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NEW LOGO
We’ve gotten two proposals for a new FAOA logo. These two logos will be placed on the FAOA web site (www.faoa.org) in full color for membership review. See page 34 for black and white versions. More proposals will be gladly accepted!

JOURNAL AUTHORS NEED
We always need interesting articles to publish in the Journal. These articles are written by FAOs for FAOs. We strongly appeal to all FAOs, especially those assigned overseas, to write an article for the FAO Journal. Please e-mail article submissions to the FAO Journal Editor, Steve Gotowicki at stevehg@usa.net.

BOOK REVIEWERS NEEDED
All members are encouraged to contribute to our regional book reviews columns. There seems to be the perception in the field that the regular editors are responsible for all content contained in their columns. NOT TRUE! Anyone can contribute and I encourage everyone to do so—particularly those of you in graduate school or other professional military education courses. If you read a good book, share it with us. Just send your input directly to the column editor or to the FAOA e-mail address and it will be forwarded promptly. We would especially welcome permanent columnists for Africa and South Asia/Southeast Asia.

MEMBERSHIP
Don’t let your membership expire. Expiration dates will be printed on the mailing label for the FAO Journal.

A Different Truth: Palestinian Perceptions Of Recent History and the Peace Process . . . And What They Want From Us By Ed Barrett

In light of the current violence in Israel and the Occupied Territories, as well as President Clinton’s efforts to facilitate the peace process, it may be worthwhile to try to understand why the Palestinians think the way they do. We, in the United States, have a general idea about the Israeli position. We understand that security concerns unlike any we can comprehend dominate Israel policy formulation. We saw President Clinton and Mr. Barak offer concessions that had never even been considered before. We wonder why such concessions were not enough to move Mr. Arafat and his chief negotiator, Mr. Ereket, any closer to a solution. What were they thinking? This article is intended to give you some background as to why the other 14 members of the UN Security Council officially condemned recent Israeli actions without making similar overtures toward the Palestinians and have repeatedly taken similar actions in the past. My intent is to give an idea of the Palestinian outlook and, to the degree I am able, how it was developed.

The Past - A Thumbnail Sketch of Events Significant to the Palestinians.
In the interests of brevity, I will limit my discussion to activities of the last 100 or so years. This is not to say that events prior to that don't have an impact on the thinking of some of the people involved but, for the most part, they add more grist to the mill of the hawks than the peacemakers. For centuries, the Palestinian Christian and Muslim residents lived more or less amicably with their Jewish neighbors. While it would be untrue to say that the three communities never had disputes, it would be fair to say that they got along better than similarly diverse neighboring groups in any metropolitan area in the U.S. I will also keep my discussion devoid of religious interpretation. I think that any argument that starts with "God wants it this way..." can only start more arguments. These arguments are generally based on something other than reason and tend to nudge each side toward extremism. Suffice it to say that the Bible, Koran, and Torah are different. I don't think any of these books says that God promised Palestine to the Ottoman Turks and they held control of it for a greater part of the last 1000 years than anybody else.

Near the end of the Ottoman period, at the start of the 1900s, the United Nations estimates that the population of Palestine was about 500,000. British estimates hold that it may have been closer to 700,000. The breakdown by ethnicity was about 85% Palestinian Muslim, 10% Palestinian Christian, and 5% Jewish. Just prior to the turn of the century, a journalist named Theodor Herzl, living in Austria, first extolled the concept of what was to be referred to as "Political Zionism", the concept of creating a homeland for the Jewish people. A few options were suggested for such a place with sub-Saharan Africa, Argentina, and Palestine as possibilities. Herzl pushed for Palestine because of historical ties to the area and the fact that, by his reckoning, the area was essentially uninhabited (by Jews?). Herzl also lived in the hotbed of anti-Jewish sentiment growing in the area running from Germany through the Balkans with its epicenter probably somewhere near the cafes of Vienna. Like many Jewish leaders of the time, Herzl understood that it didn't really matter where they went as long as they didn't stay where they were. Within ten years, the Jewish percentage of the population of Palestine grew from 11% to 17%. In 1917, the British Foreign Secretary, and former Prime Minister, Arthur Balfour promised a Jewish national homeland to prominent Jewish leaders in Europe, in the form of the Balfour Declaration. A minor problem with this declaration is that, in order to win its fight with Turkey, Britain had made promises to a number of Arab leaders as well. One such promise was called the McMahon-Hussein pact: While the British would hold a mandate on the region, it would essentially be governed by the Arabs who lived there, such as the Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Hussein. The two promises seemed at odds and, after massive Jewish migration started as the situation in Europe became more and more harsh, the Arabs protested to the international community and Britain. The British, although sympathetic to the plight of European Jews, set about, finally, to stem the flow of immigration to the area.

After the end of World War II, the situation would reach a peak when three Jewish groups born during the war in Europe to sabotage the Axis and promote Jewish interests - the Stern Gang (also called "Lehi"), Haganah (often referred to as the military arm of Lehi), and Irgun - began a program of violent acts to further their goals of a Zionist homeland in Palestine. The Zionist land acquisition efforts which had started early in the century with peaceful purchases from local owners, achieved the other extreme when the three groups started a systematic drive to expel the Palestinian Muslims and Christians in what could now only be referred to as ethnic cleansing. Their aggression was also aimed at England: In July 1946, the King David Hotel, which housed the British Army Command Headquarters and Palestine Government Secretariat, was blown up by Zionist extremists. Although estimates vary,
death toll of about ninety, with over a hundred more injured is probably accurate. The British government issued warrants for the arrests of the perpetrators of the terrorism, including a young Jewish Nationalist named Menachem Begin. As Zionist attacks on British targets and local Arabs increased, Britain asked the U.N. for help in coming up with an amicable solution.

Their efforts culminated in U.N. Resolution 181, dated November 29, 1947, which divided Palestine (in a way guaranteed to lead to war - a map of the plan appears below) with a patchwork of non-contiguous areas for both states. The plan gave more than 50% of the land to the Jewish settlers, with slightly less for the Palestinians, and Jerusalem established as an international city, owned by no single entity. At the time, this was not considered acceptable by either side. The Jewish groups believed that they had been promised the land in the Balfour Declaration and the Arab groups were enraged at the prospect of being thrown out of the homes that their families had lived in for centuries. Jewish groups continued their policy of expelling the Muslim and Christian residents and Arab groups went on strike and continued to petition the international community for help.

As the end of the British Mandate approached in 1948, the Zionist groups became more aggressive. Among their exploits include the complete destruction of the town of Dayr Yasin, where all of the nearly 300 citizens of the Arab village were slaughtered. Quickly, the Europeans that came were clearing every Christian and Muslim village to make room for new owners. After word of the events of Dayr Yasin spread, the process went fairly quickly. To make matters worse, some local Arab leaders exaggerated the carnage in an attempt to elicit support from neighboring Arab countries. It only increased Arab emigration. A particularly good account of the process was written by a Palestinian Christian reverend, himself one of those expelled from his village, named Elias Chacour, in his book, "Blood Brothers". The U. N., without a force to impose its will, and Britain, tired of fighting, disengaged. After its May 1948 declaration of statehood, Israel was immediately attacked by Jordan, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon which, with a modicum of western help, it survived. It annexed West Jerusalem, with Jordan retaining control of East Jerusalem and the West Bank, and Egypt controlling the Gaza Strip. 150,000 Arabs become Israeli citizens with limited rights. Many more than that fled to surrounding countries, especially Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. None of these countries had economies capable of absorbing the huge influx of people and the internal politics of each was negatively affected. The first Palestinian refugee camps outside of Palestine/Israel were born. The Palestinians plead again for support from the U.N. It sent an ambassador from Sweden, Count Bernardotte, to find a compromise solution during a cease-fire. Although it is assumed that he was preparing to side with the Palestinians and recommend Israel be asked to give back land it had taken, we will never be sure as Count Bernardotte was assassinated by members of Lehi on 17 September 1948.

In 1967, Israel attacked Jordan, Egypt, and Syria in what it referred to as a pre-emptive strike. It took the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the Sinai Peninsula of Egypt. In Resolution 242, the United Nations Security Council voted unanimously to condemn Israel saying that it had acted aggressively and that it should withdraw from these lands. Israel refused. In the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Egypt and Syria attacked to try to seize back some of the land lost in 1967. With U.S. assistance, Israel repelled the attack. In 1977, Egypt got the Sinai back by signing a peace treaty with Israel. Anwar Sadat shared the Nobel Peace Prize with Menachem Begin but within three years, Egypt was expelled from the Arab League and Sadat had been assassinated. In March 1978, Israel invaded Lebanon following a PLO raid. After U.N. intervention, Israel backed to its border but kept troops stationed in Lebanon in a self-imposed buffer zone. In December, 1981, Israel annexed the Golan Heights. In June of 1982, Israel
invaded southern Lebanon again. The Israeli artillery bombardment of Beirut lasted 88 days, long after any military target had been destroyed. As of this writing, it had not pulled out completely, although it made overtures to that effect and moved most of its troops to the southern edge of the country.

Another equally disturbing event happened in Lebanon. Two refugee camps had been established just outside of Beirut, called Sabra and Shatila. As Israeli Defense Forces sealed off the entrances and exits, Israeli-backed Lebanese militia entered the camps and attempted to kill nearly every man, woman, and child. The death toll at the massacre was estimated at over 3000 people. Then-Israeli Defense Minister, General Ariel Sharon was deemed to have had previous knowledge of and likely helped in the planning of the operation. Many Israelis were as horrified as the rest of the world and some 400,000 of them protested the bloodbath. As a result, Sharon was expelled from the Israeli Cabinet. This is the same Ariel Sharon whose visit to the Dome of the Rock/Temple Mount set off the current hostilities.

Finally, although not violent per se, but perhaps more vexing than anything to the Palestinians, are the settlements. Most of us have little concept of the idea but it's a simple one. Israel, trying to grow into areas previously considered Palestinian, builds neighborhoods (which are guarded by the IDF) and encourages its citizens to move into them. It then pushes the people who are already living there to move out. When former Prime Minister Netanyahu was arguing for agreements with the Palestinians he was building new settlements at an alarming rate. These settlements have continued throughout. The likelihood of peace is minimal as long as the settlement issue remains unresolved.

**Current Perspectives and Outlook for the Future.**

The Palestinians know that they are not without guilt. Most abhor the violent acts performed in their name and want only to live in peace. Unlike in 1948, most have come to the realization that there is and will be a state of Israel, although many still refer to it as "Occupied Palestine." The primary desire of the Palestinians is to have a country where they can enjoy the same individual freedoms they enjoyed when the country that is now Israel was their home. They understand that Yasser Arafat and the PLO have performed violent acts but have a difficult time understanding why their efforts to create a state are any different than their Israeli counterparts like Menachem Begin, his replacement as Prime Minister, Yitzchak Shamir, and a litany of other top leaders in the Israeli government who began as extremists as well. They would remind the world that the Stern Gang, Haganah, and Irgun taught them everything they know (the hard way).

Understanding their hatred for Ariel Sharon because of his involvement at Sabra and Shatila, it should not be hard for us to understand why they took exception to his presence, along with a contingent of IDF soldiers, at the Temple Mount/Dome of the Rock. They believe that his intent was to incite violence and to delay the peace process which he has sworn to end. The Palestinians will take some of the credit for the bloodshed in recent days but will remind you that the vast majority of the dead, by a 7-1 ratio, have been Palestinian. There is, however, no justification for a people that wants peace to allow an angry mob to kill three soldiers just for being in the wrong neighborhood by mistake, nor will the world ever understand the release of violent felons for the purpose of...well, we're not really sure. Worst of all, there is no excuse for the desecration of any sacred building, as happened with Joseph's Tomb - something that would have been considered a war crime in any other fight.

The Palestinians will admit to the mistakes of a desperate people, but their biggest complaint is the one-sided story that is told here in the U.S. (Continued on page 19)
Syria stands at a crossroads. The four historic pillars that supported regime stability for President Hafiz Assad are weakening. The collapse of the Soviet Union has left Syria without a strong patron. The Russia that emerged from the ashes no longer provides Syria with vital military, economic, or political support. The Ba'ath Party, while still formidable, is finding its base of support slowly eroding. The notable families on which the regime had depended are continually finding their future linked to an opening with the West. Finally, the military, severed from its supply of new equipment and training, is suffering from a decline in moral, respect, and confidence.

Taken together, these factors represent a climate in which Syria could break its traditional mold. With the recent death of President Assad, an opportunity has been created. The new President, his son Bashar, is a relative newcomer to national politics. He simultaneously commands respect within Syrian society and is uncommitted to the established power structure. If he possesses the courage, he could lead Syria down a new path. He could redirect Syrian policies towards openness with the outside world and increased integration into the regional and possibly global economies. This article will examine the four pillars of regime support as well as Lebanon, economic, and geographic factors to demonstrate how the potential for reform is currently present.

When the Soviet Union dissolved Syria found itself without a strong international supporter. Over the past decade, this has had a profound affect on events, both foreign and domestic, for Syria. With the end of the Cold War, Syria has become increasingly irrelevant internationally. In dealings with Israel, its belligerent, hard-line stance has become increasingly anachronistic. As a result, it has become increasingly isolated both politically and economically.

In addition, the loss of Soviet economic largess has hurt the Syrian economy. Black market activity, historically an important sector, has grown and become an almost indispensable element of state livelihood. Over the years, Lebanon has become a vital base for black market activities and smuggling; emerging as one of the single largest contributors to the Syrian economy. Consequently, the reasons supporting Syrian involvement in Lebanon have shifted from ones of political and strategic interest to ones of economic necessity. This means that any change in Syrian policy for Lebanon will require a corresponding reform in its economic policy to maintain equilibrium.

The Soviets were also the main suppliers of military equipment, training, and doctrine. When this pipeline closed, the Syrian military began to slowly decay. Syrian equipment ages daily with few replacements projected. Spare parts are increasingly difficult to find. The remaining operational equipment is outdated and no match for the modern equipment of its neighbors. Finally, with the collapse of the Soviet military education system, Syria has been cut off from a vital source of intellectual exchange. Current military concepts are not well known or understood and the Syrian pool of military expertise is slowly atrophying.

Internally, regime stability has rested on three mutually supporting legs: the Ba'ath Party, the notables, and the military. This tripod has proven to be very strong and resilient. Events over the past decade, however, have weakened this traditional structure and opened the door for possible change. The Ba'ath Party, dominated
by the minority Alawis, has worked tirelessly to maintain a dominant role for their special interest group. At the same time, they have worked with their socialist doctrine to cut across various social and cultural differences and produce an accepted Syrian identity. The goal was to produce a unified society that supported the regime and the current distribution of power within it. This effort has only been partially successful. After several decades, the concept of a Syrian identity is slowly emerging. This embryonic national identity, far from supporting the current system, is working for changes that will further cement the concept of Syrian society onto the myriad of minority interests within the country.

As demographics shift over time, the Alawis are becoming an increasingly smaller group. Though considered Muslim by the government, the majority Sunni group has never accepted the Alawis as Muslim equals. For the Sunnis there is a desire to see less active participation by the Alawis and greater openness in the government. For the other minority groups, there is a growing realization that the only genuine guarantee of their cultural, religious, and ethnic freedoms lies in a greater degree of liberal democracy, rule of law, and market economics.

In addition, demographics are shifting dramatically towards youth. The vast majority of Syrians are under thirty years old. Without adequate work or prospects, this group is becoming increasingly disillusioned and frustrated. Many youths are fleeing the country in search of jobs and opportunities. The ones that remain are beginning to demand change. It is in the government’s best interest to provide this change if for no other reason than to stem the loss of skilled and educated labor to other countries.

Finally, as the World becomes increasingly smaller, communication and information become increasingly difficult to control. The Syrian public is constantly presented with an ever-expanding list of outside images, concepts, and ideas. Some of them are good and some of them are bad. Naturally, they want to incorporate the good while rejecting the bad. This effort of selective assimilation will require government reform, greater openness, and integration into the larger World.

Another critical element of regime stability has been the old, established, and generally wealthy aristocratic families of Syria. This group is very well entrenched and respected. Most of these families have been in a position of power and influence that extends back into the Ottoman Empire. They can be collectively referred to as the notables.

Many of the notables have been traditionally land owning and agricultural. A few have maintained their position through commerce. Agricultural production in the region has not been dependable for several centuries. As populations increase and water resources decrease, there is increasing pressure to push agriculture onto marginal lands. The traditional base of the agricultural notables is being undermined. These people, leaders in their communities, are shifting to other sources of economic viability. The most common alternatives have become trade, commerce, and industrial production.

Thus, the notables are now also the leading businessmen and traders in Syria. They have two desires. First, they wish to maintain their traditional position of power and influence. Second, they understand that in order to do this, they must maintain their successful business positions. As businessmen, they desire greater contact and integration with the regional and global economy. For their continued prosperity, they need to be able to exploit economic opportunities as they present themselves. This is particularly true with their neighbors, Israel and Turkey. Consequently, while the goal of the notables has remained unchanged, there is a new method. In order to maintain their privileged position in society, they need the tools of economic development.
that only reform can provide.

The military has also been a critical element of regime stability. With the end of the Cold War, the armed forces went into a long and sustained period of decline. The acquisition of new equipment virtually stopped. The equipment on hand has continued to age. It is becoming increasingly obsolete, especially in the face of continued modernization and development by Syria's two regional rivals, Israel and Turkey. This widening gap in regional military capabilities coupled with the strong desire for greater regional contact and economic integration is a strong motivational engine for reform.

Two events illustrate the significant loss of Syrian military capability over the past decade. The first occurred in 1998 when Turkey massed troops on the Syrian border and demanded the expulsion of internationally recognized terrorist Abdullah Ocalan. The Syrian military presented only a token response, sending a few units north to reinforce those permanently stationed on the border. The government, in a pragmatic recognition of its capabilities, quickly acquiesced and quietly ejected Ocalan. This episode shows the significant loss of capability in the Syrian military. More importantly, it demonstrates a lack of confidence in the military from the civilian government. Finally, the military suffered a huge loss of prestige domestically for its inability to provide security from an external threat.

Two years later, Israel chose to unilaterally withdraw from southern Lebanon after two decades of occupation. The Syrian military has in part used its extensive commitments in Lebanon as justification for huge budgets and extensive influence throughout Syrian society and government. In addition to Israeli withdrawal, it now appears that an eventual settlement over the Golan and a general Peace treaty are within reach. This brings into question the continued relevance of Syria's huge, expensive, and outdated military.

Having said all of that, it must be remem-bered that the military remains a powerful force for suppression of domestic dissent and that it is firmly in the hands of the government. Nevertheless, the Syrians are deficient in modern equipment and incapable of projecting power beyond their borders. Arguably, they are incapable of self-defense. A lighter, modernized military, with strong, peaceful ties and cooperation with the other militaries of the region is the key to external security. Only through reform, economic development, and regional engagement can Syria hope to establish the conditions and secure the funding for much needed military reorganization.

Recent events concerning Lebanon are also providing a strong incentive for modifications in Syria's policies. Most obviously, the group, Hizb'Allah, has quickly moved into the areas vacated by Israel. They have made a strong case for legitimacy amongst both the people of Lebanon and the international community. Consequently, they have become increasingly difficult for Syria to control. This has been compounded by the fact that Hizb'Allah does not rely solely on Syria for funding. Iran, whose goals do not necessarily align with those of Syria, provides a significant amount of money to the Lebanese Hizb'Allah movement.

While Hizb'Allah is a specific force inside of Lebanon, there is also a general desire for greater autonomy and independence within the population at large. These institutions are growing in organization, power, and legitimacy. They desire greater participation in the political life of Lebanon. Most advocate the expulsion of Syrian troops from Lebanon. These forces will eventually force a reform of the political structure and weaken Syrian influence and control within the country.

Finally, there is external pressure. Syria is the only force holding up the government of Lebanon. The same international pressure that convinced Israel to withdraw from southern Lebanon is pushing Syria for similar actions. It is also

(Continued on page 21)
Since the end of September, we have all seen a great deal of news about the ongoing crisis in the Middle East. Cable news channels regularly show footage of children throwing rocks at Israeli soldiers who respond with rubber (and live) bullets and tear gas. Palestinians have also used firearms in the conflict. Most of the reports have come from Gaza and the West Bank, and grim faced analysts declare that this new surge of violence may escalate into another Arab Israeli war. The violence is certainly not decreasing, and there is a serious danger of escalation.

The election of Ariel Sharon has inflamed the situation in the short term. Sharon, a former army general who was the architect of the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, has denounced most of the proposals that the Barak government offered to the Palestinians, and said that the Oslo Peace accords are no longer valid. He has outlined his own proposals that fall well short of anything former Prime Minister Barak offered. PA President Yasir Arafat has stated Sharon’s victory would be a disaster. Violence between Palestinians and Israelis has increased. The trigger, however, for a regional crisis may not be in Gaza or the West Bank, but in a hundred or so square miles north of the Golan Heights called the Shebaa Farms. This area, little known outside of the Middle East, could be the match that ignites another Arab Israeli war. This article will address that possibility.

The Shebaa Farms are in a small strip of land between the Golan Heights and the Lebanese border. Israel occupies the land, having taken it from Syria after the 1967 War. The Lebanese and Syrian governments, and the leaders of Hizballah, claim it is part of Lebanon. The confusion as to whether the land is part of Syria or Lebanon dates to the beginning of the 20th Century. Prior to World War One, both Syria and Lebanon were part of the Ottoman Empire in the sanjak, or district, of Syria. After the war, France took control of the area. According to one Israeli geographer, Shebaa Farms was put under Lebanese control by the French in the 1920’s but was taken over by Syria in the 1950’s.

Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982 in order to drive out the Palestinian Liberation Organization and secure its northern border from terrorist attacks. What was supposed to have been a quick operation turned into a quagmire, and after being caught up in bitter internecine Lebanese rivalries, Israeli troops pulled back from most of Lebanon in 1985. However, Israeli troops remained, however, in a 10-km wide security zone inside Lebanese territory. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), has attempted to keep the peace in the south since 1978 (after an initial Israeli foray into south Lebanon) with a mandate to secure the border and separate the warring parties. It has had mixed success.

Syria also invaded Lebanon in 1975 in order to stabilize it during Lebanon’s long and bloody civil war. Syria has continued a military presence with the consent of the Lebanese Government. With 25,000-30,000 troops in Lebanon, Syria greatly influences Lebanese domestic policy, and controls Lebanese foreign policy. After Israel became entangled in southern Lebanon, Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad saw a chance to regain lost territory and overcome a humiliating defeat. He had been Syria’s Defense Minister in 1967, when Israel took the Golan Heights from Syria. Still stinging from that defeat, Asad insisted on total Israeli withdrawal from the Golan before he would negotiate a peace treaty with the Jewish state. Israeli troops were in Lebanon to secure the border and the only card Asad had left to play was to ensure that the Israeli-Lebanese border was not secure. Asad therefore relied upon Hizballah, the Party of God, to be his proxy fighters.

Hizballah began after the 1982 Israeli invasion as a Shi'a guerrilla group dedicated to driving Israel out of Lebanon. Supported by Iran and given tacit approval by Syria, Hizballah evolved from an organization that practiced rudimentary suicide bombings to one capable of sophisticated stand-off attacks and ambushes against Israeli Defense Force (IDF)
failed due to a land dispute, Barak decided to seize the initiative. In May 2000, he ordered the IDF to unilaterally withdraw from south Lebanon. The withdrawal was orderly, although many South Lebanese Army soldiers were abandoned by the IDF to the tender mercies of Hizballah. The much-feared reprisal massacre of former SLA members never came, but many have been tried and sentenced in Lebanese courts for treason because of their cooperation with Israel during its occupation. By 23 June, two days after the Israeli withdrawal began, 2200 southerners were arrested by the Lebanese government. Many were tried and sentences ranged from one week to 15 years. Hizballah has still not ruled out meting out its own form of punishment against those it considers traitors. The Lebanese government had no coherent policy, except to state that it would refuse to put its troops on the border with Israel until the UN had certified that Israel had completely withdrawn from Lebanon.

Many Israelis believed the May withdrawal from Lebanon would simply give Hizballah a better position with which to attack Israeli towns across the border. To the surprise of many analysts, Hizballah did not immediately continue the conflict and launch the much-feared Katyusha rocket barrages into northern Israel. Hizballah, taking credit for ejecting the IDF and enjoying its surging popularity in the Arab World as a result, did not pressure the Israelis across the border and did not launch any terrorist operations. But though Hizballah was not acting militarily, it did not cease its rhetoric.

Following Israel’s pullout from Lebanon in May of 2000, the government in Beirut demanded that Israel also pull out of Shebaa Farms. Israel refused, saying that was a matter to be resolved in the Syrian-Israeli peace talks. Lebanon has since officially accepted the UN demarcation, but Hizballah continues to demand Israeli withdrawal from the area and considers military operations in the Shebaa Farms area to be justified. In early December 2000, Sheikh Nai’im Qasim, Hizballah deputy secretary general, reiterated in an interview that Hizballah would continue to fight for the Shebaa Farms even if the rest of the world did not accept that it belonged to Lebanon.

The Lebanese government, despite having agreed to the UN demarcation, has also supported military resistance in order to regain Shebaa. Just after the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon,
Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri stated that Lebanon would reserve the right to use all “diplomatic and non-diplomatic means” to regain the territory it believed Israel still occupied, including Shebaa Farms. The current intifada has given Hizballah the chance to renew its military struggle with Israel and fight for what it considers to be the rest of occupied Lebanon. Since the Israeli/Palestinian violence, Hizballah has captured three Israeli soldiers and killed two in the vicinity of Shebaa Farms. The last one died in an ambush in April. These events and the seizure of an IDF reserve colonel have set events on a potentially perilous course.

At this point, it is worth mentioning two relatively new players in the region whose actions will affect the situation. Bashar al-Asad, son of President Hafiz al-Asad, took his father’s place in June, 2000. He has not significantly changed his father’s policy in Lebanon, except to allow more open debate in the Lebanese press about continued Syrian presence in the country. He certainly has not softened his father’s demand for unilateral Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights prior to concluding an Israeli-Syrian peace treaty. Bashar has kept many of his father’s advisors in their places, and is presumably still following the policy that the Hizballah threat can pressure Israel to come to the negotiating table. While the current crisis is ongoing, Bashar is moderating his country’s military activity in order to avoid provoking Israel, but Syria’s statements supporting Hizballah activity in Shebaa Farms continue to exacerbate the situation.

King Abdullah II of Jordan assumed the throne after the death of his father Hussein in March, 1999. Abdullah has yet to establish the regional influence his father had. Perhaps Hussein’s peacemaking credentials could have helped to lessen the tensions and alleviate the violence in the current crisis. But Abdullah has not done much more than meet with Arafat and publicly denounce Israeli actions against Palestinian protestors. He does not yet have the ability to help find a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian crisis, or influence Syria to stop Hizballah activity in Shebaa Farms.

Hizballah and its hard-line backers in Iran have a stake in seeing any peace treaty between Israel and the Palestinians derailed. A peace treaty signed by Palestinian Authority President Arafat would further legitimize Israel, something hard-liners in Iran so not want to see. If it appears an agreement is likely, more operations in the “occupied area” of Shebaa will probably occur. Even if an agreement fails, Hizballah may decide to launch an attack to force the Israeli government on the defensive.

Before he left office, Barak publicly stated that he held Syria responsible for Hizballah activity in Shebaa Farms, and would retaliate accordingly if Israel was attacked again. Hizballah could consider a further strike at Israeli soldiers in the Shebaa as a chance to continue pressure on Israel while it is preoccupied with the Palestinian intifada. Though Sharon has denied that he would do anything to escalate the crisis, he will be under great pressure from the Israeli public to improve the security situation in Israel. He may be tempted to retaliate against Syria should a major Hizballah attack on the Israeli border occur. Israeli warplanes struck a Syrian position in Lebanon after one Israeli soldier died in a Hizballah attack in April. A more severe Hizballah may cause a more severe Israeli response.

A terrorist strike or incident in Shebaa Farms that causes more Israeli casualties could begin a further cycle of retaliations, and the situation could quickly escalate. Iran recently stated that Israeli attacks on Syria or Lebanon would lead to “astounding and unexpected retaliation.” Attacks on Lebanon may not immediately escalate the situation, but if Sharon decides to bring the conflict to Syria, the chances of regional war will become very real. Bashar al-Asad, still trying to shore up his support in Syria, may feel pressure to answer an Israeli attack, even though he knows he cannot defeat Israel militarily. Syria has SCUD-C missiles that can range Israel, and also has the capability to put chemical weapons in its missiles. Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, always looking for a way to influence events, may decide to come to Syria’s assistance with ground forces. In the context of a regional conflict, the “April Understanding” rules that kept the violence at manageable levels will no longer apply.

In the face of a regional war, King Abdullah of Jordan would face a serious crisis. Currently trying to balance the significant anti-Israeli sentiment within Jordan and his continued diplomatic relations with Israel, he may be forced to tear up the peace treaty he signed in 1994 or face the overthrow of his government. Egypt, the first Arab country to sign a

(Continued on page 15)
I recently spent three weeks in the Persian Gulf touring the region, interviewing State Department and US military personnel, and speaking to many outside observers. It became quite clear to me that this entire region is headed for even more unrest, trouble and upheaval—not from another Iraqi invasion or from Iran closing off the Gulf, not even from the confines of Islam, but from problems within. There are three areas as future sources of conflict for all the Gulf States, should they not take steps to alleviate them. The first is a population explosion that could foster a massive unemployment problem. Secondly, the depletion of oil reserves, and thirdly, a fresh water crisis.

First there is the problem of a population explosion and future unemployment. Modern health care and improvements in diet have created a double-edged sword in the Gulf States. There has been an increase in life expectancy of most of the population, and a reduced infant mortality rate. These, combined with government and religious programs encouraging large families lasting into the 1980s, have resulted in a population explosion.

At present, the Gulf has the highest per capita of its population under the age of 25 in the world. And while this may not seem like a large problem, one must consider the impact of the current job/welfare program in most Gulf countries. The method these Kings and Princes have used to stay in power is to promise 100% employment, benefits, and subsidies for all citizens. Typically these jobs are paper pushing and have no real performance requirements associated with them. The citizens are pleased because they have high paying jobs with benefits and little or no real work. It has created a bureaucratic empire and turned the Arab population into a welfare workforce that is ineffectual, unskilled, and made the government dependent upon south Asian technicians.

These leaders have staked their future on their ability to keep the native population 100% employed with zero-substance jobs. As we begin the new century, the largest portion of the population is still in Middle and High School. Soon they are going hit the job market and demand jobs equal to their fathers and grandfathers.

However, the universities have not moved to accommodate the future glut of citizens. Instead of pushing petroleum technology or engineering, the most popular curriculum is still Islamic Studies. Many Arabs study in the US and England, but they take language instead of mining or farming classes. This is not what Shell Oil or Brown & Root are looking for in future executives.

Each Gulf State has begun a program encouraging the future employment training of its citizenry. The Saudization or Emiratization or Kuwaitization of the work force touts the entrance of native Arab artisans, engineers, salesmen, and local businessmen and the exit of expatriate (non-Arab) workers. Unfortunately, the result is some natives going into real jobs formerly held by third country nationals (TCNs), but in actuality it is more of a strong-arm maneuver by the governments to force the western companies to hire "engineers" and "managers", who typically demand high salaries, but perform few tasks. They are the private sector equivalent to their bureaucratic countrymen.
Secondly, there is the coming oil crisis. The mention of an oil crisis with a barrel of oil in the $30+ range seems ridiculous. Yet, a crisis is coming for the Gulf, not the world, over oil. The combination of dwindling oil reserves within the Gulf, an increase of oil discoveries in Africa, central Asia and the ocean, and the beginning of a move away from a glutinous oil consumption in the West, means the prospects for a continued boom in the Gulf economies looks gloomy.

Granted, the world is not ready for a quick move away from oil. Most eastern and developing economies are completely dependent upon oil to fulfill their industrial needs. Even in the United States, our biggest oil use is for electrical production and home heating. Western oil experts agree that large-scale oil consumption will lessen soon, but also know that petroleum based business is ready for diversification of the product. So, it is known the world won't give up using vast quantities of oil in the immediate future.

However, some western nations are sick of the pollution and high prices. Auto companies have put electric cars into the mainstream. Alternative energy sources are being explored and used throughout the world. And larger economies have begun to move away from oil to natural gas and hydroelectric power to fuel their industrial production. While these moves don't signal the end of the oil hey-day, they do signal the autumn of the oil-based economies.

These countries know the end is coming, they just don't know what to do about it. The Saudi Arabian Oil Minister, Ali Na’imi appeared on BBC in April and admitted that this present spike in oil prices is the last hurrah of the dying market. The Kuwaitis and Saudis still have oil, but at the present production levels, they will run out as early as 2025 according to some analysts. Given those figures, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman will all run out much earlier. Unless the Gulf nations can come up with some other industry to put the population into the workforce, they face the bankruptcy of their economies, and the disintegration of their infrastructure as the TCNs abandon a sinking ship.

Lastly, there is an absolute crisis over water. Much sooner than the Arab nations of the Gulf will run out of oil, they will have run out of all natural sources of water, and be completely dependent upon outside nations for their water needs.

Presently Gulf nations have no water policy. They import large portions of their drinking water already, and what aquifers they do have, they are depleting far faster than can naturally be replenished. At this point, they are using desalination plants powered by natural gas. While that may help in the short term, the present demands of water in most Gulf states threatens to overwhelm the already stressed desalination capabilities.

And worst still, most of the water is being wasted. Saudi, UAE, and Kuwait are draining their aquifers, and import large amounts of water or desalinate water to pour on palm trees lining the highways. Most Gulf states don't even charge their citizens for water use; it is free!

Many have said that the next war won't be fought over oil, but over water. The sides are already being drawn for that war. The Turks are already using dams to limit water reaching Iraq and Syria. Now they are going to sell water by the tanker load to the highest bidder. They've already made lucrative deals with Jordan and Israel to supplement these nations existing water supplies.

Israel and Syria cannot agree over the Golan Heights for many reasons. One major reason is the spring network that feeds the Jordan River in Syria. Israel currently has all of that fresh water piped into Israel; so returning the Golan Heights would greatly reduce the fresh water supply for Israel.
Iran has made deals with Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar to sell them water via a pipeline from their northwest region. It is not only a money-maker for the Iranians, but once these three nations are dependent upon Iranian water supplies, Iran will have broken the power of the Gulf Cooperation Council, should they threaten to cut off the water supply to their dry customers.

At this point, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have begun dumping some recycled water into their aquifers. While it helps, they also need to dump most of their desalinated water back in just to save them. Further, they need to increase efforts to trap and use wastewater created through carelessness. Few people know that Kuwait City and Riyadh sit on underground lakes of unusable wastewater lost from poor plumbing, lawn care, street cleaning, and palm watering.

Unless the Gulf States break their foolish uses of water, begin to use a recycle process with their waste, and attempt to save the aquifers, they will be completely dependent upon the goodwill of their non-Arab neighbors and the west for their water supplies, at fair market value. This crisis threatens to peak just about the same time the oil reserves run out, leaving them without the oil revenues to buy water.

The Persian Gulf's future is again threatened by crisis. Instead of invading armies or political upheaval, the threat comes from what is already happening in the Gulf countries. If these states do not take steps to better educate and move their population into the workforce, develop other means of national income, and reform their water usage practices, then they face catastrophic consequences both economically and politically. Consequences include: a broken economy dependent on a dwindling product, with demand and price both falling; a workforce of managers unable to lead; and even the fall of the monarchies in some of the more conservative nations.

(Continued from page 12)

peace treaty with Israel, may also be forced to support Syria diplomatically, if not militarily. An Israeli attack on Syria would force other Arab governments who are under popular pressure to resist any Israeli aggression, to take military actions or posture in risky ways that would cause Israeli leaders, also under popular pressure to look decisive, and further escalate the conflict.

Is this scenario inevitable? Fortunately, no. The government leaders will surely try to avoid a war. Sharon, despite his reputation as a hawk, used measured retaliation in the death of the Israeli soldier in April. Bashar al-Asad seems to be doing everything he can to avoid conflict with Israel during these tense times. He wants to improve his country's economic condition, and will try to avoid a war that would only bring more economic hardship to his country.

Shebaa is a small area, and obscure outside of the Middle East. The area seems to be the subject of a simple territorial dispute. However it is located in a volatile region, with a history of conflict. The Shebaa Farms remain a legitimate target in Hizballah eyes. If Hizballah decides to conduct another operation, and if Israel retaliates by launching an attack into Syria, events could spin out of control. Despite the fact that political leaders don't want war, the danger of escalation is very real.
One of the rather unique experiences granted to officers serving in the Defense Attaché Office in Sana’a, Republic of Yemen is attending the frequent “goat grabs” and “qat chews.” The goat grabs were the official lunches attended. Lunches in Yemen tend to be rather large scale events with goat, lamb, chicken, fish, shrimp, lobster, rice, massive quantities of pita bread, and a plethora of local vegetables offered. Attendees could number anywhere between 15 and 1,500. The goat grab was usually followed by the Qat (pronounced GOT) chew.

The event from where the pictures used in this article were taken was the wedding celebration for the two sons of a senior army general officer. Conservatively, 1,500 guests were invited concurrently. Picture one shows the prepared lunch spread in only one of four such large lunch rooms.

Usually, immediately after lunch, the Qat chew would begin. The chewing of Qat is an interesting and perplexing phenomena of Yemen. Almost every afternoon of the year beginning around 1300 hours, Yemeni men gather with their friends and associates to chew Qat. Qat is usually chewed in a special room known as a mafraqe which has cushions lining the walls. If duty prevents going to a mafraqe with friends, Qat can be chewed at the duty site such as traffic checkpoints, in the office, or in the cockpit for pilots. Qat chews normally last all afternoon until 1700.
hours, but frequently continue until 2100 hours or so.

Qat are the leaves and shoots from a small tree grown in Yemen. Qat is the number one cash crop in Yemen and is exported to Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia and Eritrea in the Horn of Africa. It is also fairly popular in Saudi Arabia, but illegal. A Qat grower can usually make two harvests of Qat from his trees in a year. Qat must be exported quickly in that its effect will only last for about 24 hours after being picked.

The Qat leaves are what is chewed and the new shoots are considered prime. The leaves are chewed a couple of times and then deposited in a cheek from where the juices will flow. After a couple hours of chewing, the cheeks of some Yemeni men will expand out to the size of a tennis ball. Qat is considered an alkaloid. Its effects have been compared to drinking eight or nine cups of very, very strong coffee in fifteen minutes. Qat generally induces the Yemeni to relax and encourages discussion of the important issues in life such as politics, sports, and life in general. Yemeni men believe that Qat enhances their mental abilities and gives them the power of a lion in their sexual performance. The Yemeni women we have talked to have said this later contention is certainly untrue. Women too, less frequently get together to chew Qat as well. Yemeni men do not consider Qat addictive. One gentleman told me that he had been chewing Qat every day for 32 years and he could assure me it wasn’t addictive.

A medium sized baggie of acceptable quality qat (there are many quality standards, usually based on the Qat’s source. The higher qualities being much more expensive) costs about $5.00. We in the DAO were never quite able to figure the math on this issue. The average annual income for the standard Mohammed on the streets of Yemen was $240 a year – about a month and a half’s Qat consumption – and yet most men chewed all year long and still had to support families. The best we could figure, the more affluent Yemenis bought most of the Qat for their poorer friends. One has to imagine that Qat chewing would have a negative impact on Yemen’s economy with most businesses closing, or significantly slowing down, for

(Continued on page 18)
restriction has caused some problems for the Defense Attaché System. According to U.S. laws, Qat was illegal, but Qat chews were an integral and important part of attaché duties in Yemen. Qat chews provided the attachés extensive, close access to senior government and military officials and provided an excellent venue for information collection. The Defense Attaché System adopted what amounts to a “Don’t ask, Don’t tell” policy with its attaches in Yemen.

As the Defense Attaché in the Republic of Yemen, I attended many goat grabs and Qat chews, and found them to be excellent opportunities for information collection on politics, social conditions, and other important issues. Throughout all of my Qat chews, including one seven hour session, the Qat never had a noticeable effect on me – perhaps because I was focused so intensely on the information collection aspect.

Unquestionably, events such as the goat grabs and Qat chews are what make the duties of the attaché such an interesting, enjoyable and enriching experience. I am thrilled to have had the experiences. To get the opportunity to have such experiences, you have to be a **Foreign Area Officer!!!**

four or five hours a day. There have been calls to reduce or stop chewing Qat, but to date they have had little impact. In 1999, the President of the Republic of Yemen, Ali Abdullah Salih, declared that he was going to cut back his Qat chewing to only two days a week. In its place, he intended to participate in more sporting activities and learn how to use a computer. The President’s declaration had little impact.

Qat used to be widely available to the large Arab population of Detroit, Michigan. But, a number of years ago, the United States Government declared Qat to be a Class C narcotic and made it illegal. This
They have a tough time understanding why the apartheid and ethnic cleansing that America fought in South Africa and Yugoslavia would be acceptable when directed at them. They then grow jaded when they realize that the reasons for our demonstrated antipathy toward them may take the shape of dollar signs as they realize that most estimates put PAC donations of the Pro-Israel lobby at 200-500 times what is spent by Pro-Arab sources. Almost every national officeholder gets a donation and that makes the Palestinians cynical.

The ironic thing about the Palestinians is how they mix this cynicism with unwavering hope that this thing will work out and peace will be achieved. I spoke to three Arab friends, two of them Palestinian, the other from Lebanon, as the latest Camp David Summit was going on. I expressed surprise that Prime Minister Barak had floated the idea of some level of Palestinian control of Jerusalem. They explained that Israeli leaders had said that before in the past and that as nice as it sounds, it's just rhetoric to make them sound open-minded in western ears. They said thanks for the concern but it simply wasn't really on the table and I should assume that it wouldn't happen. I also said that it looked like Israel was ready to make serious land concessions this time. They said two things in response: first, "I'll believe it when I see it", and second, something to the effect that they are talking about giving back 90% of some of the areas that the U.N. told them to give 100% of back, 33 years ago. They're offering to give us small parts of our own land. Pardon us if we're not ready to give everyone a big hug yet (note: criticism is theirs, sarcasm is mine). Their math checked out, by the way. The optimism came through, though. Maher Tamimi, an Arabic language professor at the Defense Language Institute, was quick to add that this is all cause for hope: "When they are talking, they aren't shooting. Most Palestinians chose peace as their option. When Palestinians were given the opportunity to elect their representatives in the West Bank and Gaza, the majority of them voted for the PLO leadership which adopted the peace approach versus other organizations that were not supportive of the peace process." He states further that he doesn't hate Israelis; he simply wants a safe place in Palestine for his family. Maher is single; the rest of his family still lives in Hebron, where two of his brothers are doctors who have been attending to the victims of the current bloodshed. Maher loves America and his life here and wants to show himself as an example of what Palestinians are really like as opposed to the stereotype often portrayed in movies and on television.

As of this writing, the Israeli electoral process was in full swing with the odds strongly favoring the same Ariel Sharon I spoke of earlier. Ehud Barak was reluctant to give up his seat to Shimon Peres, who could conceivably beat Sharon. Barak will lose if he chooses this tack, which is unfortunate because the peace process will end with his administration. A Sharon victory will almost guarantee a regional war. He has discussed giving the Palestinians about half of what Barak promised and moving IDF forces into the Sinai which Egypt will not be able to tolerate. Hosni Mubarak will be forced to react or lose all political power. Additionally, prices at the gas pump will increase and global terrorism will triple. Sharon will pay one benefit for the Arab/Islamic world: he will create greater unity in the region than it has seen in a long time. Iran and Iraq will again become major players and their ties to former enemies will be cozier than ever. From a U.S. foreign policy perspective, a Sharon administration is a worst-case scenario. If somehow, Barak pulls off a miracle, peace is still possible. His mandate will not be strong in any
event and short-term public safety needs will be paramount. From a U.S. perspective, however, even the weakest Barak is better than Sharon. The Palestinians may not be able to bend on some things but many of them trust Barak and his strongest supporters in Israel during this election will likely be the 10-12% Arab population of the Israel.

What it seems many Palestinians really want from the U.S. is a global leader that is willing to tell both sides that they must live together. One that is not afraid to tell Israel that it is not always right no matter what it does. The United States currently gives Israel between 2 and 4 billion dollars in aid every year, depending on how you measure it. A pledge to withhold some or all of that money until peace is worked out, Jerusalem is either divided or an international city, and there exists a Palestinian state with the rights that Israeli citizens are guaranteed, might make the situation a little more peaceful. It would also have secondary benefits such as increasing stability in the Middle East, and keeping prices at the gas pump a little lower. Not doing these things costs us a few billion a year and gains us nothing.

Post Script:

Update: As you know, Ehud Barak did not acquiesce to Shimon Peres and got destroyed by Sharon at the polls mostly because of serious security fears of most Israeli citizens and an almost complete boycott by Israeli Arabs, who had supported Barak in the previous election by 90%, but who had lost faith in him. Ariel Sharon has not disappointed, turning off the peace process and nullifying the Oslo Accords in his first days in office. His administration is reported to have already proposed legislation to the Knesset asking it to legalize torture in the interrogation of prisoners. New settlements have continued to grow, unabated, as well. It is my guess that these developments, along with the predictable Palestinian reaction to them, will not greatly enhance the peace process. It will get worse before it gets better. It appears that U.S. policy may be leaning toward a hand-off approach, suggesting that the Israelis and the Palestinians solve the problems themselves. This neglects a few irrefutable facts. First, the Israelis aren't interested in drawing hard lines in the ground and saying, "That side is yours and this side is mine". They want it all. They're historically insecure about their borders and with some good reason. They are expansionist as a method of feeling secure; the continued settlements demonstrate that amply. Second, for negotiations to work, both sides must have some power to wield. The Palestinians have none - Israel with all the weapons, the money, and guaranteed U.S. support at the U.N. have all of it. It's much easier to negotiate if you're holding an M-16 and your opposite number is holding a broom stick. The Israelis have no need to negotiate and, with Sharon at the helm, won't. For peace to have a snowball's chance, the U.S. must take a more active role, not less. The prospects are clearly not good with Sharon in power. As I said before, it will get worse before it gets better.

— RETIRED FAO —

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pushing Lebanon to work towards internal re-forms of its own.

In addition to the various political forces discussed so far, there is currently a strong economic incentive for Syria to seek reform. Currently, as noted above, a large portion of the Syrian economy is based on smuggling across Lebanon and other black market activities. This is contributing to the isolation of Syria from the international community. It also makes it almost impossible for Syria to secure developmental aid or loans from outside sources. As a result, there is growing pressure to curb the black market economy and develop the equally, if not more lucrative sectors of the Syrian economy that are currently fallow.

For example, a large amount of Syrian light industry and manufacturing profits are escaping across the border. Traders from neighboring countries are buying up large amounts of Syrian made goods, transporting them across the border, and selling them for huge profits. Legal reforms could easily stem this flow and help to keep profits from those transactions in Syria.

Tourism is another grossly underdeveloped sector of the Syrian economy. Tourism is a growth industry in most areas of the World. Current projections indicate that this will continue for the immediate future. Biblical tourism in particular is expected to grow exponentially. Syria holds many significant Biblical sites that could be easily developed. The majority of these sites sit near the borders with Lebanon or Israel. Therefore, development of this sector will require Syria to move towards a more harmonious relationship with its regional neighbors.

Regional geography is a final element that will compel Syria to consider reforming and opening its system. The arbitrary nature of the international borders throughout the region make national defense for all of the member nations difficult. In Syria, mountains define the border on the north and west, but the desert to the south and east stretch uninterrupted for hundreds of miles into neighboring countries. In addition, Syria, when compared to the other nations of the region, is blessed by climate, usable land area, and resources. Without improved regional relations, Syria will remain unable to exploit this

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advantage and continue to be overly focused on defense.

There are also several specific geographic elements that will compel Syria to reform. The most obvious is the Golan. This area has long been a bone of contention with Israel. Recently, it has begun to lose its significance. Originally, Golan was important in a strategic and operational perspective. Improved weaponry has diminished this importance, but the Golan remains important for political reasons. The last round of negotiations between Syria and Israel indicate that there is a possibility that the Golan could be returned to Syria in the years to come with concessions made by both sides. This relatively productive region will benefit Syria's economy. Additionally, its return will be a significant political windfall, removing one more roadblock on the road to reform.

Geography also dictates that Syria will continue to have close, strong economic ties to Lebanon. The Homs Gap is the only natural outlet for goods moving from the interior to the coast. This pass is situated between Syria and northern Lebanon through the mountains that form the border between and generally separate the two countries. Trade will flow through this route. This is true regardless of the level of political involvement or military occupation that Syria imposes.

Syria also borders Iraq. Eventually, the World will normalize relations with Iraq. With its oil resources, Iraq's economy will return to its former levels. The time is ripe for Syria to take steps to improve its economic and international political situation in order to position itself to take advantage of the resurgence from Iraq. An economically strong Syria, with organic port facilities and ready access to the well-developed ports of Lebanon will be in a prime position to exploit this resurgence from Iraq. Syria can assume a position in relation to Iraq similar to the one played by Jordan prior to the Gulf War.

Finally, water provides a major incentive for Syria to improve its relations in the region. As populations continue to expand, the pressure to optimize the use of scarce regional water resources will escalate. Currently, there is no comprehensive agreement on the use of regional water. In fact, currently there is no agreed upon set of data to use in the discussion of regional water issues.

The technology exists to properly monitor the flow and use of water from all of the various regional sources, but political animosity and in-fighting, as well as a lack of funds, have prevented their being utilized. Improved regional relations will lead to consensus, at least on the need for an agreed upon set of data. This will open the door for World Bank funding of the necessary monitoring devices.

With this data, there is a possibility for a comprehensive agreement on the use of regional water resources. The current, bilateral, system of agreements is completely inadequate. They have done more to exaggerate the problem and serve only to further various unrelated political agendas. This agreement, between all of the nations connected to the water system, must include all water resources, both surface and subterranean.

Improved regional relations and a comprehensive water agreement will be mutually supporting. As relations in the region improve, the likelihood of a water agreement becomes more likely. An effective water agreement will remove many of the sources of contention from the political table and make improved regional relations more likely. The most notable example of this would again be the Golan, where current high profile negotiations are focused on occupation of the land, but heated, less public negotiations involve access to the water contained in the Golan aquifer. A comprehensive water agreement would do much to simplify these and similar ne-
(Continued from page 22)

gotiations.

There are many forces compelling Syria to begin to open and reform its policies. This sea change, however, will be very difficult and fraught with hazards for those in charge. Seldom if ever do those that begin to lead a reform survive to enjoy the final outcome. Above all else, the current groups that are leading Syria wish to maintain their own privileged position, even at the expense of their people and nation.

Fortunately, the group that is tied to the status quo is shrinking. Soviet patronage has ended. The demographics that have historically supported the Ba’ath Party are irreversibly shifting. The notables, whose influence is directly tied to economic relevance, are increasingly seeing their future in a more open international policy. Finally, the military is declining in capability, prestige, confidence, and relevance. Syria needs access to the international community to reverse this situation. As these trends continue, the traditional forces that have held power in Syria will find their grip weakening. The possibility for change becomes increasingly likely.

Additionally, the groups that desire change are growing daily. The youth and the business class are increasingly vocal in their dissatisfaction and they are slowly becoming organized to oppose the status quo. External forces are also aligning in a manner that is conducive to reform. The Lebanese are increasingly interested in a greater degree of autonomy and integration into the World economy. Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon has made Syria’s presence there less defensible and has turned international opinion towards the desire for an eventual withdrawal from northern Lebanon. Finally, the overall climate of the world has shifted since the Cold War. There is an increased desire to seek settlements for disputes that were long subordinated to the demands of the bi-polar world. The combination of shrinking authority within the traditional power groups and the growing influence of new elements both within and without will create significant pressure on the government to re-examine its policies. Syria will have to adapt to this new reality to remain relevant. Historically seeing itself as a leader in the Arab World, it will have to work to maintain that position. A policy of engagement and integration is the only logical course to follow.

EDITOR’s NOTE

We received three excellent articles from the U.S. Air Force.

*Europe’s Double Dealings in Democracy: The Case of Austria* by LtCol David Kirkland

*The Chinese-Taiwan Crisis* by Capt Andrews Westmond


Unfortunately since each is over 20 pages, they are too long for the Journal, but they will be posted on the FAOA web site.

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I am honored and humbled to have been accepted as the new coordinator for South and Southeast Asia reviews in the Journal. I have been on the “job” less than a week. I do not yet have any input for what I hope will be a regular summary of significant happenings in the FAO world as reported by South and Southeast Asian FAOs. What I am pleased to present, however, are biographical sketches of two retired US Army FAO colonels who work four floors above me in the State Department. Both of these esteemed gentleman served 30 years in our great Army and both, coincidentally, started as China FAOs before expanding their horizons into South and Southeast Asia. Both began work in the State Department as civil servants within the last six months, and their comments and lessons learned can both motivate and educate us.

Colonel (RET) Jason Greer was commissioned an Armor officer in 1969 and retired in 1999. After completing Chinese language training at DLI in 1979 he served the next 20 years in FAO assignments including Pakistan CGSC, Pakistan National Defense College, AARMA Islamabad, ARMA Islamabad, Army DCSOPS Middle East/ South Asia Desk Officer, State Department Pol-Mil Bureau Middle East/South Asia Desk Officer, OASD/ISA Country Director for Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh, and Director for South Asian Affairs on the National Security Council. In short, Colonel Greer was the epitome of the professional FAO, serving alternating tours in the field and in Washington. His in-depth knowledge and experience drove him to the very top levels of the US Government as evidenced by his selection for an NSC Director position.

Although Colonel Greer single-tracked even when it was discouraged, he still sees the need "for FAOs to have a firm grounding in their basic branch." For FAO training he places the highest value on the in-country experiences. He supports OPMS XXI "because of its potential for allowing FAOs to fully utilize their FAO skills." He also supports alternating between field and HQ assignments so that the big picture and the small picture views of U.S. foreign policy can be seen first hand.

As for the State Department, Colonel Greer served a tour in the political-military affairs bureau as a Lieutenant Colonel. After retirement he found his current job on the Office of Personnel Management web site ( ). He is the director of the Political-Military Affairs Bureau's Office of Congressional and Public Affairs. He serves as the primary liaison between the pol-mil, legislative affairs, and public affairs bureaus. Outside the building he interfaces with Hill staffers and the media. His opinion of the State Department? "Over time, I have come to better understand State's particular strengths and weaknesses - and generally my opinion of State has become more favorable."

Colonel (RET) Tom Washburn was commissioned in the Infantry in 1970 and branch transferred to Special Forces in 1987. His FAO assignments include Chinese language training in Hong Kong, S3 and XO of 1st PSYOPS Battalion (when those positions were coded 48), and commander of 9th PSYOPS Battalion (ABN), CGSC instructor, Branch and Division Chief in DIA, Thai language training at DLI, ARMA Bangkok, and Pol-Mil Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific. Like Colonel Greer, Colonel Washburn looked for federal jobs on the OPM web site, but it was the connections he made during his last active duty tour within the State Department that landed him the job. The vacancy in the Office of Plans, Policy, and Analysis in the Political-Military Affairs Bureau was intended for a currently serving State
Department civil servant but a seldom-used provision in the Merit Promotion vacancy announcement (not advertised on the OPM site) stated that "military personnel with three years of honorable service" were eligible to apply.

Colonel Washburn is not particularly enthusiastic about the fact that OPMS XXI will take away the opportunity for FAOs to serve as XOs, S3s, and commanders, but he accepts the rationale for it. Colonel Washburn’s best tour? ARMA Bangkok – an assignment that was tremendously exciting and extremely demanding. Most disappointing FAO tour? As an instructor at CGSC Colonel Washburn was not used for the China FAO skills for which his billet was coded.

Views on the State Department? Colonel Washburn is surprised that the Foreign Service does not encourage regional or country specialization the way military FAO programs do. The Foreign Service expects its officers to be able to serve anywhere. That said, "I am impressed by the speed with which they [FSOs] move into a new job in a new geographic area and in short order become very knowledgeable and effective."

Anyone wishing to contact these two great Americans can reach them at greerjh@state.gov and washburntd@state.gov.


Kiernan’s seminal work is almost five years old and has been reviewed favorably in academic journals. Because Kiernan work is so well-known I intend to review it here from just one perspective: a perspective that supports my own academic interests of someday explaining not only how China supported the Khmer Rouge, but why China supported the Khmer Rouge. The policy decision to throw your support behind some of the greatest killers the world has ever known is a strange one indeed, made even stranger by the fact that China appears to have made no effort to temper the behavior of the Khmer Rouge.

But first a brief word on Kiernan’s work for those interested in a more traditional review. *The Pol Pot Regime* joins Elizabeth Becker’s *When the War Was Over*, David Chandler’s *The Tragedy of Cambodian History*, and Nayan Chanda’s *Brother Enemy* as mandatory reading for anyone hoping to even begin to grasp the genocidal, pathological, hyper-Maoist Khmer Rouge. Kiernan meticulously combines survivor interviews that he has been conducting since 1980 with unearthed documents and the work of other scholars. The result is an almost week by week account of the 44 months of the Khmer Rouge regime: who was in charge, who was up, who was down, who was killing, where were they killing, why were they killing, who were they killing, how were they killing etc. An overriding
The theme is an explanation of internal Khmer Rouge purges. The Khmer Rouge ate itself from within in a way unfathomable to the western reader. Anyone who has been to the Tuol Sleng torture center museum in Phnom Penh will find it poignant that the more than 26,000 men, women, and children who perished there (only seven people are known to have survived) included a large number of internal enemies who had once been loyal Khmer Rouge cadre.

Kiernan makes an extra effort to shape his analysis to support a future genocide investigation and international tribunal. He spends considerable time, for instance, on the effort by the Khmer Rouge to wipe out the minority Moslems (Chams) that made approximately five percent of the population in 1975. There were times when I had to put the book down and take a deep breath, as some of the first-hand accounts of violence are particularly disturbing. There is a slight inconsistency where in one chapter ethnic Cambodian Chinese are killed because they are Chinese, but in another chapter those same Chinese are killed because they are bourgeoisie – and Kiernan thus concludes that the charge of genocide would not stick.

Perhaps the only aspect of this book that makes its scholarship somewhat dated is the fact that none of the interviews are with the killers themselves. Since the wholesale collapse of the Khmer Rouge in 1996 it is now possible for researchers to meet with former Khmer Rouge cadre to seek details from their side of the equation. This remains to be done, and it is also a potential mechanism for answering the question I will pursue forthwith: what were the full details of Chinese support to the Khmer Rouge?

What we learn from Kiernan about Chinese support to the Khmer Rouge is some interesting particulars of the what and the when, but not the why. We learn that the “when” began years, even decades, before the Khmer Rouge took power. Promising revolutionaries went to China for training in various technical skills that were intended to pay dividends one day. As the chance of revolution grew, the reason for traveling to China extended beyond training and into what was very likely political strategizing. We learn from Kiernan, for instance, that Pol Pot himself was visiting China in March 1970 when Premier Lon Nol led a parliamentary coup that removed Prince Sihanouk from power. Pol Pot’s primary handler in China was none other than Kang Sheng, Mao’s secret service chief (see Faligot and Kauffer, *The Chinese Secret Service*, for a biography of Kang). Another Khmer Rouge leader was in China during the next major regime change in Cambodia. Ieng Sary had to be ferried to Phnom Penh in a Chinese-owned 707 on 24 April 1975, seven days after the Khmer Rouge took the city.

Following the Khmer Rouge seizure of power China began an ambitious assistance effort that continued, in one form or another, up until the end of the Khmer Rouge regime (and semi-covertly throughout the 1980s when the Khmer Rouge was a guerrilla group operating from Thailand). Pol Pot visited China in June 1975 and that same month a Chinese Defense Ministry team traveled to Cambodia to assess Cambodia’s defense needs. Chinese aircraft and ships then began regular journeys to Cambodia to deliver military items, farm implements, clothing, and other miscellaneous items. In exchange Cambodia traded rice (at a time when hundreds of thousands of Cambodians were starving to death), raw rubber, and, surrealististically, animal parts. Chinese believe in the medicinal qualities of certain animal bones, skins, and organs. In one ship’s manifest preserved for posterity from mid-1977, 24,760 dried geckos -- the large type resembling an Arizona Gila monster -- were sent to China along with six tons of monkey bone, 1.5 tons of elephant bone, a ton of snake skins (mostly python), 145 kg of panther and tiger skins, 73 kg of black bear skins, and 128 kg of ringmark lizard. There were numerous shipments like this. Kiernan goes so far as to compare the trading value that China provided the Khmer Rouge for the animal parts with the going price at contemporary Chinese and Taiwan apothecaries to demonstrate that China was ripping off the Khmer Rouge. Perhaps this was the least the Khmer Rouge could do for China to thank them for doing business with the devil. It’s a miracle that Cambodia today still has wild tiger, elephant, monkey, and Thai crocodile (extinct in Thailand).

China provided considerable military hardware to the Khmer Rouge, as well as 15,000 military and civil advisors according to Kiernan. More recent sources dispute this figure and cite Khmer Rouge documents that tracked the number of Chinese in country to
place the maximum number of Chinese advisory personnel at 800. The aid and advisory efforts required VIP visits and diplomatic coordination beyond that of the Chinese Embassy in Phnom Penh (one of only a handful that stayed open during the Khmer Rouge regime). General Wang Shangrong, then deputy chief of the PLA general staff, made one of these dignitary visits in February 1976 when he was responding to a Khmer Rouge demand for increased military aid. The two sides signed a military aid treaty and the weapons shipments increased. In December 1977 the leader of China’s Dazhai Commune, the model commune at the time, traveled to Cambodia for a VIP tour. He was shown Cambodians laboring in the fields, but not the killing in the fields. A month later Deng Xiaoping’s wife Deng Yingchao made her VIP visit to the country that by then had exterminated almost 15 percent of its population, including almost half of its ethnic Chinese population.

That basically sums up the factual information that we learn from this work about the relationship between China and the Khmer Rouge. Some of it is new, such as the animal parts trading, but much of it is available elsewhere, in particular in Chanda’s *Brother Enemy* (1986). Although we do not learn a lot about China’s motivation, we do get a glimpse of the suspicion with which the Khmer Rouge viewed their communist brothers. They were kept under constant surveillance, they had no freedom of movement, and during political indoctrination sessions in January 1976 and again a year later the Khmer Rouge leadership warned its senior cadre to “beware of China…she wants to make us her satellite.” It is perhaps this evidence that lends weight to Kiernan’s one comment on China’s motivation: “China’s interest in Democratic Kampuchea had little to do with the living conditions of Cambodians or the country’s ethnic Chinese. More important even than the trade in wildlife products were the strategic opportunities Democratic Kampuchea offered China to exploit divisions in Southeast Asia and outflank Vietnam.”

So while Kiernan’s objective was to describe the Khmer Rouge regime *in toto*, he does also help readers understand China’s role. Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of his work in this regard is a footnote stating that there are 36 dossiers of Chinese-language original Khmer Rouge documents in the Cambodian National Archives that have not yet been exploited.

**About the Reviewer:** Major Paul Marks, US Army 48F, was a UN Military Observer in Cambodia during the United Nations Transitional Authority mission (1993), and he spent three years as the Deputy CINCPACREP in the US Embassy in Phnom Penh (1996-1999). He is currently a contingency planner in the State Department’s political-military affairs bureau.
Reviews by LT Youssef H. Aboul-Enein (USNR)

EGYPTIAN RED SEA DESTROYER SQUADRON: CLOSING THE BAB-EL-MANDAB STRAITS

Much has been written about the 1973 Arab-Israeli War with the focus on the tremendous revolution in air and ground infantry warfare. The United States Army and Marine Corps spent hours studying this conflict with the result being a complete change in doctrine for both services. What is not explored is the Egyptian exploitation of its Red Sea Destroyer Squadron that executed a blockade of the Israeli port of Eilat by closing the Bab-El-Mandab Straits located at the narrow isthmus between Yemen and Somalia.

The actions of the Egyptian Red Sea Destroyer Squadron indicates meticulous planning on the part of military planners in Alexandria and Cairo and a highly developed sense of appreciation for cutting the sea-lanes of communications during the 1973 War. The tactic was not to engage Israeli naval and air forces but to only disrupt shipping bound for Israel from the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. Sadly, little has been written about the naval aspects of the Yom-Kippur War, the Israelis including the prominent author, statesman and historian Chaim Herzog dismisses the naval aspect of the 1973 War in both his books War of Attonement and the seminal The Arab-Israeli Wars. Even Egyptian authors like Egyptian Chief of Staff during the war Field Marshal Abd-al-Gahnny El-Gamassy devotes a few paragraphs in his 500 plus page memoirs published in Arabic in 1998.

An Interview with an Egyptian Commodore

Commodore Mustafa Kamal Mansour, Egyptian Navy was interviewed by journalist Manal Nour-al-Din on the 25th anniversary of the Yom-Kippur War or Ramadan War as the Arab side calls it. The Commodore explains that his squadron --which consisted of two Skory-type Destroyers, ancillary craft (Herzog, 1982)-- departed in August 1973 with orders to get underway towards the Indian Ocean. Their orders were to proceed toward Pakistan or India for needed repairs of the destroyers. The squadron put anchor in Aden, explaining to authorities that the Indian dry-docks would not be ready to receive the Squadron of Destroyers. They remained in Aden for two months conducting exercises and paying port visits in Port Sudan, Sudan; Berbera, Somalia and Hodeidah in Northern Yemen.

Five days prior to the opening of hostilities, sealed orders were opened designating H-Hour as the 6th of October at 1400 Cairo Time. Commodore Mansour was to execute a blockade of all Israeli bound shipping entering or departing the Bab-El-Mandab Straits. The Egyptians would remain on station seven months from the start of the war conducting maritime interdiction operations and cutting off tankers and merchant shipping bound for Eilat. The Egyptian destroyers also had ancillary ships as part of the squadron that provided re-supply while on-station. Being out of range from Israeli air and missile attack, the Egyptians relied on intelligence gathered from Arab merchant ships entering Bab-el-Mandab and had little interference except from naval vessels observing Egyptian actions. These observing warships included vessels from the United States, France and England along with bordering Arab and African states that sent ships to monitor events.

Choosing the Bab-el-Mandab Straits dealt a blow to Israel's ability to import petroleum products. The Egyptian Red Sea Squadron's Blockade would be used by the late Anwar Sadat as a bargaining tool during the cease-fire negotiations that were undertaken to disengage forces and negotiate the release of the Egyptian Third Army which was surrounded by the Israelis. In studying the Egyptian Navy Official website (navy.mmc.gov.eg) cites this blockade as an important long-term naval operation that disrupted Israel's supply of oil from the Persian Gulf. One can never underestimate the maritime potential of forces engaged in combat, in particular regional powers like Israel and Egypt.

According to the memoirs of Field Marshal Gamassy, he recounts that Egypt estimated that 18 million tons of oil in imported annually by Israel and ar-
rives their port of Eilat. Egyptian military planners intended to provide a layered blockade of this port laying mines around the Gulf of Suez, and interdiction of merchant shipping using fast attack boats north of the Bab-el-Mandab Straits and finally the blockade of the Straits themselves. Gamassy writes that mines sunk a total of 48,000 tons of shipping bound for Eilat in the opening days of the war.

Egyptian Naval Order of Battle for Yom-Kippur War

Egyptian books on the war lacks detail on the number and order of battle and focuses mainly on tactics, strategy and political explanations of the outcome of military action. Western and Israeli sources report the total number of Egyptian naval warships deployed in the Suez Canal Zone, Mediterranean, and Red Sea Theaters as:

- Fast Attack Boats: 60
- Submarines: 12
- Destroyers: 08
- Amphibious Craft: 14

Overall command of Egyptian Naval Forces was under Vice Admiral Fuad Abu Zikry with a division of the Red Sea Squadron and the Mediterranean Squadron.

Conclusion

The 1973 Red Sea Blockade occurred 1,000 miles away from the nearest Egyptian port and the Egyptian Navy of today is quite different from the one encountered in 1973. As anyone who has served with Egyptian Naval Forces today can attest there is a shift away from Soviet-style doctrine and an embracing of western combat styles and technology. The brevity of the war overshadows the significance of Egyptian naval planning (Aker, 1985). Had the war extended, Israel could not have sustained itself solely on airlift and several attempts to break this blockade is an illustration of the effectiveness of Egyptian naval forces in the Red Sea theater (Aker, 1985).

Sources Used:

(1) Official Website of the Egyptian Navy (navy.mmc.gov.eg).
Two recent books on Latin America provide some useful information about both history and culture. While each has its faults, they serve a useful purpose for Latin American Specialists.

The first is John Charles Chasteen’s *Born in Blood and Fire: A Concise History of Latin America*. Emphasis is placed on concise, as he moved from pre-Columbian times to post Cold War times in a mere 321 pages. His thesis is that while development was different throughout Latin America (a term which he notes ironically was derived from the French and their attempt to catch British trade supremacy) there were specific themes throughout periods of history. An interesting timeline at the beginning of the book shows the differing ways development took place during these periods in Mexico, Brazil and Argentina.

He demonstrates how cultural development differed in Latin America than in the United States. In the latter, differing cultures were melded through a melting pot into the dominant culture. However, in Latin America, Chasteen argues that the dominant Spanish culture was changed by the native Indian culture instead of the other way around. He notes the importance of Nationalism in the wars of Liberation in the early 19th Century, but demonstrates how the unity of creole and mestizo designed to drive out the Peninsulares did not last long past independence.

Throughout Latin American history, the influence of foreign powers, initially Spain, then after independence England, and finally and currently, the United States, is stressed. In each case, however, Chasteen argues that the foreign model was changed by the interplay of nativist influences. He also notes the shift in governing philosophies, from initially at least stated liberalism, to conservatism, to scientific management, through populism, to the current model based on nationalism and democracy. Even within this model, development did not occur at a similar rate. Moreover, given the paternalist style of leadership, often leadership style was more determined by who was the leader at a particular time and not what the winds sweeping Latin America were.

When he enters the 20th century, particularly in the Cold War era, he reaches conclusions that very well may be at odds with many of the readers of this journal. Chasteen places much of the ills of modern Latin America at the feet of “National Security Doctrine” – a catchall which covers every form of repression. He specifically argues that US involvement in Latin America did not lead to democracy, “but helped trigger dictatorship.” Even when attempting to be even handed, he shows a predilection for leftist regimes. Speaking of Cuba, he notes “It remained authoritarian, and the Army…constituted one of its chief pillars. But the revolutionary state worked steadily to improve the lives of Cuba’s poor majority, and it never committed the wholesale mayhem so characteristic of anticommunist military governments.” He even continues to (although couching it in the terms of “Many in Latin America believed…”) profess that the School of the Americas taught torture techniques.

This slanted approach to recent history mars an otherwise worthwhile review of Latin American history. While, in a volume this thin, in depth analysis is impossible, the work nevertheless remains thought provoking, and serves as a good introduction to Latin American history. Therefore, it can be recommended, with reservations.

A second new volume *Conquistadors*, by Michael Wood, is an interesting combination of travelogue and history. A companion to a BBC series, the concept is for Wood to travel in the footsteps of Cortes, Pizarro and the other conquerors of the New World, telling their story that way.

This is a lavishly illustrated volume, and I was quite impressed by the work Wood put into mapping and then following the routes taken not only of Cortes and Pizarro, but of Francisco Orellena up the Amazon River and Cabeza de Vaca through the Southwestern United States and Northern Mexico. The story he tells of the conquistadors is, as can be assumed, bloody in the telling. What makes this volume useful for FAO, however, is his analysis of the effects, 400 years and more later, of these actions on current day Latin America.

This book is not an academic work by any means. However, the illustrations and the well written comments on current Latin American society and the effect of the conquistadors on that society make it a useful book for a FAO’s coffee table.
As usual, there are lots of things going on here in the Proponent Office. We continue to work closely with our brethren in PERSCOM FAO Assignments Branch and Colonels’ Division to ensure we’re all pulling in the same direction. Here’s just a sample of what’s been going on.

(1) For the third year in a row, I’m happy to report that Army FAOs were well represented on the Colonels’ promotion list. This was the last O6 board held under old OPMS 2 rules and, thus, had a mix of both single track (OPMS XXI) and dual track (OPMS 2) officers. In both categories, FAOs did extremely well. Promotion percentages for “In the Zone” officers averaged 80% against a 52% Army average. Additionally, we had a very large number of FAOs picked up in the “Above the Zone” category. We in the Proponent offer each of you who were selected our most heartfelt congratulations!

(2) A proposal is being finalized to revise the FAO Career Field Designation (CFD) Process. Unexpected/unprogrammed losses at CFD impact our population of officers in several ways. Having invested significant personal time and effort in FAO training, some officers find themselves unexpectedly returned to their basic branch. As a result of their time away from branch assignments while in training, they then find themselves behind their basic branch contemporaries who have continued on in “normal” Operations Career Field assignments. Families also feel the pinch as they have made significant commitments to support spouses undergoing FAO training. Finally, scarce resources invested in training are ultimately lost, as many of these officers will never serve a FAO assignment. The resource issue is then compounded by the fact that a new crop of FAOs which has had no training gets designated by the CFD. The Proponent is forced, in effect, to pay twice for one officer.

Under the proposal we’re forwarding, FAOs would be career field designated in a similar fashion to Army Acquisition Corps (AAC) officers. Once an officer commits to start training, CFD into Operations Support/FA48 occurs. That will serve to protect the officer’s commitment to the program, keep our officers on an even footing with the AAC functional area when it comes to promotion consideration, and will protect the investment of training dollars.

Now in a final draft form, the proposal has received a great amount of support. I anticipate it will be one of several issues discussed during the upcoming Army Development System Update (ADSU) to be presented to the CSA sometime in July.

That’s just a sample of what’s been going on. June will find us out in Monterey for the semi-annual FAO Course. COL Manny Fuentes continues to do yeoman’s work out there in providing on the scene mentoring for FAOs in the course. Additionally, his focus on professional development activities for both the FAOs and spouses has been a fantastic addition to our program.

Finally, in keeping with our desire to expand knowledge in the field on our ICT program, MAJ Warren Hoy provides the next installment – focused on Brazil. Again, congratulations to all of those great FAOs selected for promotion to O6. Keep in touch with us and provide feedback on what we can do to improve the program.
In-Country Training — Rio de Janeiro

It's a Dirty Job, But Somebody’s Gotta Do It!

By Major Warren Hoy
Latin American Program Manager
FAO Proponent Office

In-Country Training – Rio de Janeiro

It’s a Dirty Job, but Somebody’s Gotta Do It

MAJ Warren Hoy, Latin America Program Manager, FAO Proponent Office

The Army maintains 11 In-Country Training (ICT) sites in Latin America for 48Bs. Of these, ten require Spanish language skills, but Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, is the exception – FAOs conducting ICT in Rio must speak Brazilian Portuguese. That’s just one of the things that make Rio a unique experience for the two FAOs each year who conduct ICT there.

Mention Rio de Janeiro, and most peoples’ minds conjure images of bikinis on the famous Copacabana and Ipanema beaches, Pão do Açúcar (Sugarloaf) Mountain, and the wild nightlife of Carnaval. For FAO trainees, though, Rio means working and learning to become regional experts. FAOs in ICT are assigned to the Defense Attaché Branch Office in the small U.S. Consulate in Rio de Janeiro, although they are supervised by the Assistant Army Attaché and senior rated by the Defense/Army Attaché, both of whom are 600 miles away at the U.S. embassy in Brasilia. Thus, trainees must be capable of surviving in the local area on their own and resolving school issues with minimal assistance from the embassy.

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FAOs in Rio for ICT attend the first year of the two-year Brazilian Command and General Staff College. They learn Brazilian Army organization, staff procedures, and joint operations, in addition to building relationships with their classmates from Brazil and several other nations. After completing the course, FAOs spend up to four months traveling throughout Latin America to develop their regional expertise and practice their Spanish skills. Brazil is nearly as big as the United States, and borders every country in South America except Chile and Ecuador, so just becoming familiar with the entire host nation is a challenge!

VIP visitors are common in Rio, and FAOs are frequently called upon to assist with their visits. In recent years, FAOs have helped host Vice President Gore, various Congressional delegations, the Commander in Chief of U.S. Southern Command, and numerous other civilian and military dignitaries. FAOs serve as interpreters, guides, and local advisors. These duties provide invaluable exposure to senior policymakers and insights into U.S. policy initiatives in the region.

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FAOs in Rio live “on the economy” in privately leased housing and are authorized to ship their full JFTR weight allowance, including a vehicle.

Training in Rio de Janeiro provides FAOs with excellent opportunities to attend a military school, travel, and learn firsthand about U.S. objectives in the region. The city also provides an outstanding quality of life for officers and their families alike.
The FAO/RAO Program Coordinator released the Marine administrative message, MARADMIN 051/01, in February 2001 announcing this year's study-track FAO/RAO board that will be held in Quantico from 10-13 July 2001. This board will select 10 new FAOs and 8 new RAOs to begin the funded training program in 2002. Applications are currently being accepted by MMOA-3, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, HQMC, Quantico. PLU likewise conducted an experience-track board at the end of the First Quarter FY01 and added ten new FAOs and 3 new RAOs to the International Affairs Officer "pool"; LtGen Hailston, the Commanding Officer of III MEF (Marine Expeditionary Force), was among those designated as RAOs.

As of March 2001, PLU is sponsoring the following officers for in-country training (ICT). In the European theater, Maj Barnes is heading to Ukraine for an internship while conducting his year with the Marshall Center in Garmisch, Germany; and Maj Christopher continues his studies at the Baltic Defense College in Tartu, Estonia. Moving on to Asia, Maj Moseley and newly promoted Maj Oppenheim continue to study at Capitol Normal University in Beijing, China. LtCol Mauro has just finished his year in Korea and is returning to the United States to assume command of a Reserve Infantry Battalion in Chicago, Illinois; and Maj Ken Nelson is still breaking ground as our first FAO in Vietnam. Both Maj Goff and Capt Perry are working hard at the Foreign Service Institute in Yokohama and making their way throughout Japan and greater East Asia. In the Middle East, Maj Cunningham will finish his stay in Oman during the month of April 2001; while Maj (LtCol-Select) Costantini and Capt Duke are relatively new to the area, having arrived in Egypt and Israel respectively during January 2001. Both recently returned from trekking through the High Atlas of Morocco for two weeks in March.

Unfortunately, we are somewhat disappointed concerning an initiative to place a Former Soviet Union FAO at the University of St. Petersburg, Russia for one year, but due to the present political climate, we have decided to wait until the summer of 2002 to move a FAO into Russia for their in-country training. At least the groundwork has been sufficiently laid for moving forward with this proposal in the future. Moreover, we will be placing our first two FAOs into Croatia this summer, as well as an additional officer in China.

In March, PLU also had the opportunity to brief 15 FAO/RAOs and Former Ambassador, Rodney Minott, from the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey about the current status of the USMC International Affairs Officer Program during an Orientation Visit to the Washington area from 5-9 April. The officers likewise received briefs at various other agencies involved with National Security Affairs: DIA, CIA, Department of State, and Congress (as Senator Dianne Feinstein hosted the officers for a breakfast). A second group will be making a similar visit in early May 2001 as part of the National Security Affairs curriculum at NPS. The Branch Head for PLU, Col O’Keefe, and Maj Carroll will likewise be making a semi-annual trip to Monterey to talk to all of the FAO/RAOs currently attending NPS or DLI in Monterey and to meet with several professors and administrators at the schools during the second week in April.

On the promotion front for the FY02 boards, we had a 47% selection rate for promotion to Colonel (7/15 officers) and an excellent in-zone selection rate of 73% for promotion to LtCol (8/11 officers). This is a marked improvement from last year's results for selection to LtCol.

Finally, the FAO/RAO Program Coordinator intends to continue to develop the Secretary of the Navy's FAO Mentoring Program initiative. We have thus far received approximately 58 positive responses from over 120 individuals (professors, former military officers, regional experts, business and political leaders) who were solicited to participate in this ongoing effort to improve the quality of our political-military officers. The IAOP Coordinator has met with several mentors to request their suggestions on how to best implement the program, and in the coming months PLU will start to match FAOs with appropriate regional Mentors.

As always, the Unified Commands and International Issues Branch (PLU), PP&O, HQMC is always available to take your comments. For further information, please see our website at... We welcome any comments on how to improve the program. Please see the FAO Proponent Page on the inside cover of the FAOA Journal for POC information. We have recently relocated office spaces within the Pentagon and are now in Room 4B337.
Proposed FAOA Logos

Submitted by:

LTC Y.T. Pak
Major Kurt Marisa
LCDR Matt Ashley
Major Phuong Pierson

Logo has purple background and red banners.

Submitted by:

Joseph Tullbane

Banner letters in red, Service names in black, blue globe with green continents.

The FAOA leadership has yet to establish selection criteria. More proposals are encouraged. E-mail any comments to faoa@erols.com
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