Green Flag Over the Balkans

Army FAOs in the State Department: Soldier-Diplomats in Action!

Psychological Operations in Korea 1968-75

The Future Use Of America’s National Power

Developments in the Islamic Discourse
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SUBSCRIPTIONS / ASSOCIATION MEMBERSHIP: Subscription to the journal comes with membership in the association. Membership information may be obtained through FAOA, P.O. Box 295, Mt. Vernon, VA 22121. E-Mail address is: fao@faoa.org or secretary@faoa.org. For those interested in subscribing, cost is $25.00 for one year and may be requested at the above address.

SUBMISSIONS: The Association is a totally voluntary enterprise. For the Journal to succeed, we need articles, letters to the editor, etc. Contributors should mail articles to the above address or e-mail to editor@faoa.org or fao@faoa.org. Articles are subject to editing by the FAO Journal Staff, to ensure that space constraints of the publication are met.


ADDRESS CORRECTIONS: FAOA is a private organization. We rely on the membership to update their mailing addresses on a regular basis. E-mail address changes to secretary@faoa.org.

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I volunteered for Iraq. I did this in order to be a part of my Army’s efforts - to be among my fellow soldiers and officers. But when I got here, I still wasn’t satisfied!

I was pining away about not having the sexy action-packed and hard-living test I expected. I came here looking for a fight. I was going to test my courage and endure the privations of war. There would be adventure and danger. Imagine my disappointment when I discovered my fight was to be at the pristine operational level. I figured I would never learn what kind of soldier I was.

But then, as I set to work, I discovered that the job I had was one of the most intellectually challenging responsibilities of my life. I discovered just how key FAO skills are to every advisement job; and how deep, honest cultural assessments are (or could have been) critical to the campaign effort. I found out that all that schooling, in-country and language training prepared me better than I would have been without them. I was lucky to deploy with certain tools that many of my non-FAO peers just haven’t had the opportunity to develop. As a result I have been able to challenge many assumptions here with credibility and experience that only FAO qualifications could provide.

I have only met four FAOs in Iraq. Each has had a unique credential and understanding born of FAO training. Only two of them were Middle East FAOs. But, each one had insight and wisdom that just isn’t had among the non-FAO officers. Each one could seamlessly interact with their foreign counterparts without pretense or apprehension. I could give many examples at this point, but will forbear. The key point is that FAOs can profitably come to Iraq for the good of the mission - regardless their area of concentration (AOC).

But for all of that, here I was, literally ashamed of my comfort and embarrassed by my safety; wondering if I would respond correctly when the lead started flying. So, as I wrote what I felt needed to change about Iraq in the paper I sent you (Editor’s note this article was printed in the September 2006 FAO Journal), I realized it was ME!

I, Matt Whitney, was indicative of the very mind set that needed changing. It’s men like me who came looking to do exciting things; not content to be about the less-glamorous job of building a Nation and installing an Army that needs changing; who neglected the weightier tasks at hand, unconsciously, in order to have more exciting stories to tell. I have countless examples of mature Army leaders choosing what they anticipate as adventure over legitimate duty in Iraq. Unfortunately, it is easy for men like me to cast aside their real duty and take up the more glamorous tactical fight. Turns out the glamour and the guns at this echelon have turned out to be tremendous distractions from what we should really be about. And the tactical fight as we have approached it happens to be making things worse.

Hence: There is a place for Strategic Scouts regardless of AOC in Iraq. FAOs can make a serious difference here if they can escape the unspoken but real desire to experience conditions for the Combat Action Badge; instead, arriving to do their mission as best they can. That was a hard and humbling lesson for me. Perhaps I continue to articulate it to convince myself I am a real soldier. And here is the Ironic twist. I NEVER needed to come to Iraq to figure this out. The maturity of this revelation – that non-kinetic mind-expanding staff work is as valuable and even more necessary to the war on terror than being shot at means that FAOs all over the world are making equally valid contributions to the effort. They are sacrificing. They are working hard to make a difference in their spheres. No, their metal isn’t being tested the way they imagined when they were in ROTC or West Point, but their contributions as FAOs will have a more lasting effect then they ever could as trigger-pullers.
ABSTRACT  Bosnia and Herzegovina is located at the historical limit of the Caliphate’s frontier and represents a tangible radical Islamic threat to the region and Europe as a whole. The ethno-religious nature of the 1990s Bosnian civil war introduced materiel, moral and financial support from oil-rich Islamic Gulf states in support of the beleaguered Bosnian Muslim government - with it came radical Islamic influence. More importantly was the entrance of foreign Islamic fighters, or mujahadeen, bringing radical and militant ideologies and, according to some sources, the Al Qaeda network into Europe itself. The growth and spread of Bosnia’s radical Islam, although limited, can be seen in activities of Saudi sponsored Islamic institutions, the presence of mujahadeen, and the recent arrests of Bosnians implicated in planning and sponsoring terrorist attacks. Even though the International Community is focused on Iraq and Afghanistan as the US struggles in the War on Terror, the Balkans, with its historical linkage to Islam and recent radical Islamic activity demands closer scrutiny.

INTRODUCTION

Islam’s historical presence in Bosnia, coupled with the recent influence of militant and radical Islam elicits concern that Bosnia may pose a terrorist threat. President Bush warned in an October 2005 address that one of radical Islam’s goals is a trans-national Muslim theocracy, a Caliphate - "a radical Islamic empire that spans from Spain to Indonesia." Bosnia and Herzegovina is located at the frontier between the Christian West and this Caliphate. Although the world’s attention is focused on Afghanistan and Iraq as the US, NATO and the “Coalition of the Willing” struggle in the Global War on Terror, the Balkan’s linkage to Islam and recent radical activity merits increased vigilance. Moreover, recent Department of State reporting highlights this concern, indicating that Bosnia is an environment which could facilitate terrorist activities.

Bosnia is governed by a weak central government and populated by mutually antagonistic national groups that may be allowing Bosnia to transform into a radical Islamist sanctuary. This predicament can be linked to the 1990s civil war in which foreign fighters, or mujahadeen (holy warriors), from Islamic states supported the Bosnian Muslim, or Bosniak, forces. The vast majority came from the Middle East and North Africa and were provided financial and political support by wealthy Gulf states. The support gave these states an inordinate amount of influence in wartime and post-war Bosniak politics, society and in the Muslim community. Many mujahadeen still remain and are the source of great concern to the Bosnian government and Western security services. The wartime trauma of the Bosnia’s Muslim community coupled with Bosnia’s stagnant economy and unfulfilled post-war expectations has led to a noticeable tolerance of and even the increase of radical Islamic practice by some Bosniaks.

BOSNIA’S QUANDARY

Bosnia’s frail central government institutions render the state virtually impotent in dealing with an Islamic threat without direct international support. The inability of the state to effectively control its territory leaves a certain level of freedom for extremist elements to operate in the “ungoverned” spaces found mostly in the rugged terrain of central Bosnia. To further complicate the matter is the sub-state political division of Bosnia into two entities, one the Bosniak-Croat Federation (Federacija) dominated by the Bosniak community and the other Republika Srpska...
controlled by the Serbs. The *Republika Srpska*, and to a lesser extent the Croat cantons of the Federation, are anathema to any Muslim extremism.

Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups, according to recent reporting, are attempting to recruit so-called “white mujahadeen” in Bosnia and other former Yugoslav territories. The radicalization of many of Bosnia's Muslims has led to the disaffection of those who suffered in the civil war. Although most Bosniaks favorably view the US as an ally, a weak economy and the political organization of the country into the weak “two entity state” (figure one) has left many disenchanted with not only the US but the West in general. In addition, Bosniaks normally prize their close US relationship and for the most part reject the imported radical Islam, the influence of Islamic extremism cannot be discounted. Indeed, there have been efforts by the Bosniak dominated government to look outside the West for material and moral support to improve the economy and strengthen the central government. Alarming to the US, Bosnian officials have stepped up interaction with Iran, a known sponsor of terrorism, and other Islamic Gulf states.

There has been little rapprochement between the Bosniaks and Serbs since the civil war’s end 11 years ago. Both entities are still dominated by nationalist political partisanship making substantial political steps forward hard to achieve without active international involvement. As a weak state that lacks mechanisms to control its security and law enforcement environment effectively, a setting exists that is conducive to illegal movement of people, arms and money within Bosnia and thus Europe. Bosnia is a state in which the political discourse is dominated by ethnic hostility between the Bosniaks who seek a stronger unitary state dominated by Muslim Sarajevo and the Serbs who support the looser two entity arrangement in which many state powers are maintained.

**FOREIGN FIGHTERS - THE MUJAHADEEN**

The existence of foreign Islamic fighters in Bosnia since 1992 has been well documented (Kohlmann, 2004, Shrader, 2003). Numbers vary but estimates range from 700 in the first year of the war to over 3000 mujahadeen in Bosnia by late 1995. Moreover, many Islamic volunteers and humanitarian aid workers received Bosnian citizenship through the Bosnian Muslim government during and following the civil war.

These foreign fighters arrived in Bosnia from Europe, North Africa and the Middle East early in the war (figure two). By 1995 the ideological goals of the mujahadeen had transitioned from helping their Muslim brethren to creating a frontline against the West. Their goals were to spread jihad and develop an Islamist base from which to strike Europe (Kohlmann, 2004, Trifk-
ović, 2002). They transited primarily through Croatia which was willing to transfer men and materiel to support the Bosniaks in their common war with the Serbs. Logistical operations were coordinated through purportedly charitable nongovernmental organizations such as the “Third World Relief Agency,” the “Saudi High Commission for Relief” and organizations like the Islamic Cultural Institute in Milan, Italy.

The Bosnian civil war permitted the mujahadeen to establish Al Qaeda’s terrorist network, that had been well developed in Afghanistan, in Europe. The upswing in militant activities in Europe in the mid 1990s is seen as a result of the inroads made by radical Islam in Bosnia. The fighting and horrors being perpetrated against fellow Muslims by “Christian infidels” attracted thousands of eager mujahadeen volunteers from North Africa, the Middle East, Pakistan and Europe - many still remain to this day in Europe. The presence of these foreign fighters caused incalculable suffering as they attempted to Islamicize native Bosniaks, wage jihad against the infidel (Serbs and the one time Bosniak allies the Croats) and in developing their jihadist bases and network in Bosnia. Although the Washington Accords signed in February 1994 stopped the Croat and Bosniak infighting, tensions remained in central Bosnia in the Travnik and Zenica region. The jihadist murders of Western aid workers and harassment of local Christians were never challenged by the Bosniak wartime President Alija Izetbegović’s central government out of fear of losing the financial backing of the wealthy Middle Eastern states. Another reason is Izetbegović’s own inclination to Islamicize Bosnia. The deafening silence of the Bosnian government towards the presence and activities of the foreign fighters cannot be forgotten, as many of the current Bosniak political leaders are affiliated with the wartime Bosniak nationalists and mujahadeen. It is through this relationship many remain in Bosnia to this day and have avoided deportation.

SEPTEMBER 11th’s AFTERMATH AND BOSNIA

Bosnia is attempting to deport these foreign Islamic fighters. This is an unfulfilled requirement of the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords and due to Bosniak intransigence. The government amended citizenship laws in 2006 and is reviewing the residency status of these individuals. All Bosnians naturalized from April 6, 1992 to January 1, 2006 are having their status and background investigated by the Commission for Review of Citizenship (CRC). This effort has met with protest by many Bosniaks who complain that the US is interfering in Bosnian sovereignty.

The 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington DC forced the at times equivocating Bosniak dominated government to clearly choose on which side they stood in the War on Terror. Indeed, it served as a turning point bringing the Bosnian government in line with America on the issue of international terrorism. Izetbegović was a casualty of this change, resigning as the head of Bosnia’s leading nationalist Muslim party, the Stranka Demokratske Akcije (SDA), one month after the terror attacks. Izetbegović’s ardent support of the mujahadeen and numerous comments denying that any Bosnian connection with Al-Qaeda or international terrorism became a political liability for the Bosniaks and fodder for ag-
gressive Bosnian reporting uncovering his pro-
mujahadeen activities. Izetbegović’s departure, however, did not remove Islamists present in key positions within the SDA or Bosniak dominated government.

Although post 9/11 Bosnia has made strides in combating the image of a state complacent to radical Islam, it has taken 11 years to address the foreign fighters. Bosnia’s ties with Islamic states, especially Iran and Saudi Arabia, highlight the cozy relationships that Izetbegović regime established with known sponsors of terrorism during and after the 1992-95 civil war. Although there has been extensive reporting of Iranian foreign fighters in Bosnia during the civil war, this has been proven to be false. There is a more sinister relationship that developed between the wartime Bosnian Muslim government intelligence service and VEVAK, the Iranian Intelligence and Security Ministry. Iranian intelligence operates today more actively through its diplomatic-consular representatives, but also through cultural, scientific, educational, and humanitarian organizations which are used as a veil to cover intelligence work.

Bosnia to some degree is being exploited as part of the worldwide terrorist network of Al Qaeda. Open source information provides examples of extremists using Bosnia as a transit location for Al Qaeda operatives and arms/weapons shipments. The October 19, 2005 Sarajevo detention of four men, one Turk, one Swede of Bosnian origin and two Bosniaks, alarmed Western governments. These individuals were planning suicide attacks on Western Embassies in Sarajevo and their arrest led to the further detention of four men in Copenhagen, Denmark planning suicide attacks elsewhere in Europe and the arrest of 17 men in Canada this past June involved in a Canadian terror plot.

Since 9/11 Western intelligence services have been warning to be on guard for travelers bearing Bosnian passports as some of the most wanted terrorists acquired Bosnian citizenship during and after the civil war. Not only were mujahadeen provided fraudulent citizenship in Bosnia, Bosnia’s embassies and consulates the world over issued passports to Islamic extremists. The discovery of Bosnian passports in Afghanistan, Chechnya and Iraq have rejuvenated international demands that Bosnian step up its efforts to combat Islamic extremism and better safeguard the issuing of passports.

THE RADICAL ISLAMIC INFLUENCE ON BOSNIA’S MODERATE ISLAM

Bosnia’s Muslims are generally members of the Hannafi school of Sunni Islam, which is a mild form of Islam that tolerates differences within the Islamic community and has the reputation of being moderate and relatively secular - hallmarks of Bosnia’s Muslims (Bringa, 1995, Noel, 1994). However, the more conservative Wahhabi sect, a subset of Salafism a rigid interpretation of Islam, is also found today in rugged central Bosnia.

During Yugoslavia’s Tito’s era, many Bosnian Muslims received religious training as exchange students to non-aligned Muslims states such as Egypt, Iraq and Syria. Islamic influences can be readily seen in Alija Izetbegović’s 1970 book “Islamic Declaration” (re-issued in 1990) in which he advocated an Islamic state in Bosnia and was critical of modern Turkey, advocating Pakistan as a model. This book led to his arrest and imprisonment by Tito. Its republishing helped fuel the nationalist intolerance developing in Bosnia, moreover it reified the narrative among Yugoslavia’s Christians that the goal of the Bosniaks was to create an Islamic state.

Bosnia’s Islamic Community, Islamska Zajednica (IZ), is a well organized institution. It is headed by the Rijaset (Supreme IZ executive body) and led by the Reis ul-Ulema, Dr. Mustafa Cerić. In September 2005 Dr Cerić was elected by the IZ’s Synodal Assembly (Sabor islamska
zajednice) to his second seven year term. The IZ is believed to be the best organized and most competent European Islamic Community.

Many International Community (IC) representatives are quick to point out that the Bosniaks are Western oriented by a large majority and rarely practice their religion. The mannerisms, strong secularism, dress and occasional alcoholic beverage characterize Bosnia as unique in the Islamic world. This is partially true - but primarily in urban areas where young Bosniaks are primarily well educated and politically passive. However it is disingenuous to portray all Bosniaks as moderates - it ignores that portion of the Bosniak community residing in remote rural areas and regions severely traumatized by the war.

Bosnia’s Muslims receive their religious education today in IZ informal elementary religious schools (maktabas), Islamic high schools (medresas), two academies that train Islam-religion teachers, and lastly the Faculty of Islamic Studies in Sarajevo. The high schools are located in Cažin, Mostar, Sarajevo, Travnik, Tuzla, and Visoko and; the academies are in Bihać and Zenica (see figure one). In addition to Bosnian based medresas, there is one each in Novi Pazar, Serbia and Zagreb, Croatia falling under Bosnian Muslim jurisdiction. This religious education organization is controlled by the Islamska Zajednica.

A parallel educational structure has developed outside the Bosnian IZ’s control. Saudi funded Islamic Pedagogical Academies have also been established in Bihać and Zenica and peddle a much more conservative form of Islam to their Bosniak students. From 2003 to 2004 approximately 100 Bosnian Islamic studies students were enrolled overseas. Figure four depicts which states sponsored the students. Saudi, or Wahabbi, influence in Bosnia is considerable and detrimental to both Western and Bosnian interests and seen as a direct threat to European security. Indeed the entire Bosniak landscape is being remade with the construction of numerous “petro-dollar” ultra-modern Middle Eastern style mosques. This marking and reclaiming of space is a clear symbol to those that are not Muslim and is intended to thwart non-Muslim refugee returns, manifesting Islam’s dominance and control.

Sarajevo’s King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud Mosque & Cultural Center was built in 2000 with Saudi funds and operates through Saudi financing. Located in the suburb of Ilidza, it is a major center of Wahabbism in Bosnia.

The mosque, its medresa and administrative offices are under the control of the Saudis, not Reis Cerić and the IZ - it enjoys a de facto extra-territorial status. Although viewed skeptically by the IZ leadership, little can be done to obstruct its radical activities. This situation is allowed to exist by the Bosnian Federacija entity wherein Sarajevo lies, and Reis Cerić has condoned a permissive environment doing little to thwart the spread radical Islam.
BOSNIA’S RADICAL GROUPS

The Active Islamic Youth (Aktivna Islamska omladina - AIO) is an indigenous fundamentalist organization with the goal of promoting an Islamic state in Bosnia and is the one organization in Bosnia within the IZ that causes the most concern with ties to terrorism and fundamentalist Islam. Established in Zenica in 1995 and associated with the mujahadeen the group’s main activities has been to organize protests in opposition to Bosnian state action against the foreign fighters, publishing promotional material and books showcasing AIO’s religious and political extremist ideology. Its Islamic weekly magazine SAFF and organization’s website, have been fonts of radical Islamic preaching, gaining notoriety for publishing interviews with terrorists who have fought against US forces in Iraq and expressing solidarity with the jihadists and suicide bombers in Israel.

Since 2002 the AIO has expanded to include computer and internet facilities, multimedia Islamic libraries, offices and conference rooms in centers located in Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zenica, Travnik, Mostar, Zavidović, Gornji Vakuf, and Sanski Most - all located in the Federacija. In addition, the AIO has members throughout the Bosniak Diaspora in Europe and the US. Through outreach activities such as summer camps, internet cafes and youth centers the AIO has been effective in recruiting young, disenfranchised Bosniaks and raised suspicion in countries that host these Bosniak-AIO sponsored camps. The appearance of bearded men and women dressed in chadors in Sarajevo is noticeably increasing and of great concern to residents who adhere to the traditionally moderate form of Islam practiced in Bosnia. According to Western sources the recruiting focus of radical Islamists in Bosnia are: (1) unemployed youth, (2) orphans of the 1992-95 Bosnian civil war, (3) rural communities in Bosnia, and (4) Bosnia’s Muslim poor and disaffected.

The Muslim Brotherhood Group or Muslimansko bratstvo, is smaller and less well funded than the AIO. However, it represents a significant threat due to its prominence as a Bosnian Islamic portal. Islam Bosna (www.islambosna.ba), the organization’s website offers promotional material, video clips and flyers typically denouncing US or Israeli aggression against the Muslim world. Its advocating of establishing an Islamic state in Bosnia, sympathy with Hamas and destruction of Israel highlight concerns about this website. Islam Bosna has supposedly distributed at least 80,000 copies of some of its posters and operates a well maintained and largely unregulated message boards and information postings. This poses an exceptional threat given the grave concerns recently of terrorist organizations utilizing radical Islamic websites to pass information and conduct terrorist attacks. Another concern is the Muslim Brotherhood Group’s success in attracting Bosniak youth membership through its website. According to the Nezavisne Novine daily in 2002 the oldest members were just 25 years old.

ISLAMIC BANKING, ZAKAT, & SHARIAH

Islamic banking is one of the fastest growing sector of the banking industry in Europe and not surprisingly, where 40% of the population is Muslim, Bosnia has become a new hub in this financial network. Islamic banking simply complies with provisions of Shariah law, dictating that Muslims cannot earn interest and thus making specialist banking services necessary. Sarajevo-based Bosna Bank International (BBI) was established on March 13, 2002 by some of the most powerful financial institutes in the Gulf, including Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank and the Islamic Development Bank in Jeddah. It is the only provider of Islamic banking services in Bosnia. In 2006 BBI plans to double the number of branches in Bosnia and expand its internet and telephone banking services and call center capabilities. Security services in Italy have
noted that traditional Islamic mustering points include call centers, internet points, and money transfer offices - all closely associated with modern banking facilities.

Micro-banking or micro-financial activities are also a new phenomenon that is altering the face of terrorist financing. Europol reporting indicates that as large Islamic charities and NGOs are being closed down for their ties to radical Islam and terror, new mechanisms are arising that continue to finance terror. Recent scholarship has highlighted the ability of Al Qaeda’s adaptive financing infrastructure to counter Western financial policy and oversight efforts. Funding radical Islam and terrorism is becoming increasingly local and substantial funds are still being raised across the Islamic world without the ability of intelligence agencies to monitor them.

Zakat, an alms tax or tithe, is increasingly becoming a significant source of terrorist funding. Difficult to track, these localized donations are gaining importance. This suggests that due to the effects of crackdown on large donors, charitable organizations, and banks, terrorists are increasingly turning to micro-scale financial activities and collecting more donations from small donors. The zakat as well as larger donations by wealthy Muslims called the sadaqa are used to support the purposes of Islam without accountability. In all likelihood this explains why counter finance activities have done little to thwart terrorist operations and even lethality since 9/11. The Islamic world’s outrage over the GWOT and recent Israeli incursion into Lebanon has energized this donor base into providing terrorism financial and moral support.

The lack of transparency in Islamic banking and charitable giving, provides an ideal infrastructure for radical Islamists and terrorists to transfer money and makes it extremely difficult for counter terror organizations and financial regulators to collect intelligence and map out their activities. The chronically short staffed and under funded SIPA is hard pressed to overcome the cloak concealing the potential or actual funding of radical Islam and terror organizations in Bosnia today. This financial wealth gives radical Islam power within the region and easy access to weapons, explosives and even advanced technology. The efforts to counter terrorist financing in Bosnia is an immature and developing front.

**BOSNIA’S RESPONSE TO RADICAL ISLAM**

Under great US pressure to deal with the allegations and realities of foreign radical Islamist presence on Bosnian soil, the government has empowered the State Information and Protection Agency (SIPA) to grapple with issues of terrorism and has instituted the Citizen Review Commission (CRC). On December 1, 2005, the Bosnian Council of Ministers adopted draft amendments to state laws giving the SIPA extensive power to combat terrorism. Moreover, SIPA now possesses the authority to conduct security and background checks of individuals with access to confidential information. SIPA’s mission and structure closely resembles the US Federal Bureau of Investigation; it is an institution of the Bosnian state, not accountable to the entities, however it is chronically understaffed and has been accused of being influenced by Bosniak officials tolerant of extremist activity. Nonetheless, SIPA has been very active since December in apprehending suspicious individuals of North African and Middle Eastern descent found in central Bosnia.

The Citizen Review Commission estimates that approximately 15,000 citizenship certificates were issued and of that number, 1,500 naturalized Bosnians originate from countries outside the former Yugoslavia. The CRC’s first quarterly report indicates that a very serious problem existed in the issuing of Bosnian citizenship to foreigners. During the war and after one could purchase the required paperwork and many mujahadeen were granted citizenship fraudulently by
the Izetbegović regime. A review of the first batch of 50 citizenship certificates issued revealed that 38 of them were issued illegally.

There have even been some grassroots efforts to draw attention to the radical Islamic threat. Two former Bosniak members of the radical Islamic movement and Wahhabi sect in Bosnia, Jasmin Merdan and Adnan Mesanović recently published a book titled “Wahhabism - Salafism” explaining in detail the differences between the traditional and radical interpretations of Islam. While well received in traditional Islamic circles, the book has been vehemently criticized by the Bosniak adherents of radical Islam. Both authors claim that the presence of radical Islam is far greater than realized.

POLITICAL GHOSTS FROM THE PAST

The political reappearance and election win of Haris Silajdžić, the wartime Bosnian Muslim government foreign minister and politician, has added a new element to the political machinations and stability of Bosnia. A leading member of Izetbegović’s cabinet, he directly oversaw the importing of mujahadeen into Bosnia; he brings this background to his new position as the Bosniak member of the Bosnian Presidency and is viewed as hostile to Serb, even Croat, interests. Silajdžić’s 2006 election platform’s main message is to abolish the entities of Republika Srpska and Federacija, something that the Serbs will never accept, and strengthen the state. The post-war stability of Bosnia was acquired by the establishment of the Dayton Peace Accords entity arrangement, guaranteed by NATO, now EU troops and the West’s political and financial support.

Silajdžić’s campaign rhetoric has radicalized all elements of Bosnian society. Serb leadership, under the RS Prime Minister Milorad Dodik who was also reelected in October, has maintained that if Silajdžić and his Party for Bosnia (SBiH), continue to push for dissolution of the entities then Republika Srpska will advocate secession. The Croats have also led renewed calls for a third entity to represent their interests and move out of their Bosniak partner’s shadow. The politics of Bosnia will be tense in the upcoming months.

The abolition of the entities would place Bosnia under the control of its Bosniak majority as they represent 40 to 45% of Bosnians. Herein lies the problem, by a simple majority and via the democratic process the Bosniaks would control the state. All three national groups have shown over the last 15 years that they vote along national lines. Silajdžić has been able to mobilize the Bosniak voters to support his quest to dissolve the entities and place the state under Bosniak control, centered in Muslim dominated Sarajevo. The Iranian government’s pleasure at the election results of Silajdžić victory and pledge of continued support in a time which Iran is increasingly under Western pressure for its nuclear program and known state sponsored terrorism leaves many Western diplomats in a state of consternation. It may indicate a strengthening of ties between Iran and Silajdžić’s Bosniak interests.

Given the influence of Islamic states in Bosnia’s Islamic Community, continued wartime relations with conservative Muslim politicians and Silajdžić’s wartime role as foreign minister, a concern becomes readily apparent that radical Islamic influence may grow and thrive under the new Bosniak political leadership and new direction. Establishment of Bosniak hegemony within the boundaries of Bosnia has become the major political objective with the election of Silajdžić. Of some concern, should the Republika Srpska buffer challenging radical Islam’s expansion in Bosnia disappear, Islam’s territorial footprint in Bosnia would double. It is even imaginable the emigration of Serbs out of Bosnia or even renewed war if secession is unattainable - an environment especially conducive to radical Islam’s expansion.
OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

Radical Islam and Al-Qaeda’s influence on Bosnia has met with only limited success. The ultimate goal of an Islamic state in the Balkan has not been realized. Radical Islam is not popularly supported, nonetheless a transnational terrorist underground and radical Islamic network does now exist in the heart of Europe. The London and Madrid terrorist bombings have been tenuously linked to Bosnia. Coupled with the recent arrests of suspected terrorists in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bangladesh, Britain, Canada, Denmark, the US and over the past eight months indicates that the region is clearly part of the Global War on Terror.

The Islamska Zajednica should not be considered an immediate radical Islamic threat. Its superb organization and territorial footprint provides an outstanding framework from which to enhance and maintain moderate Islam in the Balkans, or if left unchecked, be a proponent of radicalism. The adherents of radical Islam within the IZ, such as members of the AIO, the Muslim Brotherhood and the holdover wartime Bosniak political leaders are inculcated with a conservative Islam they believe should be linked to a centralized Islamic Bosnian state.

A generation of foreign militant Islamists have been given “safe haven, training, financing, and ideological inspiration” within Bosnia since the signing of the DPA and only recently under the shadow of 9/11 has the Bosniak and Bosnian leadership approached this threat. The support of foreign powers, such as Iran and Saudi Arabia, charitable and financial organizations that clearly advocate radical Islamic ideologies and terrorism are firmly planted in the Bosniak regions. Bosnia’s ability to resist extremism and radical Islam depends on continued Western engagement in the region. The recent election of Haris Silajdžić indicates that nationalist political brinkmanship is back on the table, continuing to foster an environment of national non-rapprochement. Moves by the Bosniak leadership to create a stronger, unitary state centered in Bosniak dominated Sarajevo should be carefully deliberated. Subsuming the Croats and Serbs within a state absent entities assures Bosniak hegemony. However, care must also be given to temper Bosniak demands without having them resort to more drastic measures pursuing greater support from radical Islamic states. In eleven years since the end of the Bosnian civil war and signing of the Dayton Peace Accords, this region finds itself once again on the global stage as it wrestles with the issues of militant and radical Islam and a renewed call for the abolition of the entities - a recipe for renewed crisis in the Balkans.

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7 Kohlmann, E., p. 140.


10 Kohlmann, E., p. 199.

Army Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) have numerous opportunities to serve in challenging and interesting assignments in which they contribute political-military and regional expertise to national security affairs, in both stateside and overseas assignments. Many officers are unaware of one such opportunity that exists in the Department of State in Washington, D.C., where Army FAOs detailed to the Department actively participate in the inter-agency process and influence policy-level national security decisions on a daily basis. As an Army FAO detailed to the State Department since 2004, I believe it is highly relevant and important that the Army assigns Army FAOs to this environment, particularly in light of the Army’s vision to develop multi-skilled “Pentathletes,” the Army’s leaders of the 21st century. In the 2006 Game Plan, the Army outlines the importance of developing qualities in leaders that will allow them to respond effectively in a constantly evolving environment. These qualities include necessary skills in governance, statesmanship, and diplomacy, activities that are a part of an Army FAO’s daily life at the State Department.

The mission of the State Department is to conduct the nation’s diplomacy to promote and protect America’s interests. It accomplishes this with a relatively small work force. With a personnel strength of 11,000 Foreign Service employees and 8,000 Civil Service employees, the State Department conducts U.S. diplomatic relations with some 190 countries, which are managed by more than 260 diplomatic and consular posts throughout the world. The State Department works with representatives of 27 different U.S. Government agencies in these overseas posts. Over 37,000 Foreign Service Nationals, or local employees, also supplement the staffing of overseas posts. This mission appears particularly challenging when one recognizes that, with only 56,000 people, the State Department is actually smaller than 10 of the 14 U.S. Cabinet Departments.

Many FAOs are already aware of the State Department jobs normally considered – within Defense Attaché Offices or Offices of Defense Cooperation at U.S. Embassies throughout the world. Those of you who have served in these types of overseas posts have received some exposure to the State Department, but even State colleagues will tell you that life is quite different in Washington. And that is what I want to talk about.

When I arrived in 2004, I was surprised to discover that each of the services details officers to the State Department, a practice that has continued for decades. Detailed officers are all field grade rank, from major to colonel or the service’s equivalent. The current October 16, 2002 Memorandum of Understanding between the Departments of State and Defense provides State with 50 military officers from the Department of Defense for a three-year period of assignment. Of this number, the Army provides 18 officers, eight of which are Army FAOs. Officers serve throughout the Department, although most Army FAOs serve in the regional bureaus. These bureaus manage specific geographic regions of the world and are aptly named the Bureaus for African Affairs, East Asian and Pacific Affairs, European and Eurasian Affairs, Near Eastern Affairs, South Asia Affairs, and Western Hemisphere Affairs. Within the regional bureaus, Army FAOs serve as political-military advisers where they put to use several years of regional familiarization, language training, and in-country experience.
In addition to the regional bureaus, the State Department has a number of functional bureaus that manage specific issues which are quite diverse, reflecting the wide range of interests the United States promotes abroad, for example, the Bureau for Educational and Cultural Affairs; Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; and the Bureau for Oceans and International Environmental, and Scientific Affairs. Army FAOs are currently assigned to two functional bureaus: the Bureau for Political-Military Affairs and the Bureau for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation.

Under the “command structure” of the State Department, an Assistant Secretary heads each bureau and reports to one of six Under Secretaries, each of which manages a “family” of several bureaus. The Under Secretaries cover the following general subject areas: Political Affairs; Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs; International Security and Nonproliferation; Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs; Management; and Global Affairs. All of the regional bureaus fall under the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, who is the third-ranking member of the Department after the Secretary of State and Deputy Secretary of State.

There is no military chain-of-command within the State Department for detailed officers — they are fully integrated into the Office and Bureau to which they are assigned. Each officer is normally rated by his or her State Department civilian rating chain and receives administrative support from the respective service. The Senior Military Representative in the State Department – a senior Air Force colonel – serves as the primary liaison for operational matters between the State and Defense Departments. There is no formal relationship between the Senior Military Representative and most detailed officers, although an informal military channel exists, primarily to pass information.

For the past three years, I have served as a political-military and arms control adviser in the Bureau for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation. I am assigned to the Office of Chemical and Conventional Weapons Affairs which, despite its name, is responsible for European arms control and security issues. The office has lead responsibility within the U.S. Government interagency national security policy process for negotiations on, and the implementation of, conventional arms control treaties and agreements in Europe. These treaties and agreements, which include the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Treaty on Open Skies, Vienna Document 1999 Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Europe, and arms control elements of the Dayton Peace Accords, are important contributors to the European security structure. The nations which participate in these agreements describe them collectively as “the cornerstone of European security.”

To provide clarity about what my duties entail, let me first provide some background about these agreements and related activities.

European arms control activities take place in Vienna, Austria under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or OSCE. The largest regional security organization in the world, the OSCE consists of 56 participating States including every European country, all the countries of the former Soviet Union (including those in Central Asia), the United States, and Canada. The OSCE likes to highlight that fact that its membership ranges from “Vancouver to Vladivostok.”

The OSCE’s origins are in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act which, among other aspects, was a groundbreaking agreement that led to the creation of the first confidence-building measures in Europe. These measures were intended to reduce the possibility of a surprise attack by providing openness and transparency about conventional military forces stationed in Europe. These measures lessened tensions during the Cold War. The latest version of these measures, which are contained in the present Vienna Document 1999, are still being implemented today and
continue to enhance peace and security in Europe.

But the Cold War is over and we are facing different threats today. One venue the OSCE uses to address today’s threats to security in Europe is the OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation. This body meets weekly in Vienna to provide a formal opportunity for dialogue in which current challenges are addressed and the implementation of Vienna Document 1999 and other agreed measures are discussed by delegations of all 56 participating States. Activities under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and Treaty on Open Skies are also discussed in Vienna in separate international implementing organizations for these treaties. The CFE Treaty is discussed in the Joint Consultative Group and the Open Skies Treaty is discussed in the Open Skies Consultative Commission. The U.S. Arms Control Delegation in the U.S. Mission to the OSCE represents the U.S. Government in all of these meetings.

So, how is an Army FAO involved in all this? In Washington, I participate in meetings of the interagency “backstopping” groups that manage U.S. involvement in conventional arms control and European security activities, formulate policy, and provide guidance for the U.S. Delegation. I work on a daily basis with representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the intelligence community, and frequently with the National Security Council. As a political-military and arms control adviser, I draw on experience from previous arms control assignments as well as my regional familiarity as a FAO, to help shape the discussions that develop the U.S. Government policies for these issues. In doing so, a contribution I bring to the process is the ability to interweave an operational focus into the discussions, as theater commanders and operational units in Europe and Central Asia will have to implement the policies and agreements that are developed and agreed.

From day to day, I have similar responsibilities and function just like my State Department civilian colleagues, to include having shed my Army Combat Uniform for a civilian coat and tie. While I am responsible for managing several issues within my assigned portfolio, I quickly discovered that no one issue is ever completely “owned” by one office, bureau, or even Department or agency. Most of the issues I deal with on a daily basis touch on or cross over into equities belonging to others, so simply ensuring coordination both within the State Department and in the inter-agency community takes up a large part of the work week. But I’m still working in the U.S. Government and, as in the military, a lot of time is spent drafting papers to provide talking points and information memoranda for the senior leadership of the State Department: I provide written products for the Deputy Assistant Secretary, Assistant Secretary, and Under Secretary on a weekly basis.

I quickly learned that the State Department culture is very different from the one we have in the military. Arriving at State after a one-year tour on the Army Staff in the Pentagon, I was surprised to discover an amazing level of familiarity among personnel: within the Department, only the Secretary of State is referred to by title; everyone else is addressed on a first-name basis. The biggest challenge I had to contend with, however, was representing the State Department at inter-agency meetings, where occasionally I will have to represent a position that runs counter to the Pentagon’s position. Thankfully, this has not presented a problem, as everyone understands the importance of using the inter-agency process to work out differences and find a solution all agencies can agree with.
As if all that were not enough, there is another aspect to my assignment that makes it unique: in addition to working in Washington, I routinely participate in international negotiations in Vienna as a member of the U.S. Arms Control Delegation. The negotiations are dynamic and on-going, so the travel is frequent and I spend almost half of the year in Vienna. As an Army FAO member of the delegation, my previous arms control experience, familiarity with the region, and language skills have been very useful in the conduct of negotiations and discussions in Vienna. On a daily basis, I interact with senior military and diplomatic counterparts from 55 countries and provide advice to the U.S. Ambassador and the Chief U.S. Arms Control Delegate. I also interact with the Russian Delegation frequently and, as a Eurasian FAO, I am able to provide informal translations of documents we receive from the Russian Delegation before they are sent back to Washington for a policy recommendation. As in other FAO assignments, my operational background provide the U.S. Delegation with important “in-house” military experience and knowledge of our partners; thus complementing the negotiations and strengthening activities related to the arms control agreements. This is one of the many “value-added” contributions an Army FAO can make on a daily basis.

My State Department assignment has provided an opportunity not only to witness governance, statesmanship, and diplomacy first-hand, but even to participate in these activities - where I have been able to make a real contribution. In Vienna, I was given the responsibility to negotiate agreement on the parameters of an international workshop to promote awareness of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, which supports U.S. efforts to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The resulting highly-publicized event included the participation of all 56 OSCE participating States and several important international organizations. This event laid the groundwork for agreement by the Foreign Ministers of all 56 countries to highlight the importance of implementing the resolution and submitting national implementation plans.

I also had the opportunity to participate as the U.S. member of an international OSCE assessment team that traveled to Kaliningrad, Russia. The team, with representatives from nine different countries, was sent to assess Russia’s request for assistance in eliminating more than 100,000 tons of surplus conventional ammunition, a potential threat to human life and the environment. My Russian language skills were particularly useful during this assessment. The visit was highly successful and the team produced a comprehensive report on the condition of the surplus ammunition and recommendations on next steps. The United States was applauded by the Russian Federation and the OSCE for my participation on the team and assistance to the team chief, which led to the successful conclusion of the visit.
Through practical, hands-on experience, my assignment with the State Department has provided a much better understanding of joint, inter-agency, multi-governmental, and multinational activities. And I am confident that my participation has enabled my State Department colleagues to have a better understanding of military issues. The new strategic environment calls for Army leaders who are fluent not only in “Army speak,” but “State speak” and “Inter-agency speak” as well. I believe the Army greatly benefits from giving officers this “out of the box” experience, as it fully supports the Army’s vision to develop Army “Pentathletes.” I urge you to look for this type of assignment not only to “use” your Army FAO skills and expertise, but also to expand your capabilities for the future.

LTC Gary Espinas has been assigned to the State Department as a political-military and arms control advisor since December 2004. A Eurasian FAO, LTC Espinas previously served as an Executive Officer on the Army Staff, Pentagon; Political-Military Officer in U.S. Embassy Moscow; and Deputy Team Chief with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency in Frankfurt, Germany. LTC Espinas has a BA from the University of California, Berkeley, an MA from Harvard University, and is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. LTC Espinas completes his tour with the State Department summer ’07 to attend Senior Service College.

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Psychological Operations in Korea 1968-75
By Ralph K. Benesch

Dates primarily apply to the time of personal involvement or complementary information. It also covers highlights of major changes up to the deactivation of the 24th PSYOP Detachment, which replaced the Korea Detachment on 4 December 1968. The 24th PSYOP provided all audio and visual, strategic-psychological operations support to the United Nations Command/United States Forces Korea.

The applicant had applied for the Foreign Information Officer position, but despite a degree from Colorado University in Asian Studies, an MA in Far Eastern Regional Studies on a National Defense Foreign Language (Korean) Fellowship from Washington University, a fellowship from a Korean Businessman to study in Korea, teaching for the University of Maryland, and teaching Ancient and Modern Asian Civilization at the US Army Education Center in Seoul, the position still required skills in writing.

The position’s counterpart with the 7th PSYOP Group in Japan was held by Walt Sheldon, author of the book “Hell Or High Water” on MacArthur’s Landing at Inchon. The selection committee wanted evidence of writing to fully meet the requirements of the job. The applicant offered his MA thesis on “Kim Ku: A Study of A Korean Nationalist” and got the job as Branch Chief in July.

Chayu Magazine

Sixteen pages of Korean domestic information were written and edited locally while sixteen pages of the monthly, 4-color magazine, Chayu (“Chayu-ui Pot”), “Friends of Freedom,” were added in Japan and covered world events, Americana, and general items of interest. Korea’s distribution of Chayu’s 266,000 copies was poorly targeted. When copies were increased to a half million, Commander Major Dennis Howley, stopped most of the urban distribution of 50,000 copies to universities and various departments like transportation in Seoul. Students had looked down on it as propaganda and none of the other recipients ever asked for it to be reinstated except the Department of Justice, which continued to send about 1,000 copies to inmates in prison to improve prisoner moral.

In August 1968 rural police boxes became responsible for getting 183,000 copies to people living in their rural areas. The bulk of the rest went to various ROK security forces. Although our domestic target audience had changed, the basic objective to promote UNC/USFK relations and the Republic of Korea’s (ROK) self-reliance, nationalism, and democratic institutions remained the same. However, presentation of the written material was more sensitized to the reader’s background and education.

Visual Branch included four Korean writers, one female and three males, to write in English. Besides editing their articles, the editor might, after a comprehensive discussion with the writer, put in editorial nuggets to enhance the PSYOP effectiveness of the article. The English text was sent for review by USIS, State’s Political Counselor, and the UNC-J5. No changes were ever made. The text then went to Japan’s 7th PSYOP for translation into Korean and was printed by the US Army’s printing plant there. Sometimes the Korean translators were not familiar with colloquial language changes in the ROK or some subtleties. This initially required frequent phone calls and TDY exchanges between writers and translators.
Occasionally there was a thin line of difference with Walt Sheldon. His target was mainly Japanese employees of U.S. Services, with more emphasis on pro-Americana. However, Korean local coverage emphasized nation-building and strengthening UNC popular support. Sheldon also reviewed writer’s English drafts sent to Japan for translation and printing. In a particular case the Korean editor disagreed with his comments on a Homeland Reserve story. It was author vs. propagandist. He wrote, “A few minor points should be mentioned. In paragraph two the author starts preaching to us again: ‘…in order to pursue a peaceful national existence we must maintain steady vigilance in the face of the consistent threat posed by an enemy bent on the destruction of our society.’ Please, everybody: we are not writing political analyses or patriotic speeches. As authors we keep ourselves and the first–person pronouns out of these articles. ROK citizens are intensely anti-Communist and do not need to be exhorted—this is the least of our problems. If one of the people you’re writing about says things like this, and you quote him, fine. But not you.”

My response was: “Since we are a propaganda magazine and when the author can’t quote others, as an observer a little preaching is necessary. This is actually where I am still very much involved with the articles. Of course, I am more than conscious to avoid ‘blind, gushy patriotism,’ however, when used in taste, such preaching becomes the salt and pepper of the article—and this propaganda is much more than an appeal towards their anti-Communist spirit—rather it is directed toward ideals—hopefully instilling patriotism for, dedication to, and pride and faith in their own country.” I sent Walt’s comments to my boss, Bill Hunt, and his written response: “Ralph – I couldn’t have written the sentence better myself…all the right words and ideals…’peaceful national existence,’ ‘vigilance,’ and consistent threat.’ Sheldon should realize he (Korean writer) is writing for a military command that is justifying its existence! Do you want me to call him?” That wasn’t necessary. I sent Walt a written reply.

The Visual Branch also included graphic artists, photographers, intel specialists, and those in distribution. The output involved designing the back cover of Chayu, writing and graphic layouts for the farmers’ almanac, later replaced by a fishermen’s almanac with shift of NK agent activity, the UNC Calendar, wall posters, hand bills, and leaflets sent to North Korea. Chayu periodically covered isolated, mountain-top guard posts, with minefields located along the DMZ and each post had its own mines it could independently trip. Having the editor present with a writer and photographer facilitated access and reception. This was true also in visiting cement plants, major economic construction, etc. It had less to do being editor and more to do with being a foreigner, with a serious interest in Korea.

With the significant increase in the magazine’s distribution by the Korean National Police, Chayu started a twelve-month series on police-community relations. This increased policemen’s interest in distributing the magazine. It was often personally delivered to villages, posted on bulletin boards, preserved in makeshift bindings in village “libraries”, and in some cases readers had to initial it and pass it on to others. It was estimated that Chayu had a readership of at least ten million.

There was one provincial police director, who told our reporter, “police duty was to control the people,” implying civil affairs wasn’t their responsibility. Consequently, an interview was set up for Chayu with the Korean National Police Director, PakYong-Su, to publicize his policy. He emphasized that local police-involvement was essential to win the confidence of the citizens. “We will have to strengthen civic actions which often extends far beyond our primary duty. For example, police help an illiterate old man register a complaint to the investigating authorities or teach boys and girls, who do not attend regular classes.”
About countering North Korean agents, he added, “in those cases, police have a larger responsibility. Only as a good friend of the inhabitants in isolated areas can he perform his duty successfully. For this he must be a reliable person, so he can be informed of any movements of agents from the inhabitants.” He gave a recent example where agents had landed and offered money for information. Two of the islanders stole their boat and contacted the police.

Still it took two more visits to that province to get an article. Long-term, strategic psychological operations are difficult to evaluate because of time and other influencing factors. However, through Chayu articles on strong police involvement in community affairs and seen as giving something away free, police attitudes and perceptions of its own role in the Korean society was substantially changed. Of interest, when a cadet at the police academy was asked what he thought would be most challenging in his job? He replied, “getting married.” Korean society still don’t want their daughters to marry a policeman, a shoe-maker, nor a butcher.

When the Republic of Korea sent 50,000 troops to Vietnam, 20,000 copies of Chayu followed. More articles on security were also written. Ms. Chayu, who had normally appeared in each issue in traditional dress, might now appear in a uniform, stressing women’s role in defense.

Through the ambitions of Chayu writers and photographers, Chayu’s reputation was outstanding. Once they wrote an article and showed pictures of a 19-page Sutra of pure gold and other ancient relics, hidden under the Wangkung Pagoda. They were discovered during repairs in 1965 and still (1969) undergoing extensive examination. They had not been put on display to avoid Japanese misinterpretations. The Korean public saw them for the first time in Chayu. Again, when The first C-5 cargo plane landed in Korea, Chayu had photos, to include one showing Ms. Chayu in traditional clothes standing inside one engine housing unit with outstretched arms to show how huge it was.

However, old traditions die hard. Once one of my photographers was driving on a dirt road in the middle of nowhere, when our jeep died. A farmer came out of a rice field and got it started. As the photographer started to drive away, I told him to thank the farmer. The photographer answered that since we were from Seoul, etc., etc. the farmer would be insulted to have helped someone whose status was so low as to thank him. We both thanked him and the photographer got a long lecture about winning hearts and minds.

Nationalism was relatively new in Korea, starting slowly with Japanese occupation in 1906. It spiked in March, 1919, after U.S. President Wilson gave a speech to the League of Nations about independence and democracy. The Korean uprising was quickly and brutally put down. Nevertheless, a Korean Provisional Government was established in China and a few assassinations, bombings, etc., occurred over the next twenty-five years. Japan’s occupation was near absolute. Only Japanese could be taught and spoken in schools and Koreans were forced to take Japanese names.

In addition, Seoul, as the seat of power for 800 years, was plagued with traditions that promoted factionalism and regionalism interspersed heavily with nepotism, favoritism, and corruption. If one looked with cold reality upon the Korean situation after the war, the mixing up of North and South Koreans in the South was a blessing for the country. Many Koreans from the industrial North, who fled South, most of whom came with little financial and personnel support, have attained economic and decision-making positions in the society. This was largely based on their own individualism and initiative.

Voice of the United Nation’s Command (VUNC)

The general North Korean (NK) citizenry could only receive broadcasts on a single- con-
trolled radio and television frequency. Therefore, VUNC’s targeted audiences were the few NK communist leaders, party members, intellectuals, military and civilians, and agents in training, who were authorized to listen to other broadcasts. Bal-loons carrying a radio and extra batteries were dropped on land and float bags in the ocean. There was a risk, of course, to be found listening to one.

VUNC broadcasts included a variety of music, Voice of America (VOA) news, and local news, but also emphasized UNC strict compliance with the Armistice; reporting on all officially announced military moves or reinforcement; point out repeated violations of the Armistice by NK; the UNC & ROK ability to cope with negative situations; playing up ROK economic & social progress; and emphasizing ROK international status.

VUNC’s “don’t do” list included: not to threaten; not speculate on what U.S. or UNC will or will not do; not to speculate on motives behind NK actions; not to mention military moves not officially announced; not to use propaganda that would be beneath the dignity of the UN; and not to run wholesale condemnation of communism, but select targeted commentaries to specific attitude changes or modification points that could be exploited in North Korea.

VUNC had interviewed a number of defectors to the ROK. However, KIM Myong-sik would be its first agent. He was in ROK Army fatigues with the rank of 1st lieutenant, swimming in the Han River along the Kimpo Peninsula, when captured. It was anticipated, based on his military background, that he would not voluntarily cooperate in making a normal defector-type interview to be broadcast to the North.

The interview was conducted under the guise of normal interrogation, using selected question designed to bring out the points desired. The interview was then analyzed to remove questions and answers that would have little psychological advantage. The second step was to cut from the original tape the male interrogator and dub in a female interviewer. The tape was excel-
lent in both quality and credibility. The agent answered all questions in a very sincere way, based on his own personal reaction to the positive conditions he discovered in the South. It was aired weekly for four consecutive weeks. Future agent interviews followed. It also dispelled the North’s claim, that if an agent was captured, he would be killed.

One time in Japan the editor went into a North Korean bookstore and picked out a couple magazines. Looking at other publications, there were school books for children, depicting numerous drawings of Koreans in the agrarian South in servitude to Yankee imperialists, being beaten, raped, bayoneted, etc. However, the store wouldn’t sell the book. Finally the owner came out and explained that whatever number of books they had were the number of students they had and if they sold one, a student would have to go without.

This story underscores the major propaganda theme that was constantly promoted internally in schools, on television, training, indoctrination, and even to North Koreans in Japan (for about 30 years). It was always the agrarian South, Yankee brutality, and the misery suffered by South Koreans in servitude. Consequently, it had so permeated those in the North that it became a fact even within its leadership. The North believed if they sent enough well-trained, armed commandos, they could rally the oppressed to start a revolution. Many leaflets sent south encouraged the South to revolt, or at least sabotage the Imperialist stranglehold on the people.

NK’s Pyongyang KCNA International with the objective of destroying the U.S. position in Korea broadcasted in English all U.S. Service-men’s transgressions committed, i.e., “A wolf named JACK of the U.S. imperialist aggressor army unit entrenched in Inchon perpetrated on the night of the 19th of May the thrice-cursed atrocity of mercilessly strangling to death a South Korean woman, Kim Kum-sun, residing in Inchon, according to a report from Inchon. This is a diabolical murderous act conceivable only for human butchers and shows in all nakedness the heinous nature of the U.S. imperialist wolves, who can not pass even a single day without seeing the sight of bloodshed. That day this beast, who was running around Inchon City like a mad dog, making it a mere “pastime” to plunder and commit violence against the guiltless inhabitants on preposterous pretexts, broke into the house of the pre-mentioned woman to satisfy his carnal desire. But the woman stubbornly resisted him. The U.S. imperialist beasts not only shoot and knife people to death but the beast committed the brutal barbarity of throttling her to death.”

1968 was a pivotal year. In January thirty-one commandos from the 124th North Korean army unit, fully armed and in ROK army uniforms reached Seoul streets as a unit. Their goal was to attack the Blue House (U.S. White House equivalent). However, police and security forces confronted them before reaching their goal. Only North Korean Kim Shin-jo survived. After that failure, the Communist Labor Party increased the number of the guerrillas of the 124th by thousands.

These soldiers were highly professional. Their training was to get up at 6 every morning, fill sand bags with 30 kilograms of sand and run, often bare-footed, over mountain trails for about 30ri (about 8-10 kilometers. Take a cold rubdown with a wet towel, eat breakfast, then attend a political class and study the “Reminiscences” (collection of writings on Kim Il-sung’s fight against Japan). They would sleep 8 hours in the afternoon before night training began. To cultivate courage, each soldier had to go by himself, dig up a tomb, take out the remains of a dead body and hide himself in the tomb.

In early November the 124th landed 120 commandos on the more isolated East Coast with the mission to create an uprising against the ROK. During agent interrogation, there was no
doubt in the success of their mission because they fully expected friendly contact with the locals. Instead they found them hostile. Within five days the Visual Branch made a poster. At the top, in small pictures, were some of the atrocities committed, followed by larger pictures of the public reporting locations of the enemy, still larger, mobilization of the security forces, and finally the largest pictures of the dead enemy with caption “as long as NK agents don’t turn themselves in, their final fate will be like this.” Also leaflets were drop asking South Koreans to report any sign of the enemy and leaflets encouraging North Koreans to surrender. One leaflet had a picture of Kim Shin-jo, sole survivor of the 124th January attack in Seoul, telling them to give up and they wouldn’t be hurt. One hundred and ten were killed, two gave up, five captured, and three remained unknown.

The two, who gave themselves up and given defector status, were brought to our detachment in preparation of broadcasting back to their unit, which we knew listened to VUNC. They were to dispel the myth that South Koreans were suffering or would welcome “invaders” from the North and to encourage their fellow soldiers of the 124th to defect as soon as possible when sent to the South. Both defectors cursed Kim Il-sung to ensure their own survival. The shocker was when they came into the commander’s’ office, where a picture of Kim Il-sung hung on the wall with the caption, “KNOW YOUR ENEMY!” One defector gave a sharp salute. Realizing what he had done, his expression became fearful. Instead we gave them sodas and talked. We knew the enemy listen to the Voice of The United Nations. No further, large-force commando attacks followed, although North Koreans continued to try to infiltrate in rubber rafts and heavily armed speed boats along the coast lines, in groups of three to nine agents and/or commandos.

Leaflet And Other Printed Materials

Ninety-nine percent of all leaflets sent to North Korea came out of the Visual Branch. A wide-range of truthful subjects and messages were designed, mostly in black and white, but color leaflets were steadily increased. No black propaganda was ever made. Leaflets were stored in Okinawa and dropped by C-130 flights over ROK territory. They were aero-dynamically designed to take advantage of the wind velocity and height of flight, to predict where the leaflets would fall. They could be floated to drop along the north side of the DMZ, North Korea’s capital, Pyongyang, and areas up to, but inside NK’s side of the Yalu river.

When the Visual Chief initially reviewed contingency leaflets stored in the event of another North Korean invasion, some had the mythical figure of Han Kun with a long white beard solemnly standing over a North Korean about to bayonet a farmer. The message was, “What would He think about brother killing brother” Myth had it that Han Kun’s mother was a bear and his father a tiger and he created Koreans.

A new leaflet, “salkil” (the way to live) was introduced in 1968 to be used in the defector inducement program and emphasized the fact that people in the Republic of Korea live better than those in North Korea. In September, 1968, a North Korean defector indicated that a leaflet he had seen, using the salkil theme, was the final persuader for his defection. Also a number of posters and leaflets were developed to exploit the disillusionment agents faced with total resistance to their efforts on the part of the South Korean people.

One-year example of total printed media support provided by Japan Detachment for the 24th PSYOP in 1968 was:

- Calendars 350,000
- Almanacs 350,000
- Magazines 3,600,000
- Posters 640,000
- Leaflets 18,300,980
- Booklets 50,000
The Detachment’s most unusual posters were the result of race riots in 1971. This was a time that black and white American soldiers were trying to kill each other in Germany, Vietnam, Korea, and the U.S. This was a particular side-effect of the mandatory draft. In Korea it hit a high level June 9, 1971 when 100 black soldiers rampaged in Pyongtaek going into the local bars in search of white soldiers, who quickly fled. Blacks proceeded to trash (destroy would be a better description) the bars, Korean stores, and attacked Koreans. Ten American soldiers and nearly 20 Koreans were injured, some seriously.

This led to a large Korean demonstration the next day with banners, “NIGGERS GO BACK TO YOUR COTTON FIELDS.” A long series of race riots, which spread over to the Korean communities, gave NK considerable opportunity to spin their own propaganda version, which had nothing to do with race, but about South Koreans rising up and striking back at U.S. Imperialist aggressors.

North Korea had for some time directed some of their English leaflets toward American black soldiers in an effort to encourage them to rebel against their military leaders, desert the Army, abandon the defense of the ROK, and return to America to fight for the emancipation of their own people. There was no evidence such propaganda had much influence.

At a meeting on 14 June the Detachment outlined the problem and consequences to include North Korea’s propaganda exploitation of USFK racial confrontations. The Problem was one of discrimination by club owners, waitresses and business girls against black GIs. It spread to eleven camps all the way down to Pusan. Eighth Army Garrison Commander asked the 24th PSYOP to get involved. Psychological objective was to convince the target audience that they must actively contribute to the prevention of racial clashes by ceasing all discriminatory practices against black soldiers. Communication was necessary for Koreans involvement in services to U.S. GIs. As Korean-language propagandists (legally prohibited to produce anything in English), the Detachment’s assets were well suited to address and solve the issue.

Visits to the area showed that club owners were trying to improve the situation and had instructed their waitresses to treat customers equally. In some clubs, the practice was started to even give blacks better treatment than whites and in the U.N. Club in Seoul this included giving them an occasional free beer. On 30 June, 1971 Mr. Kim Tong-hyon, manager of the graphics office, and The Visual Branch Chief visited several of the club owners.

It became apparent that racial problems were more than just discrimination against blacks. There was also among the blacks a “militant” group who did not want equality. They wanted their own clubs and “territory.” This group followed black racist’s concepts and wanted to aggravate the situation. Two popular arguments they used to establish mutuality with the Koreans was: “Japan exploited Korea 36 years and the whites have exploited the blacks over a hundred years.” Also, “Koreans and blacks are colored and should work together against the whites.” Fortunately, their overall impact was limited, although festering.

It was decided that posters inside the bars with the Korean message to “treat all guests equally” could have the greatest impact. The bars were a common meeting area, were often the site of discrimination, and word-of-mouth was sure to spread. The challenge was left to my artists to create such posters. After considerable discussions with a number of Korean men and women, the artists elected to show Caucasian women in various sexual enticements with the “treat all guests equally” slogan.

It had the necessary impact, was not thought of as insulting, perhaps somewhat interesting because of white females on the posters, and possibly even conveyed a common theme among white women. In conclusion, it got their attention and understanding!
It was imperative for the success of operations that all PSYOP materials be reviewed by club owners for acceptance and that distribution be made by ROK law enforcement agencies. It was equally important that U.S. military installations not be readily identifiable with these materials. PSYOP materials should imply Korean concern to improve the racial situation in their respective areas and Korean awareness that they contributed to racial problems and it is their problem also.

On 2 July, 8 posters and 500 flyers were given to the Yongsan Police to distribute among the 7 club owners. This was done during the evening of the 2nd and by the fifth, all clubs had posted them and passed out most of the flyers to lady patrons. Feedback concerning the printed materials developed by the Detachment were quite favorable. They had been well received and disseminated by the club owners. Incidents among blacks, Koreans, and whites had decreased considerably.

Osan’s one-year-old ‘Brotherhood’ system had been so effective since April 1970, when there was a bloody racial brawl resulting in 17 American and two Korean injuries, there have been no incidents of any significant. According to Maj General Robert W. Maloy, commander of the U.S. Air Force in Korea and the 314th Air Div., “the system is a Brotherhood Association for Servicemen (BAS). It comprised of mostly blacks and some whites and aimed at promoting harmony among all people living in and assigned to Korea.”

Associated Press reported that the “Osan ‘Brotherhood’ spreads to Travis AFB in California, the scene of a four-hour racial brawl involving 600 airmen in May 71 and is copying Osan’s system of solving racial problems, base official here said Friday.”

The Department of Army in August sent the Detachment’s editor to the University of Southern California for long-term training in journalism. His return in June, 1972, coincided with the final issue of Chayu. Mr. Ronald Rhodes, Chief of Propaganda Production, wrote in a Chayu After-Action Report that there was no formal directive from UNC on how the program was to be terminated. 69,750,000 copies of Chayu had been produced from June 1955 through June 1972.

The 24th PSYOP Detachment elected to publish a 64-page, full-color final issue which summarized the aims of the past 17 years in relation to the latest UNC policy guidance. The last issue contained a brief summary of conditions in post-war Korea and how they changed with the United States and UNC assistance to the point that the ROK had become increasingly self-reliant in its own defense and economy. This was in keeping with the Nixon Doctrine in terms of increased modernization of ROK Armed Forces with the aim of reducing the need for large numbers of U.S. troops in Korea.

The report went on to state that everyone had seen Chayu at one time or another according to distribution surveys. There was never any question, in the minds of Chayu readers, that Chayu was a valuable and useful publication. Harder to measure, the report went on, was whether Chayu was actually responsible for maintaining conditions favorable to the continued presence of the UNC in the ROK?

Therein lies somewhat of a contradiction. Nation-building is a lot like parenthood. Children are expected eventually to stand on their own. ROK is not there yet and with NK annual spending of about $5.2 billion on military expenditures (22.9% GDP, CIA World Factbook) and its total obsession of uniting the Korean peninsula under its control, are realities not lost on the ROK. Although ROK wants to further positive relations with NK and believe it is now strong enough to do so, it can be expected to continue a pragmatic, security relationship with UNC/U.S Forces Korea.

The UNC Commander in Chief received a letter from the Honorable Yoon Ju Young, Ministry of Culture and Public Information, dated February
16, 1972, requesting continued publication of “Chayu-ui-pot.” General J. H. Michaelis, wrote back on the 28th of February, “it had been published the past seventeen years to promote understanding among the Korean people and the United Nations Command. The very strong bonds of friendship which exist today between the Republic of Korea and the United Nations Command indicate that this objective has been achieved. This will permit the redirection of efforts to other important areas.”

Eventually the ROK began to publish its own “Sae Maul Un-dong” (New Village Movement). This basically meant having to pick up the tab. Chayu was a proven model, but now Korean emphasis and priorities could prevail.

Chayu writers were always strong-willed with a lot of initiative. It was interesting to note in the after-action report, that one writer with four years with the 24th PSYOP was quoted as saying “Chayu editors had a unique problem … It was the cultural gap existing between editors and their writers. The magazine operated best when its chief was capable of writing and capable of understanding the writers. The magazine was most miserable when its chief thought himself merely to be an administrator. It seems UNC sees its PSYOP mission in the ROK completed while still admitting the need of continued UNC presence in this country. The logic is beyond my comprehension.” I interpreted this to mean the writer missed me as an editor and wished he still had a job.

VUNC actually ended its broadcasting June 30, 1971 at 9:00 p.m. The 7th PSYOP Group in Japan and the 15th PSYOP Group in Okinawa were deactivated back to the States. I became the Command’s Operation Officer as the 24th PSYOP was tasked to develop and implement new programs and to provide mission options, while its destiny was being decided between the Joint Chief of Staff and State Department.

My position was reclassified as a Supervisory Intelligence Officer in November 1973. I planned and directed the research and evaluation of North Korea’s propaganda impact upon South Korea; provided training and assistance to Korean PSYOP units; and continued to work closely with the Korean National Police.

However, Strategic PSYOP is more of a user of intelligence and less a collector. I assisted in the closure of the command February 1975 with Detachment Commander, Captain Charles Ray.

The FAO Journal needs:

FAO articles written by FAOs!

All FAOs are requested to submit articles to be published in the FAO Journal. Articles should nominally be 7-10 pages, single spaced (longer articles will be considered). Graphics (pictures, maps, charts) should be included embedded in the article and sent separately (in a PowerPoint file is convenient).

After publishing in the FAO Journal articles will be uploaded on the FAO web site (www.faoa.org).

Please e-mail articles and graphics to editor@faoa.org or webmaster@faoa.org.

Without your articles the FAO Journal cannot be published!
In no other time in American history, has there been an opportunity to shape the course of where United States grand strategy will go in the 21st century. During the Clinton Administration, it appeared America was using almost eight years to come to terms that it was the only remaining superpower. Currently the United States is using elements of its national power in a variety of ways that has given an impetus to the question what should the United States do with its economic, military and political dominance? A series of scholars convened in 2002 at the Virginia Military Institute to answer those questions and engage in a serious debate over the international way ahead for the United States. *The Obligation of Empire: United States’ Grand Strategy for a New Century* edited by James J. Hentz (Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 240 pages, 2006) features a collection of nine essays that introduces readers to the major positions taken after 9-11 over the direction America should take as the only superpower. It is also a book that debates the concept of American Grand Strategy in the post-9/11 world. In many ways, we are very far from having a clearly articulated grand strategy, as we had during the Cold War with the containment of the former Soviet Union. This book and the national security debate are attempting to define the threat and the grand strategy the United States should pursue.

James Hentz, associate professor at the Virginia Military Institute, begins with an overview of the book and the 2002 seminar which defined four lines of argument among academics. These are neo-isolationism (we should not get entangled in conflicts that are outside our vital national interests), selective engagement (we are the dominant power but should limit our reach), cooperative security (we are not and should not act as an imperial country), and primacy (we are a superpower and should conduct an expansive and extensive foreign policy). The chapter by Doug Brandow, a fellow at the Cato Institute, argues that the United States should return to a foreign and military policy befitting a republic and not an empire, heeding the advice of John Quincy Adams that the United States should not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy. He feels this is the best way to preserve America’s independence and freedom. Of course, with each point of view one can agree or disagree, but for those with a passion for America’s national security it is important to read not only the views you tend to agree with but also those you vehemently disagree with as well. One argument against Brandow, is that the interconnectivity of the globe makes it impossible for the United States to remain neutral or uninvolved in regional crises that could undermine a region and thereby create the chaotic and ungoverned conditions from where terrorists thrive.

Clifford Kiracofe, a former instructor at the US Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and adjunct professor at the Virginia Military Institute, makes a cogent argument for selective engagement. This proposes that the United States take a hard realist stance in dealing with international crises. But as readers will discover, there are varying opinions as what constitutes selective engagement, and the chapter does not factor in the constitutional powers of the President in committing forces in the short-term that would lead to further commitments in the long-term. In essence, what constitutes selective engagement is determined initially by the President and then later sustained by Congress.
Charles Kupchan, a senior fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations, argues that the United States should not resist rising regional powers and instead America’s grand strategy should focus on working with Europe and East Asia to promote collective management of crises. The United States, this chapter opines, should shape the development of emerging regional powers like India, and the European Union. The book continues with a regional assessment of challenges from South Africa, and Asia to the Middle East and Europe. There are some hard questions posed on the utility of NATO and the maintenance and financing of Cold War institutions in a post-Cold War world now defined by 9-11. If you enjoyed Strategy and Policy at the war college, you will enjoy reading this book.

Colonel Kenneth Allard, U.S. Army (Ret) is a well-known military commentator in news networks, who wrote a book on U.S. Army operations in Somalia and consulted in a PBS documentary on America's first combat experience with Somali warlord, the late Mohammed Farah Aidid. Before retirement Allard was Dean of the National War College and earned a reputation as an unconventional military thinker. His latest book Warheads: Cable News Network and the Fog of War (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2006, 176 pages) combines humor, wisdom, the role of cable news in war to provide readers a thought provoking book on the American military of the 21st century. He opens with an observation that 1.4 million American soldiers, airmen, marines and sailors are charged with protecting 300 Million American citizens. This statistic translates into an American public that has become increasingly separated from the challenges American arms has had to face in the 21st century. He calls this the Great Divide in which most Americans are introduced to the military through cable news, and that part of the downfall of Rome was a citizenry that became too bored, too preoccupied and too lethargic to send their children to defend the outposts of the Roman Empire. Allard argued that the string of retired generals, colonels and officers who permeate MSNBC, FOX and CNN is due to an American public that needs a person to articulate the complexity of war, weapons systems and operations to American audiences. The author cites Israeli Lieutenant Colonel Yossi Ben-Hanan, a hero of the 1973 Yom-Kippur War, who told Allard that the difference between Israel and the United States, is that in the United States the Army is you, but in Israel it is us. This leads to pondering of the citizen-soldier concepts, the draft and the volunteer armed forces, causing a review of the pros and cons between them in 21st century American arms.

The book contains chapters that delve into what news networks look for in analyzing conflict for a wider audience and of course the ever creative quest for ratings which can lead media networks to some tasteless and abhorrent actions. These chapters are important because future conflict will see media embedded with units and interacting frequently with more junior officers and enlisted personnel. Allard’s book contains humor, history, and food for thought about the future of America’s armed forces. Examples include his concern about the obsession of technology to replace and or downsize the number of American troops. He argues that today’s conflicts demand persons on the ground, and that stability operations cannot be achieved with advances in technology only but with a robust presence. On Iraq, he quotes T. E. Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia) who informed his seniors that it would be better to have the Arab (tribes) undertake a task incompletely, than to have the British complete the same task to perfection, after all it is their war, he went on to say. Warheads has something for the military planners, Foreign Area Officer, Public Affairs Officer and other military specialties.

Editor’s Note: LCDR Aboul-Enein is currently stationed in Washington DC as a Counter-Terrorism Analyst. He previously served as Director for North Africa and Egypt as well as Advisor on Islamist Militancy at the Office of the Secretary of Defense from 2002-2006. He is a fully qualified Middle East Foreign Area Officer and prolific writer of reviews and essays on the Middle East and Islamist Radicalism.
Keeping up with changes in the debate within Islam requires constant reading from the moderate and rational authors to the more extreme. U.S. military planners must read a variety of books on Islam to understand not only moderate allies crucial to the war on terrorism but Islamist racialist adversaries as well. Although reading about the basics of Islamic practice (prayers, alms and fasting) is a good first step is not enough for American forces confronting enemies who have deformed interpretations of Islam.

This review essay will highlight two books designed to enhance your thinking about what President Bush means when he says Islamist radicals have hijacked a great religion. University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA) Law Professor Khalid Abou El Fadl has written *The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from Extremists* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 290 pages, 2006). The author attacks Islamist radicals using Islamic law and history to argue that they have eroded Islam’s moral tradition. His book is also an appeal for Muslims to critically engage their tradition and reclaim Islam as a humanistic force for positive change in the world.

The book opens by classifying the Islamic ideological threat, and he characterizes the ideological clash within Islam as being between puritans and moderates. Abou El Fadl derives the term moderate from Islamic texts, the Prophet Muhammad when faced who two extremes reportedly preferred the moderate path. But he characterizes Islamist radicals as puritans, which I disagree. Puritans may have resonance among western academics but the label is unsuited to public diplomacy efforts in the Middle East. Puritan has a radical yet noble quality that is not appropriate for thugs and assassins. I do agree with Abou El Fadl with the Islamic law term *hiraba* (literally waging war against society) is much better than labeling them jihadist (a badge of honor among militants). But this is exactly the reason why the book should be read, because it stimulates discourse.

The book continues to describe medieval Muslim jurists who advocated that the state has a responsibility of protecting Islam. Serious 21st century Islamic issues are not a fixation on death, suicide, murder and mayhem but the difference between protecting versus representing faith? What is the role of Shariah (Islamic Law) in a modern state? Do *fugaha* (religious jurists) have a role in modern judicial systems? What is the relationship between God, legislative sovereignty and human rights in societies with a Muslim character? Note these complex questions will not be resolved or discussed in radical or politicized madrassas nor will it be resolved through the tactics of Bin Laden.

Another interesting discussion is the problem of people with very limited education becoming self-proclaimed experts in Islamic law. This has led to an unprecedented deterioration in the quality of Islamic learning and debate. There are also pages that reveal the placing Islamic tradition at the service of political objectives. This began with the Kharijites in the seventh century, re-emerged with Ibn Taymiyah in the thirteenth century and today’s modern manifestation is the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. The obsession with Palestine has excluded discussion on other important aspects of Islamic reform. It has become a convenient form of escapism from complex problems of the 21st century.
This book is also extremely critical of Muhammad Bin Abdul Wahab, the cleric who in 1744 founded Wahabism and who ignored juristic predecessors except for the explosive and highly damaging Ibn Taymiyah (died 1328). The author highlights how Abdul Wahab’s brother Suleiman, criticized the path of takfir (declaring Muslims and non-Muslims apostates) is counter to Islamic law and he cited over 50 sayings of Prophet Muhammad on the sins of condemning fellow Muslims. Readers will also explore the merging of Wahabism and Salafi ideologies in the 1970s to create a potent mixture of militant ideologues like Shukri Mustafa and Abdel-Salam Faraj to name a few. The end of the book covers such topics as jihad and ends with a call for a counter-jihad based on intellectual activism. One may disagree with the author on many points but he lays his argument out well and is a basis to being a debate and to learn how to ideologically counter Islamist militancy ideologically using Islamic precedence, history and texts.

Barry Rubin is a staple of modern Middle East studies and is the author of numerous books on the region. He is Director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center in Herzliya, Israel. His latest entitled Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East (Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley and Sons, 2006) discusses the narrow margin of Arab liberals caught between despotism and Islamic militants. The book begins with the 1992 murder of Farag Foda, a highly effective debater of radical preachers, who that same year debated the cleric Muhammad Al-Ghazali at the Cairo book fair. Fouda took the side of secularism and the cleric predictably his concept of an Islamist state. His effective debate was silenced by AK-47 rounds discharged by a fish seller, who was himself convicted. What sums up a major problem in the current Middle East is the trial, where the cleric Al-Ghazali testified that the killing of Fouda was a proper punishment for an apostate. What is outrageous was his testimony was backed by a group of scholars from Egypt’s Al-Azhar University, perhaps the most prestigious center of Islamic learning. Fouda killer declared he could now die with a clear conscience.

Rubin argues that militant violence silences Arab liberals and pro-democracy groups, with the only winners being despotic rulers and the region’s dictators. A true danger is the political expression has been polarized between the regime and the mosque leaving no room for other political options and party politics. You will delve into the world of Egyptians Saad-el-Din Ibrahim or play write Ali Salem to the Moroccan Bu-Said, and put faces to the voices of rational yet suppressed Arab political discourse and from persons who want democracy. Read Rubin’s book and gain insight to the political currents of the Middle East.

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Excitement is brewing within the Department of Defense and Army FAO Proponent is hard at work on initiatives designed to build “Pentathletes and multi-skilled leaders who meet the needs of the force and improve regional expert capacity congruent with Army Transformation. We are also heavily engaged in creating opportunities for “re-greening” our FAO Corps. In an ever changing world it is prudent to periodically review our training program to meet the needs of our Armed Forces.

For this issue of the FAO Journal I would like to focus attention on the one thing that has distinguished Army FAOs from other functional areas and Service programs: the aspect of mentorship.

Years ago, Proponent developed a training program designed to create regional experts and it continues to improve each year. In recent years we have spent approximately 2.1 million dollars per year on the ICT program. While FAO Proponent is responsible for FAO policy and the total lifecycle management of officers throughout their career, training management remains a vital responsibility. One of the key portions of training management is monitoring in-country training. Though the program of instruction varies, one thing remains constant – mentorship. Each ICT officer has a rater that oversees all aspects of the ICT experience. The Army has had a longstanding agreement with DAS and DSCA. As our new FAOs conduct ICT they all report directly to a local supervisor.

Understandably we are all focused on our duties during this time of war. Given the critical strategic role FAOs are playing, it is even more important that not only ICT supervisors, but all Army FAOs undertake the responsibility of mentoring our FAOs in training. In addition, I would ask that when a FAO ICT officer requests a clearance for travel within the country you reside, that you please take the time to scrutinize their travel plan, schedule office calls with country and regional experts that you know and trust, and provide the officer information on those issues that have an impact on our foreign engagement policy.

What sets the Army FAO program apart from others is a developed and mature ICT program. We must all give due diligence in our support of this valuable training tool. All Army FAOs have an obligation to ensure it remains successful in meeting current and future Army operational needs. If you are located in the national capital region you may be asked to brief an outgoing ICT student on issues pertaining to your region. In many cases, ICT officers pass through the COCOM enroute to their ICT site. If you are working at a COCOM you may be asked to brief the ICT officer on policies, security issues, or cooperative agreements within your AOR. All of these things are important to the education of an ICT FAO and have been integral in making the Army program what it is today. If you have questions or comments about the ICT program please feel free to contact me or any of my regional managers. Another great tool is the Army FAO website. [www.fao.army.mil](http://www.fao.army.mil) This is a great source for FAO related updates. Both the ICT Handbook and the Supervisors Guide are located on the ICT training page.

To ensure the Army FAO ICT program remains at the cutting edge, FAO Proponent continues to conduct Regional FAO Conferences. On February 28th there was a Sub-Saharan and Middle East regional conference in Amman, Jordan. On March 6th we conducted the Asian Regional Conference in Tokyo, Japan and on April 28th we will be conducting the Latin American Regional Conference in Quito, Ecuador. I would like to thank the Attaché offices in Amman, Tokyo and Quito for hosting these events. Finally, I would like to once again thank ICT supervisors for the work that they do to keep the Army FAO program strong. Go Soldier-Statesmen!
1. **Upcoming Desk Officer Adjustment.** In summer 2007, 6 of the 9 International Issues Branch Officers will vacate their billets: East Asia (PLU-1 and PLU-2), Western Hemisphere (PLU-4), Eastern Europe, Caucasus, Africa and Israel (PLU-6), Security Cooperation and Programs (PLU-7), and the International Affairs Officer Program Coordinator (PLU-8). The slate is mostly solidified. Further updates will be provided once orders are published.

2. **Sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia FAO to commence In-Country Training (ICT).**
   a. Senegal. The FAO-in-training has completed the Naval Postgraduate School, and will graduate DLI in the French Basic Course in mid-February. He deploys to Senegal in March for a 1-year ICT.
   b. Korea. The FAO-in-training has completed Naval Postgraduate School, and will graduate DLI in the Korean Basic Course this month. He deploys to Korea in January for a 6-month ICT.
   c. Both FAOs will first stop at Headquarters Marine Corps for pre-ICT briefs with the Regional Desk Officer, Program Manager, and Branch Head. These briefs will be followed by an additional day at Marine Corps Base Quantico, for briefs with Training and Education Command representatives, the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL), and the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity.

3. The Marine Corps FY08 LtCol and Col selection boards are estimated to release the results by 26 January 2007, so we’ll have to wait until the next FAOA edition to see those results.

4. **Upcoming PLU Visit to Monterey.** The USMC-French Staff Talks required a shift from the originally planned NPS/DLI Visit of Jan 06, to Feb 06. Those dates have now been solidified. The dates for the visit are 5-8 Feb 07. POC is LtCol Mike Oppenheim at e-mail <michael.oppenheim@usmc.mil>.

5. **Proposed FAO Billet Expansion.** The Marine Corps is currently working the DOTMLPF issues to support an initiative to create 24 additional FAO billets. These billets will place 3 structured FAO billets at each Marine Expeditionary Force, and the same at each geographic Marine Component. 18 FAO billets are to be coded for LtCol, 6 FAO billets are to be coded for Maj. All are regionally appropriate to the missions and needs of each respective unit. Additionally, current efforts are underway to address inventory production beginning academic year 2008 in order to ensure an initial operational capability by 2011.

6. **Marine FAO article featured in Marine Corps Gazette.** A Middle East / North Africa FAO-in-training at DLI studying Modern Standard Arabic (and having already completed Naval Postgraduate School), published “How Iran Attacks: A look at an adversary in the global war on terrorism” in the January 07 edition of the Marine Corps Gazette. Before commencing the FAO program, the Officer deployed twice to Iraq as a military police detachment commander. To view the article, go to the following website: <http://www.mca-marines.org/gazette>.

7. **New FAOs and RAOs.** The Marine Corps recently concluded its FY07 1st Qtr FAO/RAO Experience Track Board. The Board reviews packages of officers who have met the requirements for graduate level regional study, in-country experience, and language appropriate proficiency. The Board awarded 8 Officers FAO/RAO designations as follows:
   - 5 Latin America FAO designations in Latin America
   - 1 Officer received FAO designation in East Asia
   - 1 Officer received RAO designation in China (PRC)
   - 1 Officer received RAO designation in Middle East North Africa
“We must continue to embrace the vital contributions that our partners can make in securing the global commons. . . Whenever and wherever the opportunity exists, we must develop and sustain relationships that improve the capacity of our emerging and enduring partners’ maritime forces to achieve common desired effects.”


The Navy’s new Maritime Strategy continues to take form, and as it does it is ever more evident that the Navy Foreign Area Officer community will be a critical component in its implementation. Deploying with a Global Fleet Station, participating in interagency crisis-response, coordinating security assistance and cooperation to build partner capacity, and promoting the 1000-ship Navy concept, also known as the Global Maritime Partnership, are just a few of the tenets of the new strategy that will call for FAO support. While we certainly won’t be acting alone, the stage is being set for the Navy FAO to play a central role in future maritime security planning and operations.

The good news is that as demand grows stronger, so do we. Our community currently stands at 98 Officers, with 31 of those 98 already serving in FAO billets. Another 45 New Build FAOs are presently in training, and the June 2007 Lateral Transfer Board will add 26 new members to our ranks. The quality and diversity of FAO-candidates remains impressive, and all indications are that June’s board will be the most competitive yet. We are on schedule to grow to over 300 personnel by 2012.

Equally as important, we continue to mature as an independent Navy community. Our first group of FAO-designated officers eligible for promotion to 0-6 were screened in January by the promotion board and those eligible for O-5 are being screened in February. Existing billets are in the process of being re-designated for FAOs, and identification of additional FAO billets could be on the horizon as commands continue to drive for more in-country representation and expertise. Meanwhile, operational leadership opportunities are starting to become available for new Naval Expeditionary Combat Command’s Maritime Civil Affairs Group.

So, we are on course and making speed. And with the anticipated debut of the new Maritime Strategy later this year, we can expect to be called more than ever. It’s a great time to be a FAO . . . it’s a historic time to be a Navy FAO.
In its second year of implementation, the International Affairs Specialist (IAS) Program achieved several significant milestones. The inaugural class of 26 Regional Affairs Strategists (RAS—USAF FAO equivalent) began deliberate development at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, CA. In 2006 the Program achieved substantial progress in Total Force implementation with the partial release (full report pending) of COCOM foreign language and regional expertise requirements, and IAS implementation guidelines for the Air Force Reserve. SAF/IA also improved the efficiency and utility of IAS career field management and DoD-wide RAS manning distribution with the development and publication of the IAS Prioritization Plan—now a vital tool used by the Air Staff and Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC). One of the Program’s most notable initiatives, however, establishes a larger rated officer presence in IAS.

General T. Michael Moseley, USAF Chief of Staff, recently approved a request by Mr. Bruce Lemkin, Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force (International Affairs), to augment rated presence in the International Affairs Specialist Program by 109 officers. This will be accomplished by converting selected non-rated IAS positions to rated. The increase will make it significantly easier for pilots, navigators, air battle managers, and electronic warfare officers to serve as RAS officers and Political-military Affairs Strategists (PAS). Billet conversions are expected to be complete by summer 2007.

The move to assign rated officers in greater numbers to IAS positions around the world was a calculated effort designed to ensure these critical billets remain filled at the proper rate, and with the proper mix of Air Force Specialties. “By increasing rated participation, we will infuse the IAS Program with an appropriate level of Air Force operational experts. Frontline operators with professional international skills bring additional credibility and increased potential to build enduring international partnerships essential to expeditionary air and space operations,” said Mr. Lemkin.

International air force-to-air force relationships increase partner nation security, regional stability, and coalition interoperability, capability, and capacity. Furthermore, IAS officers are managed by their development teams to ensure they balance both operational and security cooperation skills, and remain competitive within their primary AFSCs. Ultimately, the IAS program will improve both near-term and long-term USAF capability, and create a cadre of future Senior Leaders with both robust operational and International Affairs education and experience.

Rated officers interested in the IAS Program are encouraged to visit the IAS website at www.my.af.mil/iaw/iaw for more information. Rated officers will typically be required to reach their second flying gate (120 gate months) before being released for IAS deliberate development.
F.Y.I. — Service FAO POCs

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