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I considered this submission in the days leading up to the much-delayed release of the most recent Colonel selection list. This list, the first conducted under OPMS-XXI, would select officers in competition with only those within their own career fields. Originally proclaiming to provide a more equitable selection rate to those non-operations career field officers, at least for those of us in OCF-48, it did so…or did it really?

When considering the idea for this piece, I really did not know if I would write it from the perspective of “why didn’t I get selected?” or “why did I get selected?” In framing the discussion that follows, paragraphs upon paragraphs were expended by the FAO proponent office (DAMO-SSF), FAO assignments, and myself. It was as a result of this electronic dialogue, that I knew there was a need for an expansion of the discussion. I had recently heard segments of my own ideas and opinions echoed by many officers, both within the OSCF and others. All wondered if the new system would work, having officers compete only against their functional area peers, or if some cross-pollination of criteria would occur to provide some middle ground of qualification which could have been used before the list release to predict those selected for promotion. I believe this is now the case, at least if I am any example of those Foreign Area Officers selected – and I think I am.

As a preamble, I must state that I am a good officer. I work hard. I work harder than many, if not most, of those I work with. Most of those I work with will confirm this, but little do they know that I feel I must work harder. I do not now, and never have had, the innate skills necessary to be successful. So, I work harder.

That having been said, my thesis is that I may not have been selected for promotion due to the fact that I am a good FAO. I believe that I was selected due to the fact that I was a good Armor officer. So good, that all better Armor officers (and there were many) remained within the Operations Career Field and are thus no longer my competitors in the OSCF. Secondly, I was selected due to the age-old adage that it is less important what job you have, and more critical how you perform each job. At least in my case, I believe hard FAO skills were less important to my ultimate selection, than was success at whatever job I held.

To illustrate my point, I must indulge the reader in a recount of my career. While important to me, I acknowledge that it will impress few others. But it may be illustrative. To my first point of being a good Armor officer, I provide the following.

Like most FAOs of YG 1980, I spent my early career focused on my basic branch. By serving as a Platoon Leader, Troop Executive Officer and Troop Commander, all during my first overseas tour, I may have unwittingly provided myself with additional “breathing room” to pursue both basic branch and functional area jobs. Like most FAOs, my mid career was spent with graduate school, language and in-country training efforts. But there, many similarities diverge between my career and others. Coming out of CGSC, I immediately transitioned back into an operational assignment, moving back into a year as a Squadron S-3 including a rotation through the National Training Center, followed by an-
other branch qualifying Squadron Executive Officer position. With another interim FAO assignment (details follow), and three subsequent alternate command selection list designations, I sought one more LTC “branch qualifying” job to get myself over the hump and in hopes of receiving the coveted battalion commander selection. I requested, and was provided the opportunity, to serve as a brigade XO in Korea. But, despite these efforts, Battalion Command was not to be. I believe, that in terms of selection to O-6, this may have been a blessing. But this conclusion will need to wait until a review of my FAO assignments.

Like most of those selected for promotion to Colonel, I have had my share of FAO utilization assignments. However, in my view at least, these assignments have not been in the “hard” skills traditionally advocated as essential for promotion. I have had only one in-country utilization tour, immediately following my year in Cairo for in-country training. Moreover, that assignment as the training officer in MAP Jordan, was done completely while wearing Captain’s bars (although I was promotable). My next FAO assignment was as the Security Assistance desk officer for Jordan and Egypt at US Central Command. During this assignment, while still on the books as a FAO, I served two years as the Military Assistant to the two-star J4/7 at CENTCOM – a job arguably designed for a Field Grade logistician or a branch immaterial major. This job did, by default, become more of a FAO billet following the Khobar Towers attack which energized the necessity to conduct Operation DESERT FOCUS to consolidate and improve force protection for all those serving within Saudi Arabia. During the resultant 9 months in Kingdom, I served as the general’s Pol-Mil advisor -- a truer FAO job.

Following the unaccompanied Armor job in Korea, I again returned to CENTCOM to serve in the J-5 as the Egypt and Jordan Pol-Mil desk officer and later the Egypt, Jordan, and Africa Branch Chief. [And yes, this “homesteading” too could have been a discriminator to not be promoted, irrespective of my requirement to return there, due to the health condition of my spouse – all unbeknownst to the Army – and to stay in Tampa.]

And so, as a FAO, I was never an attaché. I had just one “official” in-country tour. I homesteaded in Florida, never serving in Washington, DC. Is there something else important to explain the promotion selection? While I can not quantify my conclusion, my “gut” tells me that the board may have chosen officers, and I am the prime example, based on the old model, that officers with strong basic branch files “looked” like the board members, and their image of what success looked like. With most, if not all, former battalion commanders out of the competition pack, and occupying the operations career field, my file, with three branch qualifying jobs and three alternate selections for command, may have stood out.

Of course, I have left out one critical issue. In all of my jobs, Armor and FAO, under the new OER system, each report has been a top, above center of mass, report. A system designed to provide/allow “average” ratings across an assignment history, was not exemplified in my records. The adage of “no matter the job, do the job as well as you can,” continued to apply in my case. And this, above all else is probably the answer – far more than basic branch or FAO assignments – as to why this one officer was selected and another is not.

I am not proposing that junior officers should utilize my career as a roadmap for their own, or as the school solution to promotion to Colonel. What I am advocating is the need for significant open dialogue – from the proponent office and from the folks in the Hoffman building – in several areas. First, what was the composition

(Continued on page 19)
The purpose of this trip was twofold. First, to gain a better appreciation for the process and procedures that were implemented by the U.S. Embassy in conducting observer duties for the 2002 Zimbabwe Presidential Elections between incumbent President Robert Mugabe from the ZANU-PF and Morgan Tsvangirai from the MDC. Second, to gain a better understanding of the issues and concerns that often surround an electoral process that takes place in Africa.

My experience as an election observer can easily be separated into three phases. The following are those phases and the observations and facts that I learned during each phase.

**Preparation phase.** During this phase the leadership in the embassy determined that the most effective way to conduct observer duties was to assign two-man teams to each of the nine provinces within Zimbabwe. The necessary resources were identified and collected. This included everything from checklists and questionnaires for election assessment to adequate communication equipment for each team.

Personnel were identified and assigned to a team and a province. Classes were then conducted on the rules and regulations that an observer must follow throughout the elections. This was accomplished by issuing the Official Code of Conduct for International and Local Observers.

Another very important part of the training was to discuss what is/was the objective of being an election observer. In simple terms, our purpose was to report whether or not the general public's physical and psychological environment during all phases of the process were conducive to a free and fair election. A free and fair election is defined as:

1. Freedom from fear in connection with the election and the campaign.
2. Freedom of speech (for candidates, the media, voters and others).
5. No misuse of government facilities or resources for campaign purposes.
6. Opportunity to actually participate in the election.
7. Access to polling stations for everyone.
8. Impartial allotment of public funds to each party.
10. Equal and universal suffrage.

**Pre-election phase.** During this phase, I was assigned as a partner with the DAO-Harare OPSCO, CW2 Tom Castle. As team 3, we were assigned to conduct observer duties in the Midlands Province for the period of 18 February through 28 February 02. We determined that to be productive, we would need to meet with public officials, political supporters, law enforcement agencies and NGO/human rights groups. To do this, we introduced ourselves to the different agencies within the province and requested some of their time to discuss the pre-election process. The following are some of our observations, facts and lessons learned during this phase.

The definition of a free and fair election is somewhat different in Zimbabwe than it is in the United States. For Americans, it entails the
process by which a candidate and his party present a campaign platform that consists of their policies and promises. This is done with the hope that as a voter you cast your vote for them. At times, these presentations are aggressive and even a little annoying, but there is never a time that you feel threatened if you decide to support a certain party. In contrast to this, during the last two weeks of January, there were over 20 different cases of human rights violations within the Midlands Province that were all politically motivated. This included everything from houses or shops being burned to people being snatched from their home and beaten. One evening, we had a discussion in our hotel room with three individuals who were very active in the campaigning for their party (MDC). One had his house burned down in front of him and another had literally been run out of his town and not allowed to publicly campaign. In a different discussion with ZIMRIGHT, a human rights group based in Kwekwe, we were told of one incident in which a kid was abducted because his father who is a car mechanic, worked on the car of an MDC official.

Zimbabwe also uses political terminology that we are not familiar with in the United States. One example is the phrase "No-Go Areas". This is an area or region within a province that is controlled by ZANU-PF, the ruling party. If you belong to the MDC and you voice that opinion, you will most likely be physically intimidated or your belongings destroyed. In one of these no-go areas, we met behind closed doors with a member of the minority party who literally had fear in his eyes and voice as he told us that the situation in his town had become very troublesome for his party. The irony of this is that when we met with the local Member of Parliament (MP) from the ruling party, she and her associates told us that though there were minor problems, the pre-election process was running smoothly and without any major discrepancies. This huge contrast in opinion between each party existed everywhere we traveled.

Throughout our travels we also heard of situations where fear and intimidation was not only being accomplished physically but psychologically as well. This included feasting upon the lack of education that exists in some rural or bush areas. For example, one individual told me how some people in a rural area were shown a "machine" that would be able to identify what party they voted for on the election ballot. The machine that they were shown was a cell phone that had their name typed into it. This scenario is not to say that those with a higher education were exempt from this psychological fear and intimidation. In fact, it was quite the opposite for many teachers within certain communities. This was demonstrated at a ZANU-PF political rally where the names of the local teachers were read and if they did not answer, it was assumed that they were not supporters of that party and retribution probably then followed.

During our initial observer class, we learned that approximately 95% of the radio and TV air time that was devoted to the elections belonged to the ruling party. This inequality in freedom of speech was also prevalent at the individual level. In one incident, I watched a young man who at the end of an MDC rally remove his MDC party tee shirt, wrap it tightly up into a pair of coveralls and then put the coveralls into a plastic bag. In contrast to this, I would see various people wear their ZANU-PF tee shirt without any hesitation.

An inability to meet and assemble as a political party was hampered by bureaucratic technicalities and blatant acts of assault. This was personally witnessed at the above-mentioned MDC rally. Apparently 3 to 5 vehicles that were coming to the rally were stoned by ZANU-PF youth. No one was injured, but the damage done included windshields that were shattered and vehicles with either holes or large dents in them. The minority party was in constant battle to ensure that their rallies were ap-
proved and could take place. On a couple occasions, the South African observer team had to question the local Zimbabwe Republican Police (ZRP) commissioner as to why an official MDC rally was cancelled only to have the ZRP suddenly acknowledge and approve the rally.

One other issue that because it was not resolved during the pre-election phase, had a profound impact during the elections was the accreditation of domestic observers. Within the Midlands Province alone, it was estimated that 2,193 domestic observers needed to be accredited so that all the polling stations in the province could receive adequate coverage. If this were not accomplished, the door would be left wide open for possibility of tampering with the voting process. As of election time, only 500 had been accredited.

Throughout the whole pre-election phase, the type of reception that we received as observers was equally split between that of acceptance and a feeling of encouragement to that of reservation, suspicion and a feeling that the international observers are a hindrance to Zimbabwe's elections. This was demonstrated by the request from the Kwekwe Criminal Investigation Organization (CIO) that Chief Castle and myself come down to the police station for questioning as to the purpose of our visit to the province.

Election phase. During this phase, I was assigned to work with a different employee from the embassy, Aziz Ahmed. We were assigned the Harare Province, which includes all of Harare and Chitungwiza, a town northeast of Harare. Because there were over 150 polling stations within our province, we split into two teams. We then teamed up with two other individuals from the embassy community, but they were not officially accredited. Thus, Aziz and myself were only allowed to come within a 100-meter perimeter of the polling station. The following are some observations and lessons learned during 9 to 11 March 2002.

Voters all across Harare started lining up at the polling stations well before 0600hrs on 9 March. The polling stations were opened up at 0700hrs. Every voter was required to go through a series of steps in order to cast their vote. The first requirement that an individual had to do once they were actually in the polling station was to place their hands in a metal box that had a "black light" in it. If he/she had this special solution (this will be explained) on their hands, it would show up under this light and that person was identified as one who had already voted. These individuals were not allowed to continue on through the process. In fact, some were detained with the possibility of facing legal charges. If their hands were clear, the person would then show their identification. Polling station workers would then confirm that they were a registered voter by verifying that their name was in the registered voters' books. If so, the voter would then dip both hands in the solution that was just previously mentioned. He/she was given the ballots and they would go into the voting booth and cast their vote. They then would put the ballots into the wooden ballot boxes.

To conduct and monitor this process, each polling station had a president who was overall responsible for its operation. There were also polling agents. These individuals represented his/her political party if there was a problem within the polling station. The concept was quite clear and simple, but various problems arose during the actual execution that questioned the ability to call the elections free and fair.

The first problem started at 0700hrs on 9 March and was never really solved. This was the issue of people not being able to get in and vote. I lost count of the number of people who stood in line starting at 0600hrs in the morning and by 1800hrs at night had still not been able to vote. One reason for this long delay was that the government just prior to beginning the elections decided that they needed to close down some of the polling stations within Harare. Their reason was...
that they needed to move them out to the rural areas so that those people would not have to travel great distances to a polling station. Many feel that the real reason the government closed these polling stations in the Harare Province is because the urban areas are MDC strongholds.

The second day has even more frustrating than the first. This was because not only were the people who planned to vote on Sunday in line, so were the many others who did not get to vote the first day. The reason for this backlog of voters was not only due to the closure of some polling stations, but also the manner in which they operated within the polling stations. For example, they took an extremely long time in verifying a voter's eligibility. They had the registration books divided up alphabetically into 4 or 5 sections, but they did not have the voters' line up in the same fashion. So, the person checking surnames starting with "A" through "D" still had to take a look at an I.D. card of someone whose name started with "Z".

There was also a lot of confusion as to which polling station voters in Harare were assigned to use. For example, a person could go to any polling station and cast their presidential vote, but the mayoral elections required a person to vote at a specific station. Thus, there were many that after standing in line for literally 12 hours, were told that they were at the wrong polling station to cast their mayoral vote. They then had the option to go ahead and just cast their presidential vote or go to the appropriate station to cast both the presidential and mayoral vote. If they chose the latter, they took the chance of having to stand in line for another 12 hours.

Others experienced being told that they were not on the registration role. These individuals were told that their names would be turned in to headquarters for verification of residency on the police main frame. They could then come back the next day and see if the computer had them registered. Others were told that their names were appearing on the removal list for people who lost their Zimbabwean citizenship. Obviously all this caused many people to give up on the voting process.

At one polling station, a domestic observer discovered that there were six presidential ballot books (each containing 100 ballots) missing or misplaced. One has to wonder if this was a common occurrence throughout the polling stations. But because there were only a few hundred domestic observers that received accreditation, we will never know the extent of this issue.

The most interesting situation occurred Sunday evening. We were instructed by the embassy command post to go to one polling station and verify whether or not it had closed early. When we arrived, there was a group of 30 to 40 people at the entrance gate to the polling station, but the door was locked. It was obvious that the people were very aggravated that the doors were closed and locked. As the crowd takes notice of our arrival, they quickly encircle us and begin asking us what we were going to do about it. As we attempted to determine what actually was going on, we found ourselves at the front of the gate. We identified our positions and ourselves but the policeman on the other side doesn't acknowledge us. The crowd became more aggressive and as a group started pushing on the gate. I thought it was going to collapse. We were finally allowed in and after some time and some discussion with the polling station officials and an actual Member of Parliament (MP), the gates were re-opened. The problem is that many people had departed without being given the chance to vote.

Due to the inability to provide everyone an opportunity to cast their vote, Zimbabwean officials extended the voting period for one additional day. This was an attempt to demonstrate that Zimbabwe's election process gave everyone an opportunity to vote. The problem is that inef
The following is an analysis of how NATO enlargement could affect security issues surrounding the Caspian Sea in light of Russia’s declining influence. The paper uses a scenario planning framework to analyze the security challenge from Iran’s viewpoint. This paradigm uses analytical such things as driving factors, uncertainties, and historical trends to generate four distinct possible scenarios over a two year horizon. It is important to mention that the purpose of the paper was not to pick the most likely scenario, but to give four possible futures.

**Problem Summary.**

The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and Russia's subsequent attempts at political and economic reform have provided a backdrop for NATO to enlarge its scope, power, and influence. During the 1990s, Russia faced the unfortunate dilemma of trying to maintain its hegemony, increase its economic power, and contain NATO. But the attacks on Sep 11, 2001 in New York City and Washington D.C. may have changed Russia’s outlook towards the defense alliance it has feared for so long. This presents a problem to Iran that could have immediate effects in the short run. This analysis will predict possible scenarios and its effects on Iran.

The end of the cold war ushered in a new era in which Russia has suffered from an identity crisis. It still has a nuclear arsenal large enough to maintain its superpower status, but its economic and political troubles have rendered it powerless to influence not only the world but even the former Soviet Republics with whom it shares its border. The current economic quagmire that Russia faces is due to many factors including:

- Shock Therapy” reforms it underwent under U.S. advice immediately following the disintegration of the Soviet Union. In hindsight, many experts agree that incremental reform measures would probably have served Russia better.

- Inefficient raising of tax revenue which in turn led to large budget deficits. This forced the government to devalue its currency in 1998 and default on its debts. Russia’s total international debt rose to a level it could not afford.

- Large capital outflows that deter western investments. Too often aid money is siphoned off to a class of powerful and elite people known as oligarchs.

Realizing that Russia must improve its economy in order to regain prominence, President Vladimir Putin stated economic progress as a top priority during his inauguration speech. Furthermore, he recently selected Mikhael Kasyanov as new prime minister, a man whose background lies in the field of economics and finance. Western governments responded well to this choice, and Kasyanov was immediately successful in eliminating half of Russia’s outstanding IMF debt. Thus, it is presumed that Russia will continue to make economic reform and progress a top priority, and will cooperate with the West towards that aim. Yet, it remains unclear if Russia will make any significant economic progress during the next two years. While it is true that the country is experiencing a modest recovery, most of that is due to the rise in oil prices, and not due to any real market reform.

Yet, when analyzing non-economic issues such as NATO enlargement, it is unclear whether or not Russia will adopt a similar pro-West policy. Until recently, Russia’s has regarded NATO as an organi-
zation bent on containing Russian influence. Many recent events contributed towards this view including:

- In 1998, NATO and its allies mounted a prolonged bombing campaign against Serbia, a close Russian ally. Russia was powerless to prevent this from occurring.

- In 1995, NATO decided to reverse an earlier decision not to enlist new members.

- In 1999, NATO admitted three former Soviet republics: Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. In response, Russia decided to revoke its no first strike policy on nuclear weapons, and embarked on a 15 year military modernization plan.

All these events have reinforced Russian anti-NATO views until Sep 11, 2001. The events on that fateful day have created a global environment of empathy towards the U.S. that is unprecedented. In light of this, President Putin recently decided to support America’s war in Afghanistan, and to re-look Russia’s current policy on NATO enlargement; he stated that Russia may become more tolerant of NATO expansion during a trip to Brussels after Sep 11. Indeed, President Putin, may have pragmatically decided to cooperate with the U.S. and NATO may support Russia’s national interests in light of recent events.

However, Russia policy is influenced by another growing entity, this time from the East, China. With a yearly GDP increase of over 7%, the world’s largest market, a huge border with Russia, and the world’s largest Army, China is a force with whom Russia must reckon. Recent events prior to Sep 11 have indicated that Putin fully realizes this as evidenced by his recent tour of China. It is presumed that Russia will continue its efforts to maintain a good relationship with China, a country which is wholeheartedly against NATO expansion. Thus it is unclear if Russia will adopt an policy of Atlanticism (pro-West) or Eurasianism (pro-East).

**Significance to Tehran:**

*Iran’s primary issue and concern is the nature of Russia’s reaction to NATO enlargement, and its consequent effects on Iran-Russia relations and regional stability in the Caspian Region.*

It is presumed that NATO will continue its efforts to stop Russia from selling arms to Iran, and to expand further into former Soviet republics, possibly in the Caspian Region. Should Russia adopt an Atlanticism approach and tolerate NATO expansion efforts, it would have a negative impact on Iran-Russia relations, and would present a significant de-stabilizing factor in the Caspian Region. Russia and Iran currently share a mutually beneficial relationship through arms sales, the sharing of nuclear technology, and a common support of anti-Taliban efforts. However, this was not always the case as evidenced by the last two decades of history.

After the fall of the Shah in 1979, it appeared that Russia would stand to gain a lot from that development. However, the opposite became evident when the Khomeini regime dissolved the Moscow influenced Tudeh Party in 1983. Relations between the two countries deteriorated even further when Russia supplied arms to Iran’s mortal enemy during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. Iran responded by supporting Muslim rebels fighting against Soviet occupation of Afghanistan from 1979-1989.

The fall of the Soviet Union coincided with a thawing of Iran-Russia relations, predicated by Iranian President then Speaker Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani’s visit to Moscow during June 19-23 1989. This visit spurred a Russian commitment to sell arms and nuclear technology to Iran. In addition to the benefit of receiving hard cash from Iran for these commodities, Russia has also gained an ally in its territorial disputes in the Caspian Sea. Russia and Iran claim that the body of water should be treated as a lake and not a sea. Treating at a sea would give
more territorial rights to Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. The dispute is especially important to all concerned parties due to the projected 70-200 billion tons of oil expected to lie underneath the Caspian Sea.

Currently, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan both have contractual partnerships with Western oil companies such as BP (foot), and have expressed a desire to join NATO. It is unclear how NATO will react, and it is unclear if Iran will take proactive steps to prevent that from happening. Indeed, recent events imply that Iran would take extreme measures. In June 01, in response to a joint oil drilling effort between British Petroleum and Azerbaijan, Iran mobilized troops along the Azerbaijan border, and sent military aircraft through its airspace. Russia has also shown its resolve in this matter by conducting live ammunition naval exercises on the Caspian Sea.

**Driving Factors.** *(Note: stakeholders are in bold, and factors are underlined)*

**Political:** Ever since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia has experienced a severed downturn in political influence. To reverse this course President Putin will have to decide whether to reverse its tolerance of NATO in order to bargain for other Russian national interests, or try to contain NATO influence by working with other superpowers such as China. The former Soviet republics, encouraged by the power vacuum created by a declining Russian hegemony, are also factor in that countries such as Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have indicated a desire to join NATO. Such developments have driven Russia’s continued efforts at political reform. In Iran, President Khatami, although seen as a moderate force in the region, is solidly against NATO or western influence in the Caspian Region. China, a country with an unusually strong central government, is expanding its influence globally and regionally. China is against NATO expansion and will presumably pressure Russia to support this view.

**Economic:** At the national level, Russia is enjoying a modest economic recovery due to a rise in oil prices, but it is no way permanent unless the country institutes further economic reform. Until now, Russia was unsuccessful in reversing its deterioration of economic influence at a regional level over the former Soviet republics. When Russia suddenly released price controls on its market after the fall of the Soviet Union, its economy suffered from shock. Hyperinflation resulted and ultimately caused the devaluation of the rouble, and default on IMF loans. The quick pace in which the government pursued privatization also had negative consequences. Corruption became rampant, as a class of oligarchs emerged who illegally bribed officials with stock guarantees in return for privatization and government contracts. Without a fair and impractical court system, this sort of corruption scared away western investment, and a huge capital outflow resulted which continues to this day. Needless to say,
Introduction

Military Security Assistance Officers (SAOs) make up the majority of U.S. Security Assistance (SA) personnel stationed in embassies around the world. Almost every nation the U.S. has an SA relationship has a significant land force capability. Army Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) occupy one third of available SA billets. In US Southern Command, for example, FAOs comprise 100% of Mil Group Commanders and Army Section Chiefs. This article seeks to help SA personnel better understand the Army FAO system.

The Army is the only service that has FAOs as a branch, rather than a secondary specialty. FAO is not a basic branch. FAO is an assignments branch that takes field grade officers designated Career Management Field (CMF) 48, Foreign Area Officer and places those officer personnel against Joint and Army requisitions into Attache, Political-Military Officer and SAO positions to best utilize their skills after successful service as a company grade officer (2LT-CPT) in a basic branch. Promotion to the rank of major from the basic branch is a prerequisite to FAO service.

Army Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) are divided into nine regional areas of expertise based on regional studies and language skills. They are drawn from all branches of the Army. They have diverse backgrounds and capabilities that may be successfully matched to security assistance (SA) assignments.

All Army FAOs have service in a basic branch such as Infantry, Armor, Quartermaster, Ordinance or Military Intelligence. FAO candidates assess into the program through the functional area designation process between service years 5 and 6. Officers who meet the qualifications are given an area of concentration in their 7th year of service. All officers career field designate at approximately the 10th year after their primary zone boards for the rank of major. FAO training is programmed by year group and typically begins between years 8 and 10. Career field designation affects the future career progression of the officer after year 10.

The regional areas are listed as career management fields (CMF) 48 B through J. Field 48B is Latin America, 48C is Western Europe, 48D is South Asian/Pacific, 48E is Eurasia, 48F is East Asian, China, 48G is Middle East/North African, 48H is North Asia, Japan/Korea, 48I is Southeast Asia, and 48J is Africa.

Each FAO has language skills designated for their region, along with a master’s degree in international affairs, regional studies, or a related discipline. As part of their qualification, most FAOs spend a year or more conducting In Country Training where they experience an immersion opportunity and regional orientation travel. Some language skills may be country-specific, such as Tagalog, or may have regional applications such as Russian, Chinese, French or Arabic.

Service in SA positions, as attaches and as political-military officers are three key FAO positions for officers desiring promotion to the rank of colonel. Two other positions are Service School Instructor and Political-Military Staff Officer. Many SA positions are coded for majors, allowing relatively “junior” FAOs to form a significant portion of the population. These “junior” FAOs must perform well in SA jobs if they desire promotion.
Army FAOs now compete against other FAOs and Army Acquisition Corps officers (Functional Area 51) in the Operational Support Career Field for promotion. The different Army officer career fields are, Operations, Operational Support, Institutional Support, and Information Operations.

Competition for, and in, SA jobs is keen. This promotion system, along with a management program that removes FAOs from the branch if they do not perform FAO duties ensures the SA community receives the “best qualified” officers. FAOs in over-strength specialties are retrained and transferred at the needs of the Army and at the request of the individual FAO so long as the transfer from one region to another is from one that is over-strength to one that is under-strength.

How FAO Branch matches FAOs to Security Assistance jobs

The quality “cut” for FAOs to be nominated to an SA position is identical to the nomination procedure for attaches or the Joint Staff. Indeed, all FAO SA positions, with the exception of those on Army Staff, some Component Command positions and here at DISAM, are joint positions. First and foremost, the FAO must be fully qualified as a FAO with education, language training and In-Country Training (ICT) complete. The FAO is then screened and nominated to the controlling command. This is the Theater CINC/Unified Command, or the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) for attaches. In countries with smaller SA programs the FAO may perform both the SA and attaché mission and receive training for both jobs.

The unified commands specify the skills and specialized training for SA personnel, specifying training at DISAM for all SA personnel and the Individual Terrorism Awareness Course (INTAC) for personnel likely to deploy overseas. FAOs that are majors or lieutenant colonels may receive additional Joint Professional Military Education, Phase Two, enroute to an SA assignment. Combat Arms or logistics skills may be specified for a given position, with prior, or similar experience, either by previous assignment or basic branch experience, required. These requirements become the Joint Manpower Requisition forwarded to FAO Assignments Branch.

FAO Assignments Branch then checks individual officer files for the right match for the skills required, ensuring a match of capabilities to requirements. The ability to work independently, under pressure is a personal quality frequently specified. Consistent high performance in related or previous assignments is also a filter. Screening also includes review of the FAO’s official photo, microfiche and Officer Records Brief for any factors that may render the officer not best qualified to fill the billet. After successful nomination for the position, the officer is programmed for required training.

DISAM training typically consists of the Overseas Course and any of the following blocks, Management Studies, with any or all of its subcomponents, Training Program Management, Training Management System (TMS) and the Security Assistance Automated Resource Management Suite (SAARMS). Training beyond the core course is specified by the unified command, and may be added at the request of the student. There is also training on the Security Assistance Net (SAN) to ensure world-wide connectivity for the SA community.

DISAM also provides an Executive Course for senior officers at the level of O-6 and above, along with tutorials for senior officers entering key SA positions, including SAO Chiefs. DISAM welcomes command visits from unified command staff personnel and Command Sergeants Major as these visits allow DISAM to familiarize key leaders with current issues in the SA community, leading to better
utilization of FAO skills. Army FAO personnel assigned to specific slots may also attend specialty courses, such as the Training Officer Course (TO) at the request of their unified command.

**Practical Applications**

The result of this selection and training process is basic branch experience, language skills, coupled with a thorough regional orientation and SA skills that are fused, producing the new Army FAO. These skills are coordinated and used by the FAO in-country as not only a security assistance professional, but someone who is aware of the ramifications of those activities on a country and regional level. This provides the Theater CINC with an officer that works and integrates well within the Country Team and, more importantly to the CINC, one who can execute the full range of plans and programs from Peace-time Engagement and Counter-narcotics missions to facilitating reception, staging, onward movement and integration of personnel and equipment in support of large-scale contingency plans.

SAO duties traditionally cover more than Foreign Military Sales (FMS) or International Military Education and Training (IMET). SAO duties may involve designation by the Undersecretary of Defense (Policy) as the U.S. Defense Representative. The effective combination of knowledge and skills makes the FAO well suited to these positions as well as SA jobs.

There are many jobs available to the Army FAO in SA. These range from a single individual in an austere, overseas location performing the role of both attaché and SA Chief, to Army Section Chief jobs in the larger SAOs to a few instructor slots here at DISAM. Additional examples of SA jobs include Training Officer, Joint Actions Officer, Joint Operations Officer and Exercise Officer. All of these jobs require coordination with unified commands and military departments (MILDEPS).

Frequently, the FAO in an SA job facilitates case management between the host country and the MILDEPS, assisting the host country with tracking case activities and discrepancies. The FAO may also advise on the preparation and delivery of Letters of Request or facilitate payment to DFAS, on an existing account. Depending upon the level of expertise in the host country, and upon the “newness” of the SA program, the FAO may even assist with financial reconciliation, showing his counterpart how to read logistics requisitions and status, or the DD 645. The vetting of foreign students remains an SA responsibility, along with tracking both students and US origin defense equipment in the host country. The FAO assuming an SA job should have all current and historical files and suspense lists on hand. These files must cover all activities the FAO will control.

Army FAOs are highly encouraged to coordinate with the person they will replace. The primary issue is overlap time. Overlap on the ground is the best method of ensuring continuity in SA programs, and all services should do their best to facilitate this key handover of duties. As mentioned previously, each position may have additional duties other than those associated with SA. It is important that FAOs be proficient in SA duties before assuming additional responsibilities, as SA duties are their primary responsibilities. The FAO should integrate with the host country and Country Team as soon as practical.

Why is this important? In some countries, the SA presence is the only US military presence or access to host country resources that the Theater CINC controls. The FAO/SAO must therefore be familiar with US Army, Host Nation and Joint doctrine. FAO knowledge of the operational art and doctrine facilitates the conduct and coordination of joint and combined operations with the host country and potential coalition partners. With their contacts and access to host country infrastructure and decision-makers, Army FAOs frequently become the go-to people for unified

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It has taken the United States military ten years to realize that the Cold War is over. How long will it take until we realize that the countries of the former Soviet Union are indeed independent, with their own languages, cultures and histories? We need to reevaluate the training of area specialists for this region. If we do not change the way we look at the countries in the former Soviet Union, we will find ourselves in a disadvantageous position in the future.

For those not familiar with the system, Army Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) specialize in one of nine regions of concentration. Geography, history and common culture determine the regions of concentration. The newly independent states of the former Soviet Union are classified as the Eurasian area of concentration. The training timeline for all Foreign Area Officers, regardless of concentration is pretty much the same, with some differences that I will point out later in this article. In the first stage of training each officer receives language training in one of the languages in his area of concentration. The officer then will spend 18 months of familiarization training in one of the countries in his region. During this phase of training, the officer will either attend one of that country’s military schools or travel throughout that country. The final phase of training is graduate studies in a pre-approved graduate program.

There are two significant differences between the training of Eurasian Foreign Area Officers and the training of FAOs with other areas of concentration. The most significant to my argument is that while other FAOs are assigned a concentration country and trained in the language of that country, Eurasian FAOs all learn Russian. The other difference is that Eurasian Foreign Area Officers do not spend the full 18 months of in-country training in a target country. Instead, they are assigned to the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch, Germany. While assigned to the Marshall Center, Foreign Area Officers will continue language training, take classes in policy and security and participate in one to three internships in one of the Newly Independent States or as a liaison officer to the Russian contingents in Bosnia or Kosovo. The only language requirement for any of these internships is proficiency in Russian.

Army personnel assignment officers say that the reason for the emphasis on Russian language is that Russian is the “lingua franca” of the region and officers that have a knowledge of Russian can work in any of the countries of the area. I believe that this line of thinking is mistaken and is counter-productive in our efforts to reinforce the independent nature of these countries.

There are three main reasons why I feel our emphasis on Russian is counter-productive. First of these is the message we send to the Russian speakers in who live in the countries of the Newly Independent States. When bilateral meetings automatically default to Russian as the language of common understanding the Russian speakers in those countries have less incentive to learn the language of the country in which they live. This is particularly important in countries with large Russian speaking minorities like Ukraine.

Ukraine is a country of almost 50 million people, with an army that is second largest in Europe after Russia’s. The country is strategically located between Russia and new NATO members Poland and Hungary. There is a large, politically vocal Russian minority that is concentrated in the Donbas region in the eastern part of the country. Ten years ago, shortly after declaring Ukraine an independent state, the government announced that Ukrainian would be the state language and Ukrainian would be used in
all official government meetings and correspondence. Unfortunately, this law has never been enforced. Many government officials continue to use Russian in official and private conversations.

One organization that has had much success in the Ukrainization effort has been the military. Most military officers use Ukrainian in all official meetings with one major exception—meetings with Americans. I have been a part of many bilateral meetings with Ukrainians in which the American FAOs start by apologizing for their lack of knowledge of Ukrainian and ask that the meeting be conducted in Russian. I have seen this in Georgia and Kazakhstan also. The Ukrainians always comply, but I wonder about the message we are sending to the Ukrainians when we ask them to violate their own laws.

In the coming years it will harder to fall back to Russian as the common language in these countries. There is no requirement to speak Russian in the Ukrainian, Georgian, Kazakh or Uzbek armies. The proportion of Russian speakers in these countries is growing smaller each year. In Ukraine, arguably the most Russified of these counties, the percentage of students taught in Russian dropped by almost one half in the last ten years.

The second problem of defaulting to Russian as the lingua franca is the message we send to Russia and those who believe that Russia has a special influence in the area. Russia is clearly trying to establish a sphere of influence in the region. The most telling indicator of the Russian attitude to this area is the label of “near abroad” that is attached to it. Russian is not native and did not come naturally to places like Ukraine, the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Baltic States. Tsarist and Soviet governments purposely tried to separate the inhabitants of these areas from their language in an attempt to dilute national identities. Promotion of the local language in these countries is one method of solidifying their national identities. Our continued recognition of Russian as the language of the area hurts these attempts to establish a national identity.

The final reason I find the emphasis on Russian problematic has to do with the gap in cultural understanding that we continue to have toward these countries. One of the beneficial side effects of language training is an increased understanding of the culture of the countries that use that language. I experienced some of this cultural misunderstanding during a recent trip to Tblisi, Georgia. At a dinner with officers of the Georgian military our officers offered toasts in the Russian style, each saying a few words about whatever subject came to mind. Only later did we learn about the Georgian toastmaster tradition of adding to a theme set by the host. While Georgian officers were adding to the theme of brotherhood— we were toasting to the good health of our hosts. This is but a small example of the wider problem of area specialists that do not truly understand the culture of one of the countries of

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ESDI—An Overview

Since the European Union’s inception over forty years ago, it has chartered one of the most unique and successful experiments in economic unity of all times. But for all its success in bringing about a single market and the most dynamic economic force in existence, it has severely lagged behind in complementary political unity. Until recently, the idea of a cogent, espoused common foreign and security policy (CFSP) was a running joke both within the European Union and outside observers. When pushed to sum up the identity of the European Union in one sentence, the most prevalent answer was “Economic giant, political dwarf, and military worm,” as one Belgian minister put it. Economic unity does not bear the price of its political sibling, though.

Events of the past decade and as recently as this year have made it overwhelmingly clear that the European Union is in great need of pairing its economic affluence with a consistent political will. In particular, a common foreign policy with a security arm extension. Security policy is never an act of convenience but always borne of necessity. As such, until the demise of communism in the early 1990’s, the EU had no need to think of a security policy outside of the NATO framework. These were the “good-ole-days” when the world was colored in bi-polar language and the Europeans could suckle the trans-atlantic relationship. This all rapidly changed in the last decade of the twentieth century.

This paper will present an overview of the European Security Defense Identity as it has taken shape over the past decade by tracing the development of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) in three parts. In Multi-polar World--The Need for a European Defense Identity, the pressing issues of the early 1990s that influenced the debate on developing a distinctive security and defense for Europe will be highlighted. Then in Towards a European Security and Defense Identity, the formalization of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) will be discussed in the context of the treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam, and Nice with their inherent shortcomings. In conclusion, The Future of ESDI—9/11 and Beyond will take a look at what is needed for a sustained future viability.

Multi-polar World--The Need for a European Defense Identity

Although, there was—and still is—a strong framework for European security, there was not a distinctive EU-based security identity until the early 1990s. During the Cold War, European security was little more than a consensual nod to the policy objectives laid out by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Being pinched between the two world superpowers of the United States and Soviet Union left little room—or political motivation—to seriously think about a complementary or enhanced European defense identity. The security architecture of the cold war was rather clear cut: NATO versus the rest. The defense and security of Europe vis-à-vis the United States was a classic vassal-serf relationship. But then the world changed beginning in 1989.

In his book The Government and Politics of the European Union, Neill Nugent mentions...
four factors that stimulated the certain need for a distinctive European security identity. First, with the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union and subsequent dissolution of its sphere of influence, the world moved from a bipolar strategic framework to a multipolar entity. Europe no longer found itself between two superpowers. The United States began to look towards Europe to find a partner—or at a minimum junior partner—in creating stability and democracy in the former communist world. Second, with German reunification, there was increased pressure to develop a foreign and security policy framework to ensure a reunited Germany fit squarely inside to avoid any potential political turbulence. Third, the Gulf War was a political embarrassment to the Union as a whole. There was no concerted effort and the military response was a piecemeal effort from sending troops to fight along side the coalition to parliamentary decrees denouncing the Iraqi invasion. Fourth, it was widely understood that the EU’s response to the break up of Yugoslavia was another political debacle. They were seen as being inadequately prepared, slow to react, and ineffective. Henry Kissinger’s famous quote “When we pick up the phone, who do we call in Europe?” gained momentum. As a dominantly equipped, manned and led NATO force into the Balkans began operations, European nations separately and the EU as a political actor sat largely on the sidelines either unsure of how to get involved or incapable of becoming involved in the right way. As one observer on the Balkans conflict once said about the Europeans’ involvement: “They come to a basketball game with a football bat and wonder why the Americans get upset when they want in the game.” At this point, the European Union was left with little choice than to formally address foreign and security policy.

From the inception of the European Economic Community, it was understood that intergovernmental cooperation in the foreign policy arena was a benefit to the Community when it was constructive for the parties involved. Member States attempted to consult with one another on international issues with the understanding that foreign and security policy remained the purview of the sovereign state. The idea of formalizing this notion found no part in any treaty until the 1986 Single European Act (SEA). However, this treaty did little more than signal the increasing need for a coordinated, formalized, structure for dealing with these issues. Security and defense policy, unlike economic policy, comes only through necessity. As mentioned above, until the events of the previous decade no real discussion was needed. But the decade of the 90’s being as it was, the European Union began to take formal notice. This formal acknowledgement was emanated through the Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam, and Nice.

The Maastricht Treaty

Known as the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the Maastricht Treaty came into effect on
ficiency and what appeared to be a blatant act of slothfulness on the part of the polling station presidents marred the execution phase. This was clearly apparent as we arrived at the polling station only to find out that they had not yet opened the polling station doors. When asked why the delay, the officials said they had not received authorization. This was odd because as we were driving in, we heard on the radio that the decision had officially been made that previous evening. After much confusion and delay, the doors were finally opened at 1115hrs. They remained open until 1800hrs, but having opened four hours late had already discouraged numerous people from staying around to vote.

CONCLUSION. I greatly appreciate LTC Smaugh giving me the opportunity to serve as an election observer for the Zimbabwe 2002 elections. It helped me gain a better appreciation for the important issues and circumstances that so often surround elections that take place in Africa. In the case of Zimbabwe, there were many honest and hard working men and women who attempted to make the election process free and fair, but there were others who in key positions were able to override that goal and cause the event to be skewed.

On 13 March 2002, Robert Mugabe was declared the president of Zimbabwe. Certain individuals and organizations as well as some other African countries such as South Africa made the statement that they considered it a free and fair election. One has to truly wonder whether that was an accurate statement. Especially in the case of one South Africa observer team who had their vehicle stoned by ZANU-PF youth. During this election year, there have been Zimbabweans physically and/or emotionally hurt. Many more were left with a feeling of discouragement and despair at the end of the elections. President Mugabe and his cabinet have a monumental task ahead of them in trying to improve Zimbabwe's economic and political situation. He must discover a way in which he can not only re-unite the supporters of the MDC with those of ZANU-PF, but he must also re-build the bridges that his party has burned with the international community during his quest for presidency.

Job performance should be an easy topic of discussion. We should all understand the selected officers' median performance rating. We simply should analyze, and publish, the number of new OER reports per officer and the number of ACOM, COM, BCOM reports. I am not talking about the creation of a perfect template. Vagaries will still exist in terms of determining the comparability between a COM attaché report and an ACOM instructor job at DISAM. What I am proposing is the ability of the officer himself to determine competitiveness, vice the standard "You are in the top 50% of your Year Group" conversation with branch. If I know previous statistics, I can better manage my own career.

I fully expect that the proponent office and assignment office will, without malice, disagree with this thesis and offer significant evidence that I am incorrect in my opinions. That is precisely the point. Let the discussion begin.

David G. MacLean
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the recent rise in oil prices cannot counter these factors without true reform. Putin has made this goal a top priority, and has selected a prime minister, Kasyanov, who is completely focused on it.

The economic deterioration of Russia has global effects as well. Former Soviet Republics have started to look elsewhere than Russia to attract lucrative business deals and investment. Azerbaijan’s recent collaboration in the Caspian Sea with western businesses such as British Petroleum is only one such example. This is a source of pressure for Russia to reverse its economic decline by either cooperating with the west or concentrating on eastern markets such as China.

Social: The social welfare of Russia is driven by many factors to include: level of nationalism, and economic welfare. The economic downturn in Russia have included high unemployment, low wages, and an increase in poverty. The downturn in the economic welfare of the Russian people has had a negative impact on the level of nationalism in Russia and the health of its people. It has also fueled a relatively high distrust of the federal government and the social elite. However, a recent economic recovery due to increased oil prices, may drive a subsequent rise in nationalism, but that remains unclear.

Critical Uncertainties.

Russia’s Tolerance of NATO: range of futures. While Russia’s reaction to NATO enlargement is ultimately ambiguous, it is more defined within a two year horizon. Putin will have to make a decision between adopting a doctrine of Atlanticism (pro-West) in cooperation with NATO or one of Eurasianism (pro-East), concentrating on Asia. One extreme could result with heavy NATO influence in the Caspian with Russia and Iran losing territory rights in that highly contested area, and with Caspian countries joining the defense alliance. Heavy mobilization could result and the threat of regional conflict in that area would increase dramatically. The opposite extreme could result with a strong economic and possible military relationship with Russia and China, thereby serving as an effective force for NATO containment. This arrangement would benefit Iran and Russia since China is projected to become the world’s largest market for energy.

Russian Economic Influence: true ambiguity. An extreme case is that oil prices collapse due to an expanding war on terrorism, and Russia’s economic situation deepens. This will force the country to concentrate on domestic issues and diminish its role in international affairs as well as the regional dispute in the Caspian. This would create an “open door” for NATO to enlarge and negatively influence the Caspian from Iran’s perspective. In the opposite extreme, Russia prospers economically and is successful at attracting the interests of former Soviet Republics. In this case, the trend of these countries looking to the West would decrease, and regional stability, in the eyes of Iran, would increase.

Russia’s Political Reform: range of futures. While Russia is committed to political reform, the extent of these reforms is unclear for the next two years. If it remains a strong centralized government, the chance that Russia would act more decisively to counter NATO would increase. However, if major liberalizing reforms are passed that redistribute power back to territories and provinces, Russia’s foreign policy may suffer, and even worse, states may vie for autonomy. Furthermore, this uncertainty is closely tied to the economic uncertainty facing Russia; if the country prospers, political reform would also prosper.

Scenarios.

NOTE: SCENARIOS 1,2,3,4 ARE ORDERED IN ORDER OF PREFERENCE TO IRAN WITH 1 BEING THE MOST PREFERRED.

Scenario 1: The Bear Awakens. This scenario is most preferred Iran because it projects a more powerful Russia with greater economic clout. Russia’s improved economy reverses the current trend of former Soviet Republics looking to the West, and establishes open trade partnerships which fosters a regional economic powerhouse to rival the EU and NAFTA. Western businesses benefit tremen-
dously here, and are sympathetic to Russia's grievances concerning NATO enlargement. Russia enters into an expanded economic partnership with the East and the Middle East. This benefits China immensely as it needs Russian and OPEC's energy reserves. NATO views the developments in alarm, and decides to delay expansionist plans in the Caspian. Russia convinces Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan to give up their territorial claims on the Caspian, and NATO does nothing due to China's threat to give Russia unilateral access to its domestic markets. Iran gains from this development in the Caspian, and continues to receive Russian aid. It becomes Russia's principle agent in the Middle East.

**Scenario 2: All Growl No Teeth.** Russia declines further economically, and must resort to military saber rattling to try and contain NATO. As the economy worsens, nationalistic movements gain strength in the Dumas, and they view NATO increasingly as a military threat. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan continue to drill in the Caspian with western oil companies, and continue to press for NATO membership. NATO announces that it will allow them to enter, and Russia responds with massive mobilizations along its Caspian and European borders. Yet, NATO continues to court the Caspian because it views Russian military as obsolete. Indeed the worsening economic conditions have driven operational strength of Russia's military to a historically low. Its equipment is out of date, and their is an unprecedented morale problem within the ranks. NATO pauses in its enlargement goals, but continues to actively pursue them. Iran feels that it can no longer count on Russia as a formidable ally, and is forced to consider inciting rebellion among the large Shiite Muslim populations in the Caspian countries.

**Scenario 3: The Bear Whimpers.** Russia prospers economically due to a heavy increase in western aid, and the passage of economic reform. This increase in prosperity also ushers in a new wave of liberalizing political reforms. However, due to NATO attacks on Kosovo, which it still remembers keenly, it continues to oppose NATO enlargement. While this gives the alliance pause, it does not prevent them from pursuing more members because Russia has become so reliant on Western businesses and investments. As NATO looks to the Caspian, Iran begins clandestine planning of covert operations against western interests in the area. Without a Russian counterweight there, U.S. more openly backs Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, and consequently becomes an increasingly large target for Iranian backed operations. Russia spouts rhetoric against NATO expansionism, but does nothing physically to stop it.

**Scenario 4: A Happy Bear Goes to Sleep.** Ironically, while this scenario is the best from an American standpoint, it is the worst for Iran. Here Russia enjoys spectacular growth through increased foreign investment after the passage of economic reform and a strengthening of its court system. As the
economy improves, liberal political reforms are passed, and the Russian government becomes more closely aligned with Western ideology. More importantly, it views NATO as a political organization and not a threatening defense alliance. Thus, it happily allows NATO to continue its encroachment, content that it can mutually benefit. The territorial dispute is resolved with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Russia the clear winners with the backing of NATO. Furthermore, NATO convinces Russia discontinue its sales of arms and nuclear technology to Iran which it complies because it no longer needs the funds. Iran will seek unconventional and asymmetrical means to retaliate.

1 Katzman, Kenneth, “Iran, Russia, and the New Muslim States,” http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/usazerb/124.htm


3. Ibid

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...their area. We have Eurasian area specialists that can speak intelligently of Pushkin yet have very little knowledge of Shevchenko and Tamerlane.

One of the unspoken arguments against training Eurasian FAOs in languages other than Russian is cost. It is much cheaper and more efficient to teach Russian language skills to all Eurasian FAOs because they can use it throughout the region. The first response to that statement would be that it would be cheaper and more efficient still to not teach any language because almost everybody speaks some English in the region these days. However, if you accept my earlier argument that the study of language brings with it a deeper understanding of culture, there are efficient ways to train.

Currently, Basic Russian is taught at the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, California and Advanced Russian is taught in Garmisch at the Marshall Center. There is a proposal awaiting Army approval to move all language training for Eurasian FAOs to the Marshall Center. The Marshall Center already employs two Ukrainian instructors and would be easy to add contract instructors that could teach Georgian, Uzbek, Kazakh or one of the other languages of the region. While assigned to the Marshall Center, FAOs could be sent on internships in their target countries while also gaining regional exposure through the class trips, lectures and sponsorship opportunities that already exist there. The officers who specialize in these non-Russian languages would also have the opportunity to take some survival Russian or even pick up Russian as a second language.

The world is changing. It is the responsibility of the area specialists in the Army to recognize these changes and be prepared for them. I recognize the importance of Russia in this region. It is by far the largest country in the region that maintains a powerful military armed with nuclear weapons. We must also recognize that we are now dealing with 15 independent states with their own national interests, foreign policy dilemmas, culture and language. In the wake of recent events in the world and the new importance of Central Asia in our war on terrorism I can't help but think what the Army would give for two or three Eurasian FAOs with a deep cultural and linguistic understanding of Uzbek or Tadjik. Maybe now we can start looking at these countries as independent.
1 November 1993. The TEU formally incorporated this idea by establishing common foreign and security policy (CFSP) as the second pillar of the EU. The TEU states:

**The Common Foreign and Security Policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence...**

Article 12 of the TEU continues stating how the CFSP objectives are to be met.

In short, the key points addressed in the TEU were: the creation of a defense pillar to the European Union, the idea of common positions and joint actions on defense related issues, a unanimous voting requirement on defense related issues, and identifying the Western European Union as constituting an “integral part of the development of the Union.” This was seen as the first significant step towards an independent security identity for the European Union. The basic idea of CFSP created quite a stir amongst member states of the EU. The resultant disharmony on this issue created several overarching concerns and the treaty came under immediate fire.

Shortcomings of the TEU were in two major areas: obscure language and uncertain financial responsibility. Although the TEU set out the concepts “common positions” and “joint actions”, nowhere in the treaty was there mention of exactly how these tools were to be operationalized. Other complaints arose over the requirement for unanimity in matters of defense. This was clear. One abstention could derail the efforts of the entire Union should one member choose to do so. Second—and probably the most glaring problem—was the TEU did not address nor create a budget for CFSP as a separate pillar. As such, it would be required to “raid” the Pillar One budget or go directly to member countries. Either way, a political time bomb.

### The Treaty of Amsterdam

Aware of these shortcomings, the provisions on the CFSP were revised by the Treaty of Amsterdam (ToA) which were implemented on 1 May 1999. Where the TEU was the first formal step towards a European security identity, the ToA attempted to bring about more sensible and practical language to the CFSP pillar. This was to be accomplished by providing measures aimed at strengthening the decision-making procedure through the introduction of new instruments and voting modalities. To this effect, the ToA made it possible to adopt measures through qualified majority vote with the idea of constructive abstention and the possibility of referring a decision to the European Council if a member state resorted to a veto. Another facet to the ToA was the addition of foreign policy instrument known as common strategies. One of the two most significant improvements of the ToA over the TEU was the introduction of a new post to give the CFSP a higher profile. Entitled the High Representative for the CFSP, this office is supported by a policy planning and early warning unit set up in the General Secretariat of the Council and placed under his responsibility. The second most significant move towards a security identity was incorporating the WEU’s “Petersberg Tasks” into Title V of the EU Treaty and opening the prospect to integration of the WEU into the EU as its defense apparatus. The final improvement was addressing the CFSP budget. The ToA provides for expenditure on CFSP operations to be financed from the Community budget with the exceptions of operations with military or defense implications or if the Council unanimously decides otherwise.

Although not nearly as criticized as its predecessor, there were still practical issues to be resolved before CFSP would be seen as a viable arm of the EU. Of particular importance was the need to address manning and support of
missions that would be taken on through the Petersberg Tasks. Secondly, with the inclusion of the WEU as the future security apparatus for a European defense identity, the dynamic of balancing this within the NATO architecture took on a decisive and heated new form. Not only were there concerns from the United States, but also within Europe of how to incorporate non-WEU members that were EU members and those NATO members desiring to be—but not yet—EU members.

The Nice Treaty

The latest treaty addressing a European defense identity was the Nice Treaty. This was set against the backdrop of decisions reached in Helsinki, Finland one year prior. The Helsinki meeting was important as is set forth a headline goal of deploying 50,000-60,000 troops within 60 days and sustainable for 1 year in support of the Petersberg tasks. The Nice Treaty provided for the idea of a European defense in a more realistic framework. It layed out several new permanent military bodies and structures many feel will be the cornerstone of ESDI. In particular, it provided for a standing Political and Security Committee (PSC), a Military Committee (MC), and a Military Staff (MS). Over British objections the Nice Treaty also introduced the idea of "enhanced cooperation". The French had forwarded this idea and many saw it as a way for the French to de-link the European military capacity from that of NATO. However, the British and French reached a compromise in the wording of the treaty by also recognizing NATO as the preeminent security architecture within Europe and that any forces developed for use by the European Union would be “separate but not separable” from NATO thus allaying any Trans-Atlantic fears.

The Future of ESDI—9/11 and Beyond

Although movement to create a European defense identity had transitioned at a remarkably rapid pace by EU standards, Europe still has no credible force to put into action should it be called to do so. In light of the 9/11 terrorists attacks on the United States, member states of the EU were again reminded of the pressing need for a coherent and viable defense response within Europe. For all of its structural development in this arena, the most difficult of all questions are left to be answered. The somber reality is this: on average European countries spend only 60% of what the United States does on defense and gets little more than 10% return on their investment when one takes into account the duplicity of effort. More importantly, European defense budgets are declining. Europe lags dramatically behind in defense research and development. The Economist magazine recently suggested a magnitude of spending as much as $45 billion a year to bring Europe in line with the United States. Europe has minimal heavy lift capability to move troops and equipment. There remains the dark shadow of conflicting procurement procedures and absence of an all-European producer bringing the need for cooperation in developing military capabilities and negating duplicity into a glaring light.

As recently as 20 November, EU member states discussed these very issues at a Capabilities Conference in Brussels. In short, the jury is still out and will most likely remain so until 2003—the year the “Euroforce” is to become operational. What is clear is this: There is a certain need for formalized security and defense language set forth in treaties, but true legitimacy of a common foreign and security policy—hence a European security identity—only comes with a credible, projectable military force. This rubric has yet to be crossed.

Dr. Thomas Durrel-Young of the Naval Postgraduate School and Dr. Liesbit Hooghe of the University of North Carolina are acknowledged for their insights and comments in preparation and revision of this paper.
END NOTES


2. There was considerable debate in the United States Senate at this time as the United States began to reflect on a need for continued spending on our NATO commitment.

3. Nugent, p.451


5. Nugent, p. 451


7. Glöckler, p. 303


9. ibid.

10. Although appearing several years later, one may get a general consensus of US impressions in this area by looking at the Hearing before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 106th Congress, Second Session, March 9, 2000.

11. See the CFSP website at ue.eu.int/psc/pres.asp?lang=en.


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commands until further assets arrive in the host country in support of a contingency mission. As an example, in the aftermath of the attack on the USS COLE, an Army FAO obtained access to much-needed resources, including medical evacuation aircraft from a third country.

Along with the Country Team and the Chief of Mission, the SAO is a key player in facilitating military programs in any country. The SAO Chief also integrates the Embassy’s Mission Performance Plan and the CINC’s Theater Engagement Plan. Together, the Chief of Mission and Theater CINC recommend the size of the SA presence in any given country for Congressional approval. The bottom line is that the Theater CINC specifies the special skills, personal qualities and training for SA positions and FAO Assignments Branch provides the Army officer best suited to perform the challenging job at hand.

About the Author

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community must understand that the way to transform a society is to ensure help in a manner that it gives a society pride in itself. This might even mean letting them do it themselves. Sometimes democracy does not come immediately, as the U.S. hopes – it can take several generations. In fact, as Cohen opined in a March 2001 article in *Current History*, “the Serbian transition to post-authoritarian rule will prove protracted and prone to periods of serious setbacks and considerable turbulence.”

It is necessary that the U.S. and its allies understand the impact of the Balkans before entering into another conflict where a society is significantly different. By doing this the U.S. should recognize that “the subtle linkages between the past and present, and respect for historical tradition, must provide the basis for successful international engagement.” If the U.S. has a policy to oust a nationalistic leader, “it can also have the dangerous potential of stimulating the very xenophobic and illiberal attitudes that traditionally have been responsible for the political ascendency of nationalistic leadership.” Leaders at all levels in the military, political, diplomatic fields must read the book *Serpent in the Bosom* (and others to get an evenhanded perspective of a specific situation) so that they might formulate the best possible policy in the future and not drift from one strategy to another as the Clinton administration did in the 1990s in the Balkans.
European Regional Reviews

Reviews by Major John Ellis, European FAO.


This book provides a detailed account of the diplomatic maneuvering of inter-war Czechoslovakia, particularly during the tumultuous 1930s. As can be expected, it therefore likewise highlights the dominant role that Edvard Benes played in the formulation of Czechoslovak foreign policy, first as the Foreign Minister of the infant state, and after 1935 as its President.

As the author himself acknowledges in the preface, one of his major objectives is to dispel the myth that the Czechoslovak government, and Benes in particular, were but a "passive object" who’s fate was simply the foregone result of actions taken by the European great powers during the numerous Czechoslovak-German crises of the 1930s. (Lukes, v) Tied to this, he also seeks to demonstrate that the Kremlin too played a much more vital role in these crises than the solely “marginal” one which most historians have attributed to it. (Lukes, v) In order to highlight the “hitherto neglected Czechoslovak and Soviet perspectives” (Lukes, v) the author thus primarily drew upon original primary sources only recently made available in official archives in Prague, and to a lesser extent, in Moscow. (Lukes, viii)

The author consistently reinforces a favorable picture of Benes throughout the book, staying true to his original portrayal of Benes as a self-made man, radiating self-confidence, and admired for his “intellect, toughness of character, and limitless capacity for work.” (Lukes, 5) Lukes also goes to great lengths to demonstrate how both President Masaryk and Benes were anything but “passive objects” on the world stage, and he asserts that on the contrary they were painfully aware of the imposing security challenges that stood before Czechoslovakia and took active steps to counter them. We see this in Benes’ numerous attempts to supplement his inadequate 1925 Treaty of Mutual Assistance with France with one also involving the Soviet Union.

Lukes identifies the basic premise of this foreign policy strategy as Benes’ original conviction that only a “concerted effort of all the major European countries and America” could hope to secure the peaceful development of post-war Europe, and that the ideological gap between the West and Stalin’s Soviet Union could be breached by the development of “commercial ties.” (Lukes, 12) As the increasing threat posed by Hitler’s Germany destroyed Benes’ utopian dream of a harmonious Europe, throughout the 1930s he then actively sought to “compensate for the German threat by bringing Moscow westward and giving it a real presence on the scales of power in Europe.” (Lukes, 38)

Just how active his role was is clearly demonstrated by Lukes, as we see how at Benes’ “prompting” the Soviet Union was invited to join the League of Nations in September 1934, thanks in no small part to his “real influence in the League.” (Lukes, 39) Having achieved this feat, Benes then took advantage of the ensuing Franco-Soviet rapprochement and the December 1934 Franco-Soviet Geneva Protocol. In a “daring diplomatic maneuver,” Benes informed the Soviets that Czechoslovakia would also be bound by the protocol, which with Soviet complicity thus turned “a bilateral arrangement into a de facto trilateral one.” (Lukes, 44)

Likewise, immediately following the May 1935 Franco-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance, Benes ardently pursued a parallel Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty since France was too concerned with German and Polish sensibilities to sign a trilateral one. His efforts bore fruit only fourteen
days after the Franco-Soviet Treaty had been signed, and Benes successfully secured a second Mutual Assistance treaty—this time with the Soviet Union, although its assistance was conditional upon that of France being committed as well. (Lukes, 50)

Although Lukes’ coverage of Benes is mostly favorable, he offers a somewhat objective treatment of his existing weaknesses as well (although he tends to understate some of them.) One such weakness is Benes’ occasional anxiousness, which caused him to “make mistakes; typically, he talked too much.” (Lukes, 51) The damage this caused him could best be seen when he visited the Soviet Union, and where “his apparent enthusiasm for all things Soviet further stigmatized Benes as an ally of Stalin.” (Lukes, 51) As a consequence, due to the ongoing crisis over the Sudetenland and “Benes’s diplomatic endeavors in Moscow, Czechoslovakia came to represent a liability to Western democracies.” (Lukes, 85)

Another major weakness Lukes reveals is Benes’ “uncharismatic personality” and his tendency to “lecture at great length to experienced foreign diplomats who soon resented being treated as students of international affairs.” (Lukes, 56) This particularly took its toll on his British colleagues who came to develop a strong personal dislike of Benes. (Lukes, 56) Seeing the pivotal role Great Britain would later play in sacrificing Czechoslovakia to appease Hitler, Benes’ unfortunate trait seems all the more relevant.

The author also asserts that the Soviet role in shaping the outcome of the Czechoslovak-German crisis over the Sudetenland in the 1930s was more than just “marginal.” We see this in the May 1938 decision by Benes to order partial mobilization of the Czechoslovak Army. Based upon his new sources, the author speculates that key parts of the intelligence that Prague received on the alleged German troop build-up on the border were in fact nothing other than a Soviet attempt at a “deliberate deception” operation aimed at provoking a war between the West and Hitler. (Lukes 153) Although the facts to support this thesis are admittedly incomplete, Lukes does paint a realistic scenario.

More importantly, it was at Czechoslovakia’s critical hour of need that the Soviet Union performed perhaps the most important role of the crisis. After being deserted by France and Great Britain at the September 1938 Munich Conference, Lukes’ sources reveal that it was the lack of any definitive answer on Soviet commitment to stand by Czechoslovakia that finally compelled Benes to capitulate to the Munich Diktat. (Lukes, 257)

Thus, we see that the author fulfilled the two tasks he set before himself quite successfully. The book is of great value to European FAOs looking to improve their historical knowledge of the region in that it does indeed reveal Benes’ diplomacy as much more dynamic and full of initiative than he may have been credited with. We also uncover that the Soviet Union was much more than just an actor sitting on the sidelines throughout the conflict, although there remain some loose ends as to proven Soviet responsibility for the May 1938 deception operation. Finally, in addition to fulfilling these two goals, I find that the book also has a third key value, albeit more nebulous. For the novice historian, the detail and precision with which it portrays the intense pressure to which Great Britain and France subjected democratic Czechoslovakia in order to appease Hitler is an eye opener. The book reveals appeasement not only as the faulty policy we all know it to be, but furthermore as a gross injustice to the Czechoslovak peoples—one that we all need to learn from.


This book provides a relatively detailed overview of the history of the current-day Serbian province of Kosovo, beginning with the arrival of Slavic tribes on the borders of the Byzantine Empire in the fifth and sixth centuries AD, and concluding with the appearance of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in the summer of 1997 as a response to the Serbian clampdown on the province. In doing so, the book also traces the interrelations between the ethnic Serb and Albanian peoples inhabiting the province and their evolution over the ages. As any account of this topic was bound to do, it also challenges some of the nationalist rhetoric that has been emanating from both sides.

As the author himself acknowledges in the preface, his major objective in this book is “anti-myth.” (Malcolm, i) One of the first such historical
myths he sets out to dispel is that of who were the first inhabitants of Kosovo, and the presumed historical claim to the territory that goes along with it. Malcolm asserts that following their settlement in the Rascia area in the seventh century AD, “the Serbian expansion into Kosovo began in earnest only in the late twelfth century.” (Malcolm, 26) As for the Albanians, Malcolm’s intricate ethno-linguistic research seems to indicate that Albanians trace their heritage to the ancient Illyrians, and that proto-Albanians were therefore most likely living in present-day Kosovo long before the Serbs. (Malcolm, 40) However, despite this concession to the Albanians, Malcolm also highlights his findings cased upon primary source documents that, contrary to the Albanian claim, there was not yet an ethnic-Albanian majority in Kosovo in the medieval Serb Kingdom. (Malcolm, 55) That being said, however, the Serbian claim that there were no Albanians at all in Kosovo until the seventeenth century can also be ruled out. (Malcolm, 140)

Malcolm also sheds much light on the mythical 1690 “great migration” of the Serbs and their patriarch out of Kosovo on the heels of the retreating Austrians, and the alleged resulting flood of Albanians into this vacuum. His research into several primary sources and resulting analysis reveals that the fleeing Serbs numbered only some 30,000-40,000, including in that count Serbs fleeing from areas other than Kosovo as well, thus well short of the half million figure advanced by Serbs. (Malcolm, 161) Malcolm doesn’t date the establishment of an ethnic Albanian majority in Kosovo until the mid-nineteenth century. (Malcolm, 196) He then proposes that Albanians gradually became a majority not due to migration but primarily due to local growth, thanks to what today ranks as the highest birth rate in Europe. (Malcolm, 332)

Another myth that Malcolm seeks to disprove is that the present day conflict in Kosovo is simply the predestined result of resurfacing “ancient ethnic hatreds.” (Malcolm, xxvii) Instead, Malcolm paints a picture of two peoples living in peaceful coexistence for several centuries, indeed sometimes cooperating against a common threat. Instead he blames modern Politicians for amplifying their differences and stirring-up prejudices. For example, Malcolm’s research on the 1389 Battle of Kosovo finds evidence of Albanians taking part in the battle on both sides. (Malcolm, 62-64) Likewise, during both the 1689 and the 1737 Austrian invasions he asserts that both Serbs and Albanians flocked to the Austrian side against their Ottoman overlords. (Malcolm, 148, 168)

The first real deterioration of the relations between Kosovo Serbs and Albanians came from the mass expulsions of Muslims from Serbia and Montenegro in 1877-8. (Malcolm, 228) The 50,000 or so of these so called Muhaxhirs who consequentially resettled in Kosovo brought with them a strong hostility towards the Orthodox Serbs, which in turn caused 60,000 Serbs to emigrate from Kosovo. (Malcolm, 229-230) Malcolm also points to the effect of the Serbian state’s policies following the conquest of Kosovo in 1912, and again as it reasserted control in 1918. These anti-Albanian policies (intended to encourage them to emigrate to Albania or Turkey), and the associated “large-scale program of colonization” by ethnic Serbs, also did much to breed enmity between these two peoples. (Malcolm, 269, 280) Albanian expulsions of tens of thousands of Serbs (primarily colonists) during the World War Two years further deepened the divide. (Malcolm, 305) Yet Malcolm claims the point of no return was only reached by the “Ethnic Cleansing” policies of Milosevic’s “Greater Serbia” in the 1990s, which followed the highly unpopular 1989 amendments he orchestrated which ended the generous provisions of the 1974 Yugoslav constitution and reduced Kosovo’s autonomy to a “mere token.” (Malcolm, 341-344)

Malcolm also asserts that it was only in the nineteenth century that Serbian nationalists transformed the “folk-poetic tradition” of the medieval battle of Kosovo as some sort of historically self-defining “national ideology” with religious overtones. (Malcolm, 58, 79) Malcolm clearly shows that the actual 1389 battle itself was by no means a decisive Turkish victory that sealed the fate of the medieval Serbian empire, nor was it immediately followed by Ottoman rule. Instead, his detailed analysis of numerous primary source documents reveals that although in the end the Turks held the field, the battle was really more of a draw as they immediately returned to Anatolia and Serbian self-rule persisted for another seventy years. (Malcolm, 76) Kosovo is also not the “Jerusalem” of the Serbs. (xxxi) The first seat of the Autocephalous Serbian Orthodox Church in 1219 was in Zica in central Serbia, and only after Tatars burned it down at the end of the thirteenth century did it move to Pec in Western Kosovo. (Malcolm, 45-46)
Malcolm also points out that Tsar Dusan’s medieval Serbian Empire’s origins were in the Rascia area the Serbs settled in the early seventh century AD, and not in Kosovo. (Malcolm, 24) The medieval Serbian state’s de-facto capital, for its part, was also never in Kosovo. It was initially in Ras (in Rascia proper) and later moved to Skopje (present day Macedonia) in the mid-thirteenth century. (Malcolm, 50) Thus the myth of Kosovo as the “cradle of the Serbs,” or as their “Jerusalem,” is dismissed by Malcolm as historically quite incorrect. On the other hand, Malcolm demonstrates that the nineteenth century Albanian independence movement traces its roots to Kosovo and the Albanian League’s efforts to establish a self-administering unified Albanian vilayet. (Malcolm, 217) It was here that the League’s short-lived 1880 de facto government was established in Prizren, until the Ottomans crushed it in 1881. (Malcolm, 227)

In conclusion, Malcolm’s work does provide many useful insights into the nature of the present day conflict of great use to the modern European FAO. The broad scope and spectrum of sources which he uses to support his findings does him great credit. The only flaw that I can detect is his understatement of the symbolic importance of Kosovo to the Serbs. While the facts indeed support his conclusions that Kosovo really wasn’t much of a “cradle” of any kind in Serbian history, nonetheless people have a remarkable ability to persistently hold on to myths over generations. Thus, factual or not factual, the myths surrounding Kosovo will for long outweigh Malcolm’s mere “facts” in the eyes of everyday Serbs—much like the Alamo in the eyes of Texans.

Reviewed by MAJ David A. Galles

Considering the world situation and the most recent events of September 11, 2001, policy makers in the United States must pay attention to a recent book written by Lenard J. Cohen, professor of political science at Simon Fraser University in Canada, entitled *Serpent in the Bosom: The Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milosevic*. Cohen’s book focuses on Milosevic, his dealings with Serbia, and his use of a “soft dictatorship” to convince a large portion of the Serbian people to believe he would advance Serb nationalism. Thus, the title of the book, a phrase Milosevic ironically used to describe Serb nationalism. It is not a biography of Milosevic, even though it gives great details of him, but “rather an inquiry into a specific illiberal political system, during a particular period of time.” Cohen’s thesis is that “the primordial hatred interpretation of Balkan politics and paradise lost/loathsome leaders perspective, and for that matter the post globalization thesis, cast in their starkest forms by scholars and journalists, and then employed by political decision makers to justify and guide Balkan policy, have tended to miss the mark.” One must take a view of “pragmatic coexistence,” or balanced mix of the reasons, when dealing with the Balkans, and for that matter, any other region in the world, whether it is the Caucasus or the Middle East.

The first part of the book gives a brief, yet detailed and balanced history of Serbia, starting in 1912 through Milosevic’s rise to power. He makes reference to the battle between the Ottoman Empire and the Slavic Army back in June 1389 and uses this example to show that Balkan politics is packed with facts of “interethnic coexistence and violent intergroup conflict.” The first section also gives details of how Milosevic is not only manipulative through his charismatic style, but is also a loving father and a true believer in Tito’s socialist experiment. Cohen also demonstrates that Milosevic’s wife, Mirjana Markovic, helped her husband obtain his political status.

The second and third parts of the book demonstrate respectively how the Milosevic regime operated and maintained power and then lost that power.

(Continued on page #)The reason Cohen calls Milosevic a “soft dictator” is because while Milosevic was authoritarian in his rule, there were some demonstrated aspects of a “semi-democracy.” Milosevic allowed for some independent media, political satire, and diverse political parties. This is what Cohen categorizes as “authoritarian pluralism.” It is when in 1999 and 2000 that Milosevic tried to strengthen his control that he started on the downslide. The fall of Milosevic started when he used his internal police to nullify a presidential election, the Serbian people even if they were fearful of him, did not accept the action he took. The final sign was on October 5, 2000 when over 600,000 people gathered to protest Milosevic’s decision not to transfer power.

The book is rich in facts on Milosevic and Serbia and the footnotes are as good as the text in giving accurate and apt evidence. Anyone wishing to understand the Balkans must read *Serpent in the Bosom*. It is not easily read due to the detail, but definitely shows that other popular books on the Balkans may inaccurately use certain facts to sway a reader in believing that it is either “Balkan ghosts” or “Balkan monsters” creating the turmoil. This said, the real value of the book is the penultimate chapter, which gives pertinent advice to today’s policymakers and strategists.

While the situation in Serbia is unique, Cohen’s analysis of U.S. and European policy toward the Balkans in the 1990s is applicable at present and for the future. The chapter can be read as a stand-alone article because it gives valuable lessons in formulating policies in hard to understand conflicts. Cohen states that while nationalist leaders might be enhancing their own power they may also be promoting the true attitudes of the populace. Therefore, “treating every concern advanced by nationalistic leaders as inappropriate or unacceptable in diplomatic negotiations ignores” these facts. It is also necessary when addressing post conflict resolution, that one must understand and “carefully take into account the cultural sensitivities and mythic beliefs of the society in question.” The lesson here is that while elimination of a nationalistic leader may lead to a more democratic society, the “historically grounded nationalism” takes more time to change. It takes foreign assistance and guidance, but the international
Reviews by LT Youssef H. Aboul-Enein (USNR)


First published in 1999, this book is in its second edition. It is an insightful look into the elements that created Osama Bin Laden and his network. Distinguished journalist John Cooley has spent three decades reporting in the region for various news agencies and his book starts in the 1970s, a time when the Cold War was being fought covertly in places like Angola, Yemen, Poland, and Afghanistan. Pages reveal the environment created to sustain an organization like Al-Qaeda today.

The late Egyptian leader Anwar Sadat joined forces with the Shah of Iran and the late Pakistani President Zia-ul-Haq as well as an assortment of intelligence agencies to form the Safari Club. These leaders were brought together to fight communist insurgencies in the region chiefly in Afghanistan. There were also ulterior motives, for many Arab leaders saw in Afghanistan a means to rid themselves of militant Islamic radicals who were not averse to violently expressing their discontent at the government, the economy and lack of opportunity. It was hoped that they would never return, but less than a decade later, these so-called Arab Afghans did return armed with network of contacts and combat skills.

Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence Agency (ISI) spent a better part of a decade training Afghan Mujahideen in combat techniques, and the author goes through favored methods implemented to fight Soviet forces in that country. The book continues to highlight the opium trade and distinct war fought in Afghanistan over fields, transportation routes and prices of this narcotic. Cooley methodically lays out the different Islamic militant groups and their effect on different governments in the Middle East, some are linked to Bin Laden and others operate with the sanction of local governments. This slim volume is an excellent way to begin understanding the evolution of modern Islamic militancy and its affects around the globe.


Understanding the Arab perspective is perhaps the most challenging aspect of this new war on terrorism. When the tragedy of September 11th happened there was a scramble for Arabic linguists and Mid-East experts. The war has encompassed troops, carriers and strike bombers but also the delicate and complex issue of engaging the segment of the Arab population through various reasons is supportive of Usama Bin Laden. To begin scratching the surface copious amounts of readings are necessary on Islamic history, Islamic theology, colonialism, Arab self-determination and a host of other topics. Knowing this one can begin to make sense of Bin Laden’s diatribes, for example when he refers to 80 years of humiliation is he referring simply to the carving up of the Ottoman Empire into the modern Middle East or the abolition of the Caliphate in 1926? It makes a difference because if the subject is the caliphate then Bin Laden is espousing the doctrine of former Islamic militant ideologues like Hassan al-Banna in the thirties and forties, Sayed Qutb in the sixties and Muhammad Faraj in the seventies.

Ground zero of the debate on Arab regimes, the evolution of Islam and other topics of importance to many Arabs can be found in the new cable news network Al-Jazeera. Having been raised in the region during the seventies and eighties, I was astonished to see the combination shock television and political debates the
network provides in a public forum. Much of the Arabic news I was raised was tightly controlled by the state and one required short-wave radio to pick up Voice of America and British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) to get the real story. During Desert Storm a SCUD Missile would hit the Saudi capital, Riyadh, and that night’s Saudi news would not feature any mention of it. Ironically there were plenty of civil defense warnings on TV calling on people to take cover.

Since first tuning into Al-Jazeera, I’ve watched Jihadists debate secular reformers, Algerian religious militants justifying their violence and open forums on the need to open analytical reasoning (ijtihaad) in Islam and the what Islamic law really says about veiling. It was not the content that shocked me but that I was seeing such open TV within the Middle East in my lifetime. Muhammad El-Nawawy is a professor of journalism as the University of North Florida and Adel Iskander teaches communications at the University of Kentucky. They argue that right or wrong Arabs are thirsty for an open dialog about their religion, politics and leaders. Al-Jazeera was ironically the product of a failed venture between Saudi Arabia’s Orbit Radio and BBC News over censorship. Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa Al-Thani of Qatar took over the venture and loaned it $140 million, creating the network in 1996. Another aspect was its ability to report live from Kandahar and Kabul as the only network sanctioned by the Taliban, the authors delve into the reasons for this and postulate their tactics are no different from western news organizations pursuing a hot story.

There are critical aspects of the network, like its failure to cover Qatar’s politics with the same zeal as other Arab nations. Another problem is that they invite two radically opposing views on their shows to increase ratings, knowing it will be a fiery debate. The authors praise U.S. efforts to place diplomats such as Christopher Ross who engaged in an interview in Arabic on the network, explaining the U.S. position on this war on terrorism. Chapter five is a delightful description of the show Al-Itijaah al-Moakiss (The Opposing View) which featured banned Islamic thinker Hamid Abu-Zeid, who was threatened by Islamic militants for writing about the need to analyze the Quran in a historical context. Also Mrs. Safinaz Kazem, a marxist turned Islamic radical became so frustrated with the debate on hejab (female covering) that she stormed out of the show. So controversial is their programming that the Algerian government cut off the electricity for over an hour until an episode featuring the nations terrorism and roots causes of discontent aired. In Baghdad and other Arab capitals it is common to rent video-recordings of Al-Jazeera programs at video stores.

Both authors warn that U.S. efforts to create their own network in Arabic will not be as successful as placing U.S. officials in Al-Jazeera. In a world where news has been government fed, most Arabs right or wrong trust this network as their source of news about the region and are skeptical of broadcasts from Washington or any other government-sponsored network. The book is highly recommended for those with an interest in the Middle East and the power of media to incite, debate and cause controversy. What is clear are the Arab leaders who are repressive of free speech tune into Al-Jazeera to assess the mood of their people which is impossible to gauge using their own government controlled networks.


As Foreign Area Officers, understanding the many aspects of a region involves going into facets of a culture to include not only the military and political but the literature of an area. By looking at a nation’s literature one can begin to make sense of policy decisions that may seem to be incomprehensible to the western eye. That is why, the FAO Journal features important out-of-print works alongside recent books in its review columns. When one thinks of Islamic literature images of Thousand and One Nights and
Omar Khayyam come to mind. However, many Arabs enjoy a collection of modern literature that explains the problems, issues and aspirations of today’s Islamic world.

Do not feel encumbered by the Arabic because Notre Dame professor James Kritzek has spent a lifetime translating Islamic literature. He is better known for his *Anthology of Islamic Literature* of which the book featured in this review is a companion volume. The book begins with Abd-al-Rahman Al-Jabarti, born in 1754 he was an important religious officials and was appointed by Napoleon as a member of his Grand Divan. Al-Jabarti wrote extensively about the Mameluke period, the French occupation of Egypt and the modernization carried out by Muhammed Ali Pasha. He highlights French scholars who took an interest in Egyptology and Arab theories on philosophy, mathematics, chemistry and a host of other sciences.

Kritzek’s book goes onto bring to life the works of Shah Nasr-al-Din of Iran who contributed much to modern Persian poetry. The book delves into his series of articles that would give many Iranians their first glimpse of the west through published accounts written by the Shah himself in the 1870s. His articles were compiled into a book *Safar-nameh (Book of Travels)*. Muhammed Abduh is a rags to riches story. Starting life as a peasant farmer on the nile valley and would rise to become a controversial figure in Islamic thought, establishing a school and reaching the post of Grand Mufti before his death in 1905. Abduh would push the philosophical bounds of Islam by combining aspects from different sects to articulate and discuss prohibitions and certain philosophies about the various prophets and their teachings.

Another Egyptian featured is Taha Hussein, a blind man who would rise to become Minister of Education and founder of Egypt’s modern education system. While serving as FAO during Bright Star 2000, I had the pleasure of discussing his writings along with Noble Prize Laureate Naguib Mahfouz with officers from the 13th Egyptian Special Forces Brigade. Nothing touches at the heart of our Arab allies than a westerner who shows interest and enthusiasm for the history, prose, poetry and literature of their region. This is a highly recommended book that will enhance a FAOs understanding of the region.

**Naval Billet opening**

The Assistant Defense Intelligence Officer for Africa billet with Defense Intelligence Agency will be opening on or about 1 March 2003 as the incumbent, LCDR John Pritchett will retire.

While it is an 1110, 0-5 billet and not a "FAO" billet as such, it is a great FAO job that anyone seeking top level intelligence / policy experience would enjoy.

If interested contact LCDR Pritchett at (703) 693-9560 or e-mail john.pritchett@misc.pentagon.mil
The principal emphasis over the past quarter with the USMC International Affairs Officer Program has been preparing to send some of our first USMC FAOs to In-Country Training (ICT) in India, Turkey, Greece, and Russia. While the US Army has in fact had officers in these sites for years, these are "new sites" for us, and they constitute the Marine Corps' continuing effort to expand and improve our current program, and to start training regional specialists in all the areas around the world where our Corps sees itself having some equity in the future. By the end of September 2002, we should have officers in these four sites as well as the following sites: Capt Cho in Korea, Majors Williams and Gundlach in Croatia, Maj Holahan in Latvia, Maj Madden in Oman, and Capt Connable in Egypt. Capt Martin is heading out to China in the next month to replace Capt McDonald, and Capt Benitez will likewise be joining Capt Cho in Korea. We are also replacing an East Asia FAO, Capt Mollohan, in Bangkok to work through the Joint U.S. Military Advisor Group (JUSMAG) for his year of ICT. At the present time, we are also looking for a suitable location for our first East Asian (Philippines/Tagalog speaker) FAO and we should have that settled by mid-summer. In the next couple of years, we will also be placing "pioneer" FAOs in Senegal and Jordan. Congratulations are in order to Maj Williams, Maj Holahan, and Capt Holahan for a successful year at their ICT sites; all three will be returning to the United States by the end of the summer. Welcome back.

Additionally, the Program Coordinator had another great opportunity to head out to the Monterey Bay area to visit all of our students at either the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) or the Defense Language Institute (DLI) in April 2002. The Branch Head for PLU, Col O'Keefe, also came out for two days and delivered a briefing to the FAO/RAOs on the current state of affairs of our various International Affairs Officer Programs. We had the good fortune likewise to talk to COL Rice, Commandant of DLI; COL Fuentes, the Army FAO Program Director at DLI; and CAPT Petho, the Vice Superintendent at NPS in our on-going effort to improve our program. Thanks go out to the Army and Navy at both DLI and NPS for their assistance to the Marine Corps FAO/RAO Program. It has been a pleasure working with you all for the past three years.

On that note, I have been the Program Coordinator for the Marine Corps' International Affairs Officer Program for the past three years, and I am moving on. I will depart my current billet on 7 June 2002 and report to Marine Corps University, Marine Corps Base, Quantico, VA to attend the School of Advance Warfighting (SAW). My replacement, LtCol John May, is a Naval Flight Officer and a school-trained Chinese FAO. He and I have already had a chance to conduct a turnover in late May, and he will soon depart his current command at the Expeditionary Warfare Training Group Pacific (EWTGPAC) in Coronado, CA and report to PLU, PP&O in early July. He and I have already made great progress with our budget requests, and recommended utilization assignments for FY03. I want to take this opportunity to thank all of those individuals who I have worked with over the past three years to keep the Marine Corps FAO/RAO Program moving along a positive track. I would like to especially thank the Army's FAO Program from which I gained quite a bit of insight early on in my time at HQMC, the various Services' Program Managers, and of course my own office (both past and present regional desk officers and FAO/RAO Program Managers). I truly enjoyed my time in this position, and I look forward to seeing the Marine Corps' program continue to improve. Best wishes to all, and Semper Fidelis.
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