Needed—A FAO Champion

Life After FAO—MPRI

Other Duties As Assigned

Loyalty and Integrity of the Indonesian Armed Forces

Central American FAO Conference

FAO Students Work with Russian Army

FAOA Vision Statement (Draft)
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PURPOSE: To publish a journal for disseminating professional knowledge and furnishing information that will promote understanding between U.S. regional specialists around the world and improve their effectiveness in advising decision-makers. It is intended to forge a closer bond between the active, reserve, and retired FAO communities.

SUBSCRIPTIONS / ASSOCIATION MEMBERSHIP: Subscription to the journal comes with membership in the association. Membership information may be obtained through FAOA, P.O. Box 710231, Herndon, VA 20171. The office telephone/fax number is (703) 913-1356. E-Mail address is: faoa@erols.com. For those only interested in subscribing, cost is $15.00/year and may be requested at the above address.

SUBMISSIONS: The Association is a totally voluntary enterprise. For the Journal to succeed, we need articles, letters to the editor, etc. Contributors should mail articles to the above address or to the FAO Proponent Office, ODCSOPS-DA (DAMO-SSF), Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20310-0400. Articles are subject to editing by the FAO Journal Staff, to ensure that space constraints of the publication are met.


ADDRESS CORRECTIONS: FAOA is a private organization. We rely on the membership to update their mailing addresses on a regular basis.
So, What’s a Geostrategic Scout?

I admit it, I'm a procrastinator. I tend to put things off, particularly my professional reading. However, while catching up a few months ago, I read an article in the Winter 1998-1999 issue of Parameters, the Army War College journal, that really punched my FAO button. What made it so disappointing was that it was by the commandant, Major General Bob Scales, one of the Army's senior leaders and a man I had hoped would know about the value of FAOs to the Army.

Instead, after noting that the FAO program used to provide a cadre of officers experienced "in NATO, as well as in the culture, economy, politics, and forces of other countries around the world..." he bemoaned the fact that "the Army had to curtail that program during the drawdown". True enough, although I know a lot of European FAOs are still around--many are in the Balkans right now--who might reply that reports of their absence have been exaggerated. What really bothered me, though, was the next paragraph:

Recent experience indicates a clear requirement for a cadre of officers whose skills and capabilities would transcend the norms of the Foreign Area Officer program....As in the FAO program, their skills would include language as well as cultural and historical understanding of one or more countries in a region. But they would set their sights much higher to include regional, geostrategic, and geopolitical matters, knowledge of key regional alliances; awareness of new and emerging technologies affecting the ability of the United States to lead or sustain a coalition; US capabilities in strategic communications, logistics, transportation, and sustainment; the interagency process that determines US involvement in peace support activities; and the international humanitarian support system, including the principal private volunteer and nongovernmental organizations through which most humanitarian and developmental work occurs. This list of capabilities is representative, not inclusive; it defines only part of the challenge facing each regional commander-in-chief every day.

These officers, or "geostrategic scouts" as General Scales calls them, "would be available to regional commanders-in-chief and commanders of combined and national joint task forces. They would assume the role of advisor to the task force commander in matters as important as those addressed by political advisors to regional or theater commanders. The reported proliferation of political advisors in the Balkans underscores the need for such officers."

My initial response was visceral--anger. After all, aren't the very skills he enumerates the foundation of what our FAOs learn and practice every day all around the world? As an attache, I had to know and practice all of them to be an effective member of my country team. My second response was frustration. If someone like the Commandant of the Army War College thinks FAOs lack these skills, what must other senior leaders think? However, my third response was to calm down and ask myself if perhaps he didn't have a valid point. My FAO training is now a decade and a half behind me, and my generation of FAOs has mostly retired. Maybe we aren't training and utilizing our young FAOs as well as we think.

So...what does the field think? Do FAOs lack the skills listed above or does our senior leadership have it wrong? Or is the problem simply one of poor utilization and a need for more FAOs? Send me your views (or articles in response) and I'll publish them either as separate articles or letters in From the Field.

One last note--should we change our motto from Strategic Scouts to Geostrategic Scouts?
WORLDWIDE FAO POSITIONS LIST

About a year or so ago, you published lists of current worldwide FAO positions (as they were known at that time). You did this for each AOC. I am wondering if there is any intent to publish those lists again or if they are currently available on your website. I have tried to locate them on the website, but have been unsuccessful. Thanks,

MAJ Rich Guffey, 48E

I just checked the FAOA website and the basic information is there under the heading of “Regional Information”. If you need to know the current status of each position, however, you should contact the FAO assignments folks at PERSCOM using the telephone numbers on the inside back cover of the Journal.

WAY TO GO, SUSAN

LTC(P) Susan Puska's "United States - China Perceptual Differences", FAO Journal September, 1999, was the most comprehensive, well-written treatise ever written on the subject. Bravo for an outstanding job! A copy of her article should be on the desk of every member and staffer of the Senate and House committees on foreign relations-- and a couple each at the CIA, DOS, NSC, and every university library.

Leon T. (Tim) Hunt
Colonel, USA (ret.)
South Asia FAO 1964-93
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I can’t agree more. Until just a few months ago, I was privileged to serve with Susan in the Office of the Deputy Undersecretary of the Army (International Affairs) where I observed daily just how much impact one individual FAO can have on the direction of U.S. foreign policy. For three years she was both the intellectual godfather and principal executor of the Army’s military relationship with the PLA. She left a few months ago, but the good news is that she’s now at the Army War college and in a position to mentor several generations of successors.

OSIS ARMY POC PHONE NUMBER

In the last issue of the FAO Journal there was an article entitled, “A New Tool for the FAO Rucksack,” by LTC Karl Prinslows on the Open Source Information System (OSIS). The Army point of contact to gain connectivity to this site was a Ms. Emma Covin, Ground Intelligence Support Activity (GISA), Fort Bragg, NC, but there was an incomplete phone number. Please send me the entire telephone number and an email address if possible so that I can utilize this asset.

CPT Darren E. Lynn

Using the FAOA website, I went to the Army Home Page and then to the Fort Bragg Home Page where I found the Ft Bragg post telephone book. Under the listings for the Ground Intelligence support Activity were listings for the Help Desk (comml: 910-396-8465) and Ops Section (910-396-6884). (DSN prefix is 263-XXXX). I’m sure either number will locate Ms Colvin.

FAOA LUNCHEON FEEDBACK

Thank you for the luncheon this past week (received 21 November—ed.) I enjoyed listening to LTG Hughes, but just as much, if not more, I enjoyed the conversation at our lunch table. Nice meeting old friends and FAOs. For me personally, it was a welcome break from the study of Danish verbs and prepositions! (I’m preparing to head out to be the Army Attaché in Denmark in May.) I would suggest for the follow-up luncheon in March a representative of a commercial firm that employees former active duty FAOs (MPRI, AB Technologies, or the firm in Texas that LTG Hughes mentioned in his remarks, Corporate Positioning, Inc). The guest speaker could talk to the ‘future for FAOs’ after active duty service. Again, sir, thanks for the luncheon, it was well organized and well received.

Mike Anderson, LTC, USA

Thank you, Mike, for coming, and congratulations on your new assignment in Copenhagen. After all, someone has to take the tough assignments. The Washington-area Board of Governors will meet in early January to set the date and agenda for the next luncheon and your suggestion will be considered then. In the meantime, please refer to the article on MPRI in this edition of the Journal to see what LTG (ret) Ed Soyster, also a former DIA Director, has to say about employing post-active duty FAOs.

EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT AD

I just received my September 1999 issue of your FAO Journal. On page 16 there is an advertisement for an executive assistant position and it cites Mr. John Moore as a contact for interested individuals. Unfortunately, there is no contact phone number or email address listed for him. Second, at least a couple of issues ago, the FAO Journal ran the very same ad. However, that time there was an Atlanta-based phone number for Mr. Moore. I called that number and spoke with a rather perplexed executive headhunter who did not know a “Mr. Moore”. Moreover, she told me the position advertised by the FAO Journal had already
From the Field

been offered through her office and formally accepted by a prospective employee around the May 1999 time frame. Therefore, I kindly ask that I be provided a way to contact Mr. Moore directly or that he be given my name and contact date so that I can find out more about the position he is once again advertising in the Journal. Thank you and keep up the good work! The Journal is a terrific source or relevant info about the FAO Community as well as key global issues that affect us all.

Gary F. Di Gesu
Rome, Italy

This one is a mystery to me also. The ad in September was already in the initial layout when I look over as editor last quarter. So I referred the matter to my predecessor, Joe Tullbane, now wintering in lovely Green Bay, WI, who replied as follows:

“Dave—No idea! I looked over some old issues of the Journal to try to jog my memory and remembered getting a phone call from the guy in question. I’m sure that he was also from that placement agency, but I’m afraid this is one that may have fallen through the cracks—he may have sent the ad initially through email and by the time we were able to advertise it, it could have been filled. I’m just not sure—sorry!

I’m sorry too, Gary, we’ll try to do better next time.

AND CONGRATS FROM JOE, TOO

In the same e-mail mentioned above, Joe also sent his take on the recent FAO luncheon:

“It is great that you had 65 show for the first get-together. It can only get better. Maybe next time I’ll be able to attend, too. You guys are clearly taking this to the next level. Regards, always.

Gillian Norton
Army Wife

Gillian Andrews Norton, 53, the spouse of Colonel Stephen Ross Norton, U.S. Army, Retired, died of breast cancer on September 11th at her home in Harbour Square, SW, Washington, DC. She returned to her home in Washington last summer after two years in Athens, Greece where her husband was the U.S. Defense Attaché at the American Embassy.

Mrs. Norton, a native of London, England, married her husband in 1972 and accompanied him on seven overseas postings, including diplomatic military attaché assignments at U.S. Embassies in Athens, Greece; Ankara, Turkey; and Nicosia, Cyprus. Fluent in Greek, Turkish, and French, Mrs. Norton was the epitome of an Army spouse who generously donated her time and efforts to the United States Government for 27 years, fifteen of which were spent in foreign countries where she excelled in representing the U.S. Department of Defense with the host countries’ military. Her extraordinary abilities and talents as a representative of the U.S. military and diplomatic hostess were specifically cited by the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and several U.S. Ambassadors.

Mrs. Norton willingly spent several years in areas with a high terrorist threat and was a model and mentor for younger military wives whose husbands were being assigned to the Defense Attaché System. Additionally, in Istanbul, Ankara, and Nicosia, Mrs. Norton taught English as a second language to foreign military and civilian students.

She graduated magna cum laude from George Washington University with a degree in Liberal Arts and was an honors graduate in Turkish from the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, California. In addition to being an accomplished linguist, Mrs. Norton was a teacher, artist, writer, and lover of opera. She is a past member of the Board of Directors of the Arts Club of Washington, former President of the American Women’s Club of Cyprus, a member of the Camerata of the Washington Opera, a member of the Army Wives’ Club of the Greater Washington Area, a parishioner in Saint Dominic’s Church, and an active member of the Ft. McNair Catholic congregation.

Her daughter, Stephanie Hazel Norton died in infancy in 1980. Survivors include her husband, Colonel Stephen R. Norton of Washington, DC; sister Rita Moore of Karmi, Cyprus; sister Maureen Ross of London, England; and hundreds of other relatives and friends in eleven countries.

What a great lady. Every FAO spouse contributes a minimum of 50 percent to the effectiveness of the FAO team, and some have contributed more. I hope everyone who reads this will take a moment to reflect on—and be moved by—this brief account of Gillian’s life. Our thoughts and prayers are with you, Steve.
I need to tell you how glad I am to be here today. It’s true I’ve never been a FAO; it’s also true that I’ve admired and supported people like you and the FAO program for years. More to the point, this gives me a chance to tell FAOs representing all of the services here today how grateful I am for their support to me over the years. It is truly great to look out and see an audience of real contributors to our nation.

You all represent a core of people in the military—a core of Foreign Military Specialists in all services, and because you are who you are, you would be so even without formal programs. I know that, but others don’t because you don’t have a champion—not even a Don Quixote. There are those who are careful to find people like you to do their bidding, to serve their purposes. And, they ask that of you without much real regard for who and what you are. They have little insight into the effort, time, and focus necessary to develop your talents, capabilities, languages and so on. I predict this will lead to a problem in the future.

Let’s look at the Army to begin with—the most mature of the FAO programs. The US Army has reduced in size by 29 percent in the last few years. It has reduced to the point where it cannot perform all the missions required of it. The Army’s Chief of Staff has opted to man the force to maximize its core competency—Warfighting—at 100 percent.

If you look at the 29 percent reduction and its impact—it reduced division strengths to 60 to 70 percent. And then consider the additional impact on the non-warfighting elements of restoring those divisions to 100 percent. You are in effect looking at an additional 30 to 40 percent reduction in the “rest of the Army.”

Those spaces will come from the TDA army, the sub-structures, the places where FAOs are found for the most part. It means fewer FAOs in the field as well. I predict this will happen without a champion to speak for you. The harm...
won’t be noticed until you are needed, and then it will be too late.

The other Services have been forced into developing FAO-like programs. Frankly, the Air Force and the Navy are lukewarm and basically paying lip service to the idea. There are some who care, and there are excellent FAOs in both services, but there is little structure to the programs as yet. The Marines have a good program but they are too few in number to make a real difference overall. There are many reasons for this situation, but primarily, like the Army, all of the services have been cutting back. For example, if you are a Surface Warfare Officer in the Navy and want to be a FAO at a time of constrained resources, you will be less likely to be a fulfilled FAO since there will be less overhead in the ashore Navy and more demand to fill surface warfare billets. The same idea holds true in the Air Force context.

This state of affairs is a tragedy for our government and someone needs to step forward—military or civilian—and be the advocate. With a good plan and some strong support there is, in my opinion, a 50 percent chance of keeping the FAO programs viable. Without that impetus I fear there may be little chance and the government will suffer a tragic loss.

A second part of the problem is that your function is badly misunderstood. This is odd, because the results of your work are highly valued. Every day, and in every crisis, our leadership depends on the expert knowledge and great experience of FAOs on the staffs, and on the FAO in the field who are often the difference between success and failure. FAOs ARE valued; the hard part is accepting that value is important enough to accept a shortage of personnel elsewhere so that FAOs can continue to do those things that ultimately are of greater value to the overall effort.

This is going to be a hard sell and the pressure to ignore FAO development will continue for several years due to the emphasis being placed on renewing the core competencies of the services. We will have talented people with language skills, cultural sensitivity, regional awareness and great enthusiasm who could be improving our international military-to-military relationships and providing unique insights to decision makers; instead, they may be painting rocks, washing tanks and training to do things they might have helped us to avoid.

I was at Yakima, Wash. the other day and it dawned on me that on 1 Dec we are to begin testing a Light Force. This is an idea whose time AGAIN has come. I don’t want to be critical but we’ve done that before—twice! Don’t misunderstand me, I support the Chief, but I also worry about approaches that say “take seventy and do one hundred’s worth of work”.

There is another aspect that is sad. You are above the average, you have skills and talents and vision that set you ahead of many of your peers. As a group you have made the contributions, achieved what you have achieved, because you are better than most. In some quarters you are disliked for that. This is an internal problem; again one that needs a champion to help influence service cultures and support you and your successes.

You know, some of you are entering a phase I call transition—it is not retirement, it IS a transition though. I find I have less time and more to do than before. For those of you in the same boat, there are lots of things to do in this area—you need to get politicized, get passionate, come up with solutions. Whether or not they are palatable is not important; getting them before the decision makers so they can make informed choices is. You can do this on active duty as well, but realize there are constraints imposed by your status. Together, transitional and active, you need as a group to build the brain trust and the plan to do this. You invited me here to give you my thoughts and I appreciate your confidence, but it is just so much hot air if the word doesn’t get out down to the ears and minds of those who can make a difference.

A caution though—don’t waste your energies.

The Army’s system is pretty good for FAOs but there are shortcomings. Promotions, assignments, lack of battalion command opportunity, these things probably won’t improve a lot; in fact, they are counter-cultural. It is hard to show the equity between battalion command and the responsibilities of a defense attache in a major country. I think they are equal on balance, but one cannot effectively make that case. Or look at the Air Force, you can be a fighter pilot or a FAO but not both—that’s short focused but won’t change. It’s a simple fact. We collectively have wasted our energies on those types of issues. GET PAST IT!— we can’t solve them! Your counsel should be “do the best you can, whatever the assignment and trust the system”, if you can change the system, go for it; if not, drive on. Forget trying to make FAO competitive with command, combat time and so forth—focus on professional capability, be heard and drive on—we’re not likely to change an old culture.

Education and training are not what they should be
either. The Army does give up the time for the training and preparation for FAO assignments, but none of the other services is doing what we’d all probably like to make it better. This too is a futile fight, there are no resources to make it better—your effort ought to be on keeping what we’ve got. There is no money and no time to get more. I don’t think it’s a good idea to go on a crusade to generate man-years of training for the FAO programs.

On utilization, at the early major point all FAOs are counseled to the effect that they are choosing a path that is inherently limiting; that is, you may be a colonel—probably should be a colonel—but the chances of being a general are slim to none. Further, there will be a low chance of getting branch qualifying assignments. By opting for FAO you have put yourself in a box under a new program. Your designation as FAO is primary, the old days of alternating assignments is gone, and repetitive FAO assignments will have an impact on your future. You will no longer be managed by the “hard skill” people in the combat arms or be evaluated by the standards of the “conventional Army”. These changes can be very good or very bad—this will be decided by the management and the Champion who will accord you the value you deserve. People no longer on active service can help. They can talk, politicize, advance the idea that fair treatment and fair rewards for honest labor are needed for this very necessary skill.

One last point, the environment—the operating climate. You may dispute me on this but you have your knowledge and I have my views. I have visited 126 countries—in the course of the last four years I’ve been to 85. I visited offices, attended parties and functions, and sometimes I was able to get out and get some of the grit. I think it’s getting more difficult in these post-colonial times. In the aftermath of World War II the attitudes toward the military, towards attaches was positive and accommodating and in many cases exceptional. Life was nice, pleasant, you had good houses, excellent staff and adequate support—perhaps the best you will ever have had. Today, things are going downhill, the houses are old, the support is minimal to inadequate and the environment has changed. Your hosts have changed too. It’s not that they hate us, but many don’t like us very much. It’s not necessarily a violent reaction; to our faces they treat us well. But behind our backs there is a cynical approach to the power of the US in many places. This sort of change is a trend that I think will continue. We have not yet identified all the issues we cannot control. Work can—and will—still be done but it will be under less hospitable circumstances, and probably less fun.

Now let me close with some comments on the FAO Association. I am not a member, but I’m joining today and I want to remain a member. I owe many of you a great deal for making sacrifices to do your job. This is not generosity on my part. I’m honored to be one of you in this Association. I note you have 900 members, you could have two or three thousand and that many could be a force and a forum of champions to help encourage the various departments of government to sustain your efforts. Start with this lunch—on—it should be quarterly. The Journal is excellent, lots of good info and thoughts for helping you to do good work.

However, to be a force for change you need to reorganize a little and become proactive. Those of you who are no longer on active service are unconstrained, unfettered, and you can do things for the association that active members cannot do. Think of the “Transitionals” as tools for the active military, tools that can help you achieve your goals. The Association can be your champion if you make it so.
This is the first in a series of occasional pieces dealing with companies in the Washington DC area that recruit and hire FAOs. My intention is not to promote or recommend any company profiled, merely to highlight opportunities that might exist for FAOs reaching the end of their active duty careers.

Company Profile

MPRI bills itself as a professional services company engaged in military-related contracting in the U.S. and international defense markets. Founded in 1987, its present Board of Directors is a veritable who's-who of prominent, recently retired senior military leaders. They are mainly Army and include two Chiefs of Staff; a Vice Chief; commanders of TRADOC, SOCOM, and CENTCOM; a U.S. Military Representative to NATO; and a TIG. Other services are well represented, however, by former Assistant Commandants of the Marine Corps and a four-star Navy Admiral. General (USA-retired) Carl Vuono is the President and Chief Executive Officer.

The company is lean, with only 500 full time employees, but it maintains a database of approximately 9000 retired and former-retired officers and NCOs that it uses to identify personnel to fill newly contracted positions. It recruits primarily from the upper level of former military professionals and its size expands and decreases based solely on the number, type, and duration of its contracts. Currently it is executing approximately thirty contracts worth an estimated $90 million. Of these, more than half are domestic and the remainder are international. Each of the international contracts that is directly with a foreign government have been properly licensed by the U.S. Department of State. Others are contracts with the U.S. Government for programs overseas.

MPRI advertises a business philosophy that is remarkably similar to the values of military service. Its stated goals are to provide customers with what they want on time and on budget, to "deal from the top of the deck" in all business relationships, honor all verbal and written commitments, place performance ahead of profit, tailor projects to optimize results and "add value", recruit from the top quality level, and take special care to look after employees and shareholders. Its stated principles are honesty and integrity in all things, professionalism at all levels, seamless operation between corporate headquarters and project teams, class performance without extravagance, and mutual support within the MPRI family. Their motto is, "our integrity is our most treasured asset."

While MPRI advertises an extensive list of technical military skills and capabilities, those that appear to be of most interest to FAOs include the following: providing subject matter experts, simulations and wargaming, humanitarian assistance activities, doctrinal development, democracy transition assistance, special operations, security assistance, anti-terrorism, counter-narcotics programs, military intelligence training, and studies, analyses, assessments, and evaluations.

Interview with Company Officials

Since the information above was gleaned from the company's website (www.mpri.com), I wanted to get a "feel" for the company so I arranged to meet with its Vice President for International Operations, LTG (ret) Harry E. (Ed) Soyster. General Soyster, an Army field artilleryman, spent most of his general officer time in military intelligence as Deputy Assistant Chief of staff (Intelligence), Commanding general of the Intelligence and Security command (INSCOM), and, finally, as Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency during Operations JUST CAUSE AND DESERT SHIELD/STORM. He retired from active duty in 1992 to become Director of MPRI's Washington Operations and became a Vice President in 1995.
Since he was once one of the Army's (and DOD's) principal consumers of FAO skills, I asked what his experience had been in hiring and utilizing them in private industry. He replied immediately that "FAOs bring expertise to the table that no one else has." While cautioning that MPRI generally hires people more for their functional military skills than their FAO background because it must meet certain, often very specific requirements in the contract demanded by the client, he stressed that FAOs, whenever hired, invariably brought an extra dimension to the job that more traditional officers tend not to have. While most FAOs have language skills, he explained, their real value to the company in its overseas operations is rooted in their sensitivity to local culture and group dynamics. Because of this, they tend to have more patience and understanding, and are therefore more successful in training foreign military personnel and in adapting to overseas environments. LTC (ret) Dom Mullori, the company's Vice President for Business Development and a former Middle East FAO himself, quickly agreed, noting that "Guys who don't do well in the field, generally lack FAO skills."

Of course, the general laughed, sometimes being a FAO can also be an impediment. In the early 1990s when Croatia was regrouping after the disintegration of Yugoslavia, a high-ranking official from the Ministry of Defense came to MPRI for assistance in setting up its armed forces. "Look", he said, "we want to join NATO or the Partnership for Peace and know that we need to look more like the other members with a military subordinate to elected leaders. But we're a bunch of Communists and don't know how to do that. Can you help?" The first thing that occurred to me after that meeting, Soyster said, was that we needed to get some Serbo-Croat speakers to run this effort, so I called on a former East Europe FAO and DATT in Belgrade and asked him to help. We didn't get very far down the road in planning before the Croatian official, with a certain degree of reluctance, took me aside and said that he didn't really want that individual involved. It seemed his family background was at issue—he was a SERB! And this fact alone was more important to the Croatians than his language skills, regional expertise, or American citizenship. So we ended up hiring mostly non-FAOs to do the training, former brigade commanders steeped in democratic traditions who were superb trainers. "Now, four years later, the Croats are running the Democracy Transition/Long Range Management Program and we (MPRI) are working on long range projects like PPBES."

**International Opportunities**

Still, there is great need for FAOs in the company as long as they also bring hard military skills to the table. The general next outlined MPRI's extensive international presence:

-- Croatia. The Democracy Transition Assistance Program (DTAP) began in 1994 as an effort to assist the Croatian Ministry of Defense and its armed forces in enhancing military education and training programs, establish a professional non-commissioned officer corps, and implement a military personnel management program. These have now been fully institutionalized and DTAP has transitioned into a program that addresses broader issues of force readiness and training. Building on this success, a second program, the Croatian Armed Forces Readiness and Training System (CARTS), focuses on force readiness reporting, command and staff training at all levels, enhanced training management, and continued progress in personnel management designed to reflect western military doctrine and NATO compatibility. A third program, the Democracy Transition/Long Range Management Program (DT/LRMP) began in 1995 and aims to redesign, realign, and reorganize the entire Croatian defense establishment.

-- Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following the 1995 Dayton Accords, MPRI deployed 200 contractor personnel to Bosnia-Herzegovina to "train and equip" the new Federation Armed Forces in order to provide the capability to deter armed aggression from the Republika Srpska. Though somewhat reduced in scope, MPRI continues to provide personnel to advise in areas such as individual and unit training and NCO professionalism. Additionally, it developed and assists in running a fully operational Combat Training Center and Combat Simulation Center.

-- Macedonia. Since late 1998, MPRI has undertaken
a Stability and Deterrence Program aimed at developing a self-sufficient and professional Macedonian military force capable of guarding the state's borders, defending its territory, maintaining a credible deterrent, and being compatible with NATO forces.

-- Saudi Arabia. Following a four-day National Force Management Symposium presented in October 1998 to senior leaders of the Saudi Arabian Armed Forces, the company received a contract to assist the U.S. Military Training Mission in developing a force management capability within the Royal Saudi Land Forces. MPRI contractors coach RSLF personnel in developing strategies to implement the six pillars of force management (doctrine, training, force structure, equipment and logistics, personnel management, and leader development).

-- Taiwan. In a subcontract with GTE, MPRI provides a fourteen-man team of trainers with functional and language skills to train Taiwanese Army personnel in the operation of their newly purchased improved mobile subscriber equipment (IMSE).

-- Humanitarian Assistance in the Newly Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet Union. Beginning in 1992, MPRI supervised the collection and distribution of $549.3 million of food, medicine, and clothing to 1623 organizations in all twelve of the NIS. Although the program terminated in 1996, MPRI has maintained its capability to undertake future similar missions.

-- Africa Programs. Working with USSOCOM, MPRI currently provides command and staff training to six African states participating in the Africa Crisis Reaction Initiative (ACRI). A highly skilled, French-speaking ten-man team is conducting this training at battalion, brigade, and joint task force. The company is also in the process of recruiting faculty for a newly approved African educational institution funded by DOD and patterned after the George C. Marshall Center in Germany.

-- Other Worldwide Programs. In 1997, MPRI was awarded a five-year subcontract from DynCorp Aerospace Technology to develop and publish a comprehensive Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) Worldwide Management and Staffing Plan. This program will provide the basis civilian augmentation and construction and base operation support for contingency military forces deployed anywhere in the world for 180 days or longer. The company has also developed (and conducted twelve) a Senior Leadership Seminar Program, a three-to-five day seminar/workshop taught by the company's three and four-star employees specifically designed for senior civilian and military defense officials around the world. Each seminar is country-specific and intended to provide useful knowledge, build leader competence and confidence, and promote group dynamics, synergism, and cohesiveness in a nation's senior military leadership. Subjects taught include such topics as civilian-military leadership in a democracy, defense organization and

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planning, decision-making for senior leaders, PPBES, training, and logistics.

**Contract Attaches**

Perhaps the MPRI project that has engendered the most recent interest in the FAO community is the notion of placing contracted attaches throughout the Defense Attache System. This idea originated at the 1998 worldwide Defense Attache conference hosted by the Defense Humint Service. It would be similar to a recently initiated MPRI government contract to provide contractor Assistant Professors of Military Science to the ROTC Cadet Command at TRADOC. Despite being civilian contractors, these individuals will serve as uniformed members of each school’s ROTC department. Should there be any difficulty in an individual contractor meeting service fitness standards or failing to perform their military duties satisfactorily, MPRI has pledged to remove them immediately and replace them expeditiously.

To prove the concept for attaches, MPRI recruited and placed three retired Operations Coordinators as “administrative assistants” in Defense Attache Offices in Singapore, Stockholm, and Ankara for a period of nine months. The program is scheduled to terminate in December 1999. By all accounts, it has been judged to be a resounding success. However, since government rules preclude civilian contractors from supervising DOD employees or disbursing government funds, the retired OPSCOs could not be placed in actual OPSCO billets, hence their title of administrative assistant. Since the same rules would apply for contracted attaches, supervision of assistant attaches and other DOD personnel falling under the normal supervision of an attache would have to be worked out.

Despite the success of this program and the severe shortage of O-6 FAOs in many regional specialties, it appears that DIA has elected not to pursue the idea further. Citing heavy financial costs in place civilian contractors abroad, DIA instead seems to be leaning toward the idea of using reserve FAOs and a few "limited term" GS appointments to fill attaché shortages. These limited term appointments would be of two years duration with the possibility of one but not more than two one-year extensions. DHS is planning to evaluate this concept in 2001, and in 2002-2007, assuming sufficient money and personnel spaces are available, a combination of reservists/limited term attaches and contractor OPSCOs will be considered. After 2007, OPMS XXI should have created sufficient O-6 FAOs to fill at least the Army’s attaché requirements. Opining that “something new is always difficult for government to implement,” General Soyster believes DIA’s reluctance to adopt the contractor attaché concept is rooted in the representational function of an attaché in the field—can a civilian actually represent the United States government abroad? Many in DOD think not.

**Final Observations**

Despite its "military" culture and impressive roster of senior officers, MPRI seems to be a fairly informal place to work. The atmosphere is one of casual informality and collegial interaction among people who have proven themselves in peace and war. At one point during my interview, General Soyster took a call and excused himself for a few minutes. When he returned, he explained proudly that the call had been from another company looking for a person to fill another contract, and that he had sent them the name of a retired officer whom he knew. MPRI had nothing for him at that particular time, but was happy to help him get a job with a competitor.

Later, former CSA GEN (ret) Carl Vuono stuck his head in the door to ask General Soyster a question and to banter with others in the room. Since he had been the Army DCSOPS when I was a young action officer on his staff, I introduced myself and he graciously pretended to remember me. Afterward, another person in the room laughed and talked about working for him: "If Carl Vuono was shipwrecked on a desert island with two other people," he quipped, "he would have everything so organized that within 48 hours he..."
The Foreign Area Officer is a force multiplier for the battlefield commander. This was certainly true of FAOs who served in Operations Desert Shield/Storm, and it is true today for FAOs who serve in Bosnia, Macedonia, and Kosovo. But what about during peacetime operations? Can a FAO be a force multiplier when there is no war? We think of FAOs performing major functional duties such as attache, security assistance officer, and political-military officer. But FAOs are often tasked to perform "other duties as assigned" - missions not found in a standard job description.

The purpose of this article is to discuss two "other duties" where FAOs put their area expertise to the test in accomplishing missions where there was little advanced warning and no formal course of instruction. The first mission was the evacuation of Kurds from northern Iraq in 1996; the second was the rescue and relief operations conducted during Turkey's August 1999 earthquake.

In the fall of 1996 when Saddam Hussein stepped up military ground operations in northern Iraq, a political decision was made by the Clinton Administration to relocate Iraqi opposition groups and Iraqi Kurds who had worked for the United States Government (U.S.G). Over a three month period, Operation Quick Transit moved over 6,700 men, women, and children from northern Iraq, through Turkey, to Guam for eventual resettlement in the U.S. The U.S. Ambassador to Turkey was tasked to oversee and coordinate this massive effort involving the State Department, U.S. military elements, and non-governmental organizations (NGO). Among the many players were three FAOs, with over 20 years of experience in Turkey between them, the Army Attache, the Political-Military Officer (PMO) for the Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) Turkey, and a retired FAO assigned to the Embassy.

Quick Transit took place at a time when the GOT was simultaneously conducting military operations against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a Marxist terrorist organization, and politically engaging the leaders of the Iraqi Kurdish opposition groups. This put the FAO at the border in the middle of an extremely volatile situation. As the senior representative of the U.S.G, he was required to cross the border into northern Iraq to meet Iraqi opposition leaders and NGO representatives to coordinate personnel evacuation lists, security requirements, and border crossing procedures. This required extremely close coordination with the regional “super-governor” and the Jandarma and Army commanders. Since Habur Gate is located in an area under martial law, the GOT appointed as its representative an official with broad powers and responsibilities to oversee the political-military operations in areas encompassing more than one province, hence the super-governor. He worked closely with the military commanders, especially the Jandarma, in executing his mission. The Jandarma is a paramilitary organization under the control of the Ministry of the Interior, except in times of war and national emergency when it comes under the operational control of the Turkish General Staff, as is the case in southeastern Turkey. In every sense of the word, the Army Attache was a strategic scout at the tip of the spear.

ODC Turkey's PMO worked closely with the Embassy's Political-Military Affairs Counselor to establish, man, and operate the Emergency Action Center (EOC), the embassy's communications link with the Army Attache and other downrange personnel, and with the National Security Council, State Department, Joint Staff, U.S. European Command (EUCOM), UN agencies, Turkish General Staff (TGS), and Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). The retired FAO, who had also served in Turkey as the Army Attache, was invaluable in coordinating actions with TGS and MFA concerning air transport, personnel/equipment access clearances, and high level GOT decisions affecting mission accomplishment.

It was the responsibility of the Ankara team to ensure that all U.S. higher headquarters, as well as TGS and MFA, were aware of current operations. A major challenge came in the form of aircraft size and runway capabilities, requiring a total change in the evacuation plan. Unless a
FAO is a pilot, he/she usually knows little (and cares less) about runway requirements for 747s and the amount of runway damage caused in landings and takeoffs. FAOs in Turkey learned more than they ever cared to in the proper construction and placement of back-blast barriers!

The success of the mission was attributable to the hard work and dedication of hundreds of men and women, military and civilian. FAOs played a critical role in the daily successes of the operation, from coordinating border crossings to cross-checking flight manifests, from compiling daily activity reports to ensuring adequate baby formula and diapers were on-hand, from coordinating medical requirements for ill and pregnant passengers to ensuring the military units in Guam were ready to receive the Iraqi Kurds.

Let us now fast forward to 17 August 1999 when Turkey suffered its most devastating natural disaster in modern times. An earthquake measuring 7.4 on the Richter scale struck near the Sea of Marmara, destroying one of the most heavily industrialized and populated parts of Turkey. To date, the official death toll exceeds 15,000 with an unofficial count closer to 40,000.

The U.S. Embassy and ODC Turkey rushed personnel to the scene to coordinate U.S.G search and rescue, and relief efforts. And once again, among the teams sent forward were FAOs, the Army Attaché and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's Liaison Officer (TRADOC LNO) to the Turkish Land Forces Command, who lent their language skills and area expertise in the disaster relief efforts.

As a member of one of the first teams sent to Istanbul by the U.S. Ambassador, the Army Attaché assisted in the initial damage assessment and in coordinating the rescue efforts by the U.S. military and civilian agencies sent to the stricken areas. He coordinated actions with the GOT to facilitate the work of the U.S. Air Force humanitarian assistance assessment team, the Fairfax County Virginia search and rescue teams with their Turkish counterparts, and the immediate request for humanitarian supplies.

The TRADOC LNO was tasked with coordinating relief efforts and equipment deliveries with local GOT officials, U.S. Marine Corps units from the USS Kearsarge naval task force, EUCOM, and Turkish contractors. In order to house the nearly half million homeless, the call went out for tents - preferably lined tents. Working closely with EUCOM and a local Turkish freight forwarder, the TRADOC LNO helped coordinate the delivery of 677 lined GP medium tents with fly-tents to the GOT officials of the worst-hit towns.

The immediate need for the tents was evident when the weather cooled and the rains came. Prior to the arrival of the tents, some people had chosen to remain in their damaged buildings rather than face the elements. In one six-story apartment building, the bottom floor contained a small "mom and pop" grocery store. Despite the fact that the building was visibly damaged and condemned, the owners of the store had jerry-rigged electricity and were back open for business. One can only hope that one of the many aftershocks which continued to hit the area did not bring the building down on their heads and that they soon relocated to one of the U.S.-provided tents put up by the U.S. Marines in numerous tent cities.

The power of this earthquake was sobering and the degree of devastation witnessed was numbing when one realized that beneath the piles of concrete and rebar rubble were countless victims who could not be saved. At Topel Naval Air Base, outside the hard-hit towns of Izmit and Yalova, the USMC established a tent distribution point. For days and nights after rescue efforts ceased and relief efforts intensified, there was constant movement on the two-lane road passing by Topel. The traffic consisted primarily of convoys of dump trucks taking the rubble away from the towns to sites that covered areas exceeding one square mile and were rapidly growing.

Occasionally a truck turned into Topel on its return trip to pick up a load of tents for the homeless in the driver's town. It lined up with all manner of vehicles waiting for tents from small Tofas (late model Fiat equivalents) to flatbed trucks to pick-up
trucks with trailers. On several occasions, the FAO was asked to mediate between the Marines, the truck drivers, and the Turkish families to help resolve the paperwork issues in getting their tents. The gratitude expressed by people who had lost family members and their whole world, but were still strong enough to carry on, cannot be described.

Credit for the success of this mission goes to the hundreds of people involved in both the search and rescue efforts and the follow-on relief operations. The FAOs involved were team players lending their expertise and specialized knowledge wherever needed. Whether providing a sitrep to higher headquarters or translating a shipping document or explaining a requirement to a Turkish counterpart, they used their FAO skills daily to get the job done.

Are either of these actions what you can expect to see on your FAO job description? No. Can you expect to be involved in these types of activities as a FAO? Count on it! What should you do? To quote the Boy Scout motto, "Be Prepared." First of all, favorably impress your commander, civilian or military, that you are up to the task and can meet any challenge. Ensure your commander knows you are a FAO with unique skills he/she must use to the maximum extent possible. Second, be ready for immediate deployment. You may not be trained in large-scale civilian evacuations or in disaster search and rescue methods, but you will have language skills, extensive travel experience in your country, official contacts at the highest levels, and know how to deal with people at every level. Finally, be knowledgeable. Always know what you are talking about. Gain the trust and confidence of your seniors by providing sound, logical, and intelligent advice.

By keeping this very short list in mind, you can always be in a position to be your commander's force multiplier regardless of the situation. There is no doubt that the FAOs involved in these two humanitarian missions were force multipliers for the U.S. Ambassador. FAOs are always force multipliers -- in war or peace. And if so inclined, next time you review your FAO job description or write your OER support form, add a line, "Other Duties as Assigned: Humanitarian Missions." You never can tell!

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LTC Paul Gendrolis is a 48G, Turkish FAO, serving his fourth tour in Turkey. As a FAO, he has also served in Saudi Arabia, taught at DISAM, and mentored at DLIFLC. He is also a member of your Association's Board of Governors.

Oil refinery set ablaze by earthquake damage in Turkey
Many western observers have a difficult time understanding the seemingly irrational and unprofessional actions of the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI). They have admitted to abducting student activists, committing human rights violations in Aceh and Timor, and more recently, rumors abound that members of the TNI are connected to various “provocations” throughout Indonesia, ranging from the Banyuwangi Ninja murders to the race riots in Ambon. My purpose is to provide insight into the culture of the Indonesia military in order to help the western reader interpret as well as to predict TNI actions. Because it is my belief that the key to understanding the mindset of the Indonesian officer lies in understanding his views of integrity and loyalty, I will start by providing two examples—one hypothetical and one real—that illustrate Indonesian officers’ attitudes toward these two concepts. Next, I will describe the historical and doctrinal factors that have shaped their mindset; and finally, I will interpret allegations against TNI, without trying to prove or disprove their veracity.

**Integrity**

Imagine that you are a small-group instructor at a United States Advanced Course. One of the students in your class is from Indonesia (this is not far-fetched; MG Agus Wirahadikusumah is an IOAC graduate). During a block of instruction on integrity, you ask your students to write as succinctly as possible their definition of “integrity.”

As you thumb through their responses, you are not surprised to see some of the same definitions you learned during basic officer training: “doing the harder right over the easier wrong,” “obeying the laws and legal orders of the officers assigned over you,” “always telling the truth,” etc. Suddenly, you pause as you encounter the definition submitted by your Indonesian student: “Unity, security, and stability”.

When you question your Indonesian student, he explains to you that the greatest challenge an Indonesian officer faces is maintaining the unity and integrity of the vast archipelago consisting of over 14,000 islands. Moreover, Unity of the Republic of Indonesia is of the five principles enshrined in the Pancasila state philosophy, while security and stability are viewed as preconditions for national development, which in turn provides “national resilience” against dissolution.
Thus, just as the emphasis on one meaning of the word *integrity* causes U.S. officers to produce responses related to honesty, the TNI’s emphasis on the other meaning of integrity would cause its officers to respond in a manner quite puzzling to the western observer.

**Loyalty**

Three days before I graduated from the Indonesian Command and Staff College (SESKOAD) in May of 1999, my class of 175 enjoyed a formal social gathering with our families and the SESKOAD staff. I was surprised to see Major Bambang Kristiono at this party, as he had earlier been dropped from the course because he was undergoing court-martial proceedings related to the abduction, torture, and disappearance of student activists in 1997-98. He had already pled guilty to masterminding the operation, but was able to attend the party because he was appealing his sentence.

I was also puzzled at the warm reception Bambang received from my classmates. Clearly, had an American officer been convicted of such a crime, his fellow officers would have treated him as a pariah. After questioning some of my classmates, I came to the conclusion that they all believed Major Bambang was a scapegoat. He had simply obeyed the orders of his superiors, then protected them by claiming he alone had ordered the operation out of feelings of *hati nurani* (inner conscience), believing his actions justifiable because the activists threatened national integrity.

Thus, in the TNI’s view, it was Soedirman’s act of disobedience that was chiefly responsible for achieving Indonesia’s independence from Dutch colonization. As a result of this action, the TNI views itself as an “instrument of the nation” (*alat negara*) rather than “an instrument of the government” (*alat pemerintah*), meaning the Indonesian military is obliged to disregard civilian leadership if obeying their orders will endanger national integrity or sovereignty.

**Historical Foundation**

To understand the evolution of the Indonesian officer’s interpretation of integrity and loyalty, we must selectively examine historical events since Indonesia’s independence in 1945. TNI believes itself to have been created spontaneously by the people when the Emperor Hirohito announced the capitulation of Japan 14 August 1945. These freedom fighters urged Soekarno and Hatta to declare independence on 17 August 1945. Soon thereafter, Indonesia’s pre-WWII colonizers, the Dutch, attempted to regain control of Indonesia. The struggle ended four years later, when The UN Security Council called for a cease-fire, the release of captured Indonesian leaders, and the return of Jogjakarta, the capital, by the Dutch.

The exceptional leadership of General Soedirman during the struggle for independence is the single greatest influence on the TNI’s self-perception. When the Dutch invaded Jogjakarta on 19 December, 1948, President Soekarno, VP Hatta, and several cabinet members were captured because they refused to leave Jogjakarta to wage a guerrilla war, as once promised by Soekarno. Soedirman, although critically ill, retreated to the woods and led a large-scale guerilla war against the Dutch forces and headed by a military government that was detailed in a plan that was to become the basis for the territorial apparatus.

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correctly notes that Indonesian military elites remain convinced that they are the only true guardians of the country, the constitution, and the state philosophy, Pancasila. This was summed up by General Nasution when he argued that “on three occasions the ABRI became the savior of the Republic when the civilian government was either unable or incapable”, namely, during the Dutch attacks in 1948-49, the numerous regional revolts in 1957-58, and the 1965 communist coup. Thus, as an organization, TNI’s principal loyalty is to the nation and its integrity, not to civilian leaders.

Indoctrination

Soedirman’s influence on the TNI mindset was reiterated on 10 May 1999 in a speech by Army Chief of Staff Subagyo presented to the officers attending the Army Command and Staff College (SESKOAD) in Bandung:

Faced with the developing of a situation that is uncertain at this time, I hope that all of you officers in actualizing leadership

Subagyo then elaborated, explaining that the meaning contained in the statement “unchanging” is first, that the Indonesian Defense Force is a military of the people, military of freedom fighters, and a national military that was formed from the people, and “struggles” with the people, for the good of the people. The second connotation of “unchanging” is that the Indonesian Defense Forces possesses a “spirit and resolve to “struggle”, that is, to defend the existence of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia) that is based on the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution that was proclaimed on 17 August, 1945.”

Besides Soedirman’s statement on ABRI’s unchanging role, there are two other Codes of Conduct implemented in the post-independence era that Western observers must be familiar with in order to understand the ABRI mindset. The first is the Sumpah Prajurut, or Soldier’s Oath, encompassing the following:

- To be faithful to the Government and obedient to the laws and the state Ideology, Pancasila.
- To obey military law.
- To execute my duties with full responsibility to the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia.
- To firmly uphold military discipline, meaning to be obedient, faithful and subordinate as well as devoted to superiors, without questioning their orders or decisions (emphasis added by author).

It is noteworthy that whereas Indonesian officers are devoted to their superiors, without questioning their orders, Americans are taught that they will remain faithful to the Constitution and obey the legal orders of the officers appointed over them. I often highlight this point to my Indonesian classmates, explain-
ing that the U.S. emphasis on legality is a post-
Vietnam phenomena intended to avoid the recurrence
of My Lai-type human rights violations.

The second major guiding force is the Sapta
Marga, or Seven Pledges, enumerated as follows:

I. We are citizens of the unitary Republic of
Indonesia based on Pancasila.
II. We are Indonesian patriots, bearers and de-
defenders of the state ideology, who are responsi-
ble and know of no surrender.
III. We are Indonesian knights, who are de-
voted to the One God, and who defend hon-
esty, truth and justice.
IV. We are soldiers of the Indonesian Armed
Forces, guardians of the Indonesian state and
nation.
V. We soldiers of the Indonesian Armed
Forces uphold discipline, are obedient and ob-
servant to our leadership, and uphold the sol-
diers attitude and oath.
VI. We soldiers of the Indonesian Armed
Forces set ourselves to perform our task with
courage, and are always ready to devote our-
selves to the state and nation.
VII. We, soldiers of the Indonesian Armed
Forces are loyal and keep our word and the
Soldier’s Oath.

The relevance of these two creeds is demon-
strated during the Independence Day Parades that I
have participated in as a student at SESKOAD on the
17th of every month. The Preamble of the Constitu-
tion, the Pancasila, Sumpah Prajurit and Sapta Marga
are all recited during these ceremonies. Moreover, in
a speech to my class in December 1998, General
Wiranto encouraged all students to internalize and
practice the values contained in Sudirman’s statement
on the unchanging role of TNI, the Soldier’s Oath, and
the Seven Pledges, as these creeds and oaths would
guide them through Indonesia’s crisis.

Ramifications

One of the most significant ramifications of
TNI indoctrination is that it requires officers to mind-
lessly obey illegal orders, rationalizing that their ac-
tions preserve national integrity and promote the
greater good of stability and national development.
Paradoxically, the importance of obeying all orders in
accordance with the Soldier’s Oath has caused TNI to
stray from its role as a “tool of the nation” (alat ne-
gara) by forcing each officer to become the tool of his
commanding officer (alat atasan). Why? Because the
Draft Law on Voluntary Military service of May 1982
stipulates that soldiers who disobey the Sumpah Pra-
jurit or Sapta Marga--and therefore the orders of one’s
superior, whether legal or illegal--will be court-
martialed. This helps explain the common statement
of senior TNI reformists that TNI had diverged from
its basic role by becoming the “tool” or
“instrument” (alat) by which Soeharto maintained se-
curity and preserved power.

Within this context we also understand why an
officer/soldier would convey/obey orders to abduct,
torture, and murder student activists: activists create
unrest and instability, which threatens the integrity and
growth of the nation. Moreover, it explains allega-
tions that TNI is arming, training, and supporting pro-
integration forces in East Timor, in contradiction to
the civilian government’s orders: a vote for autonomy
in Timor will fuel separatist movements in Aceh, Irian
and other regions in the archipelago and threaten na-
tional integrity. General Soedirman certainly would
not follow such dangerous instructions from civilian
leaders.

While Indonesia’s history of separatist move-
ments and the TNI indoctrination helps us to compre-
hend TNI actions taken in the name of national preser-
vation, it is harder to understand why TNI would be
involved in the “provocations” that seemingly promote
instability and national dissolution. There are two ex-
planations for this.

The first is that TNI might incite unrest in iso-
lated areas so it can “come to the rescue” and demon-
strate its invaluable role in preserving national integ-
ricity. For example, there are many high ranking gener-
als, both retired and active, who wholly believe that
TNI’s role in the parliament is critical to preserving
national stability. In the past few years, they have wit-
nessed the TNI’s allocation of seats in the DPR whit-
tled from 100 to 75 in the previous election, then to 38 in the 1999 election. The TNI is also reducing its role in *kekaryaan* positions, whereby active duty officers serve as mayors, governors, district heads, and other important postings in the government and government-controlled industries. Thus, I believe that TNI officers, past and present, are capable of creating unrest with the hopes of demonstrating the importance of TNI and *dwifungsi* out of a genuine concern for national integrity, or perhaps more succinctly, out *hati nurani* (their inner conscience). Naturally, TNI “provocateurs” would want their involvement to remain secret; if exposed the populace would demand a diminution of TNI power rather than its preservation.

The second explanation for TNI members’ involvement in provocations is more related to loyalty to one’s patron and self-preservation than to loyalty to the nation and national preservation. For example, one Kodam Jaya intelligence officer in my class who was based in Jakarta during the May 1998 riots concurred with western news reports that TNI members were involved. These reports claimed that LTG Probowo, the former Kopassus commander and son-in-law to former President Soeharto, plotted to discredit GEN Wiranto so he could replace him as Commander of ABRI/Defense Minister. There are also rumors that Kopassus deserters have admitted to participation in other provocations, such as the Banyuwangi Ninja murders. If true, their motive might be to send a veiled warning to the government that it should not pursue legal action against Prabowo or former President Soeharto, who is still revered as a father by many in TNI.

This seemingly outlandish analysis finds support in the works of Neils Mulder, an anthropologist who has spent thirty years studying Indonesian and SE Asian culture. He writes:

> The world outside the home …is a competitive area where people vie with each other for prestige and power, where prowess is admired, and where the most successful become the patrons of other… Beneficiaries incur a debt of gratitude that creates obligation for life. In the hierarchy of power, protection, patronage and prestige, and favors given also oblige, and those debts of gratitude tie people to each other, often in predictable ways; it functions as the cement that keeps the known, the personal world together.

I had the opportunity to witness the TNI’s system of patronage in 1999 when LTG Djamari, the Kostrad (Strategic Reserve) Commander visited the Indonesian Command and Staff College. As he lectured the 175 students on personal integrity, one of his aides sorted envelopes of money for SESKOAD officers who had come from Kostrad. This is a common and open method used by TNI commanders to supplement the meager salaries of their soldiers (a Major makes less than $100.00/month). A Kopassus supply officer in my class informed a fellow international student that he had accompanied LTG Prabowo to the bank to draw the equivalent of $100,000 to distribute to his subordinates upon his change of command. Such actions display power and cultivate loyalty.

Current events can also be interpreted by understanding culture of patronage and the loyalty it incurs. Andy Ghalib resigned recently as the Indonesian Attorney General. He also happens to be a Lieutenant General in the Indonesian Army. Ghalib made little progress investigating the wealth of his former boss, General Soeharto. Not only did he remain loyal to his former mentor, the patronage system served an additional critical function of ensuring that had Ghalib exposed Soeharto, he too would have been exposed. After all, as a Lieutenant General, Ghalib has certainly received monetary gifts from his superiors (perhaps even Soeharto) and had also provided them to his subordinates--this is a necessary means of surviving on ludicrously low salaries. Thus, had Ghalib accepted monetary gifts from bank officials, as charged, while clearly illegal, it is a norm acceptable under the “feudalistic culture” of the TNI. This also explains why the assistant commandant of SESKOAD, in an informal discussion a politics and reform once declared “we are all corrupt, including Megawati and Rais…”

If the reader still cannot relate to the culture of
patronage and loyalty within the TNI and its ability to motivate officers to extreme actions, then look closer to home. What actions might a Mafia soldier take to protect his Godfather? The answer will provide you insight into the TNI’s culture.

**Conclusion**

I have intentionally ignored the fact that TNI’s leadership has launched a reform campaign, or Paradigma Baru, as symbolized by the Indonesian Armed Forces’ change of name from ABRI to TNI. Because cultural change is both difficult and slow, I nevertheless believe that my analysis of loyalty and integrity in the Indonesian Armed Forces will remain useful in explaining and predicting TNI actions for several years to come. Finally, the analysis contained herein is completely my own based on my experience as a foreign student attending the Indonesian Command and Staff College from 1998-1999. It does not in any way represent the official viewpoint of the United States Government.

Footnotes

1. In my mid-term report I describe the “Sospol Estimate,” that territorial officers conduct to determine appropriate courses of action to maintain security/stability. I argue that the abduction of the activists was probably someone’s “optimal course of action” (Prabowo?) resulting from his sospol estimate.
4. For the sake of brevity, I have ignored the influence of General Nasution in forming TNI’s self perception. He was largely responsible for encouraging Soekarno to return to the 1945 Constitution and the Pancasila philosophy, for implementing the territorial structure to counter the communist influence, for declaring TNI “a special interest group” so that it had a constitutional right to seats in the DPR, and for placing officers in non-military kekaryaan positions after the nationalization of Dutch industries. In short, he set the groundwork for Dwifungsi. See chapter 2 of Singh, mainly pages 45-47.
7. Ibid, 64.
8. Singh, pg 44.
USMILGP Guatemala hosted the first annual Central American FAO Conference in Antigua, Guatemala on 20 and 21 June 1999. Over a dozen FAOs from DAOs and SAOs in Guatemala, El Salvador and Costa Rica attended the event, whose primary purpose was to update them on the impact of OPMS XXI on FAOs and their professional development. The keynote speaker was MG Alfred A. Valenzuela, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Southern Command, and the Army’s senior 48B. Additionally, MAJ Phil Battaglia, the 48B Assignments Officer from PERSCOM, briefed the officers on the initial board results under the new OER system and OPMS XXI.

This event originated after discussions with fellow deployed FAOs in which we often found ourselves with many opinions on what OPMS XXI ought to do, but little agreement on what we thought it was actually going to do. In spite of reading professional journals and checking the PERSCOM home page, we realized that we were not in a position to make sound decisions regarding assignments and career progression. In my case, I found myself having a completely different view of my own potential than did LTC Jim Brown, who was then my assignments officer. As humbling as it is to admit, I thought that I was eligible for “out-to-pasture” assignments while he seemed to think that I was still “in the hunt” (his words). Doing a quick poll of other FAOs, we thought an old-fashioned officer professional development session would help us all. Fortunately, so did MG Valenzuela when we approached him. He gave us his enthusiastic support.

The conference was held at the Casa Santo Domingo in Antigua Guatemala, a beautiful former monastery built in the late 1500’s. It was mostly destroyed (for the third time) in 1773 when a major earthquake emptied a high mountain lake, flooding the old Spanish capital of Central America. The hotel has been built among the ruins, maintaining the ambiance of a historical site while providing luxurious, if rustic accommodations. Only 45 minutes from the capital, it has become “the” place to stay in Guatemala. In fact, the First Lady stayed at the Casa Santo Domingo during her visit in November 1998. Antigua itself is full of ruins, historical buildings, and quaint shops and restaurants. Many of the officers brought their families so that they could enjoy the sights of this beautiful town while we slaved away in the conference.

Phil Battaglia hit the ground running. Arriving around noon on Sunday, we quickly sequestered him in my house for personal interviews. Two FAO trainees, CPT Paul DeCecca and CPT Ed Bonfoey, were attending the Guatemalan Army’s officer advanced course and had to leave early the next morning for a field exercise in the mountains of Huehuetenango. Then, loaded down with power point slides, computer projection equipment, laptops, and the indispensable microfiche reader (whatever happened to switching from fiche to compact disks?), we hit the road to Antigua to join the rest of the group.

For those who may want to host their own conferences, I highly recommend including the families in the conference and in as many other activities as possible in spite of the personal expense. Although many of the officers knew each other at least professionally, the dinner gave the spouses and children an opportunity to meet and get to know each other. By the end of the evening, we had developed a sense of community that set a comfortable tone for the rest of the conference.

During the dinner, MG Valenzuela spoke to the assemblage on the future of the FAO program and the opportunities and challenges FAOs will meet in next century. He was extremely optimistic on the future of the program and its importance to the military. His talk included the spouses as part of the team, letting them know what to expect in the way of assignments and progression for their FAOs.

Next morning, U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala Donald J. Planty welcomed the participants. An ardent proponent of the FAO program, Ambassador Planty gave a short talk on the value of the professionally trained FAO in the successful formulation and implementation of US foreign policy in the countries to which we are assigned. MG Valenzuela expanded on his talk of the previous night, speaking on how OPMS XXI will impact promotions and assignments for FAOs, the demise of dual tracking, and what the Army expects the FAO to be. Additionally, he talked about the new OER and how senior leaders interpret the reports.

Following MG Valenzuela’s remarks, MAJ Battaglia gave the PERSCOM brief. He analyzed recent board results in terms of the impact of the new OER and OPMS XXI. One sign that the new system is working is the fact that many FAOs had not commanded battalions but were being promoted to O6 on the basis of their strengths.
as FAOs. Following his briefing, Phil spent the rest of the day giving personal interviews. There is nothing so sobering as having your record laid bare by an objective and exacting assignments officer.

MAJ Troy Busby, the Assistant Army Attache, and I, the Army Representative in the MILGP, gave briefings on the recent activities of our offices. Originally envisioned as tools to let FAOs in neighboring countries know what was going on in Guatemala, these briefings transitioned into a discussion of how we operate. They gave us an opportunity to compare notes on our experiences over the last year, especially in terms of the support we provided to both our host nations and deployed US forces in the wake of Hurricane Mitch. We became so engrossed in the discussions that we ended up working through lunch and the rest of the day without a break.

We want to thank all those officers who joined us to make this conference a success. In particular, we want to thank MG Valenzuela for supporting this effort and providing the funding for MAJ Battaglia. We appreciated his insights into the new system and his willingness to share his knowledge and experience with us. We also appreciated the effort MAJ Battaglia made to travel down here to give us such an outstanding brief and candid interviews. He really went the extra mile.

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Colombia

Core Implementation Team

USG Sponsored Mission: Assist development of effectively structured, organized, and functioning national defense establishment for the purpose of counter-narcotic operations on a sustained basis.

MPRI anticipates implementation of this effort to begin o/a 1 Feb 00.

MPRI seeks retired LTC & COL w/MACOM or higher staff experience in 7 functional areas: Force Structure, Training Dev, Logistics Mgt, Ldr Dev, Law Enforce/Counter Drug Intel, Pol-Mil/MOD processes, Resource Management.

See www.mpri.com for details and to contact us.

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CONGRATULATIONS NEW FAO COLONEL SELECTEES!!!

Mike Anderson  Steve Aubrey  Steve Ball
Mike Borders   Mike Bosack   Arnaldo Claudio
Joe Contarino  Terry Cook    Terry Derouchey
Peter Dillon   Orlando Fernandez  John Freund
Emilio Gonzalez Bill Graves   Jeff Jore
Mike Martinez  Jorge Matos    Kevin McGrath
Patrick Michelson Randall Munch Roy Panzarella
Martin Reyes   Leopoldo Rivas  John Sadler
Scott Salyers  Steve Sboto    Mike Shalak
George Steuber Gerry Turnbow
Garmisch, Germany -- Ten years ago, a U.S Army Foreign Area Officer (FAO) would never have dreamed of working on the staff of a Soviet Army brigade, but now senior fellows studying at the George C. Marshall Center for European Security Studies are living that dream.

For the last three years, the Marshall Center located in Garmisch, Germany, has been sending Russian speaking captains and majors to Bosnia-Herzegovina to serve as liaison officers (LNOs). The LNOs act as a conduit of information between the Multinational Division (North) headquarters and the Russian Separate Airborne Brigade (RSAB). Working together as part of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) they have kept the peace in Bosnia, where a civil war raged for four years.

At the Marshall Center, officers may choose from many professionally developing internships in the Eurasian region. Most often these are three-month positions at U.S. Embassies; but the four-month internship with the Russian brigade in Bosnia is unique because of the constant military to military contact and intensive Russian language usage.

“This job definitely requires the mix of language experience and a military frame of reference,” says Captain Joe Bayerl, a Marshall Center Foreign Area Officer student presently assigned in the region.

Bosnia, with the exception of the emerging cooperation in Kosovo, is the only place in the world where U.S. and Russian soldiers serve shoulder to shoulder working, on a daily basis, to accomplish a common mission, Bayerl explained.

“For a Russian FAO, the once in a lifetime experience with the Russian military cannot be beat,” said Captain Renea Yates another Marshall Center Foreign Area Officer student assigned there.

“I think this internship is the opportunity of a lifetime for a Russian FAO,” said Yates. “The insight and opportunity to experience the Russian military way of life goes without bounds. I never, in my life, imagined I would stand in a Russian military formation or ride in the hatch of a BTR (armored personnel carrier).”

"The American liaison officers are the one and only conduit of information between the Multinational Division (North) Commander and staff and the RSAB. The staff work and Russian language practice is intensive. Daily we use our language skills to convey the division commander’s intent,” Yates explains.

The LNOs take all Russian staff reports, translate them and report to the division daily. They also facilitate and interpret all Russian staff coordination with the American staff.

“This is the hour-by-hour experience in Ugljevik, both on and off duty,” says Bayerl. The Marshall Center officers also spend all of their free time with their Russian comrades-in-arms, watching movies, doing physical training, playing soccer, dining in any of the on-base cafes, or going to the banya (the sauna, a basic ritual of Russian culture). All of this contact results in trust that translates into mission accomplishment for the brigade and the division.

“The work of the LNOs is important here, but not the most important. In that position I would place the work of commanders who are committed to building mutual trust and understanding. However, they can’t accomplish this without the liaison work that is being done in Ugljevik and Tuzla,” said Bayerl.

“I believe the LNO mission in Bosnia, especially during the tense period of NATO Bombing and the deployment of peacekeepers to Kosovo, was of the utmost importance, as it was more than peacekeeping, more than combined operations; it was the very foundation of the US-Russian political-military relations,” explains Yates.
The building and sustaining of good relations between commanders and armies really takes place during combined US–Russian operations and training.

“During the bombing of Yugoslavia, we weren’t able to do too much of that, for political reasons, but soon we should be able to start it up again,” explains Captain Paul Riley. It is during these combined operations, that the LNOs really earn their pay. They facilitate the combined planning and execution of the missions, using their language skills and knowledge of doctrine and capabilities of both armies.

 Usually the US brigade and the Russian brigade conduct combined patrols through their respective areas of responsibility or conduct combined weapons training. Russians shoot American weapons and US soldiers shoot the Russian weapons, but during the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, Russia banned all combined training. Despite this ban, mission essential operations and low-level cooperation continued. The relationship between the RSAB reconnaissance group and the MND(N)’s 312 Military Intelligence Battalion is a mutually beneficial one, and cooperation has continued in the form of sharing of information and combined firing ranges. This low-level cooperation has been a great opportunity for the LNOs to facilitate understanding between the two units.

“That was a great experience for me because I was able to get soldiers from two different countries to talk to each other and learn from each other,” explains Yates.

Recently, the Russian engineers teamed up with the U.S. 91st Engineer Battalion to remove two military bridges on a major road in the Russian sector. The LNOs facilitated the work and the exchange of ideas between the commanders.

“That was a great mission for us. I got to use my Russian all day helping commanders and soldiers talk to each other. It was really rewarding,” says Riley.

The Russian foreign area officers from the Marshall Center, are getting experience that previous generations of FAOs would never have imagined. They are sharpening their Russian language skills while learning the ways of our partner army, and establishing a base of understanding for the future.
FIRST WASHINGTON-AREA FAO LUNCHEON A SUCCESS

On 17 November, the first Washington-area FAO luncheon was held at the Fort Myer Officers Club. Sixty-four FAOs from all four services and a fair number of retired FAOs attended the event. Former DIA Director, LTG (ret) Patrick Hughes was the guest speaker and his remarks are reprinted as the first article in this quarter’s edition of the Journal.

All who attended agreed that the event was a great success, and the general consensus seemed to be to have one every three to four months. General Hughes not only provided a great beginning with his remarks, but was so enthusiastic that he joined the FAO Association as a three-year member.

The local Board of Governors members will meet in a few weeks to set the date for another one early next year and all Washington-area Association members can expect to receive a flyer announcing the date and time—IF they have a valid mailing address or e-mail address on file in the FAOA website (Unfortunately, 20-25 of the 230 flyers sent out were returned because members had moved without submitting a change of address).

TIME FOR A NEW LOGO?

During the last month, I made the rounds of the four service FAO POCs to spread the news about the recent changes to the Association management and to make pitches both for the luncheon and for more USAF, USN, and USMC membership.

In so doing, a couple of service POCs pointed out something that I hadn’t thought to question—the Association’s logo. While Army FAOs probably think it’s pretty snazzy, Marine FAOs might question the motto, “Soldier Statesmen”, and Sailors and Airmen might wonder how the air and sea services fit into the overall design.

So, it might be time to take a long, hard look at designing a logo that represents all FAOs equally.

Therefore, I need a volunteer graphic designer to come up with suggestions on how to better depict the jointness we all seem to be moving toward. Those without such skills can assist by suggesting a motto. All suggestions will be vetted with readers in future editions of the Journal.

DRAFT FAOA VISION STATEMENT

Fellow FAOA Members,

In the September issue of the FAOA Journal, our past President and Executive Director of the Association, Joe Tullbane, made a number of points in his editorial that should concern us all, if they haven’t already:

- “The FAO specialty and its association is a fragile entity…."

- The FAO specialty—and the association are a “national resource that remains largely untapped, partially because many of our senior leaders don’t understand what we do…."

- “It is incumbent on each one of us to get the word out, through words and actions, to ensure that the military and civilian decision-makers within the State Department, the Defense Department, and each of the Services understand how the FAO tool can be used…."

Lieutenant General Hughes (USA, Ret) very articulately echoed those thoughts in his address to the Association membership at our luncheon in November. A synopsis of his remarks can be found elsewhere in this issue.

We highlight the above because both Joe and General Hughes, as well as those of us on the Board who met in Washington in October, are of like perception—The Association needs to identify where it wants to go and get on the road with some enthusiasm and commitment. Notwithstanding initiatives to establish FAO programs by the Air Force and the Navy or the Army’s decision to make FAO a single track, only we—serving FAOs—can ensure that our nation maintains a viable, valuable and contributing FAO specialty. Lip service won’t cut it—commitment supported by resources, effective professional development, and proper utilization of the FAO resource are re-
quired. If we, the membership, do not develop an activist approach the Association, almost certainly, and possibly the FAO specialty itself will become marginalized and weakened.

With this in mind, we have drafted a Vision Statement for the mid-term (3 to 5 years). Its purpose is to set the direction for the Association and to outline achievable goals, as well as a few lines in the sand, for the organization as a whole and members as individuals. The Board is considering it now and it is our judgement that the membership also ought to have a chance to provide its views on what we should become. Therefore, we ask that you express your views by mail, e-mail, phone or personally to the Journal Editor or members of the Board. We will use your inputs to refine the vision with a view to publishing our official vision statement in the April issue.

MICHAEL M. FERGUSON, Colonel, USA, President
KARL EIKENBERRY, Brigadier General, USA, Chairman, Board of Governors

FOREIGN AREA OFFICER ASSOCIATION VISION STATEMENT

As stated in its Charter, the FAOA was organized for fraternal, educational and social purposes which serve to: facilitate the dissemination of information; further the common interests of the corporate body of active military, reserve military and retired military FAOs; preserve the history of this career specialty; encourage mentorship and professionalism; and, enhance understanding and social ties of the membership.

It is the opinion of the Board of Governors that the FUNDAMENTAL purpose of the Association is to be an advocate for the continued enhancement of training, utilization, development, capacity to contribute and recognition of Foreign Area Officers of all Services. To that end we propose the following broad direction and goals for the Association:

1. Enhance the content and relevance of the FAOA Journal through a program of interviews, expanded interaction with the international FAO-related business community, forging ties with appropriate Associations and Organizations (such as AUSA, Navy League, or other similar entities), and aggressive development of articles on “Topics of the Day” which affect the current status and future of FAOs. The Editor of the Journal will spearhead this effort with the support of a Seniors Committee (see below).

2. Identify the “common interests of the corporate body” of active, reserve and retired FAOs and develop and execute an action plan to protect and advance them. The Chairman, President, Editor and Membership Chair will draft an action plan based on this draft vision statement and membership inputs not later than June 2000.

3. Expand membership of the organization: Double the membership by CY2001 and enroll at least 50 percent of the accessions to the career field annually thereafter. A membership committee should be formed with a representative in each US Command area and at the appropriate Service schools and centers to accomplish this aim.

4. Take steps to enhance the professionalism of the specialty that include:

   --- A Seniors Advisory and Contact Committee to be charged with initiating contacts with, and maintaining visibility of FAO programs to, the higher levels of leadership within DoD and other USG agencies.

   --- Encourage more formal interchange and consultation between each Service FAO program proponent office on the broader aspects of the FAO specialty.

   --- Establish a “FAO Reserve Committee” and charge it with exploring reserve issues and opportunities to contribute to a more meaningful experience for Reserve FAOs while enhancing their contribution to our common goals.

   --- Initiate and maintain contact with each Service Reserve Officer Association or its equivalent with a view toward obtaining the support and participation of successful senior military and civilian officials for the goals and objectives of the FAOA.

   --- Amend the Charter to mandate that at least one representative from each Service as well as a Reserve and a Retired FAO shall be included on the Board of Governors not later than the next election.
would be in charge and everyone would be working eighteen hour days." General Soyster also laughed and agreed, but pointed out that this attitude was one of the keys to MPRI’s success and solid reputation in the business world. Performance in MPRI was more important than profit. If there was a problem with a contract somewhere in the world, he explained, "Carl Vuono would have half the company on the next plane the next day to fix it."

MPRI is located at 1201 East Abingdon Drive, Suite 425, Alexandria, VA 22314. Phone (703) 684-0853 or fax (703) 684-3528.

Nigeria

Civil Military Transition Assistance

Core Implementation Team

MPRI anticipates implementation of an approved plan to assist in the re-professionalization of the Nigerian armed forces and to assist with enhancement of civilian oversight of defense. Implementation is projected to begin in FEB 00.

Core Team Requirements- O5-O6 or Civ Eqv;
Functional area expertise and experience will drive team member selection. The 10 core functional areas are listed on the MPRI Web Site.

See www.mpri.com for details and to contact us.

DIDN’T GET THE JOURNAL THIS QUARTER?

REMEMBER!!—YOU are the only one
Who can
UPDATE YOUR
Mailing Address

(continued from ME Reviews, page 29)

ticular challenge receives excellent treatment from Gary Sick, Karim Pakravan and F. Gregory Cause. These chapters alone make the book worth reading.

Equally impressive is Paul Stevens’ chapter on the oil market, the effects of the current low oil prices, and options for the future. Dr. Stevens does a fine job of explaining the different interests and strategies of oil producing Gulf nations, reminding us that they are not often in agreement. An essay by Karim Pakravan on economic privatization further reveals that there are no quick and easy solutions to the economic challenges in the region. This section effectively debunks the idea that the Gulf states are rolling in wealth and immune to economic problems.

Other topics are not discussed in sufficient detail or consistency. Several seen to be thrown in because they were available, without contributing to the main focus of the book. There is an excellent essay on the unrest in Bahrain by Munira Fakhro, but no other similar study, Bahrain is, after all, a country of only 600,000 people. Similarly, Anthony Cordesman makes a very detailed study of Iran’s military capabilities, but we are given no other information to make a comparison. Frank E. Vogel’s essay on Islamism is merely another “grand theory” of political Islam. Roy Mottahedeh provides a very interesting look into Iran’s clerical leadership even if it is somewhat detached from the main focus of the book.

In short, this book is worthwhile for any student of the Middle East. It offers many surprising facts and insights, and looks beyond the current hot topics of Saddam, sanctions and no-fly zones.
Ghanaian-born professor George Ayittey writes a brutally honest account of the problems plaguing Sub-Saharan Africa. He identifies two schools of thought on the civil wars, corruption and lack of economic development on the continent. One involves those who blame Africa’s ills on colonialism and Dr. Ayittey labels them externalists. A second group, which includes the author, argues that decades of blaming the West for years of colonial rule is passe and does not explain despots like Idi Amin, Nigerian military rulers, and others who ravage their nations for personal gain. Offering example after example of how western technology and ideals are manipulated by dictators who have no understanding of complex issues of economics and democracy, Dr. Ayittey explains that African entrepreneurship and free-thought are either nationalized or suppressed. To their discredit, western democracies condone this behavior through massive aid and grants that the average African citizen sees little of.

Having grown up in the Middle East and attended public school in the region, I have known many who blamed Africa’s lack of development on European colonialism. This book will challenge the views of those wishing to stick to such a comforting rationale. Ayittey also writes about events I personally witnessed, like the failure of West African peacekeepers to control the civil war in Liberia. He vividly portrays the irony of a dictator nation like Nigeria sent to bring democracy to a nation in chaos. What actually occurred was that the peacekeepers sent to bring peace became part of the problem, looting and siding with one of the two main factions in Liberia. Many of these civil wars are fueled by Africa’s enormous natural resources. In the case of Liberia it was diamonds that kept the factions fighting. Nigeria under Sani Abacha is vividly described as well as his native Ghana under President Jerry Rawlings. The level of nepotism and corruption in these regimes have caused an economic implosion in these West African nations indicative of problems not only there but throughout much of Equatorial Africa.

Finally, Ayittey describes how African tribal institutions can be supplanted with democracy to produce a more representative government. However, he describes only the best part of tribal politics and has not taken the full account of how such institutions can handle the many tribes that make-up a nation like Zaire, Uganda or Tanzania. I feel that although interesting in principle, this idea requires more careful analysis.

Ayittey is winner of the coveted H. L. Mencken Book Award for his first volume on Africa entitled, *Africa Betrayed* (1993). This book along with *Africa in Chaos* is required reading for those serving in the European Command (EUCOM) or Central Command (CENTCOM) who deal with Africa.

LT Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, MSC, USN
Middle-East/N. Africa FAO

**Communiques from Sub-Saharan Africa**

*By CPT Eric J. Kruger*

For the first installment of the sub-Saharan Africa portion of this feature in the FAO Journal, I present a compilation of magazines, books, web sites, and other reference materials that have been of immense help to me in gaining an appreciation for this vast region.

**MAGAZINES:**

*New Africa.* Monthly. Gives a comprehensive and balanced mix of political reporting and comment, economic and financial analysis, together with features on culture and social affairs, including art, culture, music and sport.

*Africa Today.* Monthly. Also dedicated to political reporting and comment. This magazine features special reports each month on either business or the political climate in one of the region’s countries. It also offers several interviews in each issue with political leaders from around the continent. The book review section is a very good reference guide for the African issues.

*BBC Focus on Africa.* Bi-monthly. This magazine is product of the BBC Africa Service. It is designed to enhance the BBC’s broadcast service to the region. It contains frequency and program information as well as follow-up and read-ahead articles for its radio and television broadcasts. Also, it provides separate reporting on the politics and business of the continent. Each issue contains articles on at least 15-20 African countries.

*Discover Africa.* Bi-monthly. This independent travel magazine offers a balanced, accurate and informed coverage on travel destinations.
throughout the continent. It also provides substantial information on events, establishments, personalities and culture. Each issue offers article on at least five to ten destinations. Its articles are a must read prior to African travel.

_Africa: Environment & Wildlife_. Bi-monthly. This magazine is a byproduct of the magazine above. It is distributed through the major hotel chains in South Africa. It provides articles on culture and travel to countries not covered in _Discover Africa_. It uses the same email and web site addresses.

_Getaway_. Monthly. This magazine is dedicated to providing information on what it calls, “adventure travel and ecotourism” in southern Africa. Because it is focused on a sub-region, it has the ability to provide in-depth information regarding sites, events and culture for the area. Its photo gallery provides an impressive look at the many cultures of the region. Email: getaway@rsp.co.za

**GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS / EVENTS:**

_President Clinton Visits Africa: Building a New Partnership_. Published by the United States Information Agency. Web site: www.usia.gov/usis.html


**WEB SITES:**

_Unified Command Pages:_
www.eucom.mil/africa
www.centcom.mil/aor_pages/africa_page.htm

_State Department Page:_
www.state.gov/www/regions/africa/index.htm

_BBC Pages:_
www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/focusonafrica
www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/networkafrica
www.bbcco.uk/worldservice/fasttrack

**BOOKS (General):**

Most Africa FAOs have read, or are at least familiar with, the more common books concerning African history/politics (*The Boer Wars*, _The Scramble for Africa_, and _Out of America_). The titles that follow are relatively obscure ones that provided varying insights into the creation of African cultures, mystiques, and legends:


This book covers the origin of the human species and its cultures. Its authors contend that all modern humans share a single racial stock, and that racial and cultural distinctions stem from geographic variations thereafter.


This book is an exploration of Africa from the inside. It is comprised of stories of some of Africa’s ancient empires. The stories are the product of the authors’ journeys throughout the region. This book gives insight as to how several modern African cultures originated from, and still have ties to, ancient civilizations on the continent.


Elspeth Huxley presents Kenya in nine sections, focusing on exploration, travel, settlement, war, hunting, wildlife, environment, life-styles, and legend and poetry. She accentuates each of these sections with excerpts from works by famous authors, researchers and politicians. This book gives the perspectives that Hemingway, Churchill, Roosevelt and others had on this African nation and its cultures.

**BOOKS (SOUTH AFRICA):**

It is clear that the events that have unfolded in South Africa over the past ten years have created a wealth of resources for the study of transitional government. With a new government now taking over in Pretoria, the books listed below give a comprehensive account of where South Africa has been, as well as an illuminating concept of where it might be heading: (in order of historical precedence)


_The Life and Times of Thabo Mbeki_. By Adrian Hadland and Jovial Rantao. Rivonia: Zebra Press, 1999

_Africa: The Time has Come_. By Thabo Mbeki. Cape Town: Tafelberg and Mafube, 1998.
This is the story of the Lavi, Hebrew for "Lion": The story of the greatest fighter aircraft never made. This first person account by DoD apparachik Dr. Dov Zakheim reveals all that is wrong with America's relationship with Israel. The Lavi, a continuation of the Kfir in the eyes of Israel, was supposed to be a god-send in two areas: first, it was to ensure Israeli air-superiority over its neighbors as the best fighter aircraft in the world; second, it was supposed to create an Israeli aeronautics industry from nothing and, in so doing, enhance the nation's balance of payments by earning foreign exchange from aircraft sales. These might sound like good reasons until you realize that the entire bill, both money and technology, was to be paid by the U.S. taxpayer. Moshe Arens, the main proponent in the Cabinet, and former head of Israeli Aircraft Industries (the primary beneficiary of the project) was presumptuous enough to believe that the U.S. would allow exports of sensitive U.S. technology to be used throughout the system. Arens even expressed the belief that the U.S. would support export licenses to countries with which the U.S. had no official trade due to embargo or other negative political action. It is the viciousness with which some Israeli officials conducted themselves in dealings with the U.S. Government that makes the book so interesting; there is much biting of the hand that feeds in this story.

And that is the real story. Congress approved over $500 million per year for the Israelis to build this aircraft on a "swag" estimate prepared in large part by American lobbyists for Israel rather than aeronautics engineers or government accountants. Once it became obvious that the Lavi would likely never fly, its die-hard proponents became venomous. The oddity of this story is that is it told by an American Orthodox Jew, a trained rabbi in fact, who saw the folly of the endeavor and advised the U.S. and Israeli governments to rethink their options. Zakheim, seen by some as a self-hating American Jew with a vendetta against his cultural homeland, was vilified not only in Israel but in Jewish neighborhoods in the States; his family was often pulled into the fray as well. One of the most interesting parts of the book is a discussion of the Jonathon Pollard spy case, which occurred almost concurrently with the Lavi debate. The Israeli expectation of dual loyalties of American Jews is discussed matter-of-factly, but the end result for Zakheim was a major daily Tel Aviv newspaper article comparing him unfavorably to Pollard.

Dr. Zakheim often uses the term "chutzpah" to describe the attitudes of the people with whom he dealt. He was repeatedly confronted with foot-dragging (read "stone-walling") over costs estimates with obviously bogus numbers, the use of pro-Israeli American groups to exert political pressure, and finally a series of acrimonious personal attacks designed to destroy his credibility. A good illustration comes in a discussion Zakheim had with Menachem Eini, the Ministry of Defense Program Manager. After Congressional and State Department pushes to get contracts paid (which SecDef Weinberger had been delaying while further support of the Lavi was debated), Eini, thinking he had the upper hand, stated that all contracts, even those not scheduled to be paid until well into the future, should be paid immediately. When Zakheim rhetorically asked him if he wanted a blank check, Eini responded, "Why not?!” Zakheim's reaction: "I had never encountered such chutzpah before...whether he realized it or not, Eini was reflecting everything that was wrong with the American-Israeli relationship."

This book is entertaining and the stories of his personal interaction with major players in both governments is priceless, especially those with the late Yitzhak Rabin, to whom, along with his parents, Dr. Zakheim dedicated the book. Zakheim describes a Rabin who was at once a strong proponent of the Lavi for its presumed effects on Israel's economy and defense, a consummate politician who never showed his cards before it was time, and a fair man who very thoroughly understood the dynamics of the bilateral relationship.

I recommend the book unreservedly for Middle East/ North Africa FAOs, MI Officers, and anyone else involved with the affairs of the region.
Violence in Colombia is a pervasive, debilitating phenomenon that has attracted domestic and foreign intellectuals to explore the many facets of this problem. North American author Harvey Kline has dedicated over thirty years to the study of Colombian politics. Politics in Colombia has a long history of violence as a chief means of resolving conflict. In his latest book, *State Building and Conflict Resolution in Colombia, 1986-1994*, Kline examines the attempts made by Presidents Virgilio Barco and César Gaviria to formulate policy that would bring an end to rampant political violence in the country.

Kline's main thesis is that preexisting weaknesses within the Colombian state prevented either administration from making significant progress in resolving conflicts with the three opponents of the state: guerrilla organizations, drug cartels, and paramilitary squads. These three groups have claimed, through the threat and use of violence, a sort of political, economic, and territorial autonomy within Colombia that the weak state cannot reclaim. Kline effectively traces Colombia’s political history to illustrate how governments have failed to maintain a monopoly on military power, thus allowing regional leaders to provide for their own protection while maintaining a small, poorly equipped national military. Periods of political conflict led to protracted violence because each group had the military force available to advance its particular cause. His discussion of Colombia’s tradition of violence provides the framework to understand the rise of guerrilla organizations, drug cartels, and paramilitary squads in the country.

Kline states that Colombia’s inability to provide adequate police forces that protect people and property, establish a court system that functions at all stages of the judicial process, and protect the human rights of its citizens has afforded these groups the right to disregard the rule of law and to use political violence to promote and protect their interests. Kline examines the Barco and Gaviria administration’s efforts at negotiations with these groups and discovers that each president made gains with certain groups (Barco with the M-19 guerrilla group, Gaviria with the Medellin drug cartel and with paramilitary squads), but those achievements were blunted by policy failures with other violent groups and an overall increase in violence throughout the country. The limited and unsustainable gains made by Barco and Gaviria reinforce Kline’s argument that existing institutional deficiencies prevent the government from making real progress against the forces of violence.

This book offers keen insights on the complexities of charting effective policy, taking into account multiple groups that have only their interests to promote and their equities to defend. The book clearly defines the challenges facing future Colombian presidents as each one contemplates policy options that will offer the country a real chance for peace. Negotiating from a position of weakness offers poor prospects for policy success. The book also offers an accurate synopsis of the Colombian problem and a good lead in to the policy challenges of former President Ernesto Samper; this understanding is essential to formulating effective foreign policy with regards to Colombia.
Peter Smith’s *Talons of the Eagle* offers a comprehensive examination of U.S.-Latin American relations through a historical exploration of the events that have defined North American policies toward Latin America, and Latin American responses to U.S. activity in the region. His work not only tells the story from the U.S. or Latin American perspectives, but places events in context with global events in an attempt to explain the motivations of key foreign policy actors. He succeeds in informing the reader about the vast complexities and driving logic of hemispheric affairs throughout history.

Smith’s central idea is that U.S.-Latin American relations have exhibited recurring norms resulting from national and regional interests as defined under the existing regime of international relations. He seeks to explore the linkages between U.S and Latin American relationships during unique periods in history to reveal a structural pattern of political intercourse between the U.S. and its neighbors in the south. Smith identified three periods in time where foreign relations occurred based on one central influential factor.

The first period, dubbed the Imperial Era, occurred between the 1790s and 1930s and was defined by a global system of balance of power competition and multilateral rivalry. Smith makes the case that the United States acted in Latin America just like the great European nations did in their struggle for colonial power. U.S. activity in the hemisphere was driven by the need to gain prestige as a great power through the possession of colonial territory and the fulfillment of America’s “divine obligation” to civilize the Spanish-speaking masses. Smith effectively charts U.S. efforts at hemispheric hegemony from the proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 through the Good Neighbor Policy of 1933 and the various military interventions in between. His discussion of these and many other actions by the U.S. during this period extends beyond American motivations. He links the implementation of policy towards Latin America to critical domestic and extra-hemispheric events that provides insight into seemingly whimsical foreign policy decisions. Additionally, Smith portrays the limited options available to Latin American countries to resist the efforts of the United States.

The Cold War is the second era of U.S.-Latin American relations defined by Smith. Here the prevailing logic for U.S. policy and Latin American responses is the backdrop of the bipolar world of capitalism and communism. Smith demonstrates how the policy of containment, and the threat of nuclear war shaped U.S. involvement in the region through the expansion of military power and the return of American military intervention. Smith also illustrates how Latin American countries responded by asserting an anti-Communist position which empowered right-wing regimes to exact revenge on their political opponents. Failure to adhere to an anti-Communist policy could expose a country to unyielding U.S. involvement, as Smith exhibited through his discussion of El Salvador and Nicaragua.

Smith defines the third era as the Age of Uncertainty. The rules of the game have yet to be defined, but appear to be settling on the expansion of economic power instead of military or colonial power. According to Smith, economic primacy is being contested through multi-polar rivalries. The U.S. has retained its hegemony, but it is uncertain how the new global logic will impact hemispheric primacy. Additionally, the new global arrangement may offer Latin Americans more options in relations with the United States than ever before.

This book is an invaluable addition to the military officer or diplomat. *Talons of the Eagle* takes the broad subject of U.S.-Latin American relations and brilliantly synthesizes various policy decisions in light of national, regional, hemispheric, and global relations of the time. Smith establishes the traditions of foreign relations in the region and offers a plausible view of what will shape and define future relations. He skillfully blends the strengths of history, political science, international relations, and cultural anthropology to present the reader a comprehensive account of the nature of U.S.-Latin American relations.
LT Youssef H. Aboul-Enein recently returned from the Middle East where he served as an Arabic linguist for Exercise Bright Star 2000, a joint coalition exercise which involved 11 nations and more than 70,000 personnel. Conducted by U.S. Central Command, the exercise tested the joint warfighting capabilities of the participating countries. Navy medical personnel were on hand to provide care wherever needed.

“The exercise is the largest now conducted by the United States,” Aboul-Enein said. It began in 1980 with only ground forces of the United States and Egyptian armies initially participating. In 1983, U.S. Central Command was formed to be the United States command directly responsible for carrying out the Bright Star exercises. As the years passed, the exercise included air and then naval forces, and the number of countries increased.

This year was Aboul-Enein’s second experience with Bright Star; he served as a linguist in 1997. The exercise is held every two years.

The Lieutenant, who is plans, operations, and medical intelligence officer at Naval Hospital Great Lakes, served as linguist and Mideast advisor to Naval and Marine forces in Bright Star 2000. “My days were filled”, he said, “from 7 a.m. to 2 a.m. The Egyptians like to make their decisions late at night.”

Aboul-Enein’s early background contributed to making the assignment a good fit. He was born in Mississippi, but grew up primarily in Saudi Arabia where the family moved when he was five years old. His father is a native of Cairo and his mother, originally from Saudi Arabia, was educated in Egypt. He returned to the United States in 1986 and received a scholarship to the University of Mississippi. He joined the Navy in 1994, beginning his career as an Ensign at Naval Hospital Jacksonville.

“It’s been a wild adventure,” he said. “The Navy has given me an opportunity to be involved in interesting assignments.” During his Bright Star 2000 assignment, Aboul-Enein was presented with a flag and a certificate from the 13th Egyptian Special Forces Brigade, and received a Navy Achievement Medal as a joint U.S./Egyptian award ceremony. He was translating for the event and suddenly found himself reading his own name as a recipient. The translator enjoyed his interaction with personnel from the host country. “We talked of Cairo, the soccer teams, who’ll win the Africa Cup, and shared the latest jokes,” he said of his relationship to Egyptian officers and NCOs.

Original plans called for him to attend only the beginning and end of Bright Star 2000, “But they really needed an Arab linguist so they kept me there for the entire 45 days,” he said.

The trip also gave him the opportunity to see his grandmothers who live in Cairo. “I hadn’t seen them in 12 years,” Aboul-Enein noted, “It was quite a reunion.”
Like every other quarter, this one has seen a lot of issues worked by the FAO Proponent office. The focus of this article is to update you on some of those issues and provide information for your professional development and use.

**Foreign Area Officers’ Course (FAOC)**

The latest FAOC was conducted 13 – 17 December. Courses are conducted twice annually – normally in June and December – at DLI in Monterey. The timing and location are driven by the fact that this offers the best opportunity to reach a large number of FAOs just starting into training. The FAOC typically runs 4 ½ days with the focus as follows:

- **Day 1:** FAOs in support of National Security Strategy/National Military Strategy & PERSCOM Briefing
- **Day 2:** The Role of the State Department, the Embassy Country Team and OPMS XXI/Professional Development
- **Day 3:** FAO Roles and Functions, Advanced Civil Schooling, In Country Training and Regional Training Panels
- **Day 4:** (Focused on FAO Spouses) Thriving Overseas and Regional Spouse Panels
- **Day 5:** Graduate School Fair (normally 15-20 schools on our ACS list participate)

This session was one of the best we’ve seen in terms of questions and positive responses from the FAOs. OPMS XXI issues topped everyone’s list of concerns but we had an excellent dialogue on other issues as well. While short, the course is one sure way for the Program Managers to put out guidance and to meet with our officers. Additionally, PERSCOM has been very supportive and sends a training technician and an assignments officer to conduct interviews during the week. We’re looking for ways to get FAOC info to officers who do not go to DLI in Monterey. We will begin a shortened course at West Point this summer and are looking at other options for the rest of our FAOs. While not absolutely critical, the course does provide answers and guidance that assists our officers and families to adjust to life in the FAO lane.

**Advanced Civil Schooling (ACS) Approved Schools List**

Each year the proponent updates, by AOC, the graduate degree programs FAOs can attend as part of ACS. The criteria used in determining quality programs are listed on our web page and the approved list for FY 00 is also on the PERSCOM page.

We take a lot of time to research each school’s offerings. While some may appear more prestigious than others, every program on our list will meet your needs. We also recognize that we may not identify every possible program. If you know of another that you think meets our requirements, follow the directions on our web page to bring it to our attention.

Perhaps the greatest frustration we have in this area is with officers who fail to adequately prepare during the application process. The packet you will receive clearly addresses what you have to do. Follow that guidance and, if you want to apply for a program not on our list, ENSURE you coordinate with your Regional Program Manager early and follow the procedure we’ve provided to address those requests.

**Career Field Designation (CFD)**

As we move further toward full implementation of OPMS XXI, we continue to work through issues relating to CFD. One of the latest revolves around the difficulty for the CFD board to address our FAO requirements in each of the nine Areas of Concentration (AOCs). Experience has shown us that it is too difficult for the board to break out the total population by AOC. As a result, each board has left us with an imbalanced structure.

The only real short term solution for year groups already CFD’d is to realign within our population, where possible and practical. If you have questions in that regard, call and talk to both your assignment officer and us. For future year groups we will change the AOC designation process to make it easier to adapt to the results of CFD. Specifically, we will not AOC designate officers until (a) they have been CFD designated as FAOs or, (2) they are available to begin training prior to CFD. The late designation of AOCs will have little impact on FAOs since, under OPMS XXI, 70% will not begin training until after CFD. Those officers available to start training early will be AOC designated prior to beginning training and we will spread that population across the AOCs to give us an operating base.

As with any situation, the best line of defense is a good offense. Keep yourself informed on the issues regarding OPMS XXI and the new OER. Focus on performing well, no matter what job you are in. Enjoy yourself, your family and the Army. If you’re not having fun, perhaps…..
The USN FAO Proponent did not submit an article for this issue of the Journal.

**Foreign Area Officer Association (FAOA)**

**MEMBERSHIP APPLICATION**

Name: ___________________  Rank _______  Telephone: ________________   Regional Specialty: __________
Street: ______________________________   City:  ___________________  State:  _______   Zip:  _________________

E-Mail: ______________________________________

Membership Options: (Check Appropriate Box)

☐ 1 Year - $15.00   ☐ 2 Years - $28.00   ☐ 3 Year - $36.00

☐ Active   ☐ Reserve   ☐ Former Service

Signature: ______________________________________   Date: __________

Mail with your check to: FAOA, Box P.O. 710231, Herndon, VA 20171; Tel/fax (703) 913-1356
Over the last month and a half, the Marine Corps' Unified Command and International Issues Branch has continued to improve its Foreign Area Officer (FAO) and Regional Affairs Officer (RAO) Program. On 9 Nov 99 the IAOP Coordinator joined the Navy's FAO Proponent in briefing the Assistant Under-Secretary of the Navy for Personnel on current status and progress for their respective programs.

We continue to await Total Force Structure Division, MCCDC's decision on the redesignation of 236 Marine Component and Joint/External billets for specifically FAO/RAO additional MOSs. Our office hopes to see a decision prior to the end of 1999. Additionally, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) is being staffed with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to better define the relationship between Marine FAOs and the agencies (USDAO, JUSMAG) to which they are assigned for their year of in-country training. We also look to have this agreement in place before the 1st of January 2000.

As was published in the previous edition of the FAO Journal, the Marine Corps is in the process of establishing ICT sites in ten (10) new locations. An 11th site will also be added as an alternative for one of our two annual Russian (9942) FAOs. We hope to have a Marine captain head off to the Baltic Defense College in Tartu, Estonia by the middle of 2000 for a yearlong course. Just after the New Year, we will be sending Majors Palmer and Cunningham off for a year in Cairo, MArs Dyson and Mauro to Seoul, and Maj Collins to the Marshall Center in Garmisch, Germany for their respective ICT periods. Maj Marek Sipko, one of our reserve FAOs and a fluent Polish speaker, will be coming on active-duty for the next six months to serve on a Marine Liaison Team (MLT) to Bulgaria.

Back at HQMC, the IAOP Coordinator has been refining the FAO/RAO database and the Marine Corps currently has 215 FAOs on active duty and 30 RAOs. We have identified shortfalls with respect to East Asian and Middle Eastern FAO/RAOs and will be attempting to improve that in the coming year with selections for the study-track program and solicitation of active duty personnel who may have East Asian/ Middle Eastern expertise for the experience-track program. Strategy and Plans Division, PP&O is currently conducting one of its quarterly boards to identify experience-track FAO/RAOs; the next study-track board should meet in June of 2000. If you have not contacted the IAOP Coordinator recently, please do so and ensure that he has your most current POC information (especially e-mail) so that information can be pushed out to you concerning present initiatives. We also highly encourage the submission of any articles dealing with the pol-mil arena.

Finally, Maj Carroll (9944) and Capt Cho (9948) attended a fine luncheon hosted by the FAO Association at Ft. Myer's Officer Club on 17 Nov 99. LTG (R) Patrick Hughes (former Director of the DIA) was the guest speaker and delivered an interesting talk on his opinions and vision as to where the four services' FAO programs are and should be going. If you are a Marine FAO or RAO in the Washington area or just interested in international/political-military affairs, we highly recommend that you look for an announcement for the next luncheon and come join your fellow Marines and other FAOs in the Joint community. Best of luck and Semper Fidelis.
FAOs in the 21st Century

During the past two years, the USAF’s FAO Propenent Branch has fielded several thousand phone calls, boarded more than a thousand applicants, and awarded the FAO AFSC to several hundred officers. Not bad for an office of six folks...six highly committed functional resource managers. While the program is still in its infancy, we expect the program to live a long and productive life.

So, what does the future hold for our intrepid young FAOs? Akin to Attaches, one conjures images of James Bond traipsing off to a cocktail hour at an embassy or meeting with the KGB agent in a darkened alley. In reality, the FAO will become an integral part of our force in the next century—a strange admixture of diplomacy, core competency, language expertise, and area studies knowledge. Tomorrow’s FAOs will forge lasting ties with our allies, while simultaneously serving regional commanders as the in-country expert.

Recently, USAFE/CC Gen John Jumper remarked that the Air Force was in nearly every country in the world. That’s a significant statement. We’re not at war, though we’re hardly at peace. Policies, people, and programs will change over time. Where our military and civilian leaders take us into the 21st century is still unclear. But, if the last 10 years is any guide to predict the next decade, we can safely assume that we’ll continue to provide aid and assistance, conduct humanitarian efforts, and keep the bad guys at bay. To do any of these without the use of highly qualified and trained FAOs is unwise, unproductive, and unreflective.

The next century holds many opportunities for aspiring FAOs. The world is a dynamic stage upon which we behold the global actors. As a FAO, one develops an insight into the actors’ motives, an appreciation for the executive-level decisions, and a near-absolute understanding of the area due to diligent research and observation. The FAO will stand apart from the other members of the United States Air Force. The FAO will operate as an internationalist writ large.

What’s new?

It’s December in D.C., and we’re starting to examine the latest applications for the next FAO Board. While smaller than our previous boards, we hope to award the AFSC to another 25-30 officers. The board will be held on 24 Jan 00. Interested officers should contact our office or check out our web site.

Y2K will see an expansion of the Language and Area Studies Immersion (LASI) Program. We’ll offer more than 20 languages in more than 25 locations throughout the world. Based on our research and inputs from other organizations, we’ve added new languages to our already extensive repertoire.

In addition to the LASI Program, a number of language-proficient officers have asked where they can turn for assistance. In Y2K, we’re examining the viability of a LASI II Program, aimed at our 2/2–3/3 DLPT-level officers. Similar to the LASI Program in design, the LASI II Program will focus less on in-classroom language training, and more time in the classroom for courses in political science, history, and economics.
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