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NO JUNE 2001 FAO JOURNAL
Regrettably, we could not publish a FAO Journal in June 2001 because we did not receive any articles to publish. Every quarter we need four to six articles to publish in the FAOA Journal. We always need interesting articles from Foreign Area Officers to publish in the Journal. These articles are written by FAOs for FAOs. We strongly appeal to all FAOs, especially those assigned overseas, to write an article for the FAO Journal. Articles should normally be six to eight pages, single spaced, and submitted in a standard word processing file such as WordPerfect or Microsoft Word (we can translate most of the others). No special formatting is required. Please e-mail article submissions to the FAO Journal Editor, Steve Gotowicki at stevehg@usa.net OR TO THE Association at faoa@erols.com

BOOK REVIEWERS NEEDED
All members are encouraged to contribute to our regional book reviews columns. There seems to be the perception in the field that the regular editors are responsible for all content contained in their columns. NOT TRUE! Anyone can contribute and I encourage everyone to do so—particularly those of you in graduate school or other professional military education courses. If you read a good book, share it with us. Just send your input directly to the column editor or to the FAOA e-mail address and it will be forwarded promptly. We would especially welcome permanent columnists for Africa and South Asia/Southeast Asia.

MEMBERSHIP ADDRESSES
We had 168 of the March edition of the FAO Journal returned for incorrect addresses. Members must keep the association informed of address changes in order to insure your copy of the FAO Journal reaches you. E-mail address changes to Rick Herrick at faoa@erols.com or mail them to FAOA, P.O. Box 710231, Herndon, VA 20171.

MEMBERSHIP
Don’t let your membership expire. Expiration dates will be printed on the mailing label for the FAO Journal.

FAOA LOGO
We have received four new proposed FAOA logos. These proposed logos are shown on page 22 of this Journal.

From the Field

Command Field Designation of Foreign Area Officers (FAOs): A Big Mistake?

Under Officer Professional Management System (OPMS) XXI, we are now beginning to Career Field Designate (CFD) Army officers after their selection to Major. Army officers are still allowed to choose their Functional Area (FA) during their seventh year in service, and some will choose FA48 as their functional area. These officers who selected FA48 will most likely complete their graduate school and In-Country Training (ICT) just before selection to Major. What will this mean to MILGP Commanders and DATTs in the field?

For one, it will mean experienced FAOs who will spend their time immersed in the FAO environment. This means jobs in-country and on various CINC staffs. The FAO who follows this pattern is sure to be a success. However, problems can arise. First, FAO branch must keep an eye out for the FAO who continuously desires to homestead in Latin America.

To some FAOs, uniquely qualified means conducting back-to-back overseas assignments. It’s time we moved away from this. I know of officers that have served three-to-four back-to-back FAO assignments, and the only reason they do it is for the prestige, money or lifestyle, it’s great to be in-country! Meanwhile,
we have other FAOs looking to break into the attaché or MILGP cycle, and are stuck doing staff jobs in USARSO, SOUTHCOM or Washington. Don't get me wrong, not all FAOs are like this, there are many FAO's who will do their time in-country and then move on to a staff job for professional development.

What we need is fairness in tracking our officers. A FAO and FAO branch should come to realize that most FAOs should do an overseas tour followed by a CONUS tour. Why should they do that? As stated in earlier articles, we need to "stay green." That is, we, as FAOs, need to stay in touch with the "real Army." You can't do that if you are doing repetitive back-to-back assignments. I know of Army officers who have no idea what SINCGARS, AFTB, or OPMS XXI stand for. They've lost touch with reality and doctrine, and FAO assignment officers are doing a disservice to those officers. We need to do away with "penciling in" and "back-to-back" assignments. That way, we can keep our FAOs green and give them the in-country and staff experience that they need to stay current in Army doctrine. Who would want a counter-drug operations planning officer (48B) with no S-3 or XO time in a combat unit?

To counter the "de-greening" of officers, we still need the option of dual-tracking some of our combat-arms FAO's, and allowing them to compete for promotion in both career fields. These FAO's must be carefully managed by FAO proponency officers. These dual-tracked officers should be selected to become key Security Assistance Officers, MILGP Commanders, and Defense/Army Attachés. Notice that two of these positions are "command positions." Some will argue that only "pure" FAOs should occupy those positions. However, dual-tracked officers have much more experience understanding current Army doctrine and tactics, dealing with family problems, and remaining "green." These are the people we want in key positions in-country. Dual-tracked officers manning these positions will be assisted by "pure" FAOs occupying positions as Army Attachés and Security Assistance Officers.

Allowing "Operational FAOs" to compete in both career fields for promotion is an excellent method of ensuring that highly qualified officers are promoted. Let's get to the point, when Career Field Designation became reality, some officers talked to their branch managers and came to the realization that they would not be a success in their basic branch. Branch managers told these officers that their files were not strong enough to get into command or be promoted, and that was incentive to designate to another career field. Thus, the chaff has been separated from the wheat. The false assumption was made that these officers would be a success in another career field, possibly so. Now, here is the fallacy of OPMS XXI. The chaff must meet mandatory promotion rates set by OPMS XXI. We may now promote sub-standard officers. Oh yes, this may offend many FAO's who've made the jump, but they will now relish in the fact that OPMS XXI has done them a big favor and given them another chance to be promoted. On the other hand, an Operations Career Field Officer who is selected as an "operational FAO" means his/her file is strong enough that FAO branch has decided to designate them as a dual-tracker. However, because these Operations Career Field (OCF) officers have now lost promotions to other career fields, there is the possibility that they many not be promoted in the OCF. That is why they should still be allowed to compete in the Operations Support Career Field (OSCF), because their files are strong and they have remained "green."

FAO branch will have a tough job managing our new CFD FAOs. They must ensure adequate distribution and adequate time in-country for our FAOs. They must also watch for the homesteader and should continue to manage dual-tracked FAOs for key in-country positions. I'm not trying to beat-up FAO branch, but would like to provide them food for thought.

(Continued on page 22)
The 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union ushered in the creation, for the first time in history, of the independent nations of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Although the territory of Central Asia was often seen as a more or less homogeneous region, and was governed in this manner by the Soviet authorities, independence highlighted cultural and regional differences that had been long suppressed. To the West, the most visible difference has been the varied approaches to economic and governmental reform. Still, while the approaches to this change varied, few doubted the final destination; history was over, democracy and market economics had won.

Or have they? Kazakhstan, the richest country of the three, initially made rapid economic progress. The issue of a free society, however, has been more problematic. Since 1991, Kazakhstan has had only one presidential election, and that one has been marred by irregularities. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) called the most recent (1999) parliamentary and presidential elections “farcical,” and has noted the steady disappearance of independent and opposition media sources. Autocracy is winning the race in Kazakhstan.

Uzbekistan provides another example of resurgent autocracy. There have been no “free and fair” elections in Uzbekistan since independence in 1991. Indeed, both the U.S. and the OSCE refused even to send observers to the 1999 parliamentary elections. In the 2000 presidential election, the “alternative candidate,” Abdulhafiz Jalolov, admitted publicly that he voted for the incumbent, President Karimov. Additionally, Uzbekistan is consistently rated one of the region’s worst human rights abusers, especially of practicing Muslims. They are frequently targeted as insurgents by this de facto police state.

In many ways, Kyrgyzstan is the most disappointing of the three countries. Once considered Central Asia’s “Island of Democracy,” it too has seen a move towards autocracy, including government harassment of the press, arrests of opposition leaders, rigged elections, and police attacks on demonstrations. Amazingly, Kyrgyzstan, one of the world’s poorest countries, has even managed to be named one of the “Top 20 Enemies of the Internet” by the group Reporters Sans Frontière. In addition, the U.S. Department of State has concluded that “serious problems” exist with Kyrgyzstan’s human rights record.

Why are all three of these newly independent nations choosing autocracy over democracy as their political model? Have they been conditioned by a common Soviet heritage or are there other characteristics and commonalities at play that can explain the development paths of the past 10 years?

Kazakhstan

The constitution of Kazakhstan lays out the framework for a democratic system of government, with an elected president as head of state and a 202 member parliament. However, Kazakhstan qualifies as authoritarian because the elections process is essentially skewed to support the incumbent president, Nursultan Nazarbaev.
Ethnic tensions are exacerbated by a series of other factors. Russians made up a disproportionately high number of employees in the defense and heavy industry sectors, which have been among the hardest hit by the collapse of the Soviet economy. Kazakhstan’s Russian Cossack population has become increasingly vocal with calls for a reunification of the Russian populated northern territories with Russia. And finally, there is some evidence of outside Russian support for a small terrorist movement which has demanded outright independence for the northern territories. When taken all together, the ethnic tensions in Kazakhstan present at the least a serious obstacle to government, and at the most a growing threat of separation.

The second major threat to Kazakhstan’s political stability, regionalism, is directly connected to Kazakh cultural traditions. As the Kazakhs were initially nomads, important family ties coalesced into three large tribal based groups, the Great Horde, Middle Horde, and Lesser Horde. The problem today is that existing territorial divisions among the hordes have been strengthened by the changed economic situation. Kazakhstan’s renewed emphasis on oil and gas exports has tended to benefit the Lesser Horde, because most known deposits are located on their traditional territory in Western Kazakhstan.

At the same time, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, members of the Middle and Great Hordes residing in the industrialized and Soviet influenced north and east suffered a noticeable drop in their standard of living. This new situation has led to increasing demands from “losing” regions for subsidies and “winning” regions for greater autonomy.

Regional demands are a threat to the government for two reasons. The first is that the regional governments are already aligned along traditional horde divisions, posing serious obstacles to legislative initiatives from the center. The second reason is the tendency for the regions to be heavily influenced by neighboring countries. This in turn has strengthened an existing political divide between the urbanized and Russified Kazakhs in the north and the conservative, rural, and Islamicized Kazakhs in the south and west.

In brief, the evidence is strong that Kazakhstan is facing several credible threats to political stability. The threat to stability is the primary explanation of both Nazarbaev’s antidemocratic actions, and the populations’ apparent support for these actions.

Uzbekistan

The dictatorship of Uzbekistan is the least reformed politically and economically of the three Central Asian states. President Islam Karimov was the Communist Party First Secretary during the Soviet period, and he has maintained tight control of Uzbekistan until this day, receiving about 92% of the vote in the widely criticized January, 2000 elections. Uzbekistan is ruled through a system of regional henchmen appointed by Karimov, and elections are routinely fixed to ensure outcomes favorable to the regime. Additionally, there is no freedom of the press, and the country is frequently cited as a major human rights abuser. Economically, Uzbekistan is still largely a planned economy. In fact, Karimov’s stubborn “go slow” approach to reforms resembles a “no go” approach to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which recently withdrew its Uzbekistan representative.

Most observers, as well as Karimov himself, point to several factors which help to explain the government’s autocratic actions. The most common include credible threats of Islamic fundamentalism, regional separatism, and conflict with the neighboring states of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Let us examine each of these in turn.

Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia is possibly the most studied aspect of politics in the region, probably due to the security concerns of
the U.S. and Russia. Karimov is aware of this concern, and frequently uses the “need to fight fundamentalists” as cover for his political maneuverings. Still, whether Karimov’s actions are appropriate or not, the threat of Islamic fundamentalism is real and growing in Uzbekistan.

During the Soviet period, most of the religious content was drained from Islam, leaving only a strong cultural component and sense of Muslim identity. Karimov has been eager to seize on Islam as a marker of Uzbek identity, but has been careful to keep the religious elements of Islam off of the political stage. This has radicalized some Islamic elements, and has allowed them to define their opposition to the state in religious terms. Moreover, these groups have a high degree of legitimacy as they are frequently seen as “real Muslims” by a community that has largely forgotten the religious customs and rituals of Islam.

Once established, radical Islamic groups are able to bring together a disparate bunch of opposition movements under the banner of pan-Islam. Recent events such as the 1999 bombing assassination attempt on Karimov in Tashkent, and the kidnapping of four Japanese geologists in Kyrgyzstan a few months later, confirm the wider regional appeal of groups like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). As this appeal gains momentum, the danger of Karimov’s oft-cited “Tajik Variant” happening in Uzbekistan seems increasingly more likely. In fact, fighting last summer between IMU rebels and Uzbekistan soldiers came within 60 miles of Tashkent, and resulted in over 100 deaths.

Possible connections to super-terrorist Osama Bin Laden as well as the group’s alleged role in drug trafficking has led the U.S. to formally designate the IMU as a terrorist organization, and pledge US $3 million in anti-terrorist aid to fight the group. Russia is also concerned, and has made repeated offers of troops to help secure the borders. So, although some observers worry that the hard-line stance taken by Karimov might actually incite further radicalism and violence, the threat remains credible enough to garner widespread international support for his efforts.

In addition to fighting a resurgent Islam, the Uzbek government claims a strong central government is the only way to deal with growing regionalism. Indeed, numerous internal territorial claims and counterclaims exist, mostly as a result of a struggle over water rights or other resources that have been re-apportioned after the collapse of the Soviet Union. A good example is the situation with the Khorezm oasis in western Uzbekistan. The oasis had been under a single government for hundreds of years, but during the Soviet period, water rights were divided among the bordering regions of Karakalpak autonomous republic, the Khorezm Oblast of Uzbekistan, and the Tashauz Oblast of Turkmenistan. Since regional borders were unimportant, this division was insignificant. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, all three regions suddenly had competing claims for this scarce resource. The result has been the creation of three separate water and power systems in order to ensure independence from the ambitions of the other regions.

Although there are vast discrepancies in wealth across Uzbekistan, with the urban areas generally favored over the rural ones, regional separatism seems to play a much weaker role in Uzbekistan than in Kazakhstan. This is probably the result of Karimov’s tight control over the governors (hakims) of the regions. Moreover, Karimov’s relatively powerful military is a strong deterrent to any bordering state that would consider supporting any Uzbek region’s drive for autonomy. Finally, the significant barriers to foreign trade erected by the central government have ensured that the regions have remained dependent on the center for economic survival, further dampening regional enthusiasm for separation.

The threat of inter-state conflict is the final justification used to explain Karimov’s autocratic

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A small convoy providing peace-keeping support is surprised and captured by an anti-government militia...a foot patrol in a humanitarian support role crosses an unmarked boundary, is isolated, arrested, and held by an opposition police force...a pilot enforcing a no-fly zone is downed...a USG contractor and his family on a weekend vacation in a foreign country are kidnapped...a Defense Attaché conducting a collection mission is detained...a foreign area officer conducting regional familiarization training is questioned at a remote security checkpoint...through USG Security Assistance programs, a Special Operations Force conducting drug enforcement training is captured.

All of these situations mirror problems the United States Government must face daily in today’s complex operational environment. They all share the common thread of how a person should act, for example in accordance with the Code of Conduct, when placed in a situation of this type. They all serve to demonstrate that the prepared professional, especially those in high risk of capture assignments that characterize many foreign area officer assignments, needs a solid grounding in escape and evasion. Much can be said about the need for common, joint, universal training in escape and evasion—much as that given in the case of Code of Conduct training or the four-tiered Force Protection training currently provided service members, their families, and USG contractors. But one need not wait for formal training opportunities to gain insights into this subject.

The training of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines in their proper conduct during conflict when separated from friendly forces is as important today as it has ever been; it becomes even more critical when uniformed members must survive, evade, resist, and escape. The instruction of Service personnel begins during initial entry training, and continues throughout a military career. Certain high risk, high threat jobs require specialized training; foreign area officers assigned abroad are prime candidates for this training and the primary audience for this article on 1) evasion and escape historical summary, and 2) the MIS-X Manual on Evasion, Escape, and Survival and its applicability to the modern foreign area officer. This type of specialized training truly began for U.S. personnel only during World War Two. But how did the initial training of U.S. personnel in S.E.R.E. really begin and what did that training include?—that is the story to be told here. Most importantly, why and how does this matter to the serving foreign area officer? Before we demonstrate the applicability to the current FAO corps, it is instructive to introduce a bit of history, in the form of previous accounts of evasion and escape, to place the story in its proper context.

Evasion and Escape Accounts

The history of escape and evasion accounts can be traced back thousands of years. However, the first era in which mass formations of troops resulted in greater numbers of prisoners, producing significant accounts of evasion and escape, was the Napoleonic Era. First-person British accounts of evasion and escape...
from this general timeframe are numerous, including D.E. O’Brien in *My Adventures in the Late War*, Edward Boys in *Narrative of a Captivity, Escape, and Adventure in France and Flanders during the War*, and accounts of the experiences of Antony Brett-James in *Escape from the French*; these are balanced by the story of Napoleon’s own escape from Elba. Continuing this tradition, Sir Winston Churchill’s account of his escape, contained in *My Early Life*, during the Boer War complements these accounts.

Both World Wars of the twentieth century produced a rich escape and evasion literature. The First World War’s evaders continued this tradition of S.E.R.E accounts; among the most notable of these are A.J. Evans’ *The Escaping Club*, the more important since his experiences were put to use during World War Two when Evans worked for the British escape organization, MI9; and M.C.C. Harrison and H.A. Cartwright’s classic *Within Four Walls*. World War Two produced numerous accounts as well, including those of Eric Williams’ *The Wooden Horse*, Foot and Langley’s *MI9: Escape and Evasion 1939-1945*, Ian Dear’s *Escape and Evasion*, Leo Heap’s *The Grey Goose of Arnhem*, J.M. Langley’s *Fight Another Day*, Airey Neave’s *Saturday at MI9* and *They Have Their Exits*, John Hackett’s *I Was a Stranger*, Paul Brickhill’s *The Great Escape*, Sam Derry’s *Rome Escape Line*, Helen Long’s *Safe Houses Are Dangerous*, Watt’s *Comet Line*, and Paul Reid’s *Colditz*—among many others.

Nick Rowe’s *Five Years to Freedom* and William Anderson’s *Bat-21*, during the Vietnam Era; Andy McNabb’s *Bravo Two Zero*, from the British SAS during the Gulf War; and the recent *Return with Honor* by Scott O’Grady continue these lively first-person accounts. In earlier times evaders had no preparation in either how to evade or how to act if taken prisoner; over time, this training evolved to its present state. But British and American organizations formed in the late 1930s and throughout World War Two were the genuine beginning of organized evasion and resistance training.

With this rudimentary bibliography to escape and evasion, it is useful to understood how the *Manual* came into being, and the organization which developed it.

**MI9: The British Launch S.E.R.E. Training**

MI9 was the British organization formed to assist evaders and POWs. Its roots can be traced to the MI1 in World War One. It was reformed prior to the declaration of war in 1939, and initially commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Gerald Templar, followed rapidly by A.R. Rawlinson. Templar had approached the Director of Military Intelligence on creating an organization to help POWs escape; the MIR, a predecessor to the British sabotage unit (Special Operations Executive—SOE) director, Major J.F.C. Holland, supported the concept and furthered his support by writing a proposal to the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). The JIC approved the concept, chartering the new escape and evasion organization in December, 1939, and selecting Major Norman R. Crockatt as its head. Among its several missions, that of training fell to MI9 (d).

MI9 operated in London under the cover name of Intelligence School 9 (IS9). IS9(w) interrogated both evaders and escapers in order to better focus evasion training and collect intelligence. At the same time IS9(x) conducted escape planning and provided escape aids to POWs. Communication via codes was managed by IS9(y). And IS9(z) produced the evasion and escape equipment. MI9(d)’s dual purpose was to train personnel and to provide evasion and escape equipment to isolated, uniformed personnel.
It was the MI9(d) instructors who lectured on survival, evasion, resistance, and escape. It was first hammered into the heads of trainees that, even after capture, they remained obligated to act properly, which included escaping or occupying large numbers of enemy to prohibit their escape. Their instruction also included actions to be taken by the evaders, to include the actions once in the hands of an escape line—often also known as “ratlines”. Surviving evaders often provided first-hand accounts during this training. It also included actions one must take during the resistance phase. Over half a million British persons received this training during World War Two. As America entered the War, it too saw the value of first-class S.E.R.E. training.

MIS-X: The Americans Organize for S.E.R.E. Training

MI9’s equivalent organization in the U.S. was MIS-X. The U.S. general staff at the beginning of World War Two included the Military Intelligence Division (MID). Within the MID, the operational arm was the Military Intelligence Service (MIS). One of the operational MIS directorates was the Captured Personnel and Material Branch, led by Colonel C. ap C. Jones. The first of ap C. Jones' specialized POW organizations dealt not with U.S. prisoners, but rather with Axis POWs. This unit, formed in late 1942 to interrogate POWs, was identified as MIS-Y, and commanded by Colonel Russell Sweet. At the suggestion (despite his earlier misgivings) of the Secretary of War Stimson, the Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall, also stood up a unit designed to assist evaders and potential POW escapers. The MIS-Y sister evasion and escape organization was known as MIS-X, and was commanded throughout the War by Colonel J. Edward Johnston. Both MIS-Y and MIS-X were collectively known as “1142”—based on the P.O. Box number of the Fort Hunt, Alexandria, Virginia address.

MIS-X paralleled the British model. The commander of the U.S. Army Air Force in World War Two, Major General Carl Spaatz, had been introduced to MI9 and Brigadier Crockatt in early 1942. Among the staff officers who Spaatz directed to form an organization similar to MI-9 was Colonel W. Stull Holt. Holt’s specific directions were to study and learn the British evasion and escape techniques and instruction, using that information to form the U.S. training equivalent. MIS-X’s initial charter includes eight specific areas of focus; the first three of these apply to the training focus of this study:

- to indoctrinate uniformed personnel in evasion and after capture;
- to provide instruction on escape and escape psychology, and;
- to provide instruction in proper post-capture conduct.

It was only left to MIS-X to organize itself to meet these three missions [and the other five missions, not meaningful for the scope of this study].

MIS-X had five sections. These included interrogation; correspondence, which dealt with codes; Axis prisoner of war camp locations, to preclude bombing by Allied forces; technical, which supplied evasion and escape aids, and; the training and briefing section. It is with the training and briefing section and its program of instruction’s training model on which we shall focus.

The MIS-X Evasion and Resistance Training Model of World War Two

It has been difficult to recreate the activity of MIS-X. At the end of World War Two the U. S. general staff’s Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, the G-2 Major General George
If you continue to do the same thing to solve a problem, you usually end up with the same results. Keeping this thought in mind, I would ask the reader if there might be more we could do to assist in the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP). Sometimes we all need to step aside from our current attempts at attaining a goal, and think outside of our current course of action.

I believe there is an approach that the United States’ government could apply that would decrease tension between Palestinians and Israelis now that would serve to reduce suffering on both sides. It would also enhance our current diplomatic engagement of the Palestinian Authority while including Israelis in supporting a working solution to casualties caused by the current Intifada in the region. It is not a comprehensive solution, but serves to pave the way for increased cooperation between Palestinians and Israelis. What I propose is that the United States’ government provide limited International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Expanded IMET to the Palestinian Authority.

So, why do this? I hope to sell this idea by explaining the merits of Security Assistance (SA) training to a fledgling democracy that needs the training to improve the quality of life in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. I can think of no finer method of engagement than training members of the PA in Advanced Trauma Life Support (ATLS). ATLS is surgical intervention for casualties inflicted by military means. It trains surgeons in treating gunshot and projectile wounds seen in conflicts similar to the ongoing crisis. This relatively inexpensive training would allow for the treatment of personnel injured as the result of activity from either side. It could naturally be coupled with Emergency Medical Technician Basic (EMT-B) and Paramedic (EMT-P) training for first responders.

I wish to start with reducing the suffering of casualties created as a result of this conflict. I do not choose, nor do I expect my reader to choose, to fix blame for the situation as it currently exists, rather I propose to do something about the symptoms of the problem and leave something in the infrastructure behind that is sustainable and benefits Palestinian and Israeli civilian alike.

To further my case, let’s form a mental image of a combined PA-Israeli team treating casualties of a bombing. The EMT-B’s and EMT-P’s provide effective triage and ATLS providers perform lifesaving surgical intervention for victims that may be largely uninvolved in the activity that leads to their injuries. They are not in the job of fixing blame for the bombing, which may have occurred as the result of factors outside the control of either governing body. This team is caring for people that both authorities have a legitimate concern, might I add a duty, to provide services for.

This is feasible, even barring current positions regarding engagement prior to the cessation of violence. We can train the PA; we already train the Israelis in ATLS. Why not train them together? Alternately, we could train them separately on the same medical protocols to enhance cooperation in this critical field. The bottom line is that this is a humanitarian undertaking, regardless of your re-
ligion or politics. Islam and Judeo-Christian ethics and values are in harmony here.

Additional E-IMET training to the PA would serve to provide even further capabilities to the PA that are badly needed. In the areas of public health alone, there are several courses that would provide for better services, better sanitation, better health care and the knowledge to sustain the infrastructure improvements that will eventually occur as knowledge empowers people.

Courses that focus on civilian control of the military and civil-military relations are applicable in the case of the PA. Knowledge gained from these courses would allow the PA to improve its services and exert greater control over its forces to limit the influence of other groups and enhance responsiveness to calls for a cease-fire.

E-IMET courses in particular will have a direct, contributory effect on the efficacy of the PA in limiting the influence of factions that gain legitimacy among the populace by providing pseudo-governmental services and persist in subverting the MEPP while refusing to engage in democratic processes. E-IMET is specifically tailored to remove some of the technical restrictions associated with IMET and the training of police forces.

What I’ve discussed so far are measures that enhance the capability of the PA, an elected authority, to do its job in providing services for everything from trauma care, clean and available water supplies, to effective management of funds and services. The use of E-IMET in particular is consistent with our stated national policy of supporting democratic institutions.

All of the training mentioned can be made available to the PA in the form of Mobile Training Teams (MTT’s) or by having students visit the United States. Naturally, it might be better to train in a more stable environment.

Is training a place where the Kingdom of Jordan could serve to facilitate? I certainly believe that in the case of non-military training, no-one would benefit more, both economically and from a political standpoint, from mitigating the effects on either governing body than Jordan, with its large Palestinian population and ties to all nations in the region. The question remains. Would Jordan host an MTT that taught both parties, or even better, all three, including the Jordanians, on ATLS and EMT procedures? Perhaps. This is one of the hazards of thinking outside the box. It increases your available options.

One of those options is Israeli-Palestinian engagement. I do not see any objection coming from the Israelis for the United States providing E-IMET, as it is specifically tailored for use by civilian authorities. Personnel trained in similar protocols will naturally work better in a combined environment. Engagement serves to enhance commonalities when people work together to provide solutions. Engagement before a solid ceasefire is possible under the limited circumstances of providing services for people that endure undue hardships as a result of this crisis.

I now want to mention perhaps a larger benefit of a policy of SA training engagement. Engaging the PA will send a message to all parties involved in the peace process that the United States remains committed to the MEPP and intends to make progress and contribute to both sides of the solution, instead of repeating the measures we’ve employed before. The largest benefit that we can gain from providing limited IMET and E-IMET to the PA may be putting the region on notice that we intend to match words with action. Perhaps thinking outside the box is not such a bad idea after all.

Major Robert K. Holzhauer USA (48G) is currently serving as Director, Middle East Studies, Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management
actions. Uzbekistan’s geographic position—it shares borders with every post-Soviet Central Asian state plus Afghanistan—means that it shares the internal stability concerns of each country in this region. This concern came to the forefront in 1992 when Tajikistan descended into civil war.

Uzbekistan immediately recognized the threat of a spillover onto its territory as well as the danger to the large ethnic Uzbek population living in Tajikistan’s Khujand (Leninabad) region. The response was rapid. Together with Russia, Uzbekistan openly began to support governmental pro-Communist forces, mostly out of the hope that they would provide a better chance at stability than the pro-Islamic opposition. Among other things, Uzbekistan provided military equipment, troops, and training for the Tajik government forces. Additionally, Uzbekistan signed an agreement to defend Tajikistan’s airspace.

Still, the weak and unstable government in Tajikistan remains a problem for Karimov. Tajikistan is probably the staging area for the military strikes of the IMU against Uzbekistan, and Karimov believes that the Tajik government is supporting the strikes. Furthermore, some nationalist Tajik groups have made claims to the heavily Tajik settled Uzbek regions of Bukhara and Samarkand. Drugs, guns, and crime are also a concern as civil order has yet to be fully restored in some Tajik regions. Tajikistan is the worst off economically and socially of all of the Central Asian countries. Until this root cause can be addressed, Tajikistan will remain unstable and a security concern for Uzbekistan.

Uzbekistan’s is also threatened by competition with other countries for increasingly scarce resources. Uzbekistan’s thirsty agricultural sector (the country is the world’s fifth largest producer of cotton) is responsible for Uzbekistan consuming more fresh water per capita than any other country in the world. This has led to an increasingly bellicose stance and tense negotiations with Kyrgyzstan, the upstream source of much of Uzbekistan’s water. Land is also a problem, as Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan squabble over access to the lush Fergana valley region. A strong central government allows Uzbekistan to carefully control resources, and also provides for a strong and efficient military to counter competing claims.

In sum, the political situation in Uzbekistan seems to be largely driven by a process of reaction to real and perceived threats to the regime and the country. Although Tashkent’s reactionary stance seems destined to aggravate the situation, both Islamic fundamentalists and the sometimes strained relations with neighboring states appear to be a legitimate cause of concern for the political stability of the country in the short to medium term.

Kyrgyzstan

President Askar Akaev is a careful observer of the West. From the beginning of Kyrgyzstan’s independence, he has been careful to articulate his country’s commitment to democracy and economic reform. Indeed, Kyrgyzstan’s initial openness and rapid reforms led to descriptions of Kyrgyzstan as “the Switzerland of Central Asia,” or the “Island of Democracy,” in both the capital of Bishkek and in western capitals. The early result was solid political and financial support from the West, including loans totaling over US $1.8 billion according to the latest European Bank for Reconstruction and Development estimates. However, while economic reforms continue, Akaev’s commitment to political reform has visibly wavered. In fact, Freedom House’s latest Nations in Transit report rates Kyrgyzstan less free today than in 1992.

The current political situation in Kyrgyzstan suggests several factors that might have contributed to this shift in the government’s stance on democracy. The first of these, similar to Kazakhstan, is ethnic tensions. Ethnic Kyrgyz are a bare majority (52%) in Kyrgyzstan, with ethnic
Russians making up 18%. Independence brought the familiar push to promote ethnic Kyrgyz, including the adoption of a language law and replacing Russians with Kyrgyz in high level administrative posts. To stop the resulting out-migration of ethnic Russians, President Akaev, forced by economic realities, made major concessions to the Slavic population. That, however, only led to more demands on either side and increased protests by Kyrgyz nationalists.

Another factor in Akaev’s move towards autocracy is a growing threat of regionalism. Northern and Southern Kyrgyzstan are separated by the Tien Shen mountain range. This physical barrier has also resulted in a political division of the country between the rural, conservative, Islamic, and nationalistic southerners in the regions bordering the Fergana valley, and urban, Russified, and cosmopolitan northerners. Traditional clan affiliations also echo this division, further complicating attempts to rule the country. Furthermore, UN studies demonstrate that the south has lagged behind the north in the areas of health, education, and standard of living which only fuels resentment of the regime. As the 1995 parliamentary elections did not lead to necessary reforms and instead led to endless squabbles between northern and southern deputies, Akaev exploited the impasse to push through a referendum that expanded his own powers, including greater veto power and the power to disband government. Western diplomats considered the move antidemocratic. Akaev, however, insists that such moves are necessary to continue progress with reforms and defeat entrenched communist interests.

North-South divisions are also reflected in the growing Islamic fundamentalist movement, which is the final reason for Akaev’s increasingly heavy handed tactics. Southern Kyrgyzstan borders on the Fergana valley, which has become the primary base for the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Some of the most serious fighting has taken place in Southern Kyrgyzstan as the group has repeatedly attempted to enter Uzbekistan. Increasingly, the group’s rhetoric has shifted from anti-Uzbek to pan-Islamic and it has begun to recruit support in Southern Kyrgyzstan. Besides the obvious direct threat this poses to Akaev’s militarily weak regime, Uzbekistan’s president Karimov has accused Kyrgyzstan of not doing enough to fight the insurgents. This attitude takes on ominous overtones given the history of Uzbek-Kyrgyz clashes in the Kyrgyz city of Osh in 1990, as well as Uzbekistan’s increasing military dominance in Central Asia.

Once again, there are clear external factors that seem to play a role in Kyrgyzstan’s march towards autocracy. Kyrgyzstan faces serious challenges to government from ethnic and nationalist factions, entrenched interests, long-standing tribal and regional divisions, a radical Islamic terrorist organization, and an increasingly bellicose and militarily powerful neighbor. Akaev’s response to these challenges may be inappropriate or wrong, but it is clear that the challenges do exist and represent a danger not only to Akaev’s government, but to the Kyrgyz state itself.

**Conclusion**

Given similar internal and external threats to the governments of these three Central Asian countries, the political leadership in each country sees autocracy as the most efficient method of reacting to these threats. In Central Asian politics, clan rivalries, ethnic tensions and nationalism, rural-urban splits, and a resurgent Islam all compete with a vague and mostly Western inspired image of democracy. Moreover, the presidents of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan are themselves products of their own and Soviet culture. Their own political instincts have simply not kept pace with changes on the ground. Psychologists have
found that when confronted with a crisis, people tend to react by repeating what worked in the past. At the most basic level, that is what is happening now in Central Asia.

The countries of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan highlight how little we really understand about the transition process. How much of the autocratic direction of these countries is a response to political instability and the result of rational choices, and how much is caused by culture, religion, or other deep-rooted sociological and historical factors? Will a market economy provide a solution to the region’s troubles, or must state intervention still play a large role? Did Western monetary aid and political advice ultimately help or hurt these countries? The answers, surely, can be found through further close study of the political developments in these three similar, yet different, countries.

**Endnotes:**


8 Abazon, 318-319.


22  Gumppenberg, “Kazachstans Regionen,” 44.


26  *Ibid*.


38 EBRD Kyrgyzstan Investment Profile, 2001, 7.

39 Glenn, Soviet Legacy, 118.


41 Glenn, Soviet Legacy, 116.


Major James M. Minnich has submitted two excellent articles to the FAO Journal:

North Korean Tactics
and
ROK and DPRK Energy Sectors: Current Status and Plans for the Future

Unfortunately, these articles are too lengthy (25 and 30 pages) to publish in the FAO Journal and will be posted on the FAOA web site at www.faoa.org.

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Strong, gave the order to destroy all records of MIS-X. This order was complied with, as eyewitness Lloyd Shoemaker describes in The Escape Factory. Not only were records destroyed, but all buildings were razed to the ground with no indications at Fort Hunt of what had been there previously in support of U.S. evaders and escapers in the War. Therefore, much of what is known of MIS-X is based on Shoemaker’s recollections contained in that book; however, the focus of Shoemaker’s account is on the development of evasion and escape aids, not with training. However, some additional documents have survived that destruction. Incredibly enough one of these documents is the MIS-X Manual on Evasion, Escape, and Survival.

The MIS-X Manual on Evasion, Escape, and Survival was developed in February, 1944, for instructors by the staff of COL Russell Sweet for the briefing staff of COL Johnston and classified TOP SECRET. Colonel Catesby ap C. Jones gave the manual this high classification in January of 1943, unusual for a training manual, stating “…The Germans have been assisted in this war effort by their knowledge of…the methods of securing information used by the Allies during the 1914-1918 War. This knowledge was revealed by persons who,…after the war wrote articles and books about their work…Nothing concerning methods or sources should be revealed during or after this war, for the benefit of present or future enemies of the United States.” Clearly, ap C. Jones would not have his manual create the same sort of problem.

In his cover letter to the MIS-X briefing teams contained in the manual, Colonel Johnston clearly stated its training focus, “…Upon the briefers of this branch rests the responsibility to inspire the men of the Armed Forces of the United States with a determination to outwit the enemy and carry on the fight even when cut off from their own units or when actually captured by the enemy. The briefers have the added responsibility of telling how it is done and pressing home the point with such clarity and force that, when alone in enemy territory, the soldier who has heard them will know what to do.” He ends his cover letter by recognizing the parallel nature of this information and training with that provided the British armed forces by MI9.

Somehow this training manual survived the destruction order. Sweet retained the classification, however reducing it to SECRET in July, 1947. Colonel Harold Forde of the Fort Leavenworth Command and General Staff College’s School of Intelligence was provided a classified copy by Colonel E.W. Ridings of the War Department’s General Staff in October 1947. The manual was not declassified until August, 1994; its information is now in the public domain, the result of numerous articles and books on the subject of escape and evasion. However, as a detailed primary source record of our United States’ Armed Forces first formal training to its personnel on survival, evasion, resistance, and escape, it is an enormously valuable source of information and insight.

The MIS-X Manual on Evasion, Escape, and Survival first section is a general security primer. However, it goes beyond the normal general security briefing by concentrating on the aspects of evasion, resistance, and escape. It stresses how security can be negatively influenced in the smallest, seemingly insignificant ways by involving family and friends and providing small bits of information. It then stressed the modern, more sophisticated intelligence systems which World War II was producing; the focus on espionage directed against all uniformed personnel went well beyond the previously existing briefings on security. The section also discusses the destruction of equipment and even how to address letters to reduce security concerns. The section outlines basic material, although its combination of a basic security briefing with aspects of escape, evasion, resistance, and espionage
makes it a bit unwieldy. The introductory section closes with an explanation of why this highly (Continued from page 18)
classified information was given to the recipients and the heavy obligation they had to protect this information.

The MIS-X Manual on Evasion, Escape, and Survival second section deals with the Geneva Convention. The Geneva Convention training given by MIS-X to uniformed personnel greatly exceeds the introductory training provided to our current armed forces. Its introduction represents a fairly standard introduction to the Convention and the principal application of its general tenets. However, the briefing then moves to a detailed description evacuation from combat zones and notification of capture, Articles seven and eight. It then outlines details of POW camps and housing, contained in Articles nine and ten. All of Articles' eleven through fifteens' guidelines on food, clothing, and sanitary services required are then highlighted. The provision by the enemy of intellectual and morale needs of prisoners, Articles sixteen and seventeen, are then mentioned. Significant detail in the internal discipline expected of POWs, as contained in Articles eighteen through twenty, are then instructed. After a very brief introduction to finances of POWs (Articles twenty-three and –four), detailed guidance on POW work (Article twenty-seven) and prohibited labor (Article thirty-one) is provided to the trainees. The external relations of POWs, contained in Articles thirty-six through forty, are then presented. The correct POW relationships with capturing authorities receives very specific attention, as provided for in Article forty-two. Penalties which may be applied to Prisoners, Articles forty-five through sixty-four, are then summarized in a brief fashion. The Summary is a clear, concise capture of this lengthy and complex information. That Summary includes the Soldier's Ten Commandments, the soldiers' rights and privileges, the information a soldier must give and the corresponding information any soldier must not give, and a lecture on “knowing your rights”.

The MIS-X Manual on Evasion, Escape, and Survival third section deals with resisting interrogation. This initial training on resistance is fairly detailed, and gives any potential resistor a great deal of background that would prove useful as one executes this difficult mission. Its general introduction provides information on why interrogation is conducted, and what the procedures used by interrogators include. It then follows with a good overview of what prisoners could expect in Axis POW camps for both enlisted and officer service members. It then introduces some of the basic interrogator tricks of the trade that could be employed against our POWs. An initial lesson on the types of questioning and the most common traps follows; it is quickly followed by a very detailed explanation of techniques. The five approaches of a direct interrogation receive first discussion—the Despair Approach, the Friendly Approach, the Ridicule and Provocation Approach, The Threat versus Rescue Approach, and the Disgrace Approach. The five indirect approaches receive second discussion—the Technical Argument Approach, the Hour of Charm Approach,
(Continued from page 19)

the Appeal to Vanity Approach, the Medical Approach, and the Show-off Knowledge Approach.

The six most used traps are then revealed—the Red Cross Form, the Stool Pigeon, the Informal Chat, the Unit Identification trick, Microphones, and the use of Solitary Confinement. Based on these several approaches and guidelines, a basic primer on conduct during any interrogation is provided. Before closing, the very different methods used by the Japanese are provided. This section closes with a caution that interrogation can occur at any time and may not appear to be a questioning, that any answers may assist enemy propaganda efforts. It closes by reminding that any answers—other than those basic answers to be provided in accordance with the Geneva Convention—could result in court-martial.

The MIS-X Manual on Evasion, Escape, and Survival fourth section deals with Axis Prisoner of War camps. The two major sub-divisions of this section are the German camps and the Japanese camps. Within those two sections are significant detail on what uniformed personnel could expect at any POW camp. First the sections present the flow from the front lines through all centers to the ultimate destination of the permanent POW camp. They differences between officer and enlisted camps are then highlighted. Basic discussions of legal rights, security, general conditions, treatment, standard policies, and the operational aspects of a POWs daily life follow. Most interesting is the detailed discussion of the several escape committees resident on all camps. This information provides a wealth of information to the modern reader, and must have been incredibly valuable to downed airmen or captured ground troops. It is perhaps the most interesting of the several chapters in the MIS-X Manual on Evasion, Escape, and Survival. The closing section deals with general summaries of morale, parole, and behavior.

The MIS-X Manual on Evasion, Escape, and Survival fifth, sixth, and seventh sections deal with evasion, survival, and escape in the European and Asian theaters of operations. Before detailing the early portions of this section of the program of instruction, we jump to the end segments. The end segments offer a capsule version of the current friendly and enemy situation in each theater, and links that situation to evasion and escape. The detail covers most elements of a basic security/intelligence briefing; it is information that must have been highly perishable, but provides the modern reviewer with an appreciative understanding of the limits of what the general staff really knew about the enemy and other on-ground situations at the time; it must have been invaluable to the recipients. The Manual’s opening quote had to be enough to get the trainees undivided attention—“...I knew nothing. I had never thought of this problem before. Half an hour of instruction from someone who knew would have saved me eighteen months of captivity.” This is a resounding endorsement of the MIS-X Manual on Evasion, Escape, and Survival and the training given using the Manual. Having provided the introductory remarks on theaters, the lesson plan highlights the clear duties and obligations of all uniformed personnel [duties and obligations which served as foundational principles for the formation of both MIS-X and MI9 (d)]—

“It is a soldier’s DUTY to his country and to his unit to escape from the enemy...It should further be a matter of personal pride...You are to escape at any and every reasonable opportunity...The military principle involved is to pin down as much enemy personnel as possible...This causes him much internal trouble by forcing the employment of large groups which could otherwise be used in front line operations.”

The section then addresses the academic preparation for evasion—embodied by the instruction using this Manual. It then highlights the physical aids required for successful evasion—including the big, essential three of map, compass, water.
Before moving to its final section on the theaters, the section then provides a good academic grounding in the mechanics of both solo and group evasion, included both unassisted and assisted evasion.

The MIS-X Manual on Evasion, Escape, and Survival eighth and final section is the Program of Instruction’s directions for the briefers/teachers. This section is fascinating reading. It consists mainly of summary sheets for all previous lesson plans. This is presented in the manner of presentation notes summaries for the instructors or briefers. While most of the information is contained in the previous sections, there are elements of these lesson notes which are new, in addition to their more clear and concise presentation in this format. The modern briefer on the subject can take away valuable insights using this tool, which is by now almost sixty years old.

**MIS-X Manual on Evasion, Escape, and Survival: Relevance to Today’s Foreign Area Officer**

The MIS-X Manual on Evasion, Escape, and Survival is a fine source for current foreign area officers. It contains much which applies today. Defense Attaches, Security Assistance Officers, military-to-military trainers, official visitors, and future foreign area officers conducting familiarization travel may often be at high risk [of capture or of kidnapping/detainment] as they conduct either their training, contact, collection, or familiarization duties. For that reason, a basic grounding, or “rebluing” using these tough lessons learned makes a read of this Manual a value-added. Additionally, the significant number of visitors which often pass through the hands of our FAOs deployed forward around the world indicates that this Manual can serve as a valuable tool for building briefings for travelers in country. The wide variety of visitors combined with an ever-widening mission profile scope—NEOs, humanitarian operations, peacekeeping—increases the challenge to the FAO to keep up-to-date and pass that timely information to a wider, concerned audience in the country of assignment. The Manual also serves as a background training tool on a wide variety of sensitive areas for foreign area officers, such as Code of Conduct, what to expect in a general sense during captivity, interrogation or questioning techniques which could be used against the FAO, even a general security reminder set. Up-to-date information, of course, exists; however, for the interested military professional, this introductory primer

The Manual also serves for the audience outside of the foreign area officer core group audience as a constant reminder that the methods we continue to use from the MIS-X Manual on Evasion, Escape, and Survival can be inadvertently and improperly provided to future enemies and should be properly safeguarded. But the Manual’s most significant value is as the best existing example of the beginnings of modern survival, evasion, resistance, and escape training provided to uniformed service members and a “How-To” guide for practical application of the contents.

Rod Propst is a retired Army LTC with extensive national asset unit and Latin America experience, including a tour as a Defense Attaché in Mexico. He has a Masters Degree in Latin American Studies from the University of Texas, Austin, and is a War College-trained Defense Strategist. He is the Manager of the Technical Assessments Division at Analytic Services (ANSER), Inc. in Arlington, Virginia—leading ANSER’s support to Special Operations Forces and Personnel Recovery and S.E.R.E.
LTC Rand A. Rodriguez is an “operational FAO” who has completed his degree in Latin American Studies, and conducted in-country training at the Mexican Command and General Staff College. He has also completed resident CGSC at the ex-School of the Americas (now Western Hemispheric Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSC)), and just completed a tour as the Army Section Chief in the U.S. Military Group in Bolivia. He has been selected to command the 2nd Battalion, 80th Field Artillery at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

FAOA Logo Proposals

Submitted by: Major Kent Breedlove
Submitted by: Captain Dave Alley

Review by Major Randy Koehlmoos, US Army, a South Asia FAO stationed at USCENTCOM, MacDill AFB, Florida.

One could erroneously assume from the title that this is a historical work beginning with the creation of India at midnight on 15 August 1947. On the contrary, the major part of the book is devoted to the situation in contemporary India and not to the last 50 Years of Indian history. When author Shashi Tharoor mentions historical incidents though, they are related to present day events. In this text he looks back at India's first 50 years as a nation, describing its challenges (illiteracy, poverty, sectarian violence, and the ever-present caste problems) and its triumphs (democracy and a growing economy). After he examines some of the challenges India has faced over the past five decades, he looks as well at what lies ahead for the nation. He believes the solutions to the aforementioned challenges will determine what kind of world the next century will bring for everyone, and since Indians account for a sixth of the world's population, their choices will resonate throughout the globe.

Tharoor's is a subjective look at the forces that have made today's India. The text presents stories of village life, reflections on the Hindu religion, accounts of political turmoil and upheaval as well as of the author's own experiences as an expatriate. He states in the introduction that there is no such thing as a majority within India and acknowledges that Indian identity is multi-religious, multi-ethnic, and pluralistic. His view is multi-layered, because he describes as well what it is like to be a native of the southern Indian State of Kerala, whose language Malayalam he and his family do not even speak fluently. Though similar to many other countries in that India is a nation greater than the sum of its parts, India can only be compared with India. He arrives at the nation's essence by stating that "the singular thing about India is that you can only speak of it in the plural."

Tharoor believes that socialism was a poor choice as an economic model at the time of independence in 1947. Though Indian Prime Minister Nehru was a strong fan and supporter of five-year plans based on the Soviet's example of centralized planning, this type of economy overlooked the desire of individuals to not be sheep following an authoritarian shepherd. The problems with the Indian economy that arose from this situation are staggering because the government sanctioned unproductivity. Govern
Tharoor discusses how globalization has resulted in a spider web of interrelated events and outcomes and points to the fact that events such as the recent Asian economic crisis don’t occur in a vacuum and have global impacts. This crisis showed India (and many other countries) how unstable its economy is, and how much India relies on the outside flow of capital into its banks. The recent liberalization of Indian economic policy has allowed the relaxing of regulations placed on foreign investors. This is the result of the realization that outside capital is needed to jumpstart the Indian economy, but still carries the risk of economic re-colonization by incurring external debt. He rightly questions Indian businessman and writer Gurcharank Das’ charge that as long as education improves, the global economy will carry India on its shoulders. That view is pure irresponsible optimism and wishful thinking; India must be proactive and globally competitive.

Tharoor does not try and hide the fact that problems exist in India, especially along the lines of religion and violence. Muslims make up about 13% of the Indian population, and the global image of Islam as negatively fundamentalist, terrorist, and extremist definitely has an adverse effect on Muslims living everywhere. This stereotype must also have led to difficulty for traditionally liberal and secular Hindus to support Muslims in India, further isolating them. He states that one Muslim has commanded the Indian Air Force, but the number of Muslim officers in the Indian military is far less in percentage than are represented in the overall population. Tharoor lays the blame for the current level of violence within India at the feet of the RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh-National Volunteer Organization) and its various affiliates like the VHP (Vishwa Hindu Parishad-World Hindu Council) and the current ruling party BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party-Indian People’s Party). He is proud of his Hindu religion, but finds fault with those who use it by violent means for political gains.

The conclusion of his book seems cluttered with a multitude of topics that the author did not get to previously fit in. At one point the text starts to look like a social cookbook as he describes the food of India, and then switches to a discussion of the LTTE (Liberation Tigers Tamil Elam) in Tamil Nadu. He discusses many other issues that may lead one to think India does not have the capability to solve problems on its own. Upon closer examination, he seems to be writing with a sense of optimism about the future and confidence in the ability of Indians to find solutions within a democratic political system. As al
Tharoor’s comments are mostly insightful and even humorous at times, when he tries to speak for the Muslim community with whom he obviously does not fully relate. Tharoor states “there is no India without Islam, and no Islam without India.” Islam (like colonialism) plays an undeniable role in Indian history and historiography, but to imply that India permissively allows Islam to remain within its perimeter places far too great agency in New Delhi’s ability to control actions within its own borders. Tharoor also makes references to the Muslim painter who depicted Indira Gandhi as a Hindu Mother Goddess after the third India-Pakistan war. It seems that he is trying to place a barrier between Indian and Pakistani Muslims in order to further strengthen his idea of a pluralistic India. What he is actually doing by this is reinforcing the main entity that holds Pakistan together as a nation- Islam and its united opposition to India. He erroneously states that Islam has priests, and also states that religion and language have proved themselves an inadequate basis for nationhood. Though some other so-called experts continue to consider Pakistan (founded on Islam and the language of Urdu) a failed state (defined along the same lines as North Korea and Sierra Leone both being failed states), history has yet to validate this presumption.

Tharoor’s suggestion that a possible solution to the current myriad of problems in India is for the Indian Army to take control of the country is the worst possible option for India and contradicts his belief in democracy. I sense he makes this statement because it has happened many times before in neighboring Pakistan and Bangladesh, and the Pakistani Army has quite a bit of experience with civil rule. The Indian Army has little experience in domestic matters such as this, and when it has tried to do so in the past its heavy-handed approach has alienated many within the population. Though Tharoor addresses activities of the LTTE, he avoids mentioning the problems the Indian Peacekeeping Force caused in 1987 in Sri Lanka which would erode the validity of successful intervention in Indian domestic politics by the Indian army.

He may also be basing his trust in the Indian Army on his false assumption that the 1962 Sino-India War united the Indian people. Conversely it was a time when agricultural output was stagnant, industrial production was below expectations, and the economy was growing at only half the planned rate. Not only was this severe loss an embarrassment to India, the defeat left Prime Minister Nehru physically debilitated and mentally exhausted; maybe it even had something to do with his stroke and death shortly thereafter. A much more valid example of trust in the army would have been to note the deployment of Indian troops into the Maldives in 1988 to quell the attempted coup. This was a definite success story for India as it showed the Indian government was able to perform their equivalent of crisis action planning, quickly make strategic level decisions and successfully implement them in a timely manner.

Tharoor’s blaming of Hindu fundamentalist parties for the country’s problems seems to be a vicious circle of blame like a dog chasing its tail. If there is anyone who has to be held responsible for the state of affairs in India, it has to be those who support these radical groups, and not the groups themselves. We then again have to ask why people seek refuge in organizations that profess manifestos of Hindu nationalism and India as a Hindu Rashtra, a land of and for the Hindu majority. Have the people as a last resort turned to groups such as these only because of the failure of the policies of other ruling parties like those who govern the Indian State of Bihar, or do they truly want a sectarian nation?

Too often within this work Tharoor discusses problems within India without offering viable solutions. The world already has more than enough problem identifiers; if he really wants someone to take notice and listen he needs to offer viable alternatives. This book also seems to be an argument for the importance of India to the future of the industrialized world. I agree with Tharoor’s contention that education is key to success, but India and the rest of South Asia must get over the negative issue of colonialism (not likely in our lifetimes). Granted, the British colonized India and today India is a reflection of the effects associated with it. If Indian youth have no colonial hang-ups to hobble them as Tharoor states, we should expect to see changes in the near future as they mature and begin to hold positions of greater authority and influence.

The best quality of Tharoor’s monograph is that it touches on the current key issues of economic changes and religious fundamentalism, and integrates gender relations in terms of other events instead of
MIDDLE EAST REVIEWS

Reviews by LT Youssef H. Aboul-Enein (USNR)

**Serenade of Suffering: A Portrait of Middle-East Terrorism 1968-1993**


Wayne State University academic Richard Chasdi first book is a scholarly look into a quarter century of terrorism in the Middle-East. As FAOs, one of our pivotal missions is to contribute to field commanders and extra edge in force protection matters. This book will help in classifying different types of terrorism and discuss the evolution of many terrorist groups in the region. The author offers a balanced description of Islamic militant, Palestinian radical and Jewish extremist groups, comparing and contrasting between them.

The vocabulary describing terrorist organizations as theocentric, ethnocentric and ideocentric will aid FAOs in articulating the types of groups operating in an area. The second chapter is a study in what stimulates action in terrorist organizations. Some stimulants are more direct and include examples such as the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Others are key dates, commemorations that Palestinian, Jewish and Shiite radicals take advantage of in order to make a political statement. Chapter four contains one of the better historical discussions and outlines of each terrorist group. It starts with a description of *Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen* (The Islamic Brotherhood), founded in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna as a socio-political party in Egypt. This organization is the blueprint for many Islamic groups throughout the region. Hamas is the offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Palestinian Occupied Territories. The author also discusses the key founders of these organizations. If you read only one chapter in the book, Chapter Four will be worth your while.

Within the Palestinian movement the author peels back the different factions many who espouse different views on how to gain Palestinian independence. The Syrian-backed *Al-Saiqa* (Thunderbolt), the Iraqi-sponsored Arab Liberation Front (ALF) demonstrates how regimes wish to manipulate the Palestinian cause to enhance their regional influence in the Arab World. The book ends with counter-terrorism tips from a long and short-term perspective. Middle-East FAOs will benefit from reading this slim volume.

**Economic Crisis and the Politics of Reform in Egypt**


When many Americans serve in Egypt they typically are introduced to the upper to upper-middle classes of society. They are many reasons for this isolation from the Egyptian majority some deal with security measures, others a conscious desire for Egyptian hosts not wanting to expose the gripping poverty of the region. For any FAO who seriously studies the Middle East and in particular Egypt, it is vital to gage economic prosperity with a rise in Islamic militancy in the country. Ray Bush, a professor and director for African studies at the University of Leeds in England puts together the struggle that President Hosni Mubarak and his predecessors Sadat and Nasser have had to contend with in dealing with an agricultural
economy. Agricultural products like cotton, citrus, maize, beans and many other products fed Egypt since ancient times and formed a stable part of the economy. Today the rural areas of the nation is blighted and a devastating increase in the population of Egypt over the last four decades has made it increasingly difficult to feed the population of over 58 million Egyptians crammed along the Nile and its Delta.

The author answers questions and analyzes the effect of central planning brought about by Nasser and most recently expressed in Egypt’s Economic Reform and Structural Program of 1991. But to understand this program and the Public Laws enacted by Cairo, the book first begins with the origins of Egypt’s economic crisis. Nasser inherited a stagnant and corrupt economy from King Farouk in which the average citizen was about as well off in 1950 as they were in 1910. Immediately after the July 1952 coup and agrarian reform and a nationalization of private industries, land owned by the royal family was confiscated and redistributed and a limit of 300 feddans (a feddan is about an acre) was placed as a limit each Egyptian could own. Amazingly this was reduced to 100 feddans and then limited to 50 feddans by 1969. The redistribution of land was not the man issue but crushing rents that placed the farmer in virtual bondage. This system though cannot wholly be blamed on King Farouk, but goes back 200 years when the Albanian Muhammed Ali, founded his dynasty in Egypt and controlled the country through Turkish, Mamluke and Ottoman Pashas who were given property in return for tribute, in essence a primitive form of taxation.

There can be no doubt that the Arab-Israeli Wars crippled Egypt’s economy further and Nasser’s programs industrialize the nation. Egypt was held hostage by an insatiable demand for arms and a need for the late Egyptian President to dominate the agenda of Arab World and be a voice in the non-aligned nations of the world. No wonder, that after the 1973 War, President Anwar Sadat reversed Nasser’s socialist policies and declared the policies of infitah (open-door economic policies). By the mid-1970s accounted for $3 billion from Egyptians working abroad and $2 billion in aid from the United States. The author also explores the politics of food aid that the United States has manipulated since the Eisenhower administration. But Sadat could not control the widening economic gap and charges of corruption among his government. Some Egyptian intellectuals even charged that the pasha system of the monarchy was replaced by members of Sadat’s family and his party elite.

Under Mubarak, the nation has grows by about one million every eight to nine months and here we see that open market policies have created inequities that have attracted some of Egypt’s poorest to Islamist parties and Islamic radicalism. He is currently spending millions of dollars on the Tushka Project an attempt to irrigate the Western Desert by diverting the waters of the Nile around Luxor. What complicates matters is the environmental concerns of sharing the Nile with several African nations. Egyptians plan the Nile’s usage on the 1959 water agreement it made with Sudan and Ethiopia.

This is an excellent book and highly recommended for Mid East FAOs. Religious radicals have been able to garner sympathy among the rural population of Egypt that have led to riots in villages and clashes with security forces.
Summer normally finds the Proponent office in a state of transition. It is during this time that we not only see the transition of Program Managers, but we also experience the greatest transition into and out of our training base. This year is no different.

On the out-going side, LTC Ben Reed retired from the Army in June. His contributions to the Army and the entire FAO Program, not just the 48E and C contingent, were many and will be long lasting. Ben’s thoroughness in attacking issues and problems, calm demeanor, and candidness in offering ideas and feedback were his hallmarks here in the office. Fortunately, his talents are not being wasted. Ben is now working as for the Coast Guard as a pol-mil specialist in their International Affairs shop – heavily involved in strategic cooperation activities. We wish him, and his family, the very best in their new career.

Replacing Ben as the 48C/E Program Manager is MAJ Mike Brewer. Just graduated from CGSC and with excellent credentials, Mike is a superb addition to the FAO Team. Already baptized by fire with several “hot” issues relating to In Country Training, he’s earned his spurs here on the Army staff.

Foreign Area Officers’ Course (FAOC)

The latest FAOC was conducted in June 2001. Courses are conducted twice annually – normally in June and December – at DLI in Monterey. The timing and location are driven by the fact that this offers the best opportunity to reach a large number of FAOs just starting into training. The FAOC is not a mandatory requirement for qualification as a FAO. Typically running 4 ½ days, the focus is as follows.

Block 1: FAOs in support of National Security Strategy/National Military Strategy & PERSCOM Briefing

Block 2: The Role of the State Department, the Embassy Country Team and OPMS XXI/ Professional Development

Block 3: FAO Roles and Functions, Advanced Civil Schooling, In Country Training and Regional Training Panels

Block 4: (Focused on FAO Spouses) Thriving Overseas and Regional Spouse Panels

Block 5: Graduate School Fair (normally 15-20 schools on our ACS list participate)

This past session was the best we’ve seen so far in terms of questions and positive responses from the FAOs. While the impact of OPMS XXI issues was the hottest topic, we had an excellent dialogue on other issues as well. While short, the course is one sure way for the Program Managers to put out guidance and to meet with our officers.

Finally, in terms of the FAOC, we continue to look for ways to be able to get the info to those officers who do not go to DLI in Monterey. We offered the first shortened course at West Point last winter and will continue to

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The USMC FAO/RAO Program held its annual study-track selection board at Training and Education Command, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, VA from 10-12 July 2001 and selected 18 superb officers from 65 qualified applications to begin the formal training cycle in 2002. Congratulations to all of those who were selected, and best of luck to you all as you commence your FAO/RAO training in Monterey, CA. The Unified Commands and International Issues Branch (PLU) would also like to thank all of the officers who applied for the program; it was a very competitive board as usual.

As of August 2001, PLU is sponsoring the following officers for in-country training (ICT). In the European theater, Maj Williams is our first FAO who has studied Serbo-Croatian and is now conducting in-country training in Zagreb, Croatia. He will also be heading to the Marshall Center in Garmisch, Germany for some additional regional training over the next year.

Maj Christopher recently graduated from the Baltic Defense College in Tartu, Estonia and is heading back to the Fleet Marine Force to put his skills to good use. Maj Barnes has also recently completed his studies at the Marshall Center and his internship in Kiev, Ukraine and is now in the attaché training pipeline with a follow-on tour back in Ukraine as the Marine Attaché (MARA).

Finally, Maj Holahan has recently arrived in Riga, Ukraine to become our first FAO to conduct ICT in that Baltic nation. Best of luck to all of these “Slavic” FAOs as they either pursue their training or head to utilization tours.

In the Pacific theater, Maj Moseley and Maj Oppenheim have both completed their ICT in Beijing, China and are heading back to the operating forces; and Capt McDonald has recently reported to the USDAO, Beijing for his year in the People’s Republic of China. Maj Ken Nelson is heading back to a flying billet after his action-packed year as our first FAO in Hanoi, Vietnam, and Capt Perry is likewise heading back to the appropriate regional operating forces after finishing his year in Tokyo. PLU would like to particularly congratulate Capt Perry; not only did he break ground as the Marine Corps’ first FAO in Japan, but he finished his year by scoring 3+/3+/4 on the Foreign Service Institute’s Japanese language exam…a truly impressive achievement. Maj Goff, our second FAO in Japan, is also breaking new ground by becoming the first Marine officer to attend the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Forces Command and Staff College. He starts there later this month, August 2001.

Moving on to the Middle East, LtCol Costantini is enjoying his year in Cairo, and just returned from an exciting trip to Eritrea in the Horn of Africa. Finally, last but by no means least, Maj Duke continues to report from Jerusalem, Israel during a very stressful time in that region. Best of luck to him and all the other FAOs who are either finishing their ICT or have just arrived in-country.

Next, PLU would like to extend a hearty Welcome Aboard to a few new regional desk officers. Maj Steve Duke and Maj Jim Zientek, both East Asian RAOs who also have studied some Japanese, have reported aboard to PLU, PP&O…Steve will be taking over for LtCol Ray Griggs as the action officer for Northeast Asia (China, Japan/Okinawa, Taiwan, Korea, Mongolia), and Jim will be assuming the duties as the PACOM action officer responsible for all other areas in the Pacific theater (SE Asia, Australia, and India). Both officers are recent graduates of the Regional Affairs Officer Program at the Naval Postgradu...
ate School (NPS), Monterey, CA. Also joining us is LtCol Osamah “Sam” Jammal, a Middle Eastern FAO, who is taking over as the full-time Central Command action officer. Marhaban Beekum!

We also want to congratulate our Latin American Desk Officer, LtCol Jose Cristy, who recently planned and executed the first Latin American Conference of Marine Leaders in Guayaquil, Ecuador from 16-18 July 2001. Sixteen (16) Marine and Naval Infantry leaders representing the Americas met for the first time ever. The Commandant of the Ecuadorian Marine Corps, CAPT Valdemar Sanchez, and the Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, Gen. James L. Jones, hosted the forum that was intended to promote the professional exchange of information and to develop personal relations among the Marine and Naval Infantry leaders of the Americas. Senior Marine and Naval Infantry Leaders from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, the U.S., Uruguay, and Venezuela were present.

PLU held an experienced-track FAO/RAO selection board in late July and also added an additional five (5) new FAOs and two (2) new RAOs. Congratulations to those officers as well. On 29 August 2001, the Branch Head for PLU and the FAO/RAO Program Coordinator will be heading down the Marsh Center in Quantico, VA in order to brief the occupational field monitors on the importance of the FAO/RAO Program and to improve the utilization of all FAO/RAOs (study-track and experience-track) in appropriate billets throughout the operational forces, Marine Component Command staffs, Unified Command staffs, and the Defense Attaché System. We hope to make this an annual event that will continue to improve how all Marines regard the International Affairs Officer Program and will maximize the use of Marine FAO/RAOs.

The FAO/RAO Program Coordinator is currently serving on a working group that is writing the comprehensive Marine Corps Order on Fellowships. As part of that order, PLU will take over the duties as the billet sponsor for all officers in programs similar to the FAO/RAO Program to include the Personnel Exchange Program (PEP), Foreign Intermediate and Top Level Schools (ILS/TLS), and Foreign Scholarships such as the Olmsted Scholarship. We hope that this effort will add to the utility of all foreign area experts. The Secretary of the Navy’s Mentoring Program is underway and FAO/RAOs are beginning to profit from the corporate knowledge and expertise of many skilled civilian and former military professionals. Finally, the FAO/RAO Program is continuing to work their budget request through Training and Education Command in order to fund several new and beneficial projects to improve the International Affairs Officer Program.

As always, the Unified Commands and International Issues Branch (PLU), PP&O, HQMC is available to take your questions. For further information, please see our website at . We welcome any comments on how to improve the program. Please see the FAO Proponent Page on the inside cover of the FAO Journal for POC information. We are now located in office space 4B337 in the Pentagon.

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Each year the proponent updates, by AOC, the graduate degree programs FAOs can attend as part of ACS. We’ll soon begin the process for this year’s update. The criteria used in determining quality programs are listed on our web page and the currently approved can be found both there and on the PERSCOM page.

We take a lot of time in researching each school’s offerings. While some may appear more prestigious than others, every program on our list will meet your needs. We also recognize that we may not identify every possible program. If you know of another that you think meets our requirements, follow the directions on our web page to bring it to our attention.

Perhaps the greatest frustration we have in this area is with officers who fail to adequately prepare during the application process. If you want to apply for a program not on our list or have a special circumstance that needs consideration, ENSURE you coordinate with your Regional Program Manager early in order to maximize your chance for success.
American Tragedy -- American Response

During the next several weeks and months, American life will radically change due to the tragic events of 11 September 2001. How the armed forces will shape its response is still unclear due to a lack of reliable intelligence, cogent analysis, and a comprehensive plan. Specifically, USAF’s role in any future engagement remains wholly ambiguous but to a few planners in the recently targeted center of military operations.

Our current CSAF, General John P. Jumper stated that Foreign Area Officers are “true students of the game”, possessing the requisite academic, linguistic, and “boots on the ground” experience. Interestingly enough, USAF’s FAO Branch, does not reside within the Air Staff structure, but under the Secretariat. Given the finely honed, operationally relevant expertise of our FAOs, one would expect to find their existence in the Secretariat a bit confused. Would we not want this level of “operationally

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relevant expertise” within AF/XO, in other words AF Operations? This move may occur under the watch of our current leadership. General Jumper is not new to the world of FAOs, having witnessed first hand the absolutely positive, cultural effects of having a linguistically talented (in this case French while travelling as USAFE/CC in Sub-Saharan Africa) officer around.

If the Army had initial growing pains with the care and feeding of their FAOs, then the Air Force FAO program, while beyond its infancy, still remains wholly underdeveloped and undernourished. The news however, is not all bad. The AF possesses many highly qualified FAOs, in part through their academic achievements and many due to their exceptional foreign language skills. Unfortunately, the Air Force FAO program suffers now because of the Army’s past (now in the process of correction) shortfalls. Many of the AF brown shoes (civilians and military alike) walking the halls of the Pentagon harangue the younger Action Officers (the writer includes himself in the latter characterization) of “how the Army didn’t get the promotion system right” or other issues affecting the advancement of FAOs. Many of the aforementioned folks never got the word--the Army has addressed the problems plaguing the system for several years. The AF now has the opportunity to take advantage of the assets before them and benefit from the Army’s long and arduous overhaul of the system without having to institutionally endure it.

When the AF responded to DoD Directive 13.1517, which called for instituting a Foreign Area Officer component in each of the armed services, I applauded the initial efforts. Over time however, the chinks in the armor became apparent. The AF wanted (and to some degree still desires) their FAOs to also possess depth and breadth within a primary career field in addition to maintaining currency within the FAO realm. Early on, this theory made sense to bolster the initial numbers, but now the practice has caused greater consternation.

FAO development now and into the future is of national interest. It’s a touchy subject in some circles of the military that would rather discuss bigger ships, impenetrable tanks, and more maneuverable aircraft. In reality, none of those items, those relics of a conventional war, can be brought to bear without reliable intelligence, cogent analysis, and a comprehensive plan--the very purview of a Foreign Area Officer. As the nation develops a response to the tragedy, the acts of war by an unknown aggressor, let us develop the men and women of the Foreign Area Officer corps for the challenges of tomorrow.

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being presented in a politically-correct separate chapter. A portion of Tharoor's writing though leads me to skepticism about the rest, as occasionally simple facts are erroneous. Things might have changed between his last visit to India and my own, but the point is that I now question which portions of the book are factual, and which are merely comical hype to tell a more interesting story and sell more copies of the book. Tharoor makes the statement that each time he comes home [to India] he stands in the sun and feels himself whole again in his own skin. I'm sure that is made much easier by the fact that he knows he can quickly access his foreign currency account, get back on a plane, and depart Hindustan whenever he wants.

The simple prose of this book flows as a continual story and makes for an easy read. There are those who may say that this book is uninsightful and pretentious because Tharoor represents the Westernized, English speaking, privileged, and urban upper class environment who are out of touch with the reality of the country and not members of the majority of the population. I believe that his history of being born and raised in India but then living outside of India for half of his life allows his look at India to be more objective. This background also further legitimizes his frequent use of personal anecdotes. Other reviews written by many Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) seem to also identify with the author’s background and his feelings about India. This text can not be considered scholarly, but it is certainly not senseless either. The book has some faults and inherent contradictions, but it is still very much worth reading and will appeal to regional experts and laymen alike.
Army FAO Proponent Office

COL Mark Volk - Div Chief, (703) 697-3600 / DSN 227-3600 Email: volkm@hqda.army.mil

MS. Pat Jones - Budget/Resource Manager, (703) 697-6317 / DSN 227-6317, Email: jonesp@hqda.army.mil

MAJ Mike Brewer - 48C/E Regional Manager, COM 703-697-6794 / DSN 227-6794, Email: brewerm@hqda.army.mil

MAJ Warren Hoy — 48B Regional Manager / Inter-American Defense Board / Conference of American Armies, COM 703-614-1766 / DSN 224-1766, Email: warren.hoy@hqda.army.mil

MAJ Glen Grady - 48G/J Regional Manager, (703) 614-2336 / DSN 224-2336, Email: gln.grady@hqda.army.mil

LTC Richard Coon — 48D/F/H/I Regional Manager, (703) 697-6796 / DSN 227-6796, Email: richard.coon@hqda.army.mil

Col Manuel Fuentes — FAO PROponent LIAISON, Defense Language Institute, (408) 647-5110/DSN 878-5110 Email: fuentessm@pom-emh1.army.mil

Army FAO Assignments Team, PERSCOM

LTC Larry Kinde - Assgmts Off (COLONELS – 48), (703) 325-2861/DSN 221-2861 EMAIL: KINDEL@HOFFMAN.ARMY.MIL

LTC Grady Reese — Branch Chief (703) 325-3153/DSN 221-3153 EMAIL: reesege@hoffman.army.mil

MAJ Lynn Ostrem - Assgmts Off (48C, E), (703) 325-3134/DSN 221-3134 EMAIL: OSTROME@HOFFMAN.ARMY.MIL

MAJ Dino Pick - Assgmts Off (48D, G, H, I), (703) 325-3132/DSN 221-3132, EMAIL: PICKD@HOFFMAN.ARMY.MIL

MAJ Phil Battaglia — Assgmts Off (48B), (703) 325-2755/DSN 221-2755 EMAIL: BATTAGLP@HOFFMAN.ARMY.MIL

MS. Fran Ware - TRG PLANS (48B, C, F, H, I), (703) 325-3135/DSN 221-3135 EMAIL: WAREF@HOFFMAN.ARMY.MIL

MS. Aundra Brown - TRG PLANS (48D, E, G, J), (703) 325-3121/DSN 221-3121 EMAIL: BROWN@HOFFMAN.ARMY.MIL

Army Reserve FAO Program

MAJ Dan Hawk, (314) 592-3042/DSN 892-3042 or 800-325-4987 EMAIL: daniel.hawk@arpstl-emh2.army.mil

USMC FAO Proponent

Col Kevin O'Keefe- Head, Unified Commands and International Issues Branch, PP&O, HQMC, and Chinese FAO EMAIL: O'KeefeKP@hqmc.usmc.mil

Maj Pat Carroll - International Affairs Officer Program (IAOP) Coordinator, and Middle East/North Africa EMAIL: CarrollPJ@hqmc.usmc.mil

LtCol Mike Brooker- Middle East and SWA EMAIL: Brookermf@hqmc.usmc.mil

LtCol Jose Cristy — Latin America and Canada EMAIL: cristyjg@hqmc.usmc.mil

LtCol Tom Braden — Eastern Europe, Western Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa, EMAIL: Bradentc@hqmc.usmc.mil

LtCol Mike Foley — Western Europe (NATO), Sub-Saharan Africa EMAIL: foleymj@hqmc.usmc.mil

LtCol Mike Foley - Western Europe (NATO), Sub-Saharan Africa EMAIL: FoleyMJ@hqmc.usmc.mil

LtCol Ken Crosby - Security Assistance Officer EMAIL: CrosbyKE@hqmc.usmc.mil

Capt Mark Sullo - Joint Contract Team Program (JCTP EMAIL: sulloma@hqmc.usmc.mil

Contact these officers at (703) 614-3706/4221 or DSN: 224-3706/4221.

US NAVY FAO Proponent

CDR Charles Livingston, HQ, USN (N24C), (703) 695-4881, FAX (703) 695-6166.

US AIR FORCE FAO Proponent

Col Anthony A. Aldwell
Chief, International Airmen Division (703) 588-8334, FAX (703) 588-6396

Maj Michael Dembroski - Branch Chief (703) 588-8322; DSN 425-8322

Maj Diane Ficke - Academic Programs, (703) 588-8321; DSN 425-8321

Capt Chon Kim - Language Programs (703) 588-8337; DSN 425-8337

Capt Joseph Pilkus - Budget/Continuing Education, (703) 588-8346; DSN 425-8346

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