Global Trends and Security Strategies Part III

Improving Asymmetrical Understanding With Cultural Understanding

Transforming the Army Personnel Management System

Iraq — A New Military and Political Strategy
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FAO Journal Editor
LTC Steve Gotowicki
US Army (Retired)
Middle East FAO
editor@faoa.org
**ASSOCIATION NEWS**

**Letter from the President**

FAOs are truly great soldiers! Several months ago, I visited Pakistan and Afghanistan where I met with some of our very best politico-military experts. COL Tom Wahlen, USA, was the ARMA in Islamabad and COL Mike Norton, USA was the DATT in Kabul at the time of my trip. Tom is one of those truly invaluable individuals to the U.S. ambassador and the Country Team. He is a graduate of the Pakistani Staff College, served multiple tours in-country, knows the language and culture, and has close friends and contacts at the highest levels in the military. Tom’s access, influence, and credibility with the senior military leadership in Pakistan was unmatched in the U.S. Embassy.

Mike is a Southeast Asian FAO who has honed his FAO skills with repetitive attaché postings. When he took over USDAO Kabul, he knew what the U.S. ambassador needed from him and how to get things done in an embassy environment. Mike Norton is the last staff member the ambassador meets with every day and serves as the nexus connecting State Department, DoD, and host-nation security interests.

Both Colonels Wahlen and Norton have made significant contributions to our national security and have measurably improved U.S. military-to-military relations with Pakistan and Afghanistan. These are FAOs to emulate.

As for upcoming events, we had to move the dining-out to Friday, 26 January at the Fort Myer’s Officer’s Club. COL Dave Smith, USA, Ret., is in charge of coordinating this and he will contact you soon with the event details. This dining-out promises to be a great event and I look forward to seeing you there.

I would like to strongly encourage FAOs, throughout the world, to write articles for the *FAO Journal*. We were unable to publish a *FAO Journal* in June 2006, because we had not received any articles. FAOs are our only source of articles and have valuable stories and insights to share with other FAOs. Please contribute to the *FAO Journal*.

Finally, I would like to thank LTC Bob Olson, USA, Ret. who shared his thoughts about life after active duty for FAOs at our last FAO Policy Luncheon. My thanks also to all of you who attended the luncheon and to the Service representatives who updated us on their FAO initiatives.

Thanks,

Steve Norton

*Bob Olson speaking at the 19 October FAO Lunch*
NOTE: This is Part III of a three-part series entitled “Global Trends and Security Strategies.” Part I (Sep 2005) of this series discussed current global security threats and how the U.S. and the EU security strategies, of 2002 and 2003 respectively, each addressed these threats. Part II (Dec 2005) of this series discussed how and if the EU is capable of backing its security strategy with its defense forces, and specifically discussed how, and if, the ESDP can accomplish this important task. Finally, Part III discusses the role of the U.S. Armed Forces in contemporary Transatlantic security.

Introduction

The role of the United States (US) Armed Forces during the Cold War was very clear: to deter the threat of a Soviet invasion in Western Europe and to defend it should the need arise. This role is a genesis of the transatlantic bargain initiated following the Second World War (WWII). The bargain is the result of several separate but mutually influencing actions, the culmination of which was the Treaty of Washington in 1949 that established the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The transatlantic bargain was signed with the understanding that the US would continue its involvement in European security in return for a European commitment to organize itself for both external defense and internal stability. The role of the US Armed Forces in the initial bargain, as agreed to by the US Congress, consisted primarily of strategic bombing and sea control. Europe progressively developed and was successful in providing the internal stability as hoped for by the US. This internal stability was achieved primarily through economic development and integration.

External defense goals, however, were never achieved. Force goals as outlined in Lisbon in 1952 where considered by many to be unrealistic. The reasons for this are arguable and beyond the scope of this paper. However, the effects are that the US Armed Forces began to play an increasingly greater role in European defense. This is particularly true as the Soviet Union developed nuclear weapons. The NATO military strategy focused heavily on the threat of using nuclear weapons provided by the US against the Soviet Union. The credibility of this threat was backed up through the presence of US Armed Forces on European soil. The presence of US soldiers in Europe was further necessitated with the NATO strategy development of flexible response in which NATO would meet any Soviet aggression with an equivalent response, whether conventional or nuclear. This required the positioning of significant numbers of conventional forces in Europe. Since Europe had not produced the military forces required for such a strategy, the presence of US forces in Europe was thus vital in order to back up NATO’s strategic policies.

The role of the US armed forces in Europe was thus essential to Europe’s security. As the Soviet Union developed the capability to launch intercontinental ballistic missiles against the US, the role of military forces in Europe became even more vital to deter the Soviet threat. While the employment of neither conventional nor nuclear forces was ever required, the US...
presence provided reassurance, whether real or psychological, against the Soviet Union. With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, this role was no longer valid.

Since NATO was established to counter a Soviet threat, the collapse of the Soviet Union brought NATO’s reason for being into question. Yet NATO is fortunately more than just a military alliance. NATO’s espousing of democracy, individual freedoms and economic liberty have proved vital to its role in the post Cold War era. These beliefs proved to provide the foundation on which NATO would develop and implement its new strategic concept.

NATO’s strategic concept of 1991 provided new direction for NATO. When this concept was released the Soviet Union still existed, but it did not pose a legitimate threat against NATO. While acknowledging the Soviet Union as a holder of nuclear arms, NATO refocused its efforts on the developing democracies on its eastern border. Three general agreements provided the core of the concept. First, NATO agreed to a broader approach to security that would engage its eastern neighbors. Second, military forces would be reduced to a point consistent with needs based on crisis management tasks, and not conventional or nuclear war. Lastly, European members of NATO agreed to assume a greater responsibility for its own security. The intent was to provide political stability that would translate into European security. Yet the democratic movements did not all prove equal. While Poland, the Czech Republic and others where moving in a positive direction, the Balkans proved quite to the contrary.

While the Balkans crisis was evolving, the US began to drastically reduce its military presence in Europe from two corps down to two divisions and supporting elements and commands in Germany and one undersized brigade in Italy. This is consistent with the lack of a Soviet threat. Yet the question remained of what the role should be for the forces that remained. Without the threat of the Soviet Union, or even the new Russia attacking Europe, many questioned and argued the role of US forces in Europe.

As the Balkan crisis evolved, Europe proved itself incapable of meeting its commitments as outlined in the strategic concept of 1991. Its inability to politically resolve the crisis forced NATO, under the authority of the United Nations (UN), to respond militarily. Yet Europe’s ability to provide a military response to the Balkan’s crisis was unenviable. The US initially wished to remain neutral in the crisis, but as reality proved Europe incapable, the US role increased. Following the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in December 1995, NATO launched its Implementation Force (IFOR) of more than 60,000 personnel, many of whom were Americans from the First Armored Division stationed in Germany. Therefore, the lack of a European military response capability identified the need for a US military presence in Europe.

With a new strategic concept in 1999 more focused on current threat realities, NATO continued to adapt from the Cold War structure into one that could provide European stability, whether through activities within its borders or without. However, the need for the US military presence in Europe was again identified with NATO’s military response to the Kosovo crisis in 1999, the same year that three former Warsaw Pact countries joined NATO. However, the fact that Europe, under the auspices of the EU, took over the Bosnia mission in December 2005 is an indicator that Europe is moving in the right direction.

With Bosnia and Kosovo as ongoing missions, and NATO continuing to focus on missions associated with its strategic concept of 1999, the world was turned upside down on 11 September of 2001 (9/11) when terrorists attacked American
soil, the first large scale attack on Americans and their interests within their own territory since Pearl Harbor. Subsequent to these attacks, President George W. Bush launched the Global War on Terrorism (GWoT), much of which was focused in areas well beyond NATO’s borders and areas of interest. Once again, the role of American troops in Europe was brought into question. With the launching of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan in October 2001, the US found that its forces in Europe were not that great of a factor in executing OEF. When Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was launched in early 2003, the US began to see its military forces stretched almost to capacity, particularly with several of its troops tied up in the Balkans. It could not afford to remain engaged in the Balkans to the level it currently was and execute the GWoT. The role of the US armed forces in transatlantic security as defined by events following 9/11 is the topic of this paper.

The paper will proceed with the intent of finding a response to the central question of this paper which is: “What is the role of the US armed forces in transatlantic security?” The conclusions that will be drawn are based on three initial possible theories: “US forces will continue to play an integral role in NATO, but will shift from a more tactical role to a more strategic and operation role to assist Europe in the development of its own capabilities, as well as to keep a strategic and political influence in Europe via NATO”; or “US forces will retain an active, yet obscure role in NATO in order to counter the influence of the European Union (EU) on NATO and the transatlantic relationship”; and finally “US interests have shifted since the beginning of the GWoT to areas outside of mainstream Europe. Because of this and the EU’s strengthening capabilities in security and defense, the US role in transatlantic security will become increasingly diminished.”

The paper will proceed by first exploring the transformation of the US armed forces since 9/11 and the new role it has taken on. This will be followed by a similar exploration into the NATO transformation. Drawing on conclusions from the two previous articles in this series and the discussion herein, the paper then concludes by answering the central question.

Transformation

A Lighter, More Adaptable Force

With a changing global security environment and lessons learned following Operation DESERT STORM and the US response to Kosovo in 1999 (Task Force HAWK), senior leaders realized that the current organization of the US Army was no longer modeled to respond to current threats. The armed forces, but more particularly the Army, were still designed around a Cold War threat. A serious need was identified that would shift the Army organization from the Cold War Army to the contemporary-threat Army. With the beginning of the GWoT and the opening of fronts in Afghanistan and later Iraq, the need to develop a more flexible force became increasingly important. The US is a nation at war. This is a prolonged conflict and that has driven the US to make changes to its force and also to re-look the tools that it uses. The US Army must be able to adapt and to be agile. It must be aware. Most importantly, it must have flexible organizations in order to provide Combatant Commanders versatile land power.

With this intent, the Army transformation began in earnest and is well underway. The details of the transformation are well known to many Army personnel and will not be discussed here. The concept to understand is that the new force is based on a brigade-sized modular unit capable of deploying to cover a range of missions and without the need of hierarchical support like that which existed within the divisions of the Cold War. The intent and challenge behind the transformation is to provide Combatant Commanders the ability to mix and match capabilities more quickly and creatively. The purpose, therefore, of the transformation was to create units that are
more relevant for Combatant Commanders that are agile, adaptive, and versatile.

Reduction of US Forces in Europe

Just as the US Army transformation just discussed is being driven in a large part by the changing world security environment, so too is the positioning of US military forces throughout the world. Positioning of US military forces during the Cold War was clearly a function of the Soviet threat, which is why there was such a large presence in the European theater, and in particular in Germany which would have most likely been the front line battlefield of a war with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Following the break up of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, the US reduced its forces in Germany by a significant number. United States Army Europe (USREUR) went from a strength of about 213,000 soldiers in 1990 to around 122,000 in 1992, then to an estimated 65,000 by 1995.

The 1995 levels remained relatively stable. Yet as the security environment emerged into how we know it today (and it continues to emerge and evolve), the necessity of having so many units in Europe was questioned. US European Command (EUCOM), as the primary strategic planning element for the EUCOM Area of Operations (AOR), assessed where the threats where and the relevancy of its forces in Europe. For example, the threats assessed by EUCOM include but are not limited to: rise in corruption and instability; rise of Islamic extremism; acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD); negative shifting opinion toward the US, primarily due to our war in Afghanistan & Iraq; and neglect and disinterest by the world.

EUCOM’s AOR force structure is still based on a bi-polar environment and although the US closed a lot of installations at the end of the Cold War as already indicated, 84% of EUCOM forces are still concentrated in Western Europe. However, in the last 13 years, EUCOM has conducted more than 90 Joint Chiefs of Staff directed (JCS) peace operations, interventions, support to humanitarian assistance operations, noncombatant evacuation operations, and out of area support to CENTCOM for combat and peace enforcement. Of these operations, 34 occurred in Balkan states, 24 in Iraq, three in Levant, 30 in Africa, and only two in Western Europe. EUCOM and the US military determined that transformation must continue to gain access to forward basing and training areas to increase operational reach, provide influence to NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) participants and other allies, and establish a stabilizing presence in nearby ungoverned regions. Because of the location of current threats as well as the location of the majority of EUCOM missions, it is becoming increasingly challenging to address the threats where they are. To address this problem, EUCOM’s forces and presence will be more for-

Table 1: Changes in US Military Presence in Europe

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<td>62,000</td>
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<td>Civilian</td>
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<td>1,300</td>
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<td>14,000</td>
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ward deployed and it will increase its use of rotational forces, using an array of Main Operating Bases (MOB), Forward Operating Sites (FOS), Cooperative Security Locations (CSL), Prepositioning Sites (PPS), and Training Locations (TL).

For obvious reasons, US military forces cannot be stationed in most of the regional hot spots. The sites previously discussed help alleviate this challenge. The other aspect is shifting personnel. The figures in Table 1 illustrate the shifts in US military presence in the EUCOM AOR. The Navy and the Air Force remain relatively the same. However, they have been and are being repositioned to better address and react to the threat and conflicts. For example, the US Navy 6th have consolidated and instead of two entities, one in the United Kingdom and one in Italy, are now one entity in Italy. Additionally, in the case of the Air Force, their long-term goal is to permanently station its F-16 fighters currently at Spangdahlem, Germany to Incirlik, Turkey. However, the political climate in Turkey is such that the US will not be assured of the ability to carry out missions. In the interim the US intends to increase Fighter rotations to Eastern Europe and Africa in order to gain access to better training areas, interact with our allies and friends, and socialize a move to Turkey, or, if failing that, find an alternate suitable location for its fighters.

The significant changes come in the Army. As noted in the table, the Army is reducing in force strength by 61%, with both division going back to the United States and leaving only one Stryker Brigade in Germany and SETAF in Italy, along with other supporting units. In addition, the composition is changing and the location of the Army presence is shifting east and south. For example, SETAF will become a modularized brigade with multiple battalions (more than the current two), thus increasing its strength. Additionally, an Eastern European Task Force (EETAF) will be created that will include a rotational brigade that will rotate from the US for six-month rotations. EETAF, to be located in Constanta, Romania, is scheduled to start rotations beginning July 2007. This site will provide not only sea port access for projection, but improvements in air field infrastructure will also allow air projection, thus allowing flexibility in the type of units that rotate into EETAF.

To summarize the end state of both the Army’s transformation to a modular brigade-based system and the shifting of the US presence in Europe to the east and south, the US is becoming more expeditionary and mobile. The threat during the Cold War allowed the US to focus on one region of the world and provide projection capabilities to only that region. However, as the Cold War ended and new threats developed, the need to refocus its forces in other global regions forced the US military, and in particular the Army, to reconsider its force structure, unit locations and projection capabilities in order to provide the tools needed to address the threats, whether through preventive peacetime engagement and partnership building, preemptive military actions, or reactive engagement to enemy actions.

NATO Transformation

As evidenced by recent European and American missions in Africa, the Balkans, and the Middle East, addressing today’s security challenges requires a wide range of capabilities that must be deployed and sustained on a global scale. The likely area of operations for both European and US forces no longer resides inside the Euro-Atlantic area, as has already been addressed. Military forces that can quickly protect and advance national interests both at home and abroad are essential. This is why the US is transforming its military as previously discussed. However, conclusions from recent and current operations is that the US and European militaries are not configured to operate well collectively outside NATO’s traditional sphere of operations. European militaries, in particular, whose forces where designed for the defense of Europe rather
than the conduct of expeditionary operations, have struggled in recent years to respond adequately to the changing security environment.\textsuperscript{10}

Another aspect impacting transatlantic security integration and cooperation is that as the US and Europe confront the security challenges of the twenty-first century, they are once again at odds over security issues in and beyond Europe. This gap in vision between Europe and the US unfavorably impacts the transatlantic defense relationship.

This gap in vision coincides with economic and technological developments that make the goal of closer cooperation on security matters more and more difficult to achieve, even though the current security developments make the need for enhanced transatlantic defense cooperation more imperative than ever. At the same time, and as previously discussed, the US has recently embarked on a radical reorganization and transformation of not only its military organization, but also its resources and capabilities. This has all been done at a speed and of a scope that current NATO member countries’ budgets are in no position to match any time soon. As a result, Europe’s transformation ambitions remain subject to budgetary constrains that run counter to the continent’s significant potential for innovation and improvements in its military contributions to the transatlantic alliance.\textsuperscript{11}

Compounding the difference in attitudes and the need to close the military gap between the European NATO allies and the US has become more, not less, pressing in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. The dominant role of the US in OEF exposed the capabilities gap once again and underlined the need for improved interoperability, including the allocation of new funds to defense-oriented projects. If the US and European forces in the future are to undertake joint military operations, in as well as beyond Europe, then a serious and committed approach toward solving current tensions cannot be postponed.

However, current conflicting impulses and pressures characterize the global environment for defense cooperation.\textsuperscript{12}

New impetus for reform and transformation has come from the continuing process of European integration. With the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, the European approach to defense changed fundamentally following the European decision to create a foreign and defense policy pillar for the EU.\textsuperscript{13}

NATO transformation began in reality with the \textit{London Declaration} in 1990. This essentially changed the NATO approach to security from one that was defensive and reactive to one that is more proactive and focused on spreading security and stability. At this time, the hand of friendship was extended to the east, and has been subsequently extended to the south to the countries of North Africa and the Middle East in 1994, and more recently to the Gulf Region during the Istanbul Summit in June of 2004.\textsuperscript{14}

Another factor prompting change was the 1999 air campaign in Kosovo that underscored the growing capabilities gap between US and European forces. This realization prompted not only EU action,\textsuperscript{15} but NATO action as well.\textsuperscript{16} Following the Kosovo campaign NATO launched the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) to ensure that all Allies not only remain interoperable, but that they also improve their capabilities to confront the new security challenges. Yet Europe faces many of the challenges discussed above in financing and politically supporting the DCI.

Three years after the DCI was launched, and realizing that perhaps its goals were unrealistic, NATO launched the Prague Capabilities Commitments (PCC), which is essentially a streamlined version of the DCI. Despite good intentions, the PCC has not yet produced the necessary changes to European capabilities.
However, two key aspects from the Prague summit have proven positive. The first was the creation of the Allied Command Transformation (ACT). The ACT is designed to infuse transformational thinking into NATO and national force planning and is tasked with bringing greater coherence to the European defense planning process. One key aspect of the ACT is the establishment of “Centers of Excellence.” These are nationally funded centers that provide opportunities for the alliance and its partners to improve interoperability and capabilities, test and develop doctrine, and validate concepts through experimentation. This is why the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Center (JALLC) in Monsanto, Portugal falls under the ACT command.

A second positive outcome of the Prague Summit was the creation of the NATO Response Force (NRF). In September 2002, the US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, put forward a proposal to create a NATO rapid reaction force. The launching of the NRF initiative was announced several months later, at the Prague Summit. It is capable of performing missions worldwide across the whole spectrum of operations. These include evacuations, disaster management, counterterrorism, and acting as an initial entry force for larger, follow-on forces. At present, the force numbers about 17,000 troops. It is set to reach full operational capability in October 2006, when it will number some 25,000 troops and be able to start to deploy after five days notice and sustain itself for operations lasting 30 days or longer if re-supplied. The NRF gives NATO the means to respond swiftly to various types of crises anywhere in the world. It is also a driving engine of NATO’s military transformation. This force is also designed to help European countries build agility into their force planning process and move them away from reliance on US or British rapid deployment forces. This is why the participation of the US in the NRF is primarily limited to enablers, such as strategic air lift and other capabilities that enable the NRF to succeed. This is exactly what the US should want: NRF success with mainly European participation. Hence, when the NRF conducted its final validation exercise in June of this year in Cabo Verde, the forces actually participating in the exercise were mostly European.

To summarize, NATO’s intentions to transform into a more capable and relevant force are well placed. However, due to a lack of financing and resources, which is perhaps a function of the European cultural mentality towards war over the last 60 years, NATO’s intentions are greatly inhibited. The US is trying to influence change in NATO and support it where it can. The US realizes that NATO transformation will benefit it in its GWoT and in achieving its national security goals as outlined in its NSS, and in proving for not only US national security, but global security as well. In a globalized world the US national security is very much linked to global security, and hence European or transatlantic security. NATO needs the US to help it transform, and the US needs NATO to facilitate its GWoT. However, the US will not and is not waiting for Europe to catch up. Yet catching up is exactly what Europe needs to do.

**Conclusions**

Considering the shifting priorities and the evolving global security environment, it is no wonder the US military is not only redefining itself, but also redefining its role in transatlantic security. It is no longer the backbone of NATO against a Soviet threat. Based on the discussion in the previous two parts of this series and the discussion this paper has presented about US Army transformation, US military force reductions in Europe, and EU capabilities, it is the conclusion of this paper is that transatlantic security has a new post 9/11 meaning. It is related with global security. While providing global security, the transatlantic security is enhanced, if not guaranteed. This is based on a global environment. The US military role in NATO is still very much alive and important. However, the military’s direct role in Euro-
pean security is extremely diminished, as shown by the small number of operations it has conducted in Europe and by the reduction in its forces in Europe.

This is not to say, however, that the US military does not have a role in transatlantic security. It does. However it is an indirect role. The national security interests of the US are based more on its own security now than it was during the Cold War. Yet the security of Europe is very much linked to and will impact the security of the US. At the same time, the threats to both the US and Europe typically fall outside the traditional NATO boundaries, as evidenced by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. These threats are being pursued by the US through its GWoT and other initiatives within regions at risk of producing global insecurity. The US very much wants NATO’s help in these efforts since a secure world also means a secure Europe. However, the US will still carry on its missions with or without NATO.

Obviously it will be easier with NATO. This is why the transatlantic relationship is still vital to the US. Yet the US priority today is not the European theater. It is the global theater and the global threats that impact US national security. The role therefore of the US armed forces in transatlantic security is today a function of actions on the global scale, which makes its role in European security an indirect role, yet, very much a part of transatlantic security since global security impacts European security as well.

In summary, NATO does not need the US armed forces to provide European security, except perhaps in the case of high intensity conflicts. Yet the US needs NATO in the global fight against terrorism and against any other global threat. Similarly, NATO needs the US to fight global threats that could eventually impact European security. Therefore, today there is not a role for the US military in transatlantic security. Its role is in global security with transatlantic residual effects. In terms of the initial hypotheses developed at the beginning of the paper, this conclusion is a compilation of two of them: “US forces will continue to play an integral role in NATO, but will shift from a more tactical role to a more strategic and operational role to assist Europe in the development of its own capabilities, as well as to keep a strategic and political influence in Europe via NATO”; and “US interests have shifted since the beginning of the GWoT to areas outside of mainstream Europe. Because of this and the EU’s strengthening capabilities in security and defense, the US role in transatlantic security will become increasingly diminished.” All positioning of US military forces in Europe is to support the global security role the US armed forces have assumed following 9/11, and the same holds true for most of the US military actions within Europe, and around the globe for that matter. Finally, it should be reiterated that the NATO partnership is very much alive between the armed forces of not only the member countries, by partnership countries as well. Even though the US focus has shifted, these partnerships remain vital and will continue. However, the US will not wait for the partnership if there are threats that must be addressed. To do so would risk the deterioration of US and global security.

Endnotes


2 Idem, p. 39.

3 Idem, p.55.

4 Idem, p. 89.

5 It should be noted here that since the end of WWII, Europe has been more focused on political resolution to conflicts that the US. This is in part due to their fear of war following two World Wars on their soil, as well as their lack of ability to respond militarily. The later response has been provided by the US, whose tradition since the end of
WWII is that of military force to resolve political issues.

6 Such as proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, as well as terrorism.

7 Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary.

8 At the time of the attack, 95% of the First Infantry Division in Germany was either in the Balkans or in the reintegration phase following a Balkans deployment. The only unit it was capable of deploying to OIF was TF 1-63, an armored Task Force of battalion size under the command and control of the 173rd Airborne Brigade out of Italy.

9 All information on EUCOM’s transitioning came from an interview with CDR Mark Innes, US Navy, J8, Transformation, HQ USEUCOM, conducted 29 Dec 2005 in Stuttgart, Germany. All information in this article came from an unclassified version of a brief presented during the interview.


12 Idem, p. 4.

13 For further discussion on this aspect, refer to Part II of this series, published in the FAO Journal in December 2005.


15 Refer to Part II of this series for more on the EU actions.

16 Serafty, p. 6.

17 Niblett, pp. 39-40.

18 NATO Response Force, information available online at http://www.nato.int/issues/nrf/index.html.

19 Whether or not the EU can make this possible was addressed in Part II of this series.

(Continued from page 32)

a step in the right direction toward effectively establishing a path to GO for FAOs. With a “foot in the door”, we can then look to add positions in the Joint world if it seems feasible and beneficial.

In closing, I solicit your help and welcome your thoughts and advice on the status and direction of the FAO Program and on how we can best serve the Army and the Nation. I encourage you to write to the Proponent Team and offer your comments, critiques, or suggestions. We are your advocates on the Army Staff.

(Continued from page 33)

America, East Asia, southwest Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and Middle East North Africa (each X 1).

6. Upcoming PLU Visit to Monterey. The International Issues Branch (code PLU) visits Monterey, CA twice a year, to brief IAOs, and future IAOs (such as Olmsted Scholars, Exchange Officers and Liaison Officers training not just at NPS, but also DLI). The USMC-French Staff Talks require a shift from the Jan 06 planned date, to Feb 06. POC is Major Mike Oppenheim at e-mail <michael.oppenheim@usmc.mil>.

7. Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL). The CAOCL solicited input from Sub-Saharan Africa IAOs, and received volunteers, to support an upcoming event addressing preparation for a future U.S. Military Observer Group-Washington (USMOG-W) evolution. This event is scheduled for the first week of December at the CAOCL HQ, in Quantico, VA. POC for additional information is Maj Mike Oppenheim at e-mail <michael.oppenheim@usmc.mil>. 
In 1965, R.L. Sproul, Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), testified before the US Congress and stated, "It is [our] primary thesis that remote area warfare is controlled in a major way by the environment in which the warfare occurs, by the sociological and anthropological characteristics of the people involved in the war, and by the nature of the conflict itself." (McFate, 2005) Later, a DARPA program called "Urban Sunrise" published findings that recent US involvement in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq, have confirmed this need for civil cultural intelligence collection, fusion and effects-based analysis to support urban conflicts, peace-keeping, and stability operations. The conclusion of Urban Sunrise was that the success of our current and future operations will require expert culture awareness and competence skills. Therefore, operational commanders who do not consider the operational factors of culture and religion during mission planning and execution invite unintended and unforeseen consequences, and even mission failure. (Swain, 2002) The lack of cultural intelligence support in foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare has caused troops and policymakers to make many uninformed decisions about the populations that support either the US, the adversaries, or a particular ideology that is less tangible and not based on choosing specific sides.

On the other hand, when cultural intelligence has been used, success is the predominant general outcome. In the RAND study, "Street Smart: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield for Urban Operations," Jamison Medby and Russell Glenn arrive at this same conclusion where "Population analysis, which includes both demographic analysis and cultural intelligence, should come to the analytic foreground." (Medby and Glenn, 2002) The very ideals relating to a need for more cultural intelligence are directly linked to fully understanding the nation of people increasingly engaged in combat and diplomacy, as opposed to direct fighting of uniformed soldiers on armed fronts and battlefields.

Cultural Evolution

Today’s military has increased its embrace of demographics and cultural (or sometimes called civil or social) intelligence’s value to support strategic and tactical planning of the non-linear battle-space to leverage insight about an adversary’s mindset. The analysis tries to explain the rationale of a particular thought process; it attempts to predict adversarial intentions, and examines the potential lengths that an adversary may pursue conflict. The current forays into this space are a commendable improvement but the efforts and support can certainly be enhanced, especially with regard to the US Special Operations community. Special Operations forces demand that comprehensive intelligence be collected and analyzed on particular areas of deployment to include the inhabitants likely to be encountered to the degree required for mission success. Special operations forces’ needs are critically information intensive as the teams are often the first “in-country” where little intelligence has been collected or it is provided at a high strategic level.

The unfortunate reality is that many leaders, or “powers that be,” who are pushing to have more cultural intelligence added to warfare and peacemaking doctrine may not truly recognize how labor and resource intensive this collaborative intelligence capability needs to be in order to be done correctly to mitigate risk and ensure odds are in the detachment commander’s favor (not withstanding the innocent local population).
When Special Operations targeting and mission planning demands vital timely, detailed, tailored, integrated, prioritized, rapidly updated, and focused intelligence in this area, many of the "target specific" items demand even more collection, research, analysis, and textual elaboration than normally afforded to conventional mission planning. This also requires intensive harmony of information sharing between the host nation, the diplomatic State Department, area study desk officers, and in-country intelligence agency resources.

The exact degree to which Special Operations demand intelligence is often as elusive to the battle-field commanders themselves as it is to the intelligence officers and analysts that are tasked to help define a requirement and produce an actionable intelligence product. The reason for this void is simply the element of the unknown that we can not identify and the mindset we have all heard of that is defined as "not knowing what we don't know." Training and doctrine try to fill some of these voids in human cognition but somewhere between the Special Forces' Qualification course training and military System of Systems Analysis (SoSA)/ joint intelligence preparation of the battle-space (JIPB) for Rapid Decisive Operations and Urban Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, the devil lurks in missing details. These gaps lead to inapt understanding of adversaries and area inhabitants, which can taint analysis and therefore accuracy in mission planning. JIPB consists of steps to ensure systemic analysis of operational environments and adversaries, but even such a process does not define the components in terms of other doctrine such as a political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information (PMESII) nodal analysis in the checklist for Peacekeeping Operations and Information Warfare Battle-Space Environment definitions.

The C3I Center at the George Mason University recently cited the Joint Information Operations Center has been in writing, "Finding and understanding the causal links in the adversary’s systems and measuring the effectiveness of disrupting those systems will be new fields of analysis for intelligence professionals as well as new responsibilities." (Decision Support for Effects Based Operations in Support of JFCOM J9 Millennium Challenge, 2002) It should not be too bold of a statement to interpret this citation as - - the capability it isn’t readily prevalent today as a realistic resource. This of course is a failing of critical information when attempting to increase the probability of mission success and reducing the degrees of risk with resources that are not yet up to speed to meet vital demands.

SoSA/Operational Net Assessment (ONA) teams are improving the capabilities to perform a “system of systems analysis” using every dimension of PMESII. Yet, Special Operations missions do not only require this detailed level of planning for success, they require a great deal more details for field commanders, especially in the delicate nature of psychological and civil affairs that are intrinsically tied to information operations and knowing exactly how a country and its populace are tied to a particular conflict and inherent belief systems.

The US Marine Corps’ Small Wars Center of Excellence website states that with regard to “small wars, the key factor in determining who wins and who loses will often be knowledge of the local culture. Culture is far more than language, folklore, food, or art. It is the lens through which people see, and make sense of their world. Culture determines what is admired and what is despised, what makes life worth living, and what things are worth dying for.” (Small Wars Center of Excellence, 2006) According to the Marine Corps Intelligence Agency (MCIA), over 50 percent of all requests for information (RFIs) from the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force are culture related.

**Missing Link**

The current focus of most cultural intelligence that goes outside of PMESII is only col-
lected at the theater’s visible surface to an observer. Even the doctrinal format for joint special operations targeting and mission planning procedures suggest intelligence packages cover these surface level insights without demanding more insights below a level of basic cultural facade. (Department of Defense, 2003) This format misses the base of social beliefs and community behavior that creates an individual or group’s intentions. National culture, from a psychological or sociological perspective, is the set of enmeshed traits that are passed down through members of a group. These traits are typically slow to change and therefore can be understood and/or identified well in advance of military operations. Further, these traits have been scientifically proven to have some genetic components that are passed through generations, and many of the social traits are so routine and automatic that they never reach a conscious level in the individual.

Typical civil and cultural intelligence content in its current state is limited to our five sensory inputs for attainment. These cultural traits can be defined as observable qualities to include: language, food, population, clothing, pace of life, emotional display, gestures, or eye contact. Unfortunately, adversarial precognition answers remain a bit more hidden even beyond the typically analyzed social and political movements or characteristics. These elusive insights can involve: notions of time, how an individual fits into society, their beliefs about human nature, the importance of work, tolerance for change, preference for leadership systems, motivation for achievement, communication styles, thinking styles, etc. They can also contribute to judgments about what constitutes acceptable levels of actions such as aggression.

While many of these insights seem a bit “touchy feely”, the characteristics become vastly important when formulating additional questions around essential elements of information to assess reliability of intelligence sources, mitigating ground surprises, influences of indigenous friends versus hostiles in an area, and recruitment susceptibility for human intelligence assets or terrorist/insurgency forces. These answers cross validate data required by other methods that also consider the use of denial and deception and threat evaluations. JIPB attempts to answer many of these questions but does not completely take the data to a level of understanding how each piece interrelates and has particular influence on a general population.

“Three-domain” urban models acknowledge a need to similarly model human organizational behavior (cognitive domain), information paths and structures (informational domain) and the physical infrastructure (physical domain), yet for tactical intelligence at the field level the intelligence should actually go deeper to assess the group/individual dynamics, predispositions, and possible reactions to identify an adversary’s human capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities by investigating the environmental factors found in values, beliefs, religion, etc. Such deep dives add significant insight to strategies manifested in Special Operations Mission Planning Folders-Battlefield Area Evaluation in the social, cultural, and psychological areas that will in turn add more insight to the areas of government, military, trade and industries, friendly forces, hostile forces, or non-belligerent third-party forces.

Failures

Despite best intentions and Transformation programs, until a change is made, failures to properly support field commanders will persist. Such commanders will lack the intelligence on the dynamics of theater cultures and behavior patterns (e.g. keeping the exclusive control over a piece of territory) and how tribal chiefs (i.e. Warlords) establish and maintain control. This had been most recently experienced in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
In Somalia, as one example, although armed opposition to the government of Mohammed Siad Barre had existed for many years, the war intensely began in May 1988 when the Somali National Movement (SNM) began fighting the government in north-western Somalia. Other armed opposition groups, mainly clan-based, arose over the next few years in southern Somalia, and in 1991 the Barre regime was deposed. Clan, sub-clan, warlord, and faction-based clashes continued with a number of prominent groups within Mogadishu, to include a faction of the United Somali Congress (USC), led by Muhammad Qanyare Afrah; another faction of the USC, led by Muse Sudi Yalahow; the USC/Somali Salvation Alliance, led by Umar Finish; and the Somali National Alliance (SNA), led by Usman Hasan Ali Ato.

Within the web of clan and warlord conflicts, historically General Morgan and his forces clashed with the Jubba Valley Alliance led by Colonel Bare Hirale. Dabare and Luway sub-clans both from the Digil-Mirifle clan clashed. An alliance of the Marehan sub-clans of Hawarsame Rer Hasan and Habar Ya'qub fought with Ali Dheere and Rer Ahmad forces. Militia of the Abgal clan allied to two rival businessmen from the Warsangeli and Wabudan sub-clans clashed with each other. Murusade and Duduble sub-clans, both from the Hawiye clan, clashed. Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf, General Ade Muse Hirsi, and Jama Ali Jama, had been in conflict over control of the self-declared autonomous region of Puntland.

The US misperception of the Somali clan structure, rivalries, and ignorance of the notion of “collective responsibility” led the coalition to concentrate its attention on Ali Mahdi and Aideed; Somalia’s main warlord’s. In Cultural Issues in Contemporary Peacekeeping, Tamara Duffy summarized that the unintended consequence of this was that UN actions actually enhanced the degree of power and authority which the warlords desired but, up that point, did not legitimately possess. (Duffy, 2000) This then led to the marginalization of other clans, thereby upsetting the traditional balance of the Somali kinship system.

Without knowing the specific goals of the parties in conflict, troops enter a country not having the whole comprehension of the political and social situation to include the personalities involved. This includes who in an area owes whom certain favors or debts; how families are interlocked, favored, and ranked; knowledge of cross border tribal and family relationships; and how having a US military group in the area will effect daily civil dynamics. With respect to this last item, situational awareness and social intelligence link to cultural integration, because troops must recognize the need to behave in a certain manner and be adaptable to act suitably.

Without such details, theater engagement plans will not be able to cover much of the fine point details that soldiers need in the field to add proper contextual meaning to their observations to even translate into intelligence findings. Even ONA “Red” and “Blue” teams will likely not have enough ground level intelligence to truly think like the enemy. There are in general a number of reasons at this point for such gaps, to include: some ignorance, lack of appropriate analytical training, cultural mirroring bias, or an overall combination of all.

A New Opportunity

While the world has a number of conflicts requiring attention, the issues surrounding the Global War on Terror (GWOT) bring another opportunity for the U.S. to improve upon the many lessons learned regarding cultural knowledge and understanding. In particular, the Sahara/Sahel’s Tuareg people are a perfect starting point.

Presently, State and military are looking at North Africa from both a big picture concerning interested rival countries creating ties and natural resource exchanges that could be against U.S. interests and at the same time looking from a
situational vantage point at small scale conflicts to
the hunt for terrorists. Urgency of the ever shifting
current situation is often most focused on and
can lack the time to develop predictive models
and assessments for long term cause and effect
of actions. As more parties become involved with
strategic planning and low-key military operations,
the more likely a disruption of the fragile socio-
cultural and political dynamics in this area. The
results could be an even greater disharmony in
the region and an escalation of support to terrorist
activities or alliances with other foreign nations for
aid and support.

For the indigenous people of this region, in
particular the desert dwelling nomadic Tuareg
people, the environment they inhabit is not per-
ceived simply as a physical entity with boundaries
or borders, but it is also as a socio-cultural entity.
This is often misunderstood by most external
agencies, including military, government, and
many 'aid' agencies. With the geo-political issues
today bringing interest to their lands, there is in-
creasing concern that the Tuaregs will be inevita-
ably caught in an environmental catastrophe
(chiefly to their cultural legacy and sense of self)
resulting in another conflict uprising. Already the
Trans-Sahara counter-terrorism policing and
 crackdowns have increased the cost of goods and
reduce profits for Tuareg trade. Tuareg play a
marginal role in the greater illegal smuggling com-
merce as car and caravan drivers, and they are
typically absent in the higher positions of the or-
ganized network. A more significant concern in
the Sahara area is to contain the al Qaeda-linked
Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat
(GSPC), one of Algeria’s stronger rebel forces,
which the U.S. fears is recruiting and regrouping
further south in Africa after being largely chased
from its homeland. The anti-terror mantra has
been “Wherever there's evil, we want to get there
and fight it,” but this fight has the Tuaregs caught
in the cross hairs with security requirements and
border crossing procedures affecting their liveli-
hood commerce.

Added to the War on Terror are foreign ex-
changes regarding natural resources and the
spread of Islam. Chinese, Libya, France, Russia,
Pakistan, etc. have interests in regional resources
and are financing local power-holders and nation
states. This is causing more land grabs in an
area that the Tuaregs typically use with little com-
prehension (or less consideration) for territory
ownership. Jamaat al-Tabligh is the largest Mus-
lim mission and has a similar communal lifestyle
to that of the Tuaregs but the movement also
comes with links of “interest” to the U.S. by the
spread of anti-Western sentiment groups i.e.
Hamas, Hezbollah, ISI, Pakistani Army, Baathism,
Nasserism, Muslim Brotherhood etc. These
groups, too, are trying to gain influence in Africa
with some Saudi money trying to dictate how Is-
lam should be practiced (by controlling with the
funding).

An historical quick-fix remedy for the per-
ceived growth of terrorism is typically to arm and
train the various indigenous clans and factions
that pass for governments in the area or are the
governments in the path of potential resistance—
disregarding their own connections with rogue
arms dealers and organized crime, as well as
their often precarious grip on power. This histori-
ically haunts the sponsor later and indeed may
again. In North Africa, there is a tension between
the Sahara nation states and the Tuareg people.
Tuaregs have long felt oppressed from govern-
ment and a sense of racial prejudice, which has
led the Tuareg people to desire an independently
recognized state. It is important to note that rally
cries are of independence and injustice
(perceived or real) -- not the religion of Islam.
Linked to these economic and social/cultural
grivances are desires for increased political
rights and decision-making. By arming and train-
ing both nation state militaries and Tuareg tribes,
 it would be inevitable that an escalation of civil
malaise could spark greater armed conflicts.

Another less viable solution is an attempt to
coral the nomadic Tuareg into an area that can be
better monitored and secured. Decentralization
vs. sedentarism and the new lifestyle requirements can mean deep humiliation or frustration to the Tuaregs depending on the situation and class hierarchy of the community social system. Aid provision to the Tuaregs is also not conducive to sedentarisation and stability in the long term. Rather, it encourages dependence on aid, reinforces an uneven distribution of wealth, and ultimately leads to conflict between the “haves and have nots”. In this scenario, whether voluntary or forced, migration has to be understood by the Tuaregs as a strategy to survive. In the past, public education has also been used to woo the Tuaregs, but at the time, Tuaregs used it as a punishment to indentured slave children over their own intercultural education. The key take-away here is that solutions we deem as viable do not always hold the same value as we perceive.

It can be foreseen that typical intervention (policing, refugee camp assignment, or aid), touching a key source of wealth and harmony in the region, could provoke strong and violent reactions from the population, perhaps leading to a deepening of the relations between smugglers and terrorists, instead of a loosening. Instead, a more diplomatic and information operation strategy geared toward U.S. interests may have more positive effects. The Tuaregs are territorially concentrated and they exhibit low levels of political organization and moderate levels of group cohesion (as we define it). Clans and federations still hinder their nationalist movements but must be considered integral to nationalist diplomacy. Each confederation has a unique challenge that must be addressed with a unique solution (This is a critical factor in each group’s interaction with the U.S. soldiers and the [ONA] effects that are planned). Here ethnicity is the “ideology” at hand yet it is fueled in class discrimination as race and racism by basis of physical appearance by skin tone and feudal class. This means that without a common ground such as independence, the next best unifying element could prove a degree of success. Coupled with this would be a long and short term requirement that entails regular ground interaction, cultural knowledge enhancement, Information Operations, FAO par-
participation, and inter-agency/military/department collaboration and intel sharing. This will illuminate the real issues at hand and present solutions around underlying Tuareg intentions and will.

**Discovering Intent and Will**

A generally accepted model used at the Joint Military Intelligence College dictates that Risk=Threat x Vulnerability. Within this model, Threat=(Capabilities x Intent) (Will x Action). The critical, yet less examined, elements in the model are Intent and Will. But by using a research framework that blends targeted intelligence collection, anthropological research, and psychology to permeate cultures, a combination of analytical techniques can expose these elusive battle-space elements covering the life-cycle of a conflict to target correlating key nodes and links.

Relatively little is known about the terrorist or insurgent as an individual, and the psychology and history of unconventional warfare actors remains poorly understood. Attempts to clarify terrorism and activists in merely psychological terms ignore the aspects of economic, political, and social aspects that have typically motivated radical activists, as well as the possibility that biological or physiological variables may be a factor in bringing an individual to the point of carrying out terrorist acts.

The social psychology of political terrorism has received extensive analysis in studies of terrorism, but the individual psychology of political and religious terrorism has been greatly disregarded. This is regrettable because psychology has perfect tools to examine behavior and the factors that influence and control behavior, and it can provide practical as opposed to purely conceptual knowledge of terrorists and terrorism.

As an aside, SoSA ONA definitions in this area state “A Social System is a network of social relationships that is organized integrated and shares a common value system.” In broad theory, perhaps this is true. (Joint Warfighting Center, 2005) However, at ground level, one sees that codes, ideology/theology, beliefs, and behavior may have adjoining points that create a sense of harmony within groups, but individuals who are susceptible to changes will likely not share such an all-encompassing rigidly defined value system. Individuals may simply share “interests” at that particular time. In some cases, one group may come to scrutinize the beliefs and actions of another group as fundamentally evil and morally intolerable. This can result in internal hostility or violence and damages the relationship between the two groups. For this reason, moral conflicts tend to be quite harmful and inflexible – or exploitable for the urban war-fighters.

One element of the psychological analysis in this process is the use of Behavioral Science, but at a more complex level then that of typical profiling techniques. A belief model coupled with social cognitive theory can define human behavior as a dynamic interaction of personal factors, activities, and environment. The process illuminates what is reality for groups and individuals, and therefore how that behavior is interpreted, predicted, and can potentially be changed. To support this analysis comprehensive intelligence collection and anthropology must be conducted to also consider a level of likely scenario-based ramifications to consider ever-changing free-will before mission planning and during mission execution. This is also where significant anthropological methodology approaches to participant observation, fieldwork, and historical research makes a contribution to the puzzle for assessments of historic and recurring experiences.

According to defense analyst and anthropologist Dr. Montgomery McFate, anthropology as an intelligence contribution is noticeably absent as a discipline within our national-security establishment, especially within the intelligence community and Department of Defense. Dr. McFate defines the role that “Anthropology is a social science discipline whose primary object of
study has traditionally been non-Western, tribal societies. One of the central epistemological tenets of anthropology is cultural relativism—understanding other societies from within their own framework.” (McFate, 2005) Here is a very important emphasis of “understanding within a society’s own framework”, which is quite different from understanding a society from our own mindset and framework. The differences between the two (us versus them) are found to be quite different from the standpoint of predispositions in interpretation and context. As a brief example, the Tuaregs, a North African Sahara Berber people, govern desert space and confederations by a blend of informal economies, loosely structured laws, historic boundaries, and, most importantly, self-understanding. Due to the fact that their “rules” can not be defined in modern state infrastructures, the French and the national-states within the region have often come in conflict with the Tuaregs when extensions and intrusions to the territories are committed. Conflicts and rebellions will continue without a better sense of how the Tuaregs think and how their social/culture has historically evolved to be what it is today.

**Conclusion**

Analysts should avoid segmenting adversaries or potentially hostile individuals into randomly defined groups and our own convenient categories, tables, and data fields. Cultural intelligence analysts should ideally depict inferences from three main facets that can be found in social cultures:

- Cognitive-Judgment and Reasoning Traits (strategies used in decision-making).
- Motivational-Inducements to action (beliefs about good and bad).
- Behavioral Actions and Reactions based on internal and external stimuli (the observable traits such as customs, language, social interaction).

These inferences take form in definable qualities, whether they be links, nodes, indicators, etc., that can be applied to pattern recognition surrounding the adversary or the indigenous people of an area of interest.

Those surrounding factors will be seen in the environment or a typical area study (geography, political, economic, sociological, linguistic, demographic, and cultural) but consider a more tactical consideration that is brought down to a local or personalized level to assess individual perspectives, behavioral patterns, psychographic profiles, etc. Herein lies the real “ground truth”, especially with regard to the current Sahara challenges that affect the Tuaregs.

With improved cultural intelligence net assessments leaders and commanders can better construct essential elements of information for engagement and even survival, evasion, resistance, and escape needs should a situation become more hostile. US Army Lieutenant Colonels David P. Fitchitt and William D. Wunderle confirmed their experiences and observations as they wrote on the subject, “Cultural adaptability includes learning such things as language acronyms, slang and jargon that are unique to the culture; goals and values (formal rules and principles, as well as unwritten, informal goals and values that govern behavior); history (traditions, customs, myths and rituals that convey cultural knowledge); and politics (formal and informal relationships and power structures within the culture).” (Wunderle, 2005)

At such a micro-level, a tactical urban warrior can focus for maximizing courses of action and cover strategic, operational, and tactical needs. From here commanders are enabled to take surprise from the enemy; forecast expanding upon the capabilities of intuitive intelligence and introducing “presencing” to the equation; come to a better understanding of the relationship one enters with the adversary — known, suspected, and unknown; and fully understand the local power chains of influence.
Field Manual-Interim 3-07.22 highlights this micro-level as a formal process, "Understanding and working within the social fabric of a local area is initially the most influential factor in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. Unfortunately, this is often the factor most neglected by US forces." (Department of the Army, 2004) By becoming aware of the full human reasoning process within an area, and the choices people make, between observing data to ultimately taking action, personal and situational awareness can also transform to an ability to change or even shape others' beliefs. This is the stage where one truly knows an adversary. Perhaps it is stated best by a former expert in this area –

“When I took a decision or adapted an alternative, it was after studying every relevant- and many irrelevant-factor. Geography, tribal structure, religion, social customs, language, appetites, standards- all were at my finger-ends. The enemy I knew almost like my own side.” – Colonel T.E. Lawrence, 26 June 1933

Scott Swanson, a Military Intelligence Corps Association, Foreign Area Officer Association, and Association of Former Intelligence Officers member, specializes in strategic and tactical operation intelligence collection and analysis. He is currently the Chief Desk Officer for Delphi International Research, and is a strategic advisor at the California University of Protection and Intelligence Management in the areas of propaganda, international economics, and covert action academic programs. Mr. Swanson’s educational background consists of a M.S. in Strategic Intelligence, a B.A. in Culture and Communication (Languages studied: French, Arabic, and Spanish), and is currently pursuing a PhD in Behavioral Social Psychology. Readers can reach Mr. Swanson at 1-312-659-3000.

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The Army’s Human Resources Command responds to the challenge to grow adaptive leaders

The Army’s Human Resources Command responds to the challenge to grow adaptive leaders. The Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) review, outlined in the Spring 2005 issue of Perspective, identified a number of changes to meet the needs of an Army at war while transforming. The changes focus on developing the competencies required of Army officers in the 21st century security environment and synchronizing the personnel management system with the operational battle rhythm.

HRC established the OPMS Task Force to review and recommend changes for an OPMS that achieves specific objectives.

The foundation of the evolving OPMS is the functionally aligned OPMS design. All officers should understand this revised design and be familiar with key implementation dates.

Develop Skills Required Today and Tomorrow...

Growing adaptive, multi-skilled officers capable of operating in the 21st century security environment requires opportunities for broadening perspectives. The task force has been instrumental in implementing a number of initiatives that provide broader officer development, including the Expanded Graduate School program (see Winter/Spring Perspective, pg 7).

Building leaders with expeditionary competencies also requires recognition of Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) experience beyond formal Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) credit. The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army recently approved providing officers with additional assignment opportunities outside DoD to gain greater developmental breadth. These short-term opportunities (e.g., detail up to 90 days) focus on “just-in-time” as well as “just-in-case” development and complement graduate education. The task force also is developing better means to capture JIIM experience.

... and Group Skills Functionally to Meet Army Requirements

The Army OPMS must align branches and functional areas consistent with joint doctrine, focusing on development of multi-skilled leaders. The task force presented a functionally aligned OPMS design to the Chief of Staff of the Army, which became effective Sept. 5.

The functionally aligned OPMS design comprises categories and groups composed of branches and functional areas with similar battlefield functions, to facilitate the development of the broader functional competencies required in the 21st century officer. To support officer management and development under this design, the Officer Personnel Management Directorate (OPMD), HRC-Alexandria, reorganized this summer. The three approved functional categories and associated functional groups are shown in the chart accompanying this article.

Implementing the design requires coding multi-functional positions that facilitate the development of multi-skilled leaders. Working with the proponents, the task force identified a small number of positions (approximately 10 percent of the senior major and junior lieutenant colonel positions) which could be accessible to officers with the requisite knowledge, skills and abilities. The CSA approved the position coding to allow broader access. Within this “position access” construct, officers can gain broadening experiences by filling identified positions within functional groups, within functional categories or across functional categories of the functionally-aligned design. Over the next six months, the positions will be refined and coded so officers with the appropriate skills or training can serve in these shared positions and benefit from the experience.
Deputy Chief of Staff G-1 revised DA Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management, in 2005 to reflect an OPMS model emphasizing broader career paths with joint and interagency experience earlier in an officer’s career. The next version of this critical document will include another update to the model, reflecting even broader development within the new functional categories.

To achieve the required shift in career paths, HRC has modified various processes, beginning with the elimination of the functional area designation and the creation of two functional designation opportunities – one in the fourth year of service and one in the seventh year – to best support the requirements for functional-area officers in the modular forces.

In support of shifting career paths to be less command-centric, the task force also presented a concept centered on a revised definition of “command,” which the CSA approved (see pg. 7).

The Task Force reviewed Centralized Select List (CSL) categories, policy and procedures to refine the command and key billet lists, and recently announced broader competitive categories for certain commanders, allowing more officers with the right skills and experience to compete.

**Recruit and Retain Professionals with a Warrior Ethos Inspired to a Lifetime of Service**

Working with the G-1 staff and the Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis, the task force recommended cadets be offered incentives in exchange for accepting longer Active Duty Service Obligations (ADSO). The incentives include branch of choice, post of choice, or a guarantee of graduate school in exchange for a commitment by the cadet to add three years to their ADSO. This initiative was implemented this year for select cadets in the U.S. Military Academy and Cadet Command (ROTC) with outstanding results overall.
The task force continues to refine and develop an appropriate menu of incentives for junior officers, potentially including a retention bonus as well as the expanded graduate school opportunities already in place. As incentives and new programs are available, they are posted to the Commander’s Officer Retention Toolkit (CORT) on the HRC website at https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/active/opfamdd/LDD12.htm.

The Way Ahead

The next review cycle will focus on integrating Reserve Component officers and warrant officers. Additionally, the task force will continue working to fully implement the CSA-directed changes, including the OPMD reorganization, the coding of multi-functional positions and creation of the system to support position access, and communication of all changes to the field as they occur.

The task force continues to gather input from the field on all aspects of the OPMS as well as providing updates to the field through multiple channels. See the OPMS Community Page on AKO (page 253639) at www.us.army.mil/suite/page/253639. We welcome your feedback on how we can make these pages most useful.

The FAO Journal needs:

FAO articles written by FAOs!

All FAOs are requested to submit articles to be published in the FAO Journal. Articles should nominally be 7-10 pages, single spaced (longer articles will be considered). Graphics (pictures, maps, charts) should be included embedded in the article and sent separately (in a PowerPoint file is convenient).

After publishing in the FAO Journal articles will be uploaded on the FAOA web site (www.faoa.org).

Please e-mail articles and graphics to editor@faoa.org or webmaster@faoa.org.
This paper offers a new strategy for Iraq and a radically different approach for our government. The following is solely the opinion of the author—not an indictment of current Military leadership in Iraq.

I believe it is possible for the United States to extricate itself from Iraq in a charitable way. The below proposes a method for shifting responsibility to the Iraqi government while separating the US Military from the politics of Islam. It advocates establishing an achievable military mission with discernable standards of progress. Under this concept, a measurable military goal could be established and metrics for the withdrawal of US forces could be derived.

Textbook Approach: One often incorrectly applied staple of Army Planning was defined by Carl Von Clausewitz as the Center of Gravity. Proper strategic and operational planning emphasizes protection of one’s own Center of Gravity while targeting that of the enemy. In Counterinsurgency, (historically proven to last 10-14 years,) analysis leads to the belief that the key to victory is adequate favor in the “hearts and minds” or “the support of the people.”

Application: While this truism applies on a broad level, this knowledge has not helped us to isolate as the main effort those systems that soothe or contribute to the will of the people. A deeper probing of these systems reveals that basic services, economic hope and ultimately Infrastructure Security is the key to Iraq. We understand and profess this knowledge, but our military actions are not tied decisively to the Center of Gravity.

In contrast, the enemy lives by it. They have paid strict attention to target any and all systems that rob the people of basic needs, hope and security. Successful attacks against infrastructure make the government appear powerless. A well placed pipeline blast; fallen tower; or destroyed transfer-station has a greater effect on the people than the destruction of a single Coalition HMMWV and its occupants. The enemy correctly interprets the Center of Gravity as anything that leads to comfort and hope of the people.

Ironically, some enemy factions even offer terrorist dominated neighborhoods continuous power and running water. The Mahdi Militia controls many gas stations. The Civil Affairs work of Hezbollah in Lebanon is legend. Muqtada al Sadr has been able to fuel, power and secure Sadr City. This allows the enemy to provide for the basic needs of the people while the Coalition is cast as the reason for pain and suffering. The enemy understands. Mean time, they quietly target any system they don’t control; together with persons that threaten their spread of influence. They can do this at very low cost and remarkably low risk. When they are pushed out of one district, they simply move to another. Hiding to attack another day.

Our tactics, on the other hand, seem to have forgotten Liddell Hart’s Indirect Approach in favor of the very frontal approach — Iraqi-style tactics already shown to alienate more people than they bless. We tell the Iraqis not to canvass neighborhoods, yet the centerpiece of the Baghdad Security plan was to canvass neighborhoods. As expressed by the US Army Spokesman for MNF-I on 20 October, “Operation Together Forward, the U.S. effort to reduce violence in Baghdad, has failed and the United States is looking for a new solution… The operation has actually led to an increase in U.S. troop deaths.” If called upon to evaluate the Baghdad Security Plan, the following quote from Clausewitz may apply, "Results are of two kinds: direct and indirect… The possession of provinces, cities, fortresses, roads, bridges, munitions dumps, etc., may be the immediate object of an engagement, but can never be the final one." Indeed, failures in the current effort in Iraq could be because we have forgotten about protecting our Center of Gravity.

In the last eight months, power generation throughout Iraq has decreased dramatically; conversely, effective violent attacks have increased. No sooner does one electrical tower or pipeline get fixed than it is blown apart again. Regardless of localized efforts throughout Iraq, the Coalition is losing the Infrastructure Security war. Transformer stations, towers, pipeline joints and other fixed sites are continually targeted in spite of the establishment of 18 Strategic Infrastructure Battalions.
and a host of other Coalition-funded protection schemes. This is because very few of the methods of protection involve the professional Army of Iraq. Please don’t misunderstand: The Coalition has taken dramatic and expensive efforts to improve the infrastructure. The sheer volume of resources targeted for use in Focused Stabilization Plans and CMO projects is awe inspiring. But protection of these projects and resources Iraq-wide is not integrated into the plan except as an afterthought; and because the COIN fight commanders don’t view defense as the most critical mission in their battlespace. Unless we adjust the main military effort to protecting projects we establish, those efforts will be in vain. One Marine O6 told me that failure to secure civil projects in Fallujah and Ramadi has put those to cities in the state of deterioration they are in today. 

Vignette: (As told by an Iraq Ground Forces Command (IGFC) officer) In Baquba last Fall, a civilian contractor was slated to build a 400 unit apartment complex. They began to build it. It would house 400 families. The building project would employ several hundred men for over two years. Sadly, no one secured the contractors or the site. They were forced off the job by terrorists. Hundreds of jobs were lost. Homes were not built. But at the same time, just a few kilometers away, someone was kicking in a door searching a home and detaining some father of a household.

Another way to evaluate success of our operations in Iraq the way is the American people might. I suggest comparing coalition casualties to the number of deployed personnel. The results have a direct correlation to what Americans view as successful -- or not -- in Iraq. I apologize in advance for the sensationalistic approach. An average American, not understanding the dramatic efforts placed in counter-IED research and route security may sense that the situation is getting worse. Many military members would agree. It shows that the current priority of effort has failed to properly address the Centers of Gravity
while diffusing the best efforts and resources of the United States in an un-winnable clash with insurgents; and that our efforts somewhat neglect the goal of transitioning stewardship (not just battlespace) to the Iraqi Security Forces.

Although the Coalition has acknowledged that Infrastructure Security is key we have done little substantive and lasting work to actually get at the problem—choosing instead to focus on counter-insurgency. This choice has almost always been at the expense of long-term stability initiatives such as properly equipping, organizing and training the Strategic Infrastructure Battalions; or applying considerable coalition assets to Infrastructure Security missions.

This is not to say that Infrastructure Security has not been viewed as critical to success; but rather, “Baghdad Security” and other COIN initiatives have so dramatically upstaged security of the infrastructure and transition to Iraqi leadership as to stall them completely.

This could be because the US Military is designed and trained as a kinetic and aggressive instrument. It’s what we know and reward. The people of the United States wouldn’t have it any other way. There is also an assumption that security must precede Infrastructure development. So, we have gone after the enemy. We have searched him out and when we have found and captured him we often release him to attack us again. Perhaps the assumption is flawed.

Perhaps the problem is that we have been fighting the wrong enemy on terrain of his choosing. And try as we may, commanders will never fully divorce themselves from tactics that manufacture more terrorists than they capture. We have allowed “cordon, search, clear, hold, and build” (sequentially) to signify our efforts. While the COIN fight is a heroic effort, as long as the political and economic sources of discontent remain, it is un-winnable. Many who carry out the attacks against us would not if there were jobs and security available to him.

Vignette: (As asked by one IGFC Officer) “Why do you Americans always go right for the strongest part of the enemy. We learned to find the weakness and exploit it. But you go right into the neighborhoods?… In Baghdad you are fighting only the

symptom of the sickness, you are not seeking the cure.”

Military Recommendations:

Change the Main Effort to protecting infrastructure and borders rather than fighting insurgents. COIN Operations are a supporting effort as a distant third, behind Civil Affairs Projects and Anti-Terror. Oil, Water and Electricity must be the focus. Tasks -- Conventional Army: Infrastructure Security and Borders. Police and Government Of Iraq: Counter-Insurgency and Tribal Violence. Iraqi Special Operations Forces/ISR and CJSOTF: Counter-Terrorism.

Once new boundaries are drawn per a Security/Defense Mission, give the Iraqi Army non-negotiable Areas of responsibility for which Coalition Commanders are not held responsible. Redraw MND boundaries. Transition must be a real priority.

Once re-distributed and re-aligned, continue to provide ONLY emergency Combat Support and Service Support to Iraqi Army Units from extant operating bases.

Allow provincial control even if it is chaotic until urban areas reach some kind of natural and legitimate stasis. Have the courage to accept civil-authorities solutions to governance in their own areas. They may use methods we cannot condone.

Amend the vocabulary of the war. Expunge words that legitimize terrorists such as “Jihadist” and “Sectarian Violence” (recruiting tools.)

Stop wasting effort and money west of the Tigris River. Shrink MNF-West AOR.

Possible Result: The government of Iraq would have political responsibility for their own security in the cities. They would be forced to commit the billions of US dollars already provided to their Security apparatus, as yet unspent. While infrastructure, to include Oil and Electricity are protected and revived, Maslow’s needs would ultimately be provided to the people. Insurgents would lose their ability to foment discontent in the urban areas. They would be less able to capitalize off of misery and religious sensationalism. Assets used to fruitlessly build the west would be re-allocated to protect the strategic center of gravity. The government of Iraq would be “legitimized” in an authentic and more lasting manner by allowing the Prime Minister to co-opt, appease, buy and appropri-
ate existing centers of power unfamiliar and sometimes unacceptable to Western governments.

In the mean time, the Army (Iraqi and US) would enjoy a defined mission with a measurable end-state; aloof of Muslim politics. Forces would be out of the cities and much safer from the perspective of the American people; while they actually made measurable progress in securing prosperity to Iraq.

**Mission:** Multi-National Force Defends key infrastructure, borders and LOCs in order to deny interdiction and disruption from insurgent and criminal forces.

**Intent:** Re-position and re-mission MNF-units to defend key infrastructure *until 60% of oil capacity is flowing and 80% of power grid is restored.* Periodic review of UN SCR for MNF-I action in Iraq continues to dictate Coalition Force withdrawal. UN and IRQ officials evaluate stability of each province and may recommend early Coalition withdrawal. *At 70% oil capacity and 85% power restoration over a period of six months*, Coalition Forces will depart without UN Review. Metrics for consideration will be: Provincial Security, Economic Growth, Education Centers, Police Integrity, Civil Satisfaction and representative forms of government (religious, tribal and otherwise.)

**Vignette:** (Babil) On National Public Radio the day after the tragic incidents in the city of Babil wherein 100 civilians were reportedly killed, the report was “Prime Minister Malaki is under severe pressure as a result of the situation to resolve security issues in the nation. As a result he has fired two of the key leaders in the Ministry of Interior.”

Suddenly, the Iraqi public was holding Iraqi leaders accountable with results.

**Vignette Continued:** The report followed up by saying the US was considering placing the area back under Coalition Control. This was verified by meetings at MNC-I later that night.

Impact: The Coalition undid the good that came of the failure of Babil.

Moral: If we don’t allow failure, we don’t allow success.

* * *

**Political Recommendations:** As a FAO, I felt comfortable in crossing the line and offering a few political recommendations. Some of what I will say is simply controversial opinion, but sometimes FAOs have to go there. The following outline details differences between the current stance of the Administration and the stance required by the military adjustment above:

**Current Approach:**

1) The US went to Iraq to depose a dictator, protect national interests and enforce UN resolutions.

**Flaws:**

Americans don’t like deposing dictators just because we don’t like them. There is no constitutional or uniform standard of application. WMD plea was for the purpose of gaining world approval. When found empty, the world turned its back. Simplistic ties to Al Quada may have been proven in some circles, but have not been sufficient to turn world opinion in favor of the war. Fighting the enemy outside the US, rather than protecting the US at home, means fighting the enemy on terrain of their choosing.

2) The US stayed in Iraq to fight terror abroad; spread Democracy; build/deploy the Iraqi Army; and build a Nation.

**Flaws:**

You can’t do all four missions simultaneously. Some of them are mutually exclusive. The US Army is the wrong instrument for two out of four tasks. Department of Justice and State have not fully embraced the Iraq mission. Two of the objectives above require a Civil Society first.

**Future Approach:**

1) The US should stay in Iraq long enough to set the conditions for security and representative government (not necessarily ‘democracy.’)

**Advantages:**

Focuses on positives
Plays to the strength of the Coalition Forces as well as new Iraqi Army
Each term can be defined and articulated.

2) The US will withdraw forces from Iraq once Iraqi Security Forces are capable of providing infrastructure and border security.

Advantages:
Provides a new discernable and measurable standard for success as well as easily defined Areas of Responsibility.
Uses the Iraqi Army as a fixed-base defense (as they were designed) and not as an expeditionary force where soldiers are reluctant to either wage war against neighbors or depart from their home towns.

Of Course It’s Not THAT Easy: To realign Areas of Responsibility will be a major undertaking. To allow the “Iraqi Solution” in the cities will be distasteful and painful to both the media and some citizens of the United States. Some objections include:

1) Wouldn’t neglect of the Urban COIN fight result in wholesale war between factions? Wouldn’t it mean some people would gain unfair advantage over others?

It is going to happen anyway – before or after we depart. Why not let it occur while we are here to minimize the damage. Indeed, there is such mistrust and incompetence among the Sadr-infested Police the situation is bound to devolve into single-party thuggery in some areas; and potentially support forced migration of Shia in Diyala, and Sunnis in Fallujah. This concept already has traction with knowable Iraqi leaders as well: On 13 November, Mowaffak al Rubaie, Iraq’s National Security Adviser, said to CBS, “First, there should be a redeployment of U.S. troops. American troops should be pulled off Baghdad’s streets and sent back to their bases, leaving the Iraqi Army to take full charge of security in the capital.”

Besides, the Iraqi Military wouldn’t leave the cities entirely. They would remain to defend transformer stations and civil affairs projects. Moderate influence would remain; and people would realize that withdrawal of those security efforts would directly result in a decreased quality of life. With pure defense of projects and systems known to improve the quality of life, communities would think twice about aligning themselves with militia or parties not supported by the United States or the Government of Iraq. As it is now, people only believe that the withdrawal of the military would result in less bombings and IEDs in their cities and they are probably right. Visibly altering the task of the military in the cities from checkpoints and cordon to protection of projects and power-stations would measurably alter the perception the people have of the Army. One hostile plank of the enemy’s ‘blame the Coalition and the Government’ platform would be removed.

True, some cities and provinces may become primarily Sunni, Shia or Kurd. The idea of special autonomous areas is already a reality in the North. We just have to get to it in a stable and measured way, constantly proving that it is in the self-interest of the people to support the Nation of Iraq. While arriving at stasis is going to be painful, we must be willing to accept it. And, ensuring a working infrastructure and secure borders is bound to curb some of the pain. What is clear is that remaining in the cities as urban warriors; providing targets and legitimacy to the thugs isn’t working. A current look reveals that the Prime Minister is ready and willing for opposing factions to semi-peacefully co-exist. Are we?

2) With Sadr and Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM)-controlled areas, wouldn’t Iran leverage their resources and influence in Iraq to render it a vassal state; thereby destabilizing the middle-east?

The US must be willing to punish Iran not only for their nuclear program; but for every IED or Foreign Fighter they export to Iraq. Secure borders will ensure the success of this effort. Eventually the influx of instruments of terror; including cash, explosives and personnel would slow. With Infrastructure as the TRUE priority, economic interest in both nations would eventually get the oil flowing, the electricity on, and the people at rest. These are pragmatic people. In other words, we could also buy them. We could buy out Sadr Militia as well. We are already doing it with tribal militias in some areas. The key to this region remains economic support. Europe, (as the primary investor in Middle-east energy,) together with Asia, (the greatest consumer of Oil in the region,) would invest in an oil-producing Iraq. Iraq would be-
come a competitor again because of market pressures; and the Iranian influence in Iraq would deteriorate. Again, watch the Prime Minister closely. He has judiciously protected JAM in both Diwaniya and Sadr City. He knows who his clients are and he probably has an eye toward the security of the nation.

3) What would happen to the local governance if we didn’t force them to follow the representational system we hope to impose?

The question answers itself. It is OUR system and not theirs. The Coalition should have a willingness to accept the possibility of a semi-religious state: regionalized. We have been pushing federalism and regionalization anyway. It is only because we are terrified anything different from our Western-centric 21st Century secular-world view that we insist upon mirror-imaging our solution. As was demonstrated in Lebanon, the mirror often produces a backwards image. Whatever we impose, like a bad transfusion, the body politic of Iraq will eventually reject.

Vignette: (From IGFC Officers) In a humorous but embarrassing story, MNF-W counted it a great PR accomplishment to meet with all the Sheiks in Fallujah on TV. Problem is, everyone who is from Fallujah laughed at them because the men the Marines unwittingly invited on TV were not the respected leaders of the tribes; but rather wannabe businessmen who posed as sheiks. Moral of the story: Let them find their own leaders.

We must stop sorting it out for them. There are other more tragic versions of this story that involve importing expatriate criminals for ministerial positions when we first started this effort; but that is beyond the scope of this paper.

4) What would happen with the militias?

Two choices: Disband them or integrate them. In large part, we are integrating the Strategic Infrastructure Battalions. The army hated them at first, but now the MoD at least views them as useful for economy of force missions. And for all the tasks Iraqi Army and Militias can’t do (expeditionary failures, command and control failures, logistic failures,) they can at least defend.

Unfortunately, it already appears to be the Government’s choice not to disband some of the militias. Yet, the quiet of Sadr City and Diwaniya of late indicate that such an approach may be satisfactory to Iraqis, no matter how unsavory to us. How much of our vital national interest lies in dictating each aspect of majority-rule in the newly sovereign Iraq?

The decision to disband or integrate would be based on the source of the militia. If they are patrilineal organizations founded on family and tribal relationships, it may be possible to buy them off or integrate them in the Iraqi Security Force through recruitment and training. A family militia in Anbar could be hired as a private company to secure the highway; for which there would be tangible punishment for failure; and real rewards of both status and protection for success. An Iraqi-Solution.

If the militia is based on extremist or anti-government/coalition rhetoric, it must be disbanded without delay. This would be the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior (MOI). Aware of the present conflict of interest involved, this may also be an appropriate Combined Special Operations mission based solely on targetable intelligence and a Government of Iraq (GOI) request. Obtaining GOI support and incorruptible MOI reinforcement is the most critical part of this project, and outside the scope of this recommendation.

Conclusion: What we have done is good but has not succeeded. We have been noble and brave, but not careful. We have insisted on giving them the Bill of Rights before they had the Magna Carta. We have implied a Civil Society where none exists. We have neglected systems of power already here; and arrogantly attempted to forge our own. Until we dramatically alter expectations and our approach to Iraq, we will not succeed.

A new strategy and accompanying political stance are needed for Iraq. (I know that seems backwards, but we got into this thing backwards; reversing the formula may just get us out.) We are in need of a Military Strategy that truly and dramatically focuses on Infrastructure Security while acknowledging the true Center of Gravity in Iraq. A political strategy that rec-
ognizes the new mission would permit the US to support Iraq while truly empowering the Iraqi Government and Military.

In so doing, the US would step out of the fray of insurgency and lift herself above the politics of Islam. Reverting to a defensive and support mission would only prove to the people that we are here for the general good. It does far better than cordonning off their neighborhood and cuffing fathers in front of children. It would provide us and the Iraqis a discernable measure for our departure; and their pending responsibilities. Defensive missions also require fewer forces.

Simultaneously, if we can get both the US and Iraqi government to appropriate systems of power already extant in the country, to include Caliphs, Imams, Sheiks and the whole gamut of patrilineal power-players, we will have stability. It may not be "Democracy," but it is still greater representational freedom than they have ever known.

Consider the alternative: Under the status-quo, given competing missions and three years of co-dependency, the IA will continue to refuse to fight unless we are right next to them. And, if we continue to use them in the COIN fight (rightfully a civil police action,) they could return to the tactics and values of the old regime after we depart. All they have learned from our current strategy to include Baghdad Security is that overwhelming military force against a civilian population is an acceptable technique; and that the only way to claim Iraq is to re-invade it. And right now, they are posturing to build a military to do exactly that. Once that occurs, who will be to blame for establishing a heavy-handed population control in Iraq? If we don’t dramatically change tactics soon, our legacy will be irrevocably negative.

That said, we really can stay the strategic course while altering the operational route in Iraq. I hope we do. Watching the cities settle into political stasis while instilling legitimate authority may be painful; but with an eye toward defense, there is a positive way out of Iraq.

From January 2006 to the present, LTC Whitney has served as the Plans Advisor to the Iraqi Ground Forces Command, Baghdad, Iraq. He is a Chinese Foreign Area Officer and is very aware of his limits in Arabic culture and understanding. He certainly doesn’t claim to have it all figured out. He only knows FAOs of any AOC can bring much insight to the global war on terror. He will return from Iraq to teach Chinese at USMA beginning Summer ’07.

Endnotes

1 Out of the dominant characteristics of both belligerents a certain center of gravity develops, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which all our energies should be directed. …act with the utmost concentration [trace the ultimate substance of enemy strength to the fewest possible sources. …The first task, then, in planning for a war is to identify the enemy’s center of gravity, and if possible trace it back to single one. ” Carl von Clausewitz, On War. 1832. Translated, 1908 by Anatol Rapaport. Penguin Books, London 1968.


4 Right now, Transition is mostly a slogan. “Iraqi Army Lead” or IAL is the term applied to Iraqi units that have progressed sufficiently that they may “assume responsibility for the security of battle space and for the activities and actions of his forces within that space.” Though many units are declared “IAL” the initiative in the area remains held tightly by the Coalition. It is Coalition commanders who continue to plan for, task, and commit Iraqi Forces – even those “in the lead.” In ten months, the author has not seen a single convincing example of Iraqi initiative the Coalition would accept. Until, Coalition commanders stop having the good ideas for Iraqi owned battlespace, transition will remain a mere slogan.

5 One possibility would be for Coalition Forces to focus on primary Oil, Electricity and Transportation Lines of Communication. Coalition could use Intelligence assets to focus on borders. Iraqi Army could focus on securing Civil-Military Projects and secondary lines of communication. There is sufficient proximity between Coalition bases and Iraqi Army areas of responsibility for the Coalition to provide support if necessary. There are many mixes and options.

6 Even academic opposites, Benedict Anderson of Cornell University and Earnest Gillner of the London School of Economics agree that Nationalism is founded on the advance of technology, print media and to some extent industrialism. It follows that if a country does not come into the industrial age on their own, as Iraq did not, nationalism is therefore a completely foreign concept; unable to trump allegiance to tribe, family or local authority. Saddam Hussein found that ruthless dictatorship was the only way to forge nationalism in Iraq.

7 IA deployment failures happened because we formed them to be a constabulary national-guard force, but asked them to execute as a projection counter-insurgency force. Now we watch with fascinated horror as the MoD seeks additional Brigades to bring back an era of Military supremacy and civil-control that reigned in the last Regime. Baghdad Security Plan taught them that more is better. Urban COIN taught there is no substitute for Military Control.

8 One often heard commander’s intent is “put an Iraqi face” on the operation. That means, the Coalition will plan and mostly execute it, but make sure the Iraqi Army gets credit and therefore legitimacy. This kind of condescension is obvious to the Iraqi people and has just the opposite effect. The only way to put an “Iraqi face” on any endeavor is to have the patience, courage, and will to let them actually do it.
First of all I would like to congratulate all of our FAOs who are doing an outstanding job supporting our nation at war. With the Army transforming, and the need for enhanced security cooperation worldwide steadily increasing, the demand for fully trained FAOs is at an all time high. Together with FAO Assignments at Human Resources Command, FAO Proposent strives every day to ensure FAOs have appropriate professional development and promotion opportunities, while ensuring that the Army’s growing need for qualified FAOs is satisfied. In this article, I am going to discuss two initiatives which will improve our branch, enhance the way that we support our nation at war, and keep some senior FAOs in uniform a little longer and at higher levels.

The first initiative is the development of International Military Affairs Divisions or IMAs in the ASCCs. This division, led by a FAO colonel, will have a number of branches (2-5) each headed by a FAO LTC and populated with FAO majors representing the various AOCs included in that ASCC’s region. This initiative accomplishes a number of things:

- Better supports our Army formations during all operations, but particularly contingency operations.
- Keeps FAOs “green” by assigning them to Army positions.
- Increases the number of FAO billets, especially for O-4s, which will help keep our number of accessions into the branch relatively high.
- Highlights the skills that FAOs bring to the fight and the value of FAOs to senior Army leaders – commanders of our ASCCs, Corps, Divisions, and BCTs.

The idea is that the IMA supports the commander with regional expertise and the FAOs within the IMA are used to assist the ASCC and its subordinate units during planning, training, exercises, and deployments. They may remain at the ASCC level or be chopped down to corps, divisions, or even BCTs as the mission dictates and based on the commander’s priorities. We have already begun to field this new organization at ARCENT, ARSOUTH will start converting in 2008, followed by ARPAC and AREUR the next two years.

The second initiative is the development of a FAO path to the GO level. Some of you may be aware that OSD has actually told the services that they MUST do this, must give FAOs opportunities to serve at the GO/FO ranks. This initiative not only supports the increased professional development of FAOs, but the Army, the military, and the nation as a whole will be better for it. If you look at some of our GO billets at OSD, JCS, and the Army – they cry out “FAO” very clearly. We believe once we start assigning FAOs to these high-level jobs, our overall ability to manage international relations and security policy on the world stage will increase.

While this is a complicated and multi-faceted effort, I will mention one aspect and that is our initiative to create some Centrally Selected Key Billets (KB) for FAO O-6 positions. We think this will potentially increase the viability of our colonels for service as GOS when they go before boards of officers, all of whom are products of the Centrally Select List (CSL) process. We have had many long hours of discussions on what positions we should designate as KBs, and in the end it came down to three main factors:

1. Numbers - the CSA is not in favor of large increases in the number of these billets, so we had to keep the number small;
2. Fairness – we had to ensure that all AOCs had a reasonably equal opportunity to compete; and
3. “Face time” if you will, with senior Army GOS - something that is important when it comes time to make new GOS.

At this point we will move forward with six KB requests – the four IMA Division Chiefs, the Army Foreign Liaison Officer, and the Chief of Army International Affairs Division. You can argue the relative merits of this list for hours – we have already done so, and I can’t tell you that an IMA Chief will be a tougher, or more influential job than the DATT, MILGRP Cdr, or SDO in Columbia or Paris, or a division chief on the Joint Staff or at OSD, but the bottom line is that this is (Continued on page 12)
1. **Desk Officer Adjustment.** PLU-6, the EUCOM Desk Officer (Maj Dan Bates, Western Europe FAO) now covers Western Europe and NATO, while PLU-5 (Maj Mike Barnes, Former Soviet Union FAO) covers Eastern Europe, Caucasus, Africa and Israel.

2. **Middle East North Africa (MENA) FAO In-Country Training (ICT).** The Marine Corps opted for a unique ICT experience this time with one of its MENA FAOs.
   a. The officer completed Defense Language Institute (DLI) in Monterey, studying Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) for the entire course. However, approximately 2/3’s of the way through, he spent half-days working on Iraqi dialect, and DLPT’d in MSA, but conducted his Oral Proficiency Interview (OPI) in Iraqi dialect.
   b. Following graduation from DLI, he will deploy to Iraq and be imbedded with a training team for 6 months.
   c. In January, he will return to the U.S. briefly, and then head out to Cairo, Egypt, where he will execute 6 months of a more traditional ICT (thus completing a year-long ICT, albeit, in an unconventional fashion that meets his particular interests, the needs of the FAO program, and most importantly, the needs of the Marine Corps). We will make all his trip reports available to all interested U.S. FAOs.

3. **Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Culture & Language Sustainment Program.** The Commandant of the Marine Corps met with VADM Fahd, Commander Royal Saudi Naval Forces (RSNF) in Jul 06. VADM Fahd expressed a desire to host some Marine officers in Saudi Arabia to improve their Arabic language skills further. CMC directed Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies and Operations to develop a program to support this.
   a. The program will select 1-2 Middle East North Africa / Arabic speaking FAOs to visit the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for a 2-3 month immersion training period, every year, beginning summer 07.
   b. This is one of the efforts the Marine Corps is exploring for how to address the cultural and language requirements stipulated in the 2005 Defense Language Transformation Roadmap (DLTR).

4. **FAO selections for promotion and command.** The Marine Corps FY07 LtCol Command List selected 8 International Affairs Officers (IAOs) for battalion level command.
   a. The Marine Corps manages its FAO Program using the dual-track system, so the IAOs were selected to command units within their Primary Military Occupational Field Specialty (PMOS). On the FY06 LtCol Command Screen Board, 3 FAOs and 1 RAO were selected for command, so the FY07 results are double the previous year’s.
   b. IAOs’ information:
      1. 5 FAOs
      2. 3 Regional Affairs Officers (RAOs)
   c. Of the total, break-down follows (FAO/PMOS):
      1. W. Europe FAO/Logistics Officer
      2. W. Europe FAO/Logistics Officer
      3. E. Asia RAO/Military Police Officer
      4. S.W. Asia RAO/Assault Amphibian Vehicle Officer
      5. China FAO/Logistics Officer
      6. Latin America FAO/Engineer Officer
      7. Latin America FAO/Intelligence Officer
      8. E. Asia RAO/Infantry Officer
   d. The Marine Corps FY07 Col Selection Board selected 2 FAOs for selection to Col—a MENA FAO, and a Former Soviet Union FAO.

5. **FY07 FAO and RAO Board Selection Results.** MARRADMIN 328/06 (July 06) identified the 10 FAOs and 8 RAOs selected for the program.
   a. FAOs, upon completion of graduate studies at the Naval Postgraduate School, will begin studying the following languages at DLI: Arabic X 3, and Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Russian, Turkish, Indonesian and Tagalog (each X 1).
   b. RAOs, upon completion for 18 months of graduate study at the Naval Postgraduate School, will execute follow-on orders to assignments in or directly related to geographic regions associated with their respective concentrations. RAOs were selected for the following: Former Soviet Union / Eastern Europe X 2, and Western Europe, Latin (Continued on page 12)
NAVY’S FOREIGN AREA OFFICER COMMUNITY IS UNDERWAY!

To enhance Theater Security Cooperation and provide detailed, sound politico-military advice to its operational commanders, Navy launched its Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program as a separate and distinct Restricted Line (RL) community in December 2005. Shifting to a viable and growth-oriented community from an ad-hoc program demonstrates the absolute necessity and enormous emphasis that Navy places in its new cadre of regional specialists.

Selected from the Navy’s mid-grade officer ranks, FAOs are forming a new RL community with its own competitive promotion category and opportunities through Flag rank. The volume of applicants from Line officers and the Staff Corps has been impressive. After the first three Transfer/Re-designation boards Navy will have selected nearly 100 officers out of more than 350 candidates. Navy intends to assess 50 FAOs per year and expand the community to 400 officers by 2015.

FAO selectees are divided into two designator categories: FAO (1710) - those officers who meet all prerequisites, including graduate politico-military (pol-mil) education (or significant overseas experience) and foreign language proficiency; and FAO Under Instruction (1720) – a group comprised of two additional sub-categories, Enhanced FAOs and New Build FAOs. “Enhanced FAOs” are officers who possess graduate pol-mil education (or significant overseas experience) but require foreign language training. “New Build FAOs” are officers with between 8 and 12 years of commissioned service who have superb operational records and exceptional academic potential who will receive both graduate education and language training.

FAO selectees face a comprehensive training pipeline. Those officers requiring a pol-mil graduate degree will attend the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, California. Assigned to the National Security Affairs Department, FAO selectees will specialize in one of four Regional Studies curriculums: Middle East, Africa, and South Asia; Far East, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific; Western Europe or Russia, the former Soviet states, and Eastern Europe; or Western Hemisphere. While at NPS, FAOs Under Instruction will concurrently receive military education, earning credit for the first phase of Joint Professional Military Education. Following graduation, FAO selectees will travel “across town” to complete intense language studies at the Defense Language Institute.

In-country immersion training from one to six months will complete a FAO’s studies. The intent of immersion training is to enhance a FAO’s foreign language proficiency, while absorbing political, military, economic, sociological and cultural aspects of the country and region. No price tag can be placed on this in-country immersion training that will widen the FAO’s perspective of the geo-strategic landscape, with the ultimate objective of providing more accurate and credible advice to the supported military commander or ambassador.

A FAO’s potential impact in the international arena is immeasurable. While promoting national security objectives and the Navy’s “1000 Ship Navy” and Global Maritime Network initiatives, FAOs, in key assignments such as numbered-fleet staff regional specialists, defense and naval attaches, and security assistance or liaison officers, will shape exchanges and interaction with foreign militaries, thereby expanding mutual support and bridging cultural gaps.

The establishment of a full-fledged FAO community in the Navy with a corps of specialized officers with appropriate pol-mil master’s degrees, foreign language proficiency, and regional expertise gained from recurring FAO assignments, will provide the Navy Component and Unified Combatant Commanders, as stated in the Department of Defense Directive 1315.17, “the requisite war fighting capabilities to achieve success on the non-linear battlefields of the future.”
U.S. Army FAO Proponent Office
COL Steven Beal - Div Chief, (703) 692-7371 / DSN 222-7371 Email: daniel.fagundes@hqda.army.mil
MS. Pat Jones - Budget/Resource Manager, (703) 692-7801 / DSN 222-7801, Email: patricia.jones@hqda.army.mil
LTC James Turner - 48C/E Regional Manager, COM 703-693-2198 / DSN 223-2198, Email: james.turner@hqda.army.mil
LTC (P) Vince Moynihan - 48B Regional Manager, COM 703-692-6913 / DSN 222-6913 , Email: vincent.moynihan@hqda.army.mil
LTC Al Rumphrey-48G/J Regional Manager, (703) 614-3027 / DSN 224-3027, Email: arnold.rumphrey@hqda.army.mil
MAJ Brian Lamson - 48D/F/H/I Regional Manager COM 703-614-3026 / DSN 224-3026, Email: brian.lamson@hqda.army.mil
LTC Humberto Rodriquez - FAO Coordinator, Defense Language Institute, (831) 242-6467/DSN 768-6467

U.S. Army FAO Assignments Team, HRC
LTC TJ Moffat- Assgmts Off (COLONELS – 48), (703) 325-2861/DSN 221-2861 EMAIL: Thomas.moffat@hoffman.army.mil
LTC Paul DeCecco — Branch Chief, (703) 325-3153/DSN 221-3153 EMAIL: paul.dececco@hoffman.army.mil
MAJ Jeff Jennette - Assgmts Off (48C, E), (703) 325-3134/DSN 221-3134 EMAIL: jeffrey.jennette@hoffman.army.mil
MAJ Miki Huntington - Assgmts Off (48D, G, H, I), (703) 325-3132/DSN 221-3132, EMAIL: Miki.Huntington@hoffman.army.mil
MAJ Jeff Miller – Assgmts Off (48B,F,J), (703) 325-2755/DSN 221-2755 EMAIL: jeff.rey.miller@hoffman.army.mil
MAJ Brunilda Garcia - HRC-St. Louis FA 48 Manager 314-592-0608 - DSN: 892-0608 FAX: 314-592-0649 - DSN: 892-0650 E-mail brunilda.garcia@us.army.mil
MS. Fran Ware - TRG PLANS (48B, C, H, I), (703) 325-3135/DSN 221-3135 EMAIL: frances.ware@hoffman.army.mil
MS. Aundra Brown - TRG PLANS (48D, E, G), (703) 325-3121/DSN 221-3121 EMAIL: aundra.brown@hoffman.army.mil
Ms. Mary Gathers - Human Resource Specialist (703)325-0159/DSN: 221-0159 FAX: 703-325-6374/DSN: 221-6374 Email: Mary.Gathers@hoffman.army.mil

US Army Reserve FAO Program
COL John D. Blumenson - Asst. Div Chief (DIMA) (408)209-7563 E-mail john.blumenson@us.army.mil

USMC FAO Proponent
PLU: Col Dan Hahne- Branch Head, International Issues Branch EMAIL: daniel.hahne@usmc.mil Phone: (703) 692-4254 or DSN 222-4254
PLU EA: Mr. Tom Braden- Deputy Branch Head, International Issues Branch, (FSU FAO) EMAIL: thomas.c.braden@usmc.mil Phone: (703) 693-1365 or DSN 222-1365
PLU-1: LtCol Jon Foster- PACOM-SE Asia (E. Asia RAO) EMAIL: jonathan.foster@usmc.mil Phone: (703) 692-4346 or DSN 222-4346
PLU-2: LtCol Travis Tebbe- PACOM-NE Asia (Korean FAO) EMAIL: travis.tebbe@usmc.mil Phone: (703) 692-4364 or DSN 222-4364
PLU-3: LtCol Patrick Carroll- CENTCOM (Middle East/North Africa FAO) EMAIL: patrick.carroll1@usmc.mil Phone: (703) 692-4345 or DSN 222-4345
PLU-4: Maj Edel Sanchez- SOUTHCOM/NORTHCOM (Latin America FAO) EMAIL: edel.sanchez@usmc.mil Phone: (703) 692-4344 or DSN 222-4344
PLU-5: Maj Dan Bates- EUCOM -Western Europe, NATO (Turkish FAO) EMAIL: daniel.l.bates@usmc.mil; (703) 692-4367 or DSN 222-4367
PLU-6: Major Mike Barnes- Eastern Europe, Caucasus, Africa and Israel (Russian FAO) EMAIL: michael.w.barnes@usmc.mil Phone: (703) 692-4368 or DSN 222-4368
PLU-7: LtCol Art Collins- Security Cooperation and Programs (E. Europe FAO) EMAIL: arthur.collins@usmc.mil Phone: (703) 692-4341 or DSN 222-4341
PLU-8: Maj Mike Oppenheim- International Affairs Officer Program Coordinator (China FAO) EMAIL: michael.oppenheim@usmc.mil Phone: (703) 692-4365 or DSN 222-4365

USMC Foreign Language Officer:
LtCol Gregory Murray: HQMC, DC (I), IOP EMAIL: Gregory.murray@usmc.mil Phone: (703) 614-1161

US Navy FAO Proponent
CDR Dawn Driesbach, FAO Officer Community Manager 703-697-8761 (primary) 703-693-2394 (alternate) Dawn.Driesbach@navy.mil

US Air Force FAO Proponent
Col Rob Sarnoski, (703) 588-8349 Chief, International Airmen Division
Maj Paul Tombarge, (703) 588-8349 Chief, International Affairs Specialist Branch
Maj J.J. Casey, (703) 588-8321 Chief, International Affairs Specialist Plans and Programs
Capt Regina Cain, (703) 588-8322 Chief, International Affairs Specialist Force Management
Capt James Graham, (703) 588-8346 Chief, Language and Regional Studies Enhancement Programs
https://fao.hq.af.mil
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FAOA
P.O. Box 295
Mt. Vernon, VA. 22121

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