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Macedonia’s 2002 Elections

By George Huff

Introduction

I was one of some 800 international monitors to observe the parliamentary elections in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Macedonia or FYROM) held on September 15, 2002. (This mission was my fourth secondment by the U.S. Department of State to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in the Balkans. My earlier OSCE assignments were supervision of the first municipal elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Vitez) held on September 13-14, 1997; supervision of the second national elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Visoko) on September 12-13, 1998; and supervision of the first democratic elections in Kosovo (Urosevac) on October 28, 2000.) Annex C of the Ohrid Framework Agreement specified that international monitors including those from the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) were invited to observe these elections. Since the 1990 breakup of communist Yugoslavia, the development in Macedonia of a multi-party political system, and the international community’s recognition of Macedonia’s independence from Belgrade in 1991, OSCE’s Spill-over Mission to FYROM has operated continuously from Macedonia’s capital city, Skopje, with a mandate that includes the monitoring of elections. This year’s elections represented another step in Macedonia’s transition from communism to democracy and from religious and ethnic segregation to integration.

Macedonia’s Situation and Neighbors

Macedonia is located north of Greece and is slightly larger than Vermont with an estimated population of more than two million. FYROM’s other neighbors are Bulgaria which annexed Macedonia during World War II; Kosovo, technically a part of Serbia but now governed by the United Nations (UNMIK, or United Nations Mission to Kosovo) but regarded by many Serbs as “southern Serbia”; and Albania whose ethnic people in Macedonia comprise a sizable and growing minority. Today’s Macedonia is a name claimed by two adjacent countries, FYROM and Greece; geographically and politically, there are Slavic and Greek Macedonias. International recognition of Macedonia’s independence was delayed by Greece’s objection to the new state’s use of what it considered a Hellenic name and symbols. Greece finally lifted its trade blockade in 1995 and the two countries agreed to normalize relations despite continued disagreement over FYROM’s use of “Macedonia.”

Macedonia’s Significance

FYROM’s neighbors have a stake in its collapse as an independent state. The Balkan Wars (1912, 1913) were fought over this territory. In the interests of regional stability and European Union integration, it’s important to the West, and more particularly to Western Europe that Macedonia survives. Macedonia is of future strategic importance to Western Europe as a scheduled conduit for Caspian Sea oil. Internally, Macedonia is rife with unemployment, poverty and corruption, and simply cannot handle its problems without international assistance. Macedonia faces questions of minority rights and the status of ethnic Albanians; as mentioned above, FYROM’s use of a Hellenic name and symbols and international recognition; the instability in the former Yugoslavia; and the refugee crises of the Kosovo (1999) and Albanian (2001) Wars.
Election of Macedonia’s Parliament

This year’s third parliamentary elections in FYROM were the focus of international attention as a result of last year’s civil violence (the Albanian War) which was particularly severe along Macedonia’s northwestern border with Kosovo between armed ethnic Albanian separatist groups, fighting as the National Liberation Army (“NLA” or “UCK” in Albanian), and Macedonian government security forces. The Albanian War caused up to 100,000 people to be displaced in the country or to flee abroad. The ethnic Albanian municipalities of Tetovo, Gostivar and Kumanovo and the surrounding villages were the conflict areas. Under intense pressures from the international community, including the European Union and United States, political and military actions were taken last year to stop the violence and reduce the ethnic tension.

Survey research conducted prior to this election showed that Macedonians perceived the needs for governmental, economic and societal changes. Macedonians reported that their top problems were unemployment, poverty and corruption. In 2002, Balkan media reports underscored these concerns. It was not surprising too that, in the aftermath of the Albanian War, Macedonians reported fearing war above all else. The time was ripe for political change and this conclusion proved true at the polls.

Macedonia’s political party system is based on ethnicity with little voting across ethnic boundaries. The ethnic Macedonian party in power, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization - Democratic Party for Macedonian Unity (VMRO-DPMNE) was defeated by the previous opposition ethnic Macedonian party, the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM). This year’s upstart ethnic Albanian party, the National Democratic Party (DUI), defeated the longer-standing ethnic Albanian opposition parties (represented in the Government since 1998), the Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA) and the Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP).

Ethnic Albanian Minority

In accordance with the Ohrid Framework Agreement (“Ohrid”), a peace accord reached with armed Albanian groups on August 13, 2001, Macedonians agreed to address the concerns of ethnic Albanians in Macedonia about participation in the Government, economy and society. Macedonians also accepted NATO’s unpopular military intervention. NATO’s Operation “Essential Harvest” oversaw the token collection of weapons from the NLA in September 2001 and this operation was extended as “Amber Fox” to support the return to peace. At present in Macedonia, the Netherlands commands and controls NATO troops under the name “Task Force Fox.” Macedonia’s growing ethnic Albanian minority (20-22%; 1994 Census) and the de facto independence of neighboring Kosovo, which comprises an overwhelming, ethnic Albanian majority, continue to be sources of ethnic tension.

Ohrid contained a set of principals which included constitutional amendments, legislative modifications, and implementation and confidence-building measures. Ohrid was also designed to affect the legal basis and administration of the elections and included provisions to use as an official language any language, other than Macedonian, spoken by at least 20% of the population (i.e., the Albanian language); to hold early elections and invite international observers including the OSCE; to take a new national census by the end of 2001; to revise of the law on election districts; adopt new laws on local self-government and municipal boundaries; and expeditiously to return refugees and internally displaced persons to the former conflict areas. Unfortunately, Parliament had not adopted nor fully implemented most of these provisions.

OSCE’s Spillover Mission to Macedonia

The 2002 elections were central to a po-
political agreement reached this year between leaders of the principal political parties, two ethnic Macedonian and two ethnic Albanian, as a part of Ohrid. The military aspect of the conflict was connected to the political side when the two ethnic Albanian parties, the DPA and PDP adopted a joint platform last summer with the NLA. In August of 2001, the international community assembled the representatives of the VMRO-DPMNE, SDSM, DPA and PDP in Ohrid where the agreement was signed. Afterwards, the NLA formed the new ethnic Albanian party, DUI, around the former NLA leader, Mr. Ali Ahmeti, which would ultimately defeat both the DPA and PDP, primarily because of their past relationships with VMRO-DPMNE.

Ohrid set forth the political-legal action plan for resolving the tensions between the two main ethnic communities in FYROM. Among other things, and relating to the new election law, these compromises included the use of minority languages (in local jurisdictions where 20% or more of the population speaks Albanian), absentee voting by refugees or displaced persons, women candidates, election districts, the role of police, and conduct of election officials. Among other things agreed at Ohrid, but not realized this year, was taking a new census for Macedonia before the elections. Several other things remained unresolved on election day, such as reliance on judicial appointees, voter lists, absent voters, political party representatives, and election administration.

As a part of Ohrid, OSCE called for observers to monitor the 2002 elections for Macedonia’s third Parliament. Under a new election law enacted after Ohrid, Macedonians voted in 2,973 polling stations nationwide. In late July 2002, the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) established a large observation mission to monitor the entire election process before, during and after election day. This mission augmented OSCE’s Spillover Mission to Macedonia. The observation mission carried out its operations with 19 international experts at the headquarters in Skopje and 23 long-term observers (LTOs) throughout the country. In addition, more than 750 midterm (MTOs) and short-term observers (STOs), including 100 short-term volunteers from the United States were deployed before election day. Of more than 800 international monitors, some 500 were sent to Skopje and 300 to Ohrid.

**Former Conflict Areas**

As an OSCE/ODIHR short-term observer, I went to Ohrid, Macedonia, where I was assigned to monitor voting in Macedonia’s Election District 6 which adjoins the republic’s northwest borders with Kosovo and Albania. (See Map Appendix A.). My assignment was observing ten polling stations northwest of Gostivar, in and around the lowland villages of Dobri Dol and Negotino. These villages were situated along the road above the main highway lying east of the Vardar
vide a measure of security and a perception of balance to a team of Albanians. Dr. Eisenmann (Continued from page 5) explained to me that, earlier this year, Mr. Florian Hobdari (Albanian), a young lawyer, was chosen from OSCE’s Presence in Albania as the LTO for Gostivar. As the only Albanian LTO in Macedonia, Hobdari’s participation as an unbiased international observer in this area was unwelcome to Macedonians. Hobdari now shared his sensitive position with two internationals, Ms. Stephanie Guha, a Czech, and Ms. Hannah Roberts, a Briton. Of course, Hobdari added to his position the advantages of legal training, language and ethnicity. Hobdari’s colleagues from OSCE Albania were Albanians, except for Dr. Eisenmann, who spoke Albanian fluently having been in-country for more than three years.

On Friday morning, as OSCE’s chartered buses carried the STOs to their destinations throughout western Macedonia, Karagjozi drove our Mitsubishi Pajero 4x4 to OSCE’s staging area in Gostivar, the St. Ignatis Hotel. We were fully equipped with vehicular and portable radios as well as individual cellular telephones and communicated en route with Tirane. In advance, OSCE had arranged for our accommodations in the Balkan Hotel in Gostivar. At the St. Ignatis Hotel, located on the highway on the north edge of Gostivar, NATO’s military representative (Dutch), OSCE’s community policing specialist, and others who had been living there for months told us the local situation.

NATO and OSCE security officers regarded the villages south of Tetovo where we would be observing as “cleared” or “low risk” areas. My assignment would be Gostivar’s West Region, including Negotino. We met Lieutenant “Max” (Italian) and his three-man military team whose armored vehicle would directly support our team’s mission. We discussed radio and telephone communications and provided him our tentative itinerary for election day. My young interpreter, Agron Vojnika (ethnic Albanian), Editor, Fakti, (one of Macedonia’s two Albanian language daily newspapers), Skopje, joined us -

wearing a bulletproof vest. Vojnika’s family lived south of Gostivar in Debar on the border with Albania, and his brother attended high school in Gostivar.

**Reconnaissance**

On Saturday morning, STO Team 0304 set out on our reconnaissance taking the smaller roads west of the Tetovo-Gostivar highway, driving north from village to village, stopping to walk around each polling station, and talking with the people there. Thus, we familiarized ourselves with these western parts of Gostivar’s and Negotino’s municipalities. The weather was clear, dry and comfortable and, of course, cooler in the mountain villages. The villages we saw had a mosque and one or two had an Eastern Orthodox church. Driving through Vrapčista, a Turkish village, tobacco was hanging in strings across the walls and donkey saddles were being made from timber and leather.

In Dobri Dol, after asking some questions in the village square, we were directed to the school where voting for this community would take place in four of its classrooms. One man identified himself as a prison warden; NATO told us later that he was a former NLA leader. By the schoolyard, painted graffiti said, “Albanian Vote Albanian.” In Negotino, we located the village center and, as we were leaving, met members of the municipal election commission arriving with materials to distribute to the electoral boards. (For this election, each polling station’s electoral board would comprise a president, four members and their deputies.). They directed us to the school nearby that would be used for voting. One of this school’s popular teachers was an American Peace Corps volunteer.

The mountain villages could be reached by narrow serpentine roads using our 4x4; vehicular traffic on these roads could be visible easily from miles away. The villages of Kaliste, Lomnica,
Gurgeviste and Gorjane each had a single polling station and approximately 120-135 families, except for Gorjane with 11 families. Electric power lines connected them to the valley but the spring water was drawn from common troughs. The villagers were very young or old and the others had left them for better lives elsewhere. Some mountainside brick houses vaguely resembled medieval fortresses with feedlots alongside. In the Winter, snowfalls often isolated these handmade villages from the lowland communities.

As we were leaving tiny Gorjane, I was thinking that I’d time-traveled back to the 12th century. On the road, two men with farming equipment had stopped to allow us to pass and Karagjozi greeted them in Albanian. In a moment, one said to me in good English, “I’m from Detroit.” I listened to him for a brief minute; he’d worked in the factory, saved his money and come home. We left; returning to Gostivar via the Tetovo-Gostivar highway which was occupied at intervals by Macedonian security forces. Traffic was light and, at a checkpoint, a policeman asked us if we’d seen anyone on the highway’s overpasses.

**Election Day**

Our aims for Sunday’s election day were to meet each of the members of the ten electoral boards and monitor their activities; provide our initial written reports to the LTO at mid-day; monitor an opening and a closing of two different polling stations; after closing, accompany the ballot box from the polling station to the Regional Election Commission in Gostivar; and provide our final written reports to the LTO at day’s end. For the day’s itinerary, we would open at Dobri Dol and then visit each of the four mountain villages, in turn, by mid-day. After returning to the St. Ignatius Hotel via the highway to turn in our written reports for the morning, we would drive back to Negotino to meet the three electoral boards at the village school and monitor those polling stations. We would communicate with Lieutenant “Max” and LTO Florian by radio and telephones. We would retain the flexibility to adjust our itinerary to changing situations and choose the polling station to close based on our observations during the day.

We were aware that the ballot contest was between the ethnic Albanian parties. The “political” activities around the school at Dobri Dol immediately became problematic. This school contained four polling stations and we arrived before dawn. We met one of the electoral boards and observed that the opening procedures were generally followed. However, as the voting began there, Vojnika alerted me to activity outside this classroom. Inside the school’s main entrance, at a desk in the window, a man with a list of people’s names was noting who was coming to vote. He was communicating with others outside the school across the street. With Vojnika’s help, I identified myself to him and asked his role in the election. He replied to Vojnika, “I’m a social worker,” but hastily gathered his papers and abruptly left the school. NATO knew his identity too.

During election day, after making relatively uneventful visits to the polling stations in the four mountain villages and to Negotino, we all agreed on the necessity of monitoring the closing of the polling station in Dobri Dol. In the evening, crowds were gathering around this school and the tension was palpable. Inside the polling station, the accredited political observers and the electoral board members were handling calls on their cell phones. The ballot count was proceeding smoothly until it became clear that the votes for the ethnic Albanian DUI party would overcome those for the ethnic Albanian DPA party. At that moment, and after some cell phone conversations, the DPA’s board members walked out of this polling station leaving the closing procedures incomplete and papers unsigned. The DPA’s

(Continued on page 18)
The current economic crisis in Argentina has led many here at home to ask introspectively, Who Lost Argentina? Like China in 1949 and Cuba in 1959, politicians and pundits routinely assign blame for foreign failures to some element of the US government. The Boston Globe recently printed an article directly faulting the US government for the economic collapse in Argentina, alluding to the “one size fits all model that the US tries to impose on developing countries.” The largest newspaper in Argentina, La Nacion, recently insinuated that the US government was negligent in this case.

The truth of the matter is that Argentina is to blame for the economic debacle which recently culminated in a suspension of payments on their crushing $142 billion foreign debt. Like a normal creditor who over-extends himself financially and lives above his means, Argentina’s reckless borrowing has bankrupted the country.

Critics of the US government and the International Monetary Fund’s involvement in Argentina would have you believe that this debt was all generated during the wild 90’s, as the end of the Soviet Union and the communist block brought about a surge of countries willing to embark on the neoliberal economic model. Argentina’s debt problems, however, began way before President Menem’s administration took office in 1989. Practically half of the current $142 billion debt had already been assumed by 1991.

A serious question that should be asked to those who blame the US for Argentina’s crisis is whether the US should be duly commended for the economic successes seen in other countries where neoliberal policies have improved productivity, employment, and standards of living? The answer is no. Countries like South Korea, Indonesia, Ireland, and Mexico that have benefited from free trade and open markets have done so by making their exports attractive and their countries fertile for foreign investment. Argentina’s refusal to de-peg the peso from the dollar (until the train had already wrecked) effectively made their export products too expensive, and between the burgeoning debt, and political and civil instability the country became a risky place to park foreign investment.

The critics should also be asked how Chile, Argentina’s western neighbor, could be so successful following a neoliberal economic model now for almost 30 years? What has Chile been doing that Argentina did not? For starters they have been balancing the budget in Chile, making possible a respectable 2-4 percent annual inflation rate. Chile has made its exports attractive and affordable, proven by selling 25% of its GDP to the exterior; Argentina sends only 8% to the exterior. Chile has kept its borrowing to a minimum, having never taken an IMF loan and currently holding a manageable $3 billion in foreign debt; Argentina’s an unmanageable $142 billion.

After reviewing the facts one must begin to look internally for the causes of the Argentine crisis. Simply put, Argentina was trying to do too much with too little for too long. Most economists agree that controlled deficit spending can be advantageous at the personal or macro level, for short periods of time, in order to acquire or invest in productive resources. Deficit spending, however, becomes dangerous when the purpose of the borrowing is to pay-off other loans and make up for budget shortfalls. This is the quagmire in which Argentina has found itself. Argentines
fancy themselves at the personal and macro levels as Europeans, with practically the same culture, norms and expectations as those on the east side of the Atlantic. This has obliged them to offer first class medical care and national universities at little or no cost to its citizens, and costly social subsidies that weigh heavy on the budget. The problems begin when the economy stops generating enough money to pay for it all, the politicians try to reduce some services (even salaries) to balance the budget but the people revolt, very loudly and sometimes violently. This is the heart of Argentina’s problem right now.

Adding to the fragile fiscal situation is the fact that Argentines are averse to paying taxes. Recent newspaper articles have stated that 40% of the populous does not pay taxes. I know from living there that vendors often will offer you a choice between two receipts for large purchases: one that gets reported to the government and another that does not. The latter saves you the buyer approximately 20%. Which would you choose? The aversion to paying taxes in Argentina is directly attributable to the disdain and contempt the average citizen has for the political class. When they talk about corruption in Argentina, they are not simply talking about politicians giving government contracts to buddies and family members instead of the lowest bidder. Rather, they usually are referring to blatant robbery whereby politicians devise schemes to put government funds into theirs and their cronies’ pockets.

Neither the US, the IMF, nor the neoliberal economic model that some love to berate can be blamed for Argentina’s financial mess. With respect to world finance, the IMF is much like a fire company, responding to calls for help once the fire has begun. History has shown that some fires are extinguishable while others simply must burn out themselves. Personally I am not a proponent of the infamous IMF “cookie-cutter” solutions fed to every patient and agree with former World Bank economist Joseph Stiglitz that the IMF is in need of serious reform. The IMF may be considered guilty of prolonging the crisis by pouring in extra billions of dollars even as many knew the situation was futile, but they cannot be considered guilty of causing it.

Argentines and fellow Americans should understand that the US government did not abandon Argentina. On the contrary, for at least the last 3 years the Clinton administration supported, to the tune of $40 billion in 2000, and then another $8 billion this past August ($5 billion immediately and $3 billion contingent on a successful debt swap) by the Bush administration. This can hardly be considered abandonment. After all, how long can anyone stand by a friend who consistently mismanages his finances even after you and others have loaned him several large sums? Eventually the need for tough love becomes stronger, and more prudent, than the need for more money. A few more billion in loans would have only delayed the train-wreck articles until approximately the summer of 2002. Tough love was the right call.

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Turkey recently took command of the International Stabilization Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. This is indicative of the new direction the Turkish Military has taken since the collapse of the Soviet Union. They already possessed a high degree of interoperability due to their participation in NATO. Their modernization program has increased their deployability. Today, from the Balkans to the Middle East, Turkey has the most credible force in the region with by far the most modern military. It is the sole regional power with the military capability, international position, and domestic will to conduct operations beyond its borders. From this perspective, there is a potential for Turkey to make significant contributions to current and future coalition operations.

This has not always been the case. The Turkey that emerged from the defeat of the Ottoman Empire following World War I was isolationist; its military was defensive. The creation of the Republic of Turkey, and its subsequent survival, consumed the mental and physical resources of the military. Three factors shaped the initial course of military development within the new state: the remnants of its Ottoman heritage; the renunciation of irredentist claims on former Ottoman territories; and the presence of tangible threats to its national survival.

The well-established system of Ottoman military education was the primary factor shaping the development of the Turkish military. Crafted over five centuries, it was designed to weld individuals from a polyglot empire into an effective military instrument using rote memorization and obedience. In the short-term, it produced the solid, disciplined officer corps that built, under fire, the military that won the Turkish War for Independence. In the long-term, it provided the institutions and instructors that became the foundation upon which the new Republic built a military, retaining both positive and negative aspects of the Ottoman system.

The second factor shaping Turkey’s military development was the renunciation of irredentism. Seeing Ottoman expansionism as the leading contributor to the fall of the empire, one of the key characteristics of the new nation was an inward focus on security and development. Its foreign policy was captured in Atatürk’s slogan, “Turkey desires not one inch of foreign soil, nor will it concede one inch to a foreign power.” Militarily, this translated into the development of a static, territorial defense force. Vulnerability, and thus neutrality during World War II, membership in NATO, and the rigid discipline of the bipolar world reinforced and maintained this defensive focus.

The third factor was the presence of many legitimate threats to the security and survival of the Turkish State. From the beginning, Turkey was confronted by an array of hostile forces. The dangers posed by first Nazi Germany and then the Soviet Union were primary.
However, there were also internal insurgency groups; long standing disputes with Greece, Syria, and Armenia; and at times tension with both Iran and Iraq that added to the complexity of the security question for Turkey.

Several events, beginning in the mid-1980s, created the opportunity for Turkey to evaluate and redefine the focus of its military. The most significant event was the removal of the Soviet Union as the primary adversary on the Turkish border. Simultaneously, Turkey deepened its military relationship with Israel and to a lesser extent Jordan. Internally, success against the Kurdish insurgency group, the PKK, in Turkey’s southeastern provinces worked to improve security and stability on several fronts. It set the stage for a confrontation with Syria over its harboring of PKK forces and leadership. Syria eventually expelled Abdullah Öcalan, the group’s leader, which led to his capture by Turkish security forces in Kenya. Though tensions at the time escalated rapidly between the two countries, removing this impediment has subsequently led to a slow thawing of Turkish - Syrian relations. Furthermore, as the facts surrounding these events came to light, it was revealed that following his expulsion from Syria, several highly placed persons in Greece had actively aided Öcalan, an international criminal wanted by INTERPOL. The bad publicity led directly to a reshuffling within the Greek government and subsequently to improved relations between Greece and Turkey. This improvement accelerated following the two earthquakes that struck Istanbul and Athens in 1999 and the aid each nation gave to the other. Today, the outlook between the two countries remains guardedly optimistic.

The shifting political climate was the catalyst for military development. Since the Gulf War the Turkish military has broken with its old model and has been in a period of transition. Based on its analysis of the war, the General Staff decided to scrap its divisional system for a more flexible one based on brigades directly under the control of a corps headquarters. This organization is very similar to the one described in Colonel MacGregor’s book, *Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century*. During this period of organizational upheaval, and unlike most other countries, Turkey maintained its levels of defense spending. In 1998, concurrent with the events mentioned earlier, the decision was made to further transform into a force-projection military. This has been a very difficult and expensive transi-
tion that is not yet complete. The pace is dictated by fiscal realities over time, involving a retooling of the entire military culture. There are two areas where the Turkish system is undergoing revisions: officer development, and equipment procurement.

Officer development is the key to a successful transformation from a static to a deployable military. The areas of officer selection, education, and promotion are all undergoing a slow, thoughtful, and deliberate evolution. Over the past eleven years, the Turkish military has made efforts to expand the civilian population base from which it draws its officers. The goal is to help create a military that more closely reflects society. Currently there are officers on active service from every part of the country and from a broader range of socio-economic levels than ever before.

Once selected, officer candidates enter the military education system. In Turkey, all of the officers are commissioned through their service academy, which is a college level institution similar to the military academies in America. In addition, 70% of the cadets accepted by the academies are graduates of the military high school system, which accepts students at 14 years of age. Because training begins at such an early age and because all of the officers are produced through a single system, there is a remarkable degree of uniformity within the corps. It is through this system that officers learn the basics of their profession, develop leadership skills, and internalize the culture and values of their service.

During the year I spent as a student at the Turkish War College, from 1999 - 2000, I was able to observe the dynamics of the education system first hand. Here, transition means moving from the time-honored Ottoman system of memorization to a more dynamic model that stresses creativity, problem solving, and individual initiative. The administration of the Turkish War College is behind this effort. The commandant, Tumgeneral Kudrut Cengiz repeatedly stressed the importance of an interactive educational experience. They want to develop officers who can think on their feet under stress. To that end they have worked to develop a curriculum that places the students under stress, forces them to respond, and analyses the results. During the entire process, the students are evaluated. Characteristically, due to the competitive nature of the course, the evaluation element receives the majority of the focus. The old methods facilitate evaluation and grading. As a result, there is institutional resistance to change, but there appears to be sufficient will to see the transition through. The most capable officers will quickly learn the requirements for successfully negotiating the new courses and rise to the top.

Herein lies the litmus test for evaluating the success of the transition – promotions. The institution must identify those characteristics needed for the officer corps to successfully lead a force projection military; then begin to promote based on the demonstrated mastery of those capabilities. To be effective, the elements that contribute to individual success must be in line with the goals of the institution.

Officer selection, education, and promotion are being slowly modified. The art is to maintain those characteristics that have served the country well while preparing the officer corps to effectively meet the challenges of the future. Officer development is recognized as the key of the transformation process. Translating that into procedures that will eventually percolate through the entire officer corps will take time.

Equipment procurement is another vital element of the transformation process. Turkey, a net importer of arms, has found itself encumbered with a variety of equipment from several countries. This has created a myriad of problems for organization, supply, maintenance, and training. As part of their basic reorganization plan, the General Staff has outlined a program for achiev-

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“The rule is not to besiege walled cities if it can possibly be avoided. The general, unable to control his irritation, will launch his men to the assault like swarming ants, with the result that one third of his men are slain, while the town remains undertaken. Such are the disastrous effects of a siege.”

- Sun Tzu

Following North Korea’s invasion of the Republic of Korea on June 25, 1950 U.S. and ROK military forces found themselves engaged in a three-year armed confrontation that spanned a battlefield gamut from barren valleys to populated cities. These were not the first of our military’s experiences with the effects of cities and towns, as such was common during the Second World War. Nevertheless though insignificant by today’s standards, these urban areas encumbered military operations on both sides and in some cases caused major setbacks.

During the time of the Korean War, the country was predominantly rural. Even the largest of cities such as Seoul and Pusan rarely had buildings higher than two stories. Korea’s total population numbered 25 million of which only 38% lived in the cities. Combat was especially intense in the urban areas such as for the 5th Marines during the battle for Seoul in September 1950. The enemy had emplaced barricades of rice and fiber sandbags across the streets with anti-tank mines along the front. The North Koreans fired machineguns and anti-tank weapons from behind the barricades and from adjacent buildings. A single barricade could hold up an entire battalion for an hour. North Koreans also used the buildings to conceal equipment and combat positions. During the approach on Yongdungpo on September 17, 1950, Lieutenant Robert L. Grover’s platoon from Easy Company, 1st Marine Regiment spotted the barrel of a T-34 85mm main gun protruding from a hut. Before the North Korean crew could aim or fire, the marine Pershing’s 90mm gun fired two rounds and destroyed both the hut and the concealed tank. Shortly afterwards a hut nearby to the first exploded into flames. The hut had been used to store ammunition. There were even occasions when the belligerents used the infrastructure itself as a weapon.

In April 1951, Chinese Communist Forces used the dam at the Hwachon Reservoir in an attempt to flood and isolate the 8th Army. When the CCF opened the sluice gates on the dam, the subsequent deluge dangerously split IX Corps across the Pukhan River. One of the IX Corps bridges
(Continued from page 13) was destroyed completely, and the other was pushed back to the bank by the current. It took several days to resume normal combat operations.

Since 1950 the mountainous and rural battlefields that predominated the peninsula during the Korean War have been vanishing, as rural terrain gradually transforms into urban. Such programs as President Park Chun Hee’s Saemul Undong (New Community Movement) during the 1970’s and President Chun Doo Won’s Two Million Housing Unit Plan in the 1980’s have helped to foster the growth of new cities outside of the major hubs. Today, 79.3% of Korea’s 46 million population resides in urban areas throughout the country. Improvements in public transportation and the rise of mini-cities in outlying areas have made it easier to commute to Seoul. As these outlying small cities’ economies and living standards mature, the migratory trend is that people are drawn out of the major cities and into the cities of outlying areas, thus increasing their size and depth. Moreover, as these rural areas that we anticipate to be our battlefields become more populated and developed, and our mission to defend the peninsula remains the same, the importance of planning for urban factors during military operations likewise increases. Today, many outlying cities are larger and denser than was Seoul in 1950.

Despite the prevalence of urbanization in Korea and the advantages it provides to the defending force, some military planners are reluctant to capitalize on it. In general, our war plans provide for us to fight our battles outside of the cities. During a recent defensive mission planning exercise for combat operations around the city of Taejon, not one of the four student groups at the ROK Army Staff College considered placing combat positions or logistical bases in or around the city. These students were all field-grade officers, having completed company level command and some with higher level staff experience. Only one of the four groups considered placing their division headquarters inside the city.

North Korean military strategy for forcible unification calls for a massive strike against the south on frontlines and in rear areas with the objective of capturing the entire peninsula before U.S. reinforcements can arrive. North Korean forces are expected to strike along existing lines of communication such as on the Chorwon-Munsan approach, just as they did in 1950. ROK-U.S. combined forces are postured to defend against these North Korean invasion routes. However, the thatched huts that once cordoned mere unpaved roads have been replaced with modern structures amid built-up areas. It is these built-up areas in which the initial battles will inevitably take place. Like weeds in a flowerbed, miniature cities have begun to sprout in many rural areas. Avoiding built-up areas in Korea will be possible only up to a point. In the future, combat in built-up areas may be an inevitable result of war in Korea.
In preparation for future conflicts, we must also consider the political changes that have occurred since the Korean War. Whereas in 1950 U.S. policy dictated the course for the ROK to follow, today the legitimacy of the Republic of Korea hinges on its ability to act as an equal partner in the security alliance. Destruction of buildings and cities by U.S. forces whether inadvertent or out of military necessity will harm the ROK U.S. alliance by creating the perception that the U.S. is bent on a war of destruction rather than of unification and without concern for the people of the ROK. The commander's information operations campaign must demonstrate respect for the sovereignty of the South Korean government through close liaison with ROK counterparts and the use of measured firepower. The presence of many noncombatants in proximity to the battlefield will require the conduct of civil military operations, meticulous adherence to the rules of engagement, and close coordination with the office of the J4 Wartime Host Nation Support. Involving local officials in decisions will help to bolster legitimacy of the U.S. cause in the eyes of the civilian population.

Contemporary military operations on urban terrain have met with some success through the introduction of non-traditional doctrine. The traditional view of urban combat is that of "attrition style warfare," requiring masses of infantry, combined arms, and stockpiles of ammunition. The combatants risk disease, supply shortages, and worst of all the loss of operational tempo. The modern urban battlefield is fully three-dimensional and includes combat with forces on the ground, on rooftops, in basements and sewers, and through walls and doors. As this terrain limits the effects of conventional weapons, Russian forces in Chechnya have employed flame throwers to clear buildings and have utilized air defense guns as direct fire weapons, as these weapons could elevate their fire to levels where tanks could not.

Historically, the key to victory on urban battlefields has been a high degree of initiative by independent small units. The U.S. Marine Corps has already begun a review of its current doctrine on urban warfare. According to a recent study, the Marine Corps Combat Development Command recommends combined arms integration at the squad and platoon level along with the use of new technologies such as remote imaging systems used by U.S. counter-narcotic teams to see inside of buildings. Meeting the enemy on the urban battlefield will require changes in our combat doctrine, lest we devolve into the traditional battle of "attrition."

Commanders and staffs at all levels must understand the nature of the three-dimensional battlefield and how it will impact their mission. Fighting on these urban battlefields if done haphazardly will prove costly, particularly if the fighting regresses into house-to-house "attrition" style combat. Although the mission to defend the Republic of Korea against the threat of an armed invasion from the north has not changed over the
US Air Force senior leadership recognizes the critical need to develop officers with foreign language and regional political-military (Pol-Mil) skills. The challenge is to balance officer career development with current and future Foreign Area Officer (FAO) requirements in a resource-constrained environment.

The Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs (SAF/IA) established the Air Force FAO Program within the International Airmen Division, Policy Directorate (SAF/IAPA). The AF FAO program stood up in 1997 to track officers with foreign language and regional skills, and to provide training opportunities that maintain and improve those skills. FAO is a career-broadening specialty; positions requiring this specialized skill set are identified with the 16FXX Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC) and are filled by officers from all career specialties. The FAO program targets officers with a basic level of existing language/regional skills and further develops those skills to meet AF needs.

Currently, the FAO program remains a secondary AFSC. The Air Force also maintains an AFSC for Political/Military Officer (16P), but 16Ps are considered "general" Pol-Mil officers. What differentiates the 16P from the 16F is the FAO's foreign language capability and knowledge of Pol-Mil issues specific to their region of expertise. Officers who possess the 16F AFSC receive an AFSC suffix that identifies their region of expertise. Those regions include:

- 16FXA - Air Attaché (any geographic region)
- 16FXB - Central Asia / East Europe / Russia
- 16FXC - Latin America
- 16FXD - East Asia / China
- 16FXE - Southeast Asia
- 16FXF - Middle East / North Africa
- 16FXG - Sub-Saharan Africa
- 16FXH - Western Europe

SAF/IAPA currently tracks over 1000 officers with FAO skills. Generally, officers obtain their FAO skills prior to commissioning or outside their current duties. Additionally, officers must identify themselves to SAF/IAPA and apply for the FAO AFSC. Roughly 35% of Air Force FAOs have language skills at the professionally "fluent" level, defined as a Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) score of Reading-3 & Listening-3. Air Force FAO program manages several language and regional studies training programs focused on helping Air Force officers develop and maintain those capabilities.

The capstone Air Force FAO language program is the Language and Area Studies Immersion (LASI), a one-month intensive in-country immersion. LASIs are offered in 40 languages in 39 locations; 270 officers completed a LASI in 2002, and a total of 1139 officers have completed a LASI since 1997. Officers are required to complete the DLPT immediately prior to and after completion of the LASI; DLPT scores improved for 99% of Air Force officers trained. SAF/IAPA also sponsors one-on-one language tutoring available to officers with at least a basic knowledge of a foreign language, and recently contracted for on-line language training. Both language programs provide beginner and intermediate instruction in FAO targeted languages.

Language is half the equation for developing a FAO, and DLPT scores offer an objective measure for this capability. The capability to deal
with Pol-Mil issues specific to the region is not as measurable as language skills, but regional Pol-Mil skills are just as important. SAF/IAPA sponsors Air Force officer participation in regional studies seminars offered through the State Department’s Foreign Service Institute, Air Force Special Operations School, and DoD Strategic Studies Centers. In 2002, 74 officers completed SAF/IA sponsored regional seminars; a total of 186 have completed these programs since 1998. SAF/IAPA also sponsors or advertises a variety of masters degree, research, and related programs.

Multiple on-going FAO program initiatives exist, including the SAF/IAPA-sponsored creation of a senior-level Executive Oversight Council to oversee Air Force foreign language issues. SAF/IAPA also encouraged increased foreign language emphasis early in an officer’s career by establishing extended LASI opportunities (2-3 months) for graduating US Air Force Academy and Air Force ROTC cadets before starting primary career training. SAF/IAPA has expanded ties with the Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC) in order to ensure FAO positions are filled with well-qualified FAOs, and assists the Aerospace Expeditionary Force (AEF) Center with their FAO contingency TDY requirements.

Despite these efforts, there are several key challenges to further developing a FAO corps that meets Air Force requirements. AF officers often receive initial language training immediately prior to assignments that require that language. The Air Force must shift from “just-in-time” language training to early career/pre-accession training with continued development throughout an officer’s career. FAOs must be deliberately developed: it takes several years of intensive training and several assignments to develop a well qualified FAO and these skills are perishable if not maintained through training/experience.

Finding the best-qualified officer to fill FAO positions (including Air Attaché positions) remains a challenge. The FAO program remains a secondary/career broadening assignment and only senior AF leader involvement and support will focus attention on utilization of their critical skills while ensuring FAOs remain competitive for promotion. Additionally, the Air Force must better align FAO skill sets to current and future requirements. Currently, 41% of our Air Force FAOs are

(Continued on page 19)
electoral board members also walked out of the stations in the adjacent classrooms, and the remaining electoral board members there asked us to monitor their closing procedures too.

We learned later from LTO Hobdari that these walkouts were being repeated in polling stations around the municipality. At some stations, the DPA party’s electoral board members reported receiving death threats and, at one station, an NATO team was ordered to extract the STO team. (The American STO there later explained to me a similar scenario occurred inside his polling station.). Listening to radio and telephone traffic, Lieutenant “Max” and his team moved to a position closer to Dobri Dol’s school. LTO Hanna Roberts asked me to split our team and monitor the closing of a second station in the school. Vojinka and I did this. In the first station, Dr. Eisenmann and Ms. Shtepani were able somehow to persuade the DPA’s party board members to return and complete the closing papers. This was not possible in the second station.

Outside the school in the darkness, crowds were pressing around the windows. Inside we heard and saw angry confrontations in the hallways. Since DPA’s board members had walked out, we learned that there was no transportation for moving the ballot boxes from Dobri Dol to the Regional Election Commission in Gostivar. After some lengthy discussions and arrangements, Karagjozi wheeled our vehicle into a makeshift convoy of a local police car and taxis. Our convoy transported the four ballot boxes to Gostivar. There, outside the municipal building, we joined a long queue of electoral board members and STOs to watch the sign over to the commissioners of the sensitive election materials. As we waited, nearing midnight, Macedonia’s preliminary election results were being transmitted across the republic and around the world.

Outside Gostivar’s municipal building, men with guns began firing shots into the darkness, a typical Albanian expression of joyfulness. Ethnic Albanians were driving through the grid-locked streets continuously honking their horns. The sidewalks were thronged with excited ethnic Albanians. From the passing cars, smiling people waiving Albanian flags and added their voices to the frenzied chanting, “Ali Ahmeti, Ali Ahmeti, Ali Ahmeti . . .” The upstart DUI party won and the VMRO-DPMNE party lost control. As we drove through Gostivar’s square, where the ecstatic celebrants were overflowing the sidewalks into the streets, we were surprised to receive a spontaneous cheer for OSCE. Our job was nearly complete and Karagjozi was driving us back to the St. Ignatis Hotel to turn in our final written reports. Overnight OSCE’s statistician would consolidate ours with all the observations of Macedonia’s polling stations to support the preparation of an OSCE/ODHIR’s press statement. What a spectacle!

Aftermath

Before dawn, on Monday, I had paid Vojnika for his interpretation services and Karagjozi was driving us back to Ohrid for our midmorning briefings in the Deserat Hotel’s conference room. By the time I reached Ohrid, Richard Abbott had already returned from Bitola and checked in, and other STOs were arriving. There we gathered and critiqued the election, especially in Macedonia’s Election District 6, and ultimately reviewed and approved a version of OSCE’s draft press statement on this election. That business finished, we returned OSEC’s radio sets and the afternoon was ours free to enjoy. With the assistance of a young Macedonian college student majoring in architecture, Abbott and I treated ourselves to a walking tour of historic Ohrid, followed that evening by a delicious dinner of Lake Ohrid trout with the vin du pays.

As a very welcome bonus, OSCE’s charter flight schedule from Ohrid, Macedonia, gave Richard Abbott and me a layover of nearly twenty-four hours in Vienna, Austria. His former
home was Grinzing, a Vienna suburb. On Tuesday, we happily spent the afternoon sightseeing in Vienna where September’s weather was nearly perfect. We explored Vienna’s colossal palace and spectacular cathedral as well as the city’s exquisite parks, cafes and shops. We stopped at OSCE’s future headquarters. That evening, after a vigorous hike through the woods and vineyards around Grinzing, including stopping to photograph Abbott’s former home, we dined at a traditional "Heurigen" inn. Vienna is a wine-growing region and its traditional Heurigen inns were launched by Emperor Josef II, who decreed that vintner families could sell homemade meals with their wines. Today’s Heurigens offer courtyard tables shaded by old trees, hearty fare (roasts, grilled chicken, homemade sausages, pickles and cheeses) and refreshing, quaffable white wines made to be consumed young.

Conclusion: Responsibility of Europeans

The United States is the world’s superpower and global cop; it’s been quipped too that today’s Europe is a superplace but not a superpower. As the superpower, the United States has successfully asserted its leadership in the Balkans. Nevertheless, the European Union is unmistakably taking greater responsibility for the Balkans. European policy is now achieving success in the Balkans. The 2002 parliamentary election in Macedonia is an example of that success. In my judgment, stabilizing and reconstructing the Balkans is the responsibility and work of Europeans. Americans may thank NATO’s Secretary General George Robertson and European Union’s Javier Solana and Chris Patten for the fact the world doesn’t have a crisis in Macedonia as well as Iraq.

(Continued from page 17)

European experts while only 5% are Middle Eastern experts. This will require identification of new and revalidation of current Air Force requirements.

For more information on the Air Force FAO program, visit the Air Force FAO web site at https://fao.hq.af.mil.
The last decade has seen a significant shift in the Turkish approach to national defense. The conscious decisions made by the Turkish General Staff began a slow but steady process that will dramatically improve its capabilities. Seeing the benefit of defusing potential problems before they cross the border, they are developing along lines similar to the United States and becoming a force projection military that can readily deploy as part of a coalition. Turkish officers, adapting to a new paradigm, will continue to improve their ability to operate smoothly within a coalition staff. Likewise, equipment development and procurement will continue to emphasize interoperability and compatibility, at least with NATO, and by extension, with the United States. The final piece, not yet addressed by the General Staff, is the question of soldier management. Until it is addressed, the current system appears to be adequate. Turkish soldiers have performed admirably in every out of area deployment in which they have participated. Most recently, they assumed command of the International Stabilization Force in Afghanistan. Turkey has always been a close ally with the United States. As a regional power, Turkey continues to share many of the same goals as the United States. As their force projection capabilities continue to improve, so does their ability to make a significant contribution to coalition operations.

MAJOR Martin A. Perryman, USA is armor officer and now a 48G currently assigned to U.S. Central Command J5 as a Pol-Mil desk officer for Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. His previous assignment was for ICT at the Turkish War College in Istanbul. His next assignment, beginning in the summer of 03, is as the Executive Officer at the Office of Defense Cooperation in Ankara, Turkey.
past 50 years, the battlefield upon which such as war will be fought has changed significantly. Urbanization has spread to the most rural of areas and thus transformed the ground upon which we must fight. What were once empty rice fields have become mottled with growing towns and built-up areas and with significant populations and infrastructure. In a future conflict on the Korean peninsula, combat operations will require the employment of weapons inside and around these built-up areas. The skills required to prevail under such conditions can only be obtained through realistic combined arms training integrated at the lowest levels and conducted on simulated MOUT terrain. Although our war plans imply that we will avoid fighting in built-up areas, continued urbanization may make adherence to this tenet impossible. For future operations, we must explore revolutionary tactics, weapon systems, and new methods of integrating our current systems to ensure the highest degree of success.

Endnotes:
1 National Statistical Office, Homepage (English text), and Korean Government, Homepage, "Koreanet," (English text)


5 Korea Highway Corporation, site visit and interviews, February, 1999.

6 Koreanet.


8 Keefe, Michael (International Relations Analyst); Lieutenant-Colonel Lee JeJune (Branch Chief), Major Richard Springette (Communications and Plans Officer), C5 Plans Division Civil Affairs Branch, Combined Forces Command – Korea, interview, March 23, 2001.


10 _Ibid._

11 _Ibid._


13 USMC.
Reviews by Major James M. Minnich, Northeast Asia Foreign Area Officer


Dr. Zalmay Khalilzad, former director of the Strategy and Doctrine Program of RAND’s Project Air Force, serves as President Bush’s newly appointed Special Assistant and Senior Director for Gulf, Southwest Asia and Other Regional Issues. Dr. Khalilzad has over twenty-years of combined experience in academia and national policy formulation.

The United States and Asia, a futures book, vividly analyzes the political environment of Asia and how it will effect the United States national interests. Considering the economic miracles of Asia during the last two decades, and the stabilizing role that the United States military provides to the region, Khalilzad, et al. suggest that a continued US involvement in the region is consistent with both our current and future national interests.

Specifically, Dr. Khalilzad, et al. advises that long-term national interests require the United States to directly intervene in Asia in order to achieve three necessary objectives (1) the prevention of a regional hegemon; (2) the maintenance of regional stability; and (3) the management of Asia’s transformation.

Concurrently, Khalilzad, et al. recommend a detailed four-part strategy that will facilitate the attainment of these three objectives. First, the United States, where possible, should transform bilateral security alliances into multilateral security alliances. These alliances could then work to both strengthen and preserve Asia’s security environment. Second, the United States should foster an effective regional balance of power in order to check any future aspirations of regional hegemony by China, India or Russia. Third, the United States, to preempt any miscalculated assumptions by potential adversaries, should forcefully articulate and manifest its regional interests. Finally, the United States should advocate the creation of a security forum for the entire Asian region.

Among the authors’ critical analyses are their assertions that the enduring ability of the United States to continue its policy of forward-deployed military forces, in Japan and South Korea, is waning. Consequently, based on the technical operating capabilities of current and future United States Air Force fighter aircraft, the authors’ suggest establishing United States military airfields in both the Philippines and Vietnam, locations that will permit the US to better influence its foreign policies in both Taiwan and throughout the South China Sea.

This book, both thought provocative and easily assimilated, would greatly benefit both the political-military analyst and the intuitive reader seeking a broad exposure to the security environment of Asia. Finally, without reservation, I strongly recommend The United States and Asia: Towards a New U.S. Strategy and Force Posture for all regional policymakers.


Dr. Leon V. Sigal, a career professor of thirty years, has published several literary works in the field of international relations and US
foreign policy. In addition to Sigal’s achievements in the academia, he has worked with the State Department as both an International Affairs Fellow (1979) and as a Special Assistant to the Director, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (1980-81).

Leon Sigal, in his book *Disarming Strangers*, provides an authoritative account of the events surrounding the 1994 Agreed Framework Between the United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea). The Agreed Framework is a policy instrument designed to eliminate North Korea’s developing nuclear weapons program. Drawing upon in-depth interviews with policymakers from the countries involved, Sigal does more than deliver the details of the issues centering on the signing of this agreement; he uncovers how the American aversion to cooperation, nearly led the world into a second Korean War. Sigal’s thesis is that the US too often attempts to achieve policy ends through coercion rather than cooperation, and as a result the US unnecessarily provokes confrontation instead of ameliorating crises.

Specifically, Sigal compares the Bush and early Clinton Administrations’ inability to alter North Korea’s nuclear weapons program through the use of verbal intimidation, economic sanctions, and the show of military force, with the success that was eventually achieved following cooperative bilateral negotiations. Additionally, Sigal recognizes the necessity of the US to serve as lead nation for many international crises; however, he caveats that with a responsibility to work multilaterally, thereby permitting other regional actors a voice within their neighborhood.

In a final comparison, Sigal reminds the reader that in the past, negotiations have proved successful in eliminating nuclear weapons proliferation in at least eight other countries – South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.

Certainly it would be premature to declare the Agreed Framework successful. In fact eight years since its signing, offensive acts and verbal threats continue to slow its progress, whereby today, completion of the Agreement has been delayed by no less than seven years. Whereas many of these problems could be worked out through close association, the US has held North Korea at arm length, and consequently, not one high-level talk has taken place since the initiation of the Framework. In Sigal’s closing remarks, he reminds us that among US vital interests, resolving issues of proliferation are paramount; and while this proliferation issue is well in the working, other problems are certain to arise. And if the US is to successfully resolve these crises, we must forego our persistent attitude of “criminalizing proliferation and demonizing so-called rogue states,” in favor of a policy of positive engagement and negotiation.

To date, seven other authors have written books about North Korea’s efforts to build nuclear weapons and US efforts to eliminate these programs. I have read each book, and while each is different, Sigal’s thesis is well supported by facts, interviews and experiences. The reading flows and is easily digested. I recommend Sigal’s *Disarming Strangers* for both students of international relations and government officials vested with the responsibilities of international diplomacy.
This book provides a detailed account of the diplomatic maneuvering of inter-war Czechoslovakia, particularly during the tumultuous 1930s. As can be expected, it therefore likewise highlights the dominant role that Edvard Benes played in the formulation of Czechoslovak foreign policy, first as the Foreign Minister of the infant state, and after 1935 as its President.

As the author himself acknowledges in the preface, one of his major objectives is to dispel the myth that the Czechoslovak government, and Benes in particular, were but a "passive object" who’s fate was simply the foregone result of actions taken by the European great powers during the numerous Czechoslovak-German crises of the 1930s. (Lukes, v) Tied to this, he also seeks to demonstrate that the Kremlin too played a much more vital role in these crises than the solely “marginal” one which most historians have attributed to it. (Lukes, v) In order to highlight the “hitherto neglected Czechoslovak and Soviet perspectives” (Lukes, v) the author thus primarily drew upon original primary sources only recently made available in official archives in Prague, and to a lesser extent, in Moscow. (Lukes, viii)

The author consistently reinforces a favorable picture of Benes throughout the book, staying true to his original portrayal of Benes as a self-made man, radiating self-confidence, and admired for his “intellect, toughness of character, and limitless capacity for work.” (Lukes, 5) Lukes also goes to great lengths to demonstrate how both President Masaryk and Benes were anything but “passive objects” on the world stage, and he asserts that on the contrary they were painfully aware of the imposing security challenges that stood before Czechoslovakia and took active steps to counter them. We see this in Benes’ numerous attempts to supplement his inadequate 1925 Treaty of Mutual Assistance with France with one also involving the Soviet Union.

Lukes identifies the basic premise of this foreign policy strategy as Benes’ original conviction that only a “concerted effort of all the major European countries and America” could hope to secure the peaceful development of post-war Europe, and that the ideological gap between the West and Stalin’s Soviet Union could be breached by the development of “commercial ties.” (Lukes, 12) As the increasing threat posed by Hitler’s Germany destroyed Benes’ utopian dream of a harmonious Europe, throughout the 1930s he then actively sought to “compensate for the German threat by bringing Moscow westward and giving it a real presence on the scales of power in Europe.” (Lukes, 38)

Just how active his role was is clearly demonstrated by Lukes, as we see how at Benes’ “prompting” the Soviet Union was invited to join the League of Nations in September 1934, thanks in no small part to his “real influence in the League.” (Lukes, 39) Having achieved this feat, Benes then took advantage of the ensuing Franco-Soviet rapprochement and the December 1934 Franco-Soviet Geneva Protocol. In a “daring diplomatic maneuver,” Benes informed the Soviets that Czechoslovakia would also be bound by the protocol, which with Soviet complicity thus turned “a bilateral arrangement into a de facto trilateral one.” (Lukes, 44)

Likewise, immediately following the May 1935 Franco-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance, Benes ardently pursued a parallel Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty since France was too concerned with German and Polish sensibilities to sign a tri-
lateral one. His efforts bore fruit only fourteen days after the Franco-Soviet Treaty had been signed, and Benes successfully secured a second Mutual Assistance treaty—this time with the Soviet Union, although its assistance was conditional upon that of France being committed as well. (Lukes, 50)

Although Lukes’ coverage of Benes is mostly favorable, he offers a somewhat objective treatment of his existing weaknesses as well (although he tends to understate some of them.) One such weakness is Benes’ occasional anxiousness, which caused him to “make mistakes; typically, he talked too much.” (Lukes, 51) The damage this caused him could best be seen when he visited the Soviet Union, and where “his apparent enthusiasm for all things Soviet further stigmatized Benes as an ally of Stalin.” (Lukes, 51) As a consequence, due to the ongoing crisis over the Sudetenland and “Benes’s diplomatic endeavors in Moscow, Czechoslovakia came to represent a liability to Western democracies.” (Lukes, 85)

Another major weakness Lukes reveals is Benes’ “uncharismatic personality” and his tendency to “lecture at great length to experienced foreign diplomats who soon resented being treated as students of international affairs.” (Lukes, 56) This particularly took its toll on his British colleagues who came to develop a strong personal dislike of Benes. (Lukes, 56) Seeing the pivotal role Great Britain would later play in sacrificing Czechoslovakia to appease Hitler, Benes’ unfortunate trait seems all the more relevant.

The author also asserts that the Soviet role in shaping the outcome of the Czechoslovak-German crisis over the Sudetenland in the 1930s was more than just “marginal.” We see this in the May 1938 decision by Benes to order partial mobilization of the Czechoslovak Army. Based upon his new sources, the author speculates that key parts of the intelligence that Prague received on the alleged German troop buildup on the border were in fact nothing other than a Soviet attempt at a “deliberate deception” operation aimed at provoking a war between the West and Hitler. (Lukes 153) Although the facts to support this thesis are admittedly incomplete, Lukes does paint a realistic scenario.

More importantly, it was at Czechoslovakia’s critical hour of need that the Soviet Union performed perhaps the most important role of the crisis. After being deserted by France and Great Britain at the September 1938 Munich Conference, Lukes’ sources reveal that it was the lack of any definitive answer on Soviet commitment to stand by Czechoslovakia that finally compelled Benes to capitulate to the Munich Diktat. (Lukes, 257)

Thus, we see that the author fulfilled the two tasks he set before himself quite successfully. The book is of great value to European FAOs looking to improve their historical knowledge of the region in that it does indeed reveal Benes’ diplomacy as much more dynamic and full of initiative than he may have been credited with. We also uncover that the Soviet Union was much more than just an actor sitting on the sidelines throughout the conflict, although there remain some loose ends as to proven Soviet responsibility for the May 1938 deception operation. Finally, in addition to fulfilling these two goals, I find that the book also has a third key value, albeit more nebulous. For the novice historian, the detail and precision with which it portrays the intense pressure to which Great Britain and France subjected democratic Czechoslovakia in order to appease Hitler is an eye opener. The book reveals appeasement not only as the faulty policy we all know it to be, but furthermore as a gross injustice to the Czechoslovak people—one that we all need to learn from.

This book provides a relatively detailed overview of the history of the current-day Serbian province of Kosovo, beginning with the arrival of Slavic tribes on the borders of the Byzantine Empire in the fifth and sixth centuries AD, and concluding with the appearance of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in the summer of 1997 as a response to the Serbian clampdown on the province. In doing so, the book also traces the interrelations between the ethnic Serb and Albanian peoples inhabiting the province and their evolution over the ages. As any account of this topic was bound to do, it also challenges some of the nationalist rhetoric that has been emanating from both sides.

As the author himself acknowledges in the preface, his major objective in this book is “anti-myth.” (Malcolm, i) One of the first such historical myths he sets out to dispel is that of who were the first inhabitants of Kosovo, and the presumed historical claim to the territory that goes along with it. Malcolm asserts that following their settlement in the Rascia area in the seventh century AD, “the Serbian expansion into Kosovo began in earnest only in the late twelfth century.” (Malcolm, 26) As for the Albanians, Malcolm’s intricate ethno-linguistic research seems to indicate that Albanians trace their heritage to the ancient Illyrians, and that proto-Albanians were therefore most likely living in present-day Kosovo long before the Serbs. (Malcolm, 40) However, despite this concession to the Albanians, Malcolm also highlights his findings based upon primary source documents that, contrary to the Albanian claim, there was not yet an ethnic-Albanian majority in Kosovo in the medieval Serb Kingdom. (Malcolm, 55) That being said, however, the Serbian claim that there were no Albanians at all in Kosovo until the seventeenth century can also be ruled out. (Malcolm, 140)

Malcolm also sheds much light on the mythical 1690 “great migration” of the Serbs and their patriarch out of Kosovo on the heels of the retreating Austrians, and the alleged resulting flood of Albanians into this vacuum. His research into several primary sources and resulting analysis reveals that the fleeing Serbs numbered only some 30,000-40,000, including in that count Serbs fleeing from areas other than Kosovo as well, thus well short of the half million figure advanced by Serbs. (Malcolm, 161) Malcolm doesn’t date the establishment of an ethnic Albanian majority in Kosovo until the mid-nineteenth century. (Malcolm, 196) He then proposes that Albanians gradually became a majority not due to migration but primarily due to local growth, thanks to what today ranks as the highest birth rate in Europe. (Malcolm, 332)

Another myth that Malcolm seeks to dispel is that the present day conflict in Kosovo is simply the predestined result of resurfacing “ancient ethnic hatreds.” (Malcolm, xxvii) Instead, Malcolm paints a picture of two peoples living in peaceful coexistence for several centuries, indeed sometimes cooperating against a common threat. Instead he blames modern politicians for amplifying their differences and stirring-up prejudices. For example, Malcolm’s research on the 1389 Battle of Kosovo finds evidence of Albanians taking part in the battle on both sides. (Malcolm, 62-64) Likewise, during both the 1689 and the 1737 Austrian invasions he asserts that both Serbs and Albanians flocked to the Austrian side against their Ottoman overlords. (Malcolm, 148, 168)

The first real deterioration of the relations between Kosovo Serbs and Albanians came from the mass expulsions of Muslims from Serbia and Montenegro in 1877-8. (Malcolm, 228) The 50,000 or so of these so called Muhaxhirs who consequentially resettled in Kosovo brought with them a strong hostility towards the Orthodox Serbs, which in turn caused 60,000 Serbs to emigrate from Kosovo. (Malcolm, 229-230) Malcolm also points to the effect of the Serbian state’s policies following the conquest of Kosovo in 1912, and again as it reasserted control in 1918. These anti-Albanian policies (intended to encour-
age them to emigrate to Albania or Turkey), and the associated “large-scale program of coloniza-
tion” by ethnic Serbs, also did much to breed en-
imity between these two peoples. (Malcolm, 269, 
280) Albanian expulsions of tens of thousands of 
Serbs (primarily colonists) during the World War 
Two years further deepened the divide. (Malcolm, 305) Yet Malcolm claims the point of no return 
was only reached by the “Ethnic Cleansing” poli-
cies of Milosevic’s “Greater Serbia” in the 1990s, 
which followed the highly unpopular 1989 amend-
ments he orchestrated which ended the generous 
provisions of the 1974 Yugoslav constitution and 
reduced Kosovo’s autonomy to a “mere to-
ken.” (Malcolm, 341-344)

Malcolm also asserts that it was only in the 
nineteenth century that Serbian nationalists trans-
formed the “folk-poetic tradition” of the medieval 
battle of Kosovo as some sort of historically self-
defining “national ideology” with religious over-
tones. (Malcolm, 58, 79) Malcolm clearly shows 
that the actual 1389 battle itself was by no means 
a decisive Turkish victory that sealed the fate of 
the medieval Serbian empire, nor was it immedi-
ately followed by Ottoman rule. Instead, his de-
tailed analysis of numerous primary source docu-
ments reveals that although in the end the Turks 
held the field, the battle was really more of a draw 
as they immediately returned to Anatolia and Ser-
bian self-rule persisted for another seventy years. 
(Malcolm, 76) Kosovo is also not the “Jerusalem” 
of the Serbs. (xxxi) The first seat of the Autoceph-
alous Serbian Orthodox Church in 1219 was in 
Zica in central Serbia, and only after Tatars 
burned it down at the end of the thirteenth cen-
tury did it move to Pec in Western Kosovo. 
(Malcolm, 45-46)

Malcolm also points out that Tsar Dusan’s 
medieval Serbian Empire’s origins were in the 
Rascia area the Serbs settled in the early sev-
enth century AD, and not in Kosovo. (Malcolm, 
24) The medieval Serbian state’s de-facto capital, 
for its part, was also never in Kosovo. It was ini-
tially in Ras (in Rascia proper) and later moved to 
Skopje (present day Macedonia) in the mid-
thirteenth century. (Malcolm, 50) Thus the myth 
of Kosovo as the “cradle of the Serbs,” or as their 
“Jerusalem,” is dismissed by Malcolm as histori-
cally quite incorrect. On the other hand, Malcolm 
demonstrates that the nineteenth century Alba-
nian independence movement traces its roots to 
Kosovo and the Albanian League’s efforts to es-
tablish a self-administering unified Albanian 
vilayet. (Malcolm, 217) It was here that the 
League’s short-lived 1880 de facto government 
was established in Prizren, until the Ottomans 
crushed it in 1881. (Malcolm, 227)

In conclusion, Malcolm’s work does provide many 
useful insights into the nature of the present day 
conflict of great use to the modern European 
FAO. The broad scope and spectrum of sources 
which he uses to support his findings does him 
great credit. The only flaw that I can detect is his 
understatement of the symbolic importance of 
Kosovo to the Serbs. While the facts indeed sup-
port his conclusions that Kosovo really wasn’t 
much of a “cradle” of any kind in Serbian history, 
nonetheless people have a remarkable ability to 
persistently hold on to myths over generations. 
Thus, factual or not factual, the myths surround-
ing Kosovo will for long outweigh Malcolm’s mere 
“facts” in the eyes of everyday Serbs—much like 
the Alamo in the eyes of Texans.
Designating as a FAO means an immersion into the nations, cultures and religions of the region we are experts in. There is the temptation in our busy schedules to read books about a country’s military, terrorist factions or political biographies. This although important only gives part of the answer when trying to assess a nation’s intentions or how its government will react to the moods of its people. Reading a nation’s literature gives insight into the everyday people who must etch out a living in Teheran, Cairo or Buenos Aires. If we had analyzed the plays, books and novels written after the 1967 Six-Day War we could’ve understood the deprivations Egyptians would’ve endured to settle the score with Israel, more importantly we could’ve also understood that Nasser and Sadat after him had no choice but to attack Israel to restore legitimacy to the government in the eyes of the people. One of the most enduring failures of U.S. analysts was of course predicting the fall of the Shah. This was a result of not even attempting to understand the forces uniting behind his overthrow. These included the clergy, the middle-class, the poverty-stricken and finally the military. Amazingly no one read a book published in Arabic and Persian by Khomeini entitled while he was in exile, “Islamic Governance.” This was to be his blueprint for how he would establish his Islamic Republic. It should have come as no surprise that a group of senior clergy would control the economic and political lives of millions of Iranians.

This book is the autobiography of Dr. Nawal El-Saadawi, a rural physician, writer and woman’s rights advocate in Egypt. Her autobiography is significant because it lays the central fight against terrorism, whether Egypt can intellectually endure under the threats and stresses of Islamic militancy. Dr. El-Saadawi’s story is also a history of Egypt from the eyes of the educated middle-class. Just like today, university campuses were a hotbed of dissent and violence against the monarchy of King Farouk I and subsequent incompetence and corruption of Nasser’s ministers. As a university student she would come in contact with Islamists, Communists and Leftists bent on bringing Egypt their version of a just society. In the corridors of campuses and in the living rooms of average Egyptians talk was not of the revolution and its impact but the real power behind Egypt’s first president General Mohammed Naguib, which was a charismatic Colonel Gamal Abd-al-Nasser.

The book also details the life of an Egyptian woman and El-Saadawi criticizes the Shabka system, whereby a female’s worth in currency is determined by her dowry. This dowry is negotiated between the two families. El-Saadawi volunteered to be a medical provider in the front during the 1967 Six-Day War, she came close to death when an Israeli artillery shell landed near the vehicle she was riding killing the driver. She wrote that Egypt’s struggle is not limited to her men but also by the burdens the females endure in the fields, in factories and in homes. She would chastise the establishment that declared the rewards of Jihad only for men, citing Islamic history and the pivotal role women played during the lifetime of Prophet Muhammad.
However her service and love for country would not save her from a novel she wrote over two years ago. The novel written in metaphor warns of the danger of Islamic militants and the established clergy unwilling to educate the population as to their misguided message. Her harassment began with the mosque next door that declared her writings heresy, which only increased sales of her book. Then Gamaa-al-Islamiyah, a militant group, placed her and many Egyptian intellectuals on a death list. The Government had to place a 24-hour guard on her home and her second husband implored her to stop writing. As an Egyptian intellectual she had two choices to make hide in Egypt or go into exile and continue writing. She left for the United States.

This book is highly recommended for Middle East FAOs, because it illustrates that this is not a war against terrorism but for the intellectual soul of nations like Egypt. It is this climate of Islamic militancy that caused the stabbing of Noble Prize winner Naguib Mahfouz and the exile of Dr. Abu Zeid to the Netherlands.


Nothing discredits Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and all those who support them than scholarly Islamic study. Ahmed Moten is a head of the Political Science Department at the International Islamic University in Malaysia. His book attempts to give readers a political framework based on Islam, using the Quran (Islamic Book of Divine Revelation), Hadith (The Prophet Muhammad’s actions and deeds) and precedents of Islamic government in the past 1,400 years. Using the Quran he breaks down an Islamic government as having six basic tenants other wise they are considered tyrannical. These principles include:

- **Tawhid**, belief in the indivisible unity of God,
- **shariah**, using the Quran, Hadith and interpretation to establish a just society,
- **adalah**, establishing justice and the rule of law,
- **hurriyah**, freedom in person, property and thought in order to achieve the maximum degree of self realization,

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• **musawah**, equal opportunity to achieve his or her potential, and
• **shura**, the establishment of a consultative council as a check upon the executive branch.

Thus every so-called Islamic Republic or fringe thugs like the Taliban can be judged as to how they achieve these six essential principles of Islamic governance. The concept of equality is mentioned six times in the Quran and Prophet Muhammad said, “all people are as equal as the teeth of a comb, as they are like the children of Adam.” Somehow in their quest to oppress, steal and subjugate the Afghan people, the Taliban forgot these lessons from the very faith they claim to defend.

The Quran and Hadith did not elaborate a constitutional theory according to the author. However most Muslims agree that an Islamic society should contain elements of these six principles. Another important concept is that of the **Ummah** members of the Islamic community although this is even debatable as Prophet Muhammad in a treaty with the Jewish tribe of Abu Aawf, declared them and the Muslims to be part of one Ummah. The importance here is the abolishment of blood relationships as the defining principle of loyalty, identity, vengeance and kindness. One should assist their fellow brother or sister not on the basis of family or kin relations only, but in order to enhance the collective society and perform these acts of kindness as an act of worship to God. As Muhammad clearly intended that his successor be chosen from among the best qualified peers, according to Sunni Islam, than one can make the argument that political power emanates from the Ummah (the people) with the blessings of God. The seeds of modern democracy can be found in Islamic religious texts.

Finally the author makes an eloquent appeal for **Ijtihad** (Analytical Reasoning). What was not found in the Quran and the Hadith was adjudicated using rational discussion and discourse. This process of reinterpreting the Quran and Hadith is known as Ijtihad, which was arbitrarily stopped in the eleventh century. This needs to be reawakened in order to reconcile Islam with concepts of the 21st century. This debate among Muslims is known as the Islamic **Nahda** (Revival) and it attracts liberal, moderate and fundamentalist thinkers. Islamic militants unfortunately represent a violent expression of this revival. They threaten any Muslim thinker who wishes to re-explore the Quran and Hadith in its historical context or by analyzing its metaphors and commands reconciling them to modern theories of economics, sociology and politics. This is an important book in finding ways to ideologically combat terrorism, which is a threat to Muslims as well as the globe.

The Protection of Moderate Islamic Thought by LCDR Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, USN

On May 3rd, Mr. Paul Wolfowitz gave a speech to the World Affairs Council in Monterey, California. The Deputy Secretary of Defense implored, “The west needs to understand that there are many different interpretations of Islam, and the secular authority and Islam can live peacefully together.” He also said, “We must work to appeal to a broad population, as well as voices struggling to rise above the din of extremism, voices that tell us that the Islam of Muhammad is not the religion of Bin Laden and suicide bombers.” His remarks have been an inspiration to me personally as his words ring true for every Muslim scholar who cannot debate his own religion or write publicly regarding ideas of Quranic interpretations without being a target of Islamic extremism. Operation Enduring Freedom not only protects our country but the concept of whether one form of Islam that of intolerance, bigotry and abject domination will succeed over a religion as diverse as the other monotheistic religions of the world.

When officials and scholars say that Islamic militants have hijacked a religion, let us be specific. What Al-Qaeda, Al-Jihad, and other
militant organizations have done is to take elements of the Quran (Islamic Book of Divine Revelation) and only quote to the masses certain verses that justify their violent acts. For instance, the Quran indeed sanctions a violent form of Jihad against infidels, but what the Islamic terrorist and their ideologues to not say is that these verses were revealed when Prophet Muhammad was trying to establish an infant Islamic society amidst a program of genocide conducted by the Meccans who lived at the time and found his message of monotheism and social justice threatening. Listening to the words of Bin Laden and his reference to fighting crusaders have no basis in the original founding of Islam in the seventh century but is hateful language that found its way into Arabic vernacular during the crusades that began in the eleventh century.

Bin Laden and Islamic militants have neglected key verses of the Quran that adds credence to Mr. Wolfowitz’s remarks. Sura 49, verse 13 of the Quran states, “O mankind we created you from a single (pair) of a male and female and made you into nations and tribes, that you may know each other (not that you should hate one another) verily the most honored of you in the sight of Allah is the most righteous of you.” This verse encourages Muslims to engage a variety of people and be inspired by the variety of thought, ideas, religions and viewpoints that God created. It is this verse that made the Arabs one of the most prolific traders and seafarers from the ninth to the fifteenth centuries. The suicide bombers who claim for themselves paradise did not think of Sura 5, verse 8, “O ye who believe! Stand out firmly for Allah, as witnesses to fair dealing and let not the hatred of others to you make you swerve to wrong and depart from Justice. Be just, that (justice) is next to piety and fear Allah, for Allah is well-acquainted with all that ye do.”

How would the Palestinian issue be resolved had its people been steeped in a rational thinking of their religion. In Sura 60, verses 7 to 8 of the Quran, “It may be that Allah will establish friendship between you and those whom you hold as enemies. For Allah has power (over all things); and Allah is forgiving and most merciful.” It is not the interest of those wanting to propagate violence to quote the many passages of the Quran that appeal to the message of brotherhood, forgiveness, charity and respecting the rights of all persons. Instead Islamic terrorist organizations bring out those elements of Islamic scripture that encourage violence and even them take it out of its historical context to further their cause.

When Mr. Wolfowitz says that Islam and democracy is compatible he is absolutely on the mark and there are Islamic clerical commentators that back his statement. One of the main pillars of Jihadist groups is the re-establishment of the Caliphate, which was abolished in 1926 with the collapse of the Ottoman Turks. The concept of the Caliphate is not one present in the Islam of Muhammad’s time; the Prophet left no guidance about how his community should govern itself. What is clear however is that government is sanctioned by the Ummah (the community) and not by one person. This concept of self-government by the community represents some of the basic elements of modern democracy, which is not incompatible with Islamic thought. Islamic scholars have also correctly identified that the Caliphate is not one of the principles of Islam and therefore not the only form of governance for Muslims. Islamic militants want to forcibly graft their version of government, religion and tyranny on the community of Muslims; we have seen a glimpse of what could happen when diverse Muslims are subjected to one form of tyrannical Islam with the Taliban.

Through our efforts at thwarting terrorism, the United States can also ensure freedom to express and bring out a Muslim majority who will not stand for a single, intolerant and tyrannical form of their religion to the exclusion of all others. Mr. Wolfowitz said, “America and the west must encourage moderate Muslims who believe in a vision of Islam that embraces free thought, free speech and tolerance,” to this statement I must respond with the traditional navy, “Aye! Aye! Sir!”
Like the rest of the Army, the FAO community remains busy and committed. Here at the Proponent office, we continue to work many short and long term issues.

**Career Field Designation**

The priority for our office remains the correction of the Career Field Designation (CFD) process to minimize the loss of officers in the training base. We made some small improvement in the last CFD board. Unfortunately, we continued to have FAO trainees returned to basic branches only to receive untrained officers from those same branches. The elimination of that issue is the prime focus of the changes to the CFD process.

A complicating factor in the CFD process is the fact that the next several Year Groups (YGs) going through the O4 Board and CFD are shortage YGs. These YGs were assessed under strength and, as a result, the Army must distribute the officers across all of the branches and functional areas to meet requirements. As a result, we will continue to lose some officers in training due to short-term changes in requirements of the basic branches.

There is good news on the horizon, though. Both Army G1 and PERSCOM are now engaged in correcting the problem. We expect that we will be able to eliminate the loss of trained/partially trained officers in lieu of untrained ones – and should see this implemented for the upcoming CFD board results this summer.

**FAO PROMOTIONS**

FAOs continue to fare well in OPMS promotion boards. Congratulations to all of you who have been selected. The FY02 O6 promotion list should be released in January 2003 and we expect FAOs to continue to do well.

A review of the results confirms that manner of performance continues to be the greatest factor in promotion selection. As expected, FAOs selected for promotion look more like the DA PAM 600-3 model with each successive board. This trend is a result of the diverse files of those officers who grew up in the dual-track OPMS 2 world. While a differing opinion was offered in the last issue of the Association journal, FAOs must be very careful about equating their files with those of officers predominantly raised under the old OPMS system. For OSCF officers, BN XO and S3 time is no longer a possibility nor is it a requirement. Of course, many officers from the senior/transition year groups will have had an opportunity to fill those positions. Regardless of positions held, any officer with all Above Center of Mass OERs could reasonably expect to be promoted. Be very careful, though, when you try to apply OPMS 2 history to OPMS 3 realities.

**MENTORING**

Speaking of OPMS 2 and 3, I would ask all senior FAOs to ensure they fully understand OPMS 3 before mentoring our young officers. Failure to do so will only hurt the officer, the FAO corps, and the Army. Many of the “norms” of OPMS 2 no longer apply, yet I’m shocked that I continue to find FAOs, and other officers, who
really don’t understand the implications of providing outdated advice to our young officers. You don’t have to agree with OPMS 3 – but you do owe it to those you mentor to understand it and help them to be successful through wise counsel.

**INTERMEDIATE LEVEL EDUCATION (ILE)**

The Army continues to work through the issues associated with implementing ILE – formerly known as Universal MEL4. The ILE process is integrated to a full revision of the Army’s Officer Education System (OES) and includes two components: (1) the Common Core – that part of a MAJ’s education that provides the skills all officers need to effectively function as a field grade officer (the MEL4 component) and, (2) a follow on course that provides the specific skills relating to the officer’s branch/functional area. All MAJs will receive ILE, once implemented.

Under the current proposal, the Common Core can be completed through a resident or a non-resident course of instruction. The only criterion is that all officers successfully complete it. Duration of the resident phase is approximately 3 months. All OPCF officers will attend the resident Common Core at Fort Leavenworth and will remain for a follow on course to complete their ILE requirement.

FAOs, for the most part, will either attend a resident Common Core at a satellite campus such as in Monterey, or will complete a non-resident version. Again, how you do it is not important – getting it done is. The remaining ILE component for FAOs is our existing training program (language school, grad school and ICT). Completing the three phases of FAO training and the Common Core will fully qualify you as a FAO.

**CONCLUSION**

We, at the Proponent Office, wish all of you a very happy holiday season and we here at the Proponent office look forward to the challenges and opportunities of the New Year.

COL Mark Volk
Chief, DAMO-SSF

Afghani military recruits practice saluting
At the beginning of the 21st Century the United States faces a dynamic and evolving security environment. America’s security is now truly a global issue and the men and women of the United States Air Force are tasked to meet that challenge. We find ourselves executing an expeditionary concept that focuses us on the business of rapid deployment in response to conditions ranging from humanitarian assistance to full-scale conflict. The expeditionary air and space force concept describes who we are today and where we’re going tomorrow.

Post-September 11th operations reinforce the reality that future missions and contingencies will require greater sophistication and understanding of our international security environment. Just as we need pilots, intelligence specialists, satellite operators, and jet engine mechanics, our expeditionary force requires airmen with international insight, foreign language proficiency, and cultural understanding. Recent operations underscore our need to establish a cadre of professionals proficient in foreign languages and area studies—men and women who have the right skill sets to shape events and rapidly respond to world-wide contingencies. These international skills are true force multipliers and essential to our ability to operate globally.

Developing such a global cadre will require a much-needed “culture change.” To that end, I strongly encourage the pursuit of such skill sets and experiences through regional/international studies degree programs, foreign languages, and overseas assignments. I expect commanders to fully support and emphasize the importance of this to their charges. To be truly successful at sustaining coalitions, pursuing regional stability, and contributing to multi-national operations, our expeditionary forces must have sufficient capability and depth in foreign area expertise and language skills.

For information about current Air Force officer foreign language training, regional education, and FAO utilization initiatives, contact the Air Force Foreign Area Officer program at (703) 588-8349, -8337, or -8322.
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