In the Front and in the Rear: FAOs in Pakistan During Operation Enduring Freedom

Army In-Country Training in Estonia

The Future of Peace in Jerusalem

Helping the U.S. Intelligence Community Do Its Work
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PURPOSE: To publish a journal for disseminating professional knowledge and furnishing information that will promote understanding between U.S. regional specialists around the world and improve their effectiveness in advising decision-makers. It is intended to forge a closer bond between the active, reserve, and retired FAO communities.

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FISCAL REALITY AND ASSOCIATION BOARD ELECTIONS
Mike Ferguson, Exec Dir/Pres

The FAOA reached its corporate sixth birthday on 1 January 2002. We stand over 800 strong and have maintained that strength throughout the life of the Association. Despite the increases in postage and general operating costs, the Association dues remain what they were in 1996. Our operating account has begun to bleed a little as a result and, if not reversed, will soon become a hemorrhage that could lead to serious fiscal illness. Accordingly, the dues for association membership will be adjusted appropriately. Please see the accompanying note from the Treasurer/Secretary on the details.

The FAOA Charter provides that: "The...Board of Governors shall be elected by a majority of the membership of the Association on a three year basis....The Executive Director/President will be appointed by the Board of Governors...to run the day-to-day operations of the Association...The Board will consist of a Chairman, Vice Chairman, and at least seven members."

The association is due for an influx of fresh leadership and ideas; in fact, the current Board of Governors--installed in March 1999-- will serve an "involuntary extension". The tragic events of last fall and the intensity of our response made board elections somewhat problematic for the membership and the association. In the event, it is time to issue a call for those who are interested in serving or in nominating someone to serve on the Board. There is no serving limit, therefore you may nominate current Board Members. In fact, the President has sent a letter to each of the current board members thanking them for their service and asking if they are interested in remaining on the board. The idea is to elect a slate of officers that represent all aspects of our population--former service, retired, reserves and active duty--as well each of the services. The slate should also include the broadest possible spectrum of regional specialties. A slate of a dozen to fifteen nominees and a ballot will be submitted to the membership for approval either in a direct mailing or in the next issue of the Journal.

Please send your nominations to faoa@erols.com by 30 March 2002.

The Board of Governors of the Foreign Area Officer Association has approved the increase of membership dues to cover the increasing cost of operations. Membership dues have been held constant since the Association was chartered six years ago, but the associated costs of publishing the Journal and maintaining the web site over this period have necessitated increasing the dues. Therefore, effective June 1, 2002, the cost of a one year membership will be $25.00; two year membership will be $38.00; and three year membership will be $46.00. Members can verify when their membership expires by looking at the date next to their name on the mailing label of the Journal. Thank you for your understanding for the necessary dues increase.
We received four rebuttals to LTC Rand Rodriguez’s letter “Command Field Designation of Foreign Area Officers (FAOs): A Big Mistake?” All four rebuttals are printed as received.

As an Operations Career Field (OPCF) FAO, I am compelled to comment on the letter to the editor from LTC Rand Rodriguez regarding the OPMS XXI career field designation process. I find his characterization of FAOs in the Operational Support Career Field (OSCF) to be both offensive and inaccurate. If his comments were not so absurd they would be laughable.

No one will argue the need for officers, no matter their career field or functional area, to remain knowledgeable about the Army, its tactics, doctrine, and strategic objectives. As FAOs, that need is potentially magnified by the amount of time spent away from the MTOE Army. However, staying current is part of every officer’s life long leader development and is both a personal and professional responsibility. To assume that all officers in the Operations Career Field will somehow maintain their “greenness” due to their assignments is without merit. The reality of field grade assignments is that the majority of those positions are in the TDA, not the MTOE realm. Officers in ROTC assignments, serving on the Joint Staff, and many other places are just as prone to lose touch with the “real Army,” if they allow that to occur. For any officer, FAO or otherwise, to allow that to happen is to fail to properly carry out one’s professional responsibilities. And, I can tell you through personal experience, I have met many OPCF basic branch officers who had no real clue as to what OPMS XXI really meant. (As a former battalion commander, I found many basic branch officers who knew what AFTB meant, but had no clue as to how to effectively use it.)

LTC Rodriguez’s comments about the quality of FAOs in the Operational Support Career Field are wholly offensive. He assumes that an officer asking for any career field other than Operations is “chaff,” not capable of competing. He offers that Operations Career Field FAOs should be allowed to compete in both career fields – giving them an added opportunity for promotion – and should be selected to fill the “key” FAO positions. Apparently, the “chaff” would be there in support positions to offer their diminished and feeble assistance. How arrogant.

OPMS XXI is designed to address the changing needs of the Army in successfully accomplishing its future missions – acknowledging the requirement for trained specialists. While the majority of the Army officer core will continue its critical role as branch “generalists,” the other functional areas provide the Army with skilled specialists to react to a rapidly changing world environment. Providing officers in the other career field a viable opportunity for promotion is crucial to the retention of these skilled specialists. The concept behind the OPMS XXI system of having officers only compete within their own career field ensures officers compete based on their abilities. Promotion boards now compare like officers to determine the best qualified for promotion.

As Chief of the Army FAO Proponent office, I can attest to the quality of FAOs – both OSCF and OPCF. I challenge LTC Rodriguez to visit one of our FAO Orientations at DLI and see firsthand the superbly qualified and dedicated young officers he callously denigrates as “chaff.”

COL Mark Volk
Chief, Strategic Leadership Division
DAMO-SSF

I recently read a letter to the FAO Journal by LTC Rand Rodriguez entitled “Command [sic] Field Designation of Foreign Area Officers (FAOs): A Big Mistake?” As the FAO Assignments Branch Chief and a former Army Section Chief in the SOUTHCOM AOR, I confess to being perplexed by the article. The author is basing his arguments on misperceptions and outdated information. First, his critique of back to back down range assignments shows a lack of familiarity and understanding of DA Pam 600-3.

(Continued on page 21)
Although the crisis in South Asia is not yet resolved as this is being written, the editor of the Journal asked me to write a piece about my experiences in USDAO Islamabad during Operation Enduring Freedom. Many of you may remember me as the former editor of the FAO Journal. Despite a pretty robust optempo in Islamabad for the past four months, being well aware of the pressure the editor always has to fill the pages each quarter, how could I say no? To those claiming they do not have the time these days to write an article, I say, "Give me a break!"

I found myself in Islamabad a little over a year ago for the third time, having done my FAO ICT at the Pakistan Army Staff College in Quetta in 1982, and served previously as Army Attaché from 1994 to 1997. Perhaps as a result of these prior experiences, personal relationships going back nearly 20 years with most of the high command of the Pakistan Army, and the dearth of suitably trained 48D colonels willing to serve, I was asked by DAO in late 1999 to return as a "civilian" attaché following my second retirement in June 2000 (I had been recalled for one year to serve as the Director of Army Foreign Liaison). How that eventually came to pass may be a good subject for a future article, but it is currently beside the point.

Every attaché assignment is unique in its own way, but all share certain characteristics. We generally have three major tasks: be overt collectors of military information, represent and explain our service to the host country (and sometimes vice versa), and provide military advice to the Chief of Mission, the U.S. Ambassador, in our country of accreditation. A major ancillary task, as will be seen below, is to host visitors from the U.S. that may “drop in” from time-to-time.

My purpose in writing this article is not to demonstrate what a great American I am, nor to trumpet any particular accomplishment. There are many FAOs serving down range whose accomplishments are far more spectacular than mine, and many serve in far more arduous conditions. My aim, within the limits of classification, is to disclose a few of the requirements that were levied on our DAO and, hopefully, to illustrate the added value that Army FAOs bring to the country team when a major international crisis occurs.

THE BEGINNING.

September 11, 2001 was a typical day at the office for USDAO Islamabad. At the weekly "pol-core" meeting chaired by the Ambassador, and including the Deputy Chief of Mission, Politi-
Washington, arrived at the beginning of Phase 2. Both served superbly, accomplished great things for their country, and deserve of more praise than I can possibly express.

PHASE 1, PREPARING FOR MILITARY ACTION.

Our political and military relationship with Pakistan was rocky. Sanctioned for a decade, isolated within much of the international community because of its close relationship with the Taliban government, conducting attaché business with the Pakistan military was tough. Despite having two fully-trained 48Ds in the DAO, both with personal and professional relationships in the Pakistan Army going back in some cases nearly two decades, access was spotty, particularly with the nine corps commanders, the "feudal barons" of the Army. Coincidentally (and fortunately), one of my former instructors at the Staff College in Quetta, the Director General of Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID), the Deputy Director, met an earlier gift of a family friend of another corps commander. His name was President Pervez Musharraf. The day before, having just returned to my quarters, the television in the background was still carrying breaking news and endless repetitions of the collapsing towers in New York. Who was responsible? Was there any possibility of a coup? Were the Taliban nuclear weapons safe and under positive control? Who precisely were the Taliban? What sympathy was there within the Army for the Taliban? How much sympathy was there within the government? Did the rank and file in the Army support the decision to abandon the Taliban? What would be the domestic reaction? Were the nine corps commanders on board? How much sympathy was there within the Army for the Taliban? Was there any possibility of a coup? Were the nuclear weapons safe and under positive control? Who precisely were the Taliban? What were their names? Which one were more important than others? How well supplied were their destruction, but the angry resolve of the government to fight back. Meeting with high-level officials in the CIA and at State, Lieutenant General Mahmud Ahmed was given a stark choice--join us, or become our enemy. His return to Pakistan marked a significant turning point in our military relationship.

Within days, Pakistan’s President, General Pervez Musharraf, agreed to a series of USG "requests" for assistance and cooperation in obtaining information about OBL and Al-Qaeda. Working closely now with both the Station Chief and the DAO, ISID turned over all of its information about Afghanistan and the Taliban armed forces. Their former DATT in Kabul was made available to us for frequent de-briefings and we met frequently with Mahmud’s deputy. At our request, daily situation reports were provided on happenings inside both Afghanistan and Pakistan. It quickly became clear that Pakistan had long been frustrated with the Taliban government and did not have nearly as much influence--or information--as we had imagined. Their policy had been one of insuring that a stable, friendly government, however unsavory in other ways, was in power in Kabul. Nevertheless, rescinding the decade-long policy on Afghanistan, one that had sympathy in Pashtun-speaking parts of the country and in the country’s religious political parties and religious schools, or madrassahs, seemed a risky business for the military government to undertake.

By this time, Washington had recovered from its trauma and requests for information flooded into the DAO. How stable was the government? Did the rank and file in the Army support the decision to abandon the Taliban? What would be the domestic reaction? Were the nine corps commanders on board? How much sympathy was there within the Army for the Taliban? Was there any possibility of a coup? Were the nuclear weapons safe and under positive control? Who precisely were the Taliban? What were their names? Which one were more important than others? How well supplied were their positions?
armed forces? How was their military campaign against the Northern Alliance going? Could we work with the Northern Alliance? Who could be trusted? Who could not? What would India do? What were the -stans doing? Iran? China? Russia? Were embassy personnel at risk? And there were seemingly hundreds of similar questions.

Photo 2: Afghanistan where 21st century warfare meets 17th century warfare.

These questions came arrived from a wide variety of locations and headquarters. The majority came through our normal operational channel, the Defense HUMINT Service in Clarendon, Virginia. Many others came from DHS support elements in the regional commands. Still others came from the National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC) and other command and intelligence centers. Most were sent on our internal attaché HOCNET system; others came by telephone from individual consumers or other headquarters. Individual analysts in the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center (DIAC) occasionally queried us directly. Answering these many questions was a daunting and time-consuming task.

Fortunately, the superb relationships the DAO had forged earlier with the rest of the embassy country team paid off dramatically. From the Ambassador on down, everyone in the embassy realized very quickly that the attacks in New York and Washington were likely to be answered by military action. They also realized that building the intelligence picture of the battlefield in Afghanistan was their highest priority as well as ours. Everyone pitched in to help us. We started meeting each morning with the embassy Political Section to synchronize military and political reporting and to share information. Eventually others joined this ad hoc group, sometimes even the Ambassador, and it became for a time a daily mini-country team planning cell. The consulates, particularly Peshawar with its window on Afghanistan, contributed greatly. The Economics Sections had valuable information about the educational system within the country, particularly about the madrassahs, whence came much support for the Taliban within the country. The Refugee Counselor provided badly needed information about the location of refugee camps, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) operating in Afghanistan, and precise locations of other non-military targets to preclude civilian collateral damage should the decision be made to strike the Taliban government directly. The Narcotics Affairs Section and Drug Enforcement Agency provided much-needed information on the sensitive, isolated tribal areas of Pakistan abutting the Afghan border. The Ambassador's insights into the senior ranks of the Pakistan government were exceptionally helpful as well. As FAOs with long service and experience in Pakistan, we spent long hours working our network of active military, retired military, foreign attaché, and Pakistani civilian contacts.

By mid-September the decision was made by the Ambassador and State Department to evacuate dependents and children from Pakistan and to close the Consulate General in Lahore. Within a week, CENTCOM was considering various military options and a team from the Joint Chiefs of Staff arrived to discuss what Pakistan might be able to provide to support of various contingencies. Most of this was (and is)
classified information, but it is common knowledge that four airfields, the complete use of two-thirds of Pakistan's airspace, and a wide variety of logistical support was made available. The DAO role was to facilitate much of the interaction between this and other U.S. teams and the Pakistan Armed Forces. As in so many other requirements, much of our job involved explaining Pakistan and its political and military culture to Americans, and explaining the American political and military culture to Pakistanis. Once the initial agreements were in place, we left the execution to others and dropped back into our "attaché lane".

PHASE 2, OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM-
-THE DIE IS CAST

On the evening of 7 October 2001, having learned a few days earlier that coalition military operations against the Taliban government would commence that evening, the Ambassador told everyone to move onto the embassy compound for additional security should the domestic reaction in Pakistan be adverse. Remembering that in November 1979 the embassy had been burned to the ground by a rioting mob, many of us were skeptical about just how secure we were going to be. Late that evening, the Ambassador called us in to announce another bombshell: Musharraf had undertaken a complete re-shuffling of the Pakistan Army senior leadership. Every general considered sympathetic to the Taliban or closely linked to Islamic groups was retired or sidelined. This included the three most widely considered to be responsible for Musharraf’s successful coup in 1999, the ISID head, the Deputy Chief of Army Staff, and the influential corps commander in Lahore. The first two were my former instructors at Quetta and had been useful personal contacts.

Again the questions from Washington flew in: What did it mean? Was there any danger of a coup? Who else in the Army was being moved? What were the new leaders like? Was Pakistan more or less stable than before? How would Operation Enduring Freedom be affected?

Coupled with these were still other questions about the new military campaign in Afghanistan: How effective was the bombing? Were the Taliban sufficiently impressed to give up OBL? What might happen if coalition pilots were shot down and captured by the Taliban? What was the condition of U.S. and other foreign detainees being held captive by the Taliban in Kabul? Would they be moved? If so, to where? Would the Northern Alliance help us? Who was a potential partner and who could not be trusted? Would the Pashtuns and other ethnic groups help us or rally to the Taliban?

And, by the way, what would be the domestic reaction in Pakistan to our bombing fellow Muslims? Were we going to be safe in Islamabad? How about the consulates in Peshawar and Karachi? What about the four locations where U.S. forces were temporarily deployed in Pakistan? Could Musharraf and his regime weather the storm? We heard rumors that students in the madrassas and followers in radical religious groups in Pakistan were planning to join the Taliban in Afghanistan on a new "jihad" against the U.S. and coalition forces. Was this true? How many were going? From where? Would they be military effective?
Photo 4: A visit from the Secretary of State, General Colin Powell. Tom Wahlert is fourth from the left, Rich Given is to Gen Powell’s right, Col Smith is to Gen Powell’s left and Calvin Carlsen is to Col Smith’s left.

Again, the days became long, as did the nights, as these and many more questions came in from our consumers. Days were taken up with meetings with embassy principals, as well as meetings with senior officers in ISID, Joint Staff Headquarters, and Army General Headquarters, nights with other meetings with retired military and civilian contacts. Soon day and night became one and the only time we knew the specific day of the week was when we wrote down an appointment on rapidly filling calendar pages. Quick trips to Lahore and Peshawar provided answers to many questions as well as restoring a sense of normalcy when we realized, happily, that the reaction in Pakistan was mostly positive. Despite the best efforts of the radicals, most Pakistanis supported Musharraf and had no great love for the Taliban. Demonstrations after the first week dwindled eventually to zero.

PHASE 3, THE TALIBAN COLLAPSE AND A NEW AFGHANISTAN

Unlike many others, we were always confident of military success in Afghanistan. As we often tried to explain to Washington and elsewhere in our reporting, many things were different from the 1980s when the Soviet Union suffered defeat. First, there was no safe haven for the Taliban. Every regional state bordering Afghanistan was hostile to them. Second, they had no usable high technology weapons. During the 1980s, our provision of the STINGER missile to the mujahideen had turned the tide of war in their favor. This time there was no superpower patron for them to turn to. Third, the technology of warfare had leaped ahead. High altitude bombing with precision-guided munitions meant immunity from primitive air defenses, and special operations forces would "own the night" against the primatively armed Taliban fighters.

However, like everyone else, we were surprised at the speed of the eventual collapse. Within just over a month of commencing Opera-
tions, the northern keystone of Taliban defenses, the city of Mazar-I-Sharif had fallen and the Taliban were in full retreat to the south, not even stopping to defend Kabul. Within two weeks they were confined to their southern redoubt of Kandahar, and Marine Corps troops had established a nearby base at Camp Rhino. The end was in sight, or so it seemed.

One thing should be made perfectly clear about OEF. It might have been accomplished without strong support of the Government of Pakistan, but not nearly so quickly or easily. Pakistan was never an unwilling or reluctant ally dragged along by fear of retribution should it not cooperate with us. Pervez Musharraf was enthusiastic from the very beginning, as were most if not the great majority of his senior commanders. Perhaps he saw an historic opportunity to turn Pakistan from the near-pariah it had become into the tolerant, moderate Islamic state once envisioned by its founding father, Muhammad Ali Jinnah. And he seized it. To the many coalition requests, the answer was always 'yes', never 'maybe' or 'we'll see', but firm, immediate acceptance, followed usually by helpful suggestions about how to make the action requested even more effective.

Nevertheless, military success meant new requirements came in to the DAO for the third time: Could a new government be formed? Pakistan didn't trust the mostly non-Pashtun Northern Alliance. What would be its response to the Northern Alliance seizing Kabul? And then there was this fellow, Hamid Karzai. We had met him from time to time on the cocktail party circuit in Islamabad during the past two months. He had now gone into Afghanistan with a few trusted followers and seemed to be doing fine for himself. Could he be the new Pashtun leader everyone was looking for? What was he really like? Would others support him? What about the Northern Alliance, how would it react to Karzai's newly acquired prominence? Would it hold together or fragment along ethnic lines?

Our biggest problem now became how to seal our victory. With most of Afghanistan now under coalition control, what would senior Taliban officials do, and what about the Al Qaida fighters, mostly Arabs, but with a sprinkling of other foreigners? The 2200-kilometer border between Pakistan and Afghanistan had always been porous. In many tribal areas, the Pakistan Army, like the British Indian Army before it, could not operate without taking casualties. How could such a border be sealed so that Taliban and Al-Qaida fugitives could be brought to justice?

Again, at our urging and following several military-to-military discussions, Pakistan stepped up to the plate and deployed four regular Army divisions from its two corps located in the western part of the country. Additionally, the paramilitary Frontier Corps in Balochistan and Northwest Frontier Province deployed to the border areas. Negotiations between the ethnic Pathan corps commander in Peshawar and tribal maliks, or leaders, in the NWFP yielded an historic agreement to deploy the Army into the former "politically inaccessible areas", the first time in history this had been achieved. Similarly in Balochistan, the first ethnic-Baloch corps commander (who had been sent there in October as part of the Army shakeup) would reach a similar arrangement with the Baloch tribal sardars. Amazingly, perhaps as many as 100,000 Pakistani troops now guarded the once-lonely border and hundreds of Al Qaida eventually would be picked up by them and turned over to U.S. control.

PHASE 4, THE "TWO-FER"--SOLVE ONE CRISIS, GET ANOTHER ONE FREE.

As Christmas loomed on our horizon, things had started to get back to a semblance of normality. The workday became shorter, routine business began to dominate the schedule, fewer and fewer new requirements came in from
Army In-Country Training in Estonia
Major Michael Brewer and Captain Lisa Vining

Situated between Europe and Eurasia, Estonia offers a unique perspective into both east and west. The Army currently operates 18 in-Country Training (ICT) sites in Europe, but Estonia is one of only two sites open for Eurasian FAOs. The other site is located at the Marshall Center in Garmisch, Germany. Estonia’s one-year long ICT is centered on the ten-month long Senior Staff Course at the Baltic Defence College (BDCOL) located in the university town of Tartu, Estonia.

The Baltic Defence College first opened its doors on August 16, 1999; the third course is currently in session. The main objective of the Senior Staff Course is to establish and continuously improve the training and development of the senior staff officers of the armed forces of the Baltic States. Since the course emphasizes democratic leadership principles and prepares Baltic officers for work according to NATO procedures, the presence of international students provides the Baltic students with the contacts necessary to enhance their knowledge and understanding of NATO operations. In addition to 10 Estonian officers, nine Latvian officers and nine Lithuanian officers, this year’s course includes two Danish officers, two Bosnian officers, and one officer each from Canada, the Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Obviously the daily contact that ICT FAOs have with their Baltic counterparts offers them an unparalleled understanding of life in post-Soviet countries as well as an appreciation for the development of armed forces in newly-democratic countries. Equally as important, the yearlong course allows ICT FAOs to forge lifelong friendships with officers from the Baltic region.

Statue of Lenin in a garbage heap on the outskirts of Tartu

1979 picture of the building that currently houses the Baltic Defense College
The Senior Staff Course takes into account the general geographic and political conditions, as well as the territorial defense concepts of each of the Baltic countries. Course work covers operations and tactics, logistics, strategy and political studies, staff duties, management and administration, total defense and military technology. Additionally, NATO standards, legal aspects of operations and the principles of democratic control within the Defense Forces are integrated into the course. The instruction covers not only the problems of land and air defense, but also maritime operations. During the ten-and-a-half month course, about eight weeks are spent traveling in the three Baltic countries (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia), studying the region’s defense problems. During several of these trips, ICT FAOs have the opportunity to meet with ministry-level representatives of the Baltic countries. Also, study trips to Sweden, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are included in the course curriculum. These trips offer insight into the process and challenges of NATO integration.

Teaching at the Senior Staff Course alternates between lectures, plenary sessions and small groups (syndicates of 6 - 7 students with mixed backgrounds, with one member of the College staff attached to act as a catalyst). The staff consists of officers from twelve different countries. There is currently one American Lieutenant Colonel on the staff. He is a Special Forces officer, who works as a syndicate guiding officer and chairman of the military technology department. In the future, a United States Army FAO will replace this officer.

The Baltic Defence College’s location in Tartu, Estonia provides ICT FAOs with numerous cultural opportunities. Tartu is often called “The Athens of Estonia.” It is Estonia's second largest city with 100,000 inhabitants, and because of its world-famous university, the town is widely known as the intellectual capital of Estonia. Founded by the King of Sweden Gustavus Adolphus in 1632, the university made Tartu the center of education and science for centuries. Tartu has the same status in Estonia as Heidelberg in Germany, Uppsala and Lund in Sweden.

In addition to the Senior Staff Course, ICT FAOs in Estonia have the opportunity to conduct local and regional travel before and after the Senior Staff Course (approximately two months). This block of time offers ICTs the opportunity to travel to St. Petersburg, Moscow and other destinations in Russia. Weekends and holiday breaks offer additional opportunities to travel to destinations within the Baltic countries. The American Embassy is located in the capital city of Tallinn, about three hours north of Tartu. Tartu is 200 km from Riga, Latvia and 560 km from Vilnius, Lithuania. Classes at the Baltic Defence College are conducted in English, but FAOs schedule Russian language training through the Tartu University.

This ICT site is open both to unaccompanied FAOs and FAOs with family members. FAOs with family members are lodged in private housing on the economy in Tartu. Single officers are lodged in the Tartu Hotel. Normal arrival dates are July, with the BDCOL course beginning in August. Shipment of POV and household goods is authorized. The BDCOL’s Internet site, , provides a superb overview of the college, including a detailed course curriculum.

The combination of the BDCOL curriculum, close ties to Baltic officers, and regional travel makes this ICT an exciting alternative to the Marshall Center for Eurasian FAOs.
This summer I had the opportunity to travel to Israel and the Palestinian Authority to observe the ongoing Entifada. I went during the cease-fire surrounding the visit of George Tenet, Director of the CIA, and his efforts to get both sides to implement the Mitchell Report. Because of the cease-fire, I had exceptional access into areas that are usually off limits to Americans and had interaction with Palestinians, Israelis, and American officials working the issue first hand.

What I saw did not give me great hope for a peaceful or quick resolution to the conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians. However, the attack on 11 September gave new life to the peace process. That said, the issues that surround this conflict are not being addressed at this time, and may lead to more confrontations between two future sovereign states.

Observations

That which keeps the Entifada from being crushed is the economic “day after”. There is no doubt in anyone’s mind that the Entifada could be over in 72 hours. The Israeli army has already planned it, they’ve rehearsed it, and they’ve implemented it numerous times on a small scale. Each of the “tank incursions” into Palestinian territory is in fact, a small-scale execution of the overall plan to crush the Entifada.

However, Israel has far too much American and European based business in the western half of the country, to use a military solution. While it is true that the economy is down, mainly from a lack of tourism, the fallout of a military solution would hurt too many venture capital operations, large company branch offices and factories, to make it viable. The Israeli government knows they are slowly starving the Palestinians out, and hope that in time, their economic meltdown (45-50% unemployment) will drive the Entifada to an end.

The issue of the Palestinian refugees will never get full resolution under the present type of government. It is an economic impossibility. Right now there are millions of Palestinians living in camps outside of Israel that have never been in Israel and have zero job skills. At the same time, there is the highest unemployment rate in the Arab world within Palestinian Authority territory. Neither the Israelis nor the Palestinian Authority can economically permit hundreds of thou-
sands of new workers into a region that cannot support the present citizenry. Agriculturally, the region will not support the present inhabitants, let alone millions more.

The refugee issue is a key element as to the failure of the Wye River Accords. The US press made the matter out to be something else, but Arafat could not save face, and sell out the refugees, nor could he or Barak let them back into Israel/Palestine.

Wye River failed for a number of reasons, on both sides. The issues of the Right of Return for Palestinian refugees, Jerusalem as a Capitol and Ethnicity of the West Bank are all topics that currently have no solution. All of these issues must be resolved prior to a successful implementation of a Palestinian State.

**Israeli Issues**

The most damaging event to the State of Israel today is the Palestinian Entifada. Israeli Security Forces are part of that problem. Israeli Army patrols in the worst parts of Jerusalem are not prepared for combat situations. They are overall too young and inexperienced and they are not led by NCOs with enough experience to monitor the threat. Their patrol discipline is low, cell phones are used during patrols to make personal calls, uniforms look poor, weapons are used as crutches to lean on, breaks are taken in obvious places with no security in place, there is zero situational awareness.

These patrols use the strength of a mixed Arab-Israeli crowd to harass Palestinian youths. The result is that these patrols get themselves into violent situations because they are not paying attention. Then due to the youth of the leadership on the ground, they get scared and resort to defensive rifle-fire in the face of stones and Molitov cocktails.

At the border stations, they have conscripts of mixed sex, little training, little to no supervision, and officers with attitudes of bravado conducting all immigration/customs checks. The end result is that they are far more interested in talking to each other on their radios than they are doing real checks. What they do check looked to be solely on the basis of race. A terrorist operation could pick up on this and use European looking members to make deliveries of weapons or explosives.

The Labor Party and it’s doves are virtually dead in Israeli politics, with no chance of a resurrection in the next year or two. With Barak’s defeat in the spring, the coffin began to close on the Labor Party. When Sharon opened his government to former Labor Party members, under a National Government, he nailed it shut. Many Labor politicians were eager to restore their careers after the failure of Barak’s government, and to get inline with the conservative backlash of the Israeli population.

Entrance into this government meant political salvation, but at a price. That price being loyalty to the conservative government and the policies of the Sharon government. Unfortunately for the Labor party, Sharon’s methods have been marginally successful and the public sees something being done toward cracking down on the Palestinians. This has given the “doves” of the Labor party no room for opposition. Actually, a healthy percentage of the public favors a much more severe backlash, it is Sharon that keeps the “hawks” from using public support to crush the Entifada.

**Palestinian Issues**

Young Palestinians, ages 15-35, see this Entifada not as just another uprising against a hostile Israeli government, but as THE struggle for Independence. In the past, the PLO and other Palestinian groups would have seen this as a battle in the war against Israel. But for
various reasons, mainly disenchantment with the status quo, the younger two generations don’t see it that way. Instead, they want it all now and seem to be willing to make the sacrifices to do so. The problem is that a group willing to do anything for independence is being led by men who don’t see the fight in the same light as their constituents. If there were some type of an event that overwhelmed the Arab populace, Arafat and his government could lose control over the Entifada. Already a new grass roots level of leadership is growing out of the fight. And with the Israeli assassination campaign at work, some of the most promising post-Arafat leadership is being killed. That leaves only the untrained survivors to choose from when Arafat dies.

At some point these street leaders will be able to control the violence, and then they will want or demand the reins of leadership. That could cause a breakdown of order in Palestine. Even now, the seeds of discontent are sewn. You hear from young Palestinians that they disappointed by the ground given in negociation and are not content with what was offered to Palestinians, and are generally disappointed in Arafat. They’d rather be fighting and dying than give in to Israel. Arafat and his ministers may have no choice but to condone the violence, just in an attempt to maintain a hold on power.

Another source of discontent is that corruption and cronyism is rampant within the Palestinian Authority. Much of this is coming to light in that the Authority still exists, but does little to help out the people. People are asking where the monies donated to the Palestinian government are going. They are seeing the affect of the loss of the Israeli government services and wondering how the Palestinian government can replicate these services.

Conclusions

There is no doubt that the present relations between the Israelis and Palestinians are worse now than they have been since the Oslo Accords were signed. The Arabs hope for a break in the stalemate of the last year by an American declaration of recognition of a Palestinian State or European pressure on Israel. Palestinians would love to have a UN force separating the two sides. But neither side holds any hope for a cessation of hostilities, left to their own devises. In fact the opposite seems more likely.

Much of the Israeli populace supports the hard-line approach that Sharon is taking to the Entifada, and would favor tougher restrictions and even perhaps a military solution to the uprising. The pressure of Europe and the other Arab countries, both economic and political are having very little affect on the Israeli government. And the Palestinians do not seem capable of mounting a threat large enough to scare the Israelis into peace negotiations.

However, in light of the recent attacks on America, the United States is not going to back any major strikes or retaliatory interventions into Palestinian territory. The US needs support from all the Arab countries it can muster into the coalition against terrorism. These countries are going to use the Palestinian Statehood issue as leverage on the US for entry into or support of this Coalition. This bodes well for the Palestinians and may mean the Israelis may have to take a back seat in the region while we wage this war. Some Israeli Labor members are starting to question the political landscape after Sharon, which could prove the beginning of real opposition to the present policies.

Many point to US policy in this conflict as the reason or justification for the September 11th attacks. But it has always been our desire to see a peaceful resolution between these two parties. And in spite of US anger over the attacks on America, the attacks may indeed be the propellant that finally creates a Palestinian State.
There has been some discussion recently about U.S. intelligence in the context of the attacks against our homeland, and other ongoing activities. With this in mind, here are some suggestions with regard to the U.S. intelligence community.

The Director of Central Intelligence: Give the DCI a national mandate to direct the resources of the U.S. IC, without unnecessary outside involvement. Define the position as a distinct separate office from the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Ensure that the DCI has appropriate national "operational" authority over all the elements of the U.S. IC. The Director of Military Intelligence: Formally designate the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency as the DMI, with responsibility to represent the Department of Defense in the deliberations and decisions of the larger intelligence community.

Human Intelligence: Over the past ten years we have given much lip service to the concept of rebuilding and re-energizing our human intelligence capabilities, and some progress has been made to do just that. However, our efforts lack clear central guidance and direction, and our efforts have not been fully supported by all the parties involved. Form a National HUMINT Agency now, bring it more directly under the control of the Director of Central Intelligence, eliminate the involvement of agencies and elements of government that are unnecessary to its function, and change the culture in which the practitioners of this art and science labor. Recruit, train, sustain and nurture the very best we can entice to do this work.

Counterintelligence: In the recent past we have sadly discovered significant espionage inside our intelligence and security organizations. One might imagine how big a problem we have in people, organizations, and activities that are not subject to the frequent and active scrutiny that those organizations are. The CI function is now dispersed among many elements of the government. Consolidate national counterintelligence efforts now in an appropriate agency or element -- form the National Counterintelligence Agency - and give it the investigative, screening, policing and enforcement powers that this vital discipline needs.

Technology: Modern intelligence requires the very best technology we can generate. Some technologies are so esoteric, so arcane, and so theoretical or problematic that they require the very best technologists, scientists, engineers, and other learned people that we can muster, in the best facilities we can provide. Nearly every agency and element of the U.S. intelligence community now has its own technology effort, sometimes uncoordinated among other IC elements and in some cases unnecessarily redundant and duplicative. The National Reconnaissance Office is one of the most capable repositories of technology expertise in the U.S. government. Give the mission of primary technology research, development, and acquisition for the needs of the U.S. IC, to the NRO. Broaden their mission to include the technology requirements of the U.S. government in support of intelligence and perhaps other functions. Give the NRO the people, money, connections, and specific responsibilities necessary to carry out their new national mandate while carefully preserving the excellent work.
they have done in the past. Ensure that the NRO is fully associated with and connected to appropriate centers of science and technology in order to achieve national technical synergy. Change their name to the National Technology Organization.

Automation and Connectivity: The U.S. IC has achieved considerable automated interconnectivity between agencies and elements especially at the finished product level. But, more needs to be done to optimize the exchange of and the utility of current and raw information. The current sharing mechanism is woefully inadequate. However, for good reasons such as the inherent threat to security that access to information by more and more people represents, the hope and promise of full IC interconnectivity has yet to be realized. The technology is there to do it. It is procedure, policy and parochial organizational viewpoint that have to be changed. Decide now to achieve appropriate IC interconnectivity goals. Insert the best technologies and the best processes to optimize the delivery of intelligence to decision makers now. Do the same thing with technologies that assist the decision maker in understanding and using the information the IC provides. Link these capabilities to the intelligence production system in the most effective and efficient manner.

Analysis: We need balanced and experienced analysts who have been out in the world, and who have the language and cultural affinity or the science and technology expertise necessary to understand their area of responsibility. Seldom can such experience be found in the entry-level analyst. Thus older "retired" people, many of who have never worked directly in the IC, but have the practical knowledge, expertise, and the salting of wisdom that only comes with time and life experiences, should be brought into the U.S. IC analyst community and applied to the difficult problems of the day. This is already the case in some analytic efforts. Expand this concept and formalize the IC’s ability to muster the right people for temporary duty or for longer-term work. Improve the training and the tools that analysts throughout the IC use. There are ongoing efforts to do this. However, we need a modern and innovative approach that includes the application of technology-based tools in the context of all sources, sensors and methods. We need enough analysts, active and reserve, to meet our global military, technical, informational, cultural, political, diplomatic, economic, and homeland security intelligence needs, including very specific criminal and terrorism intelligence. We don’t have enough now. Grow this part of the IC to a level adequate to the tasks ahead.

Patrick M. Hughes is a retired Army Lieutenant General and the former Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency

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Washington and elsewhere. Now we started looking forward to the return of our dependents. Perhaps by Christmas? It seemed possible.

Then on 13 December, Kashmiri militants attacked the Indian Parliament in New Delhi and our breathing period ended abruptly. Until 1989, the Kashmiri people had been relatively quiescent. Predominantly Muslim in the scenic valley that is the prize in the disputed territory, an indigenous militancy had sprung up and for 12 years had been simmering. Perhaps 350,000 Indian Army and other security forces struggled to maintain control. Lately, militants from Pakistani and other foreign groups had gotten into the act and Pakistan was regularly excoriated by India for promoting cross-border terrorism. In fact, the Kashmir militancy, like the Taliban government, basically had been "high jacked" by foreigners who had threatened to take the war into the heart of India. The first blow had been struck at the Red Fort in New Delhi the previous year, the second in October 2001 in Srinagar. For India, 13 December was the last straw, and it began mobilizing its armed forces and deploying them westward.

Early in the morning of 18 December, I was awakened by the Deputy Director of ISID and told that hostilities with India were "imminent". This is precisely the kind of telephone call attaches do NOT want to receive! Rushing to the embassy, I spoke with him again and he amplified the earlier conversation by telling me that the Indian Air Force, which had been in a relatively high state of alert for several months beforehand, was deploying strike aircraft to forward locations and uploading bombs and missiles. He expected an attack within a few hours. After making calls to the National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC) and other locations, I waited for the war to begin. Fortunately, it didn't—but the experience was a good way to get everyone's attention focused on our next challenge.

In the next few days, it became apparent through frequent meetings and briefings with ISID that the scale of the Indian military buildup was massive and unprecedented in its scope. For the first time ever, India was sending large numbers of troops from its Eastern Army Command to the west. In its previous wars with Pakistan, this had never been done. Three Indian "strike corps" were deploying, as had the bulk of the Indian Air Force. This was (and is) truly the nightmare scenario for Pakistan. With its attention turned toward the unstable situation in Afghanistan, Pakistan now had the full armed might of India to contend with.

"I'M FROM WASHINGTON AND I'M HERE TO HELP YOU".

At this point, I will no longer bore you with the questions and requirements that began to flow in. They are obvious, particularly the ones dealing with weapons of mass destruction. Once again we hunkered down trying to answer them. It quickly became apparent that Pakistan would have to match the Indian mobilization in order, as the Vice Chief of Army Staff explained to us, "to
avoid embarrassment". Much to our amazement, but at our strong urging, Pakistan continued to meet its commitments to the coalition by keeping a substantial quantity of its forces deployed to screen the Afghan border for Al Qaida fugitives and to provide logistical support to OEF.

If all we had to do during these crises was satisfy a “few” intelligence requirements, provide occasional military advice to the country team and various military and other agency liaison teams, and represent the Mission in the attaché and wider diplomatic communities, we would have been fully occupied. However, as mentioned earlier, visitors to an embassy sometimes end up being a fulltime job as well. They have to be treated well because their perception of the Mission’s competence and treatment of them often may spell the difference between success and failure of the overall mission—particularly if your visitors provide your budget, in the case of congressional delegations.

During the past four months, our embassy had more than our fair share of high-ranking visitors. In the past 30 days, just as an example, we hosted the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Undersecretary of the Army, half a dozen congressional delegations (including one led by Senators Lieberman and McCain and seven other senators), Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the Secretary of State (for the second time in three months), Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Director of the FBI, and a whole host of lesser mortals.

Normally, the visit of the Secretary of State or a prominent senatorial visit caps weeks and weeks of intensive effort. In our case, they continue to come so fast and furiously that anyone below the rank of General, senator, or cabinet secretary now rarely causes anyone to bat an eyelid. Nevertheless, all visitors expect to be treated well (and deserve to be), so itineraries have to be drawn up and coordinated with the host country, social events have to be planned and invitation lists prepared, papers for briefing books have to be written and biographies assembled, and time must be set aside for preliminary briefings, separate agendas for lesser ranking delegation members catered for, and, of course, shopping expeditions have to be planned--and led.

TAKE THE FBIS—PLEASE!

Another major distraction throughout both crises has been the reliance on Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) reports by operations centers and other offices seemingly as their primary source of information about the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan. FBIS operates much like the Early Bird, the daily Pentagon print and broadcast media summary, as a clipping service of stories printed or broadcast in local English-language and vernacular media. Unfortunately, its readers have no way of judging the reliability of the information reported in these media outlets, and, consequently, their reporting tends to generate lots of requests for confirmation.
Imagine the *Early Bird* containing extracts from the *National Enquirer* as well as the *New York Times*.

My favorite FBIS experience came during the first week after the events in New York and Washington. A local newspaper in Pakistan carried a brief story suggesting the 82nd Airborne Division and 101st Airborne (Airmobile) had departed CONUS enroute to Pakistan. We read it and laughed. Next day, a duty officer in a headquarters that shall not be named called us to confirm or deny the story. He had read it in the FBIS and his senior duty officer wanted to know if it was true. With tongue firmly in cheek, I told him the Army Operations Center in the Pentagon might be a better choice to obtain this information.

While this episode at least HAD a bit of humor connected with it, others did not, and each one required valuable time to research (to find the story carrying the full text) and reply. The biggest problem for us was (and is) that such stories take on a life of their own in the consciousness of policy makers who have no regional context in which to place the stories. Pakistan frankly has a negative media image and such stories, even when proven untrue, serve usually to reinforce negative caricatures. Therefore, when the Government of Pakistan makes a formal announcement, the questions from Washington become not "what does it mean?", but "is it true?" and "can they be trusted?" Again, much valuable time is wasted gathering answers, the implication apparently being that if we found out that the announcement was untrue we wouldn't report it.

"TRUST ME, THIS IS COMPLETELY OFF THE RECORD".

A final distraction was the media. As the old saying goes, 'when Christiane Amanpour comes to town, you know something bad is about to happen'. Christiane and literally hundreds of her fellow journalists came to Islamabad early.

The view from the roof of the Marriott Hotel looking toward the President's House should by now be familiar to anyone who watched the evening news the past few months. Hundreds of reporters, perhaps nearly a thousand in all, descended on Islamabad. With the real story in Afghanistan hundreds of miles away, no access to it for several weeks, and a new story to write every day--what a recipe for disaster! Again, we in the embassy spent a lot of time correctly misperceptions caused by careless reporting or simply erroneous reports filed by less-than-scrupulous reporters with no story and a deadline fast approaching.

Many wanted to speak with us, and we realized eventually that it was often far better to provide accurate information--always within the bounds of classification and almost always off the record--to responsible journalists rather than waste our time correcting errors due to lack of accurate information or credible sources. This is not exactly what is taught in Attaché School, but in the real world it is often the most appropriate course of action.

Confining our backgrounders to credible media, and with the help of our Public Affairs Counselor in setting the proper ground rules, to my knowledge no reporter ever knowingly violated the rules of the game. As time went on, we even became friends with many, realizing that we all had a job to do, just a different way of doing it. We also realized that the responsible media could help our mission by providing accurate information and crowding out the outlets contributing to confusion and disinformation about what we were trying to do in OEF.

**CONCLUSION.**

We do not yet know how these two crises will turn out. Although the interim government in Afghanistan has made a reasonable start, much remains to be worked out. We must keep in mind that it is only an interim arrangement and that a final political settlement awaits. Can a multi-

*(Continued on page 31)*
The established professional development cycle for a FAO is to serve in SAO or DAO, theater or theater army staff, and National Capital Region assignments in rotation. For those of you who have been focused in other areas for the last two years, we have "move [d] away" from that cycle. I fully recognize that we have officers who need to serve in the down range positions. On numerous occasions, I have had to use a pry bar to move officers out of SAO and DAO positions, not only to give succeeding generations of FAOs the opportunity gain experience and develop, but to do the same for the "homesteading" officer. Today, FAOs serve back to back down range assignments only on a by exception basis. Even then, the norm (if you can it that for exceptions) is to move from DAO to SAO, LNO or vice versa.

As for fairness in tracking, I understand that is probably transparent to the community at large and the exceptions garner the attention, but that is exactly what your FAO assignments officers are doing every day. We do not "pencil in." We slate and nominate based upon officer qualifications and professional development needs. We explain the system in detail to everyone who attends one of our briefs at a FAOC or one of the unified commands, theater armies, or DIA.

With regard to FAO [P]roponent officers "carefully manag[ing]" combat arms FAOs, I must make two points. First, why are you discriminating against combat support and combat service support FAOs? You are all part of OPCF and they command battalions and serve as S3s and XO's. Second, as much as I truly respect and work well with the FAO Proponent, officer management is not its charter. That is my rice bowl.

Part of the reason the Army went to OPMS XXI was a realization that assigning successful former battalion commanders as military group commanders and attaches was problematic at best. While many of our colonels were able to manage both tactical and FAO assignments successfully, many were not. The circles in which FAOs operate can be extremely unforgiving. If anything, I would submit that the ideal combination could well be a "pure FAO" military group commander with an OPFAO operations officer. Fluency in language and depth of regional experience is more critical for the officer running the show than it is for the staff officer supporting him. Just as CFD'ed 48's run the risk of "de-greening" unless they make an earnest effort to stay on top of their profession, OPFAOs run the risk of losing touch with 48 -- witness the misperceptions and outdated information in LTC Rodriguez's article.

Regarding LTC Rodriguez's assertions that the quality of career field designated FAOs is somehow lower than that of the OPFAOs, I have to say that no one in the US Army is in a better position to evaluate that than I am. I see the records and I choose the OPFAOs. Here is the real deal: Part of the problem we face today is that the DA selection boards designated officers into FAO based primarily upon manner of performance. The number of below the zone selectees who elect to designate 48 is probably higher than any other career field, branch or functional area. As a result, some of those with the greatest qualifications as FAOs were not designated FAO while many officers with superb files but little or no FAO training were designated 48. Now, I am balancing the additional training load for relatively senior officers with attempting to get them branch qualified prior to their next promotion boards. Further, manner of performance is not the deciding factor in my decision who to designate OPFAO. What I look for is the level of training and experience as a FAO. When I look at manner of performance it is with an eye to retention. Heck, I want the Army to recoup its investment.

The author is showing a lack of understanding about OPMS XXI common throughout the Army. The number of CSL commands has increased by more than a third over the last three years while DOPMA promotion targets remain the same. If he is concerned about identifying the high quality OPFAOs, he would be better off proposing that we restrict our designations to those officers selected to command tactical battalions -- the ones who were CSL (then CDPL) selected under the original rules.

I am not trying to fool anyone into thinking that the system is perfect. However, the problems we do have are not the ones identified in the article. In my humble opinion, the systemic problems we still have to address are: 1) focusing the CFD
and FAD processes to ensure we make best use of Army training resources; 2) Developing and implementing universal MEL4; and 3) Recoding all Army positions to the appropriate branch, career field, or functional area.

Let’s quit kicking up dirt in front of the foxhole and start engaging targets.

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Perhaps due to the anthrax scare that affected the Brentwood postal facility, I only just received my September 2001 issue of the FAO journal. Others more eloquent than I may have already responded to LTC Rand A. Rodriguez’s opinions in his article “Command Field Designation of Foreign Area Officers (FAO): A Big Mistake?” so bear with me if this response is redundant.

LTC Rodriguez’s article made a few valid points, but for the most part, in my opinion, was an intensely insulting article to the majority of the FAO community. Perhaps the most significant fallacy of LTC Rodriguez was his application of his experiences as a 48B to the rest of the 48 career fields.

His point that FAO branch allows officers of all grades to homestead and that this ‘backs up’ the system for the rest of the FAO community is one, which I have heard before from a few officers. However, I have never heard of a FAO, who was able to ‘homestead’ as an attaché. Officers are allowed to extend one year, but I am not aware of any officer allowed to extend beyond that time. But, officers have been known to ‘homestead’ in staff assignments that others may wish to assume. The frustration mentioned earlier relates to these ‘plum’ staff assignments.

The insinuation that officers serve as attaches only for the money or prestige completely ignores that fact that many consider attaché duty the ‘best job’ and pursue these assignments as others would pursue commands. Is it so surprising that officers pursue the best jobs? Would LTC Rodriguez make the same accusation to officers who pursue back-to-back commands?

It is interesting that what LTC Rodriguez considers unfair is a system which is not slanted toward dual-tracked (“operational FAOs” in LTC Rodriguez’s terms) officers and the only way to make it fair is to create a system which reserves the top jobs in the FAO community for such officers. In other words, what would make everything fair is a system that would provide the best opportunities to officers that fit LTC Rodriguez’s career profile.

Had LTC Rodriguez confined his comments to the 48B field, it may have more appropriate to make the statement that the best attaches are ‘green’ FAOs. However, at least within the 48E field, being ‘green’ does not necessarily make an officer any better of a Defense Attaché than one who may have stayed in the FAO community and worked in assignments responsible for the region. In the Former Soviet Union, a majority of the DAOs are small stations, perhaps one, two or three officers. These attaches may spend very little of their time handling ‘Army issues’ and a majority of their time dealing with policy issues from OSD, CINCs, State Department, etc. Therefore, the experience of dual-tracked officers in understanding current Army doctrine and tactics and dealing with family problems’ may have very little impact on the performance of their duties as attaches.

Finally, LTC Rodriguez’s insinuation that straight FAOs are chaff and only dual-tracked officers are ‘wheat’ is not only insulting but entirely ignores the fact that many officers chose to remain a FAO and leave their basic branches. It also ignores the fact that in the ‘downsized Army’ competition in branches was often between officer files that required promotion boards and command boards to split hairs on selections. That being one of the Chosen could have been attributed to any number of uncontrollable factors which had little to do with the quality of the officer. I
am not suggesting that dual tracked officers ‘lucked into’ their successes. On the contrary, they fully deserve the promotions and opportunities, which have come their way. I AM saying, however, that those who have single-tracked into FAO career field are not necessarily the unqualified, disenchanted officers that LTC Rodriguez insinuates they are.

Providing PERSCOM food for thought, as OPMS XXI is implemented, is a good thing. Yet, it may be better to avoid make sweeping generalizations in a career field that requires officer with a myriad of skills to handle a wide range of responsibilities. The original belief that dual-tracked officers would be competitive in both worlds may need reconsideration. It may be that a branch qualified Major who, after S3/XO time, goes on to perform a FAO job, places himself in jeopardy for command selection. Therefore, perhaps a better question is whether the dual track system should be retained.

In light of recent command boards, perhaps FAO branch should review the statistics and find out how many dual-tracked, branch qualified FAOs are selected for battalion command that served in a FAO assignment prior to consideration for command. The results may warrant requiring an officer to pick one career field or the other and not try and live in both worlds.

Vincent P. O'Connor
MAJ, USA

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After reading “Command Field Designation of Foreign Area Officers (FAOs): A Big Mistake?” published in the September 2001 edition of F.A.O. Journal, I would like to thank LTC Rodriguez for providing an alternative viewpoint for the FAO community to consider. Hopefully the discussion will expand and we can bring it to resolution. We need to solve the “greening” problem. However, and with all due respect, I find myself in abject disagreement with a lot of what I think I read.

In direct response to the question posed, my answer is absolutely not. I ask the following question: Does designating “Operational FAOs” create a sub-group of FAOs with more opportunity to advance to positions of increased responsibility? I would contend that it does and I read the argument for creating this privileged subgroup in LTC Rodriguez’s article.

I couldn’t agree more with LTC Rodriguez’s argument for greening. However, it might be nice if we all had the same chances to get truly “green” jobs. As a field artillery officer, I would love nothing more than to be a “FAO Operator” and have a shot at getting some “muddy boots” again as a Brigade Fire Support Officer or time as an AFSCOORD on a division staff. I’d happily take that without intruding on the BQ province of S3/XO positions. Unless I have a poor grasp of the OPMS XXI facts, options like that aren’t available to me. Judging by what I’ve seen on the assignments web site, the most “green” job I have a reasonable chance of getting as a 48I (SE Asia) FAO is in the position of “Assistant G5” on a singular corps staff. This might be a “green” assignment for some, but it’s no “greener” than interacting with allies in a peacekeeping operation and maximizing opportunities to get out in the field with host nation armies. Assigned as an assistant G5, would I be in a better position to participate in Army Family Team Building (AFTB) activities, communicate using the Single-Channel Ground-Air Radio System (SINCGARS), and more able to articulate the vicissitudes of OPMS XXI than I can from repeated assignments at the Joint US Military Advisory Group—Thailand, an ICT assignment, or ACS? Maybe a little, but “green” for an operator and “green” for a FAO might be a little different in application. Personal responsibility is an important factor in staying “green” in subject areas that are common to all Army officers. The “green” subjects discussed above are available globally on the internet and in the training library at JUSMAGTHAI; and probably at other MIL-Groups I would expect. Distance learning is not “hands-on” experience, but it can suffice. I think the community would benefit by identifying the tasks, conditions, and standards of “greening.” Perhaps a FAO Mission Training Plan is called for. What we understand as “greening” must be more
clearly defined in DA PAM 600-3.

The part of the article I find professionally disturbing is the call for broad changes in assignment methodology based on what seem like anecdotal and specific cases. LTC Rodriguez poses and interesting question when he asks, “Who would want a counter-drug operations planning officer (48B) with no S-3 or XO time in a combat unit?” Parallel reasoning of this sort might sound like: who would want a DATT/ARMA who is below 2/2 language fluency (if that’s even a realistic standard) and no long term professional contacts in the target country? For the specific case LTC Rodriguez highlights, how about someone who was an XO/S3 in a non-combat unit? Are we talking about staff officers who coordinate and manage an operation or “door-kickers” who execute it? Universal MEL-4 could go a long way in “greening” FAOs sufficiently to serve as operations officers in operations like counter-narcotics, but that’s another entire discussion in the making.

LTC Rodriguez notes the “reality” that some officers made the move to OSCF 48 with the intention of getting a fresh start where they could excel in spite of their inability to do so in their original branch. I think what we’re talking about here is officers who have determined that they are not competitive for battalion command instead of officers that are sub-standard. We might also be talking about officers who have a unique aptitude for service in duties for which there is no direct-accession branch. After all, officers are only CFD’d after they are selected to promotion for Major. We could go a long way to solve the problem of creating officers with stakes in both the operations and operational support fields if we delay FAO training until officers are through the CFD process. If we are really talking about “sub-standard” officers, the “chaff”, then the Army would be better off in separating them altogether.

Although the statements in the article are tempered somewhat, the intimation is pretty clear that every officer who CFD’d to OSCF48 is something less than “best qualified.” Ouch! I didn’t realize that I was such a “rag-bag.” Should I start performing like one now? As LTC Rodriguez notes some officers are “sub-standard”; however, the overwhelming majority of OSCF 48 I know possess qualities and attributes that eclipse those of their peers in the operations field. This view of OSCF 48 officers as “sub-standard” really obscures the notion that professional Army officers have different aptitudes in which they excel. Working in a field for which you have an aptitude does not strip away all other competencies. Sweeping statements inspired by specific case experience do not create a sound basis for policy change.

The immutable fact is that we are “across the line of departure” on “operation” OPMS XXI. How we do business is always an important subject for discussion and debate. Changing the rules to favor a certain interest group within the community is bad practice and opens a path that leads to something inimical to Army values. I will heartily support the concept of “Operational FAOs” when we can have equal “greening” opportunities as “FAO Operators.” We’ll be truly equal when someone like me can have the opportunity to excel in my FAO lane, become a successful DATT/ARMA somewhere, and then move on to command a DIVARTY. I’m sure this last idea will be dismissed as absurd without consideration, but my gunnery skills will be no more atrophied than some commanders I have served under. Maybe a better way would be to move out of “no-man’s land” by eliminating dual-tracking. Operators should operate and FAOs should support operations. All should be “green,” whatever that really means.

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"Formosa Betrayed" By George Kerr, US Navy Civil Affairs Officer /Foreign Area Officer to Rep. of China, c.1945.

Read the Book Online: http://serv.formosa.org/betrayed/

Following the official surrender of Imperialist Japan on the USS Missouri in September 1945, the ensuing chaotic weeks following the taking of the Japanese troop surrender in East Asia were being significantly compounded by the Soviet looting of factories in the Japanese puppet-state of Manchukuo in Northeast China. In the power vacuum left by the Japanese military surrender and the late Soviet entrance into the Far East theatre, the Chinese Communist Party was able to broadly widen their growing peasant revolution with Comrade Stalin's blessings during the looming turmoil of Chinese civil war.

On October 25, 1945, George Kerr, US Naval Attaché to China (ROC) was flown from the KMT wartime capitol of Chongqing to the Japanese colony of Formosa. The Japanese colonial administrators, having their seat of government in Taipei, had been preparing for the formal surrender of the island territory since early September. Prior to late October, however, no Allied troops arriving in Formosa had been duly authorized to deal with the Japanese government on behalf of the US Commander-in-Chief, until the belated arrival of George Kerr and the ROC entourage.

George Kerr was the son of a missionary family whom grew up to speak both Chinese and Japanese during his youth in the Far East. Later he joined the US Navy Reserve where he was trained in Military Civil Affairs and edited volumes of CA regulations. He edited and compiled a voluminous naval area study which was a sheer encyclopedia of economic and cultural knowledge about Formosa during the war in the Pacific. This task had been done in order to aid the American occupation of Formosa and other Japanese territorial dependencies upon the eventual surrender of Tokyo. The corrupt KMT officials of the ROC soon discovered this American gift of 1200 pages embodying the area studies of Formosa, paid for by the US taxpayer, to be far more informative and more extensive than anything ever published in the Chinese language on the topic of Formosa. In fact, it literally became their blue print for very efficiently looting the Japanese industrial base of Formosa which was completely unparalleled in comparison to anything existing on the China mainland at the time.

On October 25, 1945, "Governor" Chen Yi of the ROC paraded into Taipei proclaiming that Chinese liberation of Formosans had occurred and the official retrocession of the Taiwan territory to China had been achieved on that very auspicious day. However, in the Chinese translation of the Japanese Instrument of Surrender of Formosa, the ROC retrocession or "reoccupation" of Taiwan, failed to note the joint occupational role of the USA. It was US Naval Attaché George Kerr whom took note of this illegal seizure and major discrepancy by the ROC. Thus he had the lawful role of the US inserted into the English translation which is also the more authoritative version in the event of international dispute.

Under the Laws of War, the hostile occupation of Formosa had unceremoniously begun under the joint authority of the ROC/USA. While the ROC officials began looting the prosperous island of its economic treasures prior to this day in October, the Japanese surrender being signed had not yet ended this joint, foreign occupation of Formosa. In deed, it had only just legally started on paper and the occupational status would remain a point of contention between the Allies even long after the Korean War. The Japanese government eventually signed a formal peace treaty in September 1952 and it came into legal effect with the ratification of the US Senate on April 28, 1952. It is extremely noteworthy that the Senate ratification process of the peace treaty was also concurrently conducted under the international laws of warfare with the USA being the paramount commanding authority of the Allied Powers and "principal occupational authority" of Formosa. As the
"undetermined" cession of Formosa and the immediately adjacent Pescadores Islands came under Article 2 cession of the Japanese dependencies, the joint occupational authority of these island areas did not cease. This SFPT cession also included the former US Trust Territory of the Pacific. While the USA and UK signed the treaty, neither the Republic of China nor People's Republic of China were ever allowed to sign the multilateral treaty of 49 signatories. To this day, the laws of occupation have made the ROC on Taiwan as the continuing defacto government of Taiwan without any legitimate sovereign claims under peace treaty. The SFPT intentionally designates China (ROC) as a subjugated administering authority of the Allied Powers. This limbo status of Taiwan territory under the SFPT was the most enduring legal treaty status of the George Kerr's "joint occupation" of 1945. This Kerr policy legacy has been indefinitely continuing on long after he had left the military service in 1945 to join the US foreign service. It is also the constitutional legacy of the SFPT cession by which he most lawfully left the people of Taiwan in "limbo" and such is still the bane of the China policy for today's American policy makers as the "strategic ambiguity" of Taiwan status.

To better understand the role of civil affair regulations like FM 27-10 Laws of Land Warfare and the Taiwan cession of San Francisco Peace Treaty, one will find George Kerr's "Formosa Betrayed" to become indispensable to fulfilling what the US Constitution expects from us. Such duties are not a footnote of history as treaties are the supreme law of the land for the legal framework of Shanghai Communiqués and Taiwan Relations Act. Par. 353 and 354 of FM 27-10 will clearly explain the "limbo cession" of SFPT, and then US Naval Attache George Kerr's authoritative narration of historic events places these pieces of the policy framework puzzle into their correct context of the laws of customary warfare.

Your final military analysis might startle you as FAOs much like George Kerr. Such closer examinations of FM 27-10 will better explain the aggressive posturing of the People's Liberation Army over our "illegal intrusions" into the international airspace of the Taiwan Straits and South China Sea as well as the increasing frequency of the Chinese naval encroachments upon those "unclaimed" Spratly Island cessions of the SFPT.


Review by Major James M. Minnich, Northeast Asia Foreign Area Officer

Dr. Leon V. Sigal, a career professor of thirty years, has published several literary works in the field of international relations and US foreign policy. In addition to Sigal's achievements in the academia, he has worked with the State Department as both an International Affairs Fellow (1979) and as a Special Assistant to the Director, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (1980-81).

Leon Sigal, in his book Disarming Strangers, provides an authoritative account of the events surrounding the 1994 Agreed Framework Between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea). The Agreed Framework is a policy instrument designed to eliminate North Korea's developing nuclear weapons program. Drawing upon in-depth interviews with policymakers from the countries involved, Sigal does more than deliver the details of the issues centering on the signing of this agreement; he uncovers how the American aversion to cooperation, nearly led the world into a second Korean War. Sigal's thesis is that the US too often attempts to achieve policy ends through coercion rather than cooperation, and as a result the US unnecessarily provokes confrontation instead of ameliorating crises.

Specifically, Sigal compares the Bush and early Clinton Administrations' inability to alter North Korea's nuclear weapons program through the use of verbal intimidation, economic sanctions, and the show of military force, with the success that was eventually achieved following co-
operative bilateral negotiations. Additionally, Sigal recognizes the necessity of the US to serve as lead nation for many international crises; however, he caveats that with a responsibility to work multilaterally, thereby permitting other regional actors a voice within their neighborhood.

In a final comparison, Sigal reminds the reader that in the past, negotiations have proved successful in eliminating nuclear weapons proliferation in at least eight other countries – South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.

Certainly it would be premature to declare the Agreed Framework successful. In fact eight years since its signing, offensive acts and verbal threats continue to slow its progress, whereby today, completion of the Agreement has been delayed by no less than seven years. Whereas many of these problems could be worked out through close association, the US has held North Korea at arm length, and consequently, not one high-level talk has taken place since the initiation of the Framework. In Sigal’s closing remarks, he reminds us that among US vital interests, resolving issues of proliferation are paramount; and while this proliferation issue is well in the working, other problems are certain to arise. And if the US is to successfully resolve these crises, we must forego our persistent attitude of “criminalizing proliferation and demonizing so-called rogue states,” in favor of a policy of positive engagement and negotiation.

To date, seven other authors have written books about North Korea’s efforts to build nuclear weapons and US efforts to eliminate these programs. I have read each book, and while each is different, Sigal’s thesis is well supported by facts, interviews and experiences. The reading flows and is easily digested. I recommend Sigal’s Disarming Strangers for both students of international relations and government officials vested with the responsibilities of international diplomacy.


Review by Major James M. Minnich, Northeast Asia Foreign Area Officer

Dr. Zalmay Khalilzad, former director of the Strategy and Doctrine Program of RAND’s Project Air Force, serves as President Bush’s newly appointed Special Assistant and Senior Director for Gulf, Southwest Asia and Other Regional Issues. Dr. Khalilzad has over twenty-years of combined experience in academia and national policy formulation.

The United States and Asia, a futures book, vividly analyzes the political environment of Asia and how it will effect the United States national interests. Considering the economic miracles of Asia during the last two decades, and the stabilizing role that the United States military provides to the region, Khalilzad, et al. suggest that a continued US involvement in the region is consistent with both our current and future national interests.

Specifically, Dr. Khalilzad, et al. advises that long-term national interests require the United States to directly intervene in Asia in order to achieve three necessary objectives (1) the prevention of a regional hegemon; (2) the maintenance of regional stability; and (3) the management of Asia’s transformation.

Concurrently, Khalilzad, et al. recommend a detailed four-part strategy that will facilitate the attainment of these three objectives. First, the United States, where possible, should transform bilateral security alliances into multilateral security alliances. These alliances could then work to both strengthen and preserve Asia’s security environment. Second, the United States should foster an effective regional balance of power in order to check any future aspirations of regional hegemony by China, India or Russia. Third, the
United States, to preempt any miscalculated assumptions by potential adversaries, should forcefully articulate and manifest its regional interests. Finally, the United States should advocate the creation of a security forum for the entire Asian region.

Among the authors’ critical analyses are their assertions that the enduring ability of the United States to continue its policy of forward-deployed military forces, in Japan and South Korea, is waning. Consequently, based on the technical operating capabilities of current and future United States Air Force fighter aircraft, the authors’ suggest establishing United States military airfields in both the Philippines and Vietnam, locations that will permit the US to better influence its foreign policies in both Taiwan and throughout the South China Sea.

This book, both thought provocative and easily assimilated, would greatly benefit both the political-military analyst and the intuitive reader seeking a broad exposure to the security environment of Asia. Finally, without reservation, I strongly recommend The United States and Asia: Towards a New U.S. Strategy and Force Posture for all regional policymakers.

--- RETIRED FAO ---

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--- RETIRED FAO ---
Reviews by LT Youssef H. Aboul-Enein (USNR)

Before I begin this review, I wanted to thank my fellow FAOs for their e-mail of support. Knowing that I am an American of Arab Origin, several of you sent e-mails of concern after the events of September 11th. Many of you I had not met personally, but you took the time to ask about my family and I. Such acts my fellow FAOs is one of the moving aspects of this War on Terrorism. In Navy parlance, “Thanks shipmates and let’s go out there and make our contribution against this new enemy!”


Wayne State University academic Richard Chasdi first book is a scholarly look into a quarter-century of terrorism in the Middle-East. As FAOs, one of our pivotal missions is to contribute to field commanders and extra edge in force protection matters. This book will help in classifying different types of terrorism and discuss the evolution of many terrorist groups in the region. The author offers a balanced description of Islamic militant, Palestinian radical and Jewish extremist groups, comparing and contrasting between them.

The vocabulary describing terrorist organizations as theocentric, ethnocentric and ideo-centric will aid FAOs in articulating the types of groups operating in an area. The second chapter is a study in what stimulates action in terrorist organizations. Some stimulants are more direct and include examples such as the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Others are key dates, commemorations that Palestinian, Jewish and Shiite radicals take advantage of in order to make a political statement. Chapter four contains one of the better historical discussions and outlines of each terrorist group. It starts with a description of Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen (The Islamic Brotherhood), founded in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna as a sociopolitical party in Egypt. This organization is the blueprint for many Islamic groups throughout the region. Hamas is the offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Palestinian Occupied Territories. The author also discusses the key founders of these organizations. If you read only one chapter in the book, Chapter Four will be worth your while.

Within the Palestinian movement the author peels back the different factions many who espouse different views on how to gain Palestinian independence. The Syrian-backed Al-Saiqa (Thunderbolt), the Iraqi-sponsored Arab Liberation Front (ALF) demonstrates how regimes wish to manipulate the Palestinian cause to enhance their regional influence in the Arab World. The book ends with counter-terrorism tips from a long and short-term perspective. Middle-East FAOs will benefit from reading this slim volume.


Pakistan has played both a negative and positive role in the war on terrorism. The Negative contribution includes the Taliban’s creation during the Benazir Bhutto regime Taliban were nurtured by elements of the Pakistan Inter-service Intelligence (ISI) Agency. Positive in the sense that Pakistan’s current leader General Pervez Musharraf has seized the opportunity to wrestle control of Pakistan from Islamic militants and corrupt officials that led to his personal coup of President Nawaz Shereif. To understand Pakistan however, it’s important to begin with its founding father Muhammad Ali Jinnah.

Akbar Ahmed’s book looks at Jinnah from Pakistani, Indian and Western perspectives. It reveals a highly complex figure little known in the annals of India’s independence movement, which includes Nehru and Mahatma Gandhi. Jinnah was a successful lawyer who was influenced early in life to take up the cause of Muslim minorities in a free India with a Hindu majority. From the 1920s to his death in 1948, he would struggle with the idea of being both an Indian and Muslim; this struggle in many ways is that of Pakistan today. The book details how he eventually concluded that a Hindu
majority in an independent India would not protect Muslims and he would break with Gandhi and Nehru. A chapter is devoted to the negotiation process between the last British Viceroy Lord Louis Mountbatten, Gandhi, Nehru and Jinnah. The settlement reached over the terms of partitioning India resulted in mismanagement and abhorrent violence. Remnants of this violence remain today over the dispute between the two nuclear nations in regards to Kashmir.

The author believes that Jinnah’s character was assassinated and marginalized in the West. He argues that it was a result of Lord Mountbatten’s personal dislike for Jinnah and his favoritism towards Nehru. It is ironic that both Pakistan and Israel are two nations born solely on a religious faith. During the 1947 partition of India and the independence of both nations, Jinnah struggled with the idea of secularism and Islamic fundamentalism. Pakistani intellectuals regard Jinnah’s first two speeches as his defining vision for Pakistan. He says, “You are free, you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship…you may belong to any religion, caste or creed. That has nothing to do with the business of the State.” He goes onto say, “We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one state.”

How much has Jinnah influenced General Musharraf is not known, but maintaining this vision by battling Jihadists and fighting corruption seems to resonate in the speeches and toils of Pakistan’s founder. On a personal level Jinnah’s daughter chose to stay with her husband in India rather than join her father in Pakistan, he died less than a year into the independence of Pakistan. FAOs with a specialty in this region should take time to read about Jinnah, who Pakistanis refer to as Quaid-al-Azam, urdu for great leader.


As the eyes of the world focus on Afghanistan and the Middle East, there has been faint news from Equatorial Africa regarding the elections in Zimbabwe. Saddam Hussein typically uses fear, death and almost every tool imaginable to remain in power. Zimbabwe’s dictator Robert Mugabe has taken democratic principles combined it with socialism and added thugs to remain in power at any cost. Unlike Saddam, the real tragedy is the Robert Mugabe is highly educated with three degrees in economics, law and teaching. Two of his degrees are from the University of London. He also struggled to bring independence to the former colony of Rhodesia, which split into the nations of Zambia and Zimbabwe during the rise of African nationalism. Zimbabwe is a relatively new African nation having been granted its independence in 1980, but since then the ideals of democracy and prosperity espoused by men like Mugabe and his chief rival the late Joshua Nkomo have been turned on its head, with greed, personal enrichment and remaining in power being the sole objective irregardless of the welfare of the Zimbabwean people.

Martin Meredith has reported on Africa for decades and has authored several books of South Africa. He has reported on the continent for the London Observer and Sunday Times. He writes in detail about Mugabe’s life in Ghana were he witnessed first hand revolutionaries like Kwame Nkrumah, who gained independence for his country. Mugabe would enlist the help of sympathetic Catholic clergy and newly independent African nations to foment a revolution in Rhodesia. Unlike many African nations who were granted full independence, Southern Rhodesia was technically a nation in which Britain supported and recognized the white settlers who led the nation. London wished to create a similar arrangement to South
Africa to guarantee the rights and future of white settlers. What came of this arrangement was apartheid government although not as harsh as South Africa’s, still underrepresented the black majority. What emerged were two parties committed to rectifying this situation. They included Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) and Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU).

In the sixties ZANU and ZAPU were more concerned with fighting each other than accomplishing full independence for Zimbabwe. Mugabe returned from an African trip to face eleven years of imprisonment, it is here he earns his degree and becomes an avid reader. The author delves into the intrigues of how several nations including China supported each faction and the ultimate triumph of Mugabe over his rival Nkomo. As independence was granted it looked like Mugabe would retain several white advisors and even the internal security chief who jailed him, recognizing the value of the white minorities in keeping Zimbabwe economically viable. A honeymoon period saw millions of dollars donated to this promising young country in which Ian Smith representing the white settlers coexisted with Mugabe and the black majority. This honeymoon would last only a year.

Troubles began when veterans of ZANU saw their economic plight not improving and even worsening under Mugabe. It is in this climate that ZAPU saw its chance and renewed and attempted to undermine the regime. Mugabe subdued ZAPU through violence and turned to seek retribution against those white settlers that supported Nkomo. It is here the socialist labels of bourgeois and racism was brought to bear and Mugabe cronies began to enrich themselves by confiscating farms and property. The author lists amazing feats of corruption and a land reduced to every piece of paper, government stamp or service required a kickback. The rewards also seemed to benefit Mugabe’s Shona people excluding other African minorities.

The book continues with Mugabe’s irrational involvement in the Congo, placing troops in support of the late Laurent Kabila. The motive was not political as much as gaining quick access to Congo’s rich mineral deposits. The author also details the ruining of productive farmland over the course of two decades. “Any vote we shall have, shall have been the product of the gun,” Mugabe said in a radio broadcast in 1976. He has not disappointed those who actually noticed this speech for it underlies his modus operandi and the current sanctions he is facing with the 2002 elections that the world has seen as fraudulent. Africa FAOs will find this book worth their while.

(Continued from page 20)

ethnic society be rebuilt and the power of the warlords be curtailed? No one knows at this time. In India and Pakistan, diplomatic efforts by our government and others have diminished the threat of imminent warfare between the two nuclear-armed adversaries, but nearly a million and a half troops still face each other along a tense frontier. Can face on both sides be saved and miscalculation be avoided? Again, no one yet knows. Much mutual distrust still has to be alayed and good will built before security will return to South Asia.

I chose the title of this article in an attempt to accurately depict what we FAOs do most often in our service—serve at the “front” of foreign policy in peacetime, attempt to shape the battlefield in a useful way when a crisis occurs that results in military action, and do our best to support from the “rear” when the military operation is actually being executed. It seems highly ironic that after 32 years of military service, including two retirements, I suddenly found myself on the “frontline” of a major military operation in a position to make a substantial contribution to the war effort. My advice to other FAOs is “be patient”, if you wait long enough, your time may come as well. If the events of the past four months have taught us Americans anything, it is that we cannot predict the future and must be eternally vigilant in this new and dangerous century we live in.
There have been several significant advances since the last Journal was published. We’ve made great headway in addressing our Career Field Designation (CFD) problems and saw the release of the first OPMS XXI promotion board – the O6 board.

Through close coordination with ODCSPER and PERSCOM, a process is being implemented to reduce our current loss of officers in the FAO training pipeline at CFD. First, ODCSPER and PERSCOM are working to more accurately identify the numbers of officers in each basic branch who will be available to move to a functional area at the CFD point. This should result in fewer losses across the board since we will not be forced, as we were under the old process, to train officers whom we could not realistically expect to retain at CFD.

Additionally, ODCSPER will revise the instructions to the CFD board to give primacy for designation as a FAO to those officers who are already trained/are in training as FAOs. They will also be directed to more heavily weight the officer’s personal preference. FAO Assignments Branch will now track training status on our trainees’ Officer Record Briefs (ORB). Additionally, prior to beginning training, FAOs will be required to commit to listing FAO as their first choice for a Functional Area.

Not quite the early CFD we were working for, however this option provides a solid possibility for success within the current framework established for the CFD process. Scheduled for institution prior to the next CFD board, to be held this summer, we will all be watching for more positive results.

I’m sure all Army FAOs have been waiting to see the results of the first promotion board conducted under OPMS XXI rules. The O6 promotion list was released last week and, as anticipated, FAOs continued to fare well. The selection rate for Operational Support Career Field FAOs was several points above the Army average and just slightly ahead of Acquisition Corps officers within the OSCF. With the exception of a few quirks resulting from the CFD of the senior year groups, the board selected well-qualified FAOs for promotion. A scrub of ORBs indicates the officers selected (combined OPCF and OSCF) averaged 2.4 FAO jobs while the average for OSCF FAOs was 2.8 jobs. This is right on track with what we would expect as we move into the OPMS XXI system. Congratulations to all who were selected!!
Since this is the first Marine Corps entry to the FAO Journal since 11 September 2001, we would like to take the opportunity to extend our deepest sympathies to the US Army and US Navy for their tragic losses on September 11th at the Pentagon. As a result of that attack, the Marine Corps FAO/RAO Program has been providing assistance to various agencies and commands in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.

In the training pipeline, we currently have our first two Eastern European FAOs, Majors Williams and Gundlach, conducting in-country training (ICT) in Zagreb, Croatia, and Maj Dave Holahan, a Russian FAO, in Riga, Latvia. In the Middle East, Capt Connable has recently arrived for his year abroad in Cairo, Egypt, and Maj Madden is starting his ICT in Muscat, Oman. On the other side of the globe, Maj Goff is currently attending the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Forces Command & Staff School, and Capt McDonald is braving his way through the bitter cold of northern China. In the next 6-7 months, we will likewise have our first Marine FAOs in India, Greece, Turkey, Russia, and the Philippines (pending approval of the NSDD-38 requests!). Additionally, we will also be sending FAOs to Thailand, Korea, and China. We would like to extend a hearty welcome back and a job well done to those officers who have returned from ICT since the last issue of the FAO Journal: Maj Nelson (Vietnam), Capt Perry (Japan), Maj Christopher (Estonia), LtCol Costantini (Egypt), and Maj Duke (Israel).

With regards to the future sites, the Program Coordinator has been submitting National Security Decision Directive/NSDD-38 requests to the Department of State to officially establish training positions in all of these locations, and working with the embassy teams to smooth the in-country transitions. The Program Coordinator also had a profitable trip to Monterey, CA in October 2001 to discuss program changes and improvements with those officers attending either the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) or the Defense Language Institute (DLI). The FAO Program Office at the Unified Commands and International Issues Branch (PLU), Headquarters Marine Corps also conducted two quarterly, experienced-track FAO/RAO boards in July and November 2001. As a result, we have added 19 new FAOs and 5 new RAOs to our FAO/RAO "pool". In early February 2002, we will begin soliciting applications for the next annual study-track FAO/RAO board that will take place in July 2002. We have likewise decided to incorporate the Olmsted Scholarship Program selection board along with the FAO/RAO selection board, since the Olmsted Scholar Program mirrors the FAO/RAO Program in a multitude of ways. We expect to select 10 study-track FAOs, 8 RAOs, and up to 3 Olmsted Scholars, all of whom will begin training in 2003.

The Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps (ACMC) has approved the new Marine Corps Order on Fellowships and Scholarships (MCO 1520.28C) following a brief on 25 January 2002 at Training and Education Command (TECOM), Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), Marine Corps Base, Quantico, VA. As a result, PLU Regional Action Officers will become the Billet Sponsors for all Marine officers attending Foreign Top and Intermediate Level Schools, and all other external foreign schools. PLU is also working towards taking over the program management responsibilities for the Marine Corps Personnel Exchange Program (PEP). Look for that in the next year.
On the utilization front, the FAO/RAO Program Coordinator and the Branch Head for PLU briefed the entire monitor section at Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&RA) in late August 2001, both to familiarize the monitors with the utility of the FAO/RAO Program and to discuss options for maximum utilization of all FAO/RAOs. The Program Coordinator presented the monitors with a list of those FAO/RAOs tentatively scheduled to rotate (Permanent Change of Station) in the summer of 2002 and a series of recommended commands that would best profit from these individuals’ international affairs and language backgrounds. Consequently, over the past six months, the Program Coordinator has been working on an individual basis with each ground and aviation monitor to ensure that all FAO/RAOs are getting a thorough "look" for possible utilization tours. PLU intends to continue this "push of information" via an annual briefing to the monitors of M&RA. It is our hope that we can best support the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) staffs, the regional Marine Corps Component Staffs, and the regional CINC staffs with quality foreign area expertise by meeting and working with Manpower on a regular basis. As always, we will likewise continue to support the Defense Attaché System, the Personnel Exchange Program, and all other Joint/External Assignments that require a high level of foreign affairs expertise.

We also would like to welcome LtCol Mitch Biondich to PLU, and bid farewell to LtCol Ken Crosby as he heads to the Quantico Air Base as the Executive Officer. LtCol Biondich comes to us from the Marine Attaché position in Baku, Azerbaijan and has assumed the duties of the Security Assistance Officer for PLU as of 14 January 2002. Welcome aboard.

As always, the Unified Commands and International Issues Branch (PLU), PP&O, HQMC is available to take your questions. For further information, please see our website at . We welcome any comments on how to improve the program. Please see the FAO Proponent Page on the inside cover of the FAOA Journal for POC information. We are temporarily located in Room 2020 of the Navy Annex (Federal Office Building 2), but should be moving back into our office spaces in the Pentagon (Room 4B337) shortly.
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