North Korea: Sounding the Alarm

From Ram Raj to Brittish Raj to Swaraj

Diplomacy and the FAO

Sovereignty in Africa

Training of Foreign Area Officers

Georgia: From CGSC Student to Defense Minister
INSIDE THIS ISSUE

ARTICLES

North Korea: Sounding the Alarm
LTG Patrick M. Hughes, USA
and Captain Jin Pak, USA  pg 4

From Ram Raj to British Raj to Swaraj: The Genesis of Pakistan’s Defense Culture
Major Randall Koehlmoos, USA  pg 8

Diplomacy and the Foreign Area Officer
Rod Propst  pg 11

Regional Organizations and Sovereignty in Africa: Challenges and Possibilities
Captain Sunnie Brownell, USAF  pg 15

Reinforcing the Status Quo: Training of Foreign Area Officers
Major Patrick Crabb, USA  pg 16

Georgia: From CGSC Student to Minister of Defense
Lieutenant Colonel Jeff Fargo, USA  pg 18

FEATURES

Association News  p. 3

Articles, Books, and Web Site Reviews
Europe  p. 24
Middle East  p. 25

Service Proponent Notes
Army  p. 29
USMC  p. 33
A Note from the Secretary

The Foreign Area Officer Association would like to thank COL (Ret) Mike Ferguson for the fine job he did as President. Mike served for three years and brought the Association through a transition period of its affiliation with the Department of the Army Staff to one of greater independence and greater alignment with all the service Foreign Area Officer programs. His contributions are certainly appreciated by all our members.

COL (P) John Adams is replacing Mike Ferguson as the new President of the Association and comes to us with tremendous experience serving in a number of FAO assignments. COL Adams was the Assistant Army Attaché in Brussels, the Defense and Army Attaché in Zagreb, and most recently the Defense and Army Attaché in Seoul. Prior to his assignment in Seoul, he served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy. This summer he assumed the responsibilities of Deputy G-2, Department of the Army. We are very fortunate to have him serve as President and welcome his leadership.

One of the events the Association leadership will be addressing this coming year is the election of new members to the Board of Governors. The election is scheduled to be held every three to four years and ballots and instruction will be included in the Fall 2003 issue of the FAO Journal. Members are encouraged to participate in the election, as the Board of Governors is essential to maintaining the life of the Association.

The Association is currently experiencing a decline in membership. The Board of Governors is looking at ways of turning this trend around but one of the ways membership is sustained is by current members sharing their copy of the FAO Journal with non-member FAOs and encouraging them to join.

One of the adverse side effects of a declining membership is a decline in revenue. And, the decline in revenue has impacted on the number of issues per year of the FAO Journal. For the last two years the Association has only published three issues per year instead of the previous four. Please bear with us until we can rectify this problem.

A PCS move, however, has been the primary reasons in the past members have not received issues of the FAO Journal. We would like to remind members that the only way the Association has of keeping its membership roster current and ensuring members receive their copy of the FAO Journal is by members informing us of their current mailing addresses. The membership roster is also used to remind members when their membership is due. To keep mailing cost down, members are sent email notices of membership due dates. This puts greater importance on our having current email addresses. Members can also tell when their membership is due by the number following their name on the Journal address label. The number indicates the year, month, and day membership expires.

As a service to members who miss their copy of the Journal in the mail, the Association is exploring putting the Journal on-line in PDF format and making it accessible to readers using Adobe Acrobat Reader. Excerpts of the Journal are currently available on-line but storage space precludes us from posting the complete Journal. More information will be forthcoming on this initiative.

Respectfully,

Rick Herrick
FAOA Secretary
North Korea represents the greatest threat extant to stability in Asia and to United States interests. It is a very different matter from that posed by other current antagonists. Its weapons with mass effects capability, is a fait accompli.

North Korea has since 1953 continued the state of War that existed at the official ending of direct conflict in the Korean War. There have been periods of real tension and real albeit very limited conflict throughout this fifty-year period, and there have been periods of hope and potential progress. But, over this period there has also been a remarkable set of continuities: An intransigent and undependable leadership; a consistent willingness to maintain their military at some level of relative parity with South Korea no matter the cost; a penchant to engage in hostile Stalinist-era rhetoric and some very risky threatening activities, and concurrently to meet and discuss reasonable options with some fair-minded interlocutors without changing their essentially hostile position; and a constant effort to produce weapons that create the perception that challenging them directly is too costly. This set of strategic vectors seem to the Western mind too unstable to have been designed deliberately, although they may actually be elements of a grand strategy in the North’s context. However these vectors came to be, they have been “successful,” a concept that may have to be redefined in the broader context of North Korea’s very broad failures, culturally, societally, economically, and politically, in preserving the dismal North Korean regime against all odds.

Led now, ostensibly, by the enigmatic Kim Jong-il, North Korea’s government is composed of the military and the ruling elite, such as they are, in that very narrow portion of the society that reaps the benefit of the efforts of the larger mass of people who work and survive on the barest of margins. It is not clear that Kim is in full control, nor is it entirely clear that there are any alternatives to his stated role as central and supreme leader. It is not just the President of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) that is hard to define…it is the entire nation. The nickname, the Hermit Kingdom, certainly has applied to North Korea during that nation’s history.

Today we are faced with this blend of aggravating continuity and dangerous uncertainty in the context of our confrontation with Iraq, the ongoing war against terrorism, and numerous other requirements and commitments around the world. Indeed, it seems that the North Koreans have carefully chosen this period of US extension and complex engagement to threaten and pressure the United States and South Korea – this during a period when it seemed that South Korea was moving away from their traditional relationship with the US toward some greater form of accommodation and agreement with the North. Thus the actions of North Korea to restart some portion of their nuclear energy and nuclear byproduct production capability, to abrogate treaties and agreements, to become a nearly declared member of the nuclear club, and concurrently to engage in foolhardy military gestures like firing missiles and engaging in threatening air maneuvers, seems illogical, even irrational, until one recalls the actions of the North Koreans over time.

They seem, if nothing else, to be masters of faulty brinkmanship with exceptionally bad timing, repeatedly engaging in one act or another to heighten tensions, to display their undependability, and to raise the specter of war. Why?

The answer to that question is perhaps best found in the sociopolitical culture of the North.
They are a small and arguably disadvantaged and broken nation on a big and generally progressive planet, engaging in global political interaction whenever they can, and putting forth their peculiar position in whatever way garners the attention of the global community. They are among those nations of the world that seek respect but absent some form of radical antic do not receive it. But...they can hardly be ignored. They are dangerous in ways that demand some real attention.

They have some nuclear weapons capability and some other forms of weapons with mass effects – chemical, biological, and radiological -- and it would be a huge mistake to underestimate the importance of those capabilities. No country on earth has put more of their capability underground, a feature that makes taking offensive action to them hard. They have a formidable conventional capability that, in the very short time and space dimensions of the Korean Peninsula and in the Northeast Asian context, is very worrisome. The leading edge of the first artillery round or ground-to-ground missile fired in War on the Peninsula, when it impacts in the large urban zone that Seoul presents, would also be felt in Tokyo, in Jakarta, in Delhi, in Rome, in London, in New York, in Rio and in Perth. The economic marvel that South Korea represents would produce an effect across the globe if it were destabilized or destroyed. The mere presence of so many people so close to potential conflict – the band of large population represented by Seoul – Inchon and environs of perhaps 15 million people within easy range of North Korea’s attack capabilities – constitutes a condition that demands focused attention. And, there is the leading edge “tripwire,” involvement by the United States, the uncertainty of China, Russia’s potential to be affected, and the historic and very real complexity of Japan, among others, to consider. There is no other place in the world where big power interests converge so clearly.

Suppose for a moment that we arrive at a point where the threat posed by North Korea is “unacceptable.” Think of it in terms similar to the place we have come to with Iraq. We decide that we must act in order to forestall an even worse problem if we allow this condition to persist and to evolve. What next? Korea, all of it, and the surrounding countries, constitute an entirely different set of geo-political circumstances, and a much different cultural context than we have encountered in the Middle East. Where are the safe havens from which to stage and launch? Where are the sympathetic neighbors that will support us? What time line can we depend on to prepare? What sort of opponent would they be? What real propensity do they have to use weapons with mass effects? And, what is their timeline for action? These and many other questions weigh heavily on our leaders and our military and intelligence organizations.

A few things seem clear. China must step forward at some point and moderate North Korean’s volatility. Russia can also play an important role in calming the North. South Korea and Japan must hold firm to the values and goals that have prevented most aggression in the past. The UN must have far greater clarity and sense of purpose than they have displayed recently. The United States must have the strongest resolve of all to maintain an appropriate stance regarding North Korea – strong, dependable, unwavering, believable. All of this together might help but none of it will solve the basic problem.

The problem is at our doorstep. The proliferation of unacceptable capabilities has occurred. The North is once again rattling its real sabers, probably in search of that elusive respect. But, how do we know? This may be the prototypical example of the 20th Century’s legacy of uncertainty that we are now faced with in the early part of this new century. We can hope and pray for some enlightened change that will dilute this threat bfor
now we are faced with the certainty and the immediacy of a fifty-year old problem that is worsening by the day.

The real questions are: What can be done to minimize and control the North’s nuclear and other weapons with mass effects capabilities, or to remove their nuclear capability outright? What constitutes an unacceptable condition? What actions are we willing to take? When? And more. These questions all contain a clear set of policy decisions and all portend a threat to global stability far greater than that posed by a belligerent proliferating Iraq. Only one thing seems certain: This problem will not get better if we simply ignore it.

The author, LTG Patrick M. Hughes, US Army, Retired, has served in Korea.

_____________________________________

North Korea and Iraq: An alternative view
Captain Jin Pak

There are a growing number of people who assert that the current crisis in NK highlights the weakness of a preemptive force strategy as outlined in President Bush’s recently published National Security Strategy. The labeling of NK and Iraq as part of an “axis of evil” seems to demand that the US should apply the same preemptive force doctrine in both situations. Yet, the Bush Administration repeatedly declares that it will not consider military force in the NK case. This has naturally opened the doors to critics claiming that the Administration’s policy is hypocritical and should be changed.

I argue the opposite. President Bush never asserted that preemptive force is a policy for all situations. Like any policy —foreign or domestic— certain conditions are required for success. In this case, a policy of threatening military force to secure verifiable disarmament is most appropriate in situations in which the threat of force is credible.

Many factors determine whether or not threat of force is credible. They include but are not limited to:

1) The level of domestic support —among the public and the elite— the US has for actually carrying it out.

2) The probability of military success – which is determined by the readiness, effectiveness, and transportability of the US military as compared to the effectiveness and readiness of the military of the country receiving the threat.

When these conditions are met, threat of forces is prudent and effective. The strongest counter-argument to this view, is that a country can be deterred from pursuing WMD without threat of preemptive force. After all, if such a strategy was reliable, this policy is unwise for both cases, NK and Iraq. However, a closer look at the two scenarios reveal that policies without the backing of credible force are ineffective.

US policy for deterring NK from pursuing nuclear weapons incorporated many elements including sanctions, a significant number of US troops guarding the DMZ, intense international pressure, notably including China and Russia, and various international agreements. These include the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreement, the 1992 Joint Declaration for a Non-Nuclear Korean Peninsula, and the 1994 Agreed Framework. Despite all this, NK continued its WMD program.

Not only did this strategy fail to deter NK, it also rewarded it. In 1991, NK received the US commitment to remove all nuclear weapons from South Korea as a condition for signing the IAEA agreement. Additionally, it received numerous
commitments in the 1994 Agreed Framework that included eventual normalized relations with the US, two light water reactors, and annual fuel shipments. It also kept the plutonium it already extracted from its reactor in Yongban—enough to make multiple nuclear weapons in a few months assuming it hasn’t done so already. Most importantly, NK continued its WMD program in secret for the next eight years until this past October when it officially admitted that it had an active program.

Why did deterrence fail? After all, the US did employ threat of force to get NK willing to negotiate thereby making the 1994 Agreed Framework possible. Yet, it ultimately did not deter NK from continuing its program. I submit that this is because President Kim Jong Il deemed that preemptive US military action was not credible. This thinking was present in 1994 as evidenced by NK’s aggressive bargaining during deliberations leading to the Agreed Framework, and continues now as evidenced by the official announcement of NK’s active nuclear weapons program.

NK doubted the credibility of US preemptive force, because the two conditions mentioned above were not met. While the US public would support a military response to a North Korean invasion, due to the 37,000 US soldiers that would bear the brunt of it, it is questionable whether the public would support a preemptive attack on NK. Furthermore, the probability of success for such an operation is also obscure since it could trigger a North Korean attack across the DMZ endangering untold numbers of American soldiers, South Koreans, and even Japanese. This would make the potential cost of such a preemptive action outweigh any temporary benefit.

The Iraq case exposes similar weaknesses when trying to deter without credible threat of force. Despite 16 UN Security Council resolutions, a comprehensive set of sanctions, the proximity of US troops, and intense international pressure, the containment strategy appears to have benefited Saddam Hussein more than the international community. Why did containment fail?

Containment is infeasible on geographic terms alone. Iraq has a border over 3,600 km long and shares it with six different countries: Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, and Turkey. According to a May 2002 report, the US Government Accounting Office (GAO) estimated that Iraq smuggles up to 110,000 barrels of oil per day through Jordan, up to 250,000 barrels per day through Syria, and up to 80,000 barrels per day through Turkey. Iraq also diverts some of the $10 billion worth of goods now entering Iraq every year for humanitarian needs to support its military and WMD programs instead. If allies such as Turkey and Jordan cannot effectively seal their borders, how can containment work?

Despite the practical obstacles of effective containment mentioned above, the most significant reason that it failed to deter Saddam is—similar to the NK case—the lack of credible force. Like his NK counterpart, Saddam Hussein prudently doubted the credibility of a US preemptive military action, up until September 11th. Prior to that day, he deemed that US domestic support—among the public and policy elite—for an Iraq invasion was not high despite strong probability of military success. Now, with fully two out of every three Americans supporting military action—albeit through a multilateral approach—both conditions determining credible threat of force are met.

In the cases of NK and Iraq, both leaders perceived that they faced a deterrence strategy without the backing of credible threat of force. This ultimately did not work, and both countries continued its programs. Thus, credible threat of force may serve as the deciding factor when trying to deter a country that has a strong desire for WMD capability.

(Continued on page 34)
Pakistani perceptions of foreign subjugation, geopolitical insecurity, and ineffective government have generated a pessimistic Pakistani mentality best described as a defensive culture. British partition of the subcontinent in 1947 and the resulting inequalities, warfare, and bloodshed are painful historical events for Pakistanis and form the foundation for this mentality. The lack of assistance from the United Kingdom, United States, China, and the Muslim world during critical times in Pakistan's history repeatedly has frustrated the Pakistani people, and Indian geographic, economic and demographic dominance of the subcontinent further fuels this Pakistani defensive culture. Though bolstering national unity, Pakistani xenophobia leads to Pakistan's virtual slavery to the typecast of India as a Hindu bogeyman responsible for Pakistan's domestic chaos. As Pakistanis seek revenge against India for past misadventures and view any compromise with this foreign hand as demonstrating weakness, bitter memories perpetuate this defensive culture and curtail hope for the future.

This article attempts to explain the underlying factors of Pakistan's defensive culture by examining these preceding contentious issues of foreign domination and international apathy. While I am alluding that Pakistani culture can be characterized in terms of a typical predisposition, the assumption that national stereotypes actually exist is still difficult to quantify as culture and individual beliefs are not uniform and static. Pakistani society is now so fissured, rampant with military weapons, and overwhelmed by the spread of narcotics that authoritarian military rule has become the norm rather than the exception. In general, Pakistanis lack faith in civilian authority, and elected governments can only function with support of the army. Therefore, Pakistanis tend to believe in short-term solutions, in cutting corners, and in taking unnecessary risks because in a hyper-turbulent world, people cannot be relied on, and things are likely to change abruptly.

Many Pakistanis see themselves as the victims of a carefully planned conspiracy by Indian Prime Minister Nehru (the scheming Brahmin) and Lord Louis Mountbatten (the wicked Britisher) to deprive Pakistan of its just entitlements under the partition plan in the effort to see Pakistan fail as a nation. India, as the successor-state to the British colonial regime, received the majority of the trained administrative personnel, armed forces, and financial reserves of British India. Pakistan, as the seceding state, inherited very little. After Indian forces invaded the holdout princely state of Hyderabad (the temporary South Pakistan) the day after Jinnah died in 1947, the citizens of Pakistan suspected India possessed a plan to destroy their new country. Pakistan therefore developed a national security strategy based on a highly centralized state and powerful military establishment to counter the perception of Hindu India trying to undermine Pakistan's sovereignty. Pakistan has since tried to be a strong ally of both the West and the Muslim world, as geopolitical
conditions made the search for external support a central feature of Pakistani diplomacy from the nation's inception. However, Pakistan's attempt to serve two masters has contributed to its political fragmentation.

**Domination by Ram Raj (Hindu Rule)**

One perception within Pakistan is that 80% of Indians are vengeful Hindus who wish to destroy and then re-absorb Pakistan. The Muslim invasions of the subcontinent that began in the 11th Century defiled India and ended the 2,000-year domination by Vedic culture and the Hindu dynasties. Pakistani resentment is strong toward the perception of Hindus (specifically Indian and not Nepalese) as antagonists, far beyond just the inherent differences in the religions. In the 1920s Hindus advocated the shuddhi movement (the re-conversion of Muslims to Hinduism) because Hindus argued that most of India's Muslim population had originally been Hindu. During the centuries of Muslim rule, Muslims had forced Hindus to convert to Islam. The Indian Muslim League's two-nation theory of the 1930's stated the Hindu and Muslim communities within the sub-continent constituted two separate cultures, which gave rise to the idea of a separate nation for Muslims. Hindus were strongly united in opposition to the idea of a separate Muslim state that would divide Mother India. However, the creation of Bangladesh in 1971 voided the idea of a unified Muslim homeland as the total number of Muslims who existed in India and Bangladesh exceeded the number within Pakistan.

**Partition of the Subcontinent**

Pakistan's manner of creation begins to explain contemporary Pakistani character and behavior. Pakistani opposition to Indian as well as Britishers is firmly embedded in memories of partition and the deaths of between 500,000 and 2 million people. Pakistan and India blame each other for starting this savagery and the memories are still sharp today as the elders pass down the traumatic legacy of partition to subsequent generations. The Punjab in Pakistan took the brunt of the refugees during partition (both incoming and outgoing), which begins to explain the strong Indian animosity in Pakistani Punjab.

**Indian Occupation of Kashmir**

Both Pakistan and India are unbending in their resolve over Kashmir, largely because the Kashmir issue rests on the legitimization of the principles upon which each nation was founded. Kashmir is the test of Pakistan's founding ideology as the new home for South Asian Muslims because over 77% of the population of Jammu and Kashmir in 1947 was Muslim. Pakistanis consider Indian possession of Kashmir as the unfinished business of the 1947 partition, arguing that if the Indian Princely States of Hyderabad and Junagad (both with Hindu majority populations and Muslim rulers) became part of India by force, then Kashmir (with a Hindu ruler and Muslim majority) should have became part of Pakistan.

Pakistanis believe Kashmir is disputed territory, that it currently belongs neither to India nor Pakistan, and that the question of permanent possession of the territory can be resolved only by the Kashmiri people exercising their moral and legal rights of political self-determination through an internationally administered plebiscite. Pakistanis see Kashmir as integral to their Islamic identity, dignity, and culture, and view the permanent loss to India of any portion of Kashmir as unacceptable. Pakistanis see Kashmir as symbolic of the moral criminality of Hindu minorities ruling Muslim majority areas against their wishes and thus of the continued need for a Muslim homeland.
(Pakistan) within the subcontinent. In the words of Sardar Muhammad Abdul Qayyum Khan, former Prime Minister of Azad Kashmir (AK), "If we [Pakistanis] were to give up Kashmir, it would be like giving up Pakistan. It would be giving up your religion...you have a much greater responsibility of defending Islam at the same time...Pakistan and Islam have become synonymous...defending Islam is the greatest responsibility that any Muslim country has today on earth."

**Legacy of the 1971 India-Pakistan War**

Pakistanis refer to the Indian military victory and the secession of East Pakistan as the '71 debacle. The 1971 war strengthened India's position as the dominant power in the region, and India quickly became the first country in the world to recognize the newly formed People's Republic of Bangladesh. Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had not only broken Pakistan in two, but she also captured 100,000 Pakistani prisoners of war. In a speech to the Indian Parliament, she claimed to have avenged history, as a Hindu woman had shattered the myth of the Muslim macho warrior. The final Pakistani humiliation came at the surrender ceremony in Dhaka when Pakistani General Niazi, commander of the forces of Muslim Pakistan, surrendered to the three generals of Hindu India--one being a Parsee, another a Sikh, and the third a Jew.

This war disproved West Pakistani's assertion that the Islamic faith and a shared hatred of Hindu India provided an indestructible bond joining the two wings of Pakistan into one nation. Despite the common bond of Islam, profound differences existed between East and West Pakistan. East Pakistanis were of a different ethnic stock than the West Pakistanis (Bengalis verses Punjabis, Pathans, and others) and spoke a different language (Bangla verses Punjabi and Pashtu). In addition, the West Pakistanis regarded Bengali Islam as tainted by Hinduism and thus in need of purification (the same view taken by some gulf-state Arabs in regard to contemporary Pakistanis).

**Past Political Betrayal**

Pakistanis have great skepticism of foreign governments based on their perception of intentional discrimination against Muslims by the members of the United Nations and the less than active support the Organization of Islamic Council (OIC) gives to Pakistan. Pakistanis are frustrated by the lack of Western and Muslim support during the 1948, 1965, and 1971 wars with India, and of Chinese neutrality during the Kargil fighting in 1999. Pakistanis are leery to rely again solely on external assistance to guarantee their national security.

Pakistanis are especially skeptical of the United States because of the perception of previous US betrayals by not assisting Pakistan in its 1965 war against India, the US disregard of Pakistan after the Afghan war, and nuclear sanctions only on Pakistan and not India prior to May 1998. Pakistanis like many Muslim people inherently view the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) as the Christian powers fighting a continuing war against Islam under the auspices of combating terrorism. The zero-sum US approach to India-Pakistan relations and avoidance of making a lasting political decision supporting either nation has left Pakistan feeling that the United States was playing each against the other. Though Pakistan is tired of being a political one-night-stand for the United States, Pakistani insecurity with India remains the driving force behind Pakistani foreign policy and national security strategy and forces Pakistan to accept risk with the United States in the effort to acquire additional deterrents.

**Geopolitical Insecurity**

Pakistan is a narrow country with long frontiers and limited strategic depth as politics rather than common sense determined Pakistan's borders. China and Russia to the north hesitate to back Pakistan's or India's position on Kashmir for fear of stirring-up trouble with their own Muslim minorities, and the Pakistani border area with Afghanistan is a source of continuous instability. While Iran is possibly looking to adopt more pro-Western policies, some Pakistanis suspect Iranian support for the sectarian violence within Pakistan.

The unprecedented criticism from Pakistan's longtime ally China during the 1999 Kargil fighting particularly deepened Pakistani feelings of isolation. Though in the past China has been a supporter of Pakistan, problems between one-time strong allies Pakistan and China are growing. China charges that Pakistan has continuously failed to curb the activities

(Continued on page 22)
Henry Kissinger’s *Diplomacy* is a thoughtful study in matching the foreign policy style and rhetoric of the United States with the global realities contained in state system diplomacy—that is balance of power, spheres of influence, national interests, and limits on the exercise of power. A wily practitioner of a moderated *realpolitik*, Kissinger counsels for a policy of coexistence—a coexistence which allows for the American craving for the “widest possible moral consensus around a global commitment to democracy”, but while using a Bismarck-style balance of power approach which proactively seeks to multi-laterally reduce challenges to security, seeking “to restrain power in advance by some consensus on shared objectives with various groups of countries…in an interdependent world.”

The new foreign area officer, often with a strong background in combat arms tactics, may be initially overwhelmed by the introduction to the strategic diplomatic setting, which will form one of the core competencies required in his duties as a politico-military officer. However, some basic texts provide excellent grounding, a foundation which will serve the FAO throughout his varied duties. One of these, Henry Kissinger’s *Diplomacy* (Simon & Schuster: New York, 1994), offers the foreign area officer security studies novice, or the more experienced FAO expanding his current foundational knowledge, an excellent introduction to the history of global policymaking. On the margins, it is a primer for statesmen. At its core, the book provides a thorough introductory history of diplomacy and its major approaches—nation-states, balance of power, spheres of influence, collective security, containment, détente, and the 21st Century’s yet-to-emerge approach to the challenge of global fragmentation paired incongruently with political and economic [if not military] globalization. As it does so, it introduces the ground-breaking thinkers or practitioners of the art of diplomacy—Richelieu, Metternich, Bismarck, Wilson, Kennan, and even Kissinger himself. Most importantly, the book places the role of the United States and the practice of diplomacy by that nation into an understandable context. Weaving history into a story of how America approaches foreign policy and why it does so in that manner gives *Diplomacy* a palpable immediacy.

**Diplomacy’s Thesis.** Kissinger’s background as both a professor of policy-making and as one of the late 20th Century’s most skilled practitioners of practical statesmanship firmly establishes the book’s credibility. Global in scope and employing an extended timeline, the book is anchored in a reflection on how these lessons in diplomacy are relevant to the United States and its policy-makers—as both the introductory and concluding chapters make clear. As it is America-centric, it is natural that the history of American diplomacy has as its strategic counterbalance the USSR, particularly during the Cold War period (fully ½ of the book). While de Gaulle saw Russia as a country with “an inherently flawed, fragile, and vastly inferior system,…with its gaps, its shortages, its internal failures, and above that its character of inhuman oppression, felt more and more by its elites and the masses, whom it is more and more difficult to deceive and to subjugate,” (575-576) the US viewed Russian power as monolithic and worthy of its central diplomatic focus for well over a half century. What emerges is the thesis of the United States as the singular, however reluctant, lead for global diplomacy; the US who must *balance* moral zeal and commitment...
with a natural isolationism; and who must guide the world through 21st Century diplomatic quagmires in a world from which it can neither withdraw nor dominate (the American paradox of 21st Century global diplomatic power).

Themes in Diplomacy. Kissinger works through three principle themes upon which the structure of Diplomacy is hinged. These are: 1) Diplomacy as a primer for statesmen, 2) Diplomacy as an historical survey of policy execution trends, and 3) Diplomacy as an introduction to the great theorists and practitioners of the diplomatic art.

The Art of Diplomacy: Diplomacy as a Primer on Statesmanship. He serves up his vision of Realpolitick, that is the practical application of diplomacy not the system of Bismarck, in what is in many ways a primer for would-be statesman. In fact, throughout the book he actually comments on what good or poor statesmen do. Stressing the practical lessons he seeks to convey, versus viewing his book as merely an intellectual exercise, he provides one of the early lessons—“Intellectuals analyze the operations of international systems; statesmen build them” (27); luckily for Kissinger, he was able to do both, adding credibility to the book. He seeks to teach diplomacy lessons in leaks and the use of public opinion, the quicksand of economic sanctions, the disadvantages and advantages of personality diplomacy, the diplomatic equivalent of doing nothing known as the “fact-finding mission”, the dangers of haste in diplomacy, the importance of keeping one’s options open, the balance the statesman must maintain with his people, and what statesmen owe to the people they represent. For this reader, the lessons of statesmanship so directly stated were one of the three hinges on the door Kissinger opens for the new student of policy-making in his roadmap to understanding diplomacy. Diplomacy’s [unstated] role as a primer for budding statesmen is Kissinger at his pedagogical best.

The History of Diplomacy: The Major Concepts. Another of the aspects of the book upon which its success hinges is the introduction of the central national security approaches that have had the greatest long-term influence on how diplomacy and national security policy-making work today. The modern state system, of entities with national interests, emerged with France’s raison de etat, which said that all states act in their own interests with the ends justifying the means in a risk-benefit calculation. In the Netherlands, quickly followed by Great Britain, the practice of balance of power politics and diplomacy arose. France adopted this and became a textbook case of the functioning of balance of power. One of the giants of world diplomacy was Austria in the early 19th Century, who led the development of the balance of power through the Congress of Vienna, resulting in almost a century of European peace; the Congress provided “stability by consensus.” Germany saw the next great development in methods of diplomacy in Realpolitick (raison de etat in wolf’s clothing)—a system based on raw power & might is right. Realpolitick marked a return to the principles of Richelieu using tactical flexibility to strategic advantage—power politics and national interest above all. Realpolitick was also practiced in England, by their own Disraeli. Mixing balance of power, moral crusading, and state’s interests (a moderated raison de etat and Realpolitick) was the unique American offering to diplomatic practice, first stated in the Monroe Doctrine, but reaching its most concrete statement at the turn of last century by Theodore Roosevelt and the “spheres of influence”. With the fall of Bismarck with emergence of Russia, weakening of Britain (who continued with their dominate diplomatic approach of “splendid isolation”—“diplomacy turned rigid”. National interests & conflicts without a balance of power led inexorably to WWI (William II’s weltpolitic merely inflamed the problem). Bismarck’s restraint was replaced by “confrontation as the standard method of diplomacy”, and not a prevailing system nor a single, great diplomatic practitioner was there to stop the advance of WWI. It is
here that the heart of the recommended 21st Century approach emerged. The United States, in the wake of WWI, sought to apply “Collective security”; Wilson led this attempt, although he had been preceded in these efforts by Great Britain’s Castlereagh and Gladstone. America disdained balance of power and realpolitick—it believed in democracy, collective security, & self-determination (pursued with a healthy measure of moral zeal). The ideal did not sustain the peace. The Treaty of Versailles proved too general and too unevenly applied to stop the re-emergence of Germany & WWII “Collective security fell prey to the weakness of its central premise—that all nations have the same interest in resisting a particular act of aggression and are prepared to run identical risks in opposing it”. Thus, the re-emergence of Germany between wars with Stresemann with his policy of “fulfillment” (read realpolitick) caused the downfall of Treaty of Versailles & WWII. After the Second World War, perhaps the most influential thinker on diplomacy as it applied globally with the USA as its locus was George Kennan and the diplomacy of “Containment”; the containment approach, which was more basically a strategy which assumed the mantle of diplomatic approach as it was applied in the bi-polar Cold War, remained the diplomatic touchstone for almost a half century, until the fall of the USSR in 1991. Containment operated from its USA base as the USSR and Stalin applied Spheres of influence, with Stalin as the “…master practitioner of Realpolitick” as he developed the Soviet sphere of influence around the world. The last major Cold War diplomatic trend is represented by détente. Détente, first mentioned by Churchill in 1952, became the primary focus of Kissinger and his circle of practitioners. Detente, in one form or another would last until after the Cold War. Since the Cold War, diplomacy has been fractured by ethnic, religious, and other political posturing and practice. The balance the bi-polar world had ensured, despite its many threats, was totally upset in the uni-polar world at the beginning of the 21st Century. No rational, sustainable diplomatic model has emerged in the early 2000s, although Kissinger’s closing chapter recommends an approach.

The Key Figures of Diplomacy. The third hinge on Kissinger’s open door to diplomacy study is the role of the great men, the most successful practitioners of the art of diplomacy. Kissinger describes what sets great men apart “All great leaders walk alone. Their singularity springs from their ability to discern challenges that are not yet apparent to their contemporaries.” (370) He then introduces some of these great practitioners of diplomacy. Among the earliest of the great practitioners was France’s Richelieu, the proponent of raison de etat. Of him Kissinger observes, “…Richelieu must be remembered as one of the seminal figures of modern history. For he left behind him a world radically different from the world he had found, and set in motion the policy France would follow for the next three centuries.” (65) The next set of notable practitioners were those connected with the emergence of balance of power diplomacy. These included William of Orange in the Netherlands, William Pitt in Great Britain, and even France’s Louis XIV. The architect of the greatest measure of balance of power diplomacy, represented by the Congress of Vienna, was Metternich—who saw and practiced “…moderation [as] a philosophical virtue and a practical necessity.” Realpolitick’s architect was Bismarck; his greatest strength was that he applied what could have been a threatening system into a practice, “…preached with such moderation and subtlety that the balance of power never broke down.” The next great diplomatic trend was toward collective security, embodied in the person of Wilson and his Fourteen Points; his ideals sustain and form the backbone of the recommended 21st Century approach to diplomacy. The next seminal figure of diplomacy must be recognized as George Kennan, whose ideas guided Truman in the policy of containment. Kissinger is himself one of the great students, teachers, and practitioners of diplomacy. Kissinger’s diplomatic successes, as the master of détente with President Nixon, came as a result of his understanding of policy-making and of the
President he served. Kissinger guided his president through a Triangular Diplomacy between the USA, USSR, and China; it is at the heart of the approach of dealing with multi-lateral issues, the approach Kissinger recommends for the future. As Dean Acheson had said, “the effectiveness of the secretary of state depends on knowing who the President is.” (538) It is the importance of the President, his prerogatives, and his limits of power (the paradox between limits and prerogatives) which links Diplomacy so well with core subject matter in national security studies institutions.

Diplomacy and the Study of National Security Institutions. For the foreign area officer student of national security institutions of the United States Diplomacy offers a natural, global extension of America-centric texts, such as Jordan, Taylor, and Mazarr’s American National Security or Jerel Rosati’s The Politics of United States Foreign Policy. Two major themes of these books provide direct linkage to the Kissinger book. The first is the power of the President, stated as “presidential prerogative” (Rosati, 99). That type of prerogative links to many of the great practitioners highlighted in Kissinger’s book—Richelieu, Metternich, Bismarck, through the cast that dominated the Cold War’s bi-polar clash from Stalin/Roosevelt through Nixon and Reagan until the collapse of global communism had been forced through the extended application of Kennan’s containment strategy. It is embodied in a quote by Truman in the text, “If the President knows what he wants, no bureaucrat can stop him. A President needs to know when to stop taking advice.” (425) The second of these themes which link Diplomacy to JTM/Rosati is the concept of the “paradox of power”. Jordan, Taylor, and Mazarr explore Constitutional ambivalence (JTM, 124) of the United States and how the sharing of powers is, thus, paradoxically applied. Rosati is even more direct in his review of the paradox of power; he speaks to both the internal paradoxes of power upon which JTM focus, but expands that to a more global con-text of that paradox, much as Kissinger does. Rosati and Kissinger both address the zenith of power which the United States represents as the sole remaining super-power, but then demonstrates the difficulty of applying that power in the global community with anything resembling immediacy of effect. As Rosati observes, “The United States [continues] to be the most powerful country in the world, but no longer able to exercise the kind of economic, political, and military influence that it enjoyed at its height during the late 1940s and 1950s.” (Rosati, 51) Kissinger concurs—“America finds itself both all-powerful and totally vulnerable”; Its power “...does not include the privilege of pretending that America is doing other nations a kindness by associating with them, or that it has a limitless capacity to impose its will by withholding its favors.” (836) Diplomacy is a superb text, complementing basic American national security institutions texts such as JTM and Rosati cited above.

Limits of Diplomacy. The book’s greatest shortcoming is its concluding chapter. That chapter is no less eloquent than those that pre-cede it. It is no less insightful. It closes the loop, presenting the challenges of the new world order introduced in its first chapter. However, it feels out of place. Its prescriptions for action may be accurate; they may be true. But they are transitory in nature. The challenges the United States faces and the approaches it must take in order to confront those challenges are clearly stated in the conclusion. But they are more relevant to the immediate post Cold War period than they are today. While the re-mainder of the book offers a sweeping world view—a grasp which sometimes takes the reader’s breath away in its crisp, detailed marshaling of fact and historical context—the final chapter’s immediacy is flawed by how quickly the world has moved in less than ten years since the book was written. The challenges Kissinger alludes to in his conclusion are impor-tant, but the challenges we face from the frag-

(Continued on page 20)
From 24 Feb 03 to 7 Mar 03, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, DoD’s Africa Center for Strategic Studies brought together roughly 120 high-ranking officials from the militaries, defense ministries, and foreign service ministries of most of the countries of Africa. Representatives from US and European governmental and civil service organizations also participated in the conference, whose purpose was to provide a non-attribution forum in which African leaders could hear distinguished guests provide their thoughts on issues of democratic governance and security, and then engage each other in discussions about their own experiences with these issues.

The syllabus for the conference consisted of three modules: security studies, civil-military relations, and defense economics. Throughout the modules, I noticed that the program participants with whom I interacted frequently revisited one particular concern: the role of regional and sub-regional organizations in security issues, and how this role could be balanced with sovereignty norms.

Participants cited several unresolved examples, one being the current situation in Zimbabwe. Diplomatically, the international community seems to have almost uniformly decried Robert Mugabe’s alleged human rights violations and his role in destabilizing the country’s agricultural base. However, there has been a variety of opinion on the best way to show disapproval, yet still use diplomacy to pressure changes in the regime.

French president Jacques Chirac, for example, was widely criticized for inviting Mugabe to participate in a French summit on Africa in February 2003. Many believe that inviting him construed tacit approval of his undemocratic practices. On the other hand, some African leaders acknowledge that recognition of Mugabe is problematic, but believe that negotiations with him will have a better chance of effecting reform than ostracism.

Some conference participants expressed the idea that the AU or SADC had a responsibility to improve the situation in Zimbabwe, even if this entailed the use of force. Several made the point that military interventions in countries facing unrest are often initiated at the request of the government, but that in this case, there was little chance that that would happen. There was widespread support among conference participants for the idea that human rights should always take priority over support for regimes that violate them. However, aside from issues of the limited resources of organizations like the AU and SADC, these valid points raised a difficult question concerning the appropriateness of intervention in consideration of traditional sovereignty norms.

First, some participants pointed to the collapse of the Democratic Republic of the Congo as an example of the ill effects of the violation of territorial integrity. While underlying causes with a much longer history were at play, a certain proximate cause has been the encroachment into DRC by neighbors citing political causes but partially motivated by financial ones.

Second, some countries noted that intervention could be a mechanism by which aspiring regional hegemons could legally gain access to and influence a particular country. This access might provide a disincentive to help as much as possible to

(Continued on page 21)
It has taken the United States military ten years to realize that the Cold War is over. How long will it take until we realize that the countries of the former Soviet Union are indeed independent, with their own languages, cultures and histories? We need to reevaluate the training of area specialists for this region. If we do not change the way we look at the countries in the former Soviet Union, we will find ourselves in a disadvantageous position in the future.

For those not familiar with the system, Army Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) specialize in one of nine regions of concentration. Geography, history and common culture determine the regions of concentration. The newly independent states of the former Soviet Union are classified as the Eurasian area of concentration. The training timeline for all Foreign Area Officers, regardless of concentration is pretty much the same, with some differences that I will point out later in this article. In the first stage of training each officer receives language training in one of the languages in his area of concentration. The officer then will spend 18 months of familiarization training in one of the countries in his region. During this phase of training, the officer will either attend one of that country’s military schools or travel throughout that country. The final phase of training is graduate studies in a pre-approved graduate program.

There are two significant differences between the training of Eurasian Foreign Area Officers and the training of FAOs with other areas of concentration. The most significant to my argument is that while other FAOs are assigned a concentration country and trained in the language of that country, Eurasian FAOs all learn Russian. The other difference is that Eurasian Foreign Area Officers do not spend the full 18 months of in-country training in a target country. Instead, they are assigned to the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch, Germany. While assigned to the Marshall Center, Foreign Area Officers will continue language training, take classes in policy and security and participate in one to three internships in one of the Newly Independent States or as a liaison officer to the Russian contingents in Bosnia or Kosovo. The only language requirement for any of these internships is proficiency in Russian.

Army personnel assignment officers say that the reason for the emphasis on Russian language is that Russian is the “lingua franca” of the region and officers that have a knowledge of Russian can work in any of the countries of the area. I believe that this line of thinking is mistaken and is counter-productive in our efforts to reinforce the independent nature of these countries.

There are three main reasons why I feel our emphasis on Russian is counter-productive. First of these is the message we send to the Russian speakers who live in the countries of the Newly Independent States. When bilateral meetings automatically default to Russian as the language of common understanding the Russian speakers in those countries have less incentive to learn the language of the country in which they live. This is particularly important in countries with large Russian speaking minorities like Ukraine.

Ukraine is a country of almost 50 million people, with an army that is second largest in Europe after Russia’s. The country is strategically located between Russia and new NATO members Poland and Hungary. There is a large, politically vo-
cal Russian minority that is concentrated in the Donbas region in the eastern part of the country. Ten years ago, shortly after declaring Ukraine an independent state, the government announced that Ukrainian would be the state language and Ukrainian would be used in all official government meetings and correspondence. Unfortunately, this law has never been enforced. Many government officials continue to use Russian in official and private conversations.

One organization that has had much success in the Ukrainization effort has been the military. Most military officers use Ukrainian in all official meetings with one major exception—meetings with Americans. I have been a part of many bilateral meetings with Ukrainians in which the American FAOs start by apologizing for their lack of knowledge of Ukrainian and ask that the meeting be conducted in Russian. I have seen this in Georgia and Kazakhstan also. The Ukrainians always comply, but I wonder about the message we are sending to the Ukrainians when we ask them to violate their own laws.

In the coming years it will harder to fall back to Russian as the common language in these countries. There is no requirement to speak Russian in the Ukrainian, Georgian, Kazakh or Uzbek armies. The proportion of Russian speakers in these countries is growing smaller each year. In Ukraine, arguably the most Russified of these countries, the percentage of students taught in Russian dropped by almost one half in the last ten years.1

The second problem of defaulting to Russian as the lingua franca is the message we send to Russia and those who believe that Russia has a special influence in the area. Russia is clearly trying to establish a sphere of influence in the region. The most telling indicator of the Russian attitude to this area is the label of “near abroad” that is attached to it. Russian is not native and did not come naturally to places like Ukraine, the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Baltic States. Tsarist and Soviet governments purposefully tried to separate the inhabitants of these areas from their language in an attempt to dilute national identities. Promotion of the local language in these countries is one method of solidifying their national identities. Our continued recognition of Russian as the language of the area hurts these attempts to establish a national identity.

The final reason I find the emphasis on Russian problematic has to do with the gap in cultural understanding that we continue to have toward these countries. One of the beneficial side effects of language training is an increased understanding of the culture of the countries that use that language. I experienced some of this cultural misunderstanding during a recent trip to Tblisi, Georgia. At a dinner with officers of the Georgian military our officers offered toasts in the Russian

(Continued on page 21)
My recent participation in a Mobile Training Team (MTT) to Tbilisi, Georgia and my good fortune at being invited to a traditional dinner by the Minister of Defense (MOD), Lieutenant General (LTG) David Tevzadze, clearly demonstrated the importance of DOD's Security Assistance program in general and the International Military Education and Training (IMET) component in particular. The MOD is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and Colonel George Giorgobiani, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, is a graduate of the US Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

I was assigned to Joint Command South Centre, one of the four NATO sub-regional headquarters located in the Southern Region of the NATO AOR. My position was a Military Cooperation Staff Officer, a 48C position in the J-9 Military Cooperation Branch of this NATO HQ. My duties in this new NATO HQ (established in Sep 99) were similar to those of the Political-Military Affairs, Security Assistance, and Exercises & Training Staff Officers in a Unified Command, such as the US Southern Command. The J-9 Branch planned, coordinated, and executed, high level visits from our NATO HQ Commander, a three star Greek General Officer, to the Ministers and Chiefs of Defense of Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries. In addition, we planned, coordinated, and executed training activities such as seminars at the HQ and MTTs in the PfP nations. These activities were part of the Southern Region’s Partnership Work Program (PWP) which is designed to assist Partner Nations in becoming more interoperable with NATO, both to share the responsibility in peacekeeping and coalition operations as well as to assist those that want to become NATO members. Another important program to which the J-9 Military Cooperation Branch contributed was the Mediterranean Dialogue Program, which developed a better understanding of NATO in the seven North African and Middle Eastern nations that are members of this Program. Their officers are able to participate in PfP-oriented training activities and exercises as well as some activities that are developed exclusively for the Mediterranean Dialogue nations. It was while working in this context that I traveled to Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia, to assist in the conduct of a Military Intelligence MTT that our HQ had coordinated with the Georgian Ministry of Defense.

The Military Intelligence MTT in Georgia was part of the routine training activities that our HQ had scheduled for 2002. It was not related to tactical intelligence requirements or the newly announced US-sponsored, bilateral “Train and Equip Program” that was designed to assist Georgia to improve its anti-terrorist capabilities to deal with the terrorists in the Pankisi Gorge. Both the Georgian and the Russian media questioned this presumed linkage during our training there, but as the group’s spokesman, I clearly stated that this was a regularly scheduled NATO training activity, not connected to the War on Terrorism, or to the US Special Forces training which was due to commence shortly after our MTT. The MTT, three days of classes on Military Intelligence taught by three officers from our J-2 Division, was very successful and 35 Georgian officers participated in the training. At the conclusion of the training, our NATO HQ Commander, LTG Nikolaos Katagas arrived for a high level visit with the senior leadership of the Georgian military. After meeting with the senior leaders and visiting a number of military training facilities, the visit con-
cluded with a traditional Georgian dinner hosted by the Minister of Defense, LTG Tevzadze. He was gracious enough to invite not only the Commander, his Military Assistant, and the Military Cooperation Officer accompanying him, but he also invited the four of us that conducted the MTT, as a token of appreciation for the valuable training that we had provided to his officers.

The traditional dinner was the sort of unique cultural experience that FAOs are fortunate to be invited to and often contribute significantly to both the FAOs’ understanding of the culture and to the interpersonal relationships that are so important to the future success of our military to military cooperation activities. LTG Tevzadze was a superb host and regaled us throughout the evening with a series of toasts and anecdotes about both his military career in Georgia and his time in the United States. He wore his CGSC crest on his Georgian General Officer uniform and warmly recalled his memorable experiences there in 1996-97. If he is not in the CGSC Hall of Fame, he should be, since he has risen to the highest military position in the Georgian Armed Forces.

Across the table from him and next to me sat the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, COL George Giorgobiani, whom I discovered had graduated from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) at National Defense University with a Master of Science degree in 2000. Both of them spoke excellent English and kept the conversation moving throughout the evening. They were very comfortable with discussing a variety of military and non-military topics and engaged the seven of us on different subjects. LTG Tevzadze displayed a great sense of humor and the conversation was frequently broken with laughter at his jokes. At times, the conversation did turn to more serious topics such as the fierce fighting in which he and the other senior officers at the table had been involved during the civil war in Georgia (South Ossetia and Abkhasia) from 1991-1993. The great variety of traditional food and drinks offered at the dinner was astonishing, as was the way the orderlies continued to pile the dishes on the table until every inch of the table was covered. The toasting was done with natural Georgian wine that was neither a red nor a white wine, but was honey-colored and very smooth. The General insisted that everyone follow the Georgian tradition and take turns making toasts, so we all went round the table inventing appropriate toasts as our hosts coached us in their customs. LTG Tevzadze was well aware of what NATO and Western militaries expected of Georgia if it were to become more accepted into the Euro-Atlantic community and institutions. At one point he jokingly appointed his Deputy MOD, a civilian who was present at the dinner, as chief of the toasts (a significant traditional role), by saying the military had now stepped back and put a civilian in charge of the MOD. He then acknowledged the importance of transitioning to a civilian Minister of Defense and said that Georgia would be working toward that in the future. After a wonderful evening of Georgian traditions and customs, we NATO officers all said our sincere thanks for the generous hospitality and friendship that we had been shown and reluctantly departed.

As FAOs, most of us have worked with and around the Security Assistance program, and have heard others state the importance of the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. My experience with the two senior Georgian officers, LTG Tevzadze and COL Giorgobiani, personally convinced me of the value of the program. Not only had their time at US military schools prepared them well for future interaction with NATO and US Special Forces, but also they were friendly and knowledgeable about how we could cooperate with each other to achieve greater capabilities and interoperability. To me they both validate what some may regard as clichés, but I see as truisms: that countries send their “best of the best” to US military schools and that the “contacts made with foreign military officers can be invaluable in the future.”
(Continued from page 14) 
mented world of the early 21st Century require different approaches from those described by Kissinger in his closing. The broad brush strokes Kissinger used to paint the picture of diplomacy through the rest of the book are lost in an overly narrow conclusion, which unintentionally dates the study as it closes it.

Room for Disagreement. The only other element which may ring less true to the foreign area officer reader is Kissinger’s assertion that the Cold War was not driven by reality but by “…two armed camps, each driven by fears that turned out to be unfounded.” (495) This is excellent 20/20 hindsight and analysis, yet for those of us who grew up in the period, this stretches credibility—the Berlin Blockade, Korea, Czechoslovakia, the Suez, the Soviet suppression of Hungary, the Cuban Missile Crisis, Afghanistan, Angola, and Nicaragua come to mind. The fears do seem founded on justifiable causes or events. This contrasts with total agreement on the need for a new policy designed for the 21st Century—a policy based on the complexity of a previously bipolar world now fragmented by region, by ethnicity, by religion, by culture, by temperament, by historical experience; yet also based on growing interdependence and globalization. This new policy must be one which combines “…a confluence of moral and geopolitical aims, of Wilsonianism and Realpolitick”, what Michael Kelly recently called “armed evangelism”, the recurring thesis of Kissinger and a unifying theme throughout the book.

Conclusions: the Utility of Diplomacy for the Foreign Area Officer. Despite these minor complaints, in summary, for the foreign area officer studying national security policy, Kissinger’s eloquent and insightful 1) primer for statesmen, 2) overview of policy and diplomacy approaches, 3) introduction to the great thinkers and practitioners in national strategy development and application, and 4) review of how the United States both is affected by and profoundly affects global policy-making—makes it a study of great utility in all four of these complementary areas. Diplomacy is required reading for all new foreign area officers and for more experienced FAOs seeking to expand their horizons as students of national security institutions and policy-making and seeking to build a firm foundation for their duties as military statesmen.
style, each saying a few words about whatever subject came to mind. Only later did we learn about the Georgian toastmaster tradition of adding to a theme set by the host. While Georgian officers were adding to the theme of brotherhood— we were toasting to the good health of our hosts. This is but a small example of the wider problem of area specialists that do not truly understand the culture of one of the countries of their area. We have Eurasian area specialists that can speak intelligently of Pushkin yet have very little knowledge of Shevchenko and Tamerlane.

One of the unspoken arguments against training Eurasian FAOs in languages other than Russian is cost. It is much cheaper and more efficient to teach Russian language skills to all Eurasian FAOs because they can use it throughout the region. The first response to that statement would be that it would be cheaper and more efficient still to not teach any language because almost everybody speaks some English in the region these days. However, if you accept my earlier argument that the study of language brings with it a deeper understanding of culture, there are efficient ways to train.

Currently, Basic Russian is taught at the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, California and Advanced Russian is taught in Garmisch at the Marshall Center. There is a proposal awaiting Army approval to move all language training for Eurasian FAOs to the Marshall Center. The Marshall Center already employs two Ukrainian instructors and would be easy to add contract instructors that could teach Georgian, Uzbek, Kazakh or one of the other languages of the region. While assigned to the Marshall Center, FAOs could be sent on internships in their target countries while also gaining regional exposure through the class trips, lectures and sponsorship opportunities that already exist there. The officers who specialize in these non-Russian languages would also have the opportunity to take some survival Russian or even pick up Russian as a second language.

The world is changing. It is the responsibility of the area specialists in the Army to recognize these changes and be prepared for them. I recognize the importance of Russia in this region. It is by far the largest country in the region that maintains a powerful military armed with nuclear weapons. We must also recognize that we are now dealing with 15 independent states with their own national interests, foreign policy dilemmas, culture and language. In the wake of recent events in the world and the new importance of Central Asia in our war on terrorism I can’t help but think what the Army would give for two or three Eurasian FAOs with a deep cultural and linguistic understanding of Uzbek or Tadjik. Maybe now we can start looking at these countries as independent.

1 Ministerstvo Ukrainy u spravakh natsional’nostei, mihratsii ta kul’tiv, Informatsiinyi biuleten’ 1 (3) September 1995: 40; Statystychnyi shchorichnyk Ukrainy za 1998 rik, p 424. In 1991, 48.8 percent of preschoolers were taught in Russian; in 1998 only 25.3 percent were taught in Russian.

resolve a situation and leave the country. One conference participant expressed his experience of his country attempting to help neighbors but being rebuffed, even when only proposing diplomatic measures. He believed that his country was sometimes perceived as aggressively seeking a hegemonic role in the region.

This fear was related to the hesitancy of placing too much authority in a regional organization. Some people noted the potential that international organizations have for becoming simple tools for more powerful members to use against smaller members. This was an interesting idea given the events taking place at the time: in February, the media was heavily covering US efforts to win votes on the UN Security Council for a resolution on war with Iraq.

Participants expressed a wide range of opinions and anecdotes concerning the potential of and the limits for regional organizations in intra-state conflicts and state-people conflicts. However, the norms of sovereignty seem to have taken on a more fluid nature in the past ten years. Until they become more stable, the role of regional organizations is likely to remain unclear.
of Islamic extremist groups involved in ethnic problems in China’s western Xinjiang province. China considers Pakistan a friend who sometimes causes problems, similar to North Korea.

Pakistan is obsessed with India's military potential as India is the strongest regional power and dominates the Indian Ocean. After India detonated a nuclear device in 1974, Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto immediately promised Pakistan its own nuclear weapon at all costs, even if it meant, "eating grass." Pakistan has made it clear that the smaller states of South Asia and the wider international community should judge Pakistan as India's equal. Conversely, Pakistan's continued refusal to acknowledge the realities of India's regional power status along with Pakistani efforts to destabilize India are a source of continued irritation to New Delhi.11

Ineffective Civilian Government under Swaraj (Self Rule)

Pakistan has produced a series of extraordinary leaders, most of whom faced almost impossible odds in trying to hold Pakistan together while simultaneously moving the nation forward. Military leadership has become the norm, because Pakistanis often look to strong leaders in their search for a modern-day Saladin.12

Governance in Pakistan has always been a delicate balancing act between the military chiefs and the elected civilian government. Within this power-sharing arrangement, the military has important influence over foreign, security, and key domestic issues, and mediates confrontations among political leaders and state institutions. Although the civilian government enjoys considerable autonomy in political and economic management and exercises of state authority, it is always expected to consider the military's sensitivities. The army controls the country's nuclear program and maintains deep interest in the Kashmir policy. Senior commanders jealously guard the military's autonomy against civilian interference in internal organizational matters and service affairs.

Confusion over the role of Islam in Government

Since nationhood in 1947, the question of ideology has been raging within the country’s political and social circles. The mainstream political parties have resisted the idea of turning Pakistan into a theocratic state, but the selective approach to Islamization has produced an authoritarian doctrine of nationalism and security based on Islam. Pakistanis seek identification with Islam as a persecuted minority to generate internal unity and external sympathy, but contemporary ambiguity about the domestic relationship between religion and government combined with the lack of recognition from the Muslim world for Pakistan's accomplishments causes problems. Jinnah utilized Islam as the rallying point for his campaign of anti-colonialism and nationalism, but Pakistan's contemporary identity (secular verses sectarian) still remains politically sensitive and unresolved.

Great disagreement exists on how to accommodate both the Muslim belief that sovereignty lies with Allah and the democratic approach of sovereignty lying with the people. Jinnah declared that the state would have no business to interfere with the religious beliefs of individuals, but religious conservatives do not regard this as a policy-making speech. Pakistan is unique as the only country to have been created in the name of Islam, but the relationship between religion and the state is unclear. Pakistan sees Western attacks on extremist Islam as encompassing all of Islam, and often feels compelled to take radical approaches it actually disagrees with to achieve political security. Pakistan supported the coalition against Iraq in 1990 and the current GWOT, but must balance pressures from the United States with resistance from the religious parties within its own borders. It is interesting to note that Islamic fundamentalist parties have not been electorally successful over the years in Pakistan.

The future

Pakistanis are pessimistic that the near future holds change, but point to Europe's long history of wars and instability prior to achieving the European Union. Although Pakistanis see continuing cultural encroachment from the West and increasing instances of Hindu nationalistic violence in India as threats to Pakistan's stability, they see contemporary history destroying the remaining imperial states such as the USSR, Yugoslavia, and India, and believe that their patience concerning territorial claim over Kashmir will ultimately be rewarded. Some Pakistanis claim that India is in an early process of disintegration that will play out over
decades, but doubtlessly will result in India's breakup into a panoply of states. Pakistanis also feel the world is at last waking up to the Kashmir issue and that Kashmir is now part of the international agenda. Pakistanis sincerely believe that all their country requires is efficient and effective leadership in order to become a great nation of the world.

US recognition for Pakistani participation in the GWOT would begin to break the chain of perceived betrayal. This recognition could also serve as a reward for Pakistani assistance to oust the Soviets from Afghanistan as well as supporting the collapse of the Taliban. Greater economic aid would need to accompany these thanks, because an ever-widening gap exists between what Pakistan expects as just reward for open alignment with the West and the actual dollar figure contemplated by Washington. Pakistani President Musharraf's credibility (and therefore the Pakistan Army's) is at stake if nothing positive comes from Pakistani participation in the GWOT.

Conclusion

Continuing instability has left the citizens of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan with a pessimistic and defensive culture. Pakistanis see the legacy of Ram Raj from pre-Moghul times remanifested in the increasing levels of Hindu nationalism, extremism, and levels of violence against Muslims in India. The nationalistic ideologies that emerged during the British Raj and led to the partition of British and Indian India remain, and the problems regarding identity, ethnic and religious fervor, nationalism, and communal violence that partition sought to eliminate are still daily news and growing in intensity within Pakistan and all of South Asia from Kabul to Cox's Bazaar, Kashmir and Katmandu to Kandy. Since 1947 and the advent of Pakistani swaraj (self-rule), the perceived need to rely on outside entities and domestic military governments to ensure Pakistan's national security has left the government and people lacking in self-confidence.13 Recent literary titles such as Reodad Khan's Pakistan-A Dream Gone Sour (Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1997) and Sherbaz Khan Mazari's A Journey to Disillusionment (Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1999) point to and reinforce the mindset of political betrayal and dismay. Unlike Americans who easily cast away history and traditions, problems of the past plague Pakistani discussions of the future. One thing is genetically inherent in Pakistanis' minds though: Indians are the enemy and Hindu India is a threat to Muslim Pakistan.

Endnotes:
1 Taken from part of the critique of Samuel P. Huntington's The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (Simon and Schuster, New York, 1996) presented by Edward W. Said at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst in 1998.
3 Mohammed Ali Jinnah (the Quaid-i-Azam or Great Leader), Dec 25, 1876-Sep 11, 1948; founder and first Governor-General of Pakistan.
4 Golam W. Choudhury, Pakistan's Relations with India, Meenakshi Prakashan, New Delhi, 1971.
5 The reference to the Hindu god Ram symbolizes Hinduism overall.
7 Pakistan did cede 5120 sq. km of Kashmir to China in 1963 to establish a delineated international border.
8 Address by Sardar Mohammad Abdul Qayyum Khan at the Pakistan Army Command and Staff College, Quetta, Pakistan, March 8, 1987.
10 Ahmed, p. 250.
11 Hewitt, p. 32. Economically the Indian GNP is twice that of all the other countries of South Asia combined, and India's population is over three times the others.
12 Saladin, the Muslim hero who defeated the second crusade.
13 As Sherbaz Khan Mazari wrote in Journey to Disillusionment (Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1999), he dedicated his book "To the people of Pakistan--leaderless and betrayed."
Rethinking Europe’s Future

Author: David P. Calleo; Publisher: Princeton University Press; 2001; 424 pages
Reviewed by: MAJ David A. Galles

For the past century Europe has gone through a fundamental change. It has evolved through many changes starting with communitarian nation-states to a confederal European Union (EU). David Calleo, in his book, Rethinking Europe’s Future, takes the reader through time from the enlightenment to present day giving a detailed analysis of what Europe was and is. The objective of the book is to give the reader facts in which will tell the tale of what Europe might look like in the future and then to propose what the United States policy should be toward Europe and specifically the European Union and Russia.

In the next to the last chapter Calleo proposes a tripolar Pan-Europe with the US, the EU and Russia at the poles. He states it “essentially adapts and rearranges the parts of the old European and bipolar systems to suit a more cooperative coexistence with the Russians, as well as a more balanced Atlantic Alliance.” This is the same proposal that Jaquelin K. Davis and Michael J. Sweeney make in their book, Strategic Paradigms 2025: US Security Planning for a New Era.

The book’s strength comes from Calleo himself. He has studied Europe for over 30 years publishing many articles and books on the subject. He is a historian and an American, thus giving him the detachment yet apt perspective. Calleo uses his extensive research of Europe and the European Union to support his findings. Students first studying Europe or policy makers and diplomats wanting a fresh view can use the book. The book is broken down into three parts that gives it a textbook style format, thus making it easy to reference. In the first two sections, Calleo at the end of each chapter gives “Selected Sources” broken down by subject matter. So for instance if the reader wants to study more on Friedrich von Hayek, then Calleo lists the major works used. It is very well annotated and although it the book does not take into the account the terrorists attacks of September 2001 and the world economic slowdown, it does give the reader the evidence to help predict the future of European affairs.

In the first section of Rethinking Europe’s Future, entitled “Europe’s Living History,” Calleo takes the reader from World War I forward yet reaching father back in history to give the reader evidence. The four chapters that make up the first part of the book conclude with Calleo opining that “today’s European Union, led by France and Germany together, embodies the project in a more authentically Listian form.” Any student of international relations and industrial policy of European Nations will note that the corporatist model in Germany is straight from Friedrich List. List helped spur the European Union but it was Friedrich von Hayek that helped with the solution for the welfare state. The summary of the first part brings three conclusions to the living past: 1) sovereign nation states are closely interdependent, 2) capitalism grows self-destructive as it develops (Marx), and 3) Nation states and capitalism are both symbiotic and fundamentally antagonistic. In the first half of the twentieth century we see what happens when these cannot be managed, but in the second half of the century, it was the Cold War that brought stability so that Europe could worry about integration.

In the second part of the book, Calleo looks at the “Legacies of the Cold War” and how Europe made it through and what the postwar brought to improve Europe’s state system. With the implementation of the Marshall plan; the overshadowing bipolar system between the two superpowers; and the postwar integration, led by France and Germany, are what made “Europe’s nation states much more effective, and hence

(Continued on page 34)
ANATOMY OF THE 1952 EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION

This last July saw a host of articles, special editions and magazines commemorating the fiftieth anniversary that ended the monarchy in Egypt. Many of the articles address the historical perspective of the revolution including the anatomy of how the bloodless coup occurred on July 23rd, 1952 that ousted King Farouk I. No article deals specifically with how Egypt’s experiment with Republican Government has evolved or devolved over the last half century. The Free Officers group that pulled off the coup included Nasser, Sadat, Naguib, Amer and many other names. They cannot really be classified as founding fathers of the same stature as Washington or Jefferson, but they did enter into the conspiracy to overthrow the monarchy with interesting ideas of reforming the government. They touted that their revolution is the first time Egypt was ruled by Egyptians since Ptolemaic Dynasty of the Early Kingdom of the Pharaohs. However these Free Officers descended into an abyss of repression and dictatorship in the name of reform, internal security and regime preservation. This essay will look at the days before, during and after the 1952 revolution to assess the anatomy of the coup and the ideals they proposed to the Egyptian people in order to maintain hold on the government and depose the king. Arabic sources will be used to write this article as it offers their perspective on the revolution.

Organizing the Coup

It is important to realize that the seeds of the 1952 coup to topple King Farouk were sown in the first Arab-Israeli War in 1948, with the Egyptian army being humiliated by Israeli Haganah forces. LtCol Gamal Abd-al-Nasser’s brigade would be surrounded in the Faluja Pocket. On their return to Egypt after a negotiated settlement, the armed forces came home to find the king enriching himself and his entourage with arms sales prior and during the war. The king had speculated and received kickbacks on war materiel. A group of discontented officers would emerge calling themselves the Free Officers and would begin creating a secret revolutionary cell within the Egyptian army. This is not a new innovation, Hassan-al-Banna’s Muslim Brotherhood had been doing the same thing beginning in World War II and intensified his efforts after the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. What the Free Officers did that was innovative, was recruiting specific units in and around Cairo from the infantry, artillery, signals and mechanized formations that would be key to pulling off a coup de’etat. There would be 266 officers who would be active members of the Free Officers movement.

The Decision on the Day

According to Egyptian sources the revolution was set for November and then was moved up to the fifth of August, to catch the king and his entourage at his summer retreat in Alexandria. The coup however was staged on July 23rd, because the Free Officer’s senior leader General Muhammad Naguib was contacted by Interior Minister Muhammad Hashim, five days before. The interior minister had information on twelve officers and wanted to discuss their involvement in the Free Officers movement. The movement although secretive was not by any means completely clandestine, their pamphlets were found among the king’s security services and were even shown to the king himself. Fearing a purge, ten of the Free Officers met at the apartment of Maj Khalid Moih-al-Deen on 22nd of July, they included Nasser, Air force officer Abd-al-Latif Al-
Bughdadi, Kamal al-Din al-Hussein, Hassan Ibrahim and Abd-al-Hakim Amer. They outlined their plans and each was delegated a specific part of the plan with H-Hour being 0100 and D-Day on the next day 23\textsuperscript{rd} of July.

**The Plan**

The plan for the coup was divided into three phases. Phase one, the Defense Ministry and broadcast tower would be taken over by the 13\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Battalion whereby they would leave Abbasia Barracks and take over these sites and would be reinforced by the 1\textsuperscript{st} Mechanized Infantry Battalion. Artillery units in charge of officers aligned to the movement would surround both Almaza and Abbasia Barracks, ensuring further divisions did not leave or of they attempted to depart would open-fire. They were equipped with 17-pound anti-tank artillery rounds. The Free Officers also set up checkpoints and defensive positions to the North and East of Cairo isolating both Almaza and Abbasia Barracks from Command Headquarters near Abdine Palace. The cavalry element of the 13\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Battalion would complete the envelopment and defensive part of phase one by surrounding Egypt's border guard headquarters cutting off command and control of this armed organization from its leader General Hussein Sirri Amer, who was known to be an avid royalist.

Phase one also included a mission carried out by Signals Officer Anwar al-Sadat and his unit, this included taking over the telephone exchange. Controlling the exchange cut off any communications between Cairo and the king in Alexandria. Major Magdy Hassanien was given the responsibility of securing the radio communication center at Abu Zaabal. There was also a military command and control headquarters in Tahrir Square, but this was left alone, as General Haidar Pasha the Commander-in-Chief and his staff were all vacationing in Alexandria with the king. The key to the success was cutting off communications between decision-makers and military leaders. As no leader would make a move without authorization, their simple plan worked.

Phase two, included drawing up plans for a provisional revolutionary government that would have the confidence of the people and the army. It also outlined plans for mobilizing against civil authority and ministries so that there would be little interruption in the governance of Cairo and Egypt as a whole. Phase three, involved different scenarios for getting rid of the king if caught or if he escapes to an embassy of a third country.

**Royalists Get Wind of the Coup**

Egyptian accounts explain that General Ahmed Talat Commander-in-Chief of the Cairo Military District got wind of the activities of the Free Officers at 10:00pm on the 22\textsuperscript{nd} of July. However he made several blunders, instead of reacting immediately he made efforts to contact the interior minister and get word to the summer palace in Alexandria. He also attempted to arrange a meeting at his office of all his staff officers, instead of sending them directly to their units. Talat assumed that the revolt would culminate at Abdine Palace in Cairo, with an ultimatum delivered to the king. These assumptions were based on the Urabi Revolt that occurred 70 years ago. The Free Officers also used this erroneous assumption that Abdine Palace would be the focal point of the revolution when they dispatched an officer with orders for Cairo’s military police to depart from their barracks and head directly to Palace. This in light of the fact that the king was in Alexandria and that key military units, communications as well as command and control centers were the primary targets of the Free Officers.

Another key element of the Free Officers plan was sending a team of 60 troops to proceed to the homes of key senior officers in the king’s armed forces starting at H-Hour 0100. Approximately 20 officers were caught and locked up in a jail at the Military Academy.
Conclusion

It would take four hours for the Free Officers to control Cairo. What is interesting is that the Egyptian military was only 30,000 troops in 1952 with 266 officers being sympathetic or active members of the revolutionary cell. About 80 participated in the July 23rd coup. The number of officers who are members of the Free Officer organization do not represent those members of the military and police who harbored revolutionary thoughts but were members of the Muslim Brotherhood. Therefore, King Farouk’s army was riddled with officers and non-commissioned officers who despise the monarchy. Nasser would tap into the supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood using Sadat who had contacts with the organization. Until his death in 1949, the Islamist leader Hassan-al-Banna and his successor Omar al-Telmessany would encourage members of his organization to support the Free Officers movement in the name of ridding Egypt of British influence and asserting Egyptian nationalism. King Farouk would escape unharmed aboard his yacht Mahroussa for exile in Italy, however within a year Egypt was formally declared a Republic.

Why is reflecting on the anatomy of the Egyptian revolution important? We see traces of it creeping up in the writings of Bin Laden’s ideologue, the Egyptian Ayman al-Zawahiri. In his 2002 book *Knights Under the Banner of the Prophet* he describes a failed coup attempt by jihadists in 1981 right after the assassination of Sadat. The coup involved mobilizing against broadcasting stations and also plans to recruit cells from within the Egyptian military. Additionally, the 1952 revolution was model for several military coups in the region like Syria and Iraq, although the Egyptian model was less violent. We can begin to understand the influence of a revolutionary group in the region by comprehending elements and the history of successful coups.

Sources:


The Protection of Moderate Islamic Thought

On May 3rd, Mr. Paul Wolfowitz gave a speech to the World Affairs Council in Monterey, California. The Deputy Secretary of Defense implored, “The west needs to understand that there are many different interpretations of Islam, and the secular authority and Islam can live peacefully together.” He also said, “We must work to appeal to a broad population, as well as voices struggling to rise above the din of extremism, voices that tell us that the Islam of Muhammad is not the religion of Bin Laden and suicide bombers.” His remarks have been an inspiration to me personally as his words ring true for every Muslim scholar who cannot debate his own religion or write publicly regarding ideas of Quranic interpretations without being a target of Islamic extremism. Operation Enduring Freedom not only protects our country but the concept of whether one form of Islam that of intolerance, bigotry and abject domination will succeed over a religion as diverse as the other monotheistic religions of the world.

When officials and scholars say that Islamic militants have hijacked a religion, let us be specific. What Al-Qaeda, Al-Jihad, and other
militant organizations have done is to take elements of the Quran (Islamic Book of Divine Revelation) and only quote to the masses certain verses that justify their violent acts. For instance, the Quran indeed sanctions a violent form of Jihad against infidels, but what the Islamic terrorist and their ideologues to not say is that these versus were revealed when Prophet Muhammad was trying to establish an infant Islamic society amidst a program of genocide conducted by the Meccans who lived at the time and found his message of monotheism and social justice threatening. Listening to the words of Bin Laden and his reference to fighting crusaders have no basis in the original founding of Islam in the seventh century but is hateful language that found its way into Arabic vernacular during the crusades that began in the eleventh century.

Bin Laden and Islamic militants have neglected key verses of the Quran that adds credence to Mr. Wolfowitz’s remarks. Sura 49, verse 13 of the Quran states, “O mankind we created you from a single (pair) of a male and female and made you into nations and tribes, that you may know each other (not that you should hate one another) verily the most honored of you in the sight of Allah is the most righteous of you.” This verse encourages Muslims to engage a variety of people and be inspired by the variety of thought, ideas, religions and viewpoints that God created. It is this verse that made the Arabs one of the most prolific traders and seafarers from the ninth to the fifteenth centuries. The suicide bombers who claim for themselves paradise did not think of Sura 5, verse 8, “O ye who believe! Stand out firmly for Allah, as witnesses to fair dealing and let not the hatred of others to you make you swerve to wrong and depart from Justice. Be just, that (justice) is next to piety and fear Allah, for Allah is well-acquainted with all that ye do.”

How would the Palestinian issue be resolved had its people been steeped in a rational thinking of their religion. In Sura 60, verses 7 to 8 of the Quran, “It may be that Allah will establish friendship between you and those whom you hold as enemies. For Allah has power (over all things); and Allah is forgiving and most merciful.” It is not the interest of those wanting to propagate violence to quote the many passages of the Quran that appeal to the message of brotherhood, forgiveness, charity and respecting the rights of all persons. Instead Islamic terror organizations bring out those elements of Islamic scripture that encourage violence and even them take it out of its historical context to further their cause.

When Mr. Wolfowitz says that Islam and democracy is compatible he is absolutely on the mark and there are Islamic clerical commentators that back his statement. One of the main pillars of Jihadist groups is the re-establishment of the Caliphate, which was abolished in 1926 with the collapse of the Ottoman Turks. The concept of the Caliphate is not one present in the Islam of Muhammad’s time; the Prophet left no guidance about how his community should govern itself. What is clear however is that government is sanctioned by the Ummah (the community) and not by one person. This concept of self-government by the community represents some of the basic elements of modern democracy, which is not incompatible with Islamic thought. Islamic scholars have also correctly identified that the Caliphate is not one of the principles of Islam and therefore not the only form of governance for Muslims. Islamic militants want to forcibly graft their version of government, religion and tyranny on the community of Muslims; we have seen a glimpse of what could happen when diverse Muslims are subjected to one form of tyrannical Islam with the Taliban.

Through our efforts at thwarting terrorism, the United States can also ensure freedom to express and bring out a Muslim majority who will not stand for a single, intolerant and tyrannical form of their religion to the exclusion of all others. Mr. Wolfowitz said, “America and the west must encourage moderate Muslims who believe in a vision of Islam that embraces free thought, free speech and tolerance,” to this statement I must respond with the traditional navy, “Aye! Aye! Sir!”
ARMY NOTES
COL Mark Volk, Chief, Strategic Leadership Division

For this issue of the Association Journal, we’ve provided a varied focus for our input. First, LTC Grady Reese provides a review of the most recent Colonels promotion board results. The second piece, by LTC Vas Fotopolous, documents the process we go through to select officers to enter FAO training. Addressing both the “top” and the “bottom” of the FAO personnel pyramid, the articles indicate an exceptionally healthy process and a superb quality of officers within the FAO corps.

That is not to say that we still don’t have challenges and issues that impact our population. After a concerted effort among the Proponent, FAO Assignments Branch at PERSCOM and Army G1, we believe we have established procedures that will dramatically improve the Career Field Designation problems that resulted in the return of officers either trained or in FAO training to their basic branches. Those procedures are already in place and will, we hope, be validated by the upcoming CFD board in June.

We also continue to face shortages in the FAO community resulting from the shortage year groups currently going through the CFD process – as do all functional areas. This fact of life also impacts our ability to fill training quotas, graduate school quotas and our ICT sites. We’ll talk to the specific impacts on our ICT program in a future article.

Even with the challenges, our program remains strong and there is much to be positive about. We at the Proponent office want to pass on our sincere congratulations to COL(P) John Adams who was recently selected for promotion to Brigadier General. COL(P) Adams service as a FAO spans numerous assignments and several Areas of Concentration – he clearly represents the very best of the FAO standard of Soldier Statesman.

FAO Qualification Letters

Under OPMS 3, it is critical that selection boards be able to discern an officer’s qualifications in his or her functional area. Therefore, the Proponency Office has been proactively certifying the training of our officers. We have reviewed the records of all of the CFD’ed FAOs. For those who have successfully completed all three phases of training or have been granted constructive credit for significant experience, we are providing letters certifying that they are fully trained in accordance with DA Pam 600-3. A copy of the letter is being placed in the officers’ OMPF. The first 680 such letters are in transit. There are approximately 240 officers who do not appear to meet the minimum requirements. For about 100, this is most likely due to the officers not having up to date information reflected on the ORB. We are reviewing those records in coordination with FAO Branch at PERSCOM and anticipate certification for this group. For those who clearly do not meet the minimum standards, we are providing a letter stating as such and providing a suspense (normally one year from the date of the letter) for them to bring their training up to standard. At that point, should they still not meet the standards, they will be provided a letter saying they do not meet the minimum standards. A copy of this last letter will be posted in the OMPF. Should you be one of the officers receiving a letter stating you do not appear to meet the standards and you disagree with that assessment, we encourage you to provide supporting documentation to your regional manager in this office verifying training you have had or requesting constructive credit.
FY 02 Colonels Promotion Board Results

By

LTC Grady Reese

The FY02 Colonels Promotion Board Results for FA48 were released in March. While FAOs did not meet the Army average, one must keep in mind that the overall population of FAOs is so much smaller than that of the general population that the difference of one or two officers in the selection significantly alters the statistics. When we take into account the size of the population, we came very close to the Army average. In fact, this is a success story for OPMS 3. Under OPMS 2, the selection rate for FAOs normally exceeded the Army average; however, that included many dual-tracked officers who were FAOs in name only. They possessed very little, if any, of the training and experience needed. The percentage of fully qualified FAOs and experienced FAOs selected for promotion rarely exceeded 20%. Now, virtually every FAO selected possessed not only the requisite training, but also an enormous breadth and depth of FAO experience. Since promotions under OPMS 3 are based on requirements, the above the Army average selection of the past few years, as well as the current Stop Loss policies in effect on some of our population, also impacted on the minimum selection rates established for the board.

FAO Branch, PERSCOM analyzed the results of the board and derived the following. The Army DOPMA selection rate for this board (AZ, PZ, BZ selects divided by the number of PZ considered) was 58.9 percent. Within the OSCF, the FA 48 DOPMA promotion rate was 52.6%. Officers considered for promotion held a spectrum of FA 48 positions; no single position or line of work emerges as a "career-maker". Time served in FAO positions - particularly at the field grade level - was the second most important indicator for promotion. The board determined that some officers who Career Field Designated (CFD) late to functional areas and new competitive categories were not as competitive as were officers already possessing the requisite skills and experience. In fact, battalion command did not guarantee success for those who CFD’ed to FAO late.
SSC selection/attendance figured prominently in an officer's competitiveness for selection. Both BZ selects and 14 of the 17 PZ selects were either selected for or enrolled in resident or non-resident SSC. Of the 20 officers selected (AZ, PZ, BZ), all but one had served, or was serving, in a joint position. The board was given a minimum selection requirement of 6 officers from three of the nine FAO regional Areas of Concentration (AOCs) broken out as follows: 48C (Europe) 3; 48E (Eurasia) 1; 48H (Northeast Asia) 2. An additional 14 Foreign Area Officers were selected from within the general population (“best athlete” selections). Since Acquisition Corps had a high minimum requirement, this indicates FAOs competed extremely well for those “best athlete” selections, taking virtually all for the career field.

When viewed in total, the results of the board are very promising for Army FAOs. The trends of all selection boards reflect a fairly smooth transition to full OPMS 3 implementation. The bottom line for promotion remains not what assignments you have had, but how well you performed in those assignments.

The Quest to become a FAO

By

LTC Vasilios Fotopoulos

A sister-Service field grade officer sent me an e-mail recently asking if it was possible for him to transfer to the Army’s Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program. He said that despite the risk of reprisals from his Service, he had come to the conclusion that he would only serve DOD as an Army FAO or he would get out. Another sister-Service junior officer also called, asking about the possibility of switching to the Army and becoming a FAO. A young second lieutenant sent me a note stating that he joined the Army to be a FAO, asking when could he begin his FAO training. These are just a few of the many letters I have received since becoming the Proponent Manager for FAO Accessions from members from all Services and even civilians inquiring on how to join this hot program managed by the Army G-3. What’s all the fuss and hoopla with Army FAOs? Below is a description of the process used to select the highly qualified and talented crop of officers who ultimately become the Army’s Soldier Statesmen.

Becoming a Foreign Area Officer is one of the most sought-after competitive processes among the Army’s many functional areas and career fields. The Strategic Leadership Division (DAMO-SSF) of the Army’s G-3 (Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans) is the proponent office for the Army’s Foreign Area Officer program. Each year 350 to 450 Army Captains in their fifth year of commissioned service are given the opportunity, through the Functional Area Designation (FAD) process, to compete for what eventually will become 60 to 80 fully trained Foreign Area Officers.

For Year Group 1996 (YG96) officers the journey to becoming a FAO began in early 2002 when they were asked by PERSCOM to submit their preferences for desired functional areas. In August 2002, PERSOM released the list of some 350 captains who were given Functional Area 48 - FAO. As the FAO Proponent Office Accessions Manager, the release of the list began for me a six-month rigorous process to determine which of these officers had the best qualifications and met the needs of the Army to be trained as FAOs. Each officer received a letter from the proponent congratulating him/her for the FA 48 selection and requesting they submit a package detailing their qualifications, so that we could determine who would fill the less than 120 allocations for FAO training.

The package requested of the YG 96 officers included a questionnaire and a set of test score sheets and qualifications. First, we
ensure that the candidates understand that certain family issues (spouse being a U.S citizen, EFMP requirements for family members, married to another service member) may impact their ability to serve in certain fields or may result in unaccompanied overseas assignments. Second, the candidates provided background of their foreign experience, assignments, and linguistic abilities – so we could determine their FAO related qualifications and the area of concentration they are most suited to serve as FAOs. Third, candidates were asked to provide the Defense Language Aptitude Test scores to determine what level language they qualify to study, and the Graduate Records Exam (GRE) scores, required by most accredited graduate schools, to determine if they can be accepted into the required Advance Civil Schooling (ACS) program. Finally, the officers were asked to list their preferences in Areas of Concentration (AOC) and specific languages they are interested in learning. The package information along with the officer’s ORB and an assessment of potential from PERSCOM are used in the selection process during the AOC selection panel. This process is followed for every year group.

On 21 February 2003, the FAO Proposent Office held a selection panel that included members of the FAO Assignments Branch at PERSCOM to select the best-qualified candidates for the nine FAO AOCs. The AOCs are 48B (Latin America), 48C (Europe), 48D (South Asia), 48E (Eurasia), 48F (China), 48G (North Africa/Middle East), 48H (Northeast Asia), 48I (Southeast Asia), and 48J (Sub Saharan Africa). The four FAO Proponent managers of the AOCs with the active participation of the FAO Assignments Branch selected just under 120 officers and designated each officer with an AOC. Some officers were selected on a conditional basis, pending receipt of additional pieces of their official documentation. Most of the selected officers will be scheduled for FAO training. Officers not selected by the panel are being returned to their basic branch or given an opportunity to select a different Functional Area.

FAO training consists of language qualification (usually at the Defense Language Institute in Monterey or Washington), in-country training (ICT), and a fully funded Graduate Degree program focusing on the AOC region. The officers who complete FAO training must pass one more test before securing the coveted title of Army FAO. They must be Career Field Designated (CFD) as FAOs following their promotion board to major. Although we have experienced problems with the CFD process over the past few years, a recently agreed-upon process was enacted for this year’s CFD board that should drastically reduce the effects.

The Army FAO program is still evolving along with the rest of the Army and the world environment in which we operate. The CFDed FAOs that will come out of YG96 will not have to worry about basic branch qualification or assignments outside FAO. After the CFD and majors board, these FAOs will work in Army or joint jobs related to their region and utilizing their linguistic skills. For promotions, they will be competing only with other FAOs, and will be promoted based on FAO requirements. The goal of the FAO proponent is to develop a professional corps of “Soldier Statesmen” culminating with the rank of Colonel. Given the worldwide engagement of the United States and the Department of Defense, the Army FAO program is the recognized model for all the Services. With the undisputed contributions of FAOs in the War on Terrorism and the heavy reliance of our military and civilian leadership on FAO expertise, it is no wonder why officers from the Army and other services are trying to join the Army FAO program.
As promised by Major Pat Carroll in his farewell notes, I have assumed the duty as the Program Manager for the USMC’s International Affairs Officer Program (IAOP). Those associated with the IAOP realize the great effort and progress that Pat made while at the helm of the IAOP. I hope to provide effective mid course rudder to guide many of his initiatives through to completion while focusing my own efforts on continued improvement; there remain aspects of the IAOP requiring attention and dedicated effort.

The FY04 IAOP selection board identified 18 qualified applicants—10 FAOs and 8 RAOs—for entry into the program to meet the requirements of USMC operational forces. Twelve of these IAOs-in-training began their education at the Naval Postgraduate School in Jan 03; the remaining six officers are scheduled to start school this summer. All of the remaining officers from the FY04 board are currently deployed in support of USMC participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Their school reporting dates are contingent upon their current command’s ability to support their transfer and each set of circumstances will be considered. A decision which meets the needs of the institution and individual will be made and plans to deal with anticipated all eventualities are in place.

The FY04 IAOP selection board identified 18 qualified applicants—10 FAOs and 8 RAOs—for entry into the program to meet the requirements of USMC operational forces. Twelve of these IAOs-in-training began their education at the Naval Postgraduate School in Jan 03; the remaining six officers are scheduled to start school this summer. All of the remaining officers from the FY04 board are currently deployed in support of USMC participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Their school reporting dates are contingent upon their current command’s ability to support their transfer and each set of circumstances will be considered. A decision which meets the needs of the institution and individual will be made and plans to deal with anticipated all eventualities are in place.

The “in-training” population is rounded out by a group of 12 FAOs at various ICT sites around the world. Many of these sites have been manned for the first time with USMC FAOs; Major Coady in Greece, Major Winn in India, Capt Pappas in the Philippines, Capt Lasica in Russia, and Capt Bates in Turkey. In four of these sites, the Marines followed the Army’s lead and have fallen in on their well-established paradigms. Moscow was the exception and, after a steep learning curve, Capt Lasica has established a relationship with the Diplomatic Academy and the Pushkin Institute that will serve subsequent FAOs well. Other sites that are currently manned include: Capt Martin in China (dodging SARS), Major Kendall in Japan, Capt Sullivan in Egypt, Capts Benitez, Cho, and Dominguez in Korea, and Capt Mollohan in Thailand. All of these FAOs are working hard to improve their sites while striving to meet their ICT education and training objectives. The expansion of the USMC program will continue in the remainder of this fiscal year with new sites being manned in Brazil, Indonesia, Senegal, and Vietnam.

Since the last issue of the Journal, several USMC FAOs have completed their ICT and returned to billets in the operating forces or appropriate support structure. Major Madden completed his ICT in Oman, Majors Gundlach and Williams in Croatia, Major Goff in Japan, and Capt Connable in Egypt. In accordance with the IAOP’s intent, the majority of these officers have
returned to a billet in their primary MOS in order to maintain their operational credibility; their cumulative experience will be fully exploited in subsequent utilization tours.

IAOs selection rate to LtCol for FY04 was down slightly from previous years—56% versus a Corps wide rate of 64%. The delta demonstrates the importance of managing the timing of selection, training, and subsequent utilization tours. While the program has made great gains placing both FAOs and RAOs in valid billets in the operational forces, it remains imperative that the individual officer, the manpower monitors, and the program manager at HQMC coordinate their efforts to employ these critical assets. Despite the statistical shortfall in the boardroom this year, the population of IAOs remains motivated and engaged throughout USMC operational forces. The unique skills and experience possessed by this growing group of officers—a low density, high demand cadre—is becoming more widely recognized and requested at all levels of the Marine Air Ground Task Force. The IAOP will continue efforts to train and identify officers capable of meeting these emerging/expanding requirements.

As always, the International Issues Branch (PLU), PP&O, HQMC welcomes comments and suggestions regarding the administration of the IAOP. Please see the FAO Proponent Page on the inside cover of this Journal for POC information.

(Continued from page 7) The way the Administration is handling the current NK crisis implies that the President fully understands that this policy—like any other—is dependent on certain conditions for success. In the NK situation, those conditions are not satisfied. In the case with Iraq, the conditions are now met, but only while public support remains high. It is not hypocritical that the President uses the threat of force on one country and not the other. Rather, it is prudent decision making.

(Continued from page 24) enhancing their practical sovereignty, integration has given them fresh legitimacy. The EU has thus developed a hybrid. It has remained a confederacy of sovereign nation states, even though there have been strong ‘federal’ elements of growing significance.” It is here where Calleo makes the distinction that the EU is better conceived as a civilian project, and has troubles when it comes to security, defense, and foreign policy. In a system of cooperation it is difficult to give up national interests in these three realms to a supranational organization, on the other hand, the nation states of Europe have found it convenient to do so when it comes to macroeconomic policies to obtain exchange rate stabilization.

In the last section, “The New Europe,” Calleo states why the European Union might not develop into a confederal Europe of States due to its inability to make the right constitutional choices. Calleo opines that the EU must make three choices in three major constitutional issues: membership, scope, and governing structures. He supports his arguments well when he suggests that the EU must make a decision on widening and deepening at the same time. Doing both will have detrimental effects on the EU. Calleo suggests that the EU should ensure that the right structures are in place before taking on new members.

When Calleo concludes, he comes back to the main point of the book—how will Europe look and what should be US policy. As stated at the beginning of this review, Calleo states that should Europe make the right choices in the future, which it seems it is, then the US should become an “off-shore balancer” and a tripolar model used with the US, the EU, and Russia at the poles. If this is done then the United States will not necessarily fall from its position it is in now, and will develop a regional system that might one day be the model for a future world order.
USMC FAO Proponent
Col Kevin O’Keefe- Head, Unified Commands and International Issues Branch, PP&O, HQMC, and Chinese FAO EMAIL: O’KeefeKP@hqmc.usmc.mil Phone: (703) 692-4254 or DSN 222-4254

Maj Steve Duke- NE Asia (Japan, Okinawa, Korea, China, Mongolia) EMAIL: DukeSE@hqmc.usmc.mil Phone: (703) 692-4364 or DSN 222-4364

Maj Jim Zientek- PACOM (remainder of Asia-Pacific Region) EMAIL: ZientekJB@hqmc.usmc.mil Phone: (703) 692-4346 or DSN 222-4346

LtCol Sam Jammal- CENTCOM (Middle East and SWA) EMAIL: JammalOA@hqmc.usmc.mil Phone: (703) 692-4345 or DSN 222-4345

LtCol Mike Ramos- Latin America and Canada EMAIL: RamosMR@hqmc.usmc.mil Phone: (703) 692-4344 or DSN 222-4344

LtCol Dave Booth- Western Europe (NATO), Sub-Saharan Africa EMAIL: BoothDH@hqmc.usmc.mil Phone: (703) 692-4367 or DSN 222-4367

LtCol John Williams- Eastern & Western Europe, CIS EMAIL: WilliamsJP@hqmc.usmc.mil Phone: (703) 692-4368 or DSN 222-4368

LtCol Mitch Biondich- Security Assistance Officer EMAIL: BiondichMS@hqmc.usmc.mil Phone: (703) 692-4341 or DSN 222-4341

LtCol John May- International Affairs Officer Program (IAOP) Coordinator, and China FAO EMAIL: MayJF@hqmc.usmc.mil Phone: (703) 692-4365 or DSN 222-4365

Mr. Wren Meyers- Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP) EMAIL: (703) 692-4366 or DSN 222-4366

Contact these officers at (703) 614-3706/4221 or DSN: 224-3706/4221. Temporarily in Room 2020 Navy Annex: (703) 693-9980-9984

US NAVY FAO Proponent
Cdr Charles Livingston, HQ, USN (N24C), (703) 695-4881, FAX (703) 695-6166.

US AIR FORCE FAO Proponent
Col Anthony A. Aldwell
Chief, International Airmen Division (703) 588-8334, FAX (703) 588-6396

Maj Michael Dembroski - Branch Chief
(703) 588-8322; DSN 425-8322

Maj Diane Ficke - Academic Programs, (703) 588-8321; DSN 425-8321

Capt Chon Kim - Language Programs
(703) 588-8337; DSN 425-8337

Maj Francis Sweekosky - Budget/Continuing Education,(703) 588-8346; DSN 425-8346

MSgt Stephen Taylor - Budget/Immersion Training, 703) 588-8348; DSN 425-8348
IN THIS ISSUE:

North Korea: Sounding the Alarm
From Ram Raj to Brittish Raj to Swaraj
Diplomacy and the FAO
Sovereignty in Africa
Training of Foreign Area Officers
Georgia: From CGSC Student to Defense Minister