Redefining the Foreign Area Officer's Role

Nepal’s Insurgency

The Foreign Area Officer Program: How Well do the Services Support the United States Pacific Command

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LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT

Those of us fortunate enough to enjoy the FAO Dining-Out on 7 May will remember an evening of friendship and mutual commitment. The event brought together over sixty National Capital Area FAOs, from all the services, active and retired, many with their spouses. Credit – HUGE KUDOS – belongs to a dedicated group of FAOs led by Major Don Baker, USA, from Human Resources Command (HRC). Others instrumental in the success of the Dining-Out were: Mrs. Diane Baker, LTC(P) Ray Hodgkins, LTC Steve Ayers, LTC Barry Blackmon, LTC Brey Sloan, LTC Kelly Zicarello, MAJ Paul Dececco, MAJ Clayton Holt, MAJ Andrew Jenkins, and MAJ Anthony Sebo.

To take advantage of that FAO enthusiasm, on 21 May, the HRC FAOs, led by LTC Kelly Zicarello, sponsored the latest in a series of FAO Runs, on the Mall. Another outstanding team-building event!

Of note, the Army G-35, MG Keith Dayton, is in the planning stages for an Army FAO Conference, to be held in the Spring 2005 period, along models successful in Europe, Asia, and Latin America. Although Army G-35 will be the host for the Conference, other FAO Service Proponents and FAOs will be invited. Among the events considered for the conference are FAO Proponent presentations, presentations by Combatant Command J-5s, DSCA, and DHS, and perhaps most important, working groups to discuss and develop recommendations on issues of importance to FAO professional development.

This issue of the FAO Journal offers outstanding articles. One of the articles is a reprint (by permission) from the May-June 2004 Military Review, entitled “Redefining the Foreign Area Officer’s Role.” Let’s hope the article generates lively debate among our membership.

In the spirit of addressing FAO attributes, I’d like to provide a summary of the lessons learned from the Army Foreign Area Officer perspective, based on my experience as a Board Member of the 2003 Army Colonels’ Promotion Board. While there are some differences in our services’ FAO programs, I think it is useful for all our services’ FAOs to have a perspective on what constitutes professional “success.” I do not offer my thoughts as the Solution; rather as observations and material for further dialog. I also offer my thoughts (privileged as I am to be serving in the Pentagon) in all humility – with all respect to my fellow FAOs who are OUT FRONT at this moment protecting our Nation.

GO TO THE GUNS. The most important element of success for Army Foreign Area Officers is their readiness to deploy to -- and record of success in serving in -- challenging overseas assignments as Foreign Area Officers. Assignments in FAO-coded positions in hardship areas, at the cutting edge of US political-military efforts, are the reason we have FAOs in the first place.

POLITICAL-MILITARY COMPETENCE. The second element of success is demonstrated political-military competence. Without question, FAOs' thorough grounding in Army operations is essential to successful application of political-military skills. But the political-military skills are unique to FAOs; these skills are what set FAOs apart from their fellow basic branch Soldiers, and from the other Career Fields. FAOs must work well within a Joint-Interagency-Multinational context. FAOs need to be able to advise senior military leaders, senior Defense Department officials, and representatives from State, other agencies, and Coalition partners. And a successful FAO should be able to do so not only in his or her Area of Concentration, but be able to apply graduate-level political-military skills in other regional areas as required.

REGIONAL EXPERTISE. Third (recognizing the danger of prioritizing among three ALL-important

(Continued on page 11)
Long before 11 September 2001 brought the reality of asymmetric warfare to the American homeland, statesmen, military theorists, and others were grappling with what the end of the Cold War would mean for U.S. security interests around the world. New theories of external threats to the United States (such as wars of civilizations, resurgent Chinese or Russian nationalism, rogue or failed states, and international crime) were postulated. President George H.W. Bush called this state of affairs “a New World Order.”

A firm belief was that America’s containment strategy, backed by forward-deployed, heavily armored and mechanized forces poised to fight and win a future East-West confrontation in Europe and, to a lesser extent, a conflict in Korea, was obsolete. Operations in Kuwait, Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo, with their immature infrastructures, exposed U.S. forces’ limitations in deployability and sustainment. Technologically sophisticated nonstate threats with asymmetric capabilities further exposed U.S. vulnerabilities and heightened a sense of urgency.

Believing that the United States would face no global or regional peer competitors for 20 years, the George W. Bush Administration seized this window of opportunity to initiate a transformation effort throughout the Department of Defense (DOD). Army Transformation calls for institutional and operational change across all doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leader development, people, and facilities domains.

Although technology is important to Transformation, soldiers remain the centerpiece of the future force. Transforming the way the Army recruits, trains, and fields soldiers is vital to achieving this vision. Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld summed this up best: “All the high-tech weapons in the world won’t transform our Armed Forces unless we also transform the way we think, train, exercise, and fight.”

In The Lexus and the Olive Tree, Thomas Friedman argues that globalization is the new dominant international system whose defining feature is the interaction between politics, culture, finance, national security, technology, and ecology. He believes that to understand international relations, foreign-policy practitioners must think globally and traverse all six areas seamlessly. He states, “Unfortunately, . . . there is a deeply ingrained tendency to think in terms of highly segmented, narrow areas of expertise, which ignores the fact that the real world is not divided up into such neat little beats, and that the boundaries between domestic, international, political and technological affairs are collapsing.”

The foreign area officer (FAO) career field must also adapt to the new paradigms. Officer Professional Management 3 provided this opportunity by establishing a separate career field with its own promotion and school-selection process. However, several changes must be made in FAO career development, assignment, and utilization to ensure FAO provides the necessary capabilities and skills to meet the Nation’s current and future needs.

The Army needs to address strategic studies as a core skill. Language, while important, must be viewed as an enabler. The Army should enforce a broader assignment set and change its FAO personnel policy to overcome its Cold War bias and address new regional priorities. The
central question facing the FAO career field over the next few years is whether FAO can overcome its own Cold War paradigm to become a more effective instrument of national policy during the 21st Century.

Adapting to Change

In the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse, U.S. military engagements intensified across a wide operational spectrum, including humanitarian assistance, nationbuilding, and major theaters of war. Globalization; the reduction of time-distance factors brought on by advances in transport and information technology; and the spread of nongovernmental organizations and other transnational players forced the United States to operate in a more complex security environment. U.S. leaders discovered that tactical decisions had immediate strategic ramifications, and states found it increasingly difficult to deal with transnational, global issues. In such an environment, America found it too costly, in terms of lives, prestige, or finance, to achieve all its policy goals by acting unilaterally.

FAOs, as joint officers trained to operate within interagency and multinational structures, provide ideal instruments to deal with the complexities of the new security environment. While FAOs must be expert political-military advisors at the regional level, they must also be able to function strategically, because transnational security issues transcend regional boundaries. FAOs must link their regional expertise to the broader international geopolitical arena to execute U.S. national security policy and military strategy, and more important, to influence and help formulate U.S. policy by grasping the effects and implications of other nations’ interests on U.S. policy. FAOs will only learn these essential skills through educational and developmental assignments.

FAO professional development takes from 2-1/2 to 4 years, depending on the region, and normally consists of language training, graduate schooling in international relations, and familiarization with a region through in-country training. In the regionally based graduate program, students spend 60 percent of their time in regionally oriented classes. Most master’s degree programs require students to take certain core classes such as international relations theory and U.S. foreign policy. A knowledge of history complements the study of international relations.

Although the FAO proponent directs that each program must have a regional language component, an emphasis on electives in strategic studies courses would strengthen this critical skill set. Typical FAO trainees complete 6 to 15 months of language training at the Defense Language Institute and do not experience much language skills degradation before in-country training. Sending FAO trainees to graduate school after language school and in-country training is another option.

The Army career field most closely associated with strategic thinking and policy is the Strategic Plans and Policy Officer Functional Area (FA) 59. The Army’s FAO and FA 59 fields are quite similar. For example, the strategic plans and policy officer’s skills include:

- Being highly adept at understanding other societies, their values, and national interests.

- Being attuned to the complexities of the international environment.

- Being able to implement national strategic plans and policy.

Education, including undergraduate and graduate study, is remarkably similar. The offi-
cers in the two fields fill the same types of duty positions: staff officers in theater staffs; Joint and Army Staff policy positions; and intergovernmental agencies such as the Department of State.

FAO positions tend to have a regional focus, however, in terms of both function and physical location. Around three-quarters of FAOs are deployed outside the Continental United States (OCONUS) as opposed to a third of strategists. Nearly 10 percent of FAOs (approximately 100 officers) hold the 6Z Strategist Advanced Application Program additional skill identifier, while the strategist career field numbers approximately 185. A full review of FAO records would likely reveal that many more FAOs could be awarded this skill identifier.

As the Army transitions intermediate-level education requirements and the 6Z Program ceases to exist, FAOs should complete a modified version of the Basic Strategic Art Course through distance learning. The course stresses strategic theory and art, national security decision making, and contemporary security challenges, instead of joint planning, force management, and resource management.

Functional Area 59 officers tend to focus on national plans and policies, while FAOs focus on regional policy. This distinction is not always clear, and in reality, an effective regional policy requires a larger geopolitical and strategic context.

Language as an enabler.

The FAO proponent should de-emphasize the FAO as a linguist and define language ability
for what it really is, an enabler. A soldier might speak a language, but unless he has solid political, military, and strategic knowledge, he is useless as an adviser. The reverse is not necessarily true, however. Of course, in an ideal situation the officer would have both, but this is not always achievable; more than a dozen languages are spoken in Europe.

FAO proficiency in just one or two languages is not really cost effective, although knowing French, Portuguese, and Spanish might have cross-regional utility. A language-centric view might build cultural and national stovepipes, which would be bad enough if the FAO tries to be a regional expert but potentially disastrous if he needs to think strategically. Can Japanese and Korean FAOs afford to be uninformed about what happens in China or Russia? What of the European FAO whose region consists of numerous countries, each with its own language, customs, and mores? The predictability of the bipolar Cold War made a country-centric or regional view possible, but the Cold War is over. Global and transnational issues, such as terrorism, crime, illegal arms trading, and mass immigration, transcend state and regional boundaries and require the FAO to think strategically.

Twenty percent of FAOs fill critical Continental United States (CONUS) or OCONUS assignments in English-speaking countries where their political-military expertise and analytical ability is paramount. Yet we must guard against the attitude that such postings are less desirable because they require no foreign language skills or because any officer can perform them.

The Army seems to see language ability as more than an FAO enabler; it sees it as the FAO’s raison d’être. When viewing the world from a geopolitical perspective instead of a language-centric one, this idea is even more suspect. For example, as the United States builds a new security framework in Asia to enhance stability and to prosecute the war on terror, actively engaging the Philippines, India, Pakistan, and Australia—all countries in which English is the official language or a second language—will be critical to achieving U.S. strategic interests. In terms of interoperability and warfighting, the English speaking United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada are the nations most likely to fight alongside the United States beyond regional security pacts. In Western Europe, language is less of a factor than in any other geographic area because English is the official language of NATO.

Finally, the FAO field is not the only career field to require foreign language skills. When thinking of a Special Forces (SF) soldier, many images come to mind, but yet the first is not that of a linguist. Yet language is an important skill in the SF soldier’s tool kit. The same holds true for civil affairs and psychological operations officers, whose primary role is to interface with target populations and influence them to behave in a manner favorable to friendly forces. Linguists specialize in languages and can serve only as translators, but for FAOs, language is only an enabler.

Building a broader assignment base.

First and foremost, a FAO is a soldier. Being a soldier is his core skill. The FAO’s Army training and experience add value to his exchanges with foreign militaries, U.S. agencies, and the joint force. FAOs are often present in areas of conflict and execute U.S. policy. The two attachés in Yemen, for example, were the first U.S. on-site respondents during the USS Cole incident, and a third, the security assistant officer, coordinated with the French for air casualty evacuation support. FAOs, forward-deployed to Kuwait, provide valuable interface with foreign or allied armies and advise U.S. commanders.

Still, FAOs are all too often seen as “cocktail circuit riders,” out of touch with the real Army. FAO policy has contributed to this image in several
The Defense and Army Attaché, U.S. Embassy and U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia (center and center right) discuss the airlift of Ethiopian troops to support UN relief operations in Rwanda, 1994.

ways:

- The FAO development model, which is incompatible with the Army policy of dual-tracking, requires FAOs to spend too much time in training and as much as 7 years away from troop assignments.

- FAO positions are over-billeted within plush assignments in European capital cities and are considered to be equivalent to battalion command, while senior U.S. Army or DOD representatives in the developing world hold the rank of major or lieutenant colonel.

- The Army attaché in-country is responsible for training FAOs. This narrows a FAO’s perspective and predisposes them to serve in attaché positions.

- The policy of considering the attaché position as equivalent to battalion command leads FAOs to spend the rest of their careers in such positions, thereby losing touch with the “green” Army.

A new track to success would enforce FAO rotation from attaché positions to major Army commands, combatant commands, and Department of the Army (DA), Joint Staff, and foreign military headquarters. FAOs should not serve in two consecutive attaché positions unless they are promoted or the Army has a critical need for the service. These changes would develop FAOs well grounded in the tactical, operational, and strategic arts and who are force multipliers, not just bureaucrats.

What the military brings to the international environment is a professional soldier’s knowledge. The FAO is an expert in his field, trained to engage effectively with foreign militar-
ies and statesmen. His military perspective, central to both the study and practice of geopolitics and political-military operations, is essential to national security strategy.

**Addressing regional imbalance.**

During the Cold War, Europe occupied center stage in U.S. foreign policy, which deemed Europe’s security of vital national interest. America’s commitment to NATO, backed by credible military force, was a visible U.S. guarantee of security to its European allies. A free, democratic Europe remains of vital interest, but the international security environment has changed. NATO and the European Union have expanded to include former Warsaw Pact states; the United States and Russia have reached a rapprochement; and asymmetric threats have focused U.S. attention on other areas of the world. Yet, FAO manning remains mired in Cold War constructs.

Consider the distribution of FAO colonel billets among nine regional FAO areas: Latin America, Europe, South Asia, Eurasia (Russia), China, the Middle East and North Africa, Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. European FAOs account for 38 billets—more than the combined total of all four Asian regions that are important to U.S. national interests and a locus of present and future conflict. Of the 32 billets in the 4 Asian regions, 10 are in Japan and Korea, a legacy from the Cold War. In view of North Korea’s aggressive policies, these FAOs remain well placed. But what of America’s larger regional objectives and stated national interest in preventing the rise of a regional hegemon in Asia, especially in light of the U.S. policy of containment or engagement with China? China receives only four billets, one of which is located in the region. India receives one billet; Pakistan, two. The picture is much the same in the Middle East and Africa. On the other hand, Latin America has 31 colonel billets. As in Europe and Northeast Asia, this is the result of a Cold War construct. The billets were designed in part to contain the spread of communism. While countering communism is no longer the basis for such a robust presence, geographic proximity, economic potential, the changing international security environment, and historical linkages first promulgated in the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, argue for a continuing presence. In view of the changed international security environment, a redistribution of FAO positions is necessary to ensure that the pointed end of the spear points in the right direction.

**Recommendations**

The FAO program must adapt to the present international environment and move beyond Cold War constructs. The Army must position FAOs to provide regional political-military experts who understand strategic arts and are trained to operate in joint, interagency, and multinational arenas to support U.S. strategic goals and objectives. With the downsized Army relying more on force projection capabilities, a FAO will often be the sole DOD or Army representative in-country. To maximize FAO capabilities, the Army must change the way it assigns and develops FAOs.

FAOs should develop their strategist skills through formal education and self-study, and
when possible, the Army should require FAO trainees to take electives in strategic studies and national policy areas while attending graduate school. The Army should also give FAOs the opportunity to complete a modified version of the Army War College (AWC) Basic Strategic Art program through the Army Distance-Learning Program. Selected FAOs, especially those serving in policy-related positions within DA or joint staff or in-theater commands, should complete the course before being posted to new assignments.

The Army also should consolidate strategist and FAO training into the Operational Support Career Field, mirroring the policy of the Strategic Leadership Division. The Army should update DA Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Development and Career Development, to reflect a career development path that ensures FAOs rotate through various types of duties to ensure broad contact with the Army as a whole and to develop the broadest skill sets possible. The Army also should consolidate strategist and FAO training into the Operational Support Career Field, mirroring the policy of the Strategic Leadership Division. The Army should update DA Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Development and Career Development, to reflect a career development path that ensures FAOs rotate through various types of duties to ensure broad contact with the Army as a whole and to develop the broadest skill sets possible.

Also, theater commanders and the director of operations of the Defense Intelligence Agency should review FAO personnel policy to redress the imbalance of FAO billets and align them with national and DOD guidance and policy. Finally, when possible, the Army should expose FAO in-country trainees to the full spectrum of FA 48 positions to prevent them from developing an attaché-centric point of view.

NOTES


3. The Objective Force aims to provide the Nation with a joint, interagency, and multinational precision-maneuver instrument at tactical and operational levels in support of U.S. national interests.


5. Rumsfeld, 29.


7. Ibid.


10. Seventy-five percent of FAOs serve in joint billets, while over 80 percent serve in assignments outside the continental United States.

11. In other core FA 59 skills, such as developing concepts and doctrine for employing military forces and force requirements development, there is no correlation.

12. Although FA 59 does not usually send officers to advanced civil schooling, the majority of accessed officers already possess a graduate degree in an appropriate field.

13. The DA Management Office–Regional Integration and Assessments FAO proponent website (unofficial) states that the FAO vision is to
create Army officers who are soldier-statesmen, linguists, and regional experts.


15. Approximately one-half of the Eurasian FAO 04-06 population (24) is actually in-country; 22 are in Germany, Belgium, or the United Kingdom. Several Eurasian FAOs are in the continental United States as well.


18. Because 75 percent of FAO authorizations are joint billets and fall within the purview of combatant commanders and the Defense Intelligence Agency, no effective FAO regional realignment is feasible without close coordination between them and the Army G3, overseen by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

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(components of FAO success) is the FAO’s regional expertise in one or more areas, in one or more languages. FAOs need to demonstrate competence in working with a specific region, culture, and language – if nothing else, as a base from which to expand as Army needs might require.

I’d welcome your thoughts on the subject of what constitutes “FAO success,” either in email direct to me, or if you’d care to share them in the form of an article for the Journal!

Finally, please contribute your prayers and thoughts, in support of our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines who cannot be with their loved ones as they serve our nation in far-flung locales.

V/R,
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Wanted!!!

Articles written by FAOs, on FAO subjects, for the FAO Journal and FAOA Website (www.faoa.org)

Usually seven to ten pages long, single spaced, in one of the usual word processor formats. Maps and graphics make them all the better!

E-mail article to: editor@faoa.org or webmaster@faoa.org
The Kingdom of Nepal is a small, land-locked state often touted as the “land of Buddha” and a “trekker’s paradise.” With 8 of the world’s 10 highest peaks, Nepal would seem an oasis of tranquility cloistered far above the petty conflicts which plague other countries. Sandwiched between two behemoths, China and India, Nepal is often a strategic afterthought. But beneath the veneer of tourist board idealization, the world’s only Hindu kingdom is racked with endemic poverty, fractured along regional, ethnic, caste, linguistic, and religious lines, and in the throes of an insurgency that is among the most deadly and most brutal in the world.1

On February 13, 1996, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (CPN (M)) declared the advent of People’s War in Nepal. Due to government negligence, for its first five years the movement gained momentum and spread its influence largely unchallenged.2 Although, outside of Kathmandu, Nepal is “verging on anarchy,”3 and the insurgency has claimed the lives of 8,500 Nepalese, more than 1,500 since late-August 2003 alone,4 the uprising remains largely unknown to the American public. Nonetheless, the CPN(M) has fallen increasingly under US concern both as a terrorist organization and for its potential to cause a “failed-state” scenario where an anarchic Nepal could become a haven for more globally-minded terrorist groups.5

MOTIVATIONS

At its root, the insurgency springs from insurgent exploitation of anti-government resentment which has been welling-up in the Rolpa and Rukum districts for decades. In 1996, these districts, which comprise the Maoist heartland, were the poorest in Nepal6 and had been under Communist sway for nearly half a century.7 The average Human Development Index (HDI) in Rolpa was 45% of the average in Kathmandu,8 while the poverty rate in the Mid and Far West regions was 18 times greater than the rate in the capital.9 But according to the local population, it was not always so. From the 1930s to the 1970s, the Rolpa and Rukum districts were the primary source for Nepali hashish and, accordingly, the most prosperous region in Western Nepal.10 However, in 1976, a distant Kathmandu government enacted the Drug Trafficking and Abuse Act, criminalizing the region’s primary source of income.11

The resulting decent into abject poverty, compounded by a series of lesser, but perceived...
as equally arbitrary, government mandates, bred bitterness and disillusionment with the national government. Simultaneously, factions of the Communist party filtered this mounting discontent through an increasingly radical lens, cultivating a base of revolutionary sentiment. According to anecdotal sources, support for the Communist Party grew from 10% to 60% in the 4 years following the hashish ban, as segments of the alienated population came to believe that armed struggle was the only means for redress of grievances.

In addition to endemic regional poverty, Nepal’s highly stratified society promotes gross horizontal equality along ethnic, caste, and gender lines. Magars and Tharus, the two largest ethnic minorities in Nepal, compose the majority of the CPN(M)’s ranks. These indigenous hill and Terai ethnic groups endure an HDI that is about half of what the upper castes experience and, prior to 2000, many Tharus in particular were landless farmers caught in a debt nexus which essentially reduced them to bonded labor. Dalits, the lowest, “untouchable” class of the Hindu caste system, earn less than a fifth of Nepal’s average per capita income. Women, too, have traditionally been afforded far less opportunity for education and personal betterment and make up one-fifth to one-third of the Maoist cadre. The Maoists have attempted to leverage the widespread discontent in these historically marginalized minority groups by incorporating their grievances into CPN(M) policy platforms and slogans. But while promises of social equality and self-determination have resonated with some members of these disaffected groups, the Maoist leadership remains overwhelmingly upper caste and it is not altogether clear that the movement at its core is inherently motivated by ethnic, caste, or gender based issues.

Finally, Maoist intimidation has made support for the CPN(M) the only logical choice for many in the isolated, Maoist dominated regions. The Maoists have made it clear that there can be no bystanders in people’s war and demand payments in kind of food and shelter, as well as requiring that one member from each household join their cause. When compliance has not been forthcoming, it has been coerced through use of force or terror. There are countless accounts of beatings, abductions, amputation of limbs, and murders of those who resist CPN(M) policies. To a lesser extent, some Maoists may be motivated by unruly government response to the insurgency. In the early years of the uprising, security forces were inexperienced and undisciplined and often politicized, sometimes committing criminal acts with impunity. But since OP Romeo, the government’s reaction to 1994 Maoist led election violence and often cited as a turning point for Maoist supporters, began only months before the declaration of people’s war, it could not have been a root cause of a conflict that required extended preparation.

**LIKELY STRATEGIES OF MOBILIZATION**

The Maoists have committed themselves to armed revolutionary struggle in the classic style of protracted people’s war. Specifically, the CPN(M) draws from the vein of “Gang of Four” Maoism, which also inspired India’s Naxalites, the Khmer Rouge, and Sendero Luminoso, all movements remarkable for their extreme brutality. In 2001, the Maoists adopted Prachanda Path, a synthesis of Mao’s people’s war in the countryside and Lenin’s general insurrection in the towns.
specially concocted for the urban-rural realities of Nepal, and put theory into action with the launching of their general offensive in November of that year.

In general, the Maoists use military force to remove all vestiges of grassroots government and clear the way for the new people’s republic. Although the Maoists claim a force of 100,000, reasonable estimates put the number closer to 5,000-6,000 regulars and 15,000 militia. While their numbers are small compared to the 115,000 total national forces, the Maoists are adept a massing their number to overwhelm security elements often spread thinly across forbidding terrain. The Maoists’ principal targets have been the police and the RNA, but they also target any manifestations of government authority (elected officials, postal workers, teachers), symbols of the old regime (landlords), and suspected informants. By 2003, the Maoists had destroyed more than 1,400 of the 3913 VDC offices and hundreds of police outposts, banks, and army barracks. Beyond local concerns, the Maoists seek to eradicate evidence of international capitalism and are suspected of bombing factories owned by Coca-Cola, Colgate Palmolive, and Nepal Lever. In early 2002, the Maoists also began a campaign to systematically destroy all government infrastructure, resulting in the sabotage of 14 airports, 12 electrical projects, 2 district water supplies, telecommunications, and transportation systems totaling to an estimated total of $250 million in damage. However, this imitative was abandoned because of the devastating affect it had on the local population.

In addition to military force, the Maoists have not hesitated to use terror to ensure obedience and subdue areas where they have met resistance. A 2001 USAID report documented numerous cases of Maoist human rights abuses including murder, mutilation, torture, intimidation, kidnapping. Even more gruesome were a small number of ritualistic murders in which Maoists used stones to systematically break every bone in the victim’s body and then proceeded to skin the victim alive, burn the victim alive, or saw the person in half at the waist. As evidence of the success of these measures, virtually all local government officials have fled, leading to a collapse of the grassroots government structure and allowing the Maoists to step into the remaining power vacuum, despite the fact that less than 30 VDC Chairman were actually assassinated.

When all vestiges of government authority have been removed, the Maoists present themselves as the only viable alternative, standing up an embryonic parallel government system to legitimize their new order and win the support of the people. The United Revolutionary People’s Council of Nepal, billed as the future Maoist state, supplants old institutions with new Maoist variants: elected people’s representatives, people’s courts, people’s banks, tax offices, and checkpoints. In some instances, the Maoists have embarked on public works projects, even while denying access to government workers tasked with the same job.

Although the Maoists have focused their efforts on the countryside, the cities have not been neglected. In areas under government control, particularly the cities, the Maoists have attempted to assemble a revolutionary united front, co-opting the issues of groups ranging...
from student groups to labor unions and capitalizing on special interests to broaden their base of support. Before they were banned, there were nearly 20 of these groups which acted as above ground organs of the CPN(M). The Maoists mobilized these groups to man their general strikes, a tactic that has grown increasingly more frequent and more lengthy with serious repercussions for the economy. This regimen of strikes is supplemented with bombings and assassinations to calculated to destabilize the cities. The most significant assassination to date was the murder of Mohan Shrestha, Inspector General of Police, APF on January 2003. Finally, the Maoists also pursue non-violent methods to achieve their ends. But although the Maoists have repeatedly avowed their desire for a peaceful resolution to the conflict and have twice engaged in dialogues, in both instances the ceasefires upon which negotiations were predicated were unilaterally broken by the Maoists. It has since become apparent that, in both 2001 and 2003, the Maoists used the lulls in fighting tactically to recover and prepare for their next offensive.

UNITED STATES CONCERN

Although not the primary focus of Maoist animosity, "US imperialism" has recently attracted increasing amounts of Maoist ire due to US backing of the "royalist regime," which the Maoists claim is little more than an American puppet. The Maoists accuse the US of sabotaging last year’s peace process by signing a joint US-Nepal Anti-Terrorism Agreement, which was accompanied by an increased level of arms, aid, equipment, and training for the RNA. In reaction to the murder of 2 Nepalese security personnel who worked at the US embassy, the State Department also added the CPN(M) to the "other terrorists" list, its second tier terrorist watch list. In addition, as part of an international Maoist consortium, the CPN (M) vehemently opposes US actions in Iraq and the global war against terrorism. But although the Maoists have targeted US owned factories, threatened US organizations, and murdered 2 US embassy workers, they have stressed that it is against party policy to take physical action against any foreign citizen, tourist or government official. Perhaps the US’s greatest concern in Nepal is that lack of government control will allow Nepal to become a hotbed of terrorist activity. In 2001, heightened, post-9/11 US concern coincided with the Maoists’ escalation of the conflict, and since then, the US has significantly stepped up aid to the region, contributing $40 million to Nepal through USAID in FY2003 in addition to $17 million is foreign military financing (FMF) since 2002. As Ambassador Michael E. Malinowski has stated, “Working in tandem, in a spirit of cooperation not interference, our governments can help Nepal defeat the Maoist threat and reestablish democratic institutions responsive to the needs of the people.”

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Notes:


6. United Kingdom, Department for International Development, ECON Centre for Economic Analysis, Economic Aspects of the Insurgency in Nepal; Leiv Lunde and Audun Gleinsvik, ed.; available from **, 37. Table 1B According to the 1998 UNDP, in 1996, the year that People’s War was declared, the mid-Western mountain regions of Nepal had the lowest HDI (Human Development Indicator) at .241. Since then, that region’s status has improved and the 2001 UNDP shows the far-Western mountain region as the lowest HDI at .286.


12. Thapa, 83.


14. Murshed/Gates, 6. Table 2 = HDI, upper castes = Bahun-Chetri-Newar

15. DFID/ECON, 13. Kamaiya system


17. DFID Nepal, 4. The number of years of schooling for women is only about half of the number received by men and literacy for women is one-quarter compared to two-thirds male. 2001 UNDP Table 2, 132.

18. LTC Marks

19. 40 demands (19-25); Waldman, n.p.; LTC Marks.

20. Gersony, 34; Thapa, 87.


22. Ibid., 71.

23. Ibid., 38, 96.

24. Ibid., 39.

25. T. Marks 6, 8; Gersony, 82.


27. Prachanda, “Interview with Comrade Prachanda, the Chairman of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and the Supreme Commander of the People’ Liberation army, Nepal,” n.d. [interview online]; available from http://www.cpnmaoist.org/interviews/english/newinterview.htm; Internet; accessed 08 February 2003. “As presently influences of the old regime and new regime prevail in the urban and rural areas respectively, the Party has also concretely defined dialectical relation between destruction and construction. Consequently, the Party has made clear the fact that the construction, not destruction, gets priority in rural areas where the old regime is wiped out…. But be it known that in bigger cities, destruction, not construction, is accorded top priority since the regime of enemies is still dominant there.

28. T. Marks, 12. (which had 23 district administra-tions by Nov 2001)


30. 46,500 civil police, 15,000 Armed Police Force, and 54,000 Royal Nepalese Army, T. Marks, 14, 17; LTC Marks

32. DFIDECON, 41.

33. Ibid., 18-19.

34. DFIDECON 19, 21?

35. T. Marks, 10.

36. USAID, 29; Maharjan, 169. Particularly favored method seemed to be hacking the victim to death with *khukuris*, traditional cleaver like weapons.

37. Gersony, 71.

38. T. Marks, 13.

39. LTC Marks; T. Marks, 6.


41. Maharjan, 175.

42. T. Marks, 15.

43. Basu, 66.

44. DFIDECON, 20-21. Bandhs may have cost Nepal over 5% of its GDP in 2001-02.

45. T. Marks, 14. The most significant assassination to date was the murder of Mohan Shrestha, Inspector General of Police, APF on January 2003.

46. Maoist leader Prachanda has released statements claiming, “We have never closed doors for dialogue for a timely political way out, and we will never close them either.” Prachanda, President, NCDP (Maoist), Central Committee Press Statement, 25 May 2002.

47. T. Marks, 7; Marks e-mail.

48. Prachanda, “Interview with Chairman Prachanda,” estimated date soon after 27 August 2003 [interview online]; available from http://www.cpnm.org/interviews/english/interview_cm_prachanda.htm; Internet; accessed 08 February 2004. “...we termed the old feudal state as the puppet of imperialist forces and have termed so-called royal army as royal American army” Of course, the role of true Nepalese is reserved for the Maoists themselves.

49. Baburam Bhattarai to Ambassador Michael E. Malinowski, “Open Letter to the U.S. Ambassador,” 24 September 2003 [webpage online]; available from http://www.cpnmaoist.org/article-news/english/openletter_24sept03.htm; Internet; accessed 08 February 2003. Baburam Bhattarai, “The Peace Talks and After” [webpage online]; available from http://www.cpnmaoist.org/article-news/english/afterpeacetalk.htm; Internet; accessed 08 February 2004. “Even though a large section of the international community was seen sincerely committed and endeavoring for the success of the peace-talks, some forces could not conceal their sabotaging role from the beginning to the end. Leading this evil band was US imperialism led by one Mr. Bush and his arrogant ambassador Mr. Malinowsky [sic].” In reality the anti-terrorism agreement was a pro-forma document that the Nepalese government has signed annually for several years in order to receive routine anti-terrorism training such as baggage inspections at airports.


53. Prachanda, “Interview with Comrade Prachanda,” n.p. “Right from the beginning, our Party has been restricting in policy the capture of or physical attack and/or actions against any foreign citizen, tourist, or government official.... We would like to
make it clear that it has been our Party policy not to take any physical action against any US citizen, tourist or personnel except the US soldiers who come with so-called Royal Army to fight indirect encounter.”


55. Department of State, “Background Notes: Nepal 01/04” [website online]; available from http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5283.htm; Internet; accessed 19 February 2004. The FY03 USAID package alone which is more than 10 times as much as the total funding given to Nepal in entire the decade prior to 9/11/all of the 1990s.(Garcia/Stohl).


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Foreign Area Officer Association (FAOA)

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Defense Secretary William Perry mandated in 1996 that all services sustain formal FAO programs. As we begin 2002, five years hardly allows an adequate period for overall assessment of the Services’ programs; but it would be useful to provide feedback and evaluate progress toward longer range goals. Pacific Command (PACOM) provides a demanding case of diverse cultures, languages, economic conditions, political systems, and points of strategic importance within the largest of Unified Command Areas of Responsibility, putting FAO programs supporting PACOM into positions dealing with some of the world’s delicate and intricate problems. While the Services adequately train and prepare officers to be foreign area specialists, each Service’s own FAO utilization and management of FAO billets limits support to the geographic Unified Combatant Commanders. This study examines the PACOM case.

Advance study of areas, to include travel and interaction with people, both civilian and military, assuages the friction of arrival in remote theaters like Afghanistan, Iraq, or Vietnam. Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) are the United States military Services’ knowledge repository on international affairs, gaining practical insight during peacetime to avert or abbreviate war by understanding the nature of both friendly and potential enemy nations abroad.

Introduction

The 11 September 2001 terrorist attack on the United States’ economic and military targets shocked most people around the world. The foe acted with
deliberate and calculated intention, catching his vic-
tims unaware. In the aftermath, businesses in Wash-
goington D.C. had trouble meeting demand for maps of
Afghanistan and surrounding countries, minimally
stocked and previously not a popular area of focus.
Suddenly the region was of utmost concern, with
many officials and lay persons showing great interest
in it. This sudden spike in demand for knowledge of
obscure regions was not the first, nor will it be the last.
In 1993, few knew where Somalia or Mogadishu were
until after an early October battle altered US foreign
policy in executing a humanitarian mission. Prior to
1990, most people were unfamiliar with Kuwait or
what geo-strategic impacts an Iraqi invasion would
have. When media publicized the 1983 attack on
Grenada, the scramble for maps and people who
knew something about the area was likewise a poign-
ant example of ignorance that required an event of
sizable proportions to catapult the unknown onto the
front pages.

Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) are the United
States military Services’ answer to the peacetime
preparation that would minimize these scrambles for
expertise. Rather than making up for lost time after
an event like 11 September occurs, proactive famili-
arization and practical knowledge of regions is integral
to the strategic preparation that has operational im-
ffects. “In this era of multinational operations and
complex threats involving ethnic, religious, and cul-
tural strife, regional expertise, language proficiency,
and cross-cultural communications skills have never
been more important to the U.S. military. The thesis
of this paper is that, while the Services adequately
train and prepare officers to be foreign area special-
ists, the Services’ own FAO management of FAO as-
sets and billets leads to less than optimum support to
the geographic Unified Combatant Commanders
(COCOM).

This situation results from particular Service
cultures and represents general flaws in their respec-
tive resource management systems, notwithstanding
the excellent work that the FAO Proponent detailers
and assignments officers do within their various Ser-
vices. This paper will examine who FAOs are, why
the Services need FAOs, how the Services obtain
FAOs, and how well the Services meet the require-
ments for trained and capable FAOs needed by the
COCOMs. It will show in conclusion that billet man-
agement by the Services must improve. The analysis
will focus on U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), using
examples from the PACOM operational AOR. The
conclusions reached in this paper pertain, within vary-
ing degrees, to all of the geographic COCOMs. Con-
fronting the problems and taking corrective action will
result in more “bang for the buck” in all the FAO pro-
grams.

Who are these FAOs?

To describe what FAOs provide to PACOM, recent
examples of Army, Marine Corps, Navy and
the Air Force FAOs in action will both recount histori-
ical developments and illustrate the types of future re-
results Services expect from these regional experts.
These accounts will span the breadth and depth of
who FAOs are, what they do, how they operate, the
education they require, and the service they render to
the Combatant Commander and their respective Ser-
vices, at every echelon of command.

In November 1998, the Asia Pacific Economic
Council (APEC) held ministerial meetings and a lead-
ers' summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Formally as-
signed as the US Army student in the Malaysian
Armed Forces Staff College, Major John Dacey pro-
vided support to the Defense Attaché Office (DAO) in
coordinating the arrivals and departures of the Ameri-
can delegation attending this event. He provided
translation services, tour guide services, synchroniza-
tion support, transportation, and additional duties as
required in his position as Flight Logistics Com-
mander, assisting the State Department officials, the
US military's Security Assistance Officer, and the
Government Service Office that handled immigration,
customs, hotel arrangements, and welcome briefs. In
the spirit of jointness, Major Dacey exercised a super-
visory relationship over two Air Force captains, an Air
Force Staff Sergeant, and a Navy Chief Warrant Of-
fice to ensure such distinguished visitors as the
President and Vice President of the United States, the
Secretary of State, the US Trade Representative, and
the Secretary of Agriculture accomplished their mis-
sions at the conference. Interacting with national
leaders, local nationals, and members of all Services
are a normal part of a FAO’s job.

In June 2000, the I Marine Expeditionary
Force (MEF) initiated the concept of a functional liai-
sion team that draws Marines from within the units and
gathers officers and enlisted together into a working
group called a Marine Liaison Element (MLE). Real-
recognizing the critical importance of regional knowledge, the Commandant of the Marine Corps directed that the MLE "provide the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) and Marine Component Commanders with military, regional, cultural and linguistic expertise." These marines are not the rejects from other units with nothing better to do. Rather, they are technically and tactically proficient in their own specialties, outstanding representatives to foreign allies, and accountable to a formal MLE chain of command with a USMC colonel at the top. Maintaining basic skills, these select marines must also attain knowledge of the local customs, political situations, attitudes, and military capabilities of the various regions to which the I MEF may deploy at a moment's notice. The MLE has a good balance of foreign area officers, international relations officers, forward air controllers and forward observers including artillerymen, linguists and communicators...capable of providing critical liaison for Joint Task Forces in humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement roles." The officer corps provides the leadership; but all levels must attain increased levels of proficiency and expertise, dealing with current trends in missions unified commands continue to ask marines to accomplish.

In a FAO Journal article in September 2000, Lieutenant Chap Godbey, Combat Systems Officer aboard USS Kamehameha (SSN-642), reviewed his efforts to exercise FAO skills while conducting operational training between US Navy submariners and their Republic of Korea (ROK) counterparts. Although relatively new in the FAO business, with less than five years since the first call for officers to join the corps of regional experts, the US Navy provides a bilateral military training event demonstrating that FAOs need not be relegated to embassy duties or become staff officers in the joint arena. Naval FAOs can see the open ocean, breathe salty air, get their feet wet, and still perform duties as FAOs. Chap Godbey's emphasis in the mission was to increase mutual understanding and interoperability between the two allies, a solid goal to convince the US Navy of the value of enhancing the existing bonds between the ROK Navy (ROKN) and the US Navy. Finding the benefit for the ROKN to alter the status quo was easier, emphasizing a higher level of training proficiency for the Korean submariners. Lieutenant Godbey exercised diplomacy within his own Service and among participants of the international training opportunity, and thereby established a precedent upon which future interaction will build, and probably be taken for granted.

The US Air Force, like the Navy, has recently initiated a formal FAO program; and to this end it demonstrates an academic emphasis on its Proposent web site, posting scholarly works that FAOs have produced in conjunction with their schooling and duties within the operational Air Force. Representing graduate level writings, these efforts range from topics on China-Taiwan reunification to a analysis of how the Republic of the Philippines manages security issues in the South China Sea. Relevant to the discussion in this paper is the dual-use that the Air Force gains with its FAOs. First, Captain Ares, author of the article on Philippines security issues, works as an intelligence officer assigned to Kelly Air Force Base, Texas; and second he is a FAO with a regional focus in the Asia Pacific. In the latter capacity, the Air Force dispatched him for a month-long special project to research readiness and doctrine issues for the Armed Forces of the Philippines regarding defense against territorial aggression. The Air Force maximized its benefits from this officer through this dual-use role, a topic of later discussion in this paper, gaining intelligence and insight into an ally's handling of international security threats as well as increased regional knowledge for an officer who may later find himself in an Air Expeditionary Force deployed to the Philippines or Southeast Asia.

Why do we need FAOs?

Although the Army and the Marine Corps have had formal FAO programs for decades, the other Services' experience with similar programs has been desultory. In 1996 Secretary of Defense William J. Perry directed all US Services to begin training foreign area officers As the examples above illustrate, FAOs provide an overseas presence and represent US government policies of engagement, providing a degree of assured access while integrating with other overseas US Government agencies. Embassy country teams-- Foreign Service Officers from the State Department and the US Agency for International Development (USAID), among others, as well as Marine Security Detachments-- provide a toe-hold for US interests in even the most austere embassies in countries with limited access. In the Army, many FAOs serve in Security Assistance Office (SAO) billets and Defense Attaché Office (DAO) assignments, part of a peacetime presence "with allies and friends...to deter
aggression and coercion, build coalitions, promote regional stability, support the development of indigenous counterdrug law enforcement capabilities and serve as role models for militaries in emerging democracies. The overseas presence is all the more necessary with the draw-down of the 1990s and the CONUS-based expeditionary force the US military has developed. Specially trained regional affairs officers, culturally sensitive, politically aware, schooled in economic analysis, with solid military backgrounds, provide input as human intelligence (HUMINT) sources. They are in a unique position to make “relevant observations [that] add to our larger geopolitical understanding of potential areas for instability or threats to our national interests and help select our optimal avenue of response; diplomatic, economic, or military.” Through enhanced and developed programs of training and education, FAOs can gain academic knowledge that, when applied in the field, becomes meaningful and clear. Additionally, the international relations programs in which each FAO earns his or her master’s degree expose the FAO to peers and instructors who have experience within nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Because “combatant commanders and subordinate JFCs are likely to operate with agencies representing other US instruments of national power; with foreign governments; and with nongovernmental and international organizations,” FAOs provide vital expertise and should have the competence to broker these sometimes antagonistic relationships to accomplish missions. While the military ought not get bogged down with missions detrimental to the primary focus of the armed forces, the trend indicates increased numbers of missions on the humanitarian, peace keeping, and peace enforcement end of the spectrum of conflict in order to protect American interests at home and abroad. Since the military is “less effective in solving non-military problems rooted in religious, cultural, or ethnic enmities,” and the burden of peacemaking is on statesmen, FAOs provide the logical link as the military’s representation in “partnership with the US State Department, its close relations to the armed forces of countries around the world, and a growing familiarity with the international relief community.” General Shelton also assessed that these partnerships “have helped the United States conduct its foreign policy efficiently and have contributed to the success of the military’s operations.” FAOs have demonstrated their competence and value in diverse missions, combining knowledge of political-military situations with cultural awareness and language abilities to promote US interests abroad.

How do we get FAOs?

The Army FAO program provides a longstanding tradition of trained regional experts, a foundation and model from which other Services adjust to meet their own needs. Accordingly, the Army FAO program focuses on small adjustments to keep officers competitive with mainstream combat arms peers, with an index of success being strong representation among selectees to colonel and availability for posting in Defense Attaché Offices abroad. The Navy FAO program, established in 1997, has allocated additional seats at the Naval Postgraduate School for officers requiring education in regional affairs, maximizing training dollars and use of in-house resources to meet demands of expansion. The small group of Marines who work in the FAO and Regional Affairs Officer (RAO) programs has likewise expanded; additionally the Marine Corps has instituted a program of mentorship and professional development under the Secretary of the Navy’s FAO Mentoring Program initiative to bolster vision and promotion potential of participating officers. The Air Force has likewise oriented on recruiting and training FAOs in support of “the evolving Expeditionary Air Force concept,” increasing language training opportunities for interested officers. Common threads are woven throughout the Services: language training and education, field training and experience in the regions, and maintaining officer competencies to make them competitive for promotion. Critical to the military realizing an equitable return on its substantial investments in FAOs is the promotion and retention of these regional experts.

The standard program in the Army and Marine Corps FAO systems takes senior captains or junior majors from company command or staff officer positions in battalions and brigades and requires two to five years to create a “fully qualified FAO.” Depending on previous skill and/or demonstrated potential, the Defense Language Institute offers courses from 47 to 63 weeks in duration, to train officers to sufficient levels of proficiency in reading, listening, and speaking. The results manifest themselves in practical application during a follow-on tour in the region, with heavy emphasis on travel and possibly assign-
ment to a foreign staff college using the target language. The Army rounds out initial FAO training at a wide range of civilian institutions appropriate for the particular region, culminating in a master's degree in a variety of international relations disciplines. Marine Corps FAOs, as a rule, earn master's degrees in Regional Security Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School. The basic intent in both Services is to have officers with a high degree of both practical and academic knowledge of the area, tools with which they can become "regional experts."

The initial training period is merely an investment, with little return for the active forces. Given the expense in both real dollars as well as the opportunity cost of lengthy training time, the utilization tour is part of the payback FAOs make to their respective Services. The typical utilization is on a regional CO-COM's staff or appropriate Service staff supporting a regional Combatant Commander. In PACOM, the US Army Pacific (USARPAC) has a strong complement of trained FAOs who provide input to the Army commander and the PACOM with staff planning, coordination, and exercises. Additional utilization is possible with tours in the Pentagon as regional analysts or in the Defense Intelligence Agency with similar tasks. Finally, some officers return to their basic branches of service, developing core competencies and, as the Army calls it, "re-greening." These officers provide a link to the tactical world that publicizes and encourages potential candidates to serve as FAOs while offering FAO skills at the troop level. Time served in tactical units also provides depth of skill and credibility when interacting with foreign militaries in future postings as attachés, Security Assistance Officers, or military advisory group FAOs, preventing criticism that they are only staff officers, out of touch with the current state of military affairs at the user level.

How well are the Services recruiting, training, and managing FAOs?

Given the length of training required to produce a fully trained Army or Marine FAO, with language school, graduate school, and in-country training, the time elapsed since the 1997 mandate from Secretary Perry is barely enough to provide a fair assessment of how all the Services will meet the CO-COM's needs ten years from now. However, as a snapshot in time, the current overall state shows the two ground Services with established FAO programs filling billets on the PACOM, US Army Pacific (USARPAC) and US Marine Force Pacific (USMARFORPAC) staffs. The Navy has made headway in this realm and has a dozen billets on the PACOM staff, having developed staff positions with specially-coded FAO designation. The Air Force has no FAO-coded positions on operational staffs in PACOM; and, according to (USAF) Captain Joseph Pilkus, the Air Force FAO proponent office has a current task to rework staff billets to accommodate USAF FAOs on the PACOM staff. When given the opportunity, FAOs commonly integrate with the intelligence community and provide enhanced support to PACOM on a daily basis. The following example serves two purposes, (1) to illustrate how FAOs support by virtue of their training and (2) how the Services use FAOs even in billets not necessarily coded for FAOs. In Hawaii, the case of Major John Dacey exemplifies how he was assigned to the PACOM J2 against an Army Military Intelligence billet, specifically as HUMINT Operations Officer. Once the J2 found out Major Dacey was a qualified Army FAO, he was sent to Joint Intelligence Pacific (JICPAC) section to do "FAO" work, and has been relied upon by successive J2s as the in-house Southeast Asia specialist. Furthermore the current J2 created his own personal analysis cell in the directorate and put Major Dacey in charge using both his analyst and FAO skills. As with the dual-use in the Air Force, this arrangement puts him into a situation where he is working on FAO matters every day, even though he was not his original assignment. This arrangement displays the strength of the FAO programs. FAOs provide enhanced perspectives on international issues because of their education and training. Additionally, the contacts they have made in their respective regions, countries, embassies, and counterpart militaries serve them in subsequent units to which they are assigned. Services in effect add to the number of FAO assignments when they assign a FAO in his or her basic community, especially when that basic community, like intelligence, has a natural affinity for FAO capabilities. This dual assignment capability, while enhancing certain officers' value to the force, unfortunately does not have such a good symbiotic relationship with other communities like the combat arms branches in the Army.

This lattermost situation brings up the negative perception of rating chains and senior leaders...
who do not understand the value and skills FAOs bring with them. From their perspective, while the Service invests time and money into training the FAO, officers who do not choose additional specialties remain in the operational force and work in positions critical to accomplishing their Services’ missions. Subsequently, the FAO with several years of school and training reports, rather than operational fitness reports, compares unfavorably with his mainstream counterpart. Even an exceptional FAO with strong OERs must be able to represent his or her work to the board in a manner that allows accomplishments to be evaluated in the same light as the work of non-FAO peers. Without careful education of the senior leadership that writes efficiency reports, in addition to the leadership that reads and selects for promotion based on those reports, the FAO programs are at great risk of falling short of their full potential.

**How do we get better FAO support?**

The Services must dedicate resources to maintain a nucleus of officers competent in and capable of interacting within the regional context. “Specifically, foreign-language/area skills must be developed—over the long haul, not overnight—as necessary tools for the Total Force.” While different commands (SOCOM, for example) have non-FAO officers with regional and language expertise, the FAO programs represent the holistic approach to development of officers from diverse communities into regional specialists through deliberate, planned systems of education. In the sense of the aforementioned long haul, it is still too soon to judge the USAF and USN programs: more time is necessary to assess the effectiveness of their performance and utilization. However, as a checklist for them, and an admonition to all Services, this paper is long overdue. Additionally, with the Navy and Air Force programs in their infancy, implementing safeguards and sound policies now will prevent the need for radical change or frustrated assessments in 10-15 years. Learning from the Army and Marine Corps development of effective FAO programs, the Air Force and Navy should capitalize on the experiences of others and quickly exploit the experiences of the more established programs in terms of quality, quantity, and -- most important-- wise management policies.

The following are specific recommendations regarding Services’ implementation and management of FAO programs:

- First, and foremost, the Services must institute officer management techniques to recruit, train, educate, and utilize FAOs at all levels of command in a wide variety of FAO-coded positions. The professional development systems need to promote, not penalize, these officers who bring formidable expertise in their respective areas.

- Second, and in conjunction with the professional development system working to help FAO career progression, the Services must raise awareness and educate leadership at all echelons about the value of FAOs and the urgent need for effective husbanding of these assets.

- Finally, non-FAO assignments must benefit FAOs to the maximum extent to retain perishable language skills and expand their knowledge base in areas of expertise.

The remainder of this section will expand on these three recommendations in more depth.

Individual Services must meet their own needs, but perhaps the Army situation can provide a model for input in deciding how best to go about developing FAOs. In 1996 the Army revamped its officer personnel management and instituted Officer Professional Management System (OPMS) XXI. This system sought to meet the needs of the combat and combat support branches like armor, infantry, and engineers, while also acknowledging the need for functional areas like psychological operations, public affairs, and FAO specialists. The tension among the branches and functional areas over officer manpower manifested itself in the promotion rates of officers selected to O-5, O-6 and beyond. Prior to OPMS XXI, officers with additional specialties like FAO had to balance time in their basic branches, like aviation, and time in their FAO assignments. Realizing the perishable skills that languages represent, particularly difficult, low-density languages of Arabic, Chinese, Japanese, and Korean, OPMS XXI sought to allow officers to decide as senior O-3s to “stay FAO” and avoid the difficulty of simultaneously maintaining two vital competencies. By restructuring competitive categories for promotion and “grouping interrelated branches and...
functional areas into officer management categories called ‘career fields,’ promotion board equity measures sought to count officers against either their basic branch or their functional area, but not both. The additional injection of promotion floor to establish minimum numbers of necessary FAOs, for example, retained officers who might otherwise have found themselves not selected for promotion in favor of officers working in basic branches. This lattermost circumstance is one that the Air Force and Navy must closely monitor in order to protect the investments they make in these specialized officers. Significant advantages accrue in primary career fields that benefit from the depth that FAOs provide, such as the previously noted combination of an intelligence officer who additionally is a FAO. However, no better FAO development occurs than working in specialty jobs that provide opportunities to integrate language skills, interpersonal skills, analysis abilities, regional travel, and networking on a frequent basis.

The early decision of both the Navy and Air Force mirrors the Marine Corps and early personnel management techniques that the Army used in the officer assignment business. The positive side to such a method is that more officers can participate in the FAO program without fear of losing the basic competencies they developed over the first decade of their careers. This is both good for the career and good for his knowledge and professional competence in future jobs abroad when the officer represents his Service and the US military in front of US and foreign civilians, government officials, and military personnel. However, the difficulty of maintaining parity with non-FAO peers, in terms of proficiency reports used for promotion and evaluation for advancement, emerges as a stumbling block to recruiting quality officers to the FAO program. The Army sought to educate senior ranking officers on fair judgment of the FAO files at promotion boards with the implementation of OPMS XXI.

This education process must seek not only to educate promotion board members but also the commanders who write the efficiency reports, recommend or deny officers for the FAO programs, and mentor their subordinates. Peer opinions and uneducated advice add to the difficulty of recruiting and retaining FAOs, as common perceptions are that such a specialty takes one out of the mainstream and makes the officer less competitive for promotion or command opportunities. This myopic view hamstrings the programs by limiting the talent available, and consequently fails to support operational needs of the military. Ultimately, the same commanders and officers who, as mentors, discouraged junior officers from serving as FAOs will find themselves less capable at the higher echelons because they lack quality FAO support. A major aspect of gaining better FAO support is to overcome Service culture biases. Senior leadership presumably has the cerebral knowledge that Services need FAOs, but the parallel to environmental management and waste disposal’s “Good, but not in my back yard,” applies. They think FAOs are great, just as long as they are officers other than the superstars who have a future commanding Infantry Battalions, as though these futures were mutually exclusive. Contrariwise, FAOs can--and do--command battalions.

Drawing from the Marine Corps, a final recommendation for better FAO support is to utilize FAOs in positions where the incumbents can continue to hone their FAO skills while working in their basic specialty. FAOs are most useful when they stay current; and, to maintain proficiency, they need to be out in the field, using their foreign languages, learning about both their regions of specialty and their own parent Services. “While it takes longer to acquire minimal competence in a language than to train for most military occupations, there is less opportunity for, and less emphasis placed on, the maintenance of the more expensive skill.” Maintenance of foreign languages requires repetition over extended periods of time, otherwise the ability to communicate quickly deteriorates. Language ability represents a large proportion of the FAO’s value in dealing with indigenous peoples; therefore, Services must seek to keep FAOs in their region of focus. Contacts with such environments are growing with the increase in short-term deployments for training, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and participation in United Nations missions. Using a simple solution to bridging the gap between the fleet marine force and FAO staff tours, the Marine Corps recognizes the investment in its International Affairs Officers (IAOs), of which FAOs are a component, and “will assign those IAOs who return to duty with the operating forces after training or between utilization tours to commands that are operationally oriented toward their regions of expertise.” To the maximum extent possible, officers
will go to billets that would have a high probability of operating in their areas, thus maximizing FAO utilization and reaping benefits on multiple levels. Without such accommodation, Services will ultimately incur additional re-training with added costs and extended time in training when the time comes to employ the FAO in a more language-intensive billet.

Conclusion

The early stages of any institution, agency, or organization are the most critical to development, as the Air Force and Navy programs are finding. In their early stage, the nascent Air Force and Navy FAO program managers must exercise extreme care to establish solid training arrangements and professional development techniques. FAO Proponent bureaus in each Service must work hard to find favorable sponsorship within all echelons of command; or, as retired Army Lieutenant General Patrick Hughes advocated, a “champion,” who will speak on behalf of FAOs. Without one, General Hughes fears that “the harm won’t be noticed until you are needed, and then it will be too late.” Educating senior leadership on writing fitness reports, evaluating files, and retaining deserving FAOs who represent a significant investment and capability should prevent this situation from occurring.

In order to keep the ranks of the FAOs fully and competently manned, there is the critical need to identify officers with talent to learn foreign language; if they are not already multi-lingual, ensure they are retainable and likely to earn promotion(s), and sell their indispensable value to the Services. Developing good FAOs from the outset takes commitments of time, money, and personnel, as well as effective screening that takes into account Service objectives and personnel needs. Looking at what has worked and what has failed in the Army and Marine Corps programs will indicate to the Air Force and Navy potential options to meet these needs.

Finally, the regional COCOM must become the guardian and bedrock of effective FAO utilization. The needs of the regional commands and the capabilities of regionally focused Foreign Area Officers provide a natural juncture to fulfill the ultimate joint mission to uphold US policy and global interests. The Asia-Pacific region, as with the other combatant commands, requires commitment from all involved. The careful stewardship of investments in language-capable officers, regionally focused, and educated in international affairs, combined with practical employment in the international arena, will render invaluable dividends to our nation’s successful expeditionary forces of the future.

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31. Ibid.


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In World War II, Van der Meulen was dispatched to convince the Yemeni Imam Yahya to side with the allies. It took him a year to see the Imam, but was successful in 1943 in convincing the Imam to loosen his ties with Nazis. In 1944, famine gripped the Hadramut region of Yemen, in addition the Japanese occupation of the Dutch East Indies deprived many Yemeni merchant and Javanese relatives from contacting one another and valued income from the East Indies did not flow into Southern Arabia. Van der Meulen convinced the British to air drop food and supplies to starving Yemeni tribes in the Hadramaut, no doubt the Bin Laden’s, Bin Mahfouzes and many other tribes have benefited from this humanitarian act.

The book is bursting with Van Der Muelen’s photographs of various parts of Yemen in the 1930s to the early 1950s. It shows markets, the capital Sana’a and valleys in which Imam Yahya and his descendants would take refuge and mount civil wars. There is the unique rock palace at Wadi (Valley of) Dhahr and the palace of Sultan Al-Quati in Mukalla along the coast and much more. The first half of the book is in English and the second half in Arabic. This book is only for the FAO or true specialist in Yemen and Southern Arabia. Marines and Army personnel will get a feel for the terrain with the many photos and I also recommend this book for those taking advanced Arabic. Both languages mirror each other from the introductions to the bibliography, and each photo is highlighted in both languages, it makes for an excellent means of practicing (Modern Standard with a touch of Yemeni dialect) Arabic. This work was done with the help of the Yemeni Embassy in the Netherlands, and the Dutch Embassy in Yemen as well as the Royal Tropical Institute in Amsterdam.

Van der Meulen arrived in Jeddah in 1926 and the Dutch had established a consulate there and a Muslim Javanese vice-consul in the Holy city of Mecca to cater to the millions of Muslim subjects who arrived from the Dutch East Indies (today’s Indonesia) to undertake the pilgrimage. Britain, France and Russia all opened consulates in Jeddah to cater to their Muslim subjects. In 1931, he made his way to Yemen, the Hadramuat Mountains and south to Aden, there he found a niche for Dutch representation as many Yemeni merchants traded with the Dutch East Indies.
The Army FAO program has never had so much attention and generated so much interest as in the past year. Long recognized as the model Foreign Area Officer program in the Department of Defense, the Army FAO program has proven its worth in the contributions FAOs have made in the on-going Global War on Terror (GWOT). CENTCOM has sought and filled its FAO requirements to over 170% of its authorizations. Both in Iraq and Afghanistan FAOs provide valuable expertise in cultural awareness, coalition liaison, advance linguistic skills, and much sought-after experience in dealing with coalition forces and local populations.

Perhaps it is not a coincidence that a number of FAOs who have reached the general officer ranks hold key leadership positions within the Army and the Combatant Commands. These distinguished leaders, besides their noteworthy and long military service in traditional leadership roles, have proven records as attaches, and military advisers. They are proud to call themselves Foreign Area Officers. Their FAO expertise could not have been put to better use than in the positions they currently hold. – from the CENTCOM Commander, to the PACOM J-5, to the Deputy Army G-2. In the Army G-3, we are fortunate to have two general officers in the Directorate of Strategy, Plans, and Policy – the proponent of the Army’s FAO program. MG Keith Dayton, who just came on-board as the Director, G-35, and BG Kevin Ryan, who headed the Directorate for the past several months and is now the Deputy Director, are both experienced and distinguished FAOs. Perhaps the Army and DoD have seen the value of FAOs in the senior leadership ranks and will ensure that FAOs permanently serve in a number of key general officer positions.

The Department of Defense has also taken notice of FAOs and what they bring to the fight. In an effort to more effectively manage and expand the FAO programs of all Services, DoD is finalizing coordination on an updated DoD Directive 1315.17 (Service Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Programs). This directive, when approved, will give DoD greater oversight over the FAO programs, and seek to enhance the FAO capabilities of all Services.

One of the three essential skills that all FAOs possess is language. Language gives FAOs the ability not only to communicate but to live and function in the foreign culture. DoD is raising the proficiency standard for all linguists and FAOs to 3/3/3. Army FAOs routinely meet or exceed this standard by the time they complete in-country training. Recently, Congress passed legislation authorizing the Services to give incentive pay of up to $1,000 per month or $12,000 per year to each linguist who meets language proficiency standards. Each Service was given discretion to implement the program according to its own needs. Once implemented, the increased incentive pay will go a long way in helping FAOs attain and maintain high standards in language proficiency.

Finally, the Army now has an approved FAO vision – a vision of what a FAO is, what he does and what he represents. It captures the essence of the Army FAO, the Soldier-Statesman. The FAO vision is as follows: “Army Foreign Area Officers are warriors who provide focused regional expertise to the joint warfighter. They possess expert military knowledge of the region, advanced language skills, and a studied cultural and political understanding, which enable them to increase success and reduce risk across the full spectrum of operations from major combat to stability operations. The operate decisively in uncertain environments, often independently, as a valuable force multiplier to commanders and senior leaders from the tactical to the strategic level. Above all, they are Soldiers.”

(LTC Vasilios Fotopoulos, Acting Chief, Strategic Leadership Division)
Lots of activity here in the AF FAO Branch to impart this month, and up front I’d like to address some of the feedback we have received from the field on our FAO website. First and foremost we have contracted out our website functions and will have a new and improved site up at the end of the Fiscal Year. The new FAO website will incorporate a number of user-friendly functions to help both the customer and the program managers be more efficient in management of the FAO program. The new site will have easy to use menus, common application forms, and an improved FAO database function that will help us keep better track of you when you apply for our programs, attend our training opportunities, disseminate FAO information, and perhaps fill a FAO assignments one day. However, in order to prevent having our contractor try to get a vector on a moving target, we have had to suspend use of the old FAO site. While in the short term we understand this is an inconvenience it is a necessary step in order to move our program to the next level. We expect the new site to be fully functional in mid Sept, so please be patient. There will be no need to memorize a new address, we will just be redirecting from our https://fao.hq.af.mil site.

It might be a good idea to get an AF Portal account prior to the launch of the new FAO website, since that will be the vehicle in which the new site will be delivered. (To register go to www.my.af.mil).

We’re in the middle of heavy transition period for the AF FAO Branch. Maj Frank Swekosky has departed the branch after three years and is off to Command and Staff College with the Army at Fort Leavenworth, KS. Maj Swekosky’s replacement is Maj Paul Tombarge currently finishing up his masters at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA, and will report in Oct. The FAO branch recently welcomed Capt Jim Graham from DFAS in San Antonio to take over the Language Program Manager duties. Capt Graham will be your main point of contact for any language program issues such as the Language and Area Studies Immersion or the Rosetta Stone Online Language Learning Program. We are also sad to announce the departure of Maj Cara Aghajanian from the FAO branch this coming Fall. She has been an integral part of the FAO program since its inception in 1997 and will be truly missed.

Finally there are a number of initiatives in the works with the AF Force Development Structure that could have a profound impact on the way FAOs are managed and utilized AF-wide. These initiatives tie in directly with the on-going Defense Language Transformation Study and the expected OSD directed changes to the Services’ FAO programs. More details on this will be provided in the coming months as we get senior leader approval on new FAO program initiatives. Keep an eye on the FAO website for this information and all the latest AF FAO news.
F. Y. I. — Service FAO POCs

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https://fao.hq.af.mil
Foreign Area Officer Association
Board of Governors
Elections

Thumbnail Biographies of Qualified Candidates for the Board of Governors

**BG KEVIN T. RYAN** (48E). Currently serving as HQDA Deputy Director of Strategy, Plans, and Policy, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, General Ryan has also served as Defense Attache in Moscow, Russia; Senior Regional Director for Slavic States, OSD; Chief, Moscow Office, OSD Defense POW/MIA Office, Moscow, Russia; Liaison Officer, CINCUSAREUR Representation Office, Heidelberg, Germany; Liaison Officer, US Military Coordination Center, Zakho, Iraq; Liaison Officer, US Military Liaison Mission, Potsdam, East Germany; and in several other Foreign Area Officer and Air Defense assignments. He speaks Russian and German.

**COL (P) JOHN C. ADAMS** (48C). Currently serving as HQDA Deputy G-2, Colonel Adams has also served as Defense and Army Attache in Korea, Defense and Army Attache in Croatia, Assistant Army Attache in Belgium, Deputy Director European Policy in OSD, and in several Military Intelligence assignments. He speaks Croatian, French, German, and Dutch. COL Adams is currently serving as President of the FAOA.

**LT COL KURT M. MARISA**, USAF. Currently serving as the Air Attache in Copenhagen, Denmark. Lt Col Marisa has served in a variety of intelligence and FAO positions in Europe, Asia, and South America, including Defense Attache to Suriname and Liaison Officer to the Royal Saudi Air Force. Lt Col Marisa is a USAF FAO with specialties in Western Europe and the Americas. He is proficient in Dutch, Danish, German, and Spanish. Lt Col Marisa is a graduate of the Joint Military Intelligence College (JMIC), Joint Forces Staff College, and Air War College (NR), and is also currently a member of the Editorial Board of the Defense Intelligence Journal produced by the JMIC Foundation.

**MR. JOHN C. PEMBERTON**, FAO, COL (R), USAF. Currently serving as a consultant. In this capacity, he advises the Associate Director for Overt and Attaché Affairs on Defense Attaché issues, policies and operations. He is intimately involved in the transformation of the Defense Attaché System. He retired from the USAF after 30 years of service as a Colonel in July 2003. During his finally three years in the Air Force, he served as the Dean of the Joint Military Attaché School. He has served as the Defense Attaché in three different attaché offices: Serbia, Kosovo, and Bosnia. In 1999 he was certified by the USAF as a European Foreign Area Officer.

**MR. STEWART R. BARNETT III**, CAPT (R), USN. Currently serving as the Chief of Operational Projects Division, Director for HUMINT Operations, DIA. He served as the Defense and Naval Attache at the U.S. Embassy in London, U.K. During this tour he was involved in policy development and coordination for US/UK operations in Afghanistan, the Balkans, West Africa, and elsewhere. He served more than 31 years of naval service with significant Joint, Service headquarters, interagency, and international experience.

**MR. DAVID O. SMITH**, FAO (48D), COL (R), USA. Currently serving as a consultant. COL Smith has served with the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for International Affairs, as well as, multiple tours as the Army Attache (Pakistan), Chief of the Treaty Branch (DIA), Chief of the Latin American/African Division (DIA), and a Pol-Mil officer (DCSOPS-DA), as well as an artillery battalion commander. He speaks Urdu and did his FAO
training in Islamabad, Pakistan.

**MR. RICHARD C. HERRICK**, FAO (48C), LTC (R), USA. Currently serving as Chief of the Asia/Pacific Division at DIA, Lieutenant Colonel Herrick has served as the Defense and Army Attaché in Croatia, the Army Attaché in Yugoslavia, a staff officer at the FAO Proponent Office (DCSOPS-DA), a regional analyst (ITAC), a Rand Arroyo Fellow, and an Engineer battalion XO. He trained under the old Soviet/European program in Yugoslavia and speaks Serbo-Croatia. Mr. Herrick is on our current Board of Governors and serves as the FAOA Secretary.

**LTC STEPHEN H. GOTOWICKI**, FAO (48G), USA (Retired), Currently serving as a consultant. Began serving as a Middle East Foreign Area Officer in 1982. Career included tours as a UN Military Observer in Lebanon, Senior Intelligence Officer in Defense Intelligence Agency, Middle East Desk Officer for Headquarters, Department of the Army (DCSOPS - DAMO-SSM), J-5, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the United States Defense and Army Attaché to the Republic of Yemen. Created the FAOA website in 1996 and continues to serve as its Webmaster. Served as Editor of the FAO Journal since December 2000.

**MR. ROBERT J. OLSON**, FAO (48B), LTC (R), USA. Currently serving as the Dean of Students and Administration, Institute for Hemispheric Defense Studies, Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Olson has had a distinguished career as a premier Latin American specialists. He speaks Spanish and did his FAO training in Argentina. Mr. Olson is on our current Board of Governors and serves as the FAOA Treasurer.

**MAJOR JOHN ROBERT DACEY**, SE Asia FAO (48I), since 1994, Former Field Artillery, former MI, now FAO, Experience at USDAO Kuala Lumpur, USPACOM J2, JICPAC, DIA, and Joint Staff J2.

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A. Excerpt of FAOA Charter:

"3. The Directors of the Corporation (called the Board of Governors) shall be elected by a majority vote of the membership of the Association on a three-year basis."

B. CALL FOR VOTE: The term of office for the current Board of Governors ends 31 December 2004. Calls for nominations have been made, and based on the nominations received from the membership a Slate of Qualified Candidates has been assembled.

C. RULES:

1. All ballots must be mailed, faxed, or e-mailed to Association Headquarters.
   a. Mailed Ballots must be postmarked by 15 September 2004.
   b. Faxed and e-mailed ballots must be received by 2400, 15 September 2004.

2. Finally, each member may send in only one ballot. Ballots that are faxed or mailed MUST BE SIGNED.
3. Two other options are offered to the membership:
   a. If you agree with the Slate of Candidates, as presented, you may vote for the entire slate by simply checking the SLATE BLOCK.
   b. Select any or all (by placing a check or X in the space in front of each candidate's name).
   c. If you feel that another is better qualified than one of the candidates, or that another member of the Association should be included on the Board of Governors PLEASE PRINT LEGIBLY HIS OR HER NAME IN THE WRITE-IN SPACE PROVIDED.

___________________________
(VOTE FOR SLATE or FOR INDIVIDUALS OR WRITE-IN CANDIDATES)

______ SLATE OF CANDIDATES

or ----

_____ BG Kevin T. Ryan

_____ COL (P) John Adams

_____ Mr. John Pemberton

_____ Mr. Rick Herrick

_____ Mr. Stew Barnett

_____ Mr. Dave Smith

_____ Mr. Robert Olson

_____ Steve Gotowicki

_____ LT COL Kurt M. Marisa

_____ Major John Robert Dacey

or ----

WRITE-IN Alternative ___________________________________________

FAOA Member signature: _______________________________________
Board of Governors

KARL EIKENBERRY, BG, China FAO
Chairman

ALFRED VALENZUELA, MG, Latin America FAO, Vice-Chairman

CHRISTOPHER CORTEZ, Maj Gen, USMC, Latin America FAO

MICHAEL FERGUSON, COL, Africa FAO

ROBERT J. OLSON, LTC (R), Latin America FAO, Treasurer

RICHARD HERRICK, LTC (R), Europe FAO, FAOA Secretary

RAMON FERNANDEZ-CONTE, LTC (R), Latin America, FAO

PAUL GENDROLIS, LTC, Middle East FAO,

STEPHEN POULOS, COL (USAR), Europe FAO,

JOSEPH D. TULLBANE, LTC (R), Eurasia FAO,

DAVID SMITH, COL, South Asia FAO

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Nepal's Insurgency

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