Regional Manager, COM 703-602-7373 / DSN 332-8191, Email: dennis.fiemeyer@hqda.army.mil

LTC Jonathan Edwards - 48C/E Regional Manager COM 703-602-8195
DSN 332-8185, Email: jonathan.edwards@hqda.army.mil

LTC Dino Pick- FAO Coordinator, Defense Language Institute, (831) 242-6467/DSN 768-6467, Email: daniel.pick@us.army.mil

U.S. Army FAO Senior Leadership Division (SLD)

LTC Keith Detwiler- Assgmts Off (COLONELS - 48). (703) 325-2861/DSN 221-2861
EMAIL: keith.detwiler@us.army.mil

U.S. Army FAO Assignments Team, HRC

U.S. Army FAO Human Resources Command (HRC)

LTC Dave Brigham - Branch Chief
(703) 325-3153/DSN 221-3153
EMAIL: david.e.brigham@us.army.mil

MAJ Jerzy Zubr - Assgmts Off (48C, E),
(703) 325-3134/DSN 221-3134
EMAIL: jerzy.zubr@us.army.mil

MAJ Mike Snook - Assgmts Off (48D, G, H, I), (703) 325-3132
DSN 221-3132,
EMAIL: michael.snook@us.army.mil

MAJ Drew Bayliss - Assgmts Off (48B,F,J).
(703) 325-2755/DSN 221-2755
EMAIL: terry.a.bayliss@us.army.mil

MAJ Bruniila Garcia - HRC-St. Louis Reserve FA 48 Manager
314-592-0608 - DSN: 892-0608
FAX: 314-592-0649 - DSN: 892-0650
E-mail brunilda.garcia@us.army.mil

(703) 325-3121/DSN 221-3121
EMAIL: aundra.brown@us.army.mil

Ms. Mary Gathers - Human Resource Specialist
(703)325-0159/DSN: 221-0159
FAX: 703-325-6374/DSN: 221-6374
Email: Mary.Gathers@us.army.mil

US Army Reserve FAO Program

COL John D. Blumenson - Asst. Div Chief (DIMA)
(408)209-7563
E-mail john.blumenson@us.army.mil

USMC FAO Proponent

PLU EA: Mr. Tom Braden- Deputy Branch Head, International Issues Branch, (FSU FAO) EMAIL: thomas.c.braden@usmc.mil Phone: (703) 693-1365 or DSN 223-1365

PLU-1: LtCol Chris Goff - PACOM-SE Asia (E. Asia FAO)
EMAIL: jonathan.goff@usmc.mil Phone: (703) 692-4346 or DSN 222-4346

PLU-2: Maj Michael Cho - PACOM-NE Asia (Korean FAO)
EMAIL: michael.cho@usmc.mil Phone: (703) 692-4364 or DSN 222-4346

PLU-3: LtCol Patrick Carroll- CENTCOM (Middle East/North Africa FAO)
EMAIL: patrick.carroll@usmc.mil Phone: (703) 692-4345 or DSN 222-4345

PLU-4: LtCol Brian Chin - SOUTHCOM/NORTHCOM (Latin America FAO)
EMAIL: brian.chin@usmc.mil Phone: (703) 692-4344 or DSN 222-4344

PLU-5: Maj Dan Bates- EUCOM- Western Europe, NATO (Turkish FAO)
EMAIL: daniel.bates@us.army.mil Phone: (703) 692-4367 or DSN 222-4367

PLU-6: Major Yohannes Negga - Eastern Europe, Caucasus, Africa and Israel(Sub-Saharan Africa FAO)
EMAIL: yohannes.negga@usmc.mil Phone: (703) 692-4368 or DSN 222-4341

PLU-8: LtCol Chris Sill- International Affairs Officer Program Coordinator (Russia/Eurasia FAO)
EMAIL: christopher.sill@usmc.mil Phone: (703) 692-4365 or DSN 222-4365

USMC Foreign Language Officer:
Capt Russ Harris: HQMC, DC (I), IOP
EMAIL: russell.d.harris@usmc.mil Phone: (703) 614-3938

Admin Support from MSGBN in Quantico
MSGBN Personnel Officer
Phone (703) 784-4781, DSN 278-4781

US Navy FAO Proponent

CDR William Reynolds, FAO Officer Community Manager
(703) 695-0792 Email: william.f.reynolds@navy.mil

U.S. Air Force FAO Proponent

LtCol Stephen Hughes, (703) 588-8349, Chief, International Airmen Divison

Lt Col Deborah Determan - Chief, International Affairs Specialist (IAS) Branch
Comm (703) 588-8346, DSN 425-8346

Lt Col Cathy Carter - Deputy Chief, International Affairs Specialist (IAS) Branch, Reserve Advisor (Reserve IAS Program, Rosetta Stone, Transparent Language) Comm (703) 588-8337, DSN 425-8337

Maj JJ Casey - Chief, Strategic Plans and Programs (European RAS) (Outreach, Public Affairs, Strategic Issues) Comm (703) 588-8321, DSN 425-8321

Capt Jason Kollars - IAS Force Development (Force Management Issues, RAS/PAS Inquiries) Comm (703) 588-8322, DSN 425-8322

MSgt Jackie Phillips - IAS Education and Training Manager (FSI, LASI, JSOU)
https://fao.hq.af.mil
Comm (703) 588-8904, DSN 425-8904
IAS Program FAX - Comm (703) 588-6396, DSN 425-6396
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FAOA
P.O. Box 295
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