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NEW LOGO STILL NEEDED

C’MON FOLKS—I NEED SOMEONE WITH GRAPHIC DESIGN SKILLS! I’ve asked twice now for help in designing a new Association logo to more accurately reflect the emerging jointness of our membership. Still no responses. Help me out and you’ll receive a **free three year subscription** if your design is adopted by the Board of Governors.

THANKS FOR YOUR SERVICE, DAVE!

Colonel Dave Smith has assumed the duties of the Army Attaché in Pakistan and has relinquished the responsibilities of the Editor of the FAO Journal. Dave did a super job as the Editor and will be missed. Thanks Dave!!!

BOOK REVIEWERS NEEDED

All members are encouraged to contribute to our regional book reviews columns. There seems to be the perception in the field that the regular editors are responsible for all content contained in their columns. NOT TRUE! Anyone can contribute and I encourage everyone to do so—particularly those of you in graduate school or other professional military education courses. If you read a good book, share it with us. Just send your input directly to the column editor or to the FAOA e-mail address and it will be forwarded promptly. We would especially welcome permanent columnists for Africa and South Asia/Southeast Asia.

MEMBERSHIP

Don’t let your membership expire. Expiration dates will be printed on the mailing label for the FAO Journal.

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**ASSOCIATION NEWS**

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From the Field

I just wanted to send a quick note in response to the editorial in the September 2000 FAO Journal. The statement that “[Assignments officers]...just fill empty slots” is really inaccurate. I cannot deny that we have positions we have to fill and that, at some point, someone will have to go to an assignment he or she is not happy about. However, I can assure you that each FAO assignments officer works hard to make sure we send the right officer to the right job. In fact, when an officer finds the right job for him or her, there is often another officer for whom that same job is a better fit. Additionally, the job the officer wants may not be what he or she needs. For example, we often need a crow bar to pry officers out of overseas posts after multiple extensions -- six years in the same position will not help that officer develop professionally and it hurts the following generation of FAOs that needs to get downrange.

Your assignments officer has to make some tough choices for the benefit of the Army and the FAO Corps, as well as for the officer. Every assignments officer I have known has lost sleep over assignments and the personal situations of individual officers. I say this not to drum up sympathy, rather to make sure you know that your assignments officer does the best he or she can to take care of you.

LTC Grady Reese

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What is the nature of the “strategic alliance” between the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China? For the United States, understanding the nature of the Sino-Russian convergence is critical in developing foreign and security policies for the next decade. As President-elect George W. Bush has stated, “in the long run, security in the world is going to be how we deal with China and Russia.” The new president’s approach is likely to eschew the Clinton Administration’s strategic-partnership-through-engagement approach towards both Russia and China during the 1990s, which vice-president Al Gore had intended to continue. However, this ‘new’ relationship between Russia and China, despite the “Who Lost Russia?” debate and the concern of Chinese espionage and regional expansion is at times misunderstood or simplified.

One of these simplifications is Russian weapon sales to China, which is often relegated to the idea that Russia simply needs money and China needs new weapons, so they can both band against the United States to create a multipolar world. Although this is a significant part of the motivations for these sales, it is not the only part. In fact, the motivations are more complex and reflect domestic concerns as well as short and long-term foreign policy goals of China and Russia. An examination of the extent and character of Russian armament sales to China and, the subject of this paper, serves as a starting point to understand the current Russian-Chinese relationship.

What emerges is not an equal rapprochement between Russia and China. Although both countries are working together against what they see as a US hegemonic drive, they are using this period to weather different changes and build the infrastructure for the pursuit of future geopolitical goals that are potentially opposing. Furthermore, until now Russia’s relationship to China has not been based on a unified strategy. Instead it is an amalgamation of individual actors for their own interests. China’s, on the other hand, has been, in comparison, a unified strategy. Russian weapon sales are a prime example.

Since 1991, the Russian arms industry increased its arms sales to China, with total sales exceeding $9 billion by the end of 1998. Stemming from the economic collapse and revolutionary state of transferring from communism, with its command economy, to a free market-based democracy, Russia started to actively expand its arms sales. This occurred for several reasons.

First, as Stephen Blank points out, “arms sales are critical to Russian defense industry and planners because the defense industry cannot survive on the basis of domestic procurements alone.” The Soviet military-industrial complex that the Russian Federation inherited still remains capable of producing state-of-the art weaponry, but is not capable of finding consumers at home. For instance the Ministry of Defense owes the arms industry over 20 billion rubles, with a quarter of these for wages alone. This is partially a legacy of the Russian military leadership, which opted for retaining force structure and readiness over investment in future technologies in the early 1990s. Throughout the nineties, the Russian government has been unable to implement any coherent defense conversion program that is tied into a realistic national security strategy.
This opened up windows of opportunity for the defense industry to find purchasers abroad. With a weak central government, these actors were free to act without the constraint of a coherent national security strategy, to which arms sales would be subordinated and regulated by licensing. In fact, under Yeltsin, self-serving defense industry officials were elevated to ministerial status and were able to gain some subsidies of the arms industry. Today many high-tech armaments and platforms are sold, with state consent, abroad, before Russian forces get them. In many cases, arms are sold to states that Russia is likely to confront in the future.

As a result, the Russian military currently can not afford to modernize itself or invest and support new weapons development or procurement. By not investing in R&D, it is likely that Russia will exhaust any technological lead it has in the arms trade in the next five to ten years. By 1997, Russian military output was only 8.8% of its 1991 level, reflecting a thirty-percent decline per annum. Although there was a five-percent increase in 1998, overall real output still declined. Significantly, the sectors that did not decrease amidst this overall decline were the missile and space sector, the aircraft and radio and shipbuilding sectors.

It is these sectors where Russian weapon transfers are concentrated. Russia, primarily through transfers to India and China, is the second leading supplier of major conventional weapons in the world for the 1994-1998 period, even though from 1997-1998 these transfers have declined by almost sixty percent. Future transfers of ships and combat aircraft will soon boost this figure, although only for the short term. Due to a lack of major investment in new technologies Russia risks losing its edge in the arms market.

State support of these weapon sales, even if after the fact, could satisfy immediate domestic needs of Russia. The revenue gained could slow deterioration of the armed forces and create space for Russia to first stabilize the collapse of the armed forces and then start implementing true military reform. As Alexei Arbatov, the deputy chairman of the Committee of on Defense in the Russian Duma, shows: “If Russia’s mammoth military-industrial establishment were to collapse - a distinct possibility in the next few years – the consequences would be no less devastating than were the events of 1941 … not only for Russia but for the entire world. Debates and infighting over military reform are at the very core of Russia’s domestic politics.”

It is crucial for Russia to prevent a complete collapse of its armaments industry. From 1991 to 1997, the number of enterprises subject to Ministry of Defense control has dropped from over 1,800 to less than 500, most of which never successfully converted to civilian production. Lacking any real defense conversion policy, though sorely needed, Russia must rely on foreign financing of its limited R&D efforts to prevent a complete disintegration of its scientific-technological base, one of the few bases where Russia still excels and that took decades to build up. Russia, in effect, due to this lack of future investment in its military (R&D, weapons procurement, etc.) is suffering from a “creeping disarmament,” so that by 2010 only ten percent of Russia’s military equipment will be rated as modern. Thus, Russia’s fiscal motivations for selling arms to China are fueled by more than simple profit-motive, but by a genuine need to protect some of the most vital assets to a modern industrial state and to prevent an erosion of its national capital and power.

China, as well as India, is one of the two major markets open to Russia, as the other large arms-trading countries follow the sanctions against selling arms to China. Beijing has several reasons for turning to Moscow for arms to modernize the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). One observer credits four major impulses for this. This includes a realization and commitment by the Chinese leadership to modernize the PLA to develop asymmetrical warfare capabilities; the acceptance of the “inability of China’s research and development sector to produce equipment that matches, or indeed, exceeds the state of the art;” an
amelioration of fears of dependence, by realizing China’s growing international economic leverage; and recent sustained economic growth, allowing greater defense budgets.

What this assessment does not stress, however, is that Beijing’s arms purchases are, in stark contrast to Moscow, nested on a well-defined national security strategy with its supporting national military strategy, which has been characterized as “long-term and incremental.” Importantly, all major organs of state subscribe to this strategy. The PLA is subordinate to the state and the arms industries are equally integrated into the overall state structure under the control of a one-party regime. Decision-making is more open to consensus building. However, what is important to note is that when it comes time to act, China is still a unitary actor, compared to Russia.

Specifically, Jiang Zemin’s and the PLA’s view of the security environment converge. China sees the next two to three decades as relatively safe from world war and allowing for large-scale peace and development. However, this is on the backdrop of a classical Hobbesian view of a zero-sum game for personal advantage between states. Thus, China, and particularly its military strategists, sees the world, or at least the region, as basically hostile to China’s sovereignty and that current partners can transform into future rivals. In context, a great part of China’s armament drive is a response to a potential regional arms race. It sees itself as threatened, although most of its neighbors generally see themselves forced to counter China’s potential.

Two of China’s regional neighbors have gone nuclear. Potential future, and often current, rivals Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea receive 74% of all Asian conventional weapons transfers. In addition, most other South and East Asian countries have been embarking on a modernization of their forces, especially combat aircraft and naval forces. India, as well as Singapore and Thailand are actively arming and pursuing regional aspirations for influence. Globally, both Russia and China, see American might, in all its forms, as a threat. This includes US-led actions of NATO expansion and military actions in the Balkans, support for Taiwan and Japan, as well as pursuit of energy sources in the greater Caspian region. Many of China’s neighbors’ armament programs include US combat aircraft, or other high-tech components.

The PLA’s future concept of warfare, in addition to the impulses mentioned above, is derived from other factors. First, the PLA has accepted the fundamental revolution in military affairs (RMA) after assessing how easily the US-led coalition defeated Iraqi forces in 1991. Second, China’s strategic center of gravity has shifted from the interior, to deter a Soviet invasion, to its periphery, especially the eastern coast from Dalian to Hunan. Resolving most of its land border problems, with the exception of its border with North Korea, and potential friction spots with India, frees China from the requirement to have large land forces for defense. But, at the same time, China gains a “littoral and maritime defense requirement ... the essence of defending China will be defined by the PLA’s ability to defend seaward from the coast in the surface, subsurface, and aerospace battle-space dimensions.”

It is this picture that drives the acquisition of Russian arms. Russia is desperate to prevent further erosion of its scientific-technological infrastructure and has in its arms exports, besides its energy resources, one of the last viable sectors that it can produce immediately. China desires to make generational leaps to build its own scientific-technological base for domestic armament production and, therefore, compete against what it sees as a rising regional military threat. Specifically, this translates into building a PLA that can compete with its neighbors in force-projection for either coercive or deterrent ends and to deter the US with asymmetrical warfare.

Thus, China is focusing on combat and lift aircraft, combatant ships, information and space technology, command and control and nuclear missile improvement. Russia is selling state-of-the-art combat aircraft, such as the Su-27 and Su-30, Kilo class submarines and combat ships, radar technology, air-to-air and surface-to-air missile technology, and AWACs. In addition, Russia has been indiscriminately selling dual-use technology, as well as ballistic missile technology. This indiscriminate and uncontrolled Russian policy is “distinguished by the absence of coherence and consistency due to the struggle among the ‘multipolar’ interests and opinions at the policy-making level and the government’s utter disorganization.” As a result, narrow interest groups are selling off Russian technology not only in the form of an industrial end product, but also the actual know-how and blueprints, further eroding the Russian technological base.
More than ever, US forces find themselves operating with allies from vastly different cultural backgrounds. Despite a shared mission, the cultural differences can create friction and impede effectiveness. FAOs are often expected to minimize this friction so that the combatant commanders can accomplish their missions with minimal disruption.

US-Saudi cooperation in Operation Southern Watch (patrolling the no-fly zone in Southern Iraq) provides an example of success in bridging this cultural divide. A force of several thousand US combatants has operated from Saudi Arabia for ten years. The cultural differences are great, the strategic stakes are high, and the results have been impressive. The lessons in successful cooperation can be applied to other regions of the world, as well.

These observations are based on my experience in the Saudi Ministry of Defense and Aviation (MoDA) as a liaison officer for deployed US combatant forces. Our small liaison cell coordinated combatant forces’ issues in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, from Customs to logistics to communications to engineering. Although the US has a well-established military training mission in Saudi Arabia (and of course, an embassy), we were not part of those units. Our task was strictly to help the US combat forces accomplish their mission. As MG Scales’ recent comments have created a stir about what FAOs actually contribute to the military, perhaps this will serve as another example of a tangible contribution. As we continue to deploy troops to areas where we have not had a previous troop presence (Somalia, Bosnia, East Timor, etc.) this FAO role will become more important.

**Impact of Cultural Misperceptions**

The majority of our military personnel serving with Operation Southern Watch (OSW) are on three-month TDY tours in Saudi Arabia. This includes many officers who deal with Saudi officials on a frequent basis. Most have had little or no previous interaction with an Arab military. As a result, misperceptions about Arabs or Muslims in general can affect the working relationship.

Every US action has economic, political, social and religious implications for the Kingdom. The Saudis will assess the impact of proposed operations on all those areas.

**A Basic Misperception.** The most common pitfall is to attribute far too much of the Saudis’ behavior to traditional customs, while dismissing political, economic and military concerns. There is a general perception that Westerners are driven by practical concerns like dollars and power, while “exotic” nations are influenced by their traditional culture. In this case, that refers to Bedouin Arab culture, but similar perceptions exist about other “Eastern” societies.

By traditional culture, I mean social customs, pleasantries and taboos, like “don’t shake with your left hand,” or “don’t cross your legs in public.” Such customs are important in any society, but we should not overestimate their influence on the Host Nation’s decision making process. When you propose a $100 million project to the Saudi government, they will be swayed more by the costs and benefits of that project than by
how well you drink tea.

Source of Misperceptions. The root problem is not a lack of knowledge about the Host Nation. In fact, the most successful US staff officers were those who arrived in country admitting that they did not know much about the culture. They were eager to learn, and by the end of their tour, they had an impressive understanding of the Saudi situation.

The problem, rather, is having the wrong kind of knowledge about the Host Nation. Unfortunately, the most popular sources for information about the Middle East tend to be the writings of T. E. Lawrence, or culture guides like The Arab Mind. These books do have value, but they represent very narrow views of Arab culture that are largely outdated. The warrior Bedouin of Lawrence’s time is as representative of the modern Arab professional as Davy Crockett is of an American professional.

A Very Different Reality. Most of the Saudi officers we deal with have spent five to ten years in the United States. They have graduated from American military schools and have advanced degrees from American universities. They are also well aware of the American media stereotypes of Arabs and Muslims. It is fair to say that they have had more exposure to our culture than we have had to theirs.

Impact. These misperceptions have several effects on Host Nation cooperation. First, it makes it very hard to anticipate the Saudi position and deal with it if one expects them to act based on old Bedouin traditions. Second, an American negotiator who expects to impress his counterpart with a discussion of camel husbandry will find himself stymied when the conversation turns to politics and economics. Third, such an American will appear confused, at best. At worst, the Saudis may find him condescending and insulting.

A More Accurate Picture of Saudi Government Concerns.

If Bedouin traditions are not the key to understanding the Host Nation’s thinking, then where should we focus our attention? To answer that question, we must first recognize that the presence of several thousand combat troops has a tremendous impact on life in a small country like Saudi Arabia. A Host Nation can make major adjustments to accommodate a temporary deployment, like DESERT SHIELD, but the current OSW mission has been going on for a decade, with no end in sight. Every US move has economic, political, social and even religious implications for the Kingdom. The Saudis will assess

The central importance of Islam is reflected in the Saudi flag, which contains the Muslim confession of faith, “There is no god but God, and Mo-

the impact of proposed operations on all those areas.

Economic. In the economic realm, the deployed force has positive and negative impact on the Kingdom. Saudi Arabia provides over $85 million a year to support OSW (this is separate from what it pays for the US Military Training Mission). In past years, this number has been over $200 million. The Saudis financed the construction of permanent facilities to house US troops at the same time that they cut subsidies to their own people (like some benefits for the royal family).
On the other hand, the OSW forces inject a considerable amount of money into the Saudi economy through labor contracts, construction and local purchases. These contributions are all the more important because they are in the non-oil sector.

Saudi Arabia can no longer count on consistent oil windfalls like in the 1970s. Oil prices reached lows in the 1990s and created record deficits in the country. In the year 2000, they jumped to high levels, but there is no guarantee this will continue. The Kingdom feels the pain of supporting OSW the most at the same time it most needs OSW’s non-oil revenues. Therefore, multi-million dollar projects can be seen either as a boon or a burden for the Kingdom, depending on how they are presented.

In presenting a proposal to the Saudi military, it is very important to capture these benefits in a measurable way. The liaison officers must point out how much of the labor, consulting and supplies for a project comes from Saudi sources, and be able to explain why certain services had to be brought in from the US. They must be able to show projected revenues for maintenance and support in future years. Skilled Saudi consultants and technicians will scrutinize the figures and balance them against their own projections. An effective financial analysis that shows a “win-win” scenario will have a greater impact than the way you hold your teacup.

Religious. Islam plays a central role in Saudi affairs. The Kingdom contains the two Muslim holy cities of Mecca and Medina and is the Holy Land for over a billion Muslims worldwide. The Saud family does not have a lineage to the Prophet Muhammad, which is traditionally the source of religious legitimacy in Islam. Instead, the Saud family derives its religious legitimacy by enforcing a strict version of Islamic law in the Kingdom. This function is so important that the King’s official title is “Custodian of the two Holy Sites.”

Any perceived deviation from strict Islamic law weakens the regime’s legitimacy. It is common to hear Muslims in other countries, like Egypt or Morocco say that liberal practices (like women driving cars) are acceptable in their country, but not in the Holy Land. Therefore, Saudi religious laws are not a sign of backwardness or resistance to change. They are, in fact, a part of the regime’s legitimacy.

Naturally, the presence of several thousand non-Muslim troops is a very sensitive issue. When opponents of the Kingdom, like Saddam Hussein or Usama Bin Ladin want to attack the Saud family’s legitimacy, this is the issue they use. It is very important for the Saudi government to convince its people that US troops are not violating Islamic laws. They must demonstrate that they have effective control over the actions of foreign troops in their Kingdom. If it appears that US forces are disregarding Saudi wishes, then speculation will follow that US forces are disregarding Islamic laws, as well. Little wonder that a popular English-language visitors’ guide published by the Saudi government is entitled, This is Our Country.

Political. The OSW mission also has political costs for the Saudi regime that most Americans overlook. Support for the sanctions against Iraq is dwindling throughout the world, and especially among the Arab countries. Air strikes are even less popular. Although most Arabs hate Saddam Hussein, many feel that sanctions and air strikes are ineffective ways of dealing with him. It is quite common to hear Arabs say that the sanctions and air strikes only hurt Iraqi children, not Saddam. Therefore, Saudi Arabia pays a huge cost in terms of regional prestige by being a host to US forces.

Additionally, Americans often do not appreciate how important the sense of Arab brotherhood and unity is. The Gulf War was a humiliating reminder of the failure of Arab unity. Worse, the continuing US military operation demon-
INTRODUCTION

Last month, I returned from Kosovo after another extremely interesting experience as an international election supervisor for the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). This experience was my third trip to the former Yugoslavia to supervise polling station committees for the OSCE. My earlier trips took me to the postwar cities of Vitez (1997) and Visoko (1998) which are located in the Croat-Muslim Federation in central Bosnia-Herzegovnia. This describes my experiences and observations from October 25-30, 2000, in the town of Ferizaj (Albanian name) during the municipal elections in Kosovo that were held on October 28, 2000.

BACKGROUND

End of NATO’s “78 Day” War

The United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSC) 1244 was adopted on June 10, 1999, to codify and give operational guidance to the international mission responsible for implementing the deal with Slobodan Milosevic which the international coalition negotiated to end the war. After the war, the returning Albanian refugees sought revenge against Serbs and half of Kosovo’s Serb population fled or live separately in enclaves or north of the divided city of Mitrovica. Underlying the continuing tensions in Kosovo is the perceived failure of the international community to address the issue of Kosovo’s final status.

The Albanians fear and the Serbs hope that Belgrade’s rule may one day return to Kosovo. Over 50,000 NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) soldiers are the essential underpinning for the international presence on Kosovo. These forces entered Kosovo behind departing Serb military and police forces and then deployed in a fashion to keep them out. The international civil presence, the United Nations Mission Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK), is a more complex structure which includes humanitarian affairs, interim civil administration, institution building, and economic reconstruction.

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

The OSCE is a multi-national forum with 55 participating states - the largest existing regional security organization. Under UNSC 1244, UNMIK’s component organization OSCE has assumed significant obligations in Kosovo for institution and democracy building and human rights. OSCE has no legal status under international law and all of its decisions are politically but not legally binding. However, the fact that OSCE commitments are not legally binding does not detract from their efficacy.

On October 28, OSCE supervised the first democratic elections in Kosovo. The residents of Kosovo voted using a system of proportional representation with open lists to elect representatives to the 30 multi-member municipal assemblies in Kosovo. However, the Serbs boycotted the elections by refusing to register to vote. Nevertheless, the huge task of OSCE elections was carried out with relative success. The result was a valid election that enables the international community to gauge the extent of the popularity of the political groupings.
PREPARATION FOR ELECTION

Departure, In-Processing and Assignment

On Friday afternoon, October 21, our mission of 130 American volunteers flew via commercial aircraft from the United States to Skopje, Macedonia. At the airport, I met my old friend, Dallas L. Cox, a retired Foreign Area Officer. For us, it was a short night -- we changed planes in Munich and, within a short time, began the slow descent into the Balkans. From Skopje, on Saturday afternoon, we traveled by charter buses, over the mountains, to the Hotel Metropol at Ohrid within sight of the Albanian border. There we signed on with the OSEC, received our identification cards and per diem advances, and were told our final destinations in Kosovo.

At Ohrid, we joined many international supervisors from European countries who would also receive training by OSCE staff for conducting this unique and important election. Ohrid is an ancient settlement on the north shore of Lake Ohrid that has been a living town for 2,400 years. Seized by Philip II, King of Macedonia, Ohrid later bore the name, “The Balkan Jerusalem,” as the center of the early Christian church. We were indeed fortunate to see Ohrid’s Fortress of Emperor Samuel, the on-going excavation of a classical amphitheater, and the early Christian episcopal churches with their medieval frescoes and sacred icons.

Orientation and Training

In the conference rooms of the Hotel Metropole, the UNMIK, KFOR and OSCE staffs provided us with orientations on the political situation, security, and training on how to set up and operate a polling station. Training on voting procedures included detailed procedures for issuing, counting and recording ballots. Integrity of the voting was the main concern. Most, if not all, of the international supervisors from the United States were assigned to polling station committees in the municipality of Uroševac/Ferizaj (Serb/Albanian names).

On the first morning, we learned that the Greek and American military contingents were to be responsible for our safety. The KFOR officers explained the security and evacuation plans which they would implement in the unlikely event of the need for our rescue. As we were performing quasi-diplomatic roles, and were accorded diplomatic status, we were considered to be “persons designated special status.” Each of us received complete maps of Kosovo showing the principal cites and main routes. We learned the UHF channels, call signs and priorities to be used for the Motorola radios. Later, we were to receive Motorola radios which were installed in our automobiles or hand carried to be used during the election days. Due the relatively level terrain and lack of telephones, these radios proved to be our only reliable communications.

We learned and reviewed the detailed procedures for issuing, handling and processing ballots, and carrying out our administrative duties in the English language for thousands of Albanian-speaking voters. "Supervision" involves much more than "monitoring" or "observing." Our preparation for supervising in this election in Kosovo reminded me of a college study group.

Travel to Kosovo

After three days of orientation and intensive training at Ohrid, and in the wee, pre-dawn hours, we boarded charter buses for Kosovo. Along the way, in Macedonia, we stopped at a vast cleared area, now empty, which had served as a refugee camp. Although the distance of travel across the border was relatively short, the time involved was lengthy due to mountains, road conditions, stop at the border station, and the need to follow our OSCE and military escorts.

MUNICIPALITY OF UROŠEVAČ/FERIZAJ

Town of Ferizaj
The town of Ferizaj is located approximately 40 kilometers south of Kosovo’s capital city, Pristina. For the OSCE elections, the municipality of Uroševac/Ferizaj consisted of sixteen polling centres and 90 polling stations located at Ferizaj and in the villages surrounding it. The adjacent municipality of Kacanik consists of 11 polling centres and 41 polling stations in Kacanik and its surrounding villages. All of the American volunteers were assigned to polling stations in these areas which are located near Camp Bondsteel, that is the vast U.S. Army base in Kosovo.

Our first stop was at UNMIK’s headquarters located in Ferizaj’s municipal building which also serves as UNCIVPOL’s station. The local “police” (TMK), trained and outfitted by UNMIK, were also controlled from this headquarters. There, Mr. Morris, the comical, senior American policeman briefed our delegations of supervisors on the local situation, introducing his staff and the portly Greek commander of the KFOR. In the center of Ferizaj, a small community or enclave of Serbs (twenty or more) live in their residences under the close protection of KFOR which also protects the local orthodox churches. We learned too that violence is primarily Albanian-on-Albanian, that the “gun culture” continues to prevail in Kosovo - - an AK-47 rifle and a grenade were found on the previous day - - and gunshots fired in the air are commonplace.

The OSCE core supervisor told us that we were to work with a local committee of five persons, including a chairman who was in effect our counterpart. None of the committees had worked together, nor worked on an election before, and the members had virtually no training for handling voters. Nevertheless, our relationship with the committee members was key to a smooth process. My polling centre would be in the medical school in Ferizaj that was situated a short distance from Hotel Luboten where some of us would be accommodated. I was paired with my friend, Doug Hartley, a retired Foreign Service Officer, whose regular station was also located in the medical school. Dallas Cox was assigned, by alphabet, to another polling centre.

**Polling Centre in Medical School**

On Thursday morning before the election, at the municipal gymnasium in Ferizaj, the international supervisors assigned to Uroševac/Ferizaj met with the OSCE’s core supervisor and his staff. There we learned in greater detail what was expected of us and what our jobs would be.

Outside, we would meet our drivers and interpreters. Doug and I would share a van and driver, though we each had our own interpreters. My job for OSCE was supervising an absentee polling station in Ferizaj’s medical school which was designated as a “mega” polling centre comprising 19 polling stations. Doug was assigned a regular polling station in the same centre. The absentee polling station would not only receive regular voters from the Uroševac/Ferizaj municipality, but also any registered, internally displaced people and out-of-Kosovo returnees in the area. There were over 700 voters on the register at my station, virtually all of which lived in or around Ferizaj. All registered persons would appear to vote in person, including the absentee voters. As it happened, few (three or four) absentee voters would appeared to vote.

That morning, with a few carefully rehearsed phrases in Albanian, I introduced myself to my interpreter, Nexhat. Doug and I were careful to avoid speaking Serbo-Croatian words because of the Albanian’s hatred for Serbs and on-going attacks on Serbs and Serb-speaking foreigners. We then visited the medical school to see the classrooms that would be used for the voting. Unfortunately, the school was not fully equipped with working electricity, telephones, drinking water or flush toilets. This disappointing lack became a huge problem throughout the election day as thousands of Albanians and other groups turned out to vote there.

(Continued on page 22)
The Development of the Air Force
Foreign Area Officer Program
By Major Rusty E. Shugart

Last year, the Air Force Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) at Colorado Springs sponsored several research projects related to the Department of Defense interest in developing foreign language and area proficiencies among its commissioned uniformed personnel. The Air Force FAO Program: A Case Study on Air Force Planning, DoD Roles, and Inter-Service Relationships is a key product of that interest. Based on a two-month investigation of Air Force planning, it represents the first comprehensive assessment of the Air Force effort to institute an effective program to address DoD and Service FAO interests and equities. The article below is the Executive Summary of that research paper. The paper itself is available through INSS or may be obtained from the author, Major Rusty Shughart, China Desk Officer, Defense HUMINT Service, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), (703) 604-0286. Readers are invited to contact Major Shughart for additional background information on INSS, the Air Force FAO program or defense attached operations.

The Air Force FAO Program: A Case Study on Air Force Planning, DoD Roles, and Inter-Service Relationships

Executive Summary

Introduction

For many years, the Air Force has grappled with an assessment of the utility of foreign language and area expertise among its commissioned officer corps. Although the Air Force leadership has never sanctioned area proficiencies as vital ingredients of an officer's education or career development, it nonetheless recognizes that these skills provide at least ancillary contributions to air operations.

Unlike in previous years, the Air Force now faces an increasing likelihood that officer foreign language and area expertise may contribute greatly to operational success. Since 1990, gradual changes in the geopolitical landscape have overridden a national political and policy posture dominated by a decades-old emphasis on the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc states. In supporting a new world order, the tenets of Joint Vision 2010 and Global Engagement fundamentally redefine the Air Force future contribution in war and peace across the range of full spectrum dominance. Accordingly, the utility of officer foreign area expertise has increased substantially, particularly germane in air coalition initiatives overseas and in non-traditional operations other than war, such as humanitarian intervention and relief missions. As a result, the Air Force - a primary instrument of the national security strategy - must consolidate its global agenda, paying more attention to engaging the international community; it must invest more heavily and imaginatively in both preparatory and support programs to ensure that its officer corps has the requisite skills to effectively implement global initiatives. Collectively, the convergence of Global Engagement interests and its supportive foreign language and area skill set provides the Air Force compelling justification to develop and implement a viable Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program.

The Investigative Approach

This research paper is the first critical review of the Air Force FAO program, its underlying planning factors and the role DoD organizations played in its development. The author conducted most of the research and writing of this INSS product in July and August 1999 at the National Defense University, Fort Leslie J. McNair, Washington, D.C. In developing this report, the author first conducted an extensive literature review to identify key organizations and programs associated with the accession, training and utilization of officers with foreign language and area expertise. This review led to the identification of key managers and 64 stakeholders" in the Air Force FAO initiative, which the author then engaged in a series of informal conversations and formal interviews under the rubric of "non-attribution" discussion. As a vital component of this approach, the author devised a series of questions to assess the FAO program architecture from various perspectives, such as its philosophical basis; force structure development; accession programs; management and utilization plans; and cost-benefit factors. Finally, with INSS support, the author also attended several foreign languages training confer-
ences; participated in significant foreign language related briefings and discussions; and conducted relevant interviews beyond the Washington, D.C. area.

The result is a three-part assessment. First, The Road Traveled summarizes the Air Force traditional interests in foreign language and area expertise. Second, Avenues of Approach describes the pathways of the FAO planning effort as of the ICOD of this report. Third, and most importantly, The Road Ahead highlights and summarizes discussions between the author and members of the Air Force FAO management and stakeholder communities in a non-derivative form, to include recommendations for improving the FAO program.

The Road Traveled

The Air Force has sustained FAO-related interests since the 1960's. However, the low number of validated area requirements within the Service itself did not provide compelling justification to create a fully developed FAO career path or program architecture. Although a series of factors fostered an evolution of the Air Force perspective on officer area expertise, DoD, the Joint Staff and the Defense Agencies provided the revolutionary impetus to fashion Air Force areas interests into a true FAO program.

Today, the Air Force FAO program has many advantages over its predecessor, the Foreign Area Studies Program (FASP). First, it enjoys upper level interest and support, with a baseline of expertise mandated in a CORONA-directed milestone for 10 percent of the officer corps to be proficient in a foreign language by the year 2005. Second, it is tied to the long-term strategy of Joint Vision 2010 and Global Engagement, dovetailing with big Air Force plans and operations. Third, it has centralized proponency and advocacy from SAF/IA. Fourth, it is resourced, giving the program the administrative legs over the FYDP. Fifth, it fits into a CONOP with a coordinated AFI. In this sense, the Air Staff has taken those first uneasy steps down the FAO path, having "legitimized" the requirement and "normalized" the initiative as a full and secondary AFSC tied to broad-based utilization well beyond the validated requirements of the intelligence community.

Avenues of Approach.

Within the context of the evolution of the Air Force's interest in foreign language and area expertise among its officer corps, the Air Force FAO Proponent Office is creating the pathways to facilitate the transition to a fully developed FAO program. Generally, this effort falls into four categories: (1) force structure development; (2) active component training and accession programs; (3) pre-commissioning education and recruiting programs; and (4) management and utilization plans. Descriptions of these initiatives are available at the Air Force FAO Proponent Office web page: http://www.hci.af.mil/af/saf/ia/afaolfao.

The Road Ahead.

Generally, most Air Force FAO program stakeholders acknowledge that the Air Force Proponent Office has fostered major advancements in establishing, developing and promoting the program architecture; however, they are concerned about the future of the undertaking. Generally, their views can be grouped into a series of recommendations under five broad headings: (1) refine the philosophy and programmatic focus; (2) identify and define the requirement set; (3) cultivate the program administrative relationships; (4) consolidate advances in the program and realize the full potential of advocacy; and (5) develop the mid-term concept of operations to evolve the initiative into a true FAO program.

1. Refine the FAO Philosophy and Programmatic Focus. Many observers note that it is crucial that the Proponent refine the Air Force FAO philosophy and programmatic focus. Most stakeholders acknowledge that CORONA is the primary catalyst behind the Air Force interest in developing foreign area expertise among the officer corps. However, observers familiar with the principles behind DoD's FAO philosophy note that the CORONA-based initiative lacks the requisite potency and professional rigor to underwrite a world-class FAO program. The Air Force FAO initiative, as the Proponent now envisions it, falls well short of DoD's performance expectations. In architecture and vision, it has at least four major shortfalls: (1) it does not develop a professional FAO corps; (2) it lacks the requirement for professional foreign language proficiency; (3) it does not require advanced civil schooling; and (4) it does not cultivate advanced area expertise among the senior echelon. Many stakeholders are concerned that by overvaluing CORONA's role as the philosophical foundation, the Air Force has not duly considered the greater operative need for foreign language and area expertise as embodied in DoD Directive 1315.17.

Philosophically, the CORONA and DoD directives stem

(Continued on page 18)
The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the previously autonomous region known as Nagorno-Karabakh (N-K) remains unresolved, despite a cease-fire that has lasted over five years. National self-determination remains the central issue and all parties involved remain resolute as to their desires for a solution to the question over whether N-K will become independent or an autonomous region within Azerbaijan. Political turmoil and uncertainty in both countries have not aided in the process of finding an agreeable settlement. Factions within Armenia refuse to compromise on the issue, while the failing health of President Aliyev in Azerbaijan is seen as a destabilizing factor in the negotiations. Many outsiders perceive a zero-sum attitude on the part of both the Armenians and Azerbaijanis. Meanwhile, the people of N-K, the vast majority of whom are ethnic Armenians, have hindered the resolution of the issue as well by demanding independence and claiming they will settle for nothing less. Seemingly none of the parties involved wants to compromise and view the entire negotiation as zero-sum. Sanctions haven’t worked, as they rarely do, so the international community must strive to persuade the embattled factions that there is a win-win scenario for everyone.

One can actually trace the genesis of this problem back to early Soviet times, when Joseph Stalin’s Nationalities Policy carved up regions based on ethnicity and in some cases Stalin’s whims (not too much unlike Tito’s policy in Yugoslavia, which aimed to minimize nationalism). In the case of N-K, Stalin adhered to a kind of “divide and rule” policy, and chose to designate N-K in July 1923 as an autonomous region (область in Soviet terms) within Azerbaijan rather than within Armenia, despite the overwhelming majority of Armenians living in the area. (In keeping with this policy, Stalin placed the autonomous region of Nakhichevan, largely Muslim in population, within Armenia, another contentious issue for Azerbaijan.) The goal was to counterbalance the nationalities in the region and form a common Soviet nationality, ergo, the Trans-Caucasian Federated Soviet Socialist Republic was born, consisting of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. An uneasy existence remained in the region until February 1988.

It’s easy to point to Gorbachev’s glasnost as a catalyst for what ensued in 1988, when the Regional Soviet of N-K demanded to be united with Armenia. Previously restrained ethnic rivalries unleashed themselves, as seen in the political demonstrations that followed on 11 February in Stepanakert, the capital of N-K, and Yerevan, Armenia’s capital. Finally, on the 28th of February, Muslim Azeris massacred Christian Armenians in the city of Sumgait, Azerbaijan (and later in Baku as well), igniting a powderkeg of ethnic violence which led to N-K declaring itself part of Armenia and ultimately war in December 1989. Of course, the Armenians characterized the incidents in Sumgait and Baku as the beginnings of another genocide, referring back to the Turkish ethnic cleansing of approximately 1.5 million Armenians in 1915.

Azerbaijan proved no match for the Soviet/Russian-sponsored Armenians and capitulated, losing approximately one-fifth of its territory to Armenia. A period of tense negotiations followed in 1992, led by an OSCE-sponsored international consortium of countries known as ”The Minsk Group.” The Russians, however, brokered the tenuous but current cease-fire agreement (of which there have been many) in May 1994.
As a result of the conflict, thousands of displaced refugees remain homeless, over 25,000 people died in the war, and the status of N-K, which has claimed independence (and remains unrecognized to date by the international community), is still unresolved. Externally, the influential Armenian Diaspora (a group larger than the actual population of Armenia) has lobbied for sanctions against Azerbaijan, resulting in passage of the Freedom Support Act (commonly referred to as Section 907), which prohibits the United States from aiding Azerbaijan in any way without providing like aid to Armenia. This move by the Armenians is clearly a backlash against Azeri economic blockades and fuel embargoes (Armenia has scant fuel resources) by sympathetic neighbors such as Turkey.

Conversations with U.S. personnel in Baku, as well as representatives from U.S. political organizations in the region, revealed that the hopes of the Azeri bargaining position reside with the health of aging President Heidar Aliyev. His son, Ilham, is the likely successor, but Azeris have little confidence that he will obtain a better deal for Azerbaijan. The common attitude in Baku is that the N-K issue is the one that will bring the Azeris into the streets if they feel they've been cheated.

A meeting with representatives of the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) enumerated many interesting perspectives on this issue. Overall, the Armenians maintain a very self-righteous attitude on the subject, as they claim to be honest brokers for the people of N-K. First, the Armenians consider that N-K should have the right to self-determination as it was a separate region under Soviet rule, just like Armenia and Azerbaijan. By this rationale, the Armenians contend that the Azeris really have no legitimate claim to N-K. The main goal for Armenia is to achieve a settlement that the people of N-K will accept. At this point, independence is the issue; Karabakhians are mistrustful of the government in Baku and are confident in their abilities to self-rule. When asked if self-rule is feasible, one Armenian representative claimed that it certainly is on many levels, citing the fact that N-K previously provided over 70% of Azerbaijan's agricultural output. Further, the Armenians believe that the well-organized militia force in N-K is capable of defending itself against the Azeris. Meanwhile, Armenia supports either independence for N-K or, if it is the will of the people, that N-K become part of Armenia; again, self-determination is paramount. Options such as proportional representation in Baku for N-K are non-starters at this point. At the same time, Armenia recognizes that N-K's independence will be a hard sell to the international community.

Even if the Aliyev government relented and agreed to N-K independence, how long would it last? The feasibility of N-K as a sovereign nation is unclear, especially from a defense perspective in contrast to the Armenian opinion. The Russians may not be available for assistance forever, especially as the Ministry of Defense contemplates deep cuts in military forces. Further, an agreement by Aliyev today may not be accepted tomorrow, especially after Aliyev is gone and more conservative forces assume power. Mistrust on all sides does not bode well for a binding agreement any time soon.

Recent natural gas discoveries in Azerbaijan portend potential economic improvements, possibly strengthening Baku's bargaining power with the international community. On the question of whether this possibility might cause Armenia to seek a swifter resolution to the problem, an Armenian MFA representative quickly downplayed this potential, saying that Azerbaijan's fuel resources are exaggerated. She asserted, however, that a wealthier Baku would be welcome, if this wealth were used for improving the democratic character of the nation as opposed to strengthening the military, which would carry the potential for further instability in the region.

Armenia, like Azerbaijan, has reservations about chances for a speedier conclusion to the problem if Aliyev dies. Fears of a power struggle and a less democratic regime actually serve as a
catalytic force at this time. But both sides continue to move with trepidation as they fear the backlash from the domestic hardliners on either side - no matter what the outcome of a negotiated settlement, in both Armenia and Azerbaijan disgruntled citizens will loudly voice their displeasure.

Clearly, both sides are not close to finding an acceptable resolution to the problem, especially given N-K’s stubborn hold on its, albeit unrecognized, declaration of independence. Prospects for peace exist but implementation requires compromise, pragmatism, and much courage. Former Armenian President Lev Ter-Petrosian was just such a statesman, but his own country would not support his confidence-building measures in negotiating peace with Azerbaijan.

The United States could ameliorate the problem by repealing Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act. Azerbaijan and Armenia both would benefit from the lifting of sanctions which may pave the way toward warmer relations between the battle-scarred nations. Further, the absence of 907 could allow the U.S. to enhance democratization efforts in Azerbaijan without having to follow suit necessarily in Armenia. Judging by statements made by Armenian MFA officials, the lure of increased stability in the region would behoove Armenia to accept the removal of 907.

Armenia currently seeks assistance from Iran, which is something of a pariah state in the eyes of the United States. However, if the United States and Iran improved relations, that could bode well for the Armenians and perhaps make them less intransigent at the bargaining table. An Iran that has greater flexibility in global dealings could in turn potentially translate to improved economic prospects for Armenia. Armenia is involved in pipeline negotiations with Iran and if U.S. sanctions against Iran were lifted, Armenians might view this as benefiting their joint effort. Armenians carry a deep feeling of suspicion based on a perception that they are isolated, not unlike an "Israel in the Caucasus," and look to nations like Iran for aid in the form of fuel resources and economic development, now that Soviet industrial income has dried up.

The bottom line is that independence for N-K may not be the best solution, and the international community must work diligently to persuade all parties, at least the Armenians and Karabakhians anyway, that autonomy within Azerbaijan provides the fairest compromise for all parties. However, the level of autonomy must be carefully and definitively delineated. For example, given N-K’s mistrust of the Azeri government, the Karabakhians must have proportional representation in Baku, as well as the assurance that decisions made in Baku which affect N-K must be ratified by local N-K governmental authority. In the interest of protecting minority rights within N-K itself, the local government could operate on the basis of proportional representation as well, deepening the democratic framework in the region.

The issue of refugee resettlement requires close attention and is a factor in the peace process, as is the issue of the disposition of Armenian troops in the occupied or as the Armenians call them, "areas under control." The presence of international peacekeepers, paid for by the international community and the Armenians and Azeris on a proportional scale, seems to be the way to assuage fears and assure all parties that fairness will reign.

The situation in N-K will not improve with time; time will only serve to justify the feelings of Karabakhians that they can and should rule themselves without interference from Baku. At the same time, Azerbaijan does not appear ready to relinquish its claim to the territory and is reluctant to compromise at this point. Armenia remains intransigent as well, staunchly defending what it considers to be the right of self-determination for the people of N-K. International intervention may be the only solution, which must persuade all sides that a compromise can benefit everyone.

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Even the newest FAO in the field understands that these are the minimum tools needed to be a “value-added” to those senior military and civilian leaders the FAO will inform throughout one’s career. But outside the FAO community—at both senior ranks and at the most junior FAO ranks— the understanding of the absolute requirement for possession of these attributes in order to advise and to advance the success of the military mission was not always recognized. The growth, development, and acceptance of the Services’ foreign area specialists were not always guaranteed. Hard-won experience—with the failure to understand the regional context in which our military and civilian government operates--led, often painfully, to the recognition of the need to develop a skill set, which all modern FAOs must master.

Long before the official creation of the Foreign Area Officer, the military had many examples of officers possessing the several skills listed at the beginning of this article. One of the bright stars among these early “FAQs” was Air Force Lieutenant General Edward Lansdale. Lansdale, an OSS veteran and an early clandestine operator for the CIA, had been a trusted military advisor for Ramon Magsaysay in the Philippines during the counterinsurgency war against the Huks in the 50s. As an old Asia hand, he was sent to Vietnam by the Eisenhower administration, as the French presence ended there with the fall of Dien Bien Phu in 1954. His knowledge of the country, combined with the trust placed in him by future Vietnam President Diem and his experience in unconventional warfare, ensured that Lansdale had a seat at the small table of advisors for John F. Kennedy (whose interest in Indochina began as early as 1953). By 1960, Lansdale began a fact-finding mission to the region at the request of the young Kennedy administration. Back home, Lansdale presented a briefing of that visit to the National Security Council on April 27, 1961. Lansdale’s reputation, understanding of the country and its culture, and the legend surrounding his earlier exploits in the region, led to President Kennedy’s suggestion that he be the ambassador to Vietnam. Although that never led to fruition, certainly Lansdale represents many of the best attributes required of the FAO; without a doubt his placement and access as an area advisor are of what most FAOs only dream.

Lansdale’s 1972 book, *In the Midst of Wars*, provides an excellent example of how FAOs can present their hard-won knowledge to leaders, as do many of his mid-fifties OSD studies, covering both regional studies and unconventional warfare. Lansdale, as a character, was so influential that he became a central figure in novels. He was treated less than flattering in Graham Greene’s *The Quiet American*. Conversely, he was presented to the world more positively, as Colonel Hillandale, in William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick’s *The Ugly American*. It is this last selection, *The Ugly American*, that the author of this article recommends all new FAOs read, as part of their early professional preparation, regardless of the region to which they are assigned.

*The Ugly American* is a short casebook on how to do it right and how to do it wrong as a representative of our government. Lederer was the U.S. Navy FAO-equivalent when he gained the insights represented in the book. He served as the Special Assistant to Admiral Felix Stump, commander of Pacific forces; he was widely traveled and experienced in Asian affairs, and influential in his role as a strategic scout and advisor for DoD and our government. Burdick, a political scientist, has written studies of political power theory, with a specialization in Asian affairs. The combination of their talents and insights in

(Continued on page 25)
China is actively seeking and successfully acquiring not only the finished hardware, but also the know-how (see notes 11 and 37), in what Blank calls a “Chinese arms transfer offensive.” This is part of a program of major, long-term restructuring and defense conversion. The intent includes not only rapidly upgrading the armaments of existing and new formations to counter the regional arms race, but to rapidly expand and elevate the technological base. This is accomplished by pursuing ‘spin-off’ and ‘spin-on’ of dual-use technologies and conventional military products, which is also seen to contribute to the civilian economy, as well as strengthen deterrence. China is successfully melding technologies and advancing them to slowly build up its technological base.

This leads to several conclusions. First, given the weight that defense conversion plays in future Russian reform, the current lack of control over arms sales and lack of investment in military reform is a significant inhibitor to Russian internal stability and long-term security policy. With the world arms trade in long-term decline, the Russian defense industry, on its current tack, faces the prospect of near-complete collapse, which spells further problems for a country already troubled. Russia is helping to build up and arm a country with which it may very well have significant future friction. For instance, China is proliferating Russian technology to current and potential adversaries of Russia, resulting in arms technology ‘blowback.’ However, Russia has significant interests that coincide with China’s on multiple issues and most Russian strategists think that the costs outweigh the risks, and that Russia should continue on a ‘balanced open foreign policy’ that allows it to remain engaged with China and the West.

Secondly, China’s ‘arms transfer offensive’ is tied into a coherent national security strategy, with a supporting national military strategy, making it capable of acting as a significant regional actor. It is pursuing a defense conversion and modernization strategy that will significantly increase its military capabilities over the long run. Importantly, the scope of this paper, the modernization of the PLA is playing second fiddle to the main effort, economic conversion.

Although this will not entail a direct confrontation with the US, or its major allies of Japan and South Korea, this increased capability will give it limited deterrent capabilities versus these states. This same build-up, however, is providing China a fledgling power projection capacity to compel actions versus other regional actors, if it so desires to do so, especially in maritime affairs.

Furthermore, it is not conclusive that China is participating in a ‘spiral of fear’ arms build-up, similar to pre-World War One Europe. Much of China’s build-up seems to be oriented as much towards internal stability as it is towards foreign policy objectives. Nonetheless, most neighbors of China are pursuing a ‘prepare for the worst, but hope for the best’ approach to China, realizing that policies are easier changed than capabilities. They can not ignore China’s pursuit of high-technology weaponry from Russia, given China’s sheer size and economic potential, and any ensuing imbalance of power. This is especially relevant, as Jonathan Pollack point out, as the region does not have, and is unlikely to develop, region-wide, stabilizing “security norms to regulate potential rivalries,” and, therefore, this will “tend to generate particular anxieties among smaller states.” Taken together, Russian structural and economic instability and Chinese defense modernization do not present an clear and present danger to the international order, but merely a possible one, for which there is time and opportunity to act, or build on.

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Editor’s note: Major Bruce’s article contained extensive endnotes (three pages) which were too large to fit in the Journal. The full set of endnotes and the extensive bibliography will be included with the article on the FAOA web site at www.faoa.org.
from two distinct interests and have two distinct sets of goals. CORONA established the requirement to "shape" the commissioned force with a large number of culturally proficient officers to support Air Force Global Engagement over the long term. Levels of academic achievement and cultural exposure among the members of this pool are more important than the attainment and maintenance of professional-level foreign language performance standards. As such, the educational initiative has only limited force structure implications, as utilization will stem from an inherent competence embedded within the deploying force. Conversely, the DoD directive is steeped in the operational need. In this sense, it requires practical solutions in the short-term to address the crucial requirement for a smaller number of foreign language and area experts to support FAO "interoperability" in the joint arena. Accordingly, it stipulates 4 &professional" foreign language performance criteria in addition to advanced levels of academic achievement and foreign area operational experience. The FAO training initiative has clear force structure implications, requiring the development of experts with advanced area proficiency to support the tenets of Joint Vision 20 1 0; utilization will stem from assignments through traditional force management processes. As such, a major challenge to the Air Force is to develop methodologies to cultivate FAO-quality expertise within the integrated structure of the Service as opposed to creating an elite FAO cadre.

2. Identify and Define FAO Requirement Set. Many stakeholders note that it is equally important that the Proponent work closely with the FAO user community to develop a network of sanctioned FAO requirements. They recommend a strategy of standardizing the requirement set, when possible, and note that a validated need for FAO expertise is an essential ingredient to drive other FAO programming activities.

3. Cultivate the FAO Program Administrative Relationships. Observers note that the Proponent also faces the daunting task of promoting the value of foreign language and area expertise within the Air Force, what one observer notes is the "I'll see it when I believe it" syndrome. To overcome cultural stigmas and to develop and apply area expertise, the Proponent must strive for quality networking that far exceeds merely linking with other Air Force organizations. It is impossible to be a "Lone Ranger" in the FAO business, aspiring to build a program without incorporating the expertise and resources of the greater DoD and civilian communities. Accordingly, active networking is the common essential ingredient in five major recommendations from the observers: (1) craft the FAO user and stakeholder communities; (2) guide the FAO provider and management communities; (3) align the program to comply with DoD oversight requirements; (4) integrate the foreign language initiatives into Defense Foreign Language Program; and (5) relinquish responsibility for the LRPES #10-7 goal to the Air Force Personnel Directorate.

4. Consolidate Advances in the FAO Program and Realize the Full Potential of FAO Advocacy. Most observers concur that the Air Force has broken new ground in its efforts to legitimize the call for foreign language and area proficiency among its officer corps. The fate of the FAO initiative depends greatly on the Proponent's competence, leadership and commitment to the FAO concept. The Proponent's ability to sustain momentum in evolving the program is paramount - a challenge that extends well beyond traditional staff actions such as POM'ing and candidate boarding to include staff innovation, program flexibility and strategic focus. The stakeholders suggest that the Proponent

5. Develop the Mid-term Concept of Operations to Evolve the FAO Initiative into a True FAO Program. There remains a clear need for the Proponent to "normalize" the FAO initiative in the traditional sense, to go beyond cobbling together a program to validate FAO requirements and codify performance standards. Observers note that in recent years, key members of the Air Force leadership have retired or resigned; accordingly the leaders in place today are aware that a FAO program is in place but perhaps do not understand the history or essence of the FAO issue or the context in which decisions must take place. In addition, stakeholder point out that the Air Force is still trying to administer a FAO program "on the cheap," adding that FASP failed largely because it was cobbled together with insufficient attention and resourcing. A significant investment in time, dollars and effort is required to realize true dividends in FAO proficiency. As such, there are five primary recommendations to normalize the Air Force FAO program: (1) seek opportunities for FAO- designation as a primary AFSC; (2) field test options to develop a professional FAO force; (3) develop and field a tailored FAO course; (4) sponsor FAO professional cadre, Capstone programs; and (5) develop and implement a Total Force perspective.
strates that after ten years, the Arabs are still unable to contain Saddam by themselves. While the US wants to draw maximum public attention to the US-Arab coalition against Iraq, the Saudis would like to be as discreet about it as possible.

In such a situation, it is critical for the Saudi regime to show that it is not surrendering its sovereignty to the US. As much as possible, it must appear that the Saudis have the final say about everything that goes on in their country. The US must appear to be an ally, assisting the Kingdom. Whenever US forces violate Saudi rules, it undermines Saudi credibility, much more than we realize. This leads to friction and mistrust that sap the effectiveness of the fighting force.

Causes of Friction

Americans do not consciously set out to deprive the Saudis of their sovereignty or humiliate them in front of the Arab world. Many of our actions, however, give the appearance that Saudi sovereignty and sensitivity are not considerations in our plans. We often appear as though we are acting like an army of occupation, with a green light to do whatever we please in the host country. Where does such an impression come from?

Skeptics within the Kingdom. We must recognize that many powerful elements within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia oppose the idea of a US military presence there. The religious establishment is one group, but there are also officials within Saudi Customs, Immigration, Aviation and even the military ministries charged with overseeing religious rules and practices. Numerous senior military and civilian leaders come from conservative Islamic backgrounds.

In order to win the acquiescence of these elements, the Saudi government had to make a strong case that US forces would respect the rules and practices in the Kingdom. Customs and Immigrations violations are a particular concern, because many of the officials who catch these violations are members of the conservative religious establishment who are already skeptical of the American influence. When one combines frequent violations of Saudi Customs laws with MTV-images of American culture, Saddam’s propaganda about Americans defiling the Holy Land starts to sound credible.

Misconceptions of the American System. Contributing to the friction is a common misconception that many Saudis have about the US logistical, personnel and planning systems. Most Saudi officers have trained in the United States and are quite proud of their familiarity with the US military. Although they may have technical expertise, however, most have never worked with a global logistical system like ours. Consequently, most have no idea how complex it is. In truth, I think few American officers really appreciate how massive and complicated the system is until we actually have to work with it.

Much of our logistical system is driven from CONUS. The J4 staff in Saudi Arabia doesn’t necessarily control what arrives in country, when it arrives and from where. Long lead times involved in scheduling sea lift, or changing airlift availability also make it difficult to completely control the system. Munitions destined for Saudi may be shifted to Korea and vice versa. These are events that we have come to accept as a normal part of the system.

The Saudi MoDA staff, however, tended to believe that the US commander on the ground had complete control over everything that happened involving US forces. If the US forces had authorization to import a certain type of missile, but a different type actually arrived at the airport, this was seen as a deliberate attempt to deceive the Saudi government. The fact that the original missiles were re-routed for the air campaign in Kosovo is of little concern. If prohibited religious items arrived at the Riyadh airport, the Saudis
assumed that the US commander shipped them in open defiance of Saudi law. The fact that the items were misrouted from Germany would be of no consequence.

The Host Nation sees America as the most technologically advanced power in the world. They see the precision of our weapons, our capability to transmit data instantly around the world, our ability to get a ten-digit grid location by satellite anywhere in the world, and so on. How could the US be able to track every vehicle in the Iraqi army but not deliver a box to correct country? “You are supposed to be the Superpower!” was a very common lament in Riyadh. When you combine the American and Saudi misperceptions, it is easy to see how friction can build up.

Reducing the Friction in Host-Nation Relations

Increasing Awareness. Since so much of the friction is due to misperceptions, the first step is to clear up some of these misunderstandings. Most Americans deploying to the Gulf have never been given a clear explanation of Saudi concerns. Upon exiting the plane, they are told merely that “this is a very religious country,” and “these people are very traditional.”

At the very least, those staff members that will have contact with the Host Nation need to know some of the basic political, economic and religious issues involved. This could be as brief an explanation as we have presented here. Our staff officers and NCOs are perceptive and proactive enough to scrutinize their operations and ensure that possible offenses to the Host Nation are minimal. With personnel changeover occurring every 90 days, this becomes even more critical.

Building Trust. There is much less we can do to change the Host Nation perceptions, but every effort helps. Saudi officers greatly appreciated being invited onto the US areas in their bases and getting a tour of our work areas. Observing all the proper security procedures, there is still plenty to show them to give them a window into the complexity of our operation. For many, just seeing the amount of automation equipment we use, the volumes of regulations we have and the many different agencies involved in our daily operations helps them appreciate that we are not trying to deceive anyone. Just the gesture itself conveys mutual respect and consideration. On the other hand, the over-eager US guard who holds a Saudi general at gunpoint sets us back years in terms of Host Nation relations.

Also, we must acknowledge and address Host Nation concerns at a high level and show that we are working toward “win-win” solutions. In our frequent meetings with the Saudis, our US Director and Chief of Staff would try to anticipate and address the Saudi concerns before the Saudi staff had to bring them up. Even when we did not have a solution to the problem, it paid great dividends for our Director to explain all the options we were exploring in order to satisfy everyone’s requirements.

Cooperative Solutions. To put this into practice, we have to work out policies that satisfy both sides. Obviously, we have to meet US operational needs. Yet, we cannot merely do things according to our own SOPs, and expect the Host Nation to accept it as operational necessity. Sometimes the issues are simple ones. Using guard dogs to check vehicles coming into the US compound is an example. Dogs are considering filthy and offensive to Saudi Muslims, yet security is paramount. Between the US and Saudi Military Police, we were able to create procedures to inspect visiting Saudi vehicles without the dogs actually coming into contact with the Saudi officers themselves.

Some issues are much more complex. Resolution often involves bringing together technical experts for both nations. An example was obtaining an exemption from Saudi royal decrees
to import blood and medicines for US forces. This required intense technical coordination to ensure compliance with FDA regulations, Saudi Customs law and Islamic law. Explaining why Saudi medical sources were not acceptable, without offending them, was another delicate matter. That required pointing out differences in the US and Saudi medical codes that did not necessarily make one sound better than the other. The point is that in these negotiations, the subject of camel racing did not come up very often.

Addressing Larger Controversies.

A final element in Host Nation relations concerns our role as representatives of the US government. We may be the only members of the US government that our Host Nation counterparts have the opportunity to talk to. While it would certainly be safer to limit the conversation to logistics and operations, any American military member can expect to be asked about American politics, religion or family values.

In this area, we walk a thin line. Quoting official military public relations statements will not do much to build positive relationships, yet we should not criticize our government’s policies, either. When Arabs ask about our policy toward Israel and the Palestinians, or the very unpopular sanctions against Iraq, what do we say without offending them or discrediting our own government?

First, we should remember that in such cases, they are venting frustration more than anything else. People around the world watch CNN and see the US driving international relations. Often, they feel like they are small players who do not have a voice. An Arab soldier who questions US policy in the Middle East doesn’t necessarily want an explanation as much as he wants to be heard.

Second, we must remember that the Host Nation’s version of history is the only one that many of our counterparts have heard. Most Arab schoolchildren learn that the 1973 Arab-Israeli War was a crushing Arab victory; that Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait was identical to the Israeli capture of the West Bank, Golan and Gaza; and that Israel is a European Colonial power. Arguing that their version of history is wrong is likely to be a futile, emotional exercise.

We can, however, emphasize the points on which we do agree. Any place where the US was involved in protecting Muslims is a good start. The liberation of Kosovo and the defeat of Yugoslav dictator Milosevic are examples. Our common disgust at the Russian attacks in Chechnya, is another. We can even point to US efforts to advance the peace process between Israel and Palestine, without getting bogged down in the specifics of the proposals and agreements.

Last, we can keep things amicable on a personal level, even where national policies differ somewhat. Emphasize that on the mission at hand, our governments agree. If they disagree on some other issues, those are not really our concern; we will leave those to the diplomats. Reiterating to your host how much you appreciate his assistance in your daily business will push any political disagreements to the back burner.

The FAO Contribution in Perspective.

It is obvious from the preceding discussion that “FAO work” is thoroughly interwoven with the operational success of a combatant mission in a foreign region. To view the FAO role as specializing in the language and social pleasantries is a far too narrow perspective. Political and economic concerns bleed over into treaties and military agreements and then into logistical support and operational constraints. If we make a clear dividing line between these subjects, it is an artificial one that will not apply in the real world.

MAJ David F. DiMeo is an Instructor of Arabic at the United States Military Academy at West Point. Prior to that, he served as the Liaison Officer for USCENTCOM-Forward to the Saudi MoDA in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. He conducted In-Country Training in Cairo, Egypt and received a Master’s Degree from Princeton University. The views here are the author’s and do not represent the US Military Academy or USCENTCOM.
On Friday afternoon, we international supervisors, assigned to stations in the medical school, returned there to meet with the polling station committees which OSCE had selected and briefly trained. Needless to say, these young Kosovars were very excited about participating in this historic event - Kosovo’s first democratic election. We proceeded to clean the small classroom, set up furniture, and hang the various posters explaining the procedures to the voters.

ELECTION DAY

Supervising the Polling Station

Early the next morning, Saturday, I reached the medical school at 6:15 a.m. to find some of the committee already there. Throngs of voters were assembling in the pre-dawn darkness. After the centre was unlocked, we entered and unpacked the ballots, lists, and sensitive materials. The political observers identified themselves to me, and I entered their names in the poll book that would contain the minutes of this station. Quickly I found that OSCE’s training for the committee members was incomplete but, after Nexhat and I explained and rehearsed the duties of each person’s position, and made some changes and adjustments, we opened the door. We slowly began assisting the voters, making sure they understood the ballots. I made sure that each of the members clearly understood their duties.

As I became confident that the station was operating smoothly, I stood at a table near the two voting booths (cardboard enclosures with sample ballots) and the three political observers, where the people passed before placing their ballots into the plastic ballot box. From there, I could see the people show their registration slips and sign the voter register (they had registered to vote earlier this year). The ballot issuer sprayed a fluorescent liquid (silver nitrate) on the voters’ right forefingers so that there was (indelible) proof that they had voted and couldn’t vote a second time. The voters then moved on to another table where they were given their ballots, and were instructed and directed to one of the two voting booths. After marking their ballots, they folded and dropped them into the ballot box that we had received in our polling station kit.

Within a short time after dawn, the crowds grew much larger and noisier. The continuous stampede, pushing and shoving, and chaos created by the voters is now difficult to describe. Though entirely peaceful, anxious, impatient voters had to wait for hours just to enter the centre. It was finally necessary to keep six police officers at the door to my station just to control the queue. Standing there watching these people coming through the line, many of them older women with their heads covered in the Muslim fashion, watching gnarled old fingers getting sprayed, I had moments when belief was suspended. Seeing this whole process unfold before me -- actually being in the middle of it -- is a high point of these trips, and is an experience which is hard to top.

Counting and Processing the Ballots

At midnight on Saturday night, we closed the door and began the counting process, which didn’t finish until after 2 a.m. Monday - - each ballot was examined individually, its validity decided, and then counted by hand. Nexhat and I carefully supervised this painstaking process, resolving disputes quickly over the validity of poorly marked ballots. The overwhelming majority of regular voters at my polling station voted for the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK). The political observers present were keen to learn this unmistakable fact.

Of the 696 ballots we received, many were sealed and tendered as conditional ballots, because the voters’ names were not listed on the registration lists, or the voters did not have proper identification, and thus not immediately
counted. Procedures required that registered voters who could identify themselves, but whose names did not appear on the final voter's regist-
ers, were permitted to tender conditional ballots which would be compared to the newer, updated lists at the OSCE headquarters.

Because I was supervising the absentee station in the medical centre, administratively, I was also designated to receive the conditional ballots cast in all of the regular polling stations in the centre that were operated by the other international supervisors. During the counting and processing of regular ballots, each supervisor separately bagged and tagged the conditional ballots. Nexhat and I and our driver would then deliver all the sensitive materials from the absentee station, and all the conditional ballots to OSCE. At the OSCE headquarters, after the polls were closed, the conditional ballots (there were many hundreds, if not thousands) were later opened and, very likely, many of them were counted as valid and added to the final vote total.

That morning before dawn, with a UN-CIVPOL (i.e., police) escort, I returned the election results and sealed ballot materials to the OSCE’s headquarters. There a Greek KFOR tank sat in front and armed Greek soldiers guarded the entrance and the room where the ballots were stored.

Election Results

The results of Kosovo’s first postwar elections, for local councils, showed that the region’s voters had overwhelmingly supported the party of a moderate reformer, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova. This week, the OSCE announced the final election results, including those of the municipality of Uroševac/Ferizaj, where I was assigned: Voter turnout there was 75.5% of 57,721 eligible voters. Of 41 council seats allocated in the municipality, the LDK will receive 29, and the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) will receive 11 seats. I am hopeful that our efforts in supervising this first democ

ratic municipal election will have a positive effect on precious lives of the Kosovo people.

COMMENTARY

As I mentioned above, this was the first free election ever in Kosovo, involving fledgling political groupings with deep differences in an province of Yugoslavia just emerging from war and chaos. The ballot was complex, with choices for either a party or individuals. Many of the voters were older people and many barely literate. If, during the vote, the voter indicated that he or she had made a mistake, the spoilt ballot was replaced. During ballot counting, which took place under the eyes of political observers, we explained why each ballot was or was not valid. Invalid ballots, those where the voter’s intention wasn’t clear, or where there was more than one choice made, amounted to about 10% of the total.

(Continued on page next page)
We were all overwhelmed with voters, and the process of voters' registration was incomplete, so no doubt there were some "irregularities". Nevertheless, the polling procedures were never questioned. The procedures were accepted because they were and are regarded as a fundamental part of the democratic process. We and our democratic allies have invested a huge amount of resources to convince people in the Balkans and elsewhere that democracy is the answer, and to them free elections is the fundamental first step in the process of free choice, which is the essence of democracy. They also agree to trust the system, perhaps the first time in their lives that they have ever trusted a system to be free and fair.

In previous elections in war-torn Bosnia, where I was also an international supervisor, these principles were also accepted without question. Voters often asked for help and were assisted with the ballots by family, other voters, or local members of the polling station committees. I can only imagine what the impact would be if, in the U.S., the bastion of democracy, people were allowed to vote over again because they didn't get it right the first time.
The book is full of examples of good people doing it the preferred FAO way. You'll meet Tom Knox, who began as many FAOs begin with a dream, “…certain words meant enchantment to him…They suggested strange countries, mysterious reaches of green water, smells that he had never smelled, and people he had never yet seen. Later on, when he learned what the words meant, he wanted to see the places and things for which the words stood.” You'll see the good Ambassador MacWhite, who makes it his personal business to learn the language, to eat the food, to learn the history, to study the culture, to get out and meet real people outside of the diplomatic context. You'll learn, as MacWhite does, that “everyone has ears”, some of them may be employed in your house and office, and not all of them are on your side. The reader cringes when the exemplary MacWhite is replaced by the hack, Bing. You'll meet Jesuit priest, Father John X. Finian, who creates the conditions for defeating communism by listening to the people and letting them decide for themselves what is best for their future, and then guiding them to move in a positive direction. You'll be introduced to Emma Atkins, the quintessential FAO wife, who works with local peasants and even introduces them to the long-handled broom; she best represents the value a spouse can bring to working relationships overseas, with language and other training provided by DoD. You'll travel with good Senator Jonathan Brown, who realizes too late that in his two-week fact-finding mission, he has “…talked to only two natives, and to only three officers below the rank of general…” and who “…for a moment [correctly] distrusts all his impressions of the visit.” And you'll learn the names of many others, both ugly and not.

But one will return always to COL Edwin Barnum Hillandale, based on the real General Lansdale. You'll see him interacting with locals, eating their food in their houses and restaurants. You'll see him in the smallest of towns, breaking out his American harmonica and playing traditional native folk songs of the country he's visiting. You'll see him struggle to gain a proper understanding of the political and military context, in order to best complete his strategic scout duties and to advise American leaders. One of the good guys, the showboating “Barnum” Hillandale, shames the “ugly Americans” by comparison. While fictional, and occasionally over-the-top, Hillandale exemplifies what is best in the regional specialist FAO field. Like Once An Eagle's Sam Damon, one could pick a worse fictional example to emulate.
and the idea was dropped.

other tribal leaders did not trust an Arab to lead such a revolt borders on the Red Sea.  Ironically, the Hashemites and had aspirations of ruling the entire Hijaz province which idea to Hashemites who governed the holy city of Mecca alongside Libyan tribesmen.  Nuri-al-Said suggested his liant and exiled Iraqi officer Nuri-al-Said who while fighting Asher writes that the idea of disrupting the Ottoman railways bling mission.  Lawrence is credited with organizing his travels and research brings us a complex man with a staggering mission.  Lawrence is credited with organizing the patchwork of Bedouin tribes into an irregular fighting force that would wear down Ottoman forces and force Turk-ish military planners to devote resources to the Arabian Theater.  This is the simple version of events, in reality Asher writes that the idea of disrupting the Ottoman railways and bringing chaos to Arabia was introduced first by a brill-iant and exiled Iraqi officer Nuri-al-Said who while fighting alongside Libyan tribesmen. Nuri-al-Said suggested his idea to Hashemites who governed the holy city of Mecca and had aspirations of ruling the entire Hijaz province which borders on the Red Sea. Ironically, the Hashemites and other tribal leaders did not trust an Arab to lead such a revolt and the idea was dropped.

The author takes us beyond the hype and through his travels and research brings us a complex man with a staggering mission. Lawrence is credited with organizing the patchwork of Bedouin tribes into an irregular fighting force that would wear down Ottoman forces and force Turkish military planners to devote resources to the Arabian Theater.  Lawrence was credited with organizing the patchwork of Bedouin tribes into an irregular fighting force that would wear down Ottoman forces and force Turkish military planners to devote resources to the Arabian Theater. This is the simple version of events, in reality Asher writes that the idea of disrupting the Ottoman railways and bringing chaos to Arabia was introduced first by a brilliant and exiled Iraqi officer Nuri-al-Said who while fighting alongside Libyan tribesmen. Nuri-al-Said suggested his idea to Hashemites who governed the holy city of Mecca and had aspirations of ruling the entire Hijaz province which borders on the Red Sea. Ironically, the Hashemites and other tribal leaders did not trust an Arab to lead such a revolt and the idea was dropped.

The author is disappointed by how average Saudis do not even know about Lawrence and even little about the Hashemite period of their history. Even descendants of Auda Abu-Tayi, the leader of the fierce Howaytat Tribe, look upon Lawrence as just an engineer who blew up the rail-ways. What is clear though was his ability and utter devo- tion to Prince Feisal, one of the sons of the Emir of Mecca, Hussein whom he saw as the chivalrous knight he dreamt of in his childhood. This devotion conflicted with his role as British officer and Lawrence even refused several decora-tions from the English monarch as a political protest.

Crossing the Terror (Al-Houl) to capture of the port of Aqaba, was one of the bolder moves in the Arabian Cam-aign of World War I. Here Lawrence would take 50 Agyli Tribesmen and cross the Nafud Desert (Al-Houl), where nothing lives not even bade of grass grows; attacking the Ottoman garrison unexpectedly as their guns faced the sea. Asher takes time to delve into the different tribes and what their role was in Arabia's loose political structure. The Tafas incident where Bedouins led by Lawrence on their way to Syria massacred a Turkish column and gunned down pris-oners is discussed, judge for yourself if Lawrence was to blame. But be careful, Ottoman forces did not care to under-stand the Bedouin code of fighting and as such brutality increased, as it became more than a war and evolved into a blood feud.

Michael Asher's book is an excellent read and highly recommended for Middle-East FAOs. In many ways, FAOs could probably identify with Lawrence of Arabia, playing the role of diplomat, advisor and interpreter for U.S. Military in-terests overseas. Even taking a bit of the culture, eating the food, and living among the people of the region.


No other leader has left an indelible mark on the Egyptian psyche than Gamal Abd-Al-Nasser. Like the Islamic Brotherhood that attracts the poor and disenfranchised through religion. Today’s Nasserists embodied by the Na-tional Progressive Union Party tries to represent and unite the poor through the gospel of socialism. A few Egyptian intellectuals argue that Nasser’s goals for the 1952 Revolu-tion was not fully realized. Under Nasser Egypt’s lower classes began to seek government posts and enter the civil service, it. While serving as Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the American University in Cairo, Raymond Baker wanted to write a book that would describe current Egyptian politics from the eyes of the men and women who constitute Egypt’s power bases. Many American policymakers tend to only look at a country from a purely national security perspective and the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979 came as complete shock to Washington. Another surprise to Washington was the reaction or lack of emotion when the late President Anwar Sadat was assassinated in 1981. Egyptian politics cannot be classified into black and white or those who are Muslim Fundamentalists versus the current National Democratic Party of Hosni Mubarak. There are shades and other bases of power though not as attention grabbing in the media deserve to be looked at. Part One of the book begins with Osman Ahmed Osman; one of Egypt’s
most influential construction magnates. Osman built his company from scratch and rose to advise both President Nasser and Sadat. It was his vision that built the October 6th Bridge which is a vital overpass that extends from downtown Cairo to the outskirts of Nasr (Victory) City and projects to reclaim the desert. Both projects address the population problem in Egypt and a Cairo that now has 17 million people. His political views favor a more free economy, however he seems to endorse the cronyism and special status his company the Arab Contractors enjoy during the Sadat and into the current Mubarak administrations.

The Egyptian Bar Association has been a hot bed of liberal thinking for decades. Their seminars invited personalities to express their thoughts on matters of national importance. Speakers ranged from Omar Telmesany, head of the Muslim Brotherhood (Al-Ikhwan) to Khaled Muhieddin of the socialist National Progressive Union Party (NPUP). However, this association of lawyers made the headlines in 1980, when they denounced a security measure dictated by Sadat called the “law of shameful conduct.” After the suspension by Sadat of Egypt’s State of Emergency that started in 1970, the late President issued this law that made punishable any act deemed immoral by the regime and created a special Court of Values, outside regular judicial channels, which would prosecute offenses. Overnight, political expression was squelched. Lawyers argued that these edicts eroded the legal system itself, turning Egypt into a dictatorship. In Rabat, Morocco, a meeting of Arab Lawyers saw, Egyptian attorneys and jurists opposing the Camp David accords and criticizing Egyptian internal security measures that conducted arbitrary arrests and detention without cause. Other challenges from the Bar Association came from Mrs. Ne’mat Fuad who successfully opposed Sadat’s plans to create an amusement park around the pyramids. Many Egyptian attorney’s and liberals are attracted to the Wafd Party created in the early 1920s as a means of peacefully transitioning Egyptian internal affairs from London to Cairo.

No other leader has left an indelible mark on the Egyptian psyche than Gamal Abd-Al-Nasser. Like the Islamic Brotherhood that attracts the poor and disenfranchised through religion. Today’s Nasserists embodied by the National Progressive Union Party tries to represent and unite the poor through the gospel of socialism. A few Egyptian intellectuals argue that Nasser’s goals for the 1952 Revolution was not fully realized. Under Nasser Egypt’s lower classes began to secure appeared that Egyptians now had a share in economic prosperity, but the reality was cruel and under Sadat these dreams of a job and free services for all could not be sustained. Muhammed Hasanein Heikal, the former editor of Al-Ahram Newspaper and confidant of Nasser, writes extensively of the Nasser years. Young Egyptians view the late President as an important figure in not only Egyptian politics but in Arab affairs. Still Egyptians can’t come to grips with the failed socialist experiment and three years of Sadat’s death, a series of articles appeared in Al-Ahram denouncing Nasser. The most famous of which was Ahmed Bahaeddine’s three letters addressed to an identified “you”. Here is an excerpt of the You Letters, which was a direct criticism of Nasser:

“You are the cause of all our problems…. Why didn’t you do safe things and accept Egypt’s lot as a small weak country?”

“Why did you wake up the tens of millions who had been perfectly satisfied with old cheese, onions, the death of their infants, and toil from dawn to dusk?”

Another element of Egyptian politics that is even more leftist is the Marxist party, the Arab Socialist Union and their newspaper Al-Taliah or Vanguard. In January 1975, the Vanguard started a series of food riots and corruption that exploded into demonstrations that galvanized every anti-Sadat political party and group. Demonstrators chanted “Oh hero of the Crossing, where is our breakfast,” (rhyme sounds better in Arabic). Another crisis emerged when Sadat ordered the Defense Minister Al-Gamasy to quell these demonstrations, an order he refused to carry out, citing a pledge by the political leadership after the 1973 War that the army would not be used against the civilian population. This crisis between the armed forces and the president was averted, when Sadat agreed to Gamsay’s terms cancel the subsidy cutbacks to which then the army would respond to the communists. The last chapter in Part One deals with the influence of the Islamic Brotherhood and how it finds itself by the side of the regime and at other times opposing the presidency. Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimeen has been in existence since their newspaper Al-Taliah or Vanguard. In January 1975, members organized protests against Sadat’s policies. Demonstrators chanted “Oh hero of the Crossing, where is our breakfast,” (rhyme sounds better in Arabic). Another crisis emerged when Sadat ordered the Defense Minister Al-Gamasy to quell these demonstrations, an order he refused to carry out, citing a pledge by the political leadership after the 1973 War that the army would not be used against the civilian population. This crisis between the armed forces and the president was averted, when Sadat agreed to Gamsay’s terms cancel the subsidy cutbacks to which then the army would respond to the communists. The last chapter in Part One deals with the influence of the Islamic Brotherhood and how it finds itself by the side of the regime and at other times opposing the presidency. Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimeen has been in existence since the late twenties and has been hand in hand in the establishment of modern Egypt, it has had a love-hate relationship with Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak. What attracts many poor Egyptians to the Brotherhood is not only the message of religion, but also their ability to provide social services and welfare in Egypt’s most neglected districts. The question is can Egypt’s diversity handle the single version of Islam as dictated by the Islamic Brotherhood. With less than a quarter of Egypt being Christian and a diverse Islamic population a version of Islam cannot survive in Egypt without oppression. Still, the Islamic Brotherhood is interwoven in Egypt’s political future and cannot be dismissed.

Part Two deals exclusively with a 35-page treatise on the philosophy of Third World politics and Egypt’s unique place in Africa and the Middle East. Raymond Baker’s work is a must for Mid-East FAOs as it deals honestly with Egypt’s internal politics. Being the largest population base in the Arab world and a leader in Arab and African Affairs this volume will dissect the pressures and influences in Egypt’s political structure. Highly recommended reading.
COL Jim Dunphy is an IMA to USSOUTHCOM, has been a 48B for the past ten years, and for the past four has served with the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army (International Affairs). He has agreed to be our regular columnist and can be reached at Dunphyjj@aol.com.

When recently attending the resident portion of the Army War College, I was introduced to the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI). The SSI publishes a number of studies, linked either to issues or regions. While available in traditional hard copy, the studies are also available, through the Internet by use of Adobe Acrobat. Latin American Studies are available at http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/issipubs/catalogs/latin.htm

A number of recent SSI studies are on point for Latin American FAOs. The first, Donald E. Schulz, The United States and Latin America: Shaping an Elusive Future (March 2000; 63 pp) provides an excellent overview of the entire region. As befitting a study produced at the War College, Schulz considers Latin America in terms of the US’ national interests. He concludes that while WMD fears have largely been alleviated, there still remains threats against the “survival, safety and vitality of our nation” from narcotraffickers and organized crime. He also points out the importance of economics and the promotion of democracy. He then briefly reviews the strategic environment, with specific reference to Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela. Finally, after a look at the present, he peers into the future, considering, besides these three countries, a number of scenarios throughout the region. He concludes that we are a number of years away from the endgame in Cuba, but posits a post-Raul succession struggle, which could lead to a number of unpleasant out-

comes, from an unlikely Gotterdammerung to more likely repeat of the Mariel boatlift. Possible additional military intervention in Haiti or Panama is also considered. The rise of Brazil to a regional hegemon, possibly with nuclear arms, is noted, but it is reported that US Brazil relations are improving, lessening the consequences of such a rise. In his brief overview, concentrating on a few countries within the region, Schulz has done an excellent job stating US interests and positing how those interests will play out. It is up to the reader to consider the future in such vital areas as Chile, Argentina and Peru.

Another useful general study is Max G. Manwaring, ed. Security and Civil-Military Relations in the New World Disorder: The Use of Armed Forces in the Americas (September 1999; 85pp.) This collection of essays from a Texas A & M conference on “The Use of Land Forces in the Americas” reviews, as noted in the forward, the major political, economic and social trends in Latin America; strategic issues that relate to the use of US armed forces in the Americas; and civil military relations now and in the future. After a strategic perspective by Dr. Schulz consistent with his other work, Peter Hakim argues that attempts to build strong, egalitarian democracies have failed because of governments’ inability to resist three temptations: authoritarian politics, populist economics and anti-Americanism. Present throughout history, they remain, perhaps in lessened form, even to today. Specific essays on economic policy, the role of the US Army in promoting democracy, and land forces in drug interdiction follow. There is an excellent closing essay on the use of Armed Forces in the Americas, in which the editor synthesizes the views of the Conference participants and is the most useful of the essays. He sums up the views of the Conference in two major points — while the military will have a role in promoting democracy and fighting drug traffic, planners must be ready for a long term commitment.

Another conference report, from April 1998, was on The Role of the Armed Forces in the Americas: Civil Military Relations for the 21st Century. A

(Continued on page 31)
Happy 2001 From The Army FAO Proponent Office

Lots of exciting news here in the Proponent office. Of major importance was today’s release of the Colonel’s Promotion list. While we’re still working through the details, the base numbers are amazing – FAOs were selected at a rate almost 30% over the Army average. Additionally, our above-the-zone selection rate exceeded 25% meaning there are lots of smiling faces out there. My heart-felt congratulations to you all!

Notably, these results mark the third consecutive year that FAO O6 selections exceeded the Army average – something that had not occurred in almost 15 years previously. It appears that the trends of the past boards continued in this one – the majority of FAOs selected have had at least 2 FAO tours, few have been battalion commanders, and single-track FAOs were selected at a rate very close to those still carrying dual-track status. These trends continue to confirm that the transition process into OPMS XXI is on track.

The most recent Senior Service College Board also yielded good news. 11 FAOs are headed to SSC this year and more are on the horizon. Under a full OPMS XXI board we expect about 30 FAOs per year to be selected. More good news, and a direct result of the changes resulting from OPMS XXI.

Finally, I challenge all serving senior FAOs, and retirees, to embrace your role of mentor. The continued progress and improvement of our program under OPMS XXI is a good news story. Our attitudes and our guidance set the stage for the health of the FAO Program and determine, to a large degree, the quality of our force. OPMS XXI is here. While it is in transition it IS working. We still have some challenges ahead but it’s time to shed the “woe is me” attitudes that tend to flavor the most vocal of our voices. Army FAOs have been, and still are, recognized as a critical force multiplier in the conduct of our National Military and National Security Strategies. Be advocates for change and improvement – but be positive mentors who fuel the professional flames of our junior officers, don’t extinguish them.

In-Country Training – South Asian Style!

The Army currently operates three In-Country Training (ICT) sites in South Asia. Three FAOs per year conduct training in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. The 48D region is one of great complexity, growing interest for the United States, and a terrific place for young FAOs to develop their skills. Whether it’s the nuclear-fueled India-Pakistan rivalry, the specter of terrorism and the spread of radical Islam from Afghanistan (also part of the 48D AOR), the frequent crises which make humanitarian assistance operations a regular occurrence, or insurgencies such as those in Nepal and Sri Lanka, South Asia is an ideal location for the Soldier-Statesman to ply his trade. Each ICT site in the region includes attendance at the host nation Command and Staff College, which is taught in English. The interaction with student officers of the host country and many other nations from across Asia and the Middle East (in the case of Pakistan and Bangladesh) gives the ICT FAO a tremendous opportunity to develop contacts with his peers from across the region. FAOs who do ICT in South Asia are captains or majors with a 2/2 in Hindi, Urdu, or Bengali, which they learn at the Foreign Service Institute in Washington.

The FAO in Bangladesh attends the Defense Services Command and Staff College. As part of the course, the FAO has the opportunity to travel extensively within the country. When not in school, the FAO conducts travel throughout the rest of the region. The staff college is located in Dhaka, the capital, and the FAO is provided with housing from the Embassy Housing Pool. The embassy is fairly small, and therefore the FAO has the opportunity to become quite familiar with the functioning of not only the DAO, but the other elements of an embassy as well.

The FAOs in India and Pakistan are located at the staff colleges in Wellington and Quetta, respectively, which are both several hundred miles from the capitals. This distance means the FAO does not get as much exposure to the workings of an embassy, but also allows the FAO to develop an ability to operate more independently. In Pakistan, the FAO is the only American at the college, while in India either an Air Force or Navy officer is a student as well. The FAOs are housed in student quarters on the staff college compounds. Again, the curriculum includes significant travel within the host nations, primarily on military exercises. Breaks in the course allow the FAOs to conduct travel throughout the rest of the 48D region.

ICT in South Asia can certainly fall into the “muddy boots” category. However, the combination of interaction with peers in the regional militaries, travel in a region with locations of great cultural and historical importance, and firsthand exposure to some of the critical national security and foreign policy issues facing the United States in the near future make this a region of unparalleled opportunity for motivated FAOs.
**USMC FAO Notes**  
*Major Pat Caroll, International Affairs Officer Program Coordinator*

Probably the biggest achievement for the Marine Corps’ FAO/RAO Program during the previous quarter was to sign and implement the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between Headquarters Marine Corps and the Defense Intelligence Agency. This will greatly improve our FAO in-country training experience, and the support mechanisms on which our FAOs rely during their target region. Thanks go out to Mr. Frank McCleskey at DIA for coordinating the entire effort, as well as to LTC Comer Plummer, USA for providing the initial guidance on how to effect the agreement. The International Affairs Officer Program Order (MCO 1520.11E) has likewise been signed and published, and is now fully in effect (revising MCO 1520.11D). The FAO/RAO Program Coordinator will also be releasing the announcement (MARADMIN) in February 2001 for this coming year's study-track FAO/RAO board that will be held in Quantico from 10-13 July 2001. This board will select 10 new FAOs and 8 new RAOs to begin the funded training program in 2002. Specific languages and regions are still being finalized and will be confirmed by the MARADMIN. The Unified Commands and International Issues Branch (PLU), PP&O, HQMC is also in the process of completing the First Quarter (FY01) Experience-Track Board (delayed slightly due to the holiday season); a total of 11 officers have applied for either FAO or RAO additional MOSs based on previous experience.

As of January 2001, PLU is sponsoring the following officers for in-country training (ICT). Maj Barnes is currently at the Diplomatic Academy in Moscow conducting an internship during his year with the Marshall Center in Garmisch, Germany; while Maj Christopher has completed about half his year at the Baltic Defense College in Tartu, Estonia. Maj Moseley and Capt Oppenheim continue to study at Capitol Normal University in Beijing, China while making sojourns throughout the northern provinces of China as well as along the Yangtze River. Maj Dyson and LtCol Mauro are still in Korea, but Maj Dyson will soon be rotating back to the United States during January for a follow-on staff tour with Marine Forces Pacific, Camp Smith, Hawaii. Maj Ken Nelson, our first FAO in Vietnam, has been traveling throughout that country, studying at a private language institute, and even assisted with the President's visit in December. Maj Cunningham and Maj Palmer are based out of Oman and Egypt, respectively, and have been making their way throughout North Africa, the Levant, and the Gulf States. They have recently been joined by Capt Duke who becomes our first Marine FAO to report to Jerusalem, Israel for a year at the Hebrew University (proficient in Arabic and Hebrew) and for travel throughout the Arab world. Maj Costantini will be replacing Maj Palmer during the month of January, with Maj Palmer heading to a follow-on tour with CENTCOM J-2. Maj Goff has arrived in Japan to start his training at FSI, while Capt Perry who has already been in Tokyo for 6 months is getting set to start an internship with the premier think-tank in Japan, the Okazaki Institute. The FAO/RAO Program Coordinator is likewise still working with the Japanese to allow Maj Goff to follow-on for a stint at the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Forces Command & Staff College.

Seven Regional Affairs Officers (RAOs) graduated from the various Regional Security Studies curricula at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey this past December and are heading to their follow-on assignments: Maj Ahern (Marine Attaché, Guatemala), Maj Grogan (CENTCOM J-2), Maj Holmberg (Marine Forces Pacific), Maj Lyons (Marine Attaché, Israel), Maj Myrick (Joint Contact Team Program, Croatia), Maj Kelly (NATO, Brunssum, Netherlands), and Maj Walsh (EUCOM)...congratulations to one and all and best of luck in your utilization assignments.

On the promotion front for the FY02 boards, only the Colonels Board has been released. Congratulations are in order for the 7 LtCols with a FAO/RAO additional MOS selected to Colonel; this is a 47% selection rate for FAO/RAOs. With regards to other current issues in the FAO/RAO world, PLU is currently working on an NSDD-38 agreement to have a Russian FAO actually spend their full ICT year within Russia proper. While this may not be feasible during FY01, we will continue to push for this type of ICT at either Moscow or St. Petersburg in the future. PLU, PP&O is also advocating assumption of the program sponsorship and management of the Personnel Exchange Program (PEP), USMC students at Foreign Intermediate and Top-Level Schools, as well as USMC officers currently on UN Observer duty. We are now awaiting decisions by the Deputy Commandant, Manpower and Reserve Affairs with regards to these programs, but PLU feels strongly that they belong with PP&O due to the heavy political-military, foreign affairs aspects of the duties involved. Finally, the FAO/RAO Program Coordinator intends to continue to

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develop the Secretary of the Navy’s FAO Mentoring Program initiative. We have thus far received approximately 56 positive responses from over 120 individuals (professors, former military officers, regional experts, business and political leaders) who were solicited to participate in this ongoing effort to improve the quality of our political-military officers.

As always, the Unified Commands and International Issues Branch (PLU), PP&O, HQMC is always available to take your comments. For further information, please see our website at http://www.hqmc.usmc.mil/faowebsite.nsf. We welcome any comments on how to improve the program. Please see the FAO Proponent Page on the inside cover of the FAOA Journal for POC information.

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brief introductory article on the strategic landscape shows the interlocking perspectives on Latin America in the National Security Strategy and the US Security Strategy for the Americas. Specific articles on aspects of civil military relations follow. Of particular interest is one on Brazilian military policy written by a Brazilian university professor. This rich article contains not only a sweeping discussion of civil military relations from World War II to the present, but also an analysis of the Brazilian equivalent of the NSS, the National Defense Policy (PDN in Portuguese). This volume is particularly useful, as the articles are equally divided between US authors and Latin American authors, allowing for differing perspectives.

This brief overview barely scratches the surface of the depth of monographs available from SSI. More specific country studies, particularly on Mexico, Colombia and Haiti are available, along with studies on counterinsurgency and combating drug trafficking. The ease in obtaining these studies, combined with their content value, make them an invaluable resource for the Latin American FAO.

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Neither time nor its focus on Southeast Asia dates The Ugly American. As Ambassador MacWhite’s final letter to the Secretary of State says, “…The little things we do must be moral acts and they must be done in the real interest of the peoples whose friendship we need…[Those] who have sacrificed and labored here are not romantic or sentimental. They are tough and they are hard. But they agree with me that to the extent that our foreign policy is humane and reasonable, it will be successful. To the extent that it is imperialistic and grandiose, it will fail.” MacWhite continues with suggestions that represent the best aspects of the FAOs who continue to serve our country abroad—“I request that every American (and his dependents) be able to read and speak [the language]… I request that all Americans serving in [country]…be required to read books [to expand their understanding of the region and its political drivers]… I request that we make all these conditions clear to any perspective [USG/military] employee. It has been my experience that superior people are attracted only by challenge.”

In The Ugly American’s factual epilogue, Lederer and Burdick sum up ably. “Americans who cannot speak the language can have no more than an academic understanding of a country’s customs, beliefs, religion, and humor. Restricted to communication with only that special, small, and usually well-to-do segment of the native population fluent in English, they receive a limited and often misleading picture of the nation about them.” They continue, “What we need is a small force of well-trained, well-chosen, hard-working, and dedicated professionals. They must be willing to risk their comforts and in some lands their health. [We would add a willingness to risk life on occasion.] They must go equipped to apply a positive policy promulgated by a clear-thinking government. They must speak the language of the land of their assignment, and they must be more expert in its problems than are the natives.” This defines the foreign area officer corps of our armed Services. Its lessons are as vital and as relevant today to both new and experienced FAO strategic scouts as they were when written over thirty years ago in the 1958 publication of The Ugly American.

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