Global Trends and Security Strategies

Local Knowledge: In Iraq, One Officer Uses Cultural Skills to Fight Insurgents

Khomeini’s Writings and Speeches

2005 Readings on Middle East Military and Political Issues

Urban Guerilla Warfare in Latin America
INSIDE THIS ISSUE

ARTICLES

Global Trends and Security Strategies Part 1: Addressing the Threats
Major R. Reed Anderson, USA pg 4

Local Knowledge: In Iraq, One Officer Uses Cultural Skills to Fight Insurgents
Greg Jaffe, The Wall Street Journal pg 12

Khomeini’s Writings and Speeches: The Ideological Foundations of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps
LCDR Youssef Aboul-Enein, USN pg 17

2005 Readings on Middle East Military and Political Issues
LCDR Youssef Aboul-Enein, USN pg 25

Urban Guerilla Warfare in Latin America
Captain Adam Rodgers, USA pg 28

FEATURES

Association Letter from the President pg 3
Service Proponent Notes
Army pg 33
USMC pg 34
It was indeed a great honor to be asked by the FAO Board of Governors to serve as the next president of our association. By way of introduction to those of you who don’t know me, I first entered FAO training in 1975 at Ft. Bragg, then on to Turkish language training at The Presidio of Monterey, in-country training in Turkey, and then an advanced degree in International Affairs from The American University.

What followed were a variety of politico-military and intelligence assignments that were extremely interesting and rewarding. In succession, I served as the A/ARMA in Turkey, the JCS J-5 politico-military planner for Greece and Turkey, the DATT/ARMA in Cyprus, Special Assistant for the eastern Mediterranean to the SACEUR, European Division Chief in the then newly formed Defense HUMINT Service, Chief of the Defense and Foreign Liaison Office, and finally as the DATT/ARMA in Greece. Nearly 18 of my 30 years in the Army were overseas.

The variety of commissions that studied the attack on the United States in September 2001 all agreed, in their own unique way, that we lacked foreign expertise in what I call the “human dimension.” This includes foreign language skills, human intelligence, cultural awareness, and foreign area expertise. As recently as 19 October 2005, former Speaker Newt Gingrich reported to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence that the United States had a “…lack of interrogators, tactical HUMINT teams, translators and analytical support teams. We need the Foreign Area Officers and similar programs to be more aggressively funded/supported and integrated into a wider range of activities/missions (e.g., Information Operations, at division level, etc.).”

There is a growing awareness of the importance of FAOs and their relevance in our long ideological war against a religiously motivated enemy. As FAOs, we can help keep policy makers and commanders appraised of what we bring to the fight and to help secure the funds and support that Speaker Gingrich talked about.

Together with the Board of Governors, we have identified a few objectives for the association over the next year and I solicit your support for the following:

- Develop a stronger bond among FAOs in all Services, active, reserve, and retired.

- Promote FAO professional development and keep individual skills at the highest possible level, and

- Advocate more support and resources for the FAO program, both within the Department of Defense and from the Congress.

In keeping with the first two objectives, your association is planning a luncheon at the Fort McNair Officer’s Club on Wednesday, 22 February 2006. We will have Vice Admiral James G. Stavridis, Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense as the guest speaker to discuss the future of the FAO program, FAO career development and the professional challenges we as FAOs face. You will be getting more information on this event after the first of the year, but for now please mark the date on your calendars.

Again, I am honored to serve as your president and I solicit your participation and advice to strengthen the FAO community and our association. I can be reached by phone at 202-231-5817 or by e-mail at stephen.norton@dia.mil.

Steve was appointed as the Chief, Defense Human Intelligence Management Office in July 2005 and before that was the Senior National Security Advisor to Senator Saxby Chambliss, (R) Georgia.
NOTE: This is Part I of a three-part series entitled “Global Trends and Security Strategies.” Part I discusses current global security threats and how the U.S. and the EU security strategies each address these threats. Part II of this series will discuss how and if the EU is capable of backing its security strategy with its defense forces, and specifically will discuss how, and if, the ESDP can accomplish this important task. Finally, Part III will focus on the role of the U.S. Armed Forces in contemporary Transatlantic security.

Introduction

The world in which we lived a mere 20 years ago is quickly becoming a faded memory. As democracy spreads and the world rapidly evolves into a global society, the type and nature of threats faced by the major states are congruently evolving. The Soviet Union and the spread of communism no longer present themselves as our primary threat. Determining what the emerging threats have been and currently are has been a lesson in adaptation. It is doubtful that anyone could have predicted the scale of the attacks on American soil by terrorists on 11 September 2001. Yet in the absence of a defined enemy, actions like this are what force us to re-evaluate what and where the threats are and the impact they could have on our national security.

Defining a security strategy in an evolving environment is no easy task. Too often it is the actions of the present and past that have determined our national security strategy and associated actions, while emergent indicators of the future are ignored. The attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 is a prime example of how the indicators in the Pacific pointing to imminent threat against the United States were not adequately analyzed and the reality of the European theater, while not necessarily a realistically imminent threat, overshadowed those that were. Today’s primary threats are as much of a concern to the Unites States as they are to Europe, or any part of the world. This paper will therefore analyze the security strategies of the United States and the European Union (herein used to represent the security interests of an inclusive Europe) with the goals, first, to determine if they adequately address the current and emerging threats, and second, to compare the manner by which they address the threats, and potential transatlantic policy and relationship implications.

This paper will argue that both security strategies do indeed address the threats currently perceived as the most dangerous and common not only to individual states, but globally as well. In addition, these threats are essentially consistent with those perceived by the National Intelligence Council (NIC) in Mapping the Global Future. Yet there are some potential gaps in addressing emerging future challenges. The paper proceeds by analyzing the emerging trends as defined by the NIC in their periodic reports on global trends with the intent of identifying the currently perceived threats and how they have evolved as such over the last decade. The paper then analyzes and compares the United States National Security Strategy (USNSS) and the European Security Strategy (ESS). The paper concludes by tying the two analyses together to determine where, if at all, in the USNSS or the ESS there might be inconsistencies in addressing the perceived threats as identified by the NIC.

Analyzing the Global Trends

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and
communism as the preeminent threat to global security, defining the new threats has become obscured. While the NIC Global Trends 2010 saw Russia as a viable player in global security threats, its focus was on three new key threats to global security: internal conflicts, failed states, and globalization. The NIC identified six trends within these key threats.

The first trend is population growth. The analysis here was that an increase in population growth would put an increasing strain on social systems. The threat associated with such strains is that of instability in governments incapable of handling such strains. This is a trend that has carried over through Global Trends 2015 and is defined in Mapping the Global Future as a threat to “good governance”, a concept first introduced in Global Trends 2015 and further developed in Mapping the Global Future. This trend is indeed correctly analyzed as a key aspect in global security that, if not addressed, could create instability and a desire from those adversely affected for retribution against the rich or desire for increasing their wealth via force.

Two additional threats, food and energy supplies, are also a function of population growth and similarly culminated in Mapping the Global Future under the auspices of good governance. Per capita income increase and communications are two separate trends in Global Trends 2010 encompassed into one trend in Global Trends 2015, global economy and globalization. The concerns with globalization are that as incomes rise across the globe via a global market facilitated by rapid communications, there will be those who are left behind for various reasons. This will inherently create a potential for instability as those pariahs seek recourse through force or other forms of action, resulting in strains on the ability of governments to cope with such challenges and subsequently impacting the international balance of power.

A key trend identified in Global Trends 2010 is the disparity between the United States and other states in military technology and deterrence. This is an indicator of the misperception of United States’ global dominance. While this perhaps was indeed a valid perception following the collapse of the Soviet Union, there are indicators that global dominance, particularly in technology and economics, may be shifting east. This will be further elaborated later in the paper. However, what is key is that this trend was perceived in a like manner in Global Trends 2015. It is not until Mapping the Global Future that the potential shift in global dominance is identified by describing the new global players, particularly those in Asia. However, this shift is seen more as an economic shift that will not per se impact the position of the United States as the dominant global actor. Yet I argue that this should indeed alter how the United States approaches its national security, a concept furthered in the conclusion of the paper.

A final key trend, that of future conflict, was identified in Global Trends 2015 and is the beginning of defining the current threats that have been evolving since the break-up of the Soviet Union and the creation of unstable states and regions. Herein, the threats of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), asymmetric threats (including terrorism) and regional instability are identified. These same threats are similarly addressed in Mapping the Global Future as “pervasive insecurity.” It additionally identifies a key fact that the impacts of globalization contribute to the ability of states to govern, depending on how they are able to deal with the strains of globalization.

With the current rise in religious ideology and pervasive insecurity, coupled with globalization and the rise of Asian economies, the dominance of the United States in the global scene is indeed exposed to new and various threats that perhaps may not be addressable via military
dominance. The manner and effectiveness by which the United addresses these issues in this new world will determine if it is able to retain its dominance, or if it becomes more integrated in global politics. Based on the USNSS, the United States assumes it retains its global dominance.

**Analyzing the Security Strategies**

The four big areas identified in the NIC’s latest analysis, *Mapping the Global Future*, which are new global players, globalization, good governance and pervasive insecurity, are indeed incorporated into both the USNSS and the ESS. Yet to get a bigger picture on the strategies and their legitimacy in addressing these threats we now take a closer look.

*The Evolution of the European Security Strategy*

The evolution of the European Security Strategy from Thessaloniki\(^{18}\) to the approved strategy indeed saw some significant changes. I believe a key change was the increased degree of reference to the European Union in the final version. This indicates a move to solidarity in the ESS; a vital move since the ESS is a document supporting the policy and actions of the EU not simply the whole of Europe. This is also an indicator of the need for more EU solidarity and unity of effort following the invasion of Iraq, which acted to split the EU in strategic policy matters.

Another key change was the use of the word preventive in the ESS verses using pre-emption as in the Thessaloniki version. Pre-emption implies an imminent threat, whereas preventive may not indicate as such. Prevention carries implications of the entire spectrum of problem solving, from social and political to culture and economics. Hence, the EU essentially assumes a more inclusive role in international security. I also believe the use of preventive instead of pre-emption was an attempt by the EU to define its strategy positions as separate from those in the USNSS and its demonstrated actions in Iraq that were commonly referred to as pre-emptive. That debate depends on one’s interpretation of the threat of WMD and is beyond the scope of this brief analysis. Yet, by attempting to define its differing strategic views, the EU may have semantically set itself up for a more inclusive and active role often setting itself apart from the United States.

*The United States National Security Strategy and the European Security Strategy*

The USNSS and the ESS are indeed quite similar in many ways. Most importantly, both interpret global threats in a relatively similar manner. While the EU focuses slightly more on soft threats, the difference is really not that significant. What is indeed significant is the means by which each security strategy seeks to achieve its strategic goals. While the EU is focused on international institutions, the rule of law, diplomacy, aid and other soft power methods, the United States is focused on its dominant global role, especially in economic and military terms. Why so different? Reasons for this could be debated, but the key point is that this creates friction with the USNSS methods of acting in the best interest of United States national security. This means using whatever means is most effective at achieving the strategic goals. As the most powerful nation in the world in most, if not every, aspect, the United States typically reverts to the method seen as the greatest threat to its enemies - military power. This is a distinctly realist approach. Yet this does not limit the United States to simply military force. It is just as dedicated to using soft power; in fact it may be more dedicated to soft power following the political turmoil of the Iraq invasion. Only time will tell where that will go. Yet the key issue is the United States’ willingness to use force and the EU abhorrence to the same. What one should take as a point of caution is the dominance of the United States as a global player, and the direction in which this dominance is heading. It appears it could be weakening as the EU gains strength, as Asia grows in powe
and the United States continues to isolate itself in global military actions.

**Detailed Comparison**

*Strategic Objectives.* The objectives of both security strategies are essentially the same. Both seek to promote stability through the spread of democracy and good governance. In so doing, both strategies promote early intervention. Yet the type of intervention is not defined by the ESS in the same detail that it is in the USNSS. This is a reflection of the different approaches to international relations. After centuries of warfare, Europe significantly adjusted its approach to security after World War II, focusing more on international institutions and liberalism instead of militarism. However, due to its position as the dominant actor in global politics, the United States’ approach is a realist approach that seeks to use its dominance to further its goals. In conjunction with its realist approach, the United States leaves its options open for cooperation with other states, leaving an outlet in its security strategy to act alone if necessary.
**Threat Perception.** Where the USNSS and the ESS are essentially consistent with each other is in defining the perceived threats, defined by the NIC in *Mapping the Global Future* as pervasive insecurity. However, there are key points that signify the United States’ self-recognition as the dominant global actor. The first is that the USNSS is more specific in defining regional threats. Is so doing, it takes on a more global aspect, which is a reflection of the terrorism threat that raised its ugly head following the attacks on 11 September 2001. In the ESS, the focus is more of a peripheral approach, looking predominantly to the immediate threats at and permeating through its borders. Additionally, the ESS focuses more on soft threats that could have a more subtle impact on national security (e.g. health and environment).

**Capabilities.** The manner by which the United States and Europe intend to address the threats is where the two security strategies diverge the most. The reason for this is perhaps due to the United States’ military dominance. Its military dominance is not something that evolved with the end of the Cold War and dissolution of the Soviet Union. It came about as other militaries broke apart or weakened while the United States maintained a relative status quo with its military investments and expenditures. Yet the form of its military dominance is perhaps not the most adept at dealing with the current threats. Fighting terrorism and building stable democracies is not accomplished with mechanized forces, yet the United States, until recently, continued to focus on these same forces to meet its objectives. This has led to strategic and political failure in Somalia and turned Kosovo into a prolonged and expensive operation that vaguely met the initial United Nations’ objectives. The EU, on the other hand, is focusing on reforming its forces to be more flexible and able to react to regional and limited global threats. Its challenge, however, is in funding such reform and doing so in an integrated manner within the EU. Until the EU is able to meet its defense force objectives, it will need to rely on NATO via the Berlin Plus agreement to meet its security needs that require the deployment of military forces.

Where the United States needs to focus is on more efficiently training its forces for the missions it is currently and has been carrying out over the last decade. More clearly defining military roles in Phase IV operations, their political role and implications, and training military forces in the tactics, techniques and procedures required for such operations should be the direction of reform within the military forces of the United States.

**International Cooperation.** A key point of divergence between the USNSS and the ESS is their policy on when to intervene. The USNSS retains its right, as it where, to act when and how it deems necessary in order to address threats to national security. Its use of the term preemption has been a key point of controversy for transatlantic relations. However, pre-emption is based on action against an imminent threat. Yet since the EU saw the United States’ pre-emptive action against Iraq in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) as a threat to global stability, it has defined early intervention in a different manner. The ESS uses the term preventive. While the intent of the EU is to use soft power and diplomacy instead of the threat of force, the term preventive is vague and can even refer to a more inclusive action. In addition, the type of preventive action is not defined. The key point, therefore, is that both the EU and the United States will act when and how it deems necessary. The EU will focus on diplomacy and soft power while the United States will use its dominant global position to achieve its goals.
Another key difference is the reliance on international institutions. Both the USNSS and the ESS acknowledge the need for such institutions, but the confidence each has in these institutions is quite different. The United States, for example, supports the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other such institutions at varying degrees of confidence. However, it retains its right to act unilaterally, building coalitions of the willing to address the threats. The EU, on the other hand, relies predominantly on these international organizations. I would argue that this difference is not only a function of Europe’s shift from realism to liberalism following the Second World War, but also due to its generally weaker position militarily compared to the United States.

This position, however, could be evolving to one that is more comprehensive and capable of meeting the unique challenges of European security. This evolution is via a European-internal international institution – the EU. If the EU Constitution is passed, it will create a European Defense Agency that has the potential to fully unite Europe in its defense efforts. In order to effectively apply its security strategy, this is exactly what the EU needs. Yet, the United States is only hesitantly supporting the EU’s efforts in building its defense institutions. Reasons for this may be the NATO relationship through which the United States has exerted its political influence on Europe for the past 60 years and sees an EU defense institution as a threat to its influence. Whatever the reasons, the evolution of the EU’s defense institutions will influence not only the transatlantic relationship, but also how it addresses its threats.

Policy Implications. While the threats identified by both the USNSS and the ESS are relatively the same, the manner by which each intends to address the threats will drive not only national policy, but foreign policy as well. A key point about policy is that the USNSS is more explicit in defining its actions. These give clear guidance as to the direction that the policies of the United States will take in addressing threats. The ESS on the other hand is quite vague and open for interpretation. This is perhaps logical when one considers the political environment of the EU. The ESS must be able to accommodate 25 states. This follows as to why the EU must rely on diplomacy – it must in order to reach a political consensus. However, the EU’s vagueness will create challenges in developing policy to address its threats. While the EU does indeed acknowledge the use of international organizations as a key forum through which to deal with threats, the specific manner will still need to be clarified. This will end up involving a diplomatic process that could take time and cause rifts not only within the EU, but transatlastically as well. This was evident in its handling of the Iraq situation that ended up splitting not only opinions within the EU, but also in subsequent actions of each state. While the United States will also have to clearly define the specifics of its actions, these actions will not rely on the diplomatic process when opposition and differing opinions threaten to derail or delay the achievement of its goals and addressing the threats.

A last aspect for policy is the use of international aid. While the Malthusian decline, a function of globalization, is indeed an issue affecting national security, the ESS does not address associated actions. However, the EU is quite proactive in providing support. The EU just needs to incorporate its actions into its security strategy. Conversely, USNSS addresses Malthusian decline in detail, yet it is clearly not its priority. The key thing to remember here is that when aid is given in whatever form, the recipients must be held accountable for their actions for reform in all aspects: political, economic, social, etc. If this is done, growth is more likely to occur. If not, complacency takes over as states
simply wait for the next round of aid and subsidies. The EU and the United States cannot afford to provide support without political and economic returns from the recipient states. If recipient states are not held accountable, then the donors are simply supporting weak states and sustaining a volatile political and economic environment of potential instability.

**Conclusion: Incongruities and Policy Implications**

The United States is clearly the dominant force in the world today, not only in military power, but also in political influence and economic prowess. Its security strategy is consistent with its dominant position and its ability to influence the global security environment. Its dominant role since the end of the Cold War has set the United States up as a key actor in providing global stability. The EU, on the other hand, assumes the role as political advocate by relying on diplomacy and international institutions to secure peace in a global environment.

Both the United States and the EU have evolved over the last decade just as the security environment has evolved. Yet both have been slow to acknowledge the emerging threats and developing capabilities to address the threats. It was not until the aftermath of Bosnia and Kosovo that the EU legitimately focused on its own security. Developing the ESS is a major and positive first step. The second will be to fully develop its own integrated and fully functioning defense institutions that will provide the capabilities with which to achieve its security strategy goals and objectives. For the United States, it took the attacks on 11 September 2001 to divert its focus away from a Cold War enemy to one of primarily asymmetrical threats. The key point to draw from this is that both the United States and the EU have focused too much on the evolution of the past and on what the present situation is to define its direction. By the time capabilities have been established to address the “present” threats, the security environment has changed. This is why the NIC’s research is essential. It helps to define the threats. While the NIC did indeed identify the potential for asymmetrical threats as early as 1997, the United States was stuck in a Cold War mentality that caught it off guard. While the current security strategies of the United States and the EU are on track for the current threats, one can only wonder if they are adequate for the future. It is hard to say as the future is never clear. Yet there is one key inconsistency that I argue as a significant point of concern, and it relates directly to the NIC’s addressing the new global players and globalization.

A misperception inconsistent with current trends and not adequately addressed in *Mapping the Global Future* is that the United States will remain the dominant actor in all aspects of global relations. Yet, current indicators could be painting a picture quite different from that in *Mapping the Global Future*. In a recent article from *Agence France Presse*, current trends show a declining competitiveness in technology from the United States. Coupled with the Indian “brain drain,” the United States could be seeing its decline in technological and hence economic supremacy. Militarily, the United States may have to face competition with China who recently announced a 16 percent increase in defense spending – something that could increase even more as its economy continues to grow at a rapid pace. While the United States will remain militarily dominant, it could weaken in other areas that are key in a global world. With the growth of Asian economies, it is quite possible that India, China, or other countries could eventually surpass the United States in technological and/or economic dominance. While the impact this could have on its dominant role in global politics
and economy is very difficult to near impossible to predict, I would argue that there are two key factors that, should they occur, the United States’ attitude of dominance could lead it down a road of vulnerability. The first is the rise of the new global powers in Asia that could weaken the United States’ global economic dominance. Couple this with the EU emphasis on diplomacy, the United States could find itself isolated as it continues to focus on unilateralism. This could lead to setting the conditions where adversaries are able to unite in their efforts to thwart United States’ military dominance. This could mean that the USNSS’s emphasis on unilateral action could be misplaced. It should be noted, however, that even if the United States’ position of global dominance is weakened, it will still remain a major player in global politics.

In order for the United States to remain dominant and avoid a position of compromising envy, it should rely more on diplomacy and more fully integrate itself into international institutions. It should also focus on retaining the competitive edge and look to more fully integrate its technology sharing with those states rapidly progressing. The bottom line is that the United States should still speak softly and carry a big stick, with the soft speaking referring to global diplomacy and its big stick referring its military dominance and its associated potentials for action when well-essayed diplomacy fails.

Endnotes


4 For an illustrative analysis of evolving threats, refer to Appendix A: Threat Evolution Over the Last Decade


8 Ibid., pages 10-11.

9 Mapping the Global Future, page 73.

10 Ibid.

11 Global Trends 2010, pages 4-5.


16 Global Trends 2015, pages 11-12.


20 Even without passing, which after the French and Dutch “No” votes is a possibility, efforts in the defense realm are developing and will mostly likely continue to develop.

21 This concern is only mentioned in passing on page 112 and not fully analyzed for further policy implications.


Local Knowledge: In Iraq, One Officer Uses Cultural Skills to Fight Insurgents
By Greg Jaffe, Staff Reporter of The Wall Street Journal

This article reprinted from the 15 November 2005 edition of the Wall Street Journal with the generous permission of the Wall Street Journal and the Dow Jones & Company, Inc. David, the subject of this article, is a member of the Foreign Area Officer Association.

MOSUL, Iraq -- Last summer, two dozen U.S. Army Rangers headed for the Iraq-Syria border to figure out how foreign fighters were slipping through western Iraq's barren deserts.

As they had done in the past, the Rangers took positions around each village and Bedouin encampment. At one village, an officer named David, accompanied by a small security team, strode into the center looking for someone who would talk. Unlike the clean-shaven, camouflage-clad Rangers, David wore a thick goatee and civilian clothes. The Rangers carried long, black M-4 carbine rifles. David walked with a small 9mm pistol strapped to his leg. The Rangers spoke English. He spoke Arabic tinged with a Yemeni accent.

As he recounts the day, David met a woman with facial tattoos that marked her as her husband's property. As they chatted, the pale-skinned, sandy-haired North Carolina native imitated her dry, throaty way of speaking. "You are Bedu, too," she exclaimed with delight, he recalls.

From her and the other Bedouins, the 37-year-old officer learned that most of the cross-border smuggling was carried out by Shamar tribesmen who peddle cigarettes, sheep and gasoline. Radical Islamists were using the same routes to move people, guns and money. Many of the paths were marked with small piles of bleached rocks that were identical to those David had seen a year earlier while serving in Yemen.

Col. H.R. McMaster, who oversees troops in northwestern Iraq, says David's reports allowed his regiment to "focus our reconnaissance assets upon arrival" in Iraq's vast western desert last summer and immediately begin to intercept smugglers.

David is part of a small cadre of cultural experts in the Army known as foreign-area officers. The military would only allow him to be interviewed on the grounds that his last name and rank be withheld. U.S. officials say he'll be spending the rest of his career in the Middle East, often operating alone in potentially hostile territory. Naming him, they say, would make him more vulnerable to attack.

His colleagues in Iraq say his presence has been invaluable. "We ought to have one of these guys assigned to every [regional] commander in Iraq," says Col. John Bayer, chief of staff for Maj. Gen. David Rodriguez, the commander of U.S. forces in the northern third of the country. "I'd love to say 'assign me 100 of these guys.'"

That's not happening. Instead, the military is pulling David out of Iraq later this month along with seven other officers who make up his unit. Before the end of the year, David will resume his previous post in Yemen.

The decision to disband the Iraq unit is part of a continuing debate within the Pentagon about how best to fight unconventional wars that don't lend themselves to the Army's traditional reliance on firepower and technology. The issue: How should the Army use officers who specialize in accumulating historical, political and cultural knowledge.
Earlier this fall, the U.S. embassy and the military’s main headquarters in Baghdad concluded that the work of David and his colleagues was duplicating the efforts of other personnel. David’s team is part of the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency. It was sent to Iraq to advise U.S. military and State Department officials.

"While it’s regrettable to lose experienced people, overall there are many more Arabic speakers working for us [in Iraq] than you might think," says one U.S. embassy official in Mosul.

To some in the Defense Department, the foreign-area teams offer a model for how all types of future officers should be trained. A report approved by then-Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz in January, specifically ordered the military to beef up its linguistic and cultural capabilities.

"Language skill and regional expertise have not been regarded as warfighting skills and are not sufficiently incorporated" into war plans, the report concluded.

In Iraq, cultural misunderstandings have contributed to mistakes. The decision to disband the Iraqi Army, which the U.S. saw as a tool of Saddam Hussein and a symbol of oppressions, created ill-will among Iraqi soldiers, who saw it as a source of national pride and pensions. As they battled an insurgency, U.S. commanders also struggled to understand Iraq’s deep tribal and sectarian divisions. American officers working with Iraq’s fledgling security forces frequently complain that police officers and soldiers sometimes put tribal allegiances ahead of their duty as officers.

'A Cold War Mindset'

Col. John D’Agostino, who oversees David and his colleagues and has also been recalled, says he disagrees with the decision to close the Iraq foreign-area officer unit. He says these officers are often overlooked, for which he blames "a Cold War mindset in which we are still fighting the hordes in Eastern Europe." When David leaves, the U.S. embassy’s regional office in Mosul won’t have a single Arabic speaker or Middle East expert on its staff.

In total, there are currently about 1,000 foreign-area officers in the Army. Currently, 145 of them specialize in the Middle East, the fourth-largest number devoted to a single region. The biggest concentration is in Europe. Typically, they spend big chunks of their careers working as the military’s eyes and ears in remote and dangerous outposts. They coordinate military exercises and gather intelligence about the forces in their region. "They operate at the ends of the earth," says retired Col. Jack Dees, a longtime foreign area officer. "Often they are the one military guy out there representing their nation."

David decided he wanted to be a foreign-area officer even before he graduated from the United States Military Academy at West Point because he wanted to live overseas. He grew up in rural North Carolina, shuttling between an orphanage and several foster homes after he was taken away from his parents by the state. He chose West Point because it was free. "I was also looking for a sense of family and belonging...you know, all that psycho-babble stuff," David says today.

After commissioning as an officer, he flew Apache attack helicopters for a decade, in Iraq and along the border between North and South Korea. He then spent six months in Bosnia as the American liaison officer on a French division staff. In 1999, as soon as he was eligible, David applied to become a foreign-area officer.

The military dispatched him to Morocco where he spent part of his time coordinating U.S.-Moroccan military exercises. His main job was to travel the region and learn about its culture and people.
On returning to the U.S. in 2001, David spent 18 months learning Arabic at the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, Calif. He then earned a master's degree in Arabic studies from Georgetown University, focusing on the co-existence of Yemen's tribal culture with its fledgling democratic institutions.

In preparation for a position at the U.S. embassy in Yemen, he learned all he could about qat, a narcotic leaf that's chewed in the region. He says he's never actually chewed it -- an act that would get him bounced from the Army -- but he quickly developed an ability to talk about it.

"The three books you have to read are: 'The Flowers of Paradise: The Institutional Uses of Qat in North Yemen'; 'Qat in Yemen: Consumption and Social Change'; and 'Eating the Flower of Paradise: One Man's Journey Through Ethiopia and Yemen,' " he says.

This knowledge allowed him to initiate conversations when nothing else worked. By the end of his two-year tour in the country, he could talk fervently about qat's cultivation, its aphrodisiac qualities and its price fluctuations.

David's mission was to keep senior U.S. military officials abreast of what was going on in Yemen, Osama bin Laden's ancestral home, specifically within its military. He traveled extensively, building a network of contacts with tribal leaders who would ensure safe passage through their areas. He became legendary for hosting elite receptions at his home in the capital Sana where he gathered gossip and information. Yemenis worth talking to wouldn't set foot in the U.S. embassy for fear of being labeled imperialist lackeys. David's house had a lower profile.

When Gen. John Abizaid, the top U.S. commander in the Middle East, visited Yemen in January 2004, David set up a dinner with its political elites as well as military attachés from Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan. They discussed elections in Iraq and smoked cigars on David's back porch. Gen. Abizaid's staff confirms the event took place.

David's biggest coup was convincing Sana's most-important sheik to attend one of his receptions. "He brought his wife and daughter, which was huge because they never take their women anywhere," David says. The sheik, Abdullah Mohammed Abdullah Al-Thor, says in an interview he attended several events at David's house and that the officer is a "very, very good friend."

**Posted to Iraq**

In May, after two years in Yemen, David was dispatched to Mosul. His role was to help senior commanders build relationships with Iraqis the U.S. would be able to trust in advance of any reduction in the U.S. military presence. "If things are going bad, it is my responsibility to know who we should call," he says.

In Iraq, he prepped Gen. Rodriguez, the chief of staff for northern Iraq, for meetings with senior Iraqi leaders. He also gave State Department employees extensive tutorials. The current State Department staffers in the Mosul office, who cover most of northern Iraq, are South America and Asia experts. A key lesson involved the proper etiquette of arguing with Arabs. David goaded the diplomats to be less diplomatic. When Arabs yelled, David told them to yell back.

One recent day, David sat down with a Foreign Service civilian who had arrived from Santiago, Chile. He started by explaining how one became a sheik and that not all sheiks are equal. He briefed him on the major ethnic groups and political parties in the region.

After two hours the State Department official seemed lost. "How do you keep all this stuff straight in your head?" he asked.
David discovered that many of the U.S. interpreters, including that of Gen. Rodriguez, spoke poor Arabic because the people doing the hiring didn't speak the language. "When Gen. Rodriguez spoke he was articulate. His interpreter made him sound like an eighth grader," David says.

The general's interpreter was re-assigned and David began screening new hires. A few weeks later, he figured out that one interpreter -- who had access to intelligence about U.S. operations -- had lied about his background. The tip-off: The interpreter said he was from Suleimaniya in northern Iraq. Based on the Kurdish dialect he spoke, David could tell he was from a village outside Mosul. "We don't know his agenda; we just know he was deceitful," says an intelligence officer who works with David. The interpreter was fired.

David made his biggest impact supporting the 8,000 U.S. and Iraqi troops who assaulted Tal Afar, a city in northwestern Iraq that had become a major insurgent haven. In 2004, the U.S. tried to drive insurgents from the city. The operation was a disaster. Two days into the assault, Turkey, which has historic ties to the Sunnis in the city, complained publicly to U.S. authorities in Ankara and Washington that the attack was too heavy-handed. Turkey threatened to close a border crossing with Iraq through which more than 30% of Iraq's gasoline moves. The U.S. abruptly halted the attack after two days.

Before a renewed attack this September, David, working with officials at the U.S. embassy in Ankara, hatched a plan to placate the Turks. Each night, after traveling through the area, he emailed photos with a time, date and GPS stamp to the U.S. embassy in Ankara. He also sent along the U.S. military's major-incident reports. That allowed the embassy to give Turkish military officials meticulous daily briefings.

Turkey's foreign minister complained about the attack in a meeting with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, but didn't ask the U.S. to call it off, says a U.S. official in Ankara.

David's biggest contribution in Tal Afar drew on virtually all of the skills he had amassed in five years as a foreign-area officer and a close friendship he'd forged with the city's mayor.

Three months before the attack on Tal Afar, U.S. and Iraq officials had installed Najem Abdullah, a senior official from nearby Mosul, to run the city. During his brief tenure, the Sunni mayor earned the grudging support of Tal Afar's warring Sunnis and Shiites. Without him, U.S. commanders feared Tal Afar would slip into all-out war.

Helping the Mayor

David and Mayor Najem had become close in the weeks leading up to the invasion. David teased him about his purple-tinted, rhinestone-encrusted sunglasses. He stood with him in tougher times as well. When Shiite sheiks, through their allies in the police, physically blocked key Sunni sheiks from attending a meeting, David stormed out, earning the mayor's respect.

"I consider David like an Iraqi in the city," Mayor Najem says today. "When he discusses things with the tribal leaders he does it like an Iraqi. He raises his voice. He is passionate just like the Iraqis."

In early September, as U.S. and Iraqi forces readied their second assault on Tal Afar, the mayor began to doubt whether he could continue in the job. The pressure of running the divided city had become unbearable. Death threats from Sunni extremists forced the mayor's family to flee their home. The Sunni mayor worried that Tal Afar's Shiite-led police would use the invasion to settle scores with Sunnis.
Midway through rancorous meetings in the mayor's office, the two men stepped out into a dimly lit side room. "Why should I stay here? What is the point?" Mayor Najem recalls asking David.

In this moment of doubt, David and the 49-year-old Iraqi held hands -- a common sign of affection among Arab men. David promised to move the mayor's wife and children to a new city. (They're currently in hiding.) He also pledged to make sure that U.S. commanders acted on the mayor's concerns about the city's Shiite security forces.

"David talked to me as a friend and a brother and convinced me to stay," the mayor says. "He is like Lawrence of Arabia."

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Khomeini’s Writings and Speeches:  
The Ideological Foundation of the  
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps  

By LCDR Youssef Aboul-Enein, MSC, USN

Introduction

With U.S. forces engaged in Iraq, an element of the population represented by Shiite cleric Moqtada Al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army is looking to establish a form of theocracy modeled after post-revolution Iran. Moqtada Al-Sadr vows to keep fighting coalition forces, and no doubt has Khomeini’s books and writings in his library to refer to as he addresses the shape and content of an Islamic government Al-Sadr wishes to establish in Iraq. (Awkward- what is the significance of this statement?). To understand the core ideology of clerics like Al-Sadr and even the more rational Ayatollah Al-Sistani, who heads the Iraqi Hawza (The Iraqi Shiite Clerical Hierarchy), one cannot ignore Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s precedents, speeches and writings. Teheran’s clandestine influence upon Iraq’s Shiite centers and population also makes Khomeini worth discovering. The Shiite centers of Basra, Najaf and Karballah were an obsession for Iranian forces battling Saddam’s divisions in the Iran-Iraq War. If the US is to succeed in Iraq, it is of paramount importance that Middle East Foreign Area Officers re-discover Khomeini’s political and theological theories.

It is easy to dismiss Khomeini’s rhetoric as fiery and radical, which it was, but listen carefully and you will begin to understand the concepts, context and complexity of combining democracy, Greek classics, Marxism and even the German philosopher Nietzsche in Khomeini’s words. This depth should come as no surprise, since Khomeini surrounded himself with well-read men of religion. Khomeini even borrowed from anti-Shah Iranian political philosophers who would today probably be imprisoned, or perhaps worse. One such notable in Iranian political thought is Dr. Ali Shariati, whose writings in the late sixties and late seventies focused on the construction of the Iranian (Shiite) revolutionary self. For the first time, the Shiite’s revered Hussein (son of Ali, the cousin of the Prophet Muhammad), who is considered an ultimate martyr from his death in the plains of Karballah, is not treated as simply a martyr. Rather, he is characterized as a revolutionary who attempted to deal with an unjust order. Hussein as a revolutionary was exactly the type of message that Khomeini could seize upon. It is noteworthy that Dr. Shariati, who wrote from exile in London and was persecuted by the Shah, was looking to create an Iranian-style democracy, but he understood that Shiite Islam could not be divorced from the character of Iran. Shariati sought to revolutionize Iran not through Marxism or military coup, but through the natural character of the masses. Being a sociologist commentator, he could not operationalize his vision and instead became the patron saint of the Iranian Islamic revolution, dying before seeing Khomeini’s successful toppling of the Shah in 1979.

This essay will include excerpts of Khomeini’s speeches published and translated from Persian to Arabic. These words of Khomeini were targeted for Arab audiences specifically, which in and of itself represents an interesting study, since they represent his attempt to influence Arab and Muslim public opinion and revolutionary thought. A new generation of radicals, including Hizb’allah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps are now being influenced by this compendium of Islamist (Shiite) revolutionary
thought. Khomeini’s discourse forms the ideological basis of the hard-line conservative clergy who govern Iran and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC – the real military power in today’s Iran). His writing is also important because it is his incitement and rabid anti-western rhetoric that begins to explain why Islamic fascists and militants have such a zealous hatred of the United States.

Khomeini’s Islamic Opinion on Monarchy

One part of the problem in the Middle East is the lack of political legitimacy of many of its leaders, which leaves the region susceptible to Islamic militants, Marxists and Arab Nationalists (e.g., Baathists) offering slogans and not real institutional governance. Khomeini gave a pivotal speech in October 1971, during the 2,500th anniversary of Persian monarchial rule at the ruins Persepolis. The Shah had spent $100 million, giving a lavish party in the ruins of Persipolis, which magnified the Iranian masses feelings of distance and impoverishment. The Iranian Revolution, although a little less than eight years away, was in the wind, as Khomeini says:

“The Prophet, Peace Be Upon Him (PBUH) says that (the title) King of Kings otherwise known as Shah-in-Shah (a title used by Reza Shah) is the most hateful titles to God Most High. Islam is not compatible to the regime of the Shah-in-Shah and all those aware and observe the regime know that Islam came to tear down all palaces of the oppressive Shah-in-Shah, and the Shah-in-Shah is the biggest regime that is hateful and regressive. (1)”

This speech can also be applied to monarchs in the Persian Gulf and single-person rulers in the region. Perhaps the most important aspect of this 1971 speech by Khomeini is his definition of the ultimate catastrophic event in Islamic history. It merges anti-monarchy with Shiite historical victimhood, and the murder of the Prophet Muhammad’s descendant through his cousin Ali. Khomeini says:

“The biggest catastrophe in Islam is the deprivation of Ali from governing (the Muslim Community), this is the reason that Islamic governance was substituted for a monarchial one… this catastrophe is larger than Karbullah and what happened to the lord of martyrs (reference to Hussein, Ali’s son). (2)”

This clever use of powerful images strikes a cord on Shiite Muslims in particular, but also many Sunni Muslims, who until then viewed the death of Hussein not as catastrophic, but as a tragedy. Khomeini uses such historical symbolism to explain the problems the Muslim world is facing in the 20th century.

Khomeini never passed up a chance to issue communiqués during Shiite religious observances like Ashura or Islamic holidays like Ramadan. He also closely followed events in Iran, such as when the Shah formed his own political party in 1975. Khomeini’s message read:

“The Shah talks about the constitution and the basic law, when he is in effect the chief enemy of this basic law and constitution, he has suppressed the very essence of the constitution. (3)”

In Ramadan 1973 (during the outbreak of the 1973 Yom-Kippur War), Khomeini issued a message to the Iranian people through cassette tapes smuggled into the country, saying:

“This Shah who has surrendered Iran’s petroleum to the enemies of humanity and Islam for use to kill brave Muslims and Arabs…. It (Iran) acts as a barrier for those nations wanting to use the oil weapon against America (4).”
Khomeini religiosely demonizes the Shah, always pegging the Iranian monarch’s excesses against the message of social justice emphasized by early Islam. In the same speech he recorded for the 1971 festivities in Persepolis, as foreign dignitaries feasted for a week, Khomeini incites the Iranian masses that he calls Mustadaafeen (the downtrodden), saying:

“Kings follow their primal instincts. Their enjoyment is like that of animals, eating and pleasuring themselves without thought as to where these pleasures are derived? Are they permitted or forbidden (in Islam)? His enjoyment comes from the sweat and toil of the Ummah (the Muslim Community) (5)."

Note the Ayatollah combining Islamic with almost Marxist-like disdain for the rich who feed off the poor masses. Reading Khomeini’s speeches, one gains the sense that he has read Marx, Hegel and even the Greek Classics. Khomeini’s concept of vilayet-e-faqih, the supreme religious jurisprudent involving a select few Ayatollahs guiding the moral course of Iran, is eerily similar to Plato’s Republic and the Greek philosopher’s concept of the philosopher-kings whose mission was to direct the moral course of his fictitious Utopia.

**Khomeini’s Opinions on the American Presence in Iran**

Khomeini strived to undermine America’s policies, which focused on bolstering the Shah as the regional peacekeeper in the Gulf and the bulwark against communism to the north. This old cleric, who at first glance seems to step out of the seventh century, understood the desires of Washington. In Ramadan of 1974, Khomeini seized on the presence of U.S. advisors and trainers in Iran, saying:

“I fear a danger against Islam from the servant of America, the slave (referring to the Shah) who does not question (orders).”

When the United States and Iran concluded a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) during the administration of President Lyndon Johnson, U.S. advisors entered to train Iran’s armed forces and coordinate the Shah’s massive arms purchases. Khomeini barely conceals his hatred of the United States with the following remarks:

“They (the Shah and Majlis or parliament) have made the Iranian people less than American dogs (in their scale of oppression). If one (an Iranian) steps upon an American dog, they will not be exempt from punishment. Even the Shah of Iran, if he stomps on an American dog, he will not be exempted from being held to account and if an American cook steps on the Shah-in-Shah, no one has the right to seek redress.”

Khomeini’s tapes and discussions reached Iran from his exile in Iraq. It would be helpful here to note that he is in Iraq at the time. He cleverly focuses on the revolutionary movements around the world that are bringing freedom to Africa and Asia, yet Iran, with a 2,500 year civilization, is unable to gain its freedom. To the masses that are unlearned and do not understand the intricacies of Africa’s revolutions, some of which were coordinated with the colonial power to avoid a complete collapse of the newly independent nation, these words are believed in the streets. Iranians did not see the direct benefits of modern management and western techniques. For instance, the oil industry in their country was almost entirely run by British, European and American technicians. Khomeini notes in a speech that security is an obligation for the American technician, mechanic and cook and, as for the Islamic scholar and servants of Islam, it is their obligation to be in prison or in camps.

Khomeini’s speeches and pamphlets were mainly in Persian and Arabic. His important book, *Islamic Governance*, was published in 1969 and could be found only in these two languages until after the Iranian Revolution. As one ex-
plores his collection of writings, one cannot help but wonder who in the United States was monitoring these speeches and sermons before the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Khomeini would be in Turkey, then Najaf, Iraq from 1969 to 1975, and then to the outskirts of Paris during the final four years before his return to Iran. He mixes Islam and Iranian nationalism to foment instability on the streets. Khomeini says:

“My God, this government (the Iranian monarchy) has betrayed our national rights, on the rights of Islam and the rights of the Quran, the parliamentarians who agreed to this decision have committed treason… … the entire world knows these are not the lawmakers of Iran and if they are such then I (the religious establishment) have isolated them (from our society). They are excommunicated from the legislative body and all legislation they have endorsed is considered void (5).”

Note that Khomeini as other Islamic radical ideologues never spends time explaining exactly how this is a violation of the Quran. Debate is not encouraged, just slogans. As he continues his remarks, he says:

“*The Umma (Islamic Community) is responsible to raise its voice (in opposition) and ask why did you commit this act? Why did you sell us? You are not representatives to us and even if you would remain you are traitors to us and we shall remove you from the legislature (6).”*

Today, it is easy to take for granted that the Arab world is saturated with satellite television and the Arab news network Al-Jazeera. But in Khomeini’s days, his cassettes and criticism of the Nuwab (lower legislature) and Majlis (the parliament) were new and offered an exciting aspect of political discourse unknown to the Iranian masses of the seventies. In the streets, the fiery debates within the Majlis were ignored and the masses did not connect with the political intelligentsia whose criticisms were confined to the classrooms and upper middle class gatherings. This cleric, who spent a lifetime opposing the Shah through cassette tapes, cheap pamphlets and grassroots organizations in Iran and abroad, was gaining results. In many respects, the Iranians were getting a civics lesson from a theologian, not a lawyer or elected official.

**Khomeini and His Battle with the Mullahs**

The Shah, and in particular his internal security service known as SAVAK, had a few ayatollahs and mullahs on their payroll. These religious figures published books and manipulated media programs in Iranian television featuring pro-monarchy religious leaders on the airwaves. Iran’s monarchy understood that this would be a war of ideas as much as it would be through exiles and political suppression.

“If only the Muslim Umma (the global Muslim community) understood the principles of the Quran and comprehended the heavy responsibility of the *Ulama* (the religious establishment), the false religious jurists will fall and those clerics truly in touch with society (will flourish). If the establishment, the (security) apparatus and false men of religion falls in society, then they will not be able to deceive the people and do the bidding of the imperialists (7).”

It is notable that the powerful clerical establishment, led by hard-liners like the current Supreme Leader of Iran Ali Khamenei, is in essence betraying one of Ayatollah Khomeini’s cardinal remarks: “*The Faqih (Islamic jurist) who focuses on collecting the people’s money and material things of this world cannot be a trusted steward of God’s laws and an executor of those laws (8).”*

Today, the mullahs cannot divorce themselves from the profits, power and money made during their Revolution. Some Ayatollahs were punished for this corruption, like Khomeini’s confidante, Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazari, who was placed under house arrest for bringing to light the corrosive aspects of power on the religious mission of the ulama.
Khomeini also casts dispersions on those senior clerics supported by the Shah. According to him, they cease to become scholars and are political tools, as he says:

“Those who join this apparatus are filled with lust (desires), no more. The Iranian people view them with contempt, just as those who preserve God’s laws view them with contempt.” The overall text that this excerpt came from is significant as it was crafted and delivered for the Muslim Student Union of North America and Canada and designed to form a constituency in free democracies that could freely direct criticism at the Shah. This same tactic would be employed less than two decades later by Abdullah Azzam, one of Usama Bin Laden’s spiritual guides. Azzam brought Sunni Islamic militants to the United States to recruit terrorists, finance operations, and organize conferences in the United States during the last two to three years of the Soviet-Afghan War. Khomeini discovered early on, as did Azzam, that free democracies were an excellent location to fundraise, procure equipment and organize conferences away from the prying eyes of the repressive police and intelligence apparatus of the Middle East.

Khomeini on Imperialism, Israel and the United States

Ayatollah Khomeini has never made his hatred of the United States a secret, and his reference to imperialists paints a wide brush that encompasses America, Europe and Israel. Specific anti-American references include:

“All our calamities and all our problems are from America and all our calamities and all our problems are from Israel. Those particular nu-wab (parliamentarians), ministers are from (agents of) America, all hired to oppress this poor nation further. Iran’s economy is in the hands of America and Israel. Iranian markets are outside the hands of Muslim merchants.” In another speech, he remarks how Israel and the United States have turned Iran into their own base of operations. He also devotes a great deal of time discussing Israel as a creation designed to weaken and divide Muslims. One of his more dangerous remarks advocates halting renovations to the Al-Aqsa Mosque (Dome of the Rock Mosque in Jerusalem) until Palestinian land is liberated, so that the dilapidated state of Islam’s third holiest shrine can serve as a constant reminder of the need to destroy Israel.

Khomeini combines the concepts of freedom, religion, and Marxism that easily entices those in Iran who are not well read. He lambastes class imperialists, saying:

“The imperialists do not allow the establishment of a single leader in Iran’s secular and Islamic Universities because they fear the ideas of Iranian men. The singular person who opposes them ideologically is the threat to their existence.”

“As long as the Muslim Umma is tied with these secular institutions and continues to compare secular and divine law, they will not see the face of tranquility and freedom...they (the Iranian regime) wish to distance us from the freedoms present in the Quran.” Khomeini does not explain what he means by “freedoms present in the Quran” and in today’s Iran, ideas are suppressed in favor of blind obedience to the faqih (Islamic jurist), including dissent among Muslim faqihs. This is because Khomeini’s message is primarily to the masses who thrive on his slogans and look to Khomeini as a means of holding the Shah accountable, a duty the Majlis (parliament) is incapable of performing.

Khomeini’s remarks, like Islamic militants today, seize on the image of America and the west as a decadent culture by relying on mass media as their source. He charges imperialism with poisoning the thinking of Iranian youth, of organizing and directing Iran’s intellectual programs and organizing the mass-media of the country. It is a great irony that all of these charges levied by the late Ayatollah are things he
coveted for his own government and are currently being implemented in the Islamic Republic today.

Amazingly, Khomeini blames the exacerbation of the Shiite and Sunni schism on imperialism. Yet this is a schism that goes back centuries, when Sunni Ottomans battled Shiite Safavids until the nineteenth century. Khomeini himself capitalized on the Shiite/Sunni schism when he and Saddam Hussein engaged in an eight-year battle during the Iran-Iraq War, employing the rhetoric of this historic divide.

The Goals of Khomeini’s Revolution

If Khomeini’s goals could be summarized from his book Islamic Governance, they would be Islam, independence of Iranian independence, expulsion of Israeli agents, and unity with Islamic nations. He makes the argument that Muslims are responsible for the preservation of Islam and this obligation is more important than prayer. His program is the unity of the Islamic world, unity of Islamic nations against Zionism, Israel and imperialists who steal the treasures of Iran. He ties into this vision discussions on martyrdom, noting that the blood of Iranians is not as valuable as the Imam Hussein.

He also constructs a series of remarks in support of clerics fomenting anti-Shah activities in Iran. Khomeini encourages Iran’s mullahs to say:

“Outside powers must not interfere with the resources of this nation; it is vital that the Umma elect the nuwab of parliament; The people and men of faith need to be instigators of matters involving Iranian nationalism; Should preserve freedom of the press (13).”

Khomeini captures his list of grievances that bolsters the argument of men of religion being the check against the monarch’s excesses. “If only men of religion were empowered, then they would not permit (14):

this nation’s enslavement by England then America; Israeli dominance of Iran’s economy; Israeli goods to be sold in Iran without taxation; the oil concession to be given away; the corrupt use of the public treasury; a monarchy that does what is pleases, even when its is 100 percent against the interest of the Iranian people; American agents to act on behalf of the monarchy and encourage their expulsion.”

Khomeini’s Definition of an Islamic Government

The most elusive and debatable concept in Islam is determining what constitutes an Islamic government. The Prophet Muhammad left no clear guidance on how Muslims should govern themselves, and the main focus after his death was to recreate a society based on the values he had left behind. Muslims resorted to the caliphate, a system that pre-dated Islam and offered a means in which tribal elders selected an urban ruler based on consensus. Most Muslims agreed with the idea of the caliphate, but a few felt that Muhammad’s descendants, namely his cousin Ali bin Abu-Talib, should succeed him. If an Islamic government is defined as Wahabi, as in Saudi Arabia today, it has no room for other Islamic madhabs (schools of thought) and Shiite Muslims. In Iran, Shiites come in different varieties (usuli, akhbari, twelvers and sevener to name a few), yet what dominates Iran is usuli, twelver form of Shiite Islam.

This means that a singular form of Islam, be it the Afghan Taliban Deoband-Wahabi Islam or Iran’s official Shiite Islam, isolates a majority of Muslims who make a dizzying collection of thought, discipline and theological interpretations.
Let us look at Khomeini’s vision of an Islamic state:

“Islamic government is the government of Shariah (Islamic law), none rules, the Shariah rules. The Shariah are divine laws that govern mankind and Islamic governments, it is taken from the principles of Muhammad (PBUH), the Caliphs and certain known (just) personages (14).”

“The reason for the revelation of the Shariah is to constitute a government, not in the image of an empire (15).”

“Our Muslim leader is a person who is in the mosque, issues rulings and cultivates the moral of the army. If a stranger entered the Mosque of Muhammad, the prophet was indistinguishable from the other Muslims (there in prayer)(16).”

Khomeini wrote an entire book on the subject of Islamic government, a concept that is alien and difficult to quantify among Islamic thinkers since the Prophet Muhammad left no clear guidance on how Muslims should govern themselves. Khomeini paints an image of how the fourth Caliph Ali ruled, writing:

“The Commander of the Faithful Ali governed an region of such vastness, encompassing Iran, Egypt and the Hejaz (the Red Sea Coast of Arabia), he had agents in Kurman, Ahvaz, Khurasan and Basra, he lived a meager existence that a poor student today could not exist on… and if the Islamic government remained as it was then, the oppression, transgression, and lust for the forbidden would not have come to pass, all this originates first from the leaders, they are the ones that cross into the dens of degradation, lust and corruption (17).”

He does not tie how early Muslims govern, and when forced in his thesis to elaborate on the structure of an Islamic government, he writes in terms that may be familiar to a liberal democrat, such as preserving security and justice for all. Khomeini adds an Islamist spin, emphasizing, “we must form a government that preserves the security of people, one that has the trust of the people, one which they can trust to surrender their concerns… …the goal in Islam is the formation of a strong government based on the Shariah (Islamic Law), and the supremacy of the Shariah, even if this umma (community) lives on wheat bread in the shadow of a just government is better than living in palaces and entertainment while losing freedom and security (18).” It is also useful that the concept of freedom in the Middle East tends to be associated with justice, not liberty (as it is in western democracies), a psychology Khomeini understood and exploited.

Perhaps his most insightful speech advocating Islamic Law as a form governance without explaining that it would be he who would interpret the law and therefore create a theocracy was during a Hajj (Pilgrimage) speech given in 1963. In this speech, Khomeini declares that an Islamic ruler must be a Faqih (Islamic jurist) immersed in the understanding of Islamic law; this is his clearest statement of his intent to establish a theocracy (19).

Conclusion

Khomeini left a copious amount of speeches, writings and papers that need to be rediscovered as a basis for Shiite extremism and as inspiration for those Muslims aspiring to a theocracy. The most rationale challenge to the concept of the Islamic state is that Muslims are varied in their practice representing Shiites and Sunnis, within those two there are Hanbali, Shafei, Maliki, Hanafi, Jaafari, Usuli, and Akhbari . . . the list goes on. The only way to balance this diversity is through a secular democracy.

Khomeini’s writings also demonstrate the elaborate grassroots machine he created in exile. From reaching out to Muslim student associations to encouraging clergy to use the Hajj (Pilgrimage) as a means of exchanging views on salvation of
the Muslim community, Khomeini developed a first-class psychological operations campaign. He monitored major events in Iran and also Islamic observances, never missing a chance to criticize the Shah. In weakening the Majlis and its two dominant political parties, the Shah weakened Iran’s institutions, reducing the legislature to its nickname on Iran’s streets as: “Yes and Yes, Sir !!. (20)” The Ayatollah also allied himself with secular leftists in France, only to drop them during the first year of civil disorder which Iran was thrown into following the fall of the Shah.

The best translation of Khomeini’s writings in English include Ervand Abrahamian’s *Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic* (University of California Press, 1993), which takes a critical look at Khomeini through his own words. A more recent biography of Khomeini is by Baqer Moin *Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah* (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2000). These books form an excellent start into your studies on Khomeini and the rise of the Shiite clerical establishment into Islam’s first organized papacy and their ascendancy to power.

**Editor’s Note:** LCDR Aboul-Enein is Director for Egypt and North Africa and Special Advisor on Islamic Militancy at the Office of the Secretary of Defense for International Affairs and a frequent contributor to the FAO Journal.

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**Notes**

(1). Speech given in 1971 on the occasion of the 2,500 year anniversary of uninterrupted monarchial rule in Persia.

(2). Dr. Shatta’s Al-Thawra Al-Iraniah, p. 138.

(3). Bayan Thawri (Revolutionary Declarations) issued during the Shah’s formation of the pro-monarchic Ristikheez Millet Party dated Safar 1395 AH (1975). In Arabic.

(4). Bayan Thawri (Revolutionary Declarations) issued in Ramadan 1393 AH (1973). In Arabic.

(5). Bayan Thawri (Revolutionary Declarations) undated and entitled, "Against Capitulations/Legal Preferences and Immunities for Foreigners. In Arabic.


(7). Bayan issued on 9 Safar 1393 (AH) (1973)

(8). Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah. *Hukumat Islamiyah/

(9). Khomeini’s message to the Muslim Student Union of North America and Canada, 1970.

(10). Revolutionary Declarations on Legal Immunities.

(11). Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah. *Mubaraza bi-al Nafs*
(The Revolutionary Self), page 89, published in Arabic (publisher unknown).


(13). Remarks directed at the 20th anniversary of Khordad Uprising of 1963, a protest movement stimulated by the clergy against the White Revolution modernizing reforms imposed by the Shah.

(14). Hukumat Islamiyah-Islamic Governance, lesson 8, p.8.

(15), Ibid


With American forces committed to the Middle East and the issues of Islamist extremism, governments that are despotic, and weapons of mass destruction proliferation merging in that region, it is vital to keep up with the current books written on the region. In no time in U.S. history, has the Middle East occupied center stage more in American public discourse. As members of the 21st century U.S. military it is incumbent upon military leaders from NCO to Flag Officer to keep current on the latest thinking on the problems of the Islamic world. This review essay will highlight several books written in 2005 that will expand understanding of U.S. Marine Corps tactics and the operational art executed in Operation Iraqi Freedom, the British archival view of the 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War and an excellent thoughtful but controversial piece on Iran’s weapons of mass destruction program.

Colonel Nicholas E. Reynolds, USMC (Ret) was the Officer in Charge of Field History in the U.S. Marine Corps. This outfit is not your garden variety armchair historians — Reynolds and his team embedded with the Marines in Iraq as U.S. forces pushed towards Baghdad. Reynolds’ book is not just history, but offers the first of what will hopefully provide many tactical analyses of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). His book entitled Basrah, Baghdad and Beyond: The U.S. Marine Corps in the Second Iraq War (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2005) takes readers into how the planning for OIF was conducted at Central Command (CENTCOM) headquarters in Tampa. The overall concept of a “shock and awe” campaign to paralyze the Iraqi regular formations was taken from a National Defense University book entitled, Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance.

The first chapter also highlights the impact former Marine Corps General Anthony Zinni and former Commandant Alfred Gray had on the current Marine Generals who participated in the planning and execution of OIF. The mechanics of how to integrate the Marines, Army and British forces into General Tommy Frank’s overall plan involved the usual give and take of senior commanders. In the end, the Combined Marine and British force would be under the command of Lt.Gen James Conway whose forces totaled over 80,000 of which 42,000 would be the spear head force that would secure Basra, An-Nasiriya and its crossings along the Euphrates River as well as securing the southern oil fields.

The book describes innovative Marine planning and tactics and heaps praise upon General Usher whose staff of logisticians came up with using a strategic highway as a landing strip for KC-130 tanker/transports keeping Marines supplied, fed and treated in the field. Another effective USMC lesson from Afghanistan used in Iraq was Forward Arming and Refueling Points that enabled Marine air to be even more responsive to calls of support.

The Marine Ground Combat Element was made up of the 1st Marine Division (under Maj.Gen James Mattis) consisting of four Marine Regiments as well as the 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) known as Task Force Tarawa with a fifth Marine Regiment, all five were known as Regimental Combat Teams (RCTs).

Task Force Tarawa was under the command of Brig.Gen Richard Natonski and consisted of 5,091 Marines. Natonki’s forces slogged through urban combat in An-Nasiriyah and got surprising resistance, not from regular Iraqi troops but Fedayeen Saddam (irregular fanatics and loyalists bent on killing themselves while taking the life of an American). Fighting in An-Nasiriyah would last eight days and included bitter house to house fighting, but they cleared
the city and secured key bridges vital for follow-on US forces headed towards Baghdad. Perhaps the most tragic aspect of Task Force Tarawa was the controversial A-10 Warthog friendly fire incident that is discussed in the book.

OIF saw some very surprising and effective showings by Marine artillery that was used in sandstorms in lieu of grounded air support, yet there are also tales of heroism in which helicopter pilots brought in supplies during the sandstorms — flying with instinct and compass, and no visibility in the mother of all sandstorms.

The leadership and heroism of Marine units in An-Nasiriyah was also matched in two major battles engaged in Baghdad by 1st Battalion 5th Marines. Many coalition partners described Iraq as a massive ammunition dump designed to sustain long-term guerrilla warfare against an invading army.

The author also mentions Marine Maj. Gen Henry Osman, who led a small mission in Northern Iraq designed to keep the peace between rival Kurdish factions. Had the Kurds engaged in civil war it would have fuelled the Iraqi loyalist insurgency and foreign fighters who flocked to Iraq to engage U.S. units, it would have added a more complex dimension to U.S. forces engaged in the south and potentially given fedayeen and Islamic militants more battle space in northern Iraq.

The most poignant descriptions of the book is the heroism of the individual servicemen and service-women who innovated while enduring harsh conditions, looked out for one another, and faced fanatic adversaries to take Baghdad and depose the Iraqi dictator who will join the ranks of other despots that have murdered thousands of their own people. Reynolds book should top your reading list for 2005.

A more complex book for the serious student of the Middle East published in 2005, is Frank Brenchley’s Britain, the Six-Day War and Its Aftermath (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2005). Brenchley is a career British diplomat who spent 40 years dealing with Middle East issues and would be at the center of British policy making during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. The book opens with a great primer summarized into a single chapter on British policy in the Arab world from World War I to 1956, the Suez War. It highlights the problems of maintaining peace amidst competing policies such as the Balfour Declaration that paved the way for the creation of Israel and the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence that planted the seeds of Arab self-determination after World War I.

Another chapter, offers the best summation in the English language on how Arab-nationalist leader Egypt’s Gamal Abdel-Nasser made the decision to place two divisions in the Sinai, and order the withdrawal of UN forces from the Sinai, and finally announcing the closure of the Straits of Tiran controlling the entrance of the Gulf of Aqaba. This was all part of an Egyptian policy of gradual escalation short of war, in which detailed explanations are found in Arabic books on the 1967 Six-Day War.

Brenchley devotes a good portion of his book to discussing how England desperately wanted to avert war, not wanting to alienate Arab states that provided the bulk of British oil supplies. When Israel struck Egypt, Syria and Jordan in a lightening air blitzkrieg in June 1967, British diplomats had to counter Jordanian and Nasser’s lies that British and American carriers were aiding the Israelis including its jet bombers and fighters helping the Israeli Air Force. The Egyptians could not fathom that the Israelis would leave only a dozen planes behind committing over 200 of its jets to the fight. The psychology of Arab states dictated that the bulk of its air force remained grounded to avert any aerial coups; this is the curse of despotism. Egypt would not commit mass air formations until the 1973 Yom-Kippur War.

What is striking having read Israeli, Arab and Western accounts of the Six Day War is the total lack of understanding of the wider implications on the cold war that Arab states did not adequately comprehend, the Egyptians and Syrians were consistently regionally focused in their strategy. Egyptian writers never look at the wider context of a war with Israel in terms of US-Soviet geo-strategic competition but always focus on how the west is keeping Arab states from victory, not understanding that an Arab total victory would lead to a wider superpower confrontation. Brenchley’s book is a strategic view of the 1967 Six-Day War and not a tactical analysis, yet it is important to read the tactical to understand the strategic influence a conflict has on national policy.
The final book looks at a serious and overt adversary of the United States; Iran. It is important for U.S. military leaders to read current books and ideas on the development of Iran’s military industry and weapons of mass destruction. As Iran will not come clean with its missile and nuclear capabilities before the International Atomic Energy Agency, one must look into worst case scenarios and plan for such in the case of Iran’s hard-line leaders and their military intentions. Kenneth Timmerman has spent a career writing books that piece together what is known, unknown, what is speculation and what dissidents say about such nations as Saddam’s Iraq and currently Iran. He paints a worst-case picture of Iran’s conventional, unconventional and terrorist capabilities. His current book published in 2005 is entitled *Countdown to Crisis: The Coming Nuclear Showdown with Iran* (New York: Crown Publishing, a Division of Random House, 2005) and offers readers a troubling look into what can be ascertained regarding Iran’s power projection capabilities and how this fits in spreading an ideology that not even all Iranians approve of.

The book highlights highly intelligent and capable organizers of Iran’s missile capability and follows the career of Sabzevar Rezai better known as Mohsen Rezai who during the Iran-Iraq War forged relations with China, North Korea and Russia to obtain much needed weapons to fight Iraq in the eighties. One of his earliest achievements was a $1.6 Billion deal with China to obtain such systems as the F-7M Fighter and Silkworm Anti-Tank Missile. He also placed Iran on the track towards self-sufficiency in rocket production with the earliest plants constructed at Semnan (175KM east of Teheran) and the Shahroud Great Salt Desert. The first missile that Iran would mass produce according to Timmerman is the Oghab-missile with 40KM range and 300KG warhead, 1,000 of these would be produced in time for the 1988 Battle of the Cities and during that phase of the Iran-Iraq War, 243 Oghabs would be fired on Iraqi urban centers bordering Iran in retaliation for Saddam Hussein’s deployment of SCUDs on Iranian cities. The book discusses how Rezai turned to North Korea to acquire SCUD-B to reach Baghdad and during the Iran-Iraq War, Iran would fire 77 SCUDs.

Another troubling aspect of the book is the projection of terrorist power in Lebanon, Bosnia, Gaza and many more parts of the globe by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). They provide military advice and technical assistance to Hizballah in Lebanon, Timmerman’s book quotes a figure of $70 Million per year that Iran provides Hizballah for its operating expenses. It also highlights what the Israelis call a terrorist genius Imad Mughniyah and explores sources, some of whom are not impartial, who explain Iranian relationships with Usama Bin Laden. Timmerman’s book nonetheless offers a worst case scenario of what Iran can do to harm American interests in the region; his book is timely with the 2005 election of the new hard-line President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a former IRGC commander, who is accused of holding American hostages in 1979 and whose election solidifies the power of intolerant hardliners in control of Iran.

Editor’s Note: LCDR Aboul-Enein is Middle East Country Director at the Office of the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. LCDR Aboul-Enein was advisor to Maj. Gen Richard Natonski, USMC (Commander, Task Force Tarawa) when he commanded the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit in 1997.
INTRODUCTION

As the United States battled revolutionary communist guerrillas in Vietnam on the center stage in the world news in the 1960’s, other revolutionary forces worked fervently to destabilize oppressive Latin American authoritarian regimes. As guerilla activity spread across Central America from Guatemala (1954), to Cuba (1959 & 1961), and the Dominican Republic (1965), South American revolutionary leaders, such as Che Guevara and Carlos Marighella, as well as the guerrilla organization of the Tupamaros, watched intently learning much from the failures and success of their revolutionary brothers to the north.

Each leader or group adopted the revolutionary struggle in their South American countries in efforts to destabilize and overthrow the authoritarian regimes. The ultimate goal of each of the movements was basically the same, but their methods varied dramatically. Each movement had one thing in common however: failure. Why did the communist guerrillas loose? Each group modified the guerrilla movement to “fit” their country. Each group had at least a portion of the civilian population’s support. James Kohl and John Litt attempt to answer that question as well as compare the differences between each of the guerrilla movements.

Their book, *Urban Guerrilla Warfare in Latin America*, was written near the end of the communist struggles in 1974. Kohl and Litt’s intent was to provide the historical background for three urban guerrilla movements the media glosses over as they rush to show the world car bombs, assassinations, and kidnappings. They attempt to explore the “origins, development, strategy, and tactics of urban guerrilla warfare in Latin America (p. 1-2).”

The intent of this review is to focus primarily on the urban tactics of guerrilla warfare and the tools the each government used to defeat their respective insurgency. The final objective is to analyze those tactics to provide lessons learned from their successes to the leadership of the United States and Iraq in order to defeat the insurgency in Iraq. Obviously, one could assume that it would be a stretch to compare Latin American communist movements to the terrorist activities seen in Iraq today. The tactics used by each, however, are very similar if not identical. Car bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, are not wholly specific to the Middle East. Scale and indiscrimanancy seem to be the biggest differential factors in the tactics. It is the tactics and techniques used to defeat the insurgency this review wishes to address.

This review will summarize the three sections of the book and highlight the insurgencies in Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina. The opening chapter is the most important and the majority of the summary is dedicated to it. It will also provide an analysis of each section and highlight both urban guerrilla tactics and the methods each government used in suppressing insurgencies. It will also provide a summary of the lessons learned and feasibility for use in Iraq.
SUMMARY

In their opening chapter, Kohl and Litt provide the foundation of their theory of urban guerrilla and provide background information on the U.S. interaction with the insurgencies in Cuba, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic. They describe the post-WWII confrontations between the CIA/U.S. and each of the actions against revolutionary reform in Latin America. Highlighting the “successes” of Guatemala and the Dominican Republic, and the “failure” of U.S. foreign policy in the Bay of Pigs and Cuba, the authors develop the growth and death of rural guerrilla movements and the transformations to the urban guerrilla activities across Latin-America.

Kohl and Litt show the growth of the “foco”, or nucleus of the rural guerrilla movements, highlighting leaders such as Che Guevara and Régis Debray that developed their theories of rural movements providing “the small motor which moves the large motor of revolution (p.6).” They also note the deterioration of foquismo in the failure of rural revolutionary movements on some seventeen occasions from Argentina in 1959 to the Dominican Republic in 1973 peaking with the death of Che in 1967. The elimination of the rural guerrilla was attributed to American technological advances and CIA/Special Forces units working with local forces to quell rural activities. These actions pressured the guerrilla movements into urban areas that would negate the technology and eliminate the use of American armed forces (p.10).

Kohl and Litt trace U.S. hegemony from the early 1800’s and the Monroe Doctrine from mere rhetoric to reality in an attempt to show American patterns of intervention in their southern neighbors’ affairs (p.11). This activity culminates, in their view, with the use of US forces, CIA, and local police training in order to quell the insurgencies across the region and continue the stable authoritarian regimes.

Urban Guerrilla Warfare

STRATEGY-The strategy of the urban guerrilla develops “in contrast to earlier strategies of revolutionary struggle, namely, urban insurrection, Maoism, and foquismo (p.15).” Kohl and Litt prescribe that the rural or mass struggles should not be in whole discounted; highlighting the successes of the urban insurrection of the Russian Revolution and Communist China’s successes with Maoist models of guerrilla war. They claim that the major difference between foquismo and the other forms of rural warfare is the role of the Communist Party, stating that communism became an issue after Castro assumed power and other rural communist movements following that were quickly suppressed.

The authors state that the similarities of foquismo and the urban guerrilla remain in the hurdles that they need to overcome. The primary target is the legitimacy of the regime and the urban guerrilla has the advantage of population density (access to weapons, autos, money and mass anonymity) and proximity to the enemy (hours and hundreds of miles in rural uprisings versus minutes and miles for the urban).

The greatest strategic problem inherent in urban guerrilla warfare is controlling the level of violence (p.18). The urban guerrilla’s use of violence must be “measured, clear, and precise” as not to isolate the movement from the masses (p.18). The regime has almost unlimited capacity for violence and can be directed at mass organizations or the armed underground. The regimes’ difficulty in distinguishing between the movement and mass population serves as deterrence for guerrilla recruiting which further isolates the urban movement. Torture and death squads provide the regime the ability “to obtain information, to dissuade guerrillas and their supporters, and sometimes indulge sadism in the police-military apparatus (p.19).”
ORGANIZATION- Underground networks surrounded by secrecy act as the model for organizing urban guerrillas. Compartmentalization, according to the authors, is the key to urban guerrilla effectiveness. The ability to act independently without knowledge of sister cell activities, but understanding the movement’s politics, strategy, and orientation provides the basic building blocks for the movements (p.21). The government counters this organization with the use of “infiltrators, defectors, informers (whether deliberate or accidental), and tortured revolutionaries. The cycle of arrest and torture is the foundation of counterguerrilla operations (p.21).”

Compartmentalization can be considered the downfall of the urban movement however. The inability to mass on a particular strategic goal can lead to disintegration of the movement. “A hierarchy can easily mobilize all units for action, but is vulnerable to decapitation,” as seen in the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) movement in the 1990’s (p.22). Compartmentalization can lead to fractionalization of the movement as well as competition among the divergent cells acting without central direction. As a result, the organization of the movement can be its downfall due to the necessity to maintain secrecy and the inability to coordinate efforts.

ACTION-Similar actions at different times can lead to vastly different outcomes. All actions must be analyzed in terms of the “target, their audience, and their context” in order to identify if the action will be seen as justified in the eyes of the population (p.23). A kidnapping may be seen as either extreme or justified depending on the target and the social context. A bank robbery may expose the corrupt regime or merely infuriate the people by their loss of personal earnings.

The guerrilla movement must take actions with regard to “qualitative leaps (p.25).” Strategic planning on behalf of the guerrillas must involve correct assessment of each action in order to maintain the appropriate amount of public support. Premature leaps can expose the organization or extreme leaps may be seen as excessive and lose the support of the people.

PROSPECTS-“Urban guerrilla warfare can contribute to the fall of a government and it can transform a conjuncture from crisis to breaking point, but urban guerrilla warfare has yet to win (p.25).” “Rural armed struggle, the most prevalent strategy in the last decade, can threaten an export economy, harass a government, and force an army to emerge from the cities and disperse its force. In Latin America…the result has always been defeat (p.26).”

Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina

Kohl and Litt use Brazil as the first proof of their theory. Highlighting the regionalism and uneven development back to the establishment of a Portuguese colony, they explain how populism developed across the country which divided the political ranks and eventually established a dictatorship in 1964 led by General Castelo Branco. The urban guerrilla warfare spread as a result of the authoritarian regime and came to the forefront with the kidnapping of the U.S. Ambassador to Brazil Burke Elbrick.* The authoritarian crackdown on the movement following the abduction involved torture and death squads. After the release of 15 revolutionaries in exchange for the Ambassador, the demise of the guerrillas began as the military arrested nearly 2000 guerrillas and assassinated the guerrilla leader Carlos Marighella. The chapter concludes with a detailed timeline and excerpts from writings by Carlos Marighella that detail the structure, characteristics, and principles of the Brazilian guerrilla organization. The chapter also includes the “Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla” by Carlos Marighella that was written in 1969 and used as a training manual for the ALN and other guerrilla groups operating in Brazil during the movement.

Uruguay, once known as the Switzerland of South America, fell from a solid democracy into
an authoritarian regime in the mid 1960’s. Economic deterioration and production stagnation began to impact every portion of society as the Tupamaros movement gained momentum. The movement seen as a romantic revolution was initially undermined by the government gaining control over the press and eventually spiraled into the abolition of Congress and municipal councils. Once the military assumed control of the political arm of the government, the Tupamaro movement continued to gain popularity and almost toppled the regime, but the military made a strategic victory with the capture of nine senior Tupamaro members. This secured the victory by the military regime and as in the case of Brazil, torture and death squads contributed to the success of the regime. Defections, infiltrations, informants, and tortured revolutionaries again played a key role in the suppression of the urban guerrilla movement. This chapter concludes with a detailed timeline as well as interviews with several Tupamaro members, and overviews of major Tupamaro operations against the regime.

Argentina’s political history in the 1900’s is marked by Colonel Juan Perón and his lengthy hold on power beginning with cabinet positions, to the Vice-Presidency, to the Presidency, and later, from exile. His first administration solidified Peronism and divided the politics into pro or anti-Peronism. Turmoil followed Perón’s ouster with a series of military interventions and eventually solidified the authoritarian regime under General Onganía. The authoritarian control led to sporadic guerrilla foco movements in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s allegedly involving Che Guevara. The rise of the urban movements in Brazil and Uruguay along with the defeat of the many foco movements across Argentina and death of Che Guevara as well as the urban centered working class dictated that the next guerrilla movement be urban in nature. Assassinations and kidnappings marked the guerrilla movements that bore ever increasing pressure on the regime. Working class and guerrilla pressure forced the government to return to democratic elections which brought the return of Juan Perón to power after 17 years of exile. Perón and the urban guerrilla’s articulated their divergent paths, and the initial stages of the second Perón administration saw the urban guerrilla’s intensifying their kidnappings and assassinations while the regime stepped up its anti-guerrilla campaigns. This chapter concludes with many interviews and statements by the different guerrilla and pro-Perón sectors as well as a detailed timeline of the guerrilla and governmental actions.

ANALYSIS

Kohl and Litt provide an excellent description of an era in Western Hemispheric history that was overshadowed by the U.S. activity in Korea, Cuba, and Vietnam. The activities of both the communist guerrilla movements and the attempts of local governments supported by U.S. interests to suppress the movements bring new light upon American anti-communism efforts in the heart of the cold war.

The differences in Latin American guerrilla activities as compared to that of the Iraqi insurgency are numerous. Beginning with the lack of weapons and resources constraining the guerrilla activities, Iraqi insurgency were left with wide open arms rooms and ammunition storage bunkers to exploit prior to their growth in effectiveness having a virtual endless supply of arms. Iraqi insurgency also seems to be a mixture of foreign and local fighters as the guerrilla movements in Latin America spawned from internal organizations with limited input from outside forces.

Differences in organization are also evident in Iraq as we see an external insurgent structure overlaid onto anti-imperialism sentiment and a planned post-regime fall of insurgency battling a nascent Iraqi police and military force and an external army trying to establish security. Latin American guerrilla activity established itself in the country-side and urban areas against an
established authoritarian regime that eventually controlled the monopoly of force.

Political circumstances are obvious as the authoritarian regimes in Latin America controlled access to the media and the established regime could make “qualitative leaps” in the use of force as necessary to defeat the insurgency. Iraqi governmental establishments may prevent the escalation of the use of torture as the government attempts to establish legitimacy. The communist movements in Latin America were battling a pre-established, legitimate government over purely political view with a focused goal of political change versus mere destabilization of a newly formed government.

The similarities seem to be only in the types of activities engaged by both insurgencies. Assassinations, car bombings, and kidnappings are the primary means of activities by both insurgents. The communist movements seemed to focus against the political might of the authoritarian regime, as the Iraqi insurgency appears to be indiscriminant attempting to spiral the country into chaos. The end result of the guerrilla movements in Latin America transformed into isolation from the masses.

Following the isolation theory, the Iraqi insurgency will eventually isolate itself as the mass of people become tired of the assassinations and violence, as did the masses in Latin America. We should see overt activity by the population as they identify the terrorist outsiders to local authorities. Local authorities will continue to gather information by means of infiltrators, defectors, informers, and tortured insurgents as they establish and solidify their monopoly of force. The fact that the majority of the insurgency is non-Iraqi will aid the regime in establishing legitimacy and it will eventually be seen as the answer to cope with the foreign extremists. The extreme violence used by the Iraqi insurgency will, like its Latin American predecessors, isolate the movement which will bring about the defeat of the insurgent forces.

CONCLUSION

The bad news is that the guerrilla movements against an established authoritarian regime in Latin America lasted between five to ten years. The Iraqi insurgency is trying to establish legitimacy as well as quell insurgency. The length of time for active insurgency against the Iraqi regime could be lengthened considerably. The good news is that the insurgency in Iraq will eventually be defeated by the Iraqi regime, if history is our guide. The use of torture and death squads will likely be used to subdue the Iraqi insurgency as Middle Eastern capacity for violence is greater than current limits in the United States. This use of force could, however, provide hurdles to regime legitimacy in the eyes of the world.

Semantics and definitions are not addressed in this review. The guerrilla movements in Latin America in the ‘60’s are obviously defined differently than the terrorist activity in Iraq today. Definitions of terrorism and guerrilla have purposely been left out of this analysis as it would consume the majority of the analysis portion of this review. Focusing on the tactics used by government and the insurgency is the primary concern. The goals of the respective insurgencies are obviously different as well; the tactics are similar and comparable.

In conclusion, this book review has highlighted the main points of urban guerrilla activity in Latin America as stated by the authors James Kohl and John Litt. This article has observed guerrilla activity in Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina beginning at mid-century and has traced their communist movements to their loss of impact in the eyes of the population. Lastly, we have identified the differences and similarities between the insurgent movements in Iraq and Latin America. It has also provided historical aspects as to the reasons the insurgency in Iraq will eventually succumb to governmental forces. The activities in Iraq today, while spectacular in nature, will fall as the population begins to stand up for its safety and the regime establishes control across the nation that will allow peace to be restored to the proud people of Iraq, just as peace is observed throughout Latin America today.
I am pleased to be making my first of what I’m sure will be many submissions to the FAO Journal. As a European FAO I was pleased to serve in Afghanistan for my last assignment. Army FAOs from all regions are serving with distinction in the Global War on Terrorism and we all should be proud of our accomplishments. After my arrival in September, this job has exposed me to numerous opportunities to affect the future of the Army FAO program in a positive way. Senior military leadership and policy makers are singing the praises of Army FAOs and recognizing the expertise a FAO brings to the fight. The recent Wall Street Journal article reprinted in this quarters FAO Journal is just another example of FAOs doing their part in the fight as a substantial force multiplier.

Department of Defense Directive 1315.17 is moving forward. This directive spells out a more prescriptive management in all services FAO programs and directs a path to general officer. My office is looking into the best way to reach this goal. We are focusing on those key and important areas in which FAOs develop a broad understanding of regional affairs and strategic policy. We are also seeing a newfound emphasis on language proficiency. Senior leadership desires have spelled out a goal of 3/3 for all languages and the Defense Language Office has just released a new pay scale for foreign language proficiency pay which will more than double the pay for languages of strategic importance.

It is ICT rotation time in Asia, the Middle East and Africa. The Army is sending several FAOs from DLI language training to conduct their one year in-country training. In the next couple months, Asia will see new officers in China, Pakistan, Philippines, and Thailand. There are also new arrivals in Turkey, Egypt and Ethiopia. Eurasia has seen a few key changes with the addition of a new ICT site in Moscow last summer as well as the opening of a Ukraine site in 2006.

In Latin America, two new officers are arriving in Chile. They will join officers already in Argentina, Ecuador and El Salvador. Both Guatemala and Mexico will host new ICT officers by summer. We wish these officers and their families all the best and we’ll be pushing them to get the most of their next year. For many, ICT is the best training an Officer will ever receive. Let’s all help these officers through mentorship and by providing advise as they conduct regional travel.

In the Middle East we have implemented a program that allows newly trained FAOs to join BCTs for six months of a unit’s deployment to Iraq. This provides the officers with an opportunity to hone their language skill before continuing on to their follow-on ICT site. It also helps our combat troops by providing them with a trained Arabic linguist in the form of a Commissioned American Officer. This is an exciting program and we have already deployed our first two volunteers and a third will deploy in January 2006.

We have scheduled the final interim accessions board for January 2006. This board will access YG98 officers. Three cohort year groups; 1997, 98, and 99, will undergo a CFD board in 2006. HRC and FAO Proponent are constantly reviewing branch transfer requests. I see this as a great opportunity to bring back quality officers that have completed some or all of their FAO training.

As a result of the Army Modular Transformation we are starting to see our total FAO numbers increase. This is due to the insertion of FAOs at the Numbered Army starting with ARCENT. What we can all take from this is that along with the Army’s transformation, there will be a FAO transformation. Things are moving quickly and the future will have many great opportunities and adventures.
1. **Media Interview for the USMC FAO Program.** The International Issues Branch Head (Col D. C. Hahne), IAOP Coordinator (Maj M. H. Oppenheim, China FAO), former Ukraine MARA and current PLU-6 Desk Officer (Maj M. W. Barnes, former Soviet Union FAO), Israel MARA Designate and current PLU-3 Desk Officer (Maj J. D. Duke, Middle East / North Africa FAO), and a FAO-in-training (Capt J. Brown, Indonesian FAO-in training), were interviewed by Staff Writer Christian Lowe from the Marine Corps Times, Correspondent Sally B. Donnelly from TIME Magazine, and Richard R. Burgess, the Managing Editor for Sea Power Magazine and the Almanac of Seapower Navy League of the United States. The interview, facilitated by Marine PAO Major Gabrielle Chapin, addressed the USMC FAO program, challenges, experiences and future plans. LtCol P. J. Carroll and Capt S. A. Aziz provided additional input via e-mail WRT their current efforts in Iraq with respect to some examples of the roles FAO play in OIF/OEF, and some FAO contributions on the GWOT in general.

2. **PLU-8 Website.** The PLU-8 Website has been reformatted. It identifies those programs that fall under the International Affairs Officer Program Coordinator, and provides links for two Marine Corps Orders governing the Marine Corps Foreign Personnel Exchange Program (MCFPEP) and the International Affairs Officer Program (IAOP). Additionally, it provides a link to those FAO-coded billets that are currently identified in the USMC Tables of Organization, as well as a FAO / RAO questionnaire that may be filled out and submitted to PLU-8 to assist in the placement of FAOs and RAOs in future utilization tours.

3. **Colombian PEP Billets.** The Marine Corps is underway and on-track to expand the MCFPEP by placing (2) PEP billets in Colombia beginning summer 06. The U.S. Marine Officer billet exchange is designated in Cartagena, as the Naval Academy's Assistant Marine Officer Instructor. The U.S. Marine SNCO's billet is designated in Covenas, at the Colombian Naval Infantry Training Center. Both Colombian personnel will serve in II MEF Operational and Training units, based out of Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. More to follow as the MOAs and specific billets are agreed upon by the U.S. Marine Corps and Colombian Marine Corps.

4. **USMC-wide FAO assessment.** In accordance with the CMC's guidance, USMC commands are underway with an assessment of FAO-coded billets. This effort will validate current billets, and identify possible additional billets in which FAOs might contribute to various missions. Results are due to be received in November, and then further coordination and analysis will begin with other agencies within the Marine Corps to address this issue.

5. **Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL).** The Director for CAOCL (Col J. W. Bearor), and his Deputy Director (Dr. B. A. Salmoni) presented Pentagon POLADs a brief on the status of the Center and current progress toward executing CMC intent regarding operational culture learning. The CAOCL directly addresses 3 of the 4 DoD goals (per the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap):
   - Create foundational language and regional area expertise.
   - Create the capacity to surge (to support operational units when needed).
   - Establish a process to track the accession, separation and promotion rates of military personnel with language skills and FAOs.

   The CAOCL’s working mission is: Ensure Marines and Marine units are equipped with requisite regional, culture, and language knowledge to allow them to plan and operate successfully in the joint expeditionary environment, in any region of the world, in current and potential operating conditions, targeting persistent and emerging irregular, traditional, catastrophic, and disruptive threats.

   The CAOCL’s execution statement is: Provide militarily significant culture studies to Marines and Marine units. Using an efficient mix of distance learning, schoolhouse courses, directed reading, and commercial/other service/joint instructional materials, provide every Marine operational culture and language learning IOT better prepare them for military operations in every corner of the world in current and projected operational environments. Provide targeted persistent and pre-deployment support to Marine operational forces. Track every career Marine’s progress towards defined learning goals IOT provide on-call expertise.

   The CAOCL is scheduled to be fully operational capable 1 Oct 2006.

6. **USMC FAOs "on the go."** LtCol J. C. Goff (Japanese FAO) was selected to attend the National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo. Col Melton (Korean and Japanese FAO) has recently assumed duties as the Japan MARA in Tokyo.
U.S. Army FAO Proponent Office

U.S. Army FAO Proponent Office
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IN THIS ISSUE:

Global Trends and Security Strategies

Local Knowledge: In Iraq, One Officer Uses Cultural Skills to Fight Insurgents

Khomeini’s Writings and Speeches

2005 Readings on Middle East Military and Political Issues

Urban Guerilla Warfare in Latin America