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WHY NOT FAO GENERALS?

I had the opportunity recently to visit the semi-annual FAO Course conducted at DLI in Monterey, CA to speak about both the FAO Association and life as an attaché. Other presentations were given by the FAO Proponent, PERSCOM, and invited guest speakers. It is a superb course, ably coordinated by the Proponent’s rep at DLI, COL Manny Fuentes.

However, while listening to these presentations it occurred to me that many speakers were limiting students expectations about a “successful” FAO career. Young FAOs-in-training were told the pyramid is built by determining the number of FAO colonels required by Army manning documents and building downward, that success is defined by promotion to colonel, and that the prospect of for promotion to general officer rank is unrealistic.

Our senior leaders also contribute to this diminished expectation. In the 5 June 2000 issue of the Army Times, GEN Wesley Clark, referring to the skills needed in today’s evolving strategic environment, stated, “It’s going to take leadership, understanding, cultural sensitivity, language skills, a broad perspective to be able to handle that.” He then held up the FAO program as an example of what is both right and wrong with the Army today. “It’s the envy of every other service….but if you’re an armor officer and you become a FAO, you can forget about becoming an armor officer. So all that sensitivity is lost, and they retire as lieutenant colonels and colonels.”

Why do we say this when FAOs have always been promoted to general officer rank. “Vinegar Joe” Stilwell, Maxwell Taylor, Matthew Ridgway and other legendary figures from our past were FAOs in their time. Today, we have two serving general officers on the Board of Governors of your Association; there are several others on active duty as well: Keith Dayton and Kevin Byrnes to name just two.

However, GEN Clark is right on the mark in identifying the skills needed in the future. Why shouldn’t there should be FAO general officer slots identified in service manning documents to guarantee that vital FAO skills are not lost prematurely? For example, why shouldn’t the J-5 position in each regional command be reserved for FAOs? Same goes for the two Deputy Assistant Director J-5 slots on the Joint Staff. There are potential FAO GO positions in OSD, DIA and the CIA as well. In the Army, three slots easily come to mind—Military Deputy to the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army (International Affairs) and the Director and Assistant Director for Strategy, Plans, and Policy—and certainly there are opportunities for FAO GOS in DCSINT and in MI field operating agencies. The Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps all have similar positions.

We should push strongly to raise the peak of the FAO pyramid to include general officer and flag positions. And we must recognize that the best FAOs have a legitimate shot at stars. We are limited only by our mindset. As our Air Force brethren are fond of saying, AIM HIGH!

--DOS
Thaw in Greece-Turkey Relations?

Sir - Just wanted to commend you on another very fine Journal - the depth and breadth of the articles cover an important range of timely and relevant topics. I would like to specifically comment on one of the articles - "The Greece-Turkey Dispute" by LTC Dougherty and MAJ Whatley. Basically, they provided a good overview of some of the outstanding differences between these two NATO countries.

However, I would like to point out a few recent and ongoing initiatives which indicate a warming of relations. As we all know, both Turkey and Greece suffered catastrophic earthquakes last year resulting in thousands of deaths and massive damage. What may not be as widely known is the fact that Greece provided immediate on-the-ground search and rescue assistance to Turkey within hours of the first earthquake, and that Turkey reciprocated with its own team when disaster hit Athens. The extremely favorable press both countries gave each other was not lost on the politicians from either country. "Earthquake diplomacy" gave way to reciprocal visits by the Foreign Ministers of Turkey and Greece, the first since 1962. Additionally, Greece did not block Turkey's bid for entrance into the European Union and has pledged its active assistance in helping Turkey make the required transition to full membership.

Another significant development involves the restructuring of NATO's southern tier. For years, Turkey has blocked the establishment of a NATO headquarters in Greece, comparable to one it hosts in Izmir. There now exist NATO operational headquarters in Greece and Turkey with both having Turkish and Greek officers working together on the staffs. One final note, NATO conducts a major military exercise annually in the Aegean with both Greece and Turkey invited to participate. For many of the same reasons noted in the article, either one or the other country has always opted out of the exercise. This year both countries are participating in this full scale air, land, and sea exercise. I am optimistic that Turkey and Greece will be able to make solid progress on all of the issues enumerated in the article. As a FAO with a 26 year history with Turkey, I have seen the world change here since I first arrived in Turkey during the days following the Cyprus action of 1974.

LTC Paul S. Gendrolis

General Officers-in-Training

I read your article in the FAOA Journal regarding MG Scales (Note: see last quarter’s editorial on mentoring —DOS) not appreciating what FAO's do. I agree that it is disconcerting to hear something like this, especially since FAOs are already doing all the things that he was suggesting need to be done. When I was in DUSA, I remember someone saying that FAOs are not really appreciated until the three-star level. From my experience, this does seem to be the case. Having put a CAPSTONE (and another coming up) class through Cairo during their orientation tour, it was interesting to see the differences in the new GOs between those who had some regional experience and those who had a more traditional career. While some of the 'traditional' minded seemed open to the pol-mil regional attributes, others quite clearly appeared to care nothing for it and seemed to want to get back to a division or the fleet as soon as possible. You can see this in the number of GOs who, much to their shock, are assigned as either Chief of OMC, OPM-SANG, USMTM, etc. and have no clue that this type of world ever existed. While perhaps desiring to go back to a division, most of them quickly earn a healthy appreciation for both the SAOs and the DAOs.

An idea: The CAPSTONE course could be an ideal time for a FAO primer. Someone of the appropriate level, perhaps one of the FAO GOs or the DUSA, could give a pitch on the international aspect of FAOs, what they do, and how they can assist GOs both in traditional military aspects and in the "non-traditional."

LTC Tom Milton
AARMA Cairo

I couldn’t agree more, as this quarter’s editorial should make very clear. The Army has been accused by several critics recently of having an anti-intellectual bias that interferes with training senior officers for Joint commands and key overseas billets. I would be interested to hear other views on this topic.
Marine Corps FAO Selected for Flag Rank

Colonel Michael E. Ennis USMC, a Russian FAO, has just been selected for promotion to Brigadier General. This marks only the second time of which I am aware that a Marine FAO has made flag rank; the first Marine to do so (E. J. Bronars) was promoted 3-4 decades ago. It will also be the first time that a Marine in Mike's career field (02) has EVER become a general. Recommend that you prominently announce this event in the next edition of the FAOA journal. The FAO OPR at HQMC should be able to provide the needed information.

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Congratulations to both Colonel Ennis and to the Marine Corps for what surely is great selection, and thanks for bringing it to our attention. Best wishes in the future and keep us posted on his career.

Response to Kosovo Article

As always I find Colonel Dougherty’s articles interesting reading. And, as usually is the case I find his lack of historical context distracting. It may be due to space or it may be to FAO Journal editing. Either way it is a disservice to the reader.

Although I too was/am an East European FAO, focusing on the Balkans, my true focus was the former Yugoslavia. LTC Dougherty, I believe, focused on Greece. I apologize if this is incorrect. He does bring a different perspective than I. A concern I have is the lack of understanding for the Serb position. I certainly do not want to appear that I approve of Serb atrocities but I believe to discount their rights as a sovereign nation and their rights to protect this sovereignty through force if necessary, is unfair. The U.S. fought the Civil War, or the War of Northern Aggression (depending on your political position), to hold our nation together; it would seem the Yugoslavs (now Serbia and Montenegro) would have the same right.

As an historian I realize history changes and is often only published by the winners. Too often, numbers are inflated or deflated to support positions favorable to one party or another. Therefore, I may be using numbers that will differ from those known by other readers.

In reviewing the history of Kosovo I am attempted to title it, “Déjà vu all over again” due to the meddling of the world powers. In the late 19th century and early 20th century we saw external influence from the Ottoman Empire and the Austro-Hungarian (A-H) Empire, with lesser involvement by Russia, Great Britain, and France – to no good. In the late 20th century we see external meddling from the Contact Group of France, Great Britain, Russia, Germany, and the United States – good yet to be determined. Not much has changed over the span of a century.

The purpose of this short history is to show that problems between the Serbs and Albanians began long before Milosevic and that the international community still misunderstands the Balkans today as it did then.

Although the history could go back into the 14th and 15th centuries I will begin it with the Russian signing of the Treaty of San Stefano in 1878. The Russians were prepared to reward the Bulgars at the expense of the Serbs and the Albanians. The Great Powers objected and were preparing to rework the Balkans at the Conference of Berlin. The Albanians, seeing they were ignored by the Russians in the Treaty of San Stefano, however, met earlier and created the Prizren League. The purpose of the League was to unite all Albanian people – Greater Albania. It laid claim to the Albanians living from eastern Montenegro, through Kosovo, and into Skopje, Macedonia. The Albanians met resistance from the European Powers and failed to accomplish their objective.

The Serbs, Bulgars, Montenegrins, and Greeks were beginning their revolt against the Turks at the same time the Albanians took up terrorist actions in the areas they claimed at the Prizren League of 1878. Serb numbers claim over 400,000 Serbs fled Kosovo Metohija due to persecution, killing, displacement and expulsion.

During the Balkan Wars the Albanians living in Kosovo offered armed resistance to Serbs, Montenegrins, Bulgars, and Greeks. In 1912, the Balkan powers defeated the Ottoman Empire. Serbs defeated the Turks at
Kumanovo, Macedonia and met the Montenegrins at Metohija. The Serbs capitalized on a weak Albania, and a defeated Ottoman Empire, and marched through Albania to the Adriatic. The Albanians feared its dismemberment by Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro. The A-H Empire, as well as the other Great Powers, insisted on a Serb pullout. The Serbs withdrew but took up a strategic position north of the border belt and became victims of Albanian guerrillas. When the Serbs responded and reentered Albania, the Great Powers branded it “another Serb drive toward the Albanian littoral.” To the Austrians, behavior of the Serbs was unfathomable. When the Serbs occupied Albanian territory for the second time, the A-H Empire sent an ultimatum – pull out within 8 days. The A-H Empire waited for the opportunity to attack Serbia, a country of “peasants” and one it despised.

Gavrilo Princip’s assassination of the Archduke provided all that was needed. World War I followed and the Serbs were unable to stand against the A-H Empire and the Bulgars. The Serbs retreated into Albania to be met by Albanian snipers.

Following the war, the Great Powers permitted the forming of an Albanian state but the Albanians were dissatisfied with its borders because it didn’t include Pec, Pristina, and Mitrovica (cities in present day Kosovo) or Skopje and Tetovo (cities in Macedonia). In 1920 the Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia took to the streets in protest.

In World War II, the Axis Powers granted Albania control of Kosovo and the Albanians believed the creation of Greater Albania was near. Throughout this “Protectorate”, non-Albanian people were expelled (or in today’s jargon – ethnically cleansed.) The action was spearheaded by the leaders of the 2d Prizren League in 1943. After the war, Kosovo was returned to Yugoslavia and Serbia. Many Serbs returned, in kind, the treatment they were given by the Albanians during the war.

The 3d Prizren League met in the United States in 1946 to push for a policy of a Greater Albania. A guerrilla war between Yugoslavia and Albania ensued with “terrorists” or “freedom fighters” entering Yugoslavia from Albania. As Albanians streamed in, non-Albanians streamed out – another change in Kosovo demographics.

On November 29, 1968, Kosovo exploded with violence. Demonstrators smashed windows and overturned cars in Pristina, and the anti-Serb demonstrations quickly spread to other towns in Kosovo. There were reports that some rioters demanded annexation by Albania. Demands included the dropping of the Serb name “Metohija” from the official name of the region, redesignation as a republic, extension of the right of self-determination, and the establishment of an independent university in Pristina. The unrest soon spread to the Albanian communities in Macedonia. The 1974 Constitution addressed many of these demands. Yet, relations between Serbs and Albanians remained tense. As a result of this turmoil, thousands of Serbs and Montenegrins left the province, once again changing the demographics in favor of the Albanians. The census results in 1971, thought by some to be unreliable, showed the Albanians to have 73.7 percent of the province’s population. (Today they claim no less than 90 percent.)

The unrest continued into the 1970s. “Yugoslav security forces discovered evidence of an underground separatist organization known as the Revolutionary Movement of United Albania, led by none other than Adem Demachi – (now political advisor to elements of the KLA). The group called for the secession of Kosovo and those parts of Macedonia and Montenegro inhabited by Albanians and for the creation of a Greater Albania. Another group, the National Liberation Movement of Kosovo, was discovered soon after.

In spite of the activities of the 60s and 70s, few observers were prepared for the riots that shook the province in March and April of 1981. On March 11, thousands of students from Pristina University took to the streets. By April 3 the rioting had spread across Kosovo with numerous police and students injured. Ramet indicates as many as 1000 were killed and

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ASSOCIATION NEWS

QUARTERLY LUNCHEON—APRIL 13

Former Ambassador and present national security affairs advisor to presidential candidate George W. Bush, Rich Armitage, was the guest speaker at the Association’s quarterly luncheon for DC-area FAOs on 13 April. He spoke to a gathering of approximately 60 FAOs from all services at the Pentagon Executive Dining Room on four guiding tenets future Administrations should heed in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. He also gave his views on the future of the FAO program and the need to include FAO expertise in the formulation of national security policy. Ambassador Armitage asked that his remarks be considered “off the record” so no further detail can be given.

ANNUAL DINING-IN

The Association is looking at the possibility of reviving the former tradition of an annual FAO Dining-In in the Washington area in the Fall. We are looking at dates in late September or early October. Once we lock in a date and guest speaker, flyers will be sent out to members in the Washington metropolitan area.

NEW USAF FAOA BOARD MEMBER

USAF Colonel Anthony A. Aldwell has become our newest member of the FAO Association Board of Governors. Now that we have the Marines, Air Force and Army on board, perhaps the Navy will soon join in what will surely become a joint specialty in the future. We will run Tony’s bio in the next issue of the journal.

NEW LOGO NEEDED

A couple of issues ago I asked for help in designing a new Association logo to more accurately reflect the emerging jointness of our membership. Unfortunately, I got no response. So now I’ll sweeten the pot a little and offer a free three year subscription to anyone who comes up with a logo that is adopted by the Board of Governors.

Former Ambassador Rich Armitage gives his views on the future of U.S. foreign policy at our quarterly luncheon on 13 April. Your Association’s President, COL Mike Ferguson, is deep in thought.
The knot of Kashmir is a thorny issue in the South Asian region and presents the U.S. with limited policy options. For the South Asia FAO, there is perhaps no single issue which must be explained, expounded on, deciphered and put in context more often, than the perennial Indo-Pakistani conflict over the territory of Jammu and Kashmir (J & K). It is both a fascinating and frustrating issue that returned to the limelight in Western news media during the May-Sep 1999 battle for Kargil, an area of commanding heights along the contested Indo-Pakistani Line of Control (LOC). The tattered and battered village of Kargil is regionally significant because of its location astride India’s National Highway 1A, the ground logistics lifeline for Indian army units deployed on the world’s highest battlefield - the Siachen Glacier. And of course, Kargil is a substantive and symbolic outpost on the traditionally Indian-held side of the LOC.

As a FAO who has spent four of his FAO years in India, first as a student attached to the Indian Army during the period of the Kashmiri “grassroots” uprising, and then as an attaché visiting the Himalayan region from 1996-1999 with ambassadorial envoys, escorting senior U.S. Army officials, and traveling with the attaché corps, Kashmir appears to be one dispute virtually immune from solution. The “Kargil incident,” during which the Pakistan Army initially surprised and embarrassed not only the Indian Army, but the plethora of Indian intelligence agencies as well, represents a new plateau of bilateral aggravation, which many Western observers believe is an exemplum of how this region’s events can quickly slide, perhaps toward the Rubicon of a nuclear exchange.

The domestic uprising, which began in the “Vale of Kashmir” in 1989, enabled Islamabad (read the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate and the Army) to exploit the Kashmiri “intifada,” causing an immense Indian investiture of military, paramilitary and national capital. Subsequently, Pakistan’s ten-year plus “Proxy War” has not only bled Indian military forces, but also the Kashmiris caught in the crossfire. Frustrated Indian security forces initially untrained in MOUT, or in the sophisticated nuances of counter-insurgency operations, over-reacted in many cases with retribution and abandon, which further alienated the Kashmiri people from New Delhi.

During my attaché tour I visited the region several times. While at dinner in Srinagar with Kashmir’s then Governor General Krishna Rao, I listened curiously, how the former Indian Army Chief spoke convincingly of the waning insurgency level in Jammu and Kashmir, and of how the Indian Army had sufficiently sealed the LOC (“oh, yes there will be one-sies and two-sies slipping through, and India will accept the sporadic bomb attacks”), but the situation is pretty much over. Normalcy is returning rapidly,” said the General. “We have a plan to rebuild infrastructure, economy, jobs, schools, bridges, etc. and win the confidence of the Kashmiris.” I must confess that the Governor’s rhetoric was convincing, except that the numerous security forces, guard posts, sandbagged intersections, and closed shops, made me think the general was suffering from “Triumph of The Will” syndrome. Nonetheless, despite the apparent conflicting evidence I saw, the Indian strategy seemed to make imminent sense at the time, and perhaps, I thought, the Indians were winning the campaign. In any case, it was difficult to tell from the vantage point of New Delhi, and unrestricted access to a state under perennial martial law was not usually given to attaches.

On yet another trip to J & K, getting briefings at the joint security headquarters in Srinagar, as well as at the 16 Corps Headquarters in Nagrota, Jammu, it was more of the same upbeat Indian assessments, that security forces were getting a better handle on the situation, and if only Pakistan would stop aiding, funding, training, and assisting the infiltration of insurgents, most of whom by now were “exogenous” to Kashmir, the misery would stop. The 16 Corps commander even painted a bucolic picture of his AOR to demonstrate the positive trend in the Jammu region. During a
return trip toward my tour’s end, Indian corps commanders claimed that all was under control, that the complexion of the insurgency was almost wholly foreign, Pakistani instigated, and that India and the Indian military had the patience to “wait this thing out, as long as it takes— “Hundreds of years if necessary.”

Upon ruminating over my time in region I tried to understand two essential ideas concerning the Indian and Pakistani military situation: a) threshold for action-reaction, and, b) confidence-building measures as they apply to de-escalation. On the first, the Indians explained, “there is no codified or formally mutually agreed upon threshold.” Let me expound. Say you are an Indian army divisional commander along the LOC, and your unit comes under artillery fire from the Pakistanis. Your unit, with permission from the Corps commander, can respond to a Pakistani barrage of 200 rounds with as many as 4,000 artillery Indian rounds. Hotlines (local area and the Directors General for Military Operation links between Army Hq’s) are used, if at all, well after the fact. The Indians claim the Pakistanis usually bring their artillery guns into a village, “shoot and scoot,” and then the Indian response hits innocent villagers. UN Military Observer Group Indian-Pakistan (UNMOGIP) observers are then usually tipped off by the Pakistan Army as to where the artillery attack will hit, claim the Indians. The Pakistanis then try to claim that the Indians deliberately target the villages. The tit-for-tat accusations never end. When asked how do you know when you’ve issued an appropriate response, the Indian answer was essentially, “we know it when we see it.” How well is the LOC marked? Not well at all if you ask me. There are sporadic marker stones but there is frequent shifting of positions. Any attempt to improve defensive positions near or on the LOC is met with ferocious direct fire to ensure no permanent or durable structures remain that could grant de facto ownership of terrain. The 40 or so UN observers have no legal writ, a very limited charter, and little access or cooperation from the Indians who consider the presence of UNMOGIP unnecessary after the signing of the Simla Agreement.

The bottom line is that the threshold is ill defined and de-escalation, when it happens, is problematic at best. The theory that the common cultural history shared by the Indian and Pakistani senior military leadership is a natural firebreak does not hold up to scrutiny, and, moreover, becomes less and less a potential factor as newer generations of military leaders (who have never met) occupy key leadership positions.

So where are the two sides now following the Kargil crisis, Gen Musharraf’s coup, the Indian Airlines hijacking, and apparent stepped up fighting in J & K? A broad brush description of each country’s strategy, would look something like this:

The Indian strategy:

- Invest heavily in Counter-Insurgency Operations (form new para-military units capable of conducting COIN) and increase security force presence.
- Form a new division in J & K.
- Seal the LOC as much as possible.
- Propagandize the Pakistan madrassas (religious indoctrination camps), fundamentalism, and Islamabad’s direct link to terrorists.
- Wage psyops war in Kashmir (hearts and minds campaign).
- Get Pakistan declared as a state which sponsors terrorism.
- Convince the Pakistanis that the Indians will not buy into a nuclear umbrella theory which allows Pakistan to act with impunity.
- Reiterate that India is prepared to wage limited conventional war to secure Kashmir despite the nuclear factor.
- Convince the world that India is a responsible/mature de facto nuclear (indigenously developed by the way) democracy, and downplay the threat of inadvertent nuclear escalation.
- Paint the danger of Pakistan proliferating nuclear weapons to other Islamic states.
- Leverage Kashmiri fear by allowing ambiguity over the possible abrogation of Article 370 of the constitution (some Hindu nationalist parties are suggesting this), which would take away special status for Kashmiris, and allow Hindus to migrate, own land in Jammu and Kashmir, and change the demographics. The Kashmiris greatest fear is losing their majority status in the state as a result of Hindu migration. Implications of such would be a future plebiscite obviously favoring remaining within the Indian union.

The Pakistan strategy:

- Re-ignite the “grassroots” aspect of the rebellion in the Valley.
- Bleed the Indians on the Siachen Glacier, along the LOC, and throughout the state of J & K.
- Make the pressure so great that Indians will negotiate.
- Operate under the protection of the “nuclear umbrella” and expect/hope the Indians will not escalate to full-scale war.
- Use the threat of nuclear war to garner international mediation.
- Never give up on Kashmir issue. To give up on Kashmir is to give up on Pakistan.

Can a solution to Kashmir be negotiated? It seems that India and Pakistan are still at diametrically opposed ends. The Indians reject the demand for a referendum on Jammu and Kashmir, as per the UN Resolution, on the basis that a referendum could only be held after Pakistan vacated the occupied portion of Kashmir. Adding that the entire Jammu and Kashmir formed part and parcel of India, they claim, “we will not rest till the remaining part of Kashmir is secured.” According to the Indians, the people of Jammu and Kashmir had on a number of occasions made it clear that they wanted to remain with India, adding that all elections, particularly the one in 1977, had been praised by independent observers. New Delhi won’t talk to Islamabad until Pakistan ends it aid to the insurgency. Certainly the coup in Pakistan, the subsequent Indian Airlines hijacking, (believed to have been engineered by the Pakistanis), complicated and make it unlikely that any Indian coalition government will agree to a deal with Islamabad, as well as to third party me-

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The World dies over and over again but the skeleton always gets up and walks

— Henry Miller

Although Joshua knew beforehand what was about to transpire, one can nevertheless imagine the general surprise and amazement for the others when Jericho’s walls finally fell. For many modern observers, the “fall of the wall” and subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union was greeted with no less wonderment. In the initial euphoria of the breaking of the communist yoke, there were high (and false) hopes that Russia would quickly transform itself and join the family of democratic, free market societies. Now, more than 10 years later, as Russia has completed only its second presidential election since independence, we find ourselves asking once again “What next?” Where is Russia headed, especially in the realm of military affairs? How will it face the changing security environment?

Russia enters the 21st Century facing daunting political, economic, societal, and ecological challenges. The Russian Armed Forces have been particularly hard hit by the upheaval and are plagued by outdated organization, aging equipment, insufficient resources, and chronic lack of funds as well as severe manning problems. Taken altogether, they represent a threat to Russia’s stability and, therefore, to regional security. Too radical an approach in meeting these challenges might trigger unwanted responses, while too weak might encourage further problems.

There is, however, some reason for optimism that Russia will nevertheless manage to meet its evolving security needs. While Moscow struggles to reinvent its economy, continue its experiment with democracy, and adapt to new security challenges, the World should remember that Russian military leaders have often succeeded under the most trying of circumstances, and the people themselves have demonstrated time and again an almost inexhaustible capacity to endure hardship.

Politically, Russia is still suffering from the legacy of centuries of autocratic rule followed by 70 years of Communist Party totalitarianism. There is no culture of compromise, so essential to democratic society. There are dozens of political parties at all points of the political spectrum, none of which can attract a majority. Public mistrust of the government is pervasive. Indeed, following a series of bombings in Russian cities that the government blamed on Chechen terrorists, polls showed that an equal number of Russian citizens believed that the government itself was responsible in order to have an excuse to invade Chechnya. Yet another poll showed that only slightly over one third of the respondents thought that democracy was the best form of government.

On the positive side of the political ledger, Boris Yeltsin’s surprise resignation on New Year’s Eve and the concurrent appointment of Vladimir Putin as Acting President marked the first voluntary and peaceful transition of power in Russian history. Putin won a clear, if slim, majority in the presidential elections on March 26. While he enjoyed significant advantages as the incumbent, by all indications the elections were relatively free, fair, and open.

The economy struggled throughout the 1990s and still faces stiff challenges. As a former U.S. Ambassador to Russia once commented: “Russia is neither a developed nor a developing country. It is, quite possibly, the most mis-developed country in history.” The cumbersome, ineffectual

Old Russia and New Russia: Boris Yeltsin gives way to Vladimir Putin
icient Soviet system based on centralized planning and consisting mostly of an aging heavy industry infrastructure did not readily adapt to market forces.

Attempts to jump-start a market-based economy met with only partial success, largely due to rampant corruption. Privatization of state-owned firms was hijacked by an emerging oligarchy. With government complicity for personal gains, some sales were under-priced, allowing public assets to be obtained by the oligarchs at far less than true market value. Banks were not regulated and many improper loans allowed non-viable factories to remain in production. The tax system was totally inadequate. As a result, both government officials and the new class of robber barons moved into state coffers and money that should have been re-invested in the economy was illegally moved out of country.

This loss of capital, coupled with the failure to attract sizable foreign investment, meant that there would be no significant free market development. Indeed, when Russia devalued the ruble in August 1998 and set off the economic collapse that impacted most of Europe, especially the New Independent States, it was not so much a failure of the market, or even of academic and theoretical understanding. It was in fact, reflection of failed economic policy, nonexistent fiscal oversight, and greed.

The collapse of August 1998 taught some bitter lessons, but there are indications that these lessons have been learned and that the economy is beginning to rebound. The rising price of oil is moving revenues into the treasury and boosting prices on the stock market. The Russian Trading System (RTS) index gained 9% in real terms during the first week of March 2000. The ruble appreciated 0.4% during the same week and foreign reserves increased by USD 300 million. Most importantly, with tax reform and revenue collection receiving much higher priority, revenues for that period exceeded expenditures by 12.8 billion rubles; enough to possibly prevent the government from borrowing money from the central bank.

This positive economic performance, although welcome, is fragile. Part of the upward pressure came from the pre-election tactics. Another significant factor is the current high price of oil. However, production quotas might change and prices fall for a number of reasons beyond Moscow’s control. So, although encouraging, it remains premature to say that the economy is recovering due to proper application of market economy principles. And it remains sadly true that, for many Russians, the benefits of a strong market economy are far off, and they continue to live at or below subsistence levels.

Corruption and organized crime affect almost all aspects of life and significantly impede any attempts to better the lives of the average citizen through economic performance. Bribery and influence peddling are virtual business requirements, and the heavy toll exacted on the nascent entrepreneurial class effectively prevents them from contributing much societal benefit. In 1996, a report by the California Attorney General estimated that 80 percent of private enterprises and banks in Russia were forced to pay anywhere between 10 and 20 percent of profits to organized crime groups.

These problems are exacerbated by a lack of real business and civil codes and compounded by a weak court and police system. The laws that do exist are enforced capriciously and as a result, foreign businesses, already faced with requirements to sell large portions of hard currency to the state, ultimately find that they are unable to generate sufficient profit to justify their efforts. Many pull out.

The social safety net has, in the main, collapsed. A polluted environment, generally poor living conditions, and a dysfunctional health care system are fueling a five-year decline in population. In 1999, it fell by 0.5%. The birth rate is now well below the number required to simply maintain the population. Moreover, the declining fertility rate means that the population is aging as well. Fewer young people are entering the work force to support those who are retiring. While there is an influx of Russians from the New Independent States who are returning to Russia to avoid ethnic prejudice, the total growth trend remains negative.

Even more troubling is the worsening health of the population. The infant death rate is almost twice that of economically developed countries. According to the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences, only one fifth of all children born in Russia are healthy. Almost half of the men called for military service in the last 2 years could not pass physical training standards and one third were not fit for service at all. Nutrition is so poor that some Russian conscription authorities reportedly have established camps to nourish inductees back to health so they can serve.

For the military, this negative trend indicates a shrinking draft cohort in the years ahead. This is a significant change. For centuries, Russian political and military leaders enjoyed the luxury of vast human resources. What they lacked in technology or training, they could over-
come with sheer manpower. Now, manpower is no longer an inexhaustible resource.

The generally poor health of the population is confronted with even more severe health risks. Inadequate supplies of drugs and improper dosage regimes have allowed certain diseases such as tuberculosis to not only flourish, but to become drug resistant. Drug resistant tuberculosis is rampant among the prison population. HIV infection is rising. Due to substandard living conditions and remote locations, the next high-risk population could be the military.

Ecologically, the country is toxic. Dr. Murray Feshbach coined the term “Ecocide” to describe the problem. Years of industrial development with no regard for environmental concerns contaminated much of the ground water with heavy metals and even biological contamination. The conditions improve overall health and sustain it are eroding and will not regenerate any time soon.

The Russian military, in particular the Ground Forces, appear to have felt the negative effects of transition more than any other segment of society. To appreciate the extent of the turmoil facing Russian military leaders in 1992, consider the following. The Soviet Army began the 1990s with over 150 Motorized Rifle Divisions and 52 Tank Divisions (counting all three states of readiness). The new Russian state inherited the military forces stationed in Russia proper and in East Germany.

By the end of 1999, Russian ground forces numbered about 54 divisions, few at full strength. Russia had to withdraw forces to Russian territory proper, sort out ownership of equipment and weapons, and determine which officers would remain in the Russian armed forces while others took up positions in the new military forces coming into being on its border. Key installations such as the Baikonur space center no longer belong to Russia. Major weapons manufacturing complexes now lay beyond the borders. The 14th Army was stranded in the Russian enclave in the Transdnestr region of Moldova, where fighting between ethnic Russian citizens and Moldovans quickly broke out. Even the nuclear arsenal was scattered across four separate, independent countries: Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and the Russian Federation.

Russia was left to deal with the rump of a huge armed force that had in effect suffered heavy casualties. The Russian military needed to be rebuilt, and nobody knew that better than the Russian military leadership. However, there were other challenges to be dealt with first: among them, recovering the nuclear arsenal, and ensuring survival of the state. With the help of Cooperative Threat Reduction support from the U.S. as well as other states, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan became nuclear free countries. Warheads were returned to Russia for dismantling and demilitarization. Although complex, this task proved less trying than that of securing the integrity of Russia, for the collapse of the Soviet Union let loose numerous centrifugal forces bent on sending more parts of the empire spinning away from Moscow.

As the new independent states took shape around the periphery, regions within Russia began to press for independence. Chechnya, under the leadership of former Soviet General Dudayev, made its bid to break away from the Russian Federation. Initially, Russia sent in Interior Ministry troops, supported by the Army, and almost immediately became bogged down in a war heavy mechanized forces were ill suited to fight. Casualties were heavy on both sides, but the Russians clearly got the worst of it when they tried to take the Chechen capital, Grozny. Hundreds of soldiers died, and Russia accepted a settlement that gave Chechnya a greater autonomy that amounted to de facto independence.

The Chechnya humiliation, following so closely behind the disastrous Soviet campaign in Afghanistan, wrecked morale in the Russian military as it entered a period of neglect. Budgets were slashed, and allocations under those budgets were only fractions of the budgeted amounts. The defense budget dropped to less than 20 percent of what the Soviet Union allocated in the late 1980s. Military pay fell into arrears—soldiers, even senior officers, were years behind in receiving allowances.

The Russian military began a reduction in force and reorganization carried out largely by attrition as undermanned and cadre units were eliminated. The officer rank structure became skewed as junior and mid-level officers left. Accession of new officers lagged, and more importantly, the military was losing its experienced junior officers. Russian press articles claim that for the past three years 58,000 lieutenants joined the military while 50,000 lieutenants and captains were among the 120,000 officers that departed. While this suggests a total gain of 8,000 junior officers, in reality
it means that 70,000 field grade officers departed, and so did 50,000 of the officers that might have replaced them. Although impossible to quantify with the figures available in the press, it appears that the company-grade and lower field-grade officer cohort is growing less experienced.

Although meaningful reform during the 1990s was derailed by a crushing lack of resources, military planners nonetheless continued examining the future role of the military. Russia traditionally places great importance on defense doctrine as the master plan to organize, equip, and train its military force. Doctrine worked out in the 1920s laid the foundation for the deep striking, tank heavy forces that fought World War II and stood ready to drive west during the Cold War. But that force was not suited for the 21st Century. The adoption of a new military doctrine in 1998 began the process for redefining the role of Russia’s military and its transformation, although resources to implement the changes remained as lacking as ever.

The 1998 National Security Blueprint assessed that the likelihood of Russia engaging in a large-scale external war was low. Instead, regional conflicts along Russia’s periphery would be the most likely scenario for combat. The burden of maintaining Russia’s international military credibility would fall on its nuclear arsenal, much as it had in the 1950s. In short, nuclear deterrence became dominant, while the reduced conventional forces focused on the potential regional crises.

The current Chechen War seems to validate that assessment. It also demonstrates that the Ministry of Defense, while still bureaucratic and tradition bound, can learn from past experiences. While operations are heavy handed and casualty rates high, losses are nowhere near the levels experienced during the First Chechen War (1994-1996). Military leaders have made the most of an opportunity to atone for earlier miserable performance and reclaim some of their former professional pride.

Military operations in Chechnya since last year demonstrated operational flexibility that took into account the capabilities of the forces engaged, met critical time lines, and adapted to considerations not highlighted in past operations. For example, the tactics employed were better suited to the terrain and the type of military forces available. The initial strikes into Chechnya focused on the generally flat terrain to the north, where armored forces clearly had the advantage. Second, air power and extensive use of artillery were used to gain stand-off from the Chechens. Russian casualties were kept much lower than in the first campaign when the Chechens successfully closed with Russian forces. An unfortunate side effect of these tactics, though, was reflected in the significant suffering inflicted on the civilian population.

Planners realized that they could not train a large force to deal with the insurgents during the time available before Winter set in, so a fighting force was assembled from forces across the Russian Federation. Defense Ministry forces augmented Interior Ministry forces initially, and as the fighting intensified, control for the operation shifted to the Defense Ministry. Close interagency cooperation was maintained, and at the end, control went back to the Interior Ministry.

Russian planners took great pains to minimize military casualties, which appeared to be a major planning consideration. This is interesting as, historically, many Russian operations (Soviet and Tsarist) endured enormous casualties. It reflects a growing sensitivity to public opinion on the part of Russia’s political leadership. Great effort went into shaping the news accounts of the fighting and reporting the Russian casualties, as the leadership realized that public support for the campaign, so carefully nurtured this time around, would fade quickly if large numbers of soldiers were lost.

Domestic and international public opinion suddenly mattered to the leadership. While Russia is no stranger to propaganda operations, the second campaign demonstrated Moscow’s intent to deny the media victory that worked so significantly to the rebels’ advantage during the first campaign. As well, it highlighted the greater sensitivity to public opinion that currently exists within Russian government. While the sensitivity was largely due to presidential campaign considerations, it was nonetheless important since this pressure indicated nascent government accountability to the public.

What does this all mean for the future of Russia? More than 50 years after he first uttered them, Sir Winston Churchill’s words on Russia still ring true:

“I cannot forecast you the actions of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.”
The Putin Era began officially on May 7, 2000. Will he be able to avoid the mistakes of the Yeltsin Era? Little is known of Putin, the former KGB agent turned “savior.” During the election campaign, Putin himself steadfastly refused to comment on what he might do if elected. It became popular to compare him to the Soviet-era myth of the dedicated, capable, patriotic KGB agent, interested only in the good of the state. Like much that is Russian, Putin presents a dichotomy. He has cited the historical and current Russian penchant for a strong and paternalistic state. Yet he is said to favor market reforms—to a degree. He wrote, “We can count on a worthy future only if we manage to naturally combine the principles of a market economy and democracy with Russia's realities.” These “realities” mean that, while Russia may continue on the democratic, free market path, it probably will never become a political entity in the mold of the United States or Western Europe.

During the presidential campaign, Putin promised to establish a “dictatorship of law.” It remains now to see which is more important to President Putin: dictatorship or law. He moved quickly to centralize power and change the existing power structure. In an attempt to regain control of the 82 regions that comprise Russia today, he created seven large administrative districts and now must deal with challenges from the regional governors. Even when still the Acting President, he pursued a hard line regarding Chechnya and moved to limit the influence of the so-called “oligarchs,” the men who took control of major economic, communications, and media concerns and used them to as bases of power while removing so much of Russia’s capital overseas. He reestablished (former KGB) security oversight organizations that Yeltsin abolished from the military. He also announced a refined national defense doctrine. Under Putin, the freeze in military-to-military contacts with the U.S. and NATO that Yeltsin used to protest NATO action in Serbia began to thaw.

Nevertheless, the West is unsure of what a Putin administration will ultimately yield. Will he continue and advance the democratic and capitalist reforms, or could Russia be on the verge of seeing its recent democratic experiment slide back under the shadow of a totalitarian regime? The president of Russia’s URALMASH observed that “Reforms only happen when you can’t live without them.” Putin, at least, has signaled that he believes that Russia can’t live without them.

Russia once again faces a moment of truth. The new administration can be expected to take action on the vexing issues that so hindered earlier economic progress. Failure to achieve these immediate concerns will doom Russia to at best a continuance of its current status. It might get worse. But the future of Russia goes beyond these near-term solutions and ultimately hinges on what progress Russia can make on reversing ecological damage, restoring population health, providing adequate food for its population, and overcoming negative demographic trends. A land rich in resources but under-populated is at risk from neighbors with burgeoning populations. Russian leaders will need all their resourcefulness to adapt a plan within their current resources and capabilities, assemble their forces, and act. A decade has passed since the death of the Soviet Union. It’s now time to see the skeleton get up and walk.

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That there appears to be little chance for resolving the Kashmir dispute under the current conditions seems a foregone conclusion. There are too many players, too many divergent viewpoints, not enough outside leverage, and no real national interests for major powers to intervene. The Track II approach (using retired military and government officials to open dialogue) is hamstrung by an unwillingness of the Indian bureaucrats to give up their authority. At present, the Indian PIOs and NRIs and Pakistani Diaspora do not seem sufficiently motivated (when compared to the Israeli lobby) to strongly lobby their newly adopted governments (read spend lots of money) in the U.S., Canada, and the U.K. to get these governments more actively involved. The present killing and the potential nuclear holocaust of untold dead thousands (perhaps millions), of South Asians, means this essentially boils down to a humanitarian issue for outside actors.

A virtual “cottage industry” of analyses and commentaries has flourished during the 53 year-old Kashmir dispute. Regionally focused pundits have written countless articles about this dispute and conceived many proposals on how it might be resolved. It is certainly a great coincidence of statecraft history that the treatise “Danger In Kashmir,” written in 1966 by Joseph Korbel, (Secretary of State, Madeline Albright’s father) was one of the more prescient pieces on the subject. As the U.S. presidential visit to India and Pakistan set for late March 2000, approaches, Indian bureaucrats in and South Block (India’s Pentagon & Foggy Bottom), party hacks in the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), and its opposition, are coping with varying degrees of paranoia, questioning to what extent is the U.S. Secretary of State committed to “third party mediation” (read U.S. meddling). Again, this is clearly evident and heightening as one follows the major Indian dailies. The ever-suspicious and superstitious Brahmin leadership in Delhi undoubtedly is ruminating a version of mental “connect-a-dot” (Albright-Korbel-Kashmir) and now it must cope with the “down side” of the first U.S. presidential visit since Jimmy Carter, that is, the potential for greater U.S. regional interest and involvement in Kashmir. Indian strategy obviously is to make the focus of Clinton’s visit India’s economic potential (trade and technology, etc), as well as India’s democratic characteristics (let’s avoid the issue of good governance), while simultaneously downplaying the potential for nuclear irresponsibility. India’s Ministry of External Affairs must ensure that President Clinton, in his waning days in the Oval Office, does not attempt to force on Kashmir what he has tried to do in the Middle East, the Balkans, and Northern Ireland.

For most Indians, U.S. involvement in this dispute not only represents a threat in that it delays the inevitable (Pakistan’s complete loss of legitimacy on claims to Kashmir), but, moreover, it would give Pakistan its much dreamed of outside leverage. The “land for peace” recipe might work for the Middle East, however, this solution will not resonate well with the Indian elite who have always maintained that every inch of Kashmir belongs and will remain inside the Indian Union. Recent Indian press coverage of pronouncements by Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee go to even greater extremes by indicating New Delhi’s aim is to secure all of Kashmir, including “Pakistani Occupied Kashmir”. This hard line approach is not only meant for domestic consumption. By setting the Indian bargaining mark extremely high at first, India will appear to be making a major concession when it proffers the lesser measure
of transforming the LOC into the International Border (IB). Were this to happen, it would obviously cast a very different light on cross-border violations by the Pakistanis or their surrogates. India could then be justified to retaliate against Pakistani-led or Pak-supported incursions with greater resolution, perhaps even “hot pursuit”. Indian current strategy on the de facto border appears to be focused on semantics. Repeatedly using the term, “respect for the sanctity of the LOC”, is clearly an attempt to “morph” the LOC without Pakistan’s acquiescence into a “de jure” boundary. Use the word “sanctity” enough times and perhaps the rest of the world will start to repeat this mantra.

The Indians, however, have an amazing ability to withstand external pressures and to slow roll an unpleasant situation. After all, the Mughals and British came and went after a mere several centuries, and Hinduism still thrives and dominates South Asia. Slow roll they have done on Kashmir and will continue to do so despite Washington’s well meaning efforts or suggestions. The “No War-No Peace,” as Indian’s call the situation, immensely expensive imbroglio in Kashmir will be with South Asians for perhaps another 50 years, unless, of course, the U.S. deems the issue an important national interest to solve and U.S. interest in South Asia’s development becomes more than simply a passing sound bite. Until either of these happens, there is nothing in it for the major actors to change their current positions on Kashmir. The danger that India and Pakistan might, of course, solve the dispute through a Darwinistic event (all out conventional conflict), becomes likelier each day given the current dynamics: one side’s military dictatorship, stepped up provocations, one essentially “failed state,” intensifying Hindu nationalism, and lack of desire for rapprochement. Even J & K’s flamboyant Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah, during a public rally in his state not too long ago, suggested the “battle it out option” might be the only way. Indo-Pak relations are clearly at low ebb.

Recently, while escorting a high-ranking, very intelligent, Indian Army officer through George C. Marshall Hall at the National Defense University, I was reminded of the Indian view on South Asia. My guest, whom I have known for a few years, paused with great interest to examine the many U.S. Civil War exhibits, which focused on the defining aspect of the brother-on-brother conflict in U.S. history. My Hindu friend lamented that “if only the Hindus and Muslims had done the same in 1947” (i.e. “had gotten it over with,” the sub-continent would not be under the curse it is now under with the Kashmir dispute. My friend blamed India’s lack of fast progress on its having been preoccupied with Kashmir.

While Indian strategy is to “slow roll” the Kashmir issue, time is clearly not on Pakistan’s side as it faces the likely prospect of national Balkanization and further economic meltdown. The Pakistani strategy seems clear: increase the pressure through military operations along the LOC, re-ignite the instability in the Valley, and other areas, cause the Indians to either come to the bargaining table or force them to over-react, and raise the specter in Western minds that a nuclear exchange might inadvertently occur. Pakistan’s ultimate aim is to engage the UNSC, and/or the U.S., U.K. and perhaps even China in the issue.

Western analysts and strategic gamers have developed worst case scenarios in which events in Kashmir propel India and Pakistan across the “threshold” of limited conflict and into an unlimited conventional war with unknown aims. Indian reactions inadvertently hit Islamabad’s “nuclear tripwire.” The possibility of this scenario obviously weighs heavily in Pakistan’s favor. Islamabad leverages this fear (and the surrounding ambiguity) to enhance its national survival against Indian military adventurism. Recent U.S. administration officials’ statements to congress on C-Span tend to reinforce this fear. In open testimony, U.S. officials claim Kashmir is a “very short fuse that could ignite a nuclear exchange.”

The “64,000 dollar” question for all policy-makers who cover this issue is obviously, “how can Kashmir be solved?” What proposals could possibly result in Indian and Pakistan agreement? Not to mention, what can be done for the poor Kashmiris caught in the middle? Optimists (and there are a few) remain committed that, although it is an immense uphill battle, nevertheless, a “win-win” solution that cuts three ways (Indian-Pakistani-Kashmiri) is possible. There is no dearth of possible solutions, for example:

1. In December 1998, a Kashmir Study Group in consultation with Indians and Pakistanis came up with the “Livingston Proposal” which recommended a portion of the former state of Jammu and Kashmir be reconstituted as a sovereign entity without an international personality, enjoying free access to and from both India and Pakistan. The portion of the State to be so reconstituted shall be determined through an internationally supervised method to determine the wishes of the Kashmiri people on either side of the LOC. India and Pakistan would be responsible for defense and would work out financial arrangements for the Kashmiri entity. Kashmiris would be entitled to either Pakistani or Indian passports. This proposal gets complex and would require an amazing amount of cooperation between India and Pakistan, the likes if which have not been seen.
2. Then there is the long proposed plebiscite option on national self-determination for the Kashmiris. Kashmiris have three options: a. Independence, b. Pakistan, or c. India. Of course, this proposal flies in the face of Indian elites who assert that the Kashmiris have already made the choice in previous elections. In any case, New Delhi will not agree unless Pakistan stops its involvement.
3. There is the option of a final partition of Kashmir along the LOC, (i.e. turn the LOC into the legal International Border.) However, this course creates a winner and loser. India wins by holding on to the major chunk of Kashmir. What then does the Pak military do with its belief system that the premise for Pakistan was the “two nation-theory that has sustained it through the dark
days?"

4. Some have proposed a Northern Ireland style peace effort, which seeks to satisfy all parties by ensuring there is no clear winner. Again, this would require a radical shift in trust between India and Pakistan, and would more likely be “slow rolled” by India. In the wake of the Lahore bus diplomacy that was undercut by the Kargil surprise, no Indian politician can be seen negotiating with the “duplicitous” Pakistanis. Certainly no negotiations can take place with a military junta. As my Indian friends have asked me rhetorically, “whom can we negotiate with?”

5. Some assert that only parallel efforts by U.S., China, and Russia have the best chance of affecting Kashmir negotiations. An interesting idea, however the Chinese are in no position to push on Kashmir because of Tibet, Taiwan, and the fact that it also has to resolve its own territorial disputes with India. Is Russia in a position to push for state’s rights for self-determination (how about Chechnya?). Meanwhile, New Delhi elites, long paranoid over “U.S. ulterior designs” in South Asia, remain neurotic over U.S. meddling and have to spin the Clinton visit to their advantage. Focus on what the world’s most populous democracy can do as a responsible nation, and focus on great economic potential. Sign CTBT, perhaps? Make major concessions on Kashmir? Never!

If there is a bottom line in this complex dispute it is the obvious one that as long as the “zero-sum” construct prevails in the minds of the legalistic Hindus in Delhi and the Quixotic Muslims in Islamabad, there is no room for solution. Students of the Indian mindset grow weary of the reflexive chant of the “secularity” mantra, which cuts to the chase of India’s founding principle as a nation state. Those who have interacted frequently with Indian national strategists know there is a deep paranoia over what Indians term “fissiparous tendencies” (be they in Kashmir, Punjab, the North Eastern states, or Tamil Nadu), and a zealous belief among the entrenched Delhi bureaucrats and other elites that any softening on the issue of Kashmiri autonomy will only encourage known and potential irredentists. A Muslim Kashmiri state remaining in the Indian union proves India’s national concept and vindicates the wisdom of its founding fathers. The “centers of gravity” for India (a lawyer-rich environment, by the way) are a steadfast belief in the inviolability (sanctity) of the Instrument of Accession, and the belief that the ground rules set down by the departing British were “fair and square.”

For those who have had opportunities to talk with Pakistanis on the issue, the frustrating bi-polarity of the dispute is unavoidable. The Pakistanis cannot and will not come to terms with the contrariety and paradox of a Hindu Maharaja signing away the fate of the Muslim majority in 1947. The “two-nation” theory (that a Hindu majoritiy nation cannot or will not cater to the needs of a Muslim minority), and most importantly, Hindus and Muslims are two distinct peoples, are as sacrosanct for the Pakistanis as the theory of secularity is for Indians. For the Pakistanis, a peaceful and viable Muslim majority state in a Hindu nation is anathema to Pakistan’s raison d’etre. Pakistanis remain convinced that India’s founding fathers coerced the Instrument of Accession, that the Simla Agreement of 1972 committing the Pakistanis to bilateralism in resolving disputes with India was signed under duress, and that the Kashmiris have never been given the legal right to express their national druthers. While articulating in public that they would support an independent Kashmir, no right-minded, dyed-in-the wool Pakistani would give up on incorporation of Kashmir inside Pakistan because so doing would mean the eternal vision of a cohesive Muslim state in the Himalayas could not be obtained.

**Expected Utility Model**

It is instructive that when a high tech policy analysis tool such as the “Expected Utility Model” is used to try to come up with solutions to break the deadlock, discouraging results are shown which mirror my earlier assessments. Participants in this academic experiment identified most of the players (internal and external), their degree of interest, and their degree of influence in India, Pakistan, and Kashmir (Azad and Jammu & Kashmir). The baseline data was plugged into the model by Dr. Jacek Kugler of Claremont College, (a renown expert in using the Expected Utility Model as a policy negotiation tool). The following are the results:

- The central concern in the Kashmir debate focuses on levels of regional autonomy.
- With current policies in place, the crisis in Kashmir will linger. Disgruntled forces either in Pakistan’s Azad Kashmir or India’s Kashmir region will continue guerrilla actions. If and when these incursions take place, the anticipated reaction by India is a military clamp down on rebels – once more escalating this protracted conflict.
- The vicious cycle of conflict in Kashmir could be altered if the United States chose to play this pivotal role our analysis discloses that:
  * Indian leaders could reduce tensions in the region by substantially increasing Kashmir’s autonomy.
  * Indian leaders could produce a lasting peace by accepting Kashmir’s independence.

This is not a two way street. Any attempt by the U.S., by other foreign actors like China or by Pakistan to press for a solution that integrates Kashmir into Pakistan would fail.

The following expected utility brief provides a policy path for what can be done.
The policy outcomes on the Kashmir crisis were identified as follows:

0: Kashmir becomes a part of Pakistan and is fully integrated.
20: Kashmir becomes a part of Pakistan with low degree of autonomy.
45: Kashmir is a part of Pakistan with a relatively high degree of autonomy.
50: Kashmir exists as an independent nation-state.
55: Kashmir is a part of India with a relatively high degree of autonomy.
90: Kashmir remains a part of India with a relatively low degree of autonomy.
100: Kashmir is fully integrated into the Indian federation.

While there are numerous stakeholders that have slightly different positions on this issue, they can be classified into five clusters. The appendix lists all relevant policy stakeholders. These groups must be involved in any solution to the current impasse on the Kashmir:

- Indian groups
- Pakistani groups
- Kashmiri groups
- Azad Kashmiri groups
- International actors

In round one, which provides a situation assessment prior to analysis, the Indian position on Kashmir ranges from the status quo position to a tighter integration of Kashmir into India. While most groups, including Prime Minister Vajpayee, key Cabinet Ministers including the External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh, the Defense Minister, the Home Minister L.K. Advani, the Congress (I), and the Military, are satisfied with the status quo position, the ruling party's (BJP) coalition partners demand a closer integration of Kashmir into the Indian federation. At first glance, one would not expect that negotiation over the status of Kashmir would find support among Indian decision-makers. However, our analysis suggests that such an opportunity exists only if Jaswant Singh (External Affairs Minister) were persuaded to take the initiative.

In round one, Pakistan's main stakeholders advocate closer ties between Pakistan and Kashmir without Kashmir's formal accession to Pakistan. Most Pakistani policy makers including the Prime Minister/Gen. Musharraf, Military commanders, and the Pakistani National Security Council hold this position. Pakistani intelligence however, adopts a position that calls for a complete integration of Kashmir into Pakistan. As in the case of India, Pakistan’s position appears intransigent on Kashmir. Our analysis suggests that this perception is correct, only minor concessions will follow and no new Pakistani initiatives are likely to succeed.

Policy stakeholders within Kashmir itself are also divided. Kashmiri Hindus demand closer ties to the Indian federal government, while the Muslim groups, including religious leaders, call for Kashmir's independence. Likewise, Azad Kashmir within Pakistan is divided; the nominal Prime Minister advocates Kashmiri independence, while the Muslim population and the guerrilla groups demand the integration of Kashmir and Pakistan. Finally, the international community, including the US, EU, Russia, and the UK, support the current status quo while China is beginning to diverge, tilting toward advocating greater autonomy for Kashmir. Despite the constellation of foreign powers interested in the Kashmir crisis, their involvement level suggests that they are not likely to take the initiative. Rather, the international community will react to policy decisions by the regional and direct players in India, Pakistan or Kashmir.

Expected utility analysis of future projections (rounds 2-12) shows that under current conditions there will be no major negotiation efforts to resolve the Kashmir dispute. Pakistan’s leaders would like to see movement toward Kashmir’s independence but are unwilling to alter their current stance. Indian leaders will seek to restore order by discussing or allowing increased autonomy in Kashmir, but would reject any proposals that challenge Kashmir status within India. Similarly, the various factions within Kashmir continue to mirror Indian and Pakistani policy initiatives. The Hindu faction in Kashmir will accept added autonomy, but opposes any movement towards independence from India. Muslim factions advocate autonomy while the stronger groups in Azad Kashmir advocate annexation by Pakistan. The international community is flexible and will react positively to any incentive that increases autonomy for Kashmir. However, their potential influence is unlikely to materialize in offering specific proposals of their own.

In sum, under current conditions the Crisis in Kashmir is likely to linger. Disgruntled forces either in Pakistan’s Azad Kashmir or India’s Kashmir region are likely to continue guerrilla
actions. If and when they take place, the anticipated reaction by India is a military clampdown on rebels – once more escalating this protracted conflict. Without a major policy shift, a political solution is unlikely.

**POLICY PATH TO BREAK THE DEADLOCK**

Despite this grim prospect, the expected utility analysis identifies a policy strategy and option that, if implemented, could increase the stability in the region. There is an opportunity for India’s leaders to provide substantial autonomy that will settle the dispute. However, the likely outcome of such negotiations is independence for Kashmir.

The expected utility policy model identifies that India’s External Affairs Minister, Jaswant Singh, can play a critical role in a policy initiative. Singh is unaware of his opportunity to persuade India’s PM to change his position from minimal autonomy to a willingness to discuss full autonomy, and over time eventually the independence of Kashmir (move from 90 to 45 on the policy scale). Were Minister Singh aware of this option – through discussions with the United States - negotiations over the future of Kashmir can become productive.

In this scenario the very rapid convergence of all groups towards independence quickly becomes apparent. Kashmiri and Pakistani actors would be sufficiently encouraged by these proposals to abandon demands of annexation of Kashmir into Pakistan, shifting their support toward independence. More importantly, this initiative can change the fundamental nature of the Kashmir crisis. The expected utility analysis of conflict levels suggests that both Indian and Pakistani stakeholders would begin to view the Kashmir issue as less confrontational and move the issue to a negotiated policy framework.

Following such an initiative, beneficial bilateral negotiations are possible. The policy distance between India, Pakistan and Kashmir stakeholders would be reduced sufficiently to allow serious discussions. Details of the exact negotiations require additional information once they begin. However, the United States could play a pivotal role in adopting and supporting conversations on autonomy for Kashmir that do not exclude the option of independence. With the exception of Russia and Britain, the international community would also endorse this effort. However, the United States and regional groups can act quickly to avoid any semblance of a foreign imposed solution in Kashmir.

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*Ed. Note: this article was written prior to the March visit of President Clinton to India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Also, due to length and software constraints, I was forced to delete portions of the utility analysis model including two charts and a data summary. -DOS*
Since the beginning of U.S. involvement in the Middle East, we have recognized the strategic importance of Iran. It possesses a commanding position on the key Strait of Hormuz and has the longest coastline of any Gulf state. It has a larger population than all other Persian Gulf states combined and roughly the same GDP. It is also the second largest oil producer in OPEC. In addition to Persian Gulf concerns, the U.S. is trying to encourage development and democratization in the former Soviet Central Asian republics and wean them from the Russian orbit. These republics need an outlet to the sea to have any real growth. Of the two possible transit routes from Central Asia to the sea, one (Afghanistan) is not feasible due to civil war. That leaves only Iran as a viable route, forcing a difficult policy choice on the U.S.

This is a critical time in Iran's history. Reformist Muhammad Khatami was elected President in 1997 with 70% of the vote. In February 2000, his party won a sweeping majority in the Iranian parliament. Khatami has courted closer relations with the European powers and Arab states, while attempting to liberalize the strict Islamist regime. Ultimate power, however, remains in the hands of the un-elected Supreme Guide Ali Khomeini (the successor to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini) and his hard-line faction. They control not only the supreme political authority, but also the Revolutionary Guards, the strongest military arm in the country. The hard-liners oppose Khatami’s liberal moves. This has led to a struggle for power among the two factions, leaving Iran effectively with two different governments.

The battle for control has not been limited to elections. The hard-line establishment has imprisoned some of Khatami’s key supporters. Many others have been killed by unknown assailants most likely connected to the hard-liners. Reform-minded youth launched massive street demonstrations in the summer of 1999, the largest since the Revolution. The hard-liners fought back with a brutal crackdown and series of arrests. Although the momentum now seems on the side of the reformers, overall victory is by no means certain. We need only remember the pro-democracy demonstrations in Tianamen Square in 1989, when Western journalists were predicting the end of Chinese Communist oppression.

What is clear is that the stakes are high for U.S. and Arab interests in the Persian Gulf. Formulating an effective policy toward Iran is difficult for the United States. We have followed a policy of “Dual Containment” in the 1990s, meaning the isolation of both Iran and Iraq as pariah states. Meanwhile, our Arab Gulf allies are moving ahead with closer relations with Khatami’s government.

Arab Gulf States Policy toward Iran.

Security calculations dictate that the oil monarchies of the Persian Gulf cannot ignore relations with Iran. The power configuration in the Gulf has three sides to it. The two major powers are Iraq and Iraq. Even though those two countries have changed governments and ideologies many times, they have generally remained enemies. The third side in the power balance should be the Arab Gulf monarchies. The formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1980 as a reaction to the threat of Khomeini’s takeover of Iran was the most sincere effort to make these states a credible part of the power balance. Despite this, and massive investments in defense, the third side of this power system has never developed its own credible defense capability.

Given this situation, the Arab Gulf monarchies have accepted that they must use their economic power, ties to Western allies and diplomatic skill to balance the two major powers in the Gulf. Saudi Arabia’s $80 billion contribution to Iraq’s war against Iran was a piece of this strategy. This balancing system was relatively successful until Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The desperate calls for “regional” and “Arab” solutions to the crisis were attempts to hold onto the old system and not fall back on the last resort: a massive superpower intervention.

While the Arab Gulf monarchies certainly appreciate the American military commitment, they would prefer to return to the old system of balancing off Iran and Iraq and decrease the dependence on direct U.S. intervention. Improving ties with Iraq is not an option – Saddam remains firmly in place and as belligerent as ever. But the swing toward moderation and opening in Khatami’s Iran represents a viable choice. Since 1997, diplomatic exchanges between the GCC states and Khatami’s government have become quite common. Senior military envoys, including the Saudi and Iranian ministers of defense have participated conspicuously in those exchanges.

The Arab countries have been very careful in making these overtures. Just as Iran today effectively has two competing governments, it also has two militaries: the regular forces, with some allegiance to Khatami; and the more powerful Revolutionary Guards, fiercely loyal to the hard-liners. The Arab exchanges have all dealt with Khatami’s wing, and made clear their support and preference for his side.

The GCC states are not looking for a military alliance with Iran. What they are doing, however, is moving away from a “Dual Containment” policy, towards a “Single Containment” of Iraq. The United States, with its massive military and economic power, and global focus, can afford to isolate the two main powers in the Gulf. The GCC states cannot afford to cut themselves off from the rest of the Gulf region.
Challenges in Creating a Coherent U.S. Policy.

If American policy on Iran lacks focus it is not due to neglect. This issue has been studied and analyzed extensively in the academic and government worlds. There are, however, some genuinely conflicting concerns and challenges that confound any attempt at a bold U.S. approach to Iran. Some of these are discussed below:

Black Box View of International Relations. Our tendency to treat states as a uniform whole is a convenient shorthand we have all gotten conditioned to through the media. Unfortunately, this is counterproductive when dealing with a country that is undergoing an internal power struggle. Does “Iran” support terrorism? Does “Iran” export revolution? Some factions within Iran certainly do, while some do not. Which faction prevails may depend in part on policies that the major Western powers adopt. An ideal American foreign policy would selectively reward one faction while punishing the other. Unfortunately, the American voting public has been conditioned to expect a black-and-white answer: either Iran (in its entirety) is a terrorist state that must be isolated, or it is a friendly country that we should embrace. Any American politician advocating improved ties with any element in Iran will be branded “soft on terrorism.”

The Iranian Revolution Picture. The 1979 Islamic revolution created a vivid impression of Iranians as radically anti-Western. The death sentence against Salman Rushdie and the suicidal human wave assaults in the Iran-Iraq war did a lot to reinforce this picture. In reality, the 1979 revolution was a reaction against the Shah’s Westernization as much as the 1999 street clashes were a reaction against harsh Islamic rule. Ayatollah Khomeini’s version of Islamic rule was an innovation. Most senior Shi’ite figures disagreed with his concept. Although Khomeini was only the third ranking religious scholar in Iran in his day, he was the most outspoken opponent of the Shah. This propelled him to leadership in the revolution. During the revolution, Iranian voters went to the polls to mark ballots with two choices: Return of the Shah or Khomeini’s Islamic Republic. The fact that they chose the latter hardly meant universal acceptance of Khomeinism. After Khomeini’s death, the hard-liners had to dig much deeper to find a Shi’ite leader who would endorse his system of religious rule. The current Supreme Guide (Iran’s senior ruler) Ali Khamenei was a low-ranking religious figure who rose to the position primarily on his ties to the hard-line security apparatus.

An Unfamiliar System of Government. The Iranian system does not neatly fit into our categories of “democracy” or “dictatorship.” The elected offices, such as the president and the parliament have real power, unlike many Middle Eastern countries. Yet, most of the military, judicial, media and security systems belong to the un-elected Supreme Guide. Since such a system is so alien to us, many Americans tend to draw either of two incorrect conclusions. The first is that the recent election victories of February are an encouraging sign, and do not represent USCENTCOM or the U.S. Army.

Weakening Khatami’s Position. Both the U.S. and Khatami’s party realize that warm relations with the U.S. can be a liability for the reformers. Iranian society is very much in a state of flux. Bitterness toward the United States still lingers from the revolution among many. Also, most Iranians are wary of either extreme: that represented by Islamist radicalism or the Shah’s Westernization. In a speech this year, Khatami himself expressed opposition to a direct U.S. military presence in the Gulf. Instead, Khatami presents himself as a man of the center. He has emphasized ties with Europe and the Arab states more than with the U.S. Washington has also been very careful to express its desire for greater contacts in very modest terms.

Conflicting Signals from Tehran. Both hard-line and reformist factions in Iran realize they are sitting on a precarious situation and have to gauge their actions carefully. For example, Supreme Guide Ali Khamenei sounded a much more sympathetic and progressive tone when students were filling the streets in protest in July 1999 than he did two months later after winning back the streets and rounding up the demonstrators. In this divided government, “Iranian” policy is the net result of influences from both sides. Policy toward the United States is one of the most sensitive subjects. Therefore, we should not be surprised to see some Iranian officials proposing restoration of relations with the United States one day and other officials decrying the “Great Satan” the next.

Conclusion

The contrast between the Arab and American approaches to Iranian relations is not as stark as it may seem. We should not assume that the Gulf states’ overtures, or the overtures from our Western European allies toward Khatami’s government are going on without U.S. awareness and tacit approval. The GCC countries must move faster toward normalizing relations, while the U.S. must be more cautious and gradual. The gestures of cooperation between GCC leaders and Khatami contribute to U.S. interests in the region, as does American restraint in not boldly embracing the embattled Iranian president. This situation also benefits Khatami’s reformist party as well, since moving too fast toward the United States could backfire on them. The sweeping election victories of February are an encouraging sign, but the struggle for control is far from over.

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At the end of the Cold War, the multinational corps was seen as the future NATO formation of choice. The NATO strategy articulated at the London Summit of 1990 and the Rome Summit of 1991 acknowledged the changed European security environment in the wake of German unification. This new NATO strategy, it was hoped, would allow members of the Alliance to cash in on a peace dividend. Burden-sharing was to be finally achieved by matching the strengths and weaknesses of the different allied armies through multinational corps.

A united Germany had a particular interest in multinational formations. Such formations were a way to reassure its neighbors of its benign intentions. For some years already, LANDJUT, a corps-level formation involving British, Danish, and German forces had served as a model of the multinational corps. Since the mid-1980’s, Franco-German military cooperation revolved around the Franco-German Brigade. The next logical step was the formation of the EUROCORPS, to which French and German divisions in addition to the bi-national brigade were initially committed. The formation of a bi-national Dutch-German corps followed. The establishment of German-U.S. bi-national corps was, for Germany, a sensible next step toward the goal of reassuring neighbors.

In 1991, moreover, the Gulf War seemed to confirm that U.S.-led, multinational, high-intensity conventional operations would be the norm. In the summer following the war in Southwest Asia however, the breaking up of Yugoslavia gave the first indications that the future of war may be a little different. At the time, the United States viewed Yugoslavia as an opportunity for Europe to assume its role as an equal partner in its own security. Increasingly, though, that European opportunity became a European problem resulting in the United States taking the lead in trying to resolve the issue.

The U.S.-led negotiation of the Dayton accords led to the deployment of the Implementation Force, or IFOR. As time went, the implementation mission became one of stabilization and the Stabilization Force (SFOR) was born. This implied long-term commitment to peace support operations in the Balkans changed many of the original planning assumptions for multinational corps, the most significant being the primacy of conventional, high-intensity operations. Operation Allied Force and the deployment of NATO peacekeeping forces in Kosovo seemed to confirm this changed assumption.

The two German-U.S. bi-national corps are grounded in a ministerial-level agreement signed in January 1993, almost three years before the deployment of IFOR. This ministerial agreement limited the operations and, consequently, the training of the bi-national corps to NATO Article V, Central Region scenarios. The two German-U.S. bi-national corps were to be Alliance Main Defense Forces, restricted to training for and the conduct of conventional, high-intensity operations in Germany.

The Implementing Arrangement (IA), signed in February 1993, is the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM)-German Army Forces Command (GARFCOM) document that lays out the framework for achievement of the ministerial agreement goals. In the IA, for which the United States Army Europe (USAREUR) is the executive agent, the key issue is the establishment of the operational control (OPCON) relationship over the exchange divisions. The Technical Arrangement (TA) is the corps-level agreement that outlines the agreed modalities for the execution of the bi-national corps. Signed by the V (US) Corps and II. (GE) Korps commanding generals in June 1994, the TA designates the exchange divisions. For the United States, that division is the 1st Armored Division. “Old Ironsides” now had three employment options: with V Corps, the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), and what now became known as II. (GE/US) Korps.
In December 1995, when IFOR deployed, V Corps deployed as the U.S. national support element. In part because of 1AD’s habitual relationship with the ARRC, a British-led multinational corps, it was designated the major U.S. force contributor to the Implementation Force. The Bundeswehr (which encompasses Germany’s air, land, and naval forces), due to the extent of its force reductions and domestic political concerns, was required to task organize what in essence was an ad hoc unit. Today, although one division is designated a mounting headquarters for the German SFOR contingent and one for the KFOR contingent, both are drawn from units throughout the entire army of approximately 340,000 troops. II. (GE/US) Korps alternates the responsibility for the organization, training, deployment, and redeployment of these contingents with two other German national and bi-national corps.

In four years of operations in the Balkans, little has changed in terms of their basic parameters. What these four years have consistently shown is that the planning assumptions for the bi-national corps are no longer valid. The conventional high-intensity threat is reduced. Conversely, there is a significant increase in the number of other than conventional missions. Also, during recent operations over Yugoslavia, we have seen the impact of technology and uneven technological development among the allies.

Force structure changes, the impact of which have been highlighted by operations in the Balkans, have simultaneously contributed to the changed bi-national corps parameters. The two U.S. divisions in Europe each have now two brigades with the third and its corresponding support and service support units stationed in Ft. Riley, Kansas. Many units of the Bundeswehr are effectively cadred, which results in longer mobilization timelines for German units than in the past. For current operations at brigade-level and above, the organization is ad hoc to a significant degree. Also, German corps have no corps troops which allow a corps commander to shape the battlefield.

Doctrinal changes have also occurred since the early- and mid-1990’s. Civil military operations in the Bundeswehr used to focus almost exclusively on cooperation between civil and military authorities in Germany. Today, CIMIC is a response to domestic political exigencies in which the German army seeks to facilitate the speedy return of refugees to their country of origin. In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, the army’s civil-military operations assist in the construction of housing for returning refugees. The German army is also beginning to develop its own concept of deep operations. Though deep operations in the Bundeswehr differ slightly from what is understood in the U.S. Army, the concept is evolving in the absence of weapons systems and an information technology structure that can successfully support such operations. This represents a significant gap between doctrine and technological capability.

Perhaps the greatest difference that has become apparent between the two armies is that of perspective. The United States Army has a worldwide outlook, the focus of which can swiftly change from crisis to crisis around the globe. The European perspective of the German army has resulted in the retention of a force structure fundamentally designed for national territorial defense in a region no longer facing any great conventional threat. Overall, change in the Bundeswehr has been incremental. In each successive deployment to Cambodia, Somalia, and the Balkans, the role of the Bundeswehr has expanded. But, it has only done so gradually, incrementally, and only after much debate. One factor in the NATO debate over a ground invasion of Kosovo is the fact that, for the time being, German security policy has reached the limits of change.

The vast degree of change in the post-Cold War world has left little room and few resources for pursuing the good intentions of the bi-national corps. Since the agreements described above were signed, only two exercises have been conducted involving the US/GE and GE/US corps. The first was EX ROYAL DAGGER in 1996, a Canadian-led exercise in which the 33rd Separate Infantry Brigade, Illinois National Guard, provided a U.S. force to test the II. (GE/US) Korps combined field standard operating procedure. After its return from its first deployment to Bosnia-
Herzegovina, 1AD participated in the II. (GE/US) Korps EX STAUFER LION with a response cell. A third exercise was scheduled to take place in November 1999, but was cancelled. On the whole, then, efforts to pursue development of the two German-U.S. binational corps have been unsuccessful due not only to differences in doctrine and perspective but also because of the impact of current operations in the Balkans.

The future of the bi-national corps may be more promising if the changes that have occurred since 1993 are addressed in the applicable documents, beginning with the ministerial agreement. The new NATO strategy agreed at the Washington Summit last April can help. The broader spectrum of missions agreed to by the Alliance will provide a stronger German domestic political basis for changes in the Bundeswehr. New NATO missions will also allow the German army to better harmonize its perspective with that of the United States Army. Once those perspectives are better aligned, other doctrinal and force structure changes can also be addressed in the Implementing and Technical Arrangements.

NATO and, consequently, the member armies, should continue to plan for the worst case: Article V operations anywhere in its area. Planning for conventional, high-intensity operations should provide sufficient force structure for peace support, disaster relief, and humanitarian operations. Permitting the German-U.S. bi-national corps to train for and conduct other than conventional operations will result in an improved framework for the two corps. Harmonizing training along these lines, where possible, can reduce the number of training events for units of both nations. With time, deployment of integrated GE-U.S. bi-national formations for peace support operations may become practicable, thereby achieving the goal of meshing strengths and weaknesses among allies.

Revising agreements currently based on outdated assumptions will allow the two German-U.S. bi-national corps to reduce the burden of training for the myriad of missions post-Cold War NATO armies must be prepared to execute and can be tasked to conduct. The revision of the ministerial agreement and the Implementing and Technical Arrangements will further burden-sharing and better match strengths and weaknesses between the allies. Such a revision could earn the U.S. and German armies a little bit of the peace dividend hoped for almost a decade ago.

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In 1860 when French explorer Henry Mouhot landed at the confluence of four major rivers in Cambodia’s major trading port of Phnom Penh, he found a city of 10,000 inhabitants – almost all of whom were Cantonese. D.O. King, the first Englishman to write about Cambodia, confirmed Mouhot’s report, as did others. Chinese had in fact long dominated the buying and selling of goods in Cambodia, so much so that as early as 1693 the Khmer King at Oudong, north of Phnom Penh, issued an edict directing that one individual among the Chinese community be responsible for law and order among his compatriots. Merchant trade has thus been the primary focus of Chinese in Cambodia for centuries, and never more so than today.

Not far from the river bank where Mouhot would have disembarked is Duanhua Chinese Elementary School, corporately owned by the Chaozhou (or Teochiu) Chinese community in Phnom Penh but staffed with mainland Chinese teachers. Originally founded in 1914, and with a current enrollment of over 10,000 full-time students, it is believed to be the largest Chinese elementary school in the world. Several hundred meters north, closer to the river, is the Hokkien Association’s Minsheng Chinese School, originally build in 1927, closed from 1970 to 1999, newly re-opened complete with basketball court, computer lab, and tuition of just $30 per month. China gives scholarships to study in China to the brightest, and a university specifically for overseas Chinese in Fujian Province gives preferential tuition rates to Cambodian-Chinese. The boom in Chinese schools – there are now 69 with more than 50,000 students in a country with 11 million people, is fueled by a demand for staff to serve Chinese employers.

Mainland Chinese companies can now be found in every sector of the Cambodian economy. Thanks to extremely liberal immigration policies, Cambodia has become a Chinese version of moving out west. Chinese own, operate, or have designed and built garment factories, electric power plants, pharmaceutical factories, a state-of-the art cement factory, a sugar refinery, banks, hospitals, restaurants, hotels, and discos. Chinese engineering firms bid for Asian Development Bank road contracts and in the countryside Chinese technical assistance teams dig wells. Even the Triads, Chinese mafia from Macau and Hong Kong, have arrived.

You could be excused for not noticing the influx. Who would have thought the men in coveralls painting the lines down the middle of Mao Zedong Boulevard were from the Jilin Province Technical Cooperation Company? And when the Mercedes zoomed by on March 9, 1999, who knew that inside was CITIC and Polytechnologies Chairman Wang Jun, fresh from a meeting with Prime Minister Hun Sen to discuss a tax-free development zone in the port city of Sihanoukville? It was a banner headline in the local Chinese paper.

In November 1999, during a visit to Phnom Penh to discuss the $200 million loan package that China promised Cambodia last year, a Chinese Ministry of Trade representative referred to a 1996 trade agreement as a turning point in the trade relationship between the two countries. That agreement was signed in Beijing in July of 1996, but the real rush seems to have occurred since the factional fighting in July 1997 that saw Prime Minister Ranariddh and the Taipei Representative Office both invited to leave Cambodia. Ranariddh is back as the President of the National Assembly, but since 1997 Prime Minister Hun Sen has resolutely refused to allow any level of unofficial Taiwanese representation in Cambodia, thus creating the unique situation where the nearest
interests section for Taiwanese investors, who are in fact warmly welcomed in Cambodia, is in Vietnam’s Ho Chi Minh City.

China has rewarded Cambodia for its reinvigorated “one-China” policy with low-interest loans (the Chinese Embassy claims zero percent), economic assistance, some military assistance, and a steady stream of Chinese Governmental enterprises looking to invest their capital off-shore. Even Chinese hospitals, such as Hebei People’s Number Five Hospital, have opened for business in Cambodia with Chinese staff. Official assistance ranges from basketball and volleyball coaches to funding the construction of the new Senate, thus leading to the curious headline: "China Builds Democratic Institutions in Cambodia." Most of the governmental enterprises operating in Cambodia are from Hainan, Guangxi, Yunnan, Hebei, and Hubei. Cambodia has a consulate in Guangzhou to facilitate travel, and there are direct flights to and from China operated by both Cambodian and Chinese airlines.

Militarily, both sides appear to be treading softly, careful not to upset the balance of power in Southeast Asia too quickly. China would certainly benefit from another ASEAN-member ally of the magnitude of Burma. Cambodia has already come out publicly against expanding ASEAN to include East Timor. Access to the port at Sihanoukville on the Gulf of Thailand for the expanding Chinese navy would seem a reasonable goal for within the next five years. Thus far the defense relationship has consisted primarily of senior level visits. The Cambodian Co-Defense Ministers visited China in March 1999, and the Cambodian Joint Chiefs followed in October. The PLA’s most senior Logistics Commissar reciprocated with a November 1999 visit to Cambodia. The only announced result of those contacts has been $1.5 million for the re-construction of Cambodian army barracks and a donation of some miscellaneous equipment including 20 parachutes for Cambodia’s one parachute battalion. A small number of Cambodian officers have traveled to China for demining training, and other training opportunities are likely in the works. If Cambodia can allow its relationship with China to grow without upsetting its neighbors then it has nothing to lose. The economy is growing and the only price Cambodia has paid has been to allow China to openly promote Chinese culture among the resurgent 400,000 Cambodian-Chinese community who serve as modern-day compradors. You would expect no less from a new democracy struggling to recover from 30 years of war. The Chinese Embassy funds ethnic Chinese associations, the reconstruction of Chinese schools, teacher education, textbooks, and conferences in China. Chinese Government bodies inspect Chinese language education schools in Cambodia. A Cambodian Government television station broadcasts the news nightly in Mandarin, Cambodian political parties distributed leaflets in Chinese in the 1998 election, and a Chinese language newspaper publishes a wealth of information that enables analyses such as this. Cambodian politicians, the mayor of Phnom Penh in particular, openly court the Sino-Cambodian community.

The current China-Cambodia relationship is striking when contrasted with the United States-Cambodia relationship. Although there has been excellent cooperation on a tribunal to try Khmer Rouge leaders for genocide and on American efforts to locate the remains of servicemen missing in action from the Vietnam War, the American foreign aid budget for the year 2000 explicitly prohibits any US assistance to the Government of Cambodia, and even requires the Secretary of the Treasury to take active measures to prohibit international loans to Cambodia. The effect of this draconian measure can only be to drive Cambodia closer to the People’s Republic of China.

Central Market in Phnom Penh

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Quarterly Column

MIDDLE EAST REVIEWS

Reviews by LT Youssef H. Aboul-Enein (USNR)


Understanding both our NATO ally Turkey and much of the rest of the Middle-East requires a thorough grounding in the history of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman's ruled the Balkans, Mid-East and North Africa for 400 years and only after World War I did their empire shrink to the Anatolian plains of what is now modern Turkey. Much of the legal system of the Arab world and most military titles and structure have their roots in Ottoman Turkey. Even today many Arabs, Africans and Europeans have mixed emotions about Al-Dawlah-al-Uthmania. Sociologist Karen Barkley attempts to piece together the origins of Ottoman institutions and marries them to their origins as Cellalis, which the author translates this as ‘Bandits’, but I believe roving marauders is a more accurate description. The book is interesting because it offers a glimpse as to how the ruling class, Janissary Corps, peasants, ulama (religious body) and judges related to one another. She compares Ottoman governing methods to those of the French Republic after the Revolution. This allows the western mind to contrast and grasp key concepts.

Readers will learn of the taxation system and of the timar, a system that divided land among the conquered people and peasants. Short terms of judges (qadis) led to corruption and extortion in an effort to make the most of their position and increase their wealth. What is most fascinating are accounts of the Sultan negotiating with renegade bandits. Many might think the Commander of the Faithful would have eliminated such rabble, and, although that may have occurred at times, many of their leaders were given titles and positions and were converted to standing armies that harassed the Ottoman nemesis, the Safavid Dynasty in Persia.

Unlike the French Monarchy and First Republic that stirred class divisions in an effort to eliminate opposition, the Sultan held an open court and made efforts to have opponents beholden to him through the granting of not only titles but permission and religious legitimacy for conquest. Sadly, the book lacks details of the Ottoman Sultan's court, his relationship to his ministers, and does not delve into the important pillar of power in the empire, the religious body known as the Ulema. I would have liked more on the harsh treatment of non-Turks, a practice system that in later years made many Arabs feel like second-class citizens and led to the Arab revolts in World War I. Middle-East FAOs will nonetheless find this an interesting read, and devoting time to the study of the Ottoman system is always important in gaining a truer insight into the region.


FAOs wishing to understand the Turkish Republic and its modern history cannot do better than two quintessential books written by Lord Patrick Kinross. His first book, Ottoman Centuries, is a gripping and scholarly account of the rise and fall of the Ottoman Empire. His second book, the subject of this review, is about Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, a neglected figure as we celebrate the year 2000. Ataturk is a nom d' guerre meaning Father of the Turks. Ataturk's biography is a story of dictatorial powers used for the sole purpose of reforming and creating the modern state of Turkey. Even my Turkish acquaintances point to the books of Lord Kinross as the finest English versions of their history. The book's sixty short chapters highlight the education of Kemal as an officer and his service in the Balkan, North African and Gallipoli operations. He was a highly competent military officer and, when he became President of Turkey, showed a disdain for Mussolini as an actor in military clothing.

Ataturk's involvement with politics came early and although he was an obscure figure in the Young Turk Revolution he would begin a gradual rise during

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the aftermath of World War I. The author credits Ottoman Turkey's alliance with the Kaiser as a price paid for requesting German military advisors and equipment. Kemal realized that the Ottoman provinces were a drain on Turkey and began a quest to consolidate Turkish possessions around the Anatolia Plain (Asia Minor). His ruthlessness in eliminating opposition included ending the Sultanate, exiling Sultan Abd-al-Mejid to Switzerland, and declaring a new Republic in 1923. Assuming dictatorial power he began to reform Turkey's language, dress code, emancipation of women and laws. His dream was a Turkey sovereign and powerful, but he took great pains to reassure friend and foe that Ottoman territorial ambitions had ended. However, he would not give an inch on Turkey's current borders.

Ataturk died in November 1938 and he must be ranked among the most influential persons of the twentieth century. In the Middle-East he is either revered or despised, some hold him as a great reformer and others a destroyer of Islamic tradition in Turkey. Whatever your opinion, Lord Kinross’ book is required reading for Mid-East FAOs.


Derogy and Hesi first published this book in French before it was translated into English. Both wrote for the French magazine *L'Express* and covered conflicts in Israel for many years. The book highlights the more interesting operations and political gambits conducted by Aman (Israeli Armed Forces Intelligence Service), Mossad (Israel’s Secret Service) and the Israeli Defense Forces. These organizations did not have a glamorous start. The 1955 Lavon Affair, named after the Israeli Prime Minister Pinchas Lavon, describes how a young Israeli agent who was carrying explosives, had his pants catch fire in front of an Egyptian movie theater. This quite literally blew the lid off a plan to destabilize Egyptian President Nasser’s regime while the negotiations for the withdrawal of British Forces from the Suez Canal commenced. From there the author describes how Israel dealt with a proliferation of German rocket scientists working in Egypt to develop missile technology and delivery systems. An entire chapter deals with how the Mossad brought Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann to justice and how an Iraqi pilot was courted to fly his Russian MIG-21 jet fighter into Israeli hands. As terrorism began to increase, the authors discuss how Jordan’s King Hussein almost lost his throne to Palestinian radicals in September 1970. Israel would figure prominently in stemming this crisis which involved Syria sending hundreds of tanks into Jordanian territory to take advantage of the weakness of King Hussein.

The book also shows how events make for interesting bed-fellows. In 1970, Anwar Sadat took power and in one year his own head of intelligence and Minister of Interior would threaten his authority, even bugging his presidential palace and passing information to the Kremlin. The Israelis fearing that pro-Communist radicals might take over in Cairo and threaten their security, chose to provide Sadat with information leading to their arrest. *The Untold History of Israel* makes for interesting reading and at times takes on a quality of an Ian Fleming novel, proving once again that in the Mid-East, the truth is often stranger than fiction.

**WANTED, DEAD OR ALIVE!**

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Reviewed by Major Clayton H. Holt; 48I; currently attending the Japanese conversational course at the Defense Language Institute; CPTH@aol.com

PLA involvement in politics has been evident in every key political crisis since the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The roots of this political involvement can be found in the revolutionary origins of the relationship between the PLA and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) where revolutionary soldier and political revolutionary were one and the same. Even after the communist victory in China, the line between soldier and party continued to be blurred. Party membership among the PLA officer corps was universal. Military leaders concurrently held party and government positions at all levels, including the Central Committee and the Politburo. The extension of military responsibilities into non-military realms has surely undermined some traditionally-used mechanisms for civilian control.

So why, then, has the PLA not asserted itself over the party and taken the reins of government? Why, in the face of an event such as Tienanmen, where party control crumbled, the police were paralyzed, and the paramount leader resorted to extra-legal methods in order to bring the PLA to bear against the Chinese people, did the PLA choose to support the regime? Why would the PLA, which had seen it’s troop strength and budget slashed by 25 percent in the decade leading up to Tiananmen, tarnish its own reputation in order to save the regime and not take power by 25 percent in the decade leading up to Tiananmen, tarnish its own reputation in order to save the regime and not take power for itself?

In his book, *Gun Barrel Politics: Party-Army Relations in Mao’s China*, Fang Zhu offers compelling answers to these questions. He explains the relationship between the CCP and PLA using two models – the civil-military dualism model and the Maoist power triangle model. The former explains the symbiotic relationship between party and PLA, while the latter describes the interaction between PLA, party, and paramount leader. He then applies these models to six case studies in order to demonstrate the PLA’s intrinsic role in party politics and its propensity for involvement in political struggles during Mao’s reign.

The course of Fang Zhu’s argument is methodical and focuses on understanding how and why the PLA becomes involved in political struggles when abstaining might have appeared to be the better course, and what prevented the PLA leadership from capitalizing on these struggles to seize power over the state.

First, using the civil-military dualism model, Zhu explains the genesis of the PLA into a political entity through the penetration of the communist party into every institution in China. By doing so, the party allowed itself to be penetrated as well. Government and military elites were incorporated into the party committees at every level. Through this process, the military professional identity became second to an overriding party identity. These dual-role elites, in turn, guaranteed the supremacy of the party and resulted in the low differentiation that exists between party, PLA, and state. This dualistic system gave the military such a high stake in the status quo that it had little to gain in seeking to change the nature of the relationship, and conversely, had much to lose whenever political crises erupted.

Second, Zhu uses the power triangle model to help us understand the dynamic aspects of the PLA-party relationship. That political conflicts do arise in China attests to the fact that the party-army-state interpenetration is not perfect and that factions do exist.

Zhu describes the factional power structure of the regime as a triangle with two of the corners represented by military and party elites, respectively. The third corner (say, the apex) represents the paramount leader. He then assigns two rules to factional power disputes: (1) whenever two of the players form an alliance against the third, the majority prevail, and (2) In any conflict between two of the players, the third would be the main beneficiary. A third rule, unstated by Zhu, but implied later, is that by virtue of the dualistic nature of the relationships, no player has the option of remaining neutral.

If military involvement in party and state affairs afforded little excuse for neutrality, it also provided the PLA with legitimate reasons for airing political views and participating in factional disputes. Thus, in China, the notion of “military intervention” lacks the meaning that we in the West normally assign it.

If the PLA is so actively involved in the political system, why has it not, at one time or another, seized supreme power in China? Zhu’s answer is that the structural dualism that injects the military into the political process also serves to factionalize the PLA officer corps. Because military officers simultaneously hold civilian positions in the state and party bureaucracies, they tend to split along political and factional fault lines parallel to those that exist in the civilian sector. When disputes emerge, the PLA is often unable to present a united front in support of purely military interests unless the existence of the military itself is at stake.

Finally, Zhu demonstrates the utility of the civil-military dualism model and the Maoist power triangle model by applying them to six case studies in which the PLA played a pivotal role in intra-party disputes. These include the Gao-Rao incident of 1953, the Lushan crisis of 1959, the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s (divided into two sections – PLA support for, and later, PLA resistance to Mao Zedong’s program), the Lin Biao-Mao Zedong struggle, and the fall of the Gang of Four. These case studies represent three successes for the PLA and three defeats.

Zhu attributes all of the cases in which the PLA was defeated to the military’s position as one corner of the power triangle opposed by the other two. In cases where the PLA met with success, Zhu cites the power triangle dynamic as a contributing factor, but states that the primary reason for the military’s success rested on its ability to mobilize itself against a threat to its own existence. Here, the continuity of Zhu’s argument becomes
weak. While there is a link between PLA mobilization under a common threat and the dualism model, it was not a central part of Zhu’s argument at the outset.

Zhu’s dualism model is a modification of previous neotraditionalist and symbiosis models (see pages 5-14). His “new” model promised to explain what these previous models could not – but it did not. Instead, he resorts to corporate preservation as a “primary condition for the success...of the armed forces” (pg 237), which is nothing new in terms of explaining political mobilization.

Regardless of this single weakness, Fang Zhu provides an excellent description of the dynamics that take place within the realm of Chinese party-military relations. His analysis of the case studies is thorough and convincing, particularly when examined in terms of the power triangle model. His use of the civil-military dualism model, while not altogether convincing as an analytical tool distinct from the symbiosis model, does provide some welcome clarification and detail to Chinese party-military interpenetration.

One last compliment (and critique), is that I finished the book with a real desire to see his models applied to the events at Tiananmen. Regrettably, Fang Zhu stayed true to the title of the book and refrained from expanding his analysis beyond Mao’s lifetime to what may have been the most important civil-military/party-military event in PRC history. It is the only party-military struggle not represented in his case studies and, therefore, seems to leave the work incomplete.

Review of Accord 6 – Compromising on Autonomy: Mindanao in Transition.

Accord is one of a series of publications produced by the organization, Conciliation Resources (CR). CR states that it “serves as an international resource for local or national organizations pursuing peace or conflict prevention initiatives. Its principal objective is to support sustained practical activities of those working at the community and national levels to prevent or transform violent conflict into opportunities for social, political and economic development based on more just relationships.” Accord 6 is an excellent document that is available in full on the internet at http://www.c-r.org By downloading the journal and some of it hyperlinked material, one can have readily available a well written and quite extensive background primer on the situation currently facing the Philippine government in Mindanao.

Events in Mindanao over the last six months have cast it into the world spotlight. In response to increased military activities in the Southern Philippines on the part of the Philippine Armed Forces, the insurgent group Abu Sayyaf abducted two sets of hostages: one group on the island of Basilan, and the other from the resort island of Sipadan. The latter abduction included some ten foreign tourists, which caused the incident to gain immediate interna-

It covers all the insurgent groups operating in the southern Philippines from Muslim based organizations to the New People’s Army, the military arm of the Communist Party of the Philippines. The document is well organized, with brief but informative sections on the conflict’s background, history of Mindanao, and the influence of such organizations as the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) and ASEAN. There is an especially useful section that breaks down Mindanao’s civil society institutions based on their political orientation. It also includes a useful chronology, and a glossary of actors and organizations. It is rounded out by including the full text of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement and the 1996 Peace Agreement between the Philippine government and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). At the end, the authors have also added a fairly extensive reading list. Overall, an excellent publication, and best of all, free to those with internet access. Reviewed by LTC Steve Rundle

Administrative Note Get published! Just a short reminder that we are always looking for new material. I know that all you Asian FAO’s are out there reading in your areas of interest and are coming across much that I am sure would be of great interest to your fellow officers. I highly encourage you to send to me a short review so that we can share it with all. Send your material to LTC Steve Rundle, rundlesfour@msn.com
Career Field Designation – What It Means To FAOs

Although we have been in the transition period for OPMS XXI for quite awhile now, Career Field Designation (CFD) questions remain at the top of the list of inquiries we field. Based on that, I felt it was appropriate to spend some time here addressing the issue.

Facts

Under OPMS XXI, the new system for managing our officer corps to meet the needs of the XXIst century, all officers are Career Field Designated after selection for promotion to Major. The designation takes place as part of a follow-on board to the promotion board. Officers are designated into one of four career fields and will, normally, remain in that career field for the remainder of their careers serving in assignments relating to their Functional Area. Prior to the board, officers indicate their preference for CF designation via an Internet Web page. Personal choice, command recommendation, special skills/training and needs of the Army drive the final board decisions.

FAO Specifics

Those officers designated as Operations Support Career Field (OPS SPT CF), Functional Area 48 (FA 48 FAO) will serve in FAO assignments from that point on. There will be some number of “branch immaterial” assignments that will be filled by FA 48 officers. All CFs will do this. Serving in one of these positions will not negatively affect your career (as long as you do not receive a sub-standard OER). FAOs should, however, try to avoid consecutive assignments to immaterial positions. Seek out the hard jobs and be the best FAO you can. Do what makes you happy – just realize that the career decisions you make now will affect you years down the road.

OPS SPT CF FAOs will compete for promotion against other officers in OPS SPT CF. Senior Service College (SSC) seats will be allocated for each Functional Area based on its percentage of the population of eligible officers. That means OPS SPT FAOs will get dedicated seats and won’t be competing against OPS CF officers for selection. You can expect to see this begin with the release of the upcoming SSC list.

Up to 20% of a year group cohort of FAOs can be designated as OPS CF officers. Those officers will retain their FA48 designation but will compete for promotion, battalion/brigade command and SSC against other OPS CF officers – NOT OPS SPT CF FAOs. They can, but are not required to, serve in FAO positions. In any case, a prudent OPS CF FAO who wants to retain the possibility of switching to OPS SPT down the road should avoid “branch immaterial” positions and look for FAO assignments instead. OPS CF FAOs can seek re-designation into OPS SPT CF but needs of the Army and YG density will weigh heavily in that decision, especially by the time an officer is selected for promotion to O6.

FAO Generalities

The most important thing to remember is that the Army is in the transition period of moving into OPMS XXI. Each board yields issues and ideas on how to improve the process and effects. Understand that knowing the facts about CF designation is critical – DON’T RELY ON RUMOR. Keep informed, stay positive and work hard. Look for the hard jobs that are both personally and professionally rewarding. In that regard, the Army has not changed.

New Program Managers On Board

The rotation of Regional Program Managers is underway here at DAMO-SSF. LTC Rich Coon has already reported in and is getting settled into his position as the Asia Program Manager. By the time this gets to the field, LTC Ben Reed will also be coming on board as the Europe/Eurasia Program Manager. In the mean time, the other managers have been doubling up to cover the world. Finally, LTC Plummer will leave in August and LTC Grady will replace him as the Mid East/Africa Program Manager.

Keep In Touch

The best way to ensure the success and health of the FAO Program is for all of us to be “proponents.” Keep in touch with us here. Let us know your concerns and ideas.
(Continued from page 4)

about 1000 were injured. The Yugoslav government responded with tanks and armored personnel carriers, imposed a curfew, cut off telephone connections and established control points on all roads into Pristina. By mid-July, the Albanian unrest had spread to Montenegro and into Macedonia. Even Serbia proper had problems, with Albanian nationalists stirring up trouble in the communes of Bujanovac, Presevo (a familiar name?), and Medvedja in southern Serbia.

Arson, sabotage, and terrorism became a way of life in Kosovo. Ramet quotes sources that some 680 fires were attributed to arson. There were bombings in Pristina in 1982, nearly a year and a half after the first riots. A state of siege prevailed in Kosovo, with approximately 30,000 troops and police patrolling the streets. This revolt drove more Montenegrins and Serbs from the province, once again changing the demographics.

Then we have Milosevic’s visit to Kosovo in 1989 where he tells the Serbs he will protect them. We then have the Bush administration’s Christmas demarche to Yugoslavia, the breakup of Yugoslavia, the wars in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia. This is followed by the Dayton Peace Accords that do not discuss the Kosovo situation, increased terrorism in Kosovo – enough that Ambassador Gelbard declared the KLA a terrorist organization, Serb response – as in 1981, and then NATO.

When you follow the history you can see why Colonel Dougherty is concerned for NATO, or EUROCORPS, or whatever forces remain in Kosovo. The Albanian agenda is independence, have no doubt. At this time NATO has replaced the Serb as the occupier. If NATO continues to stand in the way of independence, NATO will become the enemy as well.

The international community failed to recognize the scope of the problem and now will face the consequences.

Doug Fraze is a Yugoslavia FAO who attended in-country training in 82-83. He later served as Yugo OB, Production Div for ODSCINT USAREUR in 84-85 and as J-5 Plans and Policy, Balkans Branch Chief 93-95 and Chief Balkans Task Force J-2 95. He was also an Advisor to Gen (ret) Galvin in 94 when he served as Ambassador at Large to evaluate the likelihood of success for the Federation Army in Bosnia. I can assure Doug and other authors that any misinterpretation of the article in question was not due to editing. While I frequently change the text of an article for reasons of syntax and length, I try never to change the meaning the author intends to communicate whether or not I agree with it. I did eliminate the footnotes in this letter, however, to shorten its length. Thanks for a provocative response on an important topic.
Please check out our new USMC International Affairs Officer Program website at [http://www.hqmc.usmc.mil/PP&O%20web.nsf](http://www.hqmc.usmc.mil/PP&O%20web.nsf). It is a work in progress and we welcome comments from USMC FAO/RAOs as well as anyone else in the Joint Services. In particular, the FAO/RAO Billet Listing/Re-designation is still being reworked with Manpower and Total Force Structure, but will hopefully resemble the shape in which it now appears under the Billet Lists and Availability page. As for billet availability, the IAOP Coordinator still has issues to settle before information on pending vacancies (particularly the US Defense Attaché System) may be displayed. Keep an eye out in the next few months to see some additions in this area. Additionally, please feel free to update PLU regarding political-military billets you may have filled in the past for which we do not currently have you recorded. It will assist in monitoring how effective the overall program has proven to be.

Returning from In-Country Training (ICT) this summer will be Maj Enney (Chile), Maj Bloesl (Thailand), Majors Sumer and Sachar (from internships in the Former Soviet Union), and Capt Drake (China). They will all be heading off to regionally appropriate commands and/or to their primary MOSs. We have also been receiving updates from those officers currently conducting ICT: Maj Collins conducting an internship in Moldova; Maj Palmer in Cairo, Egypt; Majors Dyson and Mauro in the Republic of Korea, and Maj Cunningham as our first FAO in Oman. Within the next 2-3 months we will also be sending Maj Nelson off to become our first FAO in Vietnam, Capt Perry as our first in Japan, and Capt Christopher as our first to attend the Baltic Defense College in Tartu, Estonia. Last but not least, Captains Moseley and Oppenheim depart for China to replace Capt Drake, and Maj Barnes will arrive in Garmisch, Germany for his advanced Russian studies. We have also cleared the way with approval on our NSDD-38 requests for those officers heading to Israel, Estonia, Japan, Vietnam (and for Maj Cunningham already in Oman).

On the experience-track side, we held a board at PLU, PP&O in April and added another 10 FAOs and 7 RAOs as experience-track International Affairs Officers. We hope to be able to formally utilize their regional and linguistic expertise in the near future. This last board brings the total number of officers in the USMC IAOP to just under 300 officers on active-duty. Manpower (MMOA-3, M&RA) is now receiving applications for the annual study-track board that is set to meet from 1-4 August. During this selection board 10 new FAOs and 8 new RAOs will be chosen to start the formally funded program in 2001. The three major ongoing projects in the IAOP are (1) the revision of MCO 1520.11D (the FAO/International Relations Officer Order), (2) the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between HQMC and DIA concerning USMC FAO's support structure during ICT, and (3) the Billet Re-designation.

All affected agencies/divisions have submitted their recommended modifications and the Marine Corps Order is now being staffed through PP&O for signature. It will hopefully be in publication before the end of the summer 2000. As for the MOA, at last contact with DIA there were still three embassies who had yet to respond with their comments. We are likewise shooting for the end of the summer to have that MOA signed by both PP&O, HQMC and DIA. The Billet Re-designation has been revised again in order to bring it more in line with Manpower and Total Force Structure's comments, and it will be sent back to them for review in June 2000.

BGen Cortez and the IAOP Coordinator flew to Monterey, CA in March to address the current study-track officers attending both the Naval Postgraduate School as well as the Defense Language Institute. Apart from conducting question and answer (Q&A) interviews with the FAO/RAOs, Maj Carroll was also given the opportunity to address the Middle East School II about living and working in North Africa as an "Arabic" FAO. The IAOP Coordinator likewise gave briefs on the USMC International Affairs Officer Program to the Amphibious Warfare School (AWS) on 7 April, to LtGen Klimp the Deputy Commandant of Manpower and Reserve Affairs (DC, M&RA) on 26 April, and the MAGTF Intelligence Officers Course (MIOC) on 17 May. Foreign Area Officers working in the Washington, DC area had a great opportunity to attend a luncheon given by the Foreign Area Officer Association on 13 April. The guest speaker, Ambassador Armitage, delivered an insightful talk regarding his vision of how FAOs can best benefit the Department of Defense, in particular, as well as the United States as a whole.

Finally, congratulations are in order for Col Ennis, an Intelligence Officer and 9942 (Former Soviet Union FAO) on his selection to Brigadier General. We also wish LtCol Leitheiser, our Western European Desk Officer "fair winds and following seas" as he departs PLU to command 5th Battalion, 10th Marines at Camp Lejeune, NC. As always, the Unified Commands and International Issues Branch (PLU), PP&O, HQMC is always available to take your comments; please see the FAO Proponent Page on the inside cover of the FAOA Journal for POC information.
Language is the cornerstone of the FAO

During the month of May, I traveled to St Petersburg, Russia, as one of the students of our office’s Language and Area Studies Immersion Program. Throughout the four week program, the students gained insight into Russian culture, advanced their knowledge of the region’s history and politics, and resided with a home stay family, to truly round out the experience at the personal level. Most importantly, every student benefited from speaking, reading, writing, and listening to the Russian language on a daily basis. There is absolutely no substitute for immersion training.

Despite this apparent fact, the government continues to fund programs and institutions that perform well at providing initial language training. Unfortunately, it falls woefully short of the mark for assisting advanced students in maintaining or enhancing their skills. We (specifically Air Force) need to break the old paradigm of “just-in-time” training for our “experts”. Training a linguist, or more specifically, training a Foreign Area Officer requires time, and a lot of it. Unlike other career fields, FAOs are not developed in a few weeks or even a few months, similar to our training for pilots, intelligence officers, or missileers.

The U.S. suffers from “chronic parochialism”. In short, we do not expose our youth to languages at an early age akin to our European allies. Apparently, “They’ll speak English” is the thought for the next millennium, despite the ever-shrinking globe, where language is vital in all areas, including science, technology, business, and increasingly, the arts. To break this unfortunate chain, we need to educate our young, but at our level, in the military, we need to “rethink” our training of language proficient officers.

As one senior Air Force officer stated, “the money you receive for your DLPT scores isn’t going
F. Y. I. — Service FAO POCs

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