Senior FAO Thoughts
A Warrior’s Farewell
The “Operational” Nature of the Attache Business
The Rise of Military Diplomacy
Coalition-Building at Sea
Shaping Russian Foreign and Security Policy
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PURPOSE: To publish a journal for disseminating professional knowledge and furnishing information that will promote understanding between U.S. regional specialists around the world and improve their effectiveness in advising decision-makers. It is intended to forge a closer bond between the active, reserve, and retired FAO communities.

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Push the Envelope

There’s an old Army saying that there are three kinds of officers: those who make things happen, those who react when things happen, and those who don’t know what happened. Unfortunately, I see a lot of FAOs in the second category and even a few in the third. I submit that all of you must strive to be in the first category.

In his fine letter on page four, Colonel Bruce Boevers accurately identified several of our biggest problems in the FAO world: the shortage of genuine mentors, the lack of knowledge about the value FAOs bring to the table by senior leaders, and the fragmentation in the policy world that results in FAOs not being consulted when issues arise that are within their areas of expertise.

Now we can complain mightily, but if that is all we do, we will fall short of our potential and nothing in the system will change. Each FAO must do his part by “pushing the envelope” whenever and wherever possible. We must individually find ways to educate our senior leaders; we must try actively to identify and enlist appropriate FAO mentors: above all, we must strive to demonstrate our relevance and ability to add value. There are three ways this can be done.

First, every FAO must understand that he is his own best personnel manager. Assignment officers match requirements with available personnel—they just fill empty slots. You frequently will have to push PERSCOM (or your service equivalent) hard at times to give you the right assignment for you. But don’t push for the cushy jobs—push for tough jobs where you will be challenged intellectually and professionally, and where you can make a real difference. These days, this is often in the CINC-doms.

Second, strive to build credibility in your field through networking. Nowhere is this better illustrated than in Colonel Mike Ferguson’s superb article about his career as a FAO. Don’t just sit in your cubicle—go out and find the key players in your field. No one else will do it for you—they don’t care. But you should because the people you meet along the way can affect your future career in ways you cannot imagine. Your network should include more than just military officers and officials. They should include the key people at State, the NSC, the Joint Staff, the National Defense University, civilian think tanks, the UN and other international bodies, private voluntary organizations that do business in your country or region, recent immigrants from your region, and top-flight academics. Attend conferences and symposia, visit offices, subscribe to professional journals and WRITE FOR THEM!

Finally, fight to be relevant even if you are not invited to the table. When I first joined the Politico-Military Division of DCSOPS many years ago, we were enjoined to be the “conscience of the Army”. This was true on the Air Staff as well where I served as an exchange officer. We were expected by our leadership to fight hard to get our views heard and to do what was right for the country, for national security, and for our service—in that order. It is an unfortunate fact of life in the post-Goldwater-Nichols era in DOD that many key regional policymakers have little or no actual regional experience. They often need help but sometimes don’t know they do. Even if they do, they often don’t know where to get it. This is where YOU and your network come in. When a crisis or other situation comes along and you are not invited to participate in the deliberations (even though you may have expertise that might be invaluable), offer your help to work the issue, write policy drafts or talking points, or perform research to assist the policymakers. Get seniors to intercede on your behalf if necessary. Those you help will usually be grateful and you will emerge with an enhanced reputation—and perhaps a grateful contact that one day may make all the difference in your career.

PS: This is my last edition as editor of the FAO Journal. I’m on my way to Pakistan once again to be the Army Attache in Islamabad. I’ve enjoyed the past year and undoubtedly have learned much more from you than I’ve given in return. I urge you all to be active members of our joint service FAO community and continue to support the Journal by writing articles, book reviews, or letters (keep sending them to www.faoa.org and they will be forwarded to the new editor when named). As FAOs we all have something to say within our professional community.

-DOS
The Search for a FAO Mentor

At a recent FAO event in DC, LTG Patrick Hughes, outgoing Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, bemoaned the lack of a mentor for the FAO community. While I second LTG Hughes’ call to identify a FAO mentor, I am less heartened by the prospects. The search for a real mentor may be likened to what one of my friends once referred to as “Don Coyote trying to tip over windmills.” The reasons for our plight are not that others don’t like us (they do—too much) or that we are bad officers. Instead it lies with the very nature of FAO duties and the resulting force structure, although other factors do play a role.

Although I no longer have access to hard data, I once did, and I’ve been around the business since I started FAO training in 1977. I have worked in the specialty as a producer (FAO proponent office) as well as a consumer of FAO skills. Done most of the flavors of the FAO thing, less intelligence analysis. Been there, done that, got the T-shirt, but I am not God’s gift to FAO or the Army (disregarding theological arguments).

First, finding a FAO mentor is difficult because of the nature of FAO duties. Disaggregated into its component parts, FAO duties generally fall into three major categories: intelligence, security assistance and policy/strategy. Intel can again be split between operations (attaché) and analysis. Each of these component duties places us within one of several larger communities, none specifically or predominantly FAO; all dominated by other specialties.

To use General Hughes’ own case, the intelligence community is dominated by military intelligence, but FAO plays a critical role, both in operations and strategic analysis. The intel weenies love us! At the same time, they counsel their best and brightest to single track MI.

If intel looks grim, security assistance may be worse. Not only does security assistance represent only a subgroup of FAO duties, at the major command (MACOM) level and below it is a sub-set of logistics. Yet security assistance plays a crucial role in the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy under the pillar of “Shape the Future.” In some areas of the world, U.S. security assistance plays a dominating role in our engagement strategy with key countries.

Policy ought to be a good news story, but it too falls short. By policy-type jobs, I mean JS/OSD/STATE/NSC, etc. There is no policy “daddy”, let alone a FAO policy daddy.

Author’s note: To the best of my knowledge, the closest FAO ever came to having a real mentor was when we were subordinated to the Special Operations community, and the Commanding General of the JFK Special Warfare Center served as somewhat of a mentor. SOF still was problematic for FAOs because not all of us were Special Forces, Psyops, Civil Affairs or Rangers. Nonetheless, since CG, JFKSWC was responsible for our entry-level training, he found himself pregnant with the FAO problem, like it or not.

As a direct result of the fragmented nature of FAO duties, the force structure in which we work is not supportive. There are no mentor-level jobs for FAOs nor those to which we can reasonable aspire.

Let’s turn first to the intelligence community. As I mentioned before, there are two subsets of FAO duties within the community. While fairly cohesive, the Defense Attaché System (DAS) is now administered as part of the larger HUMINT community. The analytical community is exceptionally fragmented, defying emergence of a predominant mentor figure. Within the intelligence hierarchy, general officers usually do not come from either of the traditionally FAO-heavy specialties, analysis and HUMINT. Instead, they are traditionally tactical guys and SIGINTers, because that’s where the commands are. At the end of the day, there’s not much help here from a structural perspective. (Intel generals like LTGs Hughes and Williams and MGs LaJoie, Harding and Leide have been personally supportive. Please don’t muddy my argument with references to specific personalities.)

As alluded to earlier, Security Assistance may be in even worse shape. Of the leadership positions, only the commanding generals of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) and U.S. Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC) (or whatever we call them today) reflect FAO-type skills. At the MACOM level and below, we work for logisticians who mainly mentor the staffs who work around them, and then mainly their logistician protégés who still have a future in the Army. I am struck by two ironies when looking at the current state of FAOs in security assistance. First, MG Scott at USASAC is a FAO (German language, advanced degree, two years in-country training), albeit one who has avoided the designation like the plague. Second, at a recent OSD-level all-Service FAO conference, the DSCA rep stated that he saw little value FAOs bring to security assistance; he preferred good combat arms officers who could be “trained” to implement SA.

The policy community is possibly the most disjointed of all. The civilian agencies are headed by people who not only lack FAO experience, but increasingly have only passing contact
with the military in general. Unfortunately, my experience with
general officers in the policy arena is that if they have any FAO-
type background at all, they have assiduously avoided being
tainted by carrying the 48 designation. FAOs serving well in J5
positions often become profile balancers for former battalion
commanders who rank above-center-of-mass because of their
command, not because of their J5 performance. As one deputy J5
explained to me, he placed “the best expert on Balkans
affairs” (during the shooting war in Bosnia) center of mass
because he was “only a FAO”. That’s a mentor?

So what does that leave us? First, we need to enlist the
help of any FAO-like mentor in the government who is willing to
carry the banner. More than anything else, we need these people
in critical positions to further the FAO cause, to keep resources
like grad school and language flowing, etc. They also need to
have the guts to urge top-notch officers of any branch to join the
FAO community.

Equally important, we need the continued support of
those who have gone before and are now in influential positions
in support associations and private industry. They wield
influence far beyond the narrow descriptions of their jobs.

Finally, those of us who have reached the O-6 level (and
higher) need to actively engage younger officers to assist in their
professional development, both recruiting those not in the
program and developing those within. There is an inherent
danger to advise junior officers that the way we came is the best/
only way to the top. The way to FAO success is as multifaceted
as the way to Karma. Those of us with the O-6 brass ring also
have no idea how exactly OPMS XXI will impact on FAO.
Nonetheless, we need to be able to share support, experiences and
contacts with those who follow.

All of this will not solve the mentor situation, but I
remain unconvinced that there is a comprehensive solution to the
problem. In the meantime all of us need to continue to press the
organization at every possible opportunity.

COL Bruce E. Boevers

Bruce is absolutely on the mark in his analysis. Due to our
current policy organization for combat (or lack thereof), much
FAO expertise is wasted, or even worse, ignored. No one seems
able to step up to the plate in OSD and even the services go back
and forth like a pendulum. We old soldiers fondly recall the days
when GEN Max Thurman served as the Army FAO godfather and
look in vain for his successor.

-DOS

ASSOCIATION NEWS

ANNUAL DINING-IN POSTPONED UNTIL SPRING

Last issue we raised the possibility of reviving the former tradi-
tion of an annual FAO Dining-In in the Washington area in the
Fall. We looked at dates in late September or early October, but
our preferred choices for guest speaker are all actively involved
in this Fall’s presidential campaign. Rather than fight the tide,
we elected to wait and will try again in the Spring.

NEW LOGO STILL NEEDED

C’MON FOLKS— I NEED SOMEONE WITH GRAPHIC DE-
SIGN SKILLS! I’ve asked twice now for help in designing a
new Association logo to more accurately reflect the emerging
jointness of our membership. Still no responses. Help me out
and you’ll receive a free three year subscription if your design
is adopted by the Board of Governors.

THANKS FOR YOUR SERVICE, MARK!

Pressing professional obligations have caused Mark Beto, a long
time Board of Governors member to resign from the Board. We’re sorry
to see Mark depart, but understand the need to reduce his workload and
thank him for his service to the As-
sociation. In our next issue we will
announce the Board of Governors’ selection to replace him.

BOOK REVIEWERS NEEDED

All members are encouraged to contribute to our regional book
reviews columns. There seems to be the perception in the field
that the regular editors are responsible for all content contained in
their columns. NOT TRUE! Anyone can contribute and I en-
courage everyone to do so—particularly those of you in graduate
school or other professional military education courses. If you
read a good book, share it with us. Just send your input directly
to the column editor or to the FAOA e-mail address and it will be
forwarded promptly. We would especially welcome permanent
columnists for Africa and South Asia/Southeast Asia.
Senior FAO Thoughts:  
Colonel Mike Ferguson, President, FAO Association

This is the first of what I hope will be a series of “ruminations” from our senior FAOs on the subject of how to achieve success—however one chooses to define that ambiguous term—in our chosen profession. Mike’s bio data is self-evident in his submission, but he neglected to mention that he is a member of the Defense Attache Hall of Fame. -DOS

When first asked to write an article on "How one makes Colonel as an Army FAO", I was frankly reluctant to do so. How could my experiences, and others of my cohort, in the Army of the '70s and '80s possibly be relevant to today’s Captains, and Majors who face a vastly different personnel management system. What parallels could exist between the focused and programmed requirements for FAOs in the Cold War environment and today's environment of near-chaotic scrambles to find the right person with the skills and background to fill the gap for the crisis of the day?.

On reflection, however, I came to the conclusion that perhaps not much has changed after all. As a FAO "wannabe" in 1974, the Army's Personnel System was in a state of flux, a major draw-down was underway, command was the only way to go if you wanted to succeed, and I was told in no uncertain terms that becoming a FAO was the "kiss of death"—the first kiss of several I was to enjoy. At that time the FAO Program consisted of Graduate School, the FAO Course, language qualification and an in-country tour.

As usual, I did it differently. I curtailed my Infantry Officer Advanced Course by three weeks and reported to the six-month FAO Course at Fort Bragg, NC. Students in the African Seminar ranged from Captain thru Lieutenant Colonel and included (later Colonels) Kim Hennigsen, Ed Rybat, Hank Sturm and Cliff Fields as well as an instructor, Major Bismark Myrick, who is now a U.S. Ambassador.

On completion of the course I reported to the U.S. Defense Attache Office, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia as a FAO In-country Trainee replacing Major (later Colonel) Dale Ackles. During that ICT I traveled to over 20 other African nations and moved about extensively within Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa. I did not realize it at the time, but I was networking—it would be fairly easy to draw up a list of literally scores of people, both U.S. officials and foreign nationals, who were of invaluable assistance to me in later assignments. My ICT was unique in a way because in 1977 the Socialist government of Ethiopia expelled all U.S. military personnel with the exception of a few Marine Guards. This gave me my first experience in helping to close a USDAO and the dubious distinction of being the "last guy out" along with my spouse on an Air France jet to Djibouti.

The signs were apparent for a couple of months prior to the expulsion and I was able to ensure acceptance at a Masters program at the Naval Postgraduate School. I completed NPS (MA, International Affairs) in 1978 and amazingly, to me at least, made the Major's list at the same time. The bad news, according to the conventional wisdom, was that my validation tour was to be as an analyst at Headquarters, U.S. European Command and not back to troops which was the "only way" to make Lieutenant Colonel (conventional wisdom again). The reality was that my three years in EUCOM were the bedrock for my credentials as an Africanist. A two man shop (my cell-mate was a GG-13 named Bill Thom who today is the Defense Intelligence Officer for Africa), we covered all 47 (at that time) of the countries in Africa and over three years briefed all of them. The experience again proved invaluable in later assignments as a Defense Attache.

After EUCOM, I attended CGSC (I had already done it by correspondence) but was totally dismayed and frankly distraught by my follow-on assignment—the old kiss of death again—to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command at Fort Monroe. I did everything possible to get out of the job, including an appeal to BG Butch Saint, then the Commandant at CGSC; begged the Chief of MILPERCEN, MG Robert Arter; and pleaded with my new boss at TRADOC to let me go. Fortunately for me, BG Don Morelli refused to release me and I went to work in a relatively new staff division, the Office of the DCS for Doctrine, and rapidly became engaged in the development of a new idea-Air Land Battle. Having no other skills to apply, I attempted to make my FAO background relevant fairly easy to do since one of the major foci of the work was a third-world scenario (later turned out to be Kuwait and Iraq). Other interesting, and FAO-relevant tasks were found in working the Light Infantry Division and Leadership concepts. Perhaps the most important result of this job was becoming accustomed to thinking independently and discussing and briefing the results to very senior military and civilian officials.

By 1983, It was clear to me that even if I made Lieutenant Colonel I would not be selected for command because I had spent no troop time as a Major. Therefore, I decided to follow my Daddy's old dictum and "dance with the gal that brung you". I applied for both a White House Fellowship and Attache Duty. I made the finals for the fellowship and was not selected, but was offered the post of Defense and Army Attache in Cameroon—the latter because no body else wanted it—a double kiss of death, but I took the job anyway. What an experience—what a country! My wife loved it, my French became fluent, I covered two other countries, and on top of everything else we were running operations by ship, rail, air and highway in support of another colleague, Mike Mensch (also later Colonel), who was passing U.S.
equipment to the Chadians for use in their conflict with Libya. We also had a major ecological disaster at Lake Nyos which killed thousands of people and livestock. This led to an exercise idea called MEDFLAG, a program which continues throughout Africa to this day. It culminated in a major visit by the Secretary of State with me, the DATT, playing a critical role. Lots of work, lots of responsibility in a small station—the perfect fit for a frocked Lieutenant Colonel. Regrettably, all good things end and, because I had not done much planning for the next assignment, PERSCOM decided to designate me as the DLI Liaison Officer at the State Department's Foreign Language Institute. I went shopping for a job.

I was extremely lucky to find a vacancy on the staff of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Jim Woods' office working the central and later the southern African account. My desk-mate was Mike Beraud (later Colonel) and together we worked closely with the security assistance folks and the State Department in support of DoD's African policy. We also spent many hours working the non-resident War College course. I cannot stress the value of the background knowledge I gained through this assignment. I learned what button controlled what process and also learned what button needed to be pushed to make it go quicker. Best of all, I was engaged throughout my region on policy matters which greatly reinforced the network I had built as an analyst. Finally, on a senior staff it follows that you have the opportunity to establish credibility with senior officials, both as a FAO and as an officer of integrity and reliability. This is crucial in the more important assignments, especially those with a political flavor. I must have succeeded since I was asked to take the job as Defense Attache in South Africa.

I think it took all of 30 seconds for me to agree, since this was the most sensitive and visible account on the continent at the time. I was also astounded to be told in the same conversation that I had been selected for Colonel. I spent the Gulf War in Pretoria dealing with the enormous problems of the transition from Apartheid to democracy. This was a seven-person post and we needed every one of them since we covered four other countries in the region. My wife continued to love attache life and so I applied for a follow-on tour. Denise was less than pleased to discover it would be to Zaire, then in serious internal unrest and designated as an unaccompanied tour. While enroute in Washington, I was asked if I minded being diverted to another location—Ethiopia—where it had been deemed urgently necessary to re-establish our Defense Attache Office.

In 1992, I arrived at Addis Ababa—seventeen years after being the last person out of the DAO under the old regime. I was to be the first U.S. Military Representative under the new one. My job was to restore our bilateral military relationship starting from zero. Compounding matters was the turmoil in Somalia that involved the DAO and the Ethiopians heavily, and the question of the independence of Eritrea—which I was privileged to witness as the only uniformed foreigner in the city. We also worked closely with CENTCOM and SOCCENT in establishing a de-mining Program in both countries and with NAVCENT in a major salvage operation to clear a large part of the port of Massawa, Eritrea. By 1996, Denise was ready for the beach, and another French speaking assignment, and we quickly accepted when asked to undertake the job of Defense Attache in Tunis, Tunisia.

But, the Army wasn't through with me yet. I was asked by DIA to be the first Chief of Training and Professional Development for the Defense HUMINT Service. This was, and is, probably the highest accolade I have had. To do what colonels are supposed to do—pass on what they have learned and help to prepare others for the challenges ahead—and to be allowed to remain an additional year on active duty to boot. Who could refuse?

Now, the above was not written to be self-serving—there are some themes in it and I think they are the themes that tell one how to make colonel as an Army FAO. As such, they are relevant to every officer:

1. You have only one personnel manager—youself. You have only one person to satisfy—youself.

2. Don't take advice too readily, it usually comes from people who want you to grow up just like them. The operative word in Foreign Area Officer is “foreign” (I spent 25 out of 30 years overseas).

3. Your target should be War College selection (non-resident is fine). Without it you won't be a colonel. Take the hard jobs and do them well. If they are not relevant to FAO, try to make them that way. Networking is key to establishing your credibility. Most FAO posts are nominative so people need to know your name.

4. Remember that majors are being developed, colonels are contributing. Focus your goals to that end.

I hope I have succeeded in my task and in a way that doesn't sound self-serving. In any event, I wish all OPMS XXI FAOs good luck and much success from an old soldier who was a single track FAO before single tracking was considered "cool".
A Warrior’s Farewell:  
General Zinni’s Retirement Remarks

On 12 July 2000 one of the nation’s most respected warriors, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Central Command, General Anthony C, Zinni, USMC, bid farewell after a distinguished career spanning 40 years. His remarks were not directed specifically to FAOs, but they are thought provoking nevertheless and we all can learn something from them. Unfortunately, the transcript ends just prior to the General’s closing sentences, but enough is available to get the gist of his sentiments. Although a warfighter of the first magnitude, General Zinni was also a skilled diplomat and he earned the trust of every nation’s military leadership in the CENTCOM AOR. I had the privilege of meeting him in Pakistan in 1994 when he was in charge of withdrawing UN peacekeeping forces from Somalia. He immediately established a solid working relationship with the Pakistani military and quickly earned their trust and confidence as he developed a plan to safely withdraw their contingent from Mogadishu. Later, as CINC-CENT, he established such a close rapport with the Pakistan military that one of GEN Pervais Musharraf’s first phone calls after the October coup that overthrew the civilian government was to his friend, Tony, explaining the reasons for his action.

—I'DOS

I joined the Marines in 1961, so it's been 39 years. My retirement date is 1 September, but I plan to step down and go on terminal leave in July.

I'd like to talk about who we were--the military generations who went through the past four decades, from the 1960s up to the new millennium. If you looked at a snapshot taken when I first came into the service, all the generals looked the same--older white males with Anglo-Saxon names and Southern drawls--despite the fact that the troops they led came from lots of different places. Let's just say that the generals didn't speak Philadelphia the way I speak Philadelphia.

But things were changing in the 1960s. Marine Corps officers were still coming from the service academies and military institutes, but more and more were coming in from Catholic colleges in the Northeast (like I did), from state colleges and universities around the nation, and from other schools with strong NROTC units or other strong military traditions. At the same time, we were seeing people coming up through the enlisted ranks to become officers—not just the old mustangs or limited-duty officers with mid-grade terminal ranks, but quality people we would send to school as an investment in the future of the Corps.

Back then, whatever our various backgrounds, we all came into the service with a code—something imprinted on each of us by family, school, or church. In my case, nuns and Augustinian priests had drilled one into my head. Those who had come from military schools received the imprint from their officers. One way or another, all of us were programmed to believe that what we were doing was not a job; not even a profession; but a calling.

For me, joining the Marines was the closest thing to becoming a priest. Certainly, I took a vow of poverty when I joined the Corps, although I stopped short of taking a vow of celibacy. Lately, though, it seems as though we have been driven more and more toward a "warrior monk" ethic, and I just wish that we’d start spending as much time on the warrior part as we seem to be spending on the monk part.

Perhaps part of the move toward monkishness is prompted by the realization that the young people today don't seem to be coming into the service with that code imprinted. It's not necessarily their fault, but the code is not there. Until recently, our recruit depots, officer candidate schools, and other institutions responsible for socializing recruits and new officers have operated on the assumption that the code was there, imprinted beforehand. So now we have to regroup.

A lot of things affected my generation over the years. In addition to having good genes and DNA, those who did well also seemed to have come from families that functioned normally, as opposed to the dysfunctional ones seen so often today. We also grew up in school systems that actually taught us something and imprinted us with that code, which helped move us along the path toward being useful citizens. And for most of us, our religious upbringing gave us an acceptance of a Higher Being in one form or another, at the core of our beliefs.

We also were shaped by events. Some were our legacy; some were events we actually lived through. One of the biggest was World War II, which has proved to be both a blessing and a curse to my generation. The blessing was that it preserved our freedoms and our way of life and lifted us out of a severe depression on a wave of prosperity and moved us into a role of world leadership. The curse is that it was the last Good War—with moral clarity, an easily identified and demonized enemy, unprecedented national unity in mobilization and rationing, pride in those who served in uniform shown by blue-star flags hung by the families of those who fought and gold-star flags by the families of those who died, and welcome-home victory parades for those lucky enough to return home from overseas. Every war should be fought like that.
Our family military tradition in America started with my father, who was drafted to fight in World War I--the War to End all Wars--shortly after he arrived here as an immigrant from Italy. He got here and he was drafted. When I looked into it, I found that 12% of America's infantrymen in World War I were Italian immigrants. And they were rewarded for their wartime service to their new homeland. My father loved the Army for the relatively short time he served in it--and along with his discharge papers he received his citizenship papers. He came out of the War as a full-fledged citizen of the United States. Just imagine what that meant to him!

During and after World War II, I learned about war at the knees of my uncles and cousins, who fought at the Battle of the Bulge in Europe and all over the Pacific--on the ground and in the air. A few years later, my older brother was drafted and fought in Korea. Their war stories were remarkable: sometimes gory and horrible, but always positive in the end. It was like winning the Big Game against your arch rival--always clean and always good.

So this was my generation's legacy: World War II was the way you fight a war. And all throughout our four decades of service, this notion kept getting reinforced. Former Secretary of Defense Cap Weinberger's famous statement of doctrine is a recipe for re-fighting World War II--not for fighting the operations other than war (OOTW) that we face today. In fact, if you read the Weinberger Doctrine and adhere to every one of its tenets, you will be able to fight no war other than World War II.

I've been attending all the World War II 50th anniversary and follow-up celebrations in Florida, where I live and work, and sometimes it is unnerving to face the old veterans who look at me and seem to be saying, "How in hell did you screw it up? We had it right and we did it right and we fought and we understood and we did all this...."

It's hard to escape the feeling: God--I've let them down, because the second major event that affected us was the Vietnam War--our nation's longest and least satisfactory. It was my second-lieutenant experience, and I wondered at the time just what in hell our generals--my heroes who fought in World War II--thought they were doing. Those of us who were platoon commanders and company commanders fought hard, but never could understand what our most senior leaders were doing. The tactics didn't make sense and the personnel policies--one-year individual rotations instead of unit rotations in and out of country--were hard to comprehend. In time, we lost faith in our senior leadership.

Today, of course, we are seeing a stream of apologetic books by the policy makers of that era--as though saying mea culpa enough will absolve them of the terrible responsibility they still bear. Beyond all his other shortcomings, I'll remember--as an infantryman--former Secretary of Defense Robert Strange McNamara for one indelible thing: He decided that all services should have a common combat boot. Further, he decreed that to economize there would be no half sizes. So I had to wear size 10 boots instead of 9 1/2, my regular size. My feet are still screwed up to this day, thanks to Robert Strange McNamara. And that just about symbolizes the leadership we had back then.

The third thing that affected my generation was the Cold War--which actually was a 40-year attempt to re-fight World War II, if ever the need arose. Once again, we were energized to engage in global conflict against the evil Red Menace. Problem was that we never could figure just how this particular war would actually start. After playing a bazillion war games at the Naval War College and other places, I still could not come up with a logical or convincing way such a war would kick off. It was just too hard to show why the Soviets would want to conquer a burning, devastated Europe, or how that could possibly benefit the communists in any way. So we would just gloss over the way the miserable war got started, jump into the middle of things, and play on. Deep down inside, I don't think many of us really believed it ever was going to happen.

To be sure, there probably were some armor or armored cavalry folks with not much to do in Vietnam who sought to patrol the Czech border, in the belief that World War III would erupt there. But that's not where my life was focused at the time. The Cold War was ever-present, and it was great for justifying programs, systems, and force structure--but no one seriously believed that it would actually happen. Still, it drove things. It drove the way we thought; it drove the way we organized and equipped; and it drove the way we developed our concepts of fighting.

Then suddenly, at the end of the 1980s, the Berlin Wall came down, the Evil Empire collapsed, and we found ourselves in the post-Cold War period. It would require a major adjustment. I was serving in the European Command when the Wall came down so quickly and unexpectedly--and in turn we drew down too quickly, in the worst possible way. On the way down, we broke a lot of china, in the form of contracts with U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines--and in particular the soldiers. We drew down our Army too far, almost ripping it apart in the process--ten divisions is just too low a force level--I'm here to tell you.

In addition, we have let manning levels sink way too low, not understanding that the post-Cold War would bring more chaos instead of a smooth transition to world peace. Not fully understanding the Cold War force structure we were drawing down--and the kind of structure we would need for the post-Cold War period, we have been drawing down to a mini-version of the Cold War force. Today's high-demand, low-density units are paying the price for those decisions. Let's admit it--we've screwed up again.

The next influential event was Desert Storm, which, as

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The “Operational” Nature of the Attache Business

By LTC Phil Dermer, USA

The Joint Military Attaché School at Bolling Air Force Base has a good curriculum. When I went through the course several years ago, I was impressed at how the cadre had packaged and presented the mounds of material designed to cover “the attaché’s world”. Early on I realized this was no easy feat because of the different cultural worlds in which my classmates and I would soon be serving. And my convictions were re-affirmed once on station. The myriad events in which I became involved never ceased to amaze me.

But as we have learned over our careers, a school environment is just that, a school environment. Having recently served in two vastly different attaché duties: Israel (one of the largest Defense Attaché Offices); and Eritrea (where I was the only attaché in country), I learned that there are a few key “operational field tools” that complement the curricula of the Joint Military Attaché School. Tools that if understood and used on a daily basis, support and enhance the foundation of an attaché’s charter - competent open collection and professional military representation.

What do I mean by operational field tools? How can an attaché build and use these tools as a base to produce the best results? This article will explain my concept and highlight what I consider to be the primary operational tools for attaché success? To support my argument, I will provide some simple but pertinent examples.

Know your own primary skill profession, and be up to date.

Operators from other nations like talking to operators. Sailors relate to stories at sea; infantry and armor soldiers relate to tough field missions and exercises; and pilots relate to bad weather and in-flight emergency stories. In addition, commanders and operations officers like talking to commanders and operations officers. I learned early on that operational experiences break down barriers and build legitimacy in the eyes of your host. And as an attaché, I noticed that legitimacy is EVERYTHING. Legitimacy means when you give a professional opinion it is listened to and taken for granted as words of a consummate professional. In return, this legitimacy ensures YOU RECEIVE THE SAME in kind and not a run around or a smokescreen.

But knowing just your little piece of your profession is not enough. You must know the scope and breadth of it, i.e. the latest vehicles and equipment, training, doctrine, school environments, the senior leadership, etc. All our services are changing rapidly and it does not take long before the neat things we were doing are already old news. In the field, once your professional credentials are solidified, it does not mean you can talk only in the past tense. You must know what is going on in your field and how it can serve or assist your host nation. By being up to date, you add to your legitimacy.

EXAMPLE – I had been out of aviation for three years prior to my first tour. I called a CGSC buddy and arranged to spend the whole day with his aviation unit. I began with the Brigade commander and a current operations brief. From there I went from the motor pool to the hangar to the training offices to the chow hall and even to the gym. Not only did I update myself, I also made valuable contacts that I could call anytime for the latest information. In addition, I made sure I had access to the latest professional journals and newsletters. In Israel, it is a national honor to be a pilot, so often times it was my aviation expertise that was the key to other areas of business. In Eritrea, I used my default knowledge of Soviet helicopters and prior armor division experience as means for access into areas otherwise closed for conversation.

Know your Service as well as your profession.

Building on your professional expertise is consummate knowledge about your service. You must know this just as well. What is new? What are the differences among the various type units i.e. F15 vs. F16? What is the difference between the Marines and the Army? What is your Service’s current vision? Where are your major units/vessels? Traditionally, fighter pilots and combat ground types know little about their logistics systems. As an attaché you need too. Again, the more you know the better your legitimacy. Moreover, it provides a good baseline for reporting and assists analysts in reading and understanding your reports. Understand that few analysts have the operational background or experience that you do.
Example – When escorting the Marine Commandant, I was constantly asked to compare or answer questions about the Marines and the Army in full view of the host nation’s senior leadership. The more competently I answered, the more I was held in high esteem by the host nation - the real target audience for an attaché’s replies.

Example – Along with my impromptu travels to an aviation unit, I visited other combat arms’ battalions on the post to include seeing and touching every piece of equipment I could.

**Understand what it is to be an American and an Attache - together.**

The two together can be awesome or they can be your worst enemy. I found it to be a true dual edged sword. Depending on your country, the access afforded as an American attaché will be different than other countries. In some countries, you will have more access than certain elements of the host nation. In other countries, you will be more restricted. Other attaché’s will seek you out to see what you are doing and with whom you have access.

**EXAMPLE** – Shortly after arriving in country, I was at a host country’s international airport, accompanied by members of their military and foreign liaison, awaiting the arrival of sensitive equipment for an exercise. Shortly after arriving, customs problems arose and then hours began to pass by. As I stood by on the sidelines waiting for my host nation counterparts to fix the problem, I noticed that the customs officers seemed to approach me first for status updates and current efforts to solve the problem. At the same time, my host nation counterparts would continuously ask ME whom I coordinated with when planning for the equipment’s arrival. After five hours sitting on the tarmac, the equipment was released. In the wake of the debacle, I said to myself, “okay, if attention was being focused on me, then I will use my position to figure how not to let this happen again”. I was ultimately successful, enough to ensure that on each successive shipment, all accompanies by my host nation counterparts, I ran the show and never again encountered unexpected delays.

The downside is that if you use it unwisely or do not understand your limits, you will be looking for things to do. There are many host nations that will be very guarded around any American. Eritrea was this way because it was unhappy with the lack of U.S. support for its efforts against Ethiopia. There may also be the perception that because you are an American, you have the means and logistics to accomplish anything. In this case, expectations will be high even when it is not true.

**EXAMPLE** – On one occasion, we arrived in the middle of a volatile and potentially dangerous situation between the host nation and one of their internal antagonists. On the host nation side, they were not very glad to see us because of overwatching American eyes that could hold them accountable for their actions. They acknowledged our credentials but refused to have much to do with us. On the other side, there was almost open joy at the arrival of the American attachés. The perception was now that we were on the scene, everything would be soon be resolved – in their favor. The fact of the matter was as chartered, we could do very little more than observe and report the situation. The disappointment clearly showed on the antagonists’ faces and subsequently in their actions towards us on scene.

**LANGUAGE! LANGUAGE! LANGUAGE!**

Not enough can be said about knowing the language of the country - above all else. It is first and foremost a simple courtesy to understand your host nation’s language. To think otherwise borders on arrogance. More importantly in doing your job language is the key to understanding a difficult culture and the door to your successful charter. Language opens doors and bestows the utmost legitimacy and respect upon an attaché. In some cultures, even the minimum level of understanding can be of assistance. Finally, knowing the language can save your life.

**EXAMPLE** – During one road reconnaissance into the Israeli territories in the West Bank, another attaché, an embassy political officer and myself found us smack in the middle of an ongoing violent confrontation. While we maneuvered ourselves to stay out of harms way, it soon became apparent there was nowhere to go. Hundreds of Palestinian demonstrators, loaded with rocks, bottles and Molotov cocktails began passing us on their way to the next battle site. I turned away for a moment and when I looked back at my partner attaché, there was a young Palestinian demonstrator standing in front of him pointing and saying something to him while pointing his finger directly into his face. My first instinct was to call to the Palestinian in Arabic to get his attention, and then to ask my partner what was going on. Immediately upon hearing the Arabic, the demonstrator turned his attention to me, which gave my partner a chance to tell me that the Palestinian was asking him if he was Israeli secret security. Upon hearing this, I realized that if the demonstrator stated his thoughts to the passing crowd, we were in seri-
ous trouble. But by my speaking Arabic to the demonstrator, I was able to convince him otherwise and then was able to turn his thoughts to other things, all in the matter of a minute or two. Language was the key to saving our butts.

Get out, get out, get out of the office.

If you are not traveling, meeting, or escorting, you will only see half the picture and your reports will only tell half the story. Second ONLY to language is knowing the cultural and physical layout of the host nation. My goal was that whenever I was on the road, I would take one different route or make a stop to look at something I passed on the road a hundred times before. In terms of operational acumen and reporting benefit, you will not be able to form a good baseline as to what is new and what is not; what is normal and what is not; and sometimes, what is dangerous and what is not; unless your know the full scope of your country. In addition, senior visitors will ask “the darnedest things” from history to religion to geography to geology to fauna. These are not learned from remaining in the office.

Use your “Openness” – the fact you are declared and credentialed - or lose it.

Contrary to popular belief, the fact you are openly declared is not a hindrance, but an asset. Think about it. When on official business, always identify yourself clearly and confidently (not ashamedly as if it is obvious the cat is now out of the bag). Once openly declared, anything discussed, viewed, or represented to you by the host nation is fair game for use. When confronted, or challenged by your knowledge of specific information or access gained, the fact you declared yourself openly nullifies any formal attempt to label you a “spy”, or accuse you of any serious diplomatic violation. Trying to “fool” someone will only hurt you and your effectiveness in the long run. Keep in mind also about what I said about the fact you are an American attaché.

EXAMPLE – While approaching a clearly marked sensitive military base on a road recce, two attaches arrived at the gate and were clearly noticed by the guards. Instead of getting out of the vehicle to identify themselves, in which case they would have been asked to leave, or simply turn around to leave, they began to drive around the classified facility’s fence in a hurried manner. This attempt to fool the guards only brought them undue attention and trouble explaining later why they were there in the first place.

EXAMPLE – While in Hebron, a volatile city in the Israeli occupied West Bank, we always approached, rather than avoided, IDF patrols and checkpoints. We announced who we were, what we were doing and where we would be going. This routinely helped rather than hindered us, especially when I told the young soldiers my rank and profession. They would sometimes let us into places where others were never allowed, and even would call ahead to facilitate. Other times, however, when there was a changing of the guard or a confrontation brewing, the fact we were American attaché’s made things difficult and with little room for maneuver. When identifying ourselves to the Palestinians, it took away the uncertainty of who we were which afforded us a safer visit and better access.

That said, when on INFORMAL business, how and when you identify yourself is another story. You still do not want to lie or intentionally fool someone. But you have more “room” for maneuver as to the timing of when you have to “let the cat out of the bag” and how far you can go.

EXAMPLE – While traveling in the countryside on vacation, when meeting host nationals abroad, or at a local nightspot, I would stop by a local bar in Eritrea frequented by foreign military personnel and their local girlfriends. Sometimes by saying “I work in the embassy” sufficed. Everyone understands what this means. In most cases I was asked nothing further other than to help with getting a visa.

Employ the “Courtesy Costs You Nothing” manner of operating in your daily relations with the host nation.

Years of operating in overseas environments have proven the following tips to be successful in gaining access and safeguarding your person. Taken together, they cost you nothing, kill suspicion and unwanted attention, and disarm any possible initial hostility towards you. In fact, they can buy you time in a dangerous situation.

1. When approaching a guard, checkpoint or senior official, relax your posture and your countenance. Assume the most humble non-threatening posture as pos-
Breeding suspicion and a “grey” uncertainty aura are not healthy and will only bring unneeded attention. Un-needed attention hinders rather than helps your movements.

2. Don’t wait to be asked for your ID, always have it ready and available. When presenting, your hands should be open and in full view.

3. When approaching in a vehicle, open the window or door to present your I.D. It allows open viewing into your vehicle, even if the rules say it cannot be searched. If you have nothing to hide, you should not treat yourself or a vehicle as a hidden threat. When possible, exit the vehicle to present your ID. Again, allow no “grey” areas.

4. Don’t wait to be greeted, take the friendly initiative and extend a greeting in the local language, even at a distance. Ask what is going on or how things are. In many countries, a handshake is the best thing at the same time, or if nothing else. Smile.

5. Understand how far your diplomatic credentials will and will not take you, regardless of the rules. If told you cannot park somewhere, don’t park there. Arguing and “splashing” credentials is usually not worth it. Save it for when it really counts. You might need the assistance of the same local police a short time later. And what does it matter to walk a bit in order to get done what you need to get done. If someone insists on searching at a border, let them. Offering first usually ensures they will not.

6. When traveling in a vehicle, get out as much as possible and meet as many people as you can. Don’t be a “window shopper”. Getting known by your face in many areas is usually a benefit, as long as it is not for intrusive purposes. Let the area get used to seeing you so it becomes normal having you around.

7. Don’t be in a hurry. The purpose and timeliness of your mission will always be constrained by cultural boundaries.

**Two final operational tips - Maps and First Aid.**

Maps. When using maps, use local maps and only unclassified ones. Do not write anything on them other than a tourist would or things that are obvious from an openly observed distance. If stopped by an official, and the only thing he can see are familiar maps in his own language, there won’t be a problem.

First Aid. If you do not know first aid, in many countries you are at risk. An attaché does not have the luxury of deployed forces with AWACS and rescue forces as in Bosnia, Korea, or Kosovo. Evidence shows traveling without a proper first aid kit is commonplace, as are attaché’s improperly trained in their use. In many countries, special first aid equipment is needed, to include trauma capabilities and IV bags. Know the medical capabilities in your country and think about how you will need to fill any gaps. What are the MEDEVAC procedures in your country? Do you know any first aid at all? Can you give an IV to someone? To yourself? Do you know how to neutralize suspected AIDS tainted blood? What are the common procedures for a medical problem? Do you have a satellite phone that you can touch the world with? The fact is in many countries, the US military, DIA, Embassy, CINC will not be available to help, and your life will depend on your own capabilities. You must think about the environment you will place yourself in versus the availability of competent first aid help.

**EXAMPLE –** In Eritrea, I had an accident that required me to be MEDEVAC’d. No U.S. assets were made available. What I did have was a partner, a satellite phone, a fully stocked trauma kit, and advanced first aid training I arranged on my own prior to deploying (with the assistance of two great American soldiers in the Pentagon clinic).

Previous duty in the Israeli occupied territories had taught me this lesson. Especially helpful were the classes on how to give IV’s, to include to myself. Eventually, a private contracted plane was brought in from Israel and the rest is history. The lesson is simple. Without the tools mentioned above, I might not be writing this article.

In conclusion, being an attaché is a unique experience. As such, it requires a unique set of tools. Many of these are quantifiable and readily apparent, as taught at the Joint Military Attaché School. Others, however, come only with time and experience, keen situational awareness and cultural understanding. It is these tools and lessons learned that I have outlined in the paper. I understand they are not a clear set of established dictums that are universal in every country. Use those relevant as either thoughtful considerations or in your deliberate planning. Either way, you will enhance your attaché charter and mission success.

**Enjoy your tour!**
The Army currently operates seven In-Country Training (ICT) sites in sub-Saharan Africa. The ICT site in the West African country of Cameroon provides an outstanding opportunity for a developing Foreign Area Officer (FAO) to acquire the background necessary to become a regional expert. One FAO per year conducts training in Cameroon beginning in January. The officer must be a captain or a major and a 2/2 in French. Officers assigned to Cameroon for ICT live in government leased housing and are authorized a consumables weight allowance. The opportunity for a new FAO to receive exposure to the complexities of Africa is one of the strong points of this ICT site.

The FAO in Cameroon attends the 14 week-long Cameroonian Staff Officers Course that is taught in French. When not in school, the FAO is assigned as an intern in the Defense Attache Office (DAO) at the U.S. Embassy in the capital city of Youande. The internship provides the chance to learn about embassies and how they work. Many of the embassies in Africa are small, which gives the FAO greater access and an increased opportunity to understand how an embassy functions. The current FAO has had the opportunity as a DAO intern to travel with the ambassador and to coordinate with the Cameroonian military for the deployment of a Joint Combined Exercise Training (JCET) team, a MEDFLAG and a US Navy ship visit. These events provide invaluable exposure to typical missions that a sub-Saharan African FAO can expect to work for years to come.

In addition to intern duties, the FAO in Cameroon conducts local and regional travel. The ICT site has a government owned vehicle to facilitate FAO trips, something that is not always easy on African roads, especially during the rainy season! The current FAO has attended a British peacekeeping school in Ghana and has studied the workings of the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) first hand. Normally the officer at the ICT site in Cameroon has the opportunity to travel and conduct research in each major region of sub-Saharan Africa.

The combination of host nation military schooling, embassy experience, and regional travel make this one of the most versatile sites to train Army FAOS in sub-Saharan Africa.
far as I am concerned, was an aberration. It seemed to work out okay for us, but ultimately it may be an aberration, because it may have left the impression that the terrible mess that awaits us abroad--to be dealt with by peacekeeping or humanitarian operations--or coercive diplomacy, for some--can somehow be overcome by good, clean soldiering, just like in World War II.

In reality, though, the only reason Desert Storm worked was because we managed to go up against the only jerk on the planet who actually was stupid enough to confront us symmetrically--with less of everything, including the moral right to do what he did to Kuwait. In the high- and top-level war colleges we still fight this type of adversary, so we always can win. I rebelled at this notion, thinking there would be nowhere out there so stupid to fight us that way. But then along came Saddam Hussein, and "good soldiering" was vindicated once again. Worse yet, the end of any conflict often brings into professional circles the heartfelt belief that "Now that the war is over, we can get back to real soldiering." So we merrily backtrack in that direction. Scary, isn't it?

Still trying to fight our kind of war--be it World War II or Desert Storm--we ignore the real warfighting requirements of today. We want to fight the Navy-Marine Corps Operational Maneuver from the Sea; we want to fight the Army-Air Force AirLand Battle. We want to find a real adversarial demon--a composite of Hitler, Tojo, and Mussolini--so we can drive on to his capital city and crush him there. Unconditional surrender. Then we'll put in place a Marshall Plan, embrace the long-suffering vanquished, and help them regain entry into the community of nations. Everybody wants to do that. As a retiring CinC, I would love to do that somewhere before I step down--just find somebody for me!

But it ain't gonna happen.

Today, I am stuck with the likes of a wiser Saddam Hussein and a still-elusive Osama Bin Laden--just a couple of those charmers out there who will no longer take us on in a symmetric force match-up.

And we're going to be doing things like humanitarian operations, consequence management, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. Somewhere along the line, we'll have to respond to some kind of environmental disaster. And somewhere else along the line we may get stuck with putting a U.S. battalion in place on the Golan Heights, embedded in a weird, screwed-up chain of command.

And do you know what? We're going to bitch and moan about it. We're going to dust off the Weinberger Doctrine and the Powell Doctrine and throw them in the face of our civilian leadership. But at the same time, there's the President, thinking out loud in a recent meeting and saying, "Why can't we ever drive a stake through the hearts of any of these guys? I look at Kim Jung II; I look at Milosovic; I look at Saddam Hussein. Ever since the end of World War II, why haven't we been able to find a way to do this?"

The answer, of course, is that you must have the political will--and that means the will of the administration, the Congress, and the American people. All must be united in a desire for action. Instead, however, we try to get results on the cheap. There are congressmen today who want to fund the Iraqi Liberation Act, and let some silk-suited, Rolex-wearing guys in London gin up an expedition. We'll equip a thousand fighters and arm them with $97 million worth of AK-47s and insert them into Iraq. And what will we have? A Bay of Goats, most likely. That's what can happen when we do things on the cheap.

But why can't we muster the necessary political will to do things right? It goes back to cost-benefit analysis, especially in terms of potential casualties. Nobody in his right mind can justify the possible human cost and the uncertain aftermath of strong military action. The bombings at Beirut and the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia and the debacle in Mogadishu have affected us in bad ways--making us gun-shy to an extreme degree. But every time I testify at congressional hearings, I try to make the point that there is no way to guarantee 100% force protection while accomplishing the variety of missions we undertake out there. Somewhere, sometime, we are going to lose people again--to terrorist or other actions that take advantage of our own less-than-perfect protective measures.

For example, I have more than 600 security-assistance people working throughout the Central Command's area of responsibility. Some of the detachments are quite small--in twos and threes. They live in hotels and try to keep low profiles. Their mission is to work with host-country military organizations and try to improve them. They travel a lot. They get targeted; they get stalked; they can get hit. If anyone really wants to take them out, they can and they will.

And, you know, we are going to see it happen some
day. The only way to stop it from happening is to shut down all our activities overseas, if we want 100% security for all our deployed people. But 100% definitely seems to be what more and more people want these days, as we send our people into operations other than war. These OOTW are our future, as far as I am concerned. But in a sense, it's going to be back to the future, because today's international landscape has some strong similarities to the Caribbean region of the 1920s and 1930s—unstable countries being driven by uncaring dictators to the point of collapse and total failure. We are going to see more crippled states and failed states that look like Somalia and Afghanistan—and are just as dangerous.

And more and more U.S. military men and women are going to be involved in vague, confusing military actions—heavily overlaid with political humanitarian, and economic considerations. And representing the United States—the Big Guy with the most formidable presence in the area—they will have to deal with each messy situation and pull everything together. We're going to see more and more of that.

My generation has not been well prepared for this future, because we resisted the idea. We even had an earlier Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who said, "Real men don't do OOTW." That just about says it all. Any Army commander worth his salt wanted to take his unit to the National Training Center and any Marine commander would want to go to the Marine Air-Ground Training Center for live-fire maneuver and combined-arms work, rather than stay on their bases and confront a bunch of troops in civilian clothes, throwing water balloons and playing the role of angry overseas mobs. It just goes against the grain to have to train our people that way.

Going beyond these events, what other things have affected my military generation? There have been trends in law a policy making that have had a profound effect. The National Security Act of 1947, for example, set up the most dysfunctional, worst organizational approach to military affairs I could possibly imagine. In a near-perfect example of the Law of Unintended Consequences, it created a situation in which the biggest rival of any U.S. armed service is not a foreign adversary but another one of its sister U.S. services. We teach our ensigns and second lieutenants to recognize that sister service as the enemy. It wants our money; it wants our force structure; it wants our recruits. So we rope ourselves into a system where we fight each other for money, programs, and weapon systems. We try to out-doctrine each other, by putting pedantic little anal apertures to work in doctrine centers, trying to find ways to ace out the other services and become the dominant service in some way. These people come to me and the other CinCs and ask, "What's more important to you--air power or ground power?"

Incredible! Just think about it. My Uncle Guido is a plumber. If I went to him and asked, "What's more important to you--a wrench or a screwdriver?" he'd think I'd lost my marbles.

The real way this stuff gets worked out is not in the doctrine centers but out in the field. The joint commands and the component commanders can figure things out because we're the warfighters. We have to work things out, so we actually do. We could not produce a joint fire-support doctrine out of Washington or the doctrine centers to save our ass. But we can produce one in the Central Command, or in the Pacific Command or European Command or any joint task force we create. They can produce one in a heartbeat—and they have. We can make a JFACC work. We can make a land-component command arrangement work. There will be no more occasions in the Central Command's area of operations where the Marines fight one ground war and the Army fights a different ground war. There will be one ground war and a single land component commander.

But we've been brutalized in the process. We've had to be pushed into cooperating with each other by legislation. And those of us who have seen the light and actually put on joint "purple" uniforms—we've never been welcomed back to our parent services. We have become the Bad Guys. The only thing we are trusted to do is to take your sons and daughters to war and figure out ways to bring them back safely.

Virulent inter-service rivalry still exists—and it's going to kill us if we don't find a better way to do business. Goldwater-Nichols is not the panacea everybody thinks it is. I'm here to tell you that it did not increase the powers of the CinCs—not one bit. A CinC still owns nothing. I own no resources and no assigned forces. All I get is geography and responsibility. And the CinCs have to go up the chain of command through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

For more than a quarter-century, we have been operating with an All-Volunteer Force—and the American people tend to forget that until the volunteers stop showing up and reenlisting. And that's what is wrong right now. But the troops are not getting out because they're deployed too long and too often. I will bet anyone that the forward-deployed units—the carrier battlegroups, the Marine expeditionary units, the air expeditionary forces and wings—have the highest retention rates.

So what does that say about the high operations tempo and personnel deployment rates? The people who deploy are not the ones getting out. The guy getting out is the guy who's left back home and has to pick up the slack with a workload that's been increased by a factor of eight or ten. We were building an All-Volunteer Force with professionals, not mercenaries. The troops certainly don't mind a better paycheck, but they find it insulting that we seem to think that's all they want. Deep inside, there have been negative reactions to the recent pay raise. They see their benefits continuing to erode. Their families are telling them, "Look at what happens to your medical care when you retire. You can't even pick up a telephone and get through to someone who might see you." And despite all the smoke and mirrors around TriCare and MediCare and other programs—even if they
do work--the perceptions are bad. To top things off, the quality of life back at the home base is terrible. We still have too much infrastructure eating up funds that should go toward improving quality of life. But don't count on DoD and the politicians going through another base-closure drill or anything like it.

So this all-volunteer, highly professional force we built--to give quality performance with quality support--has been allowed to erode. That came with the "peace dividend." The All-Volunteer Force has become something else--something less attractive than opportunities on the outside, in many ways. The troops want to be caught up in a calling--but they're not. They are involved in a job.

Over the past 40 years, we also have seen strange things happen with regard to the media. To be sure, there are no more Ernie Pyles out there, but there's nothing inherently wrong with the media, which has the same percentages of good guys and bad guys as other fields. But technology has changed things. The media are on the battlefield; the media are in your headquarters; the media are everywhere.

And the media report everything--good things, warts, and all. And everyone knows that the warts tend to make better stories. As a CinC, I've probably been chewed out by seniors about five times--and four of the five were about something I'd said to the media. At this stage of my life, it doesn't really bother me--because where in hell do I go from here? But if you are a lieutenant or a captain and you see another officer get fried, you react differently. The message is clear: "Avoid the media." And the message hardens into a Code: "They are the enemy. Don't be straight with them." And that is bad.

That is bad because we live in the Information Age. Battelfield reports are going to come back in real time, and they are going to be interpreted--with all sorts of subtle shadings and nuances--by the reporters and their news editors. And the relationship between the military and the media, which should be at its strongest right now, has bottomed out. It has begun to heal a little, but a lot more must be done. We need to rebuild a sense of mutual trust.

My uncles in World War II generally experienced a friendly press--with Willie and Joe cartoons and Ernie Pyle stories--that was part of the war effort. G.I. Joe was lionized and bad news was suppressed--if not by the military then by the media. The relationship generally remained positive through the Korean War, despite its ambiguities. But the relationship soured during and after Vietnam, for a number of reasons--not the least of which was a mounting distrust of government by the media and the American people.

My generation and those who have followed over the past 40 years are still dealing with social issues that swept across the nation in the 1960s and 1970s. The racial and drug problems that peaked during the Vietnam years and persisted well beyond them are largely behind us now--but they came close to destroy-ing the military from within--something no enemy has ever accomplished on the field of battle. We still wrestle with problems associated with the massive infusion of women into the ranks of the military, seeking a final adjustment that meets the twin requirements of fairness and common sense. A final adjustment on the issue of gays in the military--largely sidestepped up to now--still lies ahead.

Today, we are suffering through the agony of watching and waiting for our political masters and the American people to decide what me U.S. military should look like in the future. It is especially agonizing because the political leaders--and the population in general--have very little association with the armed forces. Consequently, they have very little awareness of how we function.

For example, they don't understand the Uniform Code of Military Justice--the UCMJ. If you work for IBM and don't show up for work, you might get fired. If you are in the Marines and don't show up, you might get locked up. Further, the military doesn't hire the handicapped in the same percentages as IBM or other corporations--probably for good reason. The military is different but not enough Americans are aware of that.

Over this 40-year period, we have made some significant internal changes. We made a magnificent recovery from the Vietnam War, and my hat goes off to the Army, because I think they led the way in making the needed transformations. In general, we have professionalized our noncommissioned officer corps, but still not enough NCOs are doing the jobs that officers had taken away from them when I first came in. The rank structure is holding them back, despite the fact that their educational attainments--bachelors, masters, and even doctoral degrees--have far outstripped the structure. This needs to be fixed. The one thing that makes us a standout among the world's military services is the quality of our NCOs. Don't ever believe it's the officers; it's the noncommissioned officers.

All of the events that have shaped us over the past 40 years have not been negative. Somewhere in the mid-1980s we
began to experience a renaissance in the operational art. We actu-
ally started to take war fighting more seriously. Once again, I
want to credit the Army for leading the charge, and the other ser-
vices for following suit, in one way or another. Today, we see
highly qualified, professionally competent, operationally sound
officers and noncommissioned officers as a result.

There's also been a technological revolution--the Revo-
lution in Military Affairs, which already has gone beyond the
point most may think prudent. Whenever I go to my command
center in the basement of my Tampa headquarters, I can pull up a
common operating picture--every ship and aircraft (commercial,
bad guy, good guy) in real time. With a six-hour delay--which I
could crunch to two hours if I wanted to--I can get a complete
ground picture. That's the good news. The bad news is that the
White House and the Pentagon will probably be interested in the
same picture, and might be tempted to make decisions on their
own, without input from the folks actually on the scene. That
could be disastrous, as history amply demonstrates.

As we close out 40 years of service, those of us who served must
ask: "What is our legacy?" My son is a newly commissioned sec-
ond lieutenant of Marines. What have we left for him to look for-
dward to?

We all know that burgeoning technology will widen his
horizons beyond anything we can imagine. It also will present
new questions of ethics and morality that we barely have begun
to fathom.

But he also must live with an organization that I have
had to live with for 40 years. Napoleon could reappear today and
recognize my Central Command staff organization: J-1, admini-
stration stovepipe; J-2, intelligence stovepipe--you get the idea.
This antiquated organization is oblivious to what everyone else in
the world is doing: flattening organization structure, with decen-
tralized operation.....

At this point, the transcript ends abruptly. Don’t worry, sir, we
get the message. —DOS

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A dramatic change took place in the Defense Attache System (DAS) this past decade with little fanfare. The scope and diversity of defense attache (DATT) involvement in U.S. programs abroad increased to the point where our attaches have become full participants in security-related initiatives and activities. This occurred so rapidly and naturally that few have noticed. It is only when we examine what attaches were doing at the beginning of the last decade and what they are doing now that the change becomes clear.

The traditional missions of the military attaches assigned to our embassies are to observe military conditions and developments, advise the ambassadors, and represent the Department of Defense (DoD). Our attaches have been accomplishing these missions for over one hundred years. With some exceptions, they were expected to take secondary, sometimes mainly ceremonial, roles in embassy affairs. They performed the necessary political-military task of explaining military things to political officials and political things to military officials. They represented the U.S. and DoD at host country ceremonies and meetings. Not the least of all, they became extremely knowledgeable and competent experts on the host country's military forces and national security concerns.

The duties expected of our attaches began to broaden prior to the 1990's. The DoD's security assistance programs, ranging from U.S.-sponsored military training courses to sales of military equipment, expanded into friendly but non-allied countries with little or no presence of security assistance officials. This caused DoD and the regional commands to ask our Defense Attache Offices (DAOs) to help out. As security assistance personnel augmented DAOs and new Security Assistance Offices (SAOs) were added to some embassies, many ambassadors and defense officials wanted to be able to turn to one local point of contact for all defense policy matters. The current system of designating one in-country military officer already responsible for other duties be designated U.S. Defense Representative came into place gradually. The majority of our defense attaches now have this responsibility of coordinating administrative and security matters for U.S. officials pertaining to DoD personnel associated with embassies.

With Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM, the end of the Cold War, and the increase in our worldwide defense engagement programs, the trend of broadened defense attache responsibilities switched into fast-forward. During the campaign to protect Saudi Arabia from aggression and force Iraqi invaders from Kuwait, defense attaches became pivotal to coalition building and maintenance because of their knowledge of and relationships with senior host country military officials. The term "nation building" began to be used in official dispatches to our embassies in the countries of the former Warsaw Pact and the former Soviet Union at about the same time. Instead of being on watch for a potential invasion of Western Europe spearheaded through Czechoslovakia, our attaches in Prague made arrangements for Czech tank commanders to attend the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. Farther to the east, the DATT in our newly opened DAO in the newly independent country of Kazakhstan organized a joint training exercise for Special Forces "Green Berets" with Kazakh soldiers. Late in the decade, at the request of U.S. European Command, more DAOs were opened in Sub-Sahara Africa to help put "eyes and ears" close to potential hotspots and assist the Commander-in-Chief (CINC) in humanitarian relief missions.

Defense attaches have now become key members of Country Teams and recognized heads of military sections in the embassies. Country Teams, headed by ambassadors, are composed of senior representatives of federal agencies represented in country. Composition of the Country Team depends on the size of the mission and our relations with the host country, but at the minimum there is representation from the political, economic, military, com-

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By Col David Potts, USAF
mercial, and public affairs sections. All of the sections are in theory equal; but as the old saying goes, some are more equal than others. With the rise in the last decade of what may be referred to as "military diplomacy," our defense attaches have moved to the front row as principal advisors. On many occasions they have served temporarily as acting deputy chiefs of mission (number two position in the embassy) and even in some instances as acting charge d'affaires (Chief of Mission in the ambassador's absence).

The defense attache's relationship with the regional command has similarly changed. Not only does the regional J2 (Intelligence) look to defense attaches for information the J3 (Operations), J4 (Logistics), and J5 (Policy) look to them for leadership in helping orchestrate many regional programs and initiatives. These include senior level exchange visits, military-to-military contact events, training exercises, equipment transfers, and negotiations for temporary basing. Years ago the commanders-in-chief would rely solely on the formal tasking system to answer their most pressing questions concerning a particular country. With the rise of military diplomacy and the increased access our defense attaches have with senior host country defense officials, it is not uncommon for the CINCs and key staff to call the defense attache and talk directly to him or her. "What does the DATT say?" is a common question heard during regional crisis briefings.

The rise in military diplomacy means that today's defense attache is more important than ever to U.S. interests abroad. It also means that he (or she) is challenged to keep everyone - including the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the regional CINC, and the ambassador - well advised, represented, and informed. Defense attaches no longer have the luxury of sufficient time to do their work in supporting roles. It is now a fast-paced, electronically connected world and defense attaches need to be prepared and equipped to meet the growing needs of our national decision-makers.

Two tasks needing attention come to mind. The first is to make sure that all of us in greater DIA do all we can to expeditiously provide proper time-saving process and equipment support to all of our 127 defense attache offices. Every moment we can save field personnel is a moment they can devote to actively supporting U.S. interests. Second, all of us should encourage the military services to fully support their foreign area officer (FAO) programs in producing highly qualified attache candidates in this era of constrained human resources. While all of our defense attaches are volunteers from the military services, the position of defense attache is not for amateurs. Those who have the greatest chances of serving with distinction are fluent in languages, at ease in foreign cultures, and have previous experience serving abroad and in political-military positions. If we are successful in these two tasks we can help keep the Defense Attache System strong and well positioned for future changes and challenges.

Colonel David Potts, USAF, is Deputy Director of the Office of Operations in DIA’s Directorate for Operations. He served as Assistant Air Attache in Moscow, as a Foreign Liaison Officer in Washington, and as our DATT in Prague at the time the Czech Republic entered NATO.
The submarine force didn’t earn its sobriquet, “Silent Service”, just because of the inherent stealth of a sub; the force’s culture is that of secrecy, of keeping mum about what subs do and how they do it. Submariners in today’s force need to change that mindset and understand the need for successful coalition operations involving a fighting and communicating submarine. We are slowly learning that the capabilities of the platform need to be demonstrated often. In addition, the force is remembering that gains made from learning how to operate as part of a coalition team far outweigh the risks if handled properly and honestly. Between 1996 and 1998 I was lucky enough to see a remarkable interaction between the Republic of Korea Navy’s submarine force and the U.S. Navy’s Western Pacific submarine force. The lessons I learned may prove useful to other junior personnel who, like me, are starting out in a liaison role.

Opening Situation.
At the close of the Cold War, the fast attack nuclear powered submarine (SSN) force was at a peak in size. By 1995, though, the drawdowns had severely reduced available submarine assets. Since it was much cheaper to decommission a sub than refuel it, useful SSNs were being struck at a rapid rate. At the same time, the requirements for SSNs in a multipolar world grew just as rapidly, causing more and more tasking to be required for each deployed submarine. Submarine operating tempo became critical, and several initiatives were started at Submarine Group SEVEN in Yokosuka, Japan to increase tasking and routing efficiency. These initiatives bought some time in the ships’ schedules, but not nearly enough to get the job done.

At the same time, the Republic of Korea Navy (ROKN) had completed the first significant diesel-powered submarine (SS) acquisitions in its history. The ROKN purchase of a Type 209 SS and associated support from Germany started an effort in ROKN to find out how to effectively build a doctrine and operate the machines. The German training was efficient, but some ROKN officers felt that it did not provide sufficient proficiency or expertise in operations for them. There was no organizational culture built in the ROKN for the unique requirements of a hunter-killer submarine force.

USN-ROKN interaction on the operator level was (and still is, in spots) problematic. The traditional Korean way of negotiating with others can often be seen as overly aggressive to American military personnel, and a series of military intelligence collection blunders by the ROKN deepened a distrust by USN officers of ROKN questions or interoperations. This, combined with the closely held nature of American submarine operations, severely limited the interoperability between our two forces.

Why Work Together? Given this situation, it would seem implausible that the two submarine forces could manage to work together at all. However, the most likely major regional contingency (MRC) in the Seventh Fleet's Pacific-Asian theater is that of a North Korean invasion of the Republic of Korea (ROK). American submarine forces are less available than they used to be, and it takes a significant amount of time for SSNs to get into theater from San Diego or Hawaii. The half-dozen Korean submarines could fill some of the SSN’s jobs, if the ROKN had capable ships and competent crews. A capable ROKN ship defending its homeland was obviously more preferable to American naval forces than sending a USN SSN halfway across the world would be. It became obvious that interoperability was in the best interests of both the U.S. Navy and the USN Submarine Force.

Additionally, unlike airplanes, submerged submarines can’t "see" each other very well. To minimize collisions at sea, some means of coordination was required between submarine forces in the East Sea/Sea Of Japan without antagonizing Japanese, other foreign, or Korean forces. The USN seemed in a position to become an honest broker between submarine forces, to be able to coordinate so that operations and transits between countries could be deconflicted without alerting allied rivals of each other's intentions. To this end, the operational
commander of the submarines in the Western Pacific made it a key goal to pursue as much interoperability as possible, while still treating each country in his area of responsibility equally.

Advocating Our Position. By the time I started working for Submarine Group SEVEN, the command had already established a strong foundation for interoperability. Periodic meetings between admirals and staffs allowed the two submarine commands to air out dirty laundry and figure out a direction until the next meeting. Crossdecksing, where sailors from one boat ride the other boat for a few days, had been negotiated between heads of navies, and personnel from each country’s submarine force rode another navy’s ship for a few days to learn what information would be allowed and useful, and how to pass it. ROKN-UNSN submarine exercises had been arranged. A ROKN initiative was in place to send the first ship of the new class to Guam from Korea, a distant trip that would both serve as a blue water shakedown of safe operating practices and build ROKN confidence in their submarine force.

At this point we had a few goals:

1. Build mutual trust between organizations.
2. Build interoperability between submarine forces.
3. Improve communication between the USN deployed sub forces and ROKN forces.
4. Convince USN and ROKN forces that interoperability, and a viable ROKN SS force, was essential.
5. Support the viability of the ROKNSS force to improve flexibility of the USN SSN force.

In order to do this, we had to do some convincing among both the USN staff and ROKN staff. The ROKN staff problem was easier in this respect since working to make their boats and crews more effective in a wartime scenario was clearly in their best interest. For us, the challenge with ROKN personnel was to guide U.S. support in a way that also supported U.S. security goals. For the USN staff with which our command interacted, we had to perform as much liaison work as we did with ROKN forces.

Useful Methods and Practices. Submarine Group SEVEN settled on the following method to reach our goals:

Make sure arguments are intellectually based. We were proposing change, and change involves more work and the destruction of something that already works to some extent. The change we wanted, improving interoperability and mutual trust, is emotionally based. Only by taking the emotion out of the argument can you successfully support that argument in front of someone who also has strong feelings about a policy change.

Sometimes this method can help reveal hidden strengths. It became readily apparent that USN SSNs needed to practice against quiet, effective diesel submarines in littoral waters, and the USN has no way to do this by itself without resorting to simulation. The ROKN base in Chinhae was building a new submarine base, and one of the piers could be built to accommodate SSNs for a few days, instead of the SSN staying at sea or transiting to another area for liberty. Both mutual training time and ship berthing were cost savings to the USN, but would not have happened if the ROKN submarine admiral did not agree with the intellectual argument for interoperability.

Make sure that you understand which goals are common and work towards those. Different organizations have different goals and core needs. The ROKN, for instance, is part of a country that for hundreds of years has been a buffer between two larger, more powerful countries, and, over the centuries, has fine-tuned the art of thriving as a culture without being crushed by either larger power. The ROKN submarine flotilla we worked with was keenly aware that it needed to be more proficient in submarine warfighting skills, but also understood that this was a rare opportunity to get support relatively cheaply as much as it was to learn U.S. submarine warfighting techniques. This was at the core of some of the negotiating difficulties I had. Often I would find myself in the middle of a tug-of-war between ROKN submarine personnel who very forcefully desired something to help make them better, and American staff who needed to keep from wasting money or unnecessarily releasing classified information. The resulting “vigorous discussions” provided the means to ensure that what we did to train with ROKN was muturally beneficial and supported the intellectual argument.

These common goals are really another way of saying “think win-win”. There are lots of places where I or others in my command could make an effort and improve both organizations without harming either.

Communicate what you are doing and where you are going. At the proper time, communication is essential to dispel frustration between organizations and to ensure the goal inside the organization is correct and correctly implemented. Submariners don’t—or at least didn’t—talk much with other organizations as a general rule. Our work practices are classified, and the spaces in which we live are similarly restricted. Submariners have to be circumspect while still communicating effectively. Experience with this professional mindset actually was valuable to me because large bureaucratic organizations also don’t tend to communicate well, and I knew already what communication methods I needed to focus on. My experience reinforced this belief; two different organizations a half mile apart would have no idea what the other intended to do, in both ROKN and USN staffs. By “welding a telephone to my head” and becoming a frequent and forceful communicator, I smoothed over the inevitable difficulties between staffs in support of the goal.

The reverse was also true. One time, an equipment acquisition we strongly promoted to the ROKN sub force was rejected by other USN staff who determined that the equipment could not be released. If I had understood better what was
going on in advance, I could have kept both sides informed and kept our command from losing a little credibility and thereby weakening arguments for recommending that ROKN purchase other equipment.

The rule of “better comms means better ops” also worked organizationally. The Group comms shop set up improved communications between organizations, even going so far as installing a ‘hot line’ between ROKN Submarine Flotilla NINE and USN Submarine Group SEVEN. We kept no palace guard around it; it could be and was used by junior personnel on a regular basis to coordinate any issue that needed work. Despite our disadvantage at Group in not being able to understand the Korean language, this written comms system helped innumerable times when urgent crises erupted or unknown contacts needed identification. The written comms link also limited potential translation problems or misunderstanding as to who said what.

Be intelligent about what’s releasable. Some of the information we had passed to other allies—indeed, information that was easily available in open source or on our own USN websites—was also listed in outdated publications as classified and unreleasable. In some cases that caused embarrassment when we submariners refused to talk about a subject and were called on it; in others it was a definite block to interoperability between organizations in wartime. We had to be extremely proactive to determine the exact status of different pubs or systems, and worked closely through JUSMAG and our immediate operational and administrative superiors (Seventh Fleet and Submarines Pacific Fleet) to do so. (To do otherwise could have proved disastrous!)

Build military-to-military contacts. Unlike the other services, the Navy has only a fledgling Foreign Area Officer (FAO) community. Other services conduct In-Country Training and return to their area of expertise over and over again. Submariners have such a highly technical core skill that there are no people available to send outside the force for such training. We have to go to sea to do our job. Managing the requirements of a submarine officer’s career track is such a challenge that returning people to the same overseas shore billet is counterproductive to their proficiency as warfighters. Instead of placing people in country for long periods of time, we had to be more creative in creating military-to-military contacts. We arranged seminars, crossdeck opportunities, and host ships for each inport period. We designated a primary point of contact on each level of the chain of command as a liaison. Above all, we established a baseline attitude among the USN submariners that it was important to maintain engagement and to operate effectively together. A good example one commander used to teach this was the “lieutenants today will be the captains and admirals tomorrow” argument. The senior officers’ decisions tomorrow will be based on the understanding and impressions of each other’s countrymen that we build today.

What’s Next? The critical job we now have is to maintain the momentum of improved interoperability. There are of course going to be crises and bad feelings, and personalities will change in all organizations, but once the effective working relationship is institutionalized, it will be much simpler to work through the difficulties. Trust between the two navies isn’t fully established; both sides are well aware that despite the common goals and history, each party is still working towards its own national goals. Individuals on both sides still need to be less overtly aggressive about pursuing their non-mutual national goals in order to improve mutual trust. Our submariners in theater must continue to strive to delicately balance the relationships our submarine force has among all the forces we work with, be as open and clear as we can about our intentions to each country, and still keep confidences between ourselves and each force with which we work.

Despite the effort involved, my job was a fascinating challenge. The success we had in achieving harmony and building constructive change was a great morale builder for all of us. The American submarine force is still way too small for its increased tasking, but the coalition we formed with our sister submarine force makes us both stronger and more effective.

LT Chap Godbey is the Combat Systems Officer aboard USS Kamehameha (SSN-642), FPO AP 96670-2063
In the post-Soviet era, successive Russian administrations have attempted to establish domestic stability while simultaneously dealing with external pressures that could undermine this transition. The perceived gravity of these pressures has varied by subject and with time, but security has always been a major subject for debate by policy makers in Moscow. Russia’s foreign and security interests face challenges all over the world: nuclear non-proliferation in Korea and the Indian Subcontinent, relations with former client states in Africa, and interaction with the People’s Republic of China come to mind. However, the most crucial (and controversial) issues that face Russia are in the West — in its relations with the United States and Western Europe. With NATO expansion and the integration of new market economies, one would now have to include Central and parts of Eastern Europe in what constitutes “the West” as well. This paper will concentrate on current topics relating to Russian-Western interaction and attempt to answer the question, “How Is Russian Foreign and Security Policy Shaped by Relations with the West?”.

Political Groupings In Russia. In order to understand the current topics and how Russia reacts to them, one must first comprehend the domestic forces at work. First, in a democracy (albeit a nascent one), public opinion must be considered. For a period of time after the fall of communist rule, the public perceived little direct threat from the West. For example, the New Russian Barometer Poll III conducted in 1994 revealed that the majority of the public did not feel threatened by any of the eight listed countries (Japan, US, China, Iran, Germany, Ukraine, Poland, and Belarus).

Since then, events such as the NATO bombing campaign in Serbia and Kosovo in 1999 and Western criticism of Russian tactics in Chechnya have changed the opinion of some. According to Alexander Kabakov, a columnist with Kommer- sant Daily, “The pacifism that had prevailed in Russia since the early days of perestroika has vanished because of anger over Western bombing raids on Serbia last year and the violent challenge to Russian stability posed by Chechen terrorists who have attacked civilians in Moscow and other cities.”

There are clearly differing attitudes among political elites toward the approach Moscow should take in dealing with the West. Alex Pravda, writing in Developments in Russian Politics 4, divides these elites into three groups: “radical reformers” who can be characterised as “liberal Westernisers”; “radical conservatives,” both communist and non-communist, who are “nationalists”; and “centrists” who use a “state realist” approach.

Radical reformers are pro-West in outlook and feel that Russia’s future lies in rapid and total integration into Western institutions. Radical conservatives, on the other hand, are strongly nationalist and suspicious of Western policies, seeing in many of them an American strategy to isolate Russia and keep it weak. Centrists, following a realpolitik perspective, attempt to find a middle path and use Western co-operation as a springboard for expansion of Russia’s own status as a great continental power.

The relative influence of each of these blocs has varied. Currently, it can be said that the Centrists’ “state realist” approach remains dominant with the transition of power from Boris Yeltsin to his hand-picked successor, Vladimir Putin.

Current Issues. Having defined the landscape of domestic politics, we are now ready to examine specific issues which shape Russia’s foreign and security policies.

Expansion of NATO. This is hardly a new topic, having first appeared early in the 1990’s following the demise of the Warsaw Pact and the democratisation of its former members. However, the issue has gained more immediacy since March 1999. It was at this time that the first new members were added to the Alliance: Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic. A few weeks later, these countries found themselves supporting NATO’s first-ever combat operations — in Kosovo, which has already been referred to in this paper as a source of Russian irritation.

Russian reaction to NATO expansion has been inconsistent over time. In 1992 the revised Russian security doctrine still listed NATO as a continuing threat, and in the early 1990’s the Duma linked compliance with the terms of the SALT II
treaty to a deceleration in the Alliance’s plans for eastward expansion. However, in 1992, Boris Yeltsin made the bold suggestion that NATO peacekeepers actually replace Russian soldiers in Nagorno-Karabach, within the former territorial boundaries of the erstwhile USSR. In August of 1993, Yeltsin appeared to signal Russia’s approval for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to proceed with accession; however the attempted coup shortly thereafter led to a reversal in policy.

Over time a series of institutional compromises were attempted to ameliorate Russian concerns while allowing the West’s agenda of expansion to proceed. Russia at first tried to marginalize NATO altogether by emphasising the role of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), later styled the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Established in 1975, this was a forum for discussion and negotiation among European countries, both NATO and Warsaw Pact, but significantly without the U.S. Richard Sakwa states, “Russia’s call for a comprehensive system of collective security based on the OSCE…were clearly designed in part to oppose plans for NATO expansion.” Russia was unable to take NATO out of its role as the primary guarantor of European security, so Russia had to deal with the Alliance again. To this end, a North Atlantic Co-operation Council was established in November 1991. This was a forum in which Russia could directly present its security concerns to NATO. Another tool was the Partnership for Peace (PfP), which slowed the pace of expansion as such and created a level of association below that of full membership. In this program, initiated in January 1994, partners could participate on a limited basis in NATO exercises and express security concerns. PfP membership would be a prerequisite to, but not guarantee of, eventual full membership. Russia itself eventually joined PfP.

PfP provided the impetus to final accession of new members into NATO, and, as previously stated, the first new members joined in March 1999. The transition from potential to reality, as well as NATO’s war against fellow Slavs in Serbia, has made this issue one of the most prominent in Russia’s relations with the West. The view of the “state realists” appears to be ascendant; recent pronouncements from Russian leaders are more accepting of expansion. President Vladimir Putin was interviewed by Sir David Frost of the BBC on March 4, 2000, and stated Russia is amenable to “more profound integration” provided Russia is treated on a basis of equality. Putin went on to say, “Attempts to exclude us from the process is what causes opposition and concern on our part, but that does not mean we are going to shut ourselves off from the rest of the world. Isolationism is not an option.”

Missile Defence. The next issue shaping relations between the West and Russia is the U.S. plan to deploy a system to defend itself against attacks from “rogue states” using ballistic missiles. Although the system is not intended to defend against a robust threat from a state such as Russia, there are those that feel that it nevertheless could diminish the deterrent effect of Russia’s arsenal and enable a U.S. first strike.

The Russian reaction has been to play on European concerns that the U.S. system leaves them exposed. Putin has proposed that Russia will develop its own system that would destroy incoming missiles in the boost phase, shortly after launch. (The proposed U.S. system would have the much more difficult task of targeting individual warheads in space). Russia would share this system with the Europeans, thus providing a lever to alienate Europeans from the U.S. and increase Russian influence. The Russian position was recently re-stated by Defence Minister Sergeyev, but again the statement was lacking in specifics. The timing is probably not coincidental but rather intended to influence European Union opinion and U.S. domestic debate. The EU states recently committed themselves to an EU-only reaction force within NATO, potentially decoupling US strategic guarantees from the continent. Meanwhile, President Clinton will be required to make a decision on implementation of the U.S. system within the month. The issue has also become a topic of the U.S. presidential campaign.

Other Issues. Besides NATO expansion and the development of a national missile defence system, there are other issues that are affecting Russia’s relations with the West. As referred to previously, NATO’s air campaign against Serbia in 1999 became a source of anti-Western and anti-NATO sentiment. Russia found itself in a position where it was divided between its loyalty to a Slavic brother state and a desire to keep good relations with NATO. Russia stayed out of the 78-day conflict, but has participated in the peacekeeping duties following Serbia’s withdrawal from Kosovo. Although Russia doesn’t have it’s own sector in Kosovo per se (as do the U.S., France, the UK, and Italy), it does have forces patrolling in the sectors of other nations. Their presence is viewed by ethnic Serbs in Kosovo as a guarantor of objectivity due to the close historical and cultural ties between Serbia and Russia.
Closer to home, Chechnya continues to be a source of tension between the West and Russia. As stated earlier, many Russians resent Western criticism of tactics used against “terrorists” within their own borders. It is unlikely that such criticism will actually change Russian methods, since this is widely seen as a matter crucial to national survival. Indeed, many give the aggressive campaign in Chechnya credit for Putin’s popularity. Nevertheless, those statements Putin makes for Western consumption (such as the Frost interview) declare an intention to punish any Russian war criminals and attempt to justify the action in Western eyes.

Finally, one can’t ignore the economic factor in Russia’s relations with the West. The most important economic issue at this time is debt restructuring, which Moscow is having success with. Much of the debt owed to external lenders was inherited from the Soviet era. Moscow recently was successful in its negotiations with the London Club of private lenders. According to the deal, approximately one-third of the $32 billion debt was written off, and the remainder transferred to 30-year Eurobonds guaranteed by the Russian government. Negotiations with the Paris Club, which is owed $42 billion, will probably have similar aims.

Conclusion. The driving factor in Russia’s foreign policy vis-à-vis the West is the need to have a stable international situation in order to complete the transition to domestic stability. Initially fearful of NATO expansion, Moscow now realises the inevitability of its fruition and attempts to work on a more cordial, if not friendly, basis with the Alliance.

Moscow views the U.S. proposal to defend itself from rogue ballistic missile attacks as the precursor to a system that could render its own arsenal ineffective, therefore threatening stability. It sees opportunity in offering an alternative, which could not only reduce the threat it perceives from the U.S. policy but also provide a lever to decouple the U.S. from European defense, resulting in more influence for Russia.

The Russian elite views Western policies in the Balkans and Chechnya in different ways. Moscow probably had the power to prevent the bombing of Serbia, but did not, in order to preserve its relatively good relations with an ever-expanding NATO. However, Chechnya is viewed as a matter of national survival; Western objections to Russian tactics are ignored.

Probably the most important underlying factor in Russia’s relations with the West are economic interests. It is here that foreign policy toward the West affects the government’s domestic ability to stabilise. It is currently successful in securing marginal relief of its loans, and hopes for further aid and development assistance.

The course of Russia’s foreign policy with the West is viewed in terms of its impact on domestic stability. Depending on which political grouping reigns, different approaches will be taken. However, the national interests of Russia will always be the deciding factor.

Major McCleskey is in the USAF FAO program and this article is based on his regional studies component in the Air Force Area Studies and Advanced Program (ASAP). The article was thoroughly researched and footnoted, but I deleted the footnotes to save space. —DOS
Too Rich: The High Life and Tragic Death of King Farouk

Egyptians have for decades expunged the memory of King Farouk, the nation's last monarch who ruled from 1937 to 1952. His antipathy for the Egyptian Army, coupled with his disregard for the aspirations of the Egyptian masses and well-known decadence led to his downfall in July 1952. His exile to Italy ended the Muhammed Ali dynasty that had ruled Egypt since 1804. It is impossible to understand Egypt without delving into the Egyptian monarchy and the characters, both British and Egyptian, that controlled the Royal Family and political life in pre-Nasser Cairo.

The book begins with a description of the Turko-Albanian dynasty of King Farouk's forefathers. Rulers like Khedive (Viceory) Ismail bankrupted Egypt by building modern Cairo, Alexandria, and the massive Suez Canal project. Wanting to protect their investment in the canal, British forces occupied Egypt in 1882. There then followed a string of puppet regimes like the Khedive Tewfik, and pro-German Khedive Abbas Hilmi. This English control of Egypt would continue until the downfall of Farouk. His grandfather's were dominated by the British Sirdar (Commander-in-Chief), men like Generals Gordon, Kitchener and Allenby. Farouk's British nemesis was Sir Miles Lampson, British Ambassador or Minister to Egypt.

When Egypt was shut out of the Versailles Treaty ending World War I, Egyptians formed the Wafid (Delegation) Party. It is still in existence today and represents the opposition voice to President Mubarak's regime. They publish an opposition newspaper that challenges the government controlled newspapers, Al-Ahram (The Pyramids) and Al-Gonhoriah (The Republic). In Farouk's time the Wafid Party balanced the King and the British to push for Egyptian autonomy and more control over domestic, foreign and military affairs. Readers will learn of the intrigue, corruption and palace adventures that dominated Egypt in the thirties and forties.

During World War II, a few Egyptians were so desperate for liberation from Great Britain that they publicly supported the Nazis in their drive for North Africa. Among them was a young Army Captain, Anwar el-Sadat, who was subsequently was jailed for involvement in undermining the British war effort in Egypt. Some Egyptians vehemently opposed to England saw Hitler as their potential liberator, giving the Nazi dictator the name, Muhammed Haidar. Many of those cheering were not aware of his racial policies and fewer still read Mein Kampf.

Students who discount the Muhammed Ali dynasty cannot possibly grasp important Egyptian figures like Sa'ad Zaghlul (Egyptian Nationalist), Hassan al-Bannah (Founder of the Islamic Brotherhood) and Egyptian presidents Nasser and Sadat who operated in the political climate of non-Arabic speaking King Fouad and his son King Farouk. The book also explains why Egypt can never return to a monarchy, even one that may be constitutional. It also serves to illustrate why monarchs fail or succeed in the Arab world.


Hafiz Al-Asad, Syria's late president, has remained one of the most enigmatic leaders of the modern Middle East. His death this year sparked a radical shift in the delicate politics of the region. His son, Bashar, was immediately confirmed the leader of Syria, bypassing any chance for his uncle, Rifaat, who still contests this succession from exile in London. Patrick Seale has written many books on the Middle East and this biography of Hafez Al-Asad is an excellent start for FAOs interested in learning more about Syria and the Levant.
Divided into two parts, the book starts with a young Asad's years as a Revolutionary. During his childhood he witnessed the divide and conquer tactics of French colonial rule and the class structure of Syria's tribal society. As an Alawite, a minority Shiite Muslim sect, his family has a history of both revolt and collaboration with the French as a means to increase their stature within tribe and community. Asad settled on the air force career as a means to climb Syria's ladder of power. However, before his years at the air force academy, he had already developed into an ardent Arab nationalist and in 1951 was elected to the nation-wide Union of Syrian Students. Baathism, which is the political system currently in place in Syria and Iraq appealed to young Asad. The author describes Baath Party founders Salah-el-Din Bitaar and Michel Aflaq and their vision of a state created with an emphasis on Arab social nationalism.

The bloody 1958 coup in Iraq was followed closely in Damascus, because it now seemed possible to be rid of the pro-western Arab monarchies created by French and British colonialists following WW I. Add to this heady brew the influence of Egypt's Gamal Abd-Al-Nasser who turned these events into a crusade to rid Algeria, Syria, Lebanon of French influence and Iraq, the Gulf and Sudan from British control.

Hafez-Al-Asad's climb began in 1962 and culminated in 1970 when he became president of Syria. Asad's inner-circle, including General Mustafa Tlas, the Defense Minister, is well covered, as is Asad's leadership during the 1967 Six-Day War, the 1973 Yom-Kippur War and the Lebanon War of 1982. One chapter describes how Palestinian guerillas fighting a proxy war against Israel in Lebanon created the opportunity for a Syrian involvement which persists to this day. Other chapters cover the 1984 attempted usurpation of Syria's presidency by Hafez-Al-Asad's brother, Rifaat, and Syria's alliance with Iran to destabilize Saddam Hussein of Iraq in a geo-political rivalry that continues to this day. This timely book is highly recommended for newly designated Mid-East FAOs.


U.S. Forces are cooperating with Arab allies on an unprecedented level and NATO exercises routinely involve the Turkish Armed Forces. Therefore, understanding the Ottoman influence on the region is an absolute for those seeking to build coalition forces. Many modern Arab and North African nations were ruled as sanjaks (provinces) of the Ottoman Empire. From law to architecture, nowhere is the influence of Ottoman organization more visible than in the military. Words like Naqib (Army Captain or Navy Lieutenant), Askari (Soldier) and a host of other military terms have found their way into current dialects of Arabic and had its roots in the Ottoman language.

The author, Godfrey Goodwin, is better known for his books on Ottoman architecture but this work is excellent for the novice wanting to learn not only about the elite Janissary Corps but the total organization and traditions of the Ottoman land and sea forces. As an added benefit, the book takes the Ottoman Army and compares them with the four pillars of the Empire: Sultan, Ulema (Religious Council and Keepers of the Law), Divan (Council of State) and finally the merchants who sustained the government and her armed forces. Readers will delve into truly revolutionary divisions of the Ottoman Army, like the topcus (artillery), serdengecti (suicide squads), sipahis (cavalry), gurbas (foreign divisions) and many more descriptions of specific units within the army.

One-quarter of the Ottoman Army were Janissaries, who averaged 70,000 elite troops recruited through the Devsirme (Christian Levy) imposed on each Christian province. This tax on young boys, levied biannually, resulted in the force of elite fighters that eventually became the Sultan's personal guard. They were full-time professional soldiers and the tax was created to relieve the Muslim farmers from providing forces and causing a drain on agricultural manpower. Although outright kidnapping of these boys occurred, many parents willingly gave up their sons to the Sultan knowing they would be taught a skill, given a first-class education and perhaps even rise to become Grand Vizier like Ibrahim Pasha, a Greek Janissary who was the right hand of Suleiman the Magnificent.

The boys were given Muslim names and sent to learn the skills of war plus another skill like metallurgy, the law, gardening or baking. Some coveted positions of power included such as Colonel of a Janissary division or kadi-asker (Religious Judge). The author mentions how Sinan, Grand Architect and designer of many wonders of the Ottoman world was more proud of his service in the Janissaries than his accomplishments as an architect. This highly readable book is one of the better ones on Ottoman history.
COL Jim Dunphy is an IMA to USSOUTHCOM, has been a 48B for the past ten years, and for the past four has served with the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army (International Affairs). He has agreed to be our regular columnist and can be reached at Dunphyjj@aol.com.


As the United States’ immediate neighbor, Mexico’s influence on United States affairs dwarfs that of other Latin American countries. Understanding those relations requires a background in Mexican history. For example, the Mexican War, relegated to obscurity in the United States, still echoes in Mexico. Two recently published tomes attempt to mine these fertile fields.

Neither book takes the traditional narrative approach to Mexican history. The Oxford History, while divided into distinct periods, takes a thematic approach. For example, during the colonial period, there are chapters on Imperial Government, Faith and Morals, Indian Resistance, Disease and Ecology, and Women in Colonial Mexico. Each of these chapters is written by a different scholar, Professors of History at many of the leading Universities. Such an approach has both its merits and problems. Given the thematic approach and the use of different authors, there is a multi-layered approach, both allowing the reader to form a personal consensus on Mexican History and resulting at times in duplicative rendering of events. Moreover, by not using a narrative approach, the reader is often brought forth to, for example, the brink of independence before being jerked back to the Conquistadors. For FAO’s, the final chapters, dealing with Post World War II Mexico are particularly fertile. While obviously written before the fall of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and the election of incoming President Fox, the chapters dealing with the rise of the technocrats, the splits within the PRI, and the increased strength of the National Action Party (PAN) presage this victory. The chapter on the influence of mass media and popular culture in Mexico also provides valuable insights for FAOs.

Mexico: Biography of Power takes a differing but still non conventional approach. Arguing that the history of Mexico is actually the history of its leaders, Krauze takes a biographical approach to Mexican History. It is the history of Mexico told through the lives of its leaders. After a brief survey of 19th Century Mexico, with vignettes of Iturbide, Santa Anna, Juarez and Diaz, Krauze finds his muse with Revolutionary and post Revolutionary Mexico. Each one of the 20th Century Presidents receives a chapter on his life and times. Much like the Oxford History, Krauze foresees the fall of the PRI, particularly after the failures of the most recent Presidents. Two Presidents, de la Madrid and Salinas, come under particular fire, the former for failing to democratize the PRI but instead allowing old practices to continue, and the latter for presiding over corruption and possibly murder to defend the PRI and the old guard.

Of the two, which then is most beneficial to the FAO? Krauze provides a deeper approach, considering Mexican history from a political standpoint. However, it presumes a basic knowledge of Mexican History perhaps not present in the neophyte. The Oxford History, while not without its problems, provides a richer tapestry by considering culture, the arts, and social factors in addition to traditional political history. Both books are a worthy addition to any Latin American FAO’s library.
Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany -- The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies Research Center has released its first book “Military and Society in 21st Century Europe.” The book is a result of a multinational, interdisciplinary project organized and funded by the Marshall Center’s Research Department.

Dr. Jurgen Kuhlmann, former Director of the Marshall Center’s Research Department and Jean Callaghan, a member of the Research Department, edited the book which consists of chapters by 20 scholars from 11 countries. The first three chapters present a commonly developed and empirically based analytical framework used to examine the relationship between civil society and the military and defense establishments in Bulgaria, Czech, Hungary, Romania, Russia, Germany, France, Italy and Netherlands. The scholars were recruited from military academies and government think tanks. The volume ends with an overview and synthesis jointly written by three academics from a Western European perspective. These authors predict that the new democracies in the East will most probably follow in the footsteps of Western Europe, and face similar shifts in public perceptions of the military and its place in society once they have reached their Western standards of development.

Militarily and diplomatic staff officers, their civilian counterparts throughout the national security structure, politicians and scholars will find both the theoretical framework, individual country studies and concluding chapters useful in comprehending realities of transition countries and their defense establishments.

The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies is located in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany and is a bilateral institution funded by the United States and Germany. The Center is dedicated to the advancement of George C. Marshall’s vision of a democratic, free, and undivided Europe and Eurasia that is at peace in the 21st century. The Marshall Center’s mission is to promote the resolution of complex Atlantic-European-Eurasian security issues through active, peaceful engagement, and enhancing enduring partnerships and cooperative security. The Center’s post-graduate courses, conferences, and research projects bring together civilian and military professionals from more than 45 countries.

For U.S. readers, the book is published by Transaction Publishers of Rutgers University in New Jersey. For the European market, the book is published by Lit Verlang in Hamburg, Germany. For Russian readership, the book is published by Nauchnaya Kniga of Moscow.

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FAO In-Country Training (ICT) Program

You made a career choice and decided to become a FAO. You want to be one of the Army’s experts on military, economic, social, cultural, psychological or political issues of a country or region of the world. You want to be an attaché, security assistance officer, politico-military staff officer, intelligence staff officer, liaison officer, or politico-military instructor. You want to be one of the Army’s "Soldier-Statesmen." You have completed your language course at the Defense Language Institute and think you can survive or possible even flourish linguistically in your target country. The hypothetical is about to become reality as you prepare for the ICT portion of the FAO training program.

Conducted in over 50 countries around the world and the capstone of the FAO training program, ICT sites are selected and programs designed to immerse officers in the language and culture of a specific country and region and to provide firsthand, practical understanding of regional issues and reinforce language training, graduate schooling, and military experiences.

Normally a 12-month accompanied tour, the basic ICT program includes continuing language training, regional travel, contact with host nation military and civilian officials, and formal host nation military and civilian schooling. Throughout the ICT program, a senior FAO (Defense Attaché; MIL Group Commander; or Chief, Office of Defense Cooperation) will mentor you and together you will determine the exact makeup of your ICT program. The guidance and supervision of this experienced officer in the development and implementation of your ICT is crucial to the quality of the program. Additionally, the personal and professional relationships you establish during ICT will serve you well in future assignments.

Language fluency is an essential tool for all FAOs and improving proficiency is a principal objective of ICT. Language training normally is accomplished by attendance at a host nation school (civilian or military), the utilization of indigenous tutors and immersion in the host culture.

Regional travel is designed to develop a thorough knowledge of the geography, issues, peoples and cultures of the region and is coordinated with appropriate U.S. Defense Attaché Offices (DAOs), U.S. Offices of Defense Cooperation (ODCs) and U.S. Missions to arrange briefings and meetings that provide an introduction to the local community.

Summary of FAO ICT objectives:

- **Language Proficiency:** Attain a professional level foreign language ability through daily reading, listening, speaking and writing.

- **Military:** Know the service capabilities, present leadership, key military contemporaries, operational concepts and force structure of host country forces; gain familiarity with regional forces.

- **Geography and Demography:** Acquire a detailed appreciation for the major physical and human features of the country and a general appreciation for the region.

- **Economics:** Gain firsthand knowledge of the local economic structure and the key features of the regional economic system; understand the national demands placed upon the economic system and how the local population views economic issues.

- **Culture:** Gain an in-depth understanding of social, ethnic, political, religious and economic issues as perceived by the local populace.

- **Politics and Foreign Affairs:** Know in detail how the region/country functions, officially and unofficially (who decides what and how), the mechanics of the bureaucracy in actual practice, and the political leadership. Know the inter-relation of countries in the region - sources of commonality and of friction. Understand relationship with the U.S. and our Government’s interests in the country and the region.

- **Interpersonal Skills/Contact:** Gain the ability to use conversations, news reports, visual observations and first/second person contacts to form a clear understanding of the local/regional situation when integrated with other background data; develop professional contacts with both military and civilian representatives in the host country and the region.

- **Country Team Structure and Operations:** Understand the Country Team structure, formal and informal lines of communication and basic organizational responsibilities.
Sorry, we again received no input from the Navy Proponent Office for this issue of the Journal.

(Continued from page 32)

Farewells to ...  
Lt Col Brian Vickers has retired from the Air Force and has sought employment with a government contractor in Colorado Springs, CO.  
Maj Kirk Karver is presently serving as the Assistant Air Attache in Madrid, Spain.  
Capt Tariq Hashim is serving as the Political-Military Advisor to 9 AF/CC in the CENTCOM AOR.  
MSgt Vicki Briggs has retired from the Air Force and has taken a position with a DC-based Internet company.

Introductions to ...  
Maj Diane Ficke comes to our office from Ramstein, Germany as the Chief, FAO Education Programs (TEL: 703-588-8322).  
Capt Chon Kim will serve as the Chief, ASAP and as our Command Language Program Manager (TEL: 703-588-8321).  
MSgt Stephen Taylor has left the DAS (after several tours in both Madrid, Spain and Cairo, Egypt) to serve as the Superintendent of FAO Language Programs and Webmaster (TEL: 703-588-8348).  
And finally, our website has undergone a complete makeover. Please check out the new site at:  http://www.safia.hq.af.mil/afaao/fao/FAOIndex.htm.

Major General Freeman assumes duties at the Inter-American Defense Board

WASHINGTON, DC — Major General Carl H. Freeman, USA, assumed duties as chairman of the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) and director of the Inter-American Defense College (IADC) on July 13.  
General Freeman joins the IADB and IADC after a two-year tour of duty in Korea as Commander, 19th Theater Support Command. A graduate of the “Escuela Superior de Guerra de México” (The Mexican Superior War College), and the U.S. Army School of the Americas, he relieves Major General John C. Thompson, who retired on July 1.

“The Inter-American Defense Board is a unique organization,” said Freeman. “The combined and joint nature of the Board and College is very special. This organization has a great wealth of experience in the members that constitute the staff and faculty. It’s a tremendous storehouse of experience and knowledge.”

“As we turn the century, the [Inter-American Defense Board] has a tremendous history of service to the hemisphere,” said Freeman. “If you look at the Board’s great track record during the days of WWII and the post-war period, the Board has done commendable work, but times have changed,” noted Freeman. “The circumstances in the national and international environment are vastly different, so the Board has to adapt and adjust….We see changing areas of interest in military involvement that are nontraditional, not only national and hemispheric security, but areas such as national disaster assistance, environmental concerns, military cooperation and security and confidence building.”

Freeman said the mission and function of the Inter-American Defense Board will continue to flourish in the future: “You will see the Board evolving over the next few years. They won’t be revolutionary changes, but they will be evolutionary to respond to the needs of member nations…You will see the Board continue to be a relevant organization into the 21st century, that adjusts to increased globalization and more mobile societies around the world. It [the Inter-American Defense Board] will continue to be of importance to its member nations, and perhaps to new member nations who decide to join the Board.”

Freeman’s personal decorations include the Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit (3 OLC), Bronze Star Medal, Purple Heart, Combat Infantryman’s Badge, and Master Parachutist Badge. He has been awarded numerous foreign parachute wings. An ROTC graduate of Lafayette College, he has served in Kuwait, Panama, Mexico and the Republic of Korea as well as throughout CONUS.
As announced in the FAO Journal's June issue, the USMC International Affairs Officer Program website has been moved to its permanent location at http://www.hqmc.usmc.mil/faowebsite.nsf. We will continue to update and improve the site as a tool for both USMC and other services FAOs, and we welcome any of your comments. Future planned additions will include USMC Defense Attaché System billet availability, FAO In-Country Training Trip Reports, potential thesis topics (specifically for RAOs), and Mentoring Program information/points of contact. Additionally, please feel free to update PLU regarding political-military billets you may have filled in the past for which we do not currently have you recorded. It will assist in monitoring how effective the overall program has proven to be.

The Unified Commands and International Issues Branch (PLU), PP&O is currently sponsoring the following officers on active-duty. Our annual study-track board number of officers in the USMC IAOP to 248 FAOs and 41 RAOs officers on active-duty. Our annual study-track board was also held during the first week in August during which 10 new FAOs and 8 new RAOs-in-training were selected from among 53 superior application packages. Congratulations to all those who were selected. The RAOs and the Japanese and Chinese FAOs will start their training at NPS, Monterey in Jan 2001 with the remaining FAOs commencing in July 2001.

On the experience-track side, a board held by PLU, PP&O in late July added another 17 FAOs and 4 RAOs as experience-track International Affairs Officers. This brings the total number of officers in the USMC IAOP to 248 FAOs and 41 RAOs officers on active-duty. Our annual study-track board was also held during the first week in August during which 10 new FAOs and 8 new RAOs-in-training were selected from among 53 superior application packages. Congratulations to all those who were selected. The RAOs and the Japanese and Chinese FAOs will start their training at NPS, Monterey in Jan 2001 with the remaining FAOs commencing in July 2001.

LTGen E. R. Bedard, the new Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies and Operations (PP&O) signed the revision to the FAO/RAO Marine Corps Order. The update, MCO 1520.11E (International Affairs Officer Program), should be released shortly. General Bedard also signed the Memorandum of Agreement between HQMC and the Defense Intelligence Agency which will formalize the support structure for our FAOs conducting ICT while attached to various DAOs around the globe. The third main issue from the Program Coordinator's perspective involves a billet redesignation initiative. In late July 2000, representatives from PP&O, Director Intelligence, Total Force Structure Division, and Manpower all met in Quantico and agreed to redesignate 65 billets and “tie” them to FAO/RAO study-track program graduates. While this change will not be formally entered into the Total Force System until Feb 2001 (and will not impact assignments until the summer of 2002), this is a big step towards improving utilization tours for Marine Corps-funded FAOs and RAOs. Adding these 65 billets to the 45 FAO/RAO billets that already exist (31 of which are within the Defense Attaché System) will improve the stature of the program and, more importantly, place the most qualified officers in areas that will best benefit the Corps' worldwide mission.

The FAO/RAO Program, and the Marine Corps in general, received a tremendous boost in its Foreign Area Studies arena after former Marine and Wall Street entrepreneur, Mr. Guy Wyser-Pratte the President of Wyser-Pratte Co., Inc., offered to make a sizeable donation to the Marine Corps University Foundation that will be used to purchase Foreign Area Studies material for the MCU Research Center in Quantico and/or newly selected FAOs and RAOs. Our most sincere thanks go out to one of our own...Once a Marine Always a Marine, Semper Fidelis.

The Navy and Marine Corps FAO Program Coordinators have also been working together to implement SECNAV’s FAO Mentoring Program initiative. This is an attempt to solicit the international expertise of business leaders, former military officers, and university professors to assist our FAOs/RAOs through an informal type of teacher-pupil relationship. Letters are now being mailed out to over 100 individuals asking for their participation. Finally, on 13 September, the Navy and Marine Corps Program Coordinators had the opportunity to jointly brief Secretary Danzig on the status of their respective programs. The Secretary of the Navy was particularly pleased with how the Marine Corps is running their ICT portion of the program and raised several issues about Marine Corps participation within the Defense Attaché System that will be examined in the coming months.
Air Force’s FAO Program for the New Millennium

Language and Area Studies Immersion (LASI) Program

As we usher in the new millennium, our flagship program, Language and Area Studies Immersion, has recently received AF-wide advertising. The program’s manager, MSgt Stephen Taylor distributed, via e-mail, over 1,500 notifications regarding the program, its benefit to the Air Force at large and highlighted its implications to the evolving Expeditionary Air Force concept, starting now to take final shape. In response to his initial contact, he received over 5,000 e-mails requesting further information and application procedures.

FY 00 proved successful for the program, with 225 students studying 31 foreign languages throughout 25 countries. In addition to the normal fare of German, French, Spanish, and Italian, we offered multiple iterations of language training in Arabic, Chinese, and Russian. To grow officer-linguists in Less-Commonly-Taught Languages, we offered Iso-Immersions (CONUS) in both Lithuanian and Indonesian. For FY 01, we’re examining the possibility of offering Hindi through an Iso-Immersion and French in Mali. Early estimates project a student base exceeding 300.

Language and Area Studies Immersion II Program

Like its predecessor, the LASI II Program emphasizes the cultural dimension while strengthening language proficiency. To that end, we developed the program to enhance the language ability of officers possessing DLPT scores of 2/2 and higher. The program will grow in FY 01, but meanwhile FY 00 statistics can boast 24 students learning 6 foreign languages in the following countries: Austria, China, Korea, Russia, Tunisia, and Vietnam.

Area Studies Advanced Program (ASAP)

The ASAP, designed to further language proficiency and develop a significantly greater understanding of a region, had great success throughout FY 00, and we look forward to an expanding program in FY 01. The officers selected for the ASAP travel overseas to perform thesis-level research on a topic of Air Force significance. The FAO Proponent Office funds travel, per diem, language material, cultural excursions, and all matters relating to the research for a period NTE 3 months. Country (ies) and Associated ASAP Research Proposals:

Philippines—The Philippines and its Spratley Dilemma: Changing Strategic and Tactical Perspectives Within the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

Argentina, Chile, and Venezuela—High Tech Weapon Sales to Latin America: Economic Boon or Regional Bane?

Germany—Effects of Deregulation of the German Telecommunications Industry on Government and Military Communications.

China—China-Taiwan Relations in the post-election environment.

Austria—Austria’s Freedom Party: Beyond the Rhetoric.

France and Belgium—Eurocorps: Can Europe Develop Autonomous and Responsive Air Power?


Language Training Opportunity 2000

Our latest initiative provides DC-area officers with maintenance and enhancement foreign language training. During the past several months, over 70 officers have taken advantage of the one-on-one training. The officers establish instruction times (4-6 hours per week) during duty and off-duty hours, including nights and weekends. Four local schools provide the training in over 30 foreign languages.

FAO Board

On 24 Jul 00, the FAO Proponent Office recommended 19 officers (16 Active Duty and 3 Reserve) out of 51 for the FAO designation. Of the 19 officers recommended for the 16FXX Air Force Specialty Code, we had the following breakdown by rank: Lt Col: 4; Maj: 8; and Capt: 7.

The following areas are further represented by the additional FAOs:

Russia/Eurasia 3; Latin America 5; NE Asia / China 1; Sub-Saharan Africa 1; and Europe 9.

FAO Proponent Office

Finally, a word of introduction to our newest members, and farewell to our former colleagues.
Army FAO Proponent Office

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Email: volkmar@hqda.army.mil

MS. Pat Jones - Budget/Resource Manager, (703) 697-6317 / DSN 227-6317
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