U.S. — China Perceptual Differences

A New Tool For The FAO Rucksack

Development of Iraqi Ground Combat

De-Certification: Should The Approach Be Unilateral or Multilateral

GEN Van Fleet and The JUSDMPG In Greece

El Alamein
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Dear Fellow FAO’s,

In this issue, I won’t get on a soap box, or exhort you to support various programs, or find fault with our Service efforts at improving the use of FAO’s worldwide.

As you might have noticed in the last issue of the journal, I am moving on and at least in part passing the baton of the organization on to other worthy individuals who will keep this organization growing. LTC(R) Rick Herrick will be handling the membership database, as well as the FAOA E-mail site. If he can’t answer your questions, he will pass them on to someone who can, me included. Just so you know, he is a great guy and a stellar FAO. LTC(R) Bob Olson will expand his current duties of treasurer to include the bookkeeping for the Association. He is also a great FAO and highly experienced with the Association. Last, but certainly not least, the Journal will be taken over by COL Dave Smith. Dave is the best! A top-notch FAO and a true professional. LTC Steve Gotowick will continue as one of the best webmasters in the business. In short, as I ease out of the lime-light, I feel that I am leaving the Association with a superb team.

While I will stay on the Board of Governors, I also hope to pass the Presidency on to one of the other Board members (remember! The post of president is appointed by the Board, not elected).

Now to the Sermon that I promised I would not give. The FAO Specialty and its Association is a fragile entity. The potential effect that this specialty could have for the Services, for DoD, and for the nation’s international policy is incredibly large. It is a national resource that remains largely untapped, partially because the man-on-the-street doesn’t understand what we do or worse doesn’t see what we do as contributing to the war-fighting missions of the Armed Forces.

It is incumbent on each of us to try to get the word out, through words and actions, and ensure that the military and civilian decision-makers within State Department, the Defense Department, and the Services understand how the FAO tool can be used as a force multiplier, especially in peacetime. With the United States increasingly involved in humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, and peacemaking missions around the world, the value of having officers on the ground who KNOW THE REGION, KNOW THE LANGUAGE, and have contacts at the mid and high levels of the appropriate governments is enormous. You are those people! Your actions are your credentials!

As an “Old FAO” (I can’t believe I’m writing that), it is my job to mentor the younger of our crowd, as well as to act as a conscience for the program. But it isn’t just my job, it is the job of every “Old FAO” to do this. We need to seek to improve FAO in every way for the good of the specialty, the Service, and the country.

SCOUTS FORWARD!
**United States – China PERCEPTUAL DIFFERENCES**

LTC (P) Susan Puska, China FAO

**INTRODUCTION**

The two United States-People’s Republic of China (PRC) summits, in October 1997 and June 1998, appear to have stabilized bilateral relations to a degree not seen since June 4, 1989. Beneath the positive signs and promise of even greater progress and cooperation, however, lie persistent uncertainty and potential instability. It remains uncertain whether or not the current positive trend will collapse overnight in the face of the next bilateral crisis.

Radical swings have characterized much of the history (discussed below) of United States-PRC relations since the mid-1900s. These shifts have ranged from the extremes of idealized friendship during times of war and strategic alliances to mutual enmity and isolation, such as during the Korean War and the Cold War period until 1972. Accompanying these swings have been emotionally-charged extremes in how each country views the other that have often soured state-to-state relations.

The boom-bust nature that has characterized United States-China relations for the last 150 years can be illustrated as a cyclic pattern as shown in Figure 1. The U.S.-China paradigm can be divided into at least four predictable stages – punishment (including isolation), reassessment and opening that is spurred by a “breakthrough,” followed by high, often unrealistic expectations, only to be disrupted by mutual disillusionment and recrimination, and once more returning to a negative period.

This paradigm has been facilitated by an asymmetrical power relationship that has, so far, favored the United States with its stronger components of comprehensive national power (especially economic, political, and military). This imbalance has permitted the U.S., which remains overwhelmingly focussed on Europe and Middle East oil, to repeatedly ignore or neglect U.S.-China relations. The brief periods of alliance between the U.S. and China, during WWII or the strategic triangle of the 1970s, were only short lived and narrowly focussed to counterbalance a mutual enemy of the period, i.e., Japan or the Soviet Union.

Despite its comparatively weaker power position, China has successfully thwarted United States military and political power on China’s borders, as it did directly in the Korean War, and indirectly in the Vietnam War. Chinese leaders are unapologetic about their weaker power relationship to the United States, and in many ways see themselves as America’s equal, and even its superior in some aspects. This sense of confidence and strong national identity is wedded to a sense of grievance over past Western oppression and dismemberment, and a suspicion that the West (symbolized by the United States) seeks to prevent China from realizing its full potential as a regional and global power.

Helping to perpetuate this cyclic pattern, which has prevented United States-China relations from maturing, is an underlying mutual perceptual gap. This has proved critical, especially at the point where mutual expectations bloom. It has often led to mutually unrealistic, even false, expectations, based on misperceptions. These, in turn, have led to dangerous miscalculations. In the 1995-1996 Taiwan crisis, for example, Administration and congressional leaders miscalculated how the Chinese would ultimately react to Lee Tenghui’s visit to the United States in April 1995. The Chinese leadership, in turn, miscalculated how the United States military would respond to its March 1996 missile exercise, as well as the level of concern its “internal” actions would have throughout the Asia-Pacific region.

As Sunzi recognized centuries ago, to promote one’s own interests, it is not merely enough to know your opponent or to simply know yourself. The one who knows both has the best chance for success - i.e., “will not be endangered in a hundred engagements.” With this goal in mind, we will examine both the American and Chinese sides of this perceptual gap, primarily in terms of mutual philosophical and cultural aspects, mutual historical experiences, as well as lingering ideological problems. This inquiry may assist policy makers, and others engaged in managing United States-China contacts by providing a deeper understanding of the cultural underpinning of each country’s policy goals, strategies and limitations.

**U.S.-CHINA PERCEPTUAL GAP:**

**PHILOSOPHICAL AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES**

Miscommunications and misunderstandings between Chinese and Americans frequently arise from philosophical and cultural differences. Often there is a complete break in understanding what is important to the other party and why. For example, in official meetings it is common for the Chinese to measure their success on the basis of form, such as an office call with an inappropriately high official, while Americans frequently arise from philosophical and cultural differences. Often there is a complete break in understanding what is important to the other party and why. For example, in official meetings it is common for the Chinese to measure their success on the basis of form, such as an office call with an inappropriately high official, while Americans frequently arise from philosophical and cultural differences.
to-military contacts, for example, Chinese tend to resist institutional ties and following regular procedures. They prefer informal contacts that depend on a few trusted intermediaries (“friends of China”) and ad hoc procedures in pursuit of Chinese interests and objectives, which actually can undermine relations over the long term. Informal relations have clear limits for contacts with the United States military, where normal, non-adversarial relations with foreign militaries are characterized by regularization, institutional ties, and reciprocity, all of which help build mutual trust, communication, and cooperation. Regularization also mitigates against changes in contacts that can result from normal rotation of American military personnel.

One way of understanding the Chinese preference for form, versus the American preference for substance, is by examining the philosophical roots of Chinese and Western worldviews. David Hall and Roger Ames have traced the earliest philosophical differences between the West and China to the period from 800-200 BC, by which time dramatically different cultural perspectives had developed. China’s worldview gravitated toward analogical or correlative thinking, while the West’s showed a preference for rational and causal thinking. Despite these vastly different preferred perspectives, each culture, nonetheless, retained recessive elements of the other’s preferred view.

According to Hall and Ames, Western thinking presupposes: the beginning of things arises from chaos; the universe is single-ordered; rest has priority over change (i.e. being has priority over becoming); and the belief in an agency of construal, such as the Will of God, which ultimately determines the state of affairs in the world. In contrast, Chinese thinking does not presume “an initial beginning nor… the existence of a single ordered world. This mode of thinking accepts the priority of change or process over rest and permanence, presumes no ultimate agency responsible for the general order of things, and seeks to account for states of affairs by appeal to correlative procedures rather than by determining agencies and principles.”

These cultural and philosophical differences give rise to very different perspectives of time, for example, that often negatively affect dealings between the two countries. For the Chinese, time is an open-ended process with no beginning and no end. In a sense, time has “no value” to the Chinese because it is eternal. While the Chinese tend to take the long view, looking backward to over 5,000 years of continuous civilization with special pride, Americans tend to look forward to the future and emphasize how fleeting time is. Consequently, the American tendency to be impatient for change often clashes with the seemingly eternal patience of the Chinese.

These different perspectives on time are common in the dealings between the United States and China. In 1988-89 before June 4th, Chinese students I talked with often discussed their concept of democracy in China. Contrary to popular views at the time in the United States, many students demanded greater democracy (specifically the vote) for themselves as intellectuals, but they had a much different view of what was appropriate for the majority - the peasants. Most argued that the “backward” and “uneducated” peasants were not yet ready for democracy and would first need time to develop culturally. When I asked how long this would take, it was not unusual for the students to suggest that 50 to 100 years, or one or more generations of development was needed before the Chinese majority would be ready for democracy.

It is not uncommon for a Chinese counterpart to ask for patience from the American side, arguing that points of disagreement will eventually be resolved once generational change occurs in the Chinese system, for example. Although sometimes such arguments are merely stalling tactics to set aside a contentious issue while promoting Chinese interests, they often reflect the “time is eternal” viewpoint. For the American side, however, the promise of change in the undetermined and distant future, is untenable, especially when the Chinese seek concessions today on the basis of a nebulous tomorrow.

The main elements of the philosophical and cultural dimensions of the perceptual gap between the United States and China can be depicted as in Figure 2. Although both cultures can and do occasionally cross the line to selectively (and temporarily) assume positions of the other culture’s world view, both the United States and China tend to stay within the boundaries of their own cultural and philosophical preferences. These deeply imbedded differences, which are diametrically opposed to one another, help explain why miscommunication often arises between China and the United States.

Ames and Hall suggest the United States’ tendency to universalize Western values, a frequent sticking point in United States-PRC relations, is an outcome of Western causal and linear thinking. Americans tend to see the spread of Western values as a sacred mission, based on universal principles that are guided by a higher order than the mere will of man. Further, America’s own security and national interests are often linked to the attainment of universal principles.

In the United States National Security Strategy (NSS) of Engagement and Enlargement, for example, the connection between the United States’ national interests and global conditions in the post-Cold War era is closely linked and mutually reinforcing:

This national security strategy . . . is premised on the belief that the line between our domestic and foreign policies is disappearing - that we must revitalize our economy if we are to sustain our military forces, foreign initiatives and global influence, and that we must engage actively abroad if we are to open foreign markets and create jobs for our people.

The importance that the NSS attaches to promoting democracy and market economy abroad is based upon the belief that:

Secure nations are more likely to support free trade and maintain democratic structures. Free market nations with growing economies and strong and open trade ties are more likely to feel secure and to work toward freedom. And democratic states are less likely to threaten our interests and more likely to cooperate with the United States to meet security threats and promote free trade and sustainable development.

America’s self-proclaimed mission to globally spread democracy and Western values, and the unquestioned belief that the values of the U.S. are, in fact, universal, often threatens both the Chinese Communist Party’s political pre-eminence and even Chinese culture. Similar to the Western missionaries of the 19th century and early 20th century, the U.S.’s goals for China (and other countries) are based on the fundamental assumption that these values must be promoted regardless of conse-

(Continued from US-China, page 5)
quences, because these values are morally “right.”

A comparison between American causal thinking and Chinese correlative thinking, as they affect each country’s national security objectives, is depicted in figure 3. Although China and the U.S. both seek security, stability and greater prosperity, the criteria for attaining these goals are very different. The United States NSS defines security, stability, and prosperity in terms of democracy, free market economy, promotion of American values, all of which reinforce one another and promote American security and national interests.

In contrast, China’s recent National Defense White Paper outlines similar national security objectives - stability, prosperity, peace, and dialogue and cooperation with countries in the Asia-Pacific region. But, unlike the United States, China sees its security in the narrower terms of internal stability, prosperity, as well as regional peace and stability.

**Figure 3**

**COMPARISON OF U.S. AND CHINESE NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>CHINA</th>
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<tr>
<td>Security&lt;br&gt; - Overseas Presence&lt;br&gt; - Counterterrorism/drug&lt;br&gt; - Nonproliferation</td>
<td>Internal Stability&lt;br&gt; - One Party Rule&lt;br&gt; - Internal Prosperity&lt;br&gt; - Border Peace and Stability&lt;br&gt; - Dialogue and cooperation in accordance with Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence - mutual non-agression - mutual non-interference in internal affairs - equality and mutual benefits - peaceful coexistence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy&lt;br&gt; - Promotes stability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prosperity&lt;br&gt; - Free Market Economies&lt;br&gt; - Protect Intellectual Property Rights</td>
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China’s White Paper indirectly criticizes the passe “cold war mentality” of the U. S. and advocates what it calls a “new concept” for world peace. This is based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which were agreed upon by China and India in the early 1960s as a mechanism for the two countries to step back from their brief border war. These principles (outlined in Figure 3) deter any external interference in the internal affairs, while minimizing asymmetrical power relationships (such as between developing and developed countries) by stressing equality (international democracy) and mutual benefit. China unilaterally applies the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence to all of China’s territory, including disputed claims, such as the Spratly and Senkakus (Diaoyutai) Islands, as well as Taiwan.

The goals of the United States NSS, consequently, conflict in at least two fundamental ways with China’s own goals for maintaining national security. First, while the United States sees its national security irrevocably dependent upon the promotion of global democracy and market economies, China pursues market economy as a strategy to promote comprehensive strength. China further seeks to protect and channel its internal energy in ways that are advantageous and supportive of its own interests. Democracy, consequently, is problematic in the near term because it could threaten internal stability and cohesion. Without these, so the argument goes, China’s century-plus dream to recapture its past glory and regain its rightful place within the Asia-Pacific region and the world could be squandered. China’s economic development is firmly linked to Chinese nationalism, but does not accept prosperity and democracy as mutually reinforcing.

Further, China does not accept the universality of other Western values beyond market economy and democracy. As shown in Figure 4, some of these differing values include the American emphasis on the individual versus the Chinese regard for the group; the American dependence on the rule of law versus the Chinese reliance on personal relationships; and differences on human rights.

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Chinese Self-Strengthening Movement - Then and Now

Although China has resisted Western values, its views toward the West have often been ambivalent, rejecting foreign influence and interference, while actively seeking foreign capital, advanced foreign technology, and other foreign assistance to develop China. This contradiction first appeared in the 19th century, when the scholar Feng Guifen wrote a series of essays that argued that China must use the West to resist it. Although “the intelligence and wisdom of the Chinese are necessarily superior to those of the various barbarians,” he wrote, China must strengthen itself (zizheng) by adopting some foreign methods in order to meet the Western challenge. Feng’s ideas helped inspire the Self-Strengthening Movement of the late 19th century, which sought to revitalize the Qing Dynasty with the aid of foreign investment, machines, weapons, and technology. In this way, Feng believed “China would first learn from foreigners, then equal them, and finally surpass them,” possessing the means to “emphasize China’s autonomy and initiative.”

Deng Xiaoping’s formula for building socialism with Chinese characteristics, which he articulated in the opening speech of the Twelfth Party Congress on September 1, 1982, reflects the essence of the Self-Strengthening Movement. While arguing for modernization and opening to the outside world, Deng, nonetheless, rejected any “mechanical copying and application of foreign experiences and models” and urged China to base its development on its own “concrete realities” and “blaze a path of [its] own.”

HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE

A second component of the perceptual gap between the United States and China is the historical experience since the 18th century. This history adds concrete and mythological elements that effect relations even today. The pattern of relations, as previously shown in Figure 1, has often fluctuated between love and hate. Several authors described these shifts primarily from the American perspective. Warren Cohen, for example, divided American views of China into five eras: deference (1784-1841), contempt (1841-1900), paternalism (1900-1950), fear (1950-1971), and respect (beginning in 1971). Arkush and Lee identified four different periods that reflect a similar pattern in Chinese perceptions of the United States: exotic wonderment and fear (1841-1900); admiration of the American model, combined with criticism of flaws in its values (1900-1950); rampant anti-Americanism in mainland China, combined with “friendly familiarity” in Taiwan (1950-1971); and “rediscovery and respect” (1971-1989).

These different periods, the time frames between 1841 and 1950 are especially useful in providing an historical comparison of mutual perceptions between China and the United States prior to the Cold War. The cyclic and emotionally-charged swings of this period have left a mutual legacy of old resentments and disappointments, as well as unrealistic hopes and expectations that continue to haunt relations today.

American contempt versus Chinese wonderment and fear

When reviewing the history of United States and China relations before 1899, several patterns (and not a few ironies) stand out. The extreme anti-Chinese sentiment that the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 (and subsequent laws) reflected until it was repealed in 1943 is instruc-
Every Foreign Area Officer relies on open source and unclassified information at every stage of his/her training and subsequent utilization tours. The Open Source Information System (OSIS) is a tool that should be added to every FAO’s rucksack.

The OSIS is a private virtual network, or intranet, that provides US government employees worldwide access to dozens, if not hundreds, of government and commercial databases. This provides the FAO access to background information and current analysis of events and issues from virtually any region of the world. The OSIS is firewall and password protected. However, any personal computer using the Windows 95/98/NT operating systems with access to a quality telephone line can be authorized the ability to connect to the OSIS. All access and movement within the OSIS is via a Web browser (e.g. Netscape Navigator).

A PC that currently has access to a commercial Internet Service Provider such as AOL can still connect to the OSIS. Once connected to the OSIS intranet the individual can contact any public Internet site and return the OSIS server/database as well.

In addition to the more well known material, the FAO will find on the OSIS network the following types of databases:
- Air and Trade Show imagery
- Jane's Publications
- Sanitized or unclassified IIR's
- IC-Rich Open Source Environment (IC-ROSE)- access to over 900 international journals, magazines and newspapers
- Counter Drug Links
- Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)
- Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) Expeditionary Factbooks
- Library of Congress Country Studies
- Infantry Weapons Identification Guide
- Technical Equipment Library
- AFMIC Infectious Disease Assessments, medical capabilities
- Machine Translation software
- Mines CD
- NIMA products and maps from other sources
- Encyclopedia Britannica, Encyclopedia of the Orient, Bartletts Quotations, dictionaries
- Of course, one will also find links to Unified Commands, Intelligence Commands, government agencies and organizations.

The Foreign Area Officer needs this type of information as he conducts his graduate school research requirements. He further needs it while conducting in-country training as a convenient way to remain in touch with news and developments throughout his region. He needs it all the more when assigned to a non-FAO position, yet retains a desire and need to stay abreast of developments within his region, its activities and languages.

Easy access to this wealth of unclassified information may also prove invaluable to the FAO in any number of assignments or tasks in which close interaction with foreign nationals occurs. Although one cannot violate copyright laws, the ability to openly share important and timely information can be an instrumental element in building closer and more credible relations and in breaking down national or cultural barriers of suspicion.

The next step to gain OSIS connectivity is to contact the service manager for the OSIS accounts. They are:

Army - Ms Emma Covin, Ground Intelligence Support Activity (GISA), Ft Bragg, NC phone 910-396-

Air Force - Mr Dan Carrigan, National Air Intelligence Center (NAIC), Wright Paterson Air Force Base, OH (937)-257-6298 or by e-mail: jdc301@naic.wpafb.af.mil

Navy - COSPO, 703-733-5802/6468 or via e-mail at; info@cospo.osis.gov

Reservists of all services - Mr Ed Waller, COSPO, 703-733-6009 or by e-mail:rew@copso.osis.gov

Among the potentially more useful database on the OSIS is the World Basic Information Library (WBIL) managed by the US Army's Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO). The WBIL is a computer database of catalogued information about regions and countries of the world as well as transnational issues and emerging threats.

The WBIL is a 'virtual library' designed to provide open source and unclassified information that satisfies the US government's information requirements, specifically those of the Intelligence Community (IC), the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice and assorted law enforcement organizations. This database is not intended to nor can it compete with current intelligence assets. It is intended to be the best first source of basic information, catalogued in accordance with an Intelligence Community's hierarchy of about 750 separate topics. Furthermore, this information is analyzed prior to being catalogued so that the results of a WBIL database search will be more effective and efficient than the more traditional "surfing" of the Internet.

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Source documents submitted to the library are entered into a HTML form interface, which enables meta-data describing a document to be entered such as URL, title, description and abstract. These source documents can be obtained from many different sources including the WBIL "sources" repository, the OSIS network, the Internet and manually created from computer files, or paper copy documents.

The WBIL has two unique characteristics. Firstly, is the cataloguing the information. Secondly, the WBIL is built by members of the all services' Reserve forces, especially those Individual Ready Reservists and IMA's with few or no other Reserve commitments but a desire to continue their service. Managed by the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO), the work is done via "virtual drilling" or "distance drilling", which allows the Reservist to perform the work at a time and place of their choosing. Presently, there are over 75 Reservists participating and the project is undergoing a recruitment effort to support the database expansion to all regions of the world. Participation is not limited by regional expertise, military specialty or grade. Participants include a medical doctor in West Africa, Foreign Service personnel around the world, oil executives in multiple regions, university librarians, computer software salesman and college students. Participation in the project is an excellent way for the Reservist to make a valuable and valued contribution, earn drill points, utilize their foreign language(s) and learn more about their region of expertise.

Reservists that are interested in the distance drilling concept and working on the World Basic Information Library project should contact CAPT John Aaron at nja@cospo.osis.gov or 770-938-0018 or LTC Karl Prinslow, Sub-Sahara Africa FAO (48J), at the Foreign Military Studies Office, 604 Lowe Drive, Ft Leavenworth, KS 66027 or via phone at 913-684-5963 or via e-

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**Development of Iraqi Ground Combat Systems**

**By LT Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, MSC, USNR**

Through United Nations weapons inspections the world has been fixated on Iraq’s program in pursuing weapons of mass destruction. Although eliminating nuclear, chemical and biological weapons from Baghdad’s arsenal little attention is focused on Iraqi investments in the field of artillery, tank modification, and multiple rocket launch systems. The eight-year war with Iran has facilitated in Iraq’s capability to locally produce field howitzers among other items needed for a ground offensive. This article will focus on Iraqi developments in ground combat systems and discuss their potential in the battlefield.

The Iran-Iraq War taught the Iraqis that artillery was the cheapest means to deal with the human-wave assaults sent by Khomeini. Iran’s 3 to 1 advantage in human resources was countered with volumes of artillery and multiple rocket launch systems (MRLS). During the war Iraq would acquire artillery from Austria, South Africa and France and it became apparent to Baghdad that self-sufficiency in artillery projectile manufacturing and other armaments was a necessity. It is estimated that Iraqi forces expended 500,000 artillery shells per month in their war against Iran. By 1987, Iraq’s Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization (MIMI) purchased manufacturing rights to several weapons systems. That same year Iraq had become self-sufficient in manufacturing mortars, munitions, artillery shells, rocket propelled grenades and pipe launched rockets. This allowed for development of ballistic missile technology and advanced artillery systems. Iraq’s fixation with artillery culminated in the attempt to build the Super Gun. The Super Gun was supposed to be 1000 mm, 107 meters high and required 10 tons of explosives to launch a projectile against Israel, Saudi Arabia or deep inside Iran.

Today Iraq can locally produce a Yugoslav version of the Russian 122-mm towed howitzer; the Iraqis call the local version the Saddam 122-mm howitzer. This field artillery piece has been modified from the original Russian version to fire 8 rounds per minute and has a maximum range of 17,133 meters. Baghdad has exhibited this howitzer in international arms fairs, particularly in the Middle East. In June 1988, the Iraqis signed an agreement with Dr. Gerald Bull’s company Space Research Corporation to design and build two prototypes of the South African G-6 self-propelled howitzer. The result of this agreement is the Al-Majnoon a 155 mm howitzer and the Al-Faw, a 210-mm gun both with enhanced ammunition and a range of 40 kilometers. Lessons from Desert Storm has taught Baghdad that developing long-range guns is of little use if advanced tracking systems are not developed which enhances the accuracy of projectiles. The logical next step after manufacturing artillery is the local production of fire control systems.

Iraqi artillery development not only focuses on range but also focuses the life of the barrel. In contracts with Austria’s Voest-Alpine maker of the 42 kilometer GH N-45, the Iraqis wanted them to develop a barrel that did not suffer a meltdown after 638 rounds. When the Austrian firm could not fulfill Iraq’s demands for a barrel life of 1,500 rounds Baghdad went elsewhere. In following Middle-East defense trends in Arabic and International media during the Iran-Iraq War you see the same pattern of barrel life as an issue with the French AMX-30 tank.

Other developments of the Iraq’s military industry include Multiple Rocket Launch Systems (MLRS). Local variants
of the Luna-M (FROG-7A) have had their range extended from 70,000 to 90,000 meters. But the crown jewel in Iraq’s MLRS manufacturing capability is the locally produced ABABEEL system. The 400 mm ABABEEL is a truck mounted MLRS with a four round capability. Each rocket fired by the ABABEEL carries a warhead capable of dispensing 300 anti-tank bomblets and 25 anti-tank minelets. According to Jane’s, Iraq is experimenting with eight different MRLS using a wide range of technologies from around the globe to come up with an Iraqi soufflé for mass-production and export.

In the realm of tanks, the Iraqis are capable of locally modifying a wide range of Soviet and Chinese technologies to make it adaptable for their specific needs. The Russian T-72M1 Main Battle Tank (MBT) has been given additional armor in the front and rear to protect against HEAT projectiles. The T-69 Chinese Main Battle Tank have seen an addition of a 125 mm gun to upgrade its firepower to the level of a T-72 MBT and reduce its crew size to three. But no tank has been modified by Iraq more than the T-55, which China dumped on Iraq as a means of ridding itself of excess 1950s surplus materiel. The T-55 has seen more armor plating, the addition of 160-mm mortars, an observation mast and some Iraqi T-55 have been fitted with a 105-mm main gun. The addition of the 105-mm gun has converted this antiquated tank into a tank killer capable of firing armor-piercing rounds. Artillery research is conducted 25 kilometers South of Baghdad in the Al-Badr Factory in the town of Al-Yusufiyah.

These few publicized examples demonstrate Iraq’s determination not only to develop NBC technology and ballistic missiles but also local production, modification and upgrade of advanced ground combat systems. Vigilance must be maintained in all realms of Iraq’s military industrial complex. It is estimated Iraq spends 50 percent of its Gross Domestic Product on the military expenditures, it should not come as surprise if Baghdad manages to locally produce and export weapons such as light tanks and artillery systems in the future.

LT Youssef H. About: Fao MSC USNWR. 5th Navy Foreign Area Officer for Middle-East/North Africa and a 1997 Graduate Marine Corps University Amphibious School Non-Resident Program, as well as a 1998 Graduate Naval War College Non-Resident Command & Staff Program.

NOTES:


Various Arabic Newspaper Reports Collected from 1993-1998 and Translated by the Author.

Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) like to consider ourselves to be “soldier-statesmen;” a name that implies a wide variety of skills to include military expertise, an understanding of all the instruments of national power, diplomatic skill, political sensitivity, and regional awareness. The F.A.O Journal has in several articles described the difference that the right soldier-statesman in the right place at the right time can make (see for example Perrin and Norton, Mar 1998, and Dougherty, Dec 1997). Another example of a man who made such a difference is General James Van Fleet during the Greek Civil War.

Van Fleet served as a machine gun battalion commander in World War I, a corps commander in World War II, and an army commander in the Korean War. Van Fleet undoubtedly had the “soldier” part of the soldier-statesman equation down pat. Amidst these phenomenal accomplishments, Van Fleet's outstanding service from 1948 to 1950 as the head of the Joint US Military Advisory and Planning Group (JUSMAPG) in what he called "a first-class war against international communism" (Time, 23 May 1949, 26) in Greece is often overshadowed. However, it was in this a role that Van Fleet demonstrated he was a soldier-statesman as well.

The fact that Van Fleet's mission in Greece has been relegated to a footnote in Cold War history is a testimony to its tremendous success rather than an indication of insignificance. In fact, it was the United States' first successful resistance to an armed communist invasion (Army, Dec 1992, 11). Nor was there any certainty at the time that US ground forces would not be drug into the fray. On 5 March 1948, US News World Report (USNWR) reported that "Plans for actually moving units of the American Army into Greece are far advanced.... At present, in readiness is a combat force of American ground troops, about one and a third undersized Army divisions and a division of Marines. The total is about 25,000 men" (USNWR, 5 March 1948, 30). Should these ground troops be committed, USNWR predicted inevitable Soviet involvement with the end result being "a big war" (USNWR, 5 March 1948, 31).

The fact that Van Fleet avoided this crisis and saved Greece for democracy with the help of just 350 odd US advisors is a true testimony to his greatness and gives credence to President Harry Truman's assessment that Van Fleet was "the greatest general we ever had" (McCaffrey, Dec 1992, 8). FAOs like to talk about being "force multipliers.” Van Fleet and his team certainly were.

The situation with which Van Fleet was faced was one of a Communist guerrilla rebellion. The aftermath of World War II left Greece and many other European countries destitute and
Certification or lack thereof, is an annual rite of passage for countries that have been identified as producers, processors, or transshipment facilitators of illicit narcotics and are not in compliance with the 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics Drug and Psychotropic Substances. The statute that governs the United States Drug Certification procedures is the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), as amended in 22 U.S.C. B2291. This law requires that the President submit to the United States Congress a list of all countries that fail "to take legal measures to outlaw and punish all forms of illicit drug production, trafficking, and drug money laundering, to control chemicals that can be used to process illicit drugs, and to cooperate in international efforts to this end." Those countries identified by a presidential memorandum will be then: (1) Certified - the administration feels the country is fully cooperating with U.S. counter-drug efforts; (2) Conditionally Certified - the country's performance in counter-drug cooperation does not qualify for full certification, but U.S. national interest prevails; or (3) De-certified - certification is denied due to lack of full cooperation.

This unilateral system has been in place since 1986. The Department of State argues that "the purpose of the law is not to punish; it is to hold every country to a minimum acceptable standard of cooperation . . ." However, the effect of de-certification is the immediate loss of U.S. economic and military aid, an automatic "no" vote from the U.S. on economic assistance and severe trade restrictions. Once identified as a pariah state, the economic, political, and social blow to a nation is significant. Especially since certification is an all or nothing proposition, there is no reward for effort.

Many nations feel this unilateral approach hinders the U.S. efforts in the war on drugs. In fact, the literature reveals that a strong resentment against the current drug certification process is prevalent in the international community, particularly among the Latin American and Caribbean countries. The questions are: could the certification procedure, which has not been revised in over a decade, stand some scrutiny? Is the international community ready for a multilateral approach to this issue?

This asymmetrical methodology is an abomination in an era that is seeing the consolidation of multiple democracies and increasing regional integration. Although the certification process affects many countries, no countries are affected more than those in Latin America. Since many of these new emerging democracies are still struggling to be treated as equals by the United States, they are vexed by this high-handed procedure. Additionally, several countries in the region have very strong economical ties to the United States and are dependent on U.S. foreign trade and military aid in order to fund counter-drug programs. De-certification further erodes their capacity to act.

Though the U.S. Drug Certification mechanism applies to all drug producing, processing and transshipment countries, this paper will be limited to crafting a policy for Latin American and Caribbean countries. The policy options explored here may or may not be applicable to other areas of the globe. The paper will first explore some of the political maneuvering that has lead to the possibility of implementing a multilateral approach to certification in the Western Hemisphere. Then, it will posit two policy options that the United States, Latin America and the Caribbean may consider as a way to move from the existing unilateral approach to a more inclusive multilateral approach in the certification process. Finally, it will recommend what would seem to be an appropriate course of action to follow in modifying the certification process for the Latin American region.

BACKDROP

Since before the second Summit of the Americas held in Santiago, Chile, this year, the United States Drug Certification Policy has been a source of irritation among Latin American nations. While there is a broad consensus for a drug certification policy within the region, there is a marked disagreement on what form this policy should take. Influential members of government, such as Senators Kay Bailey Hutchison of Texas and Pete Domenici of New Mexico have recognized that the current process for drug certification is flawed. Even the current drug czar, Barry McCaffrey, is on record as opposing the current certification process and endorsing a strategy of increased international cooperation. Things were made worst by the recent de-certification (1997) and the "national-interest" certification of Colombia, a country in the region that many see as "haven[ing] made enormous efforts to eradicate drug trafficking." Another negative factor is the perception within the Latin community that not all nations are treated equally within the certification process, as the full certification of Mexico seems to confirm.

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The current process, which was enacted by Congress in 1986, requires that the President of the United States, under Section 490(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961 certify to Congress:

"major drug producing and/or major transit countries/dependent territories that have cooperated fully with the United States, or taken adequate steps on their own, to achieve full compliance with the goals and objectives of the 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances."

The document that provides the factual basis for narcotics certification is the Department of State's International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR). Once a country has been identified in the INCSR, in November of each year, FAA Section 490 requires that fifty percent of certain types of aid be withheld pending the President's final decision in March of the subsequent year. In 1997, of the thirty-two countries considered in the certification process, sixteen were from the Western Hemisphere region. All except Belize and Colombia received full certification.

The above numbers highlight how prevalent the problem is in the region. It is not an understatement to say that the drug-trade is a threat to regional security and prosperity. The U.S. government, instead of seeking a regional solution, has made unilateral certification one of the cornerstones of its strategy in the war against drugs. States in a colloquial manner, the U.S. is footing the bill, therefore, it has the right to institute whatever policy supports its national interest. This unilateral approach has succeeded in alienating many of the partners in the struggle. Even the Department of State, which is the lead agency in international narcotics control, realizes that many governments resent the current policy of annual certification. The U.S. certification policy has a direct impact on the countries in the region, both in political and economic terms.

While advocating that political will and international effort are key components of the counter-narcotic strategy, the U.S. seeks to pursue a course of action that other countries in the region view as increasingly antagonistic. This according to the 1997 INCSR has led "Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia to propose total rejection of unilateral actions on economic, social and anti-drug policy matters." Countries in the region may resent the current policy, a procedure that holds all the nations in the region accountable has to be part of a realistic anti-drug strategy.

EXPLORING THE OPTIONS

If political will and international effort are the pillars for an effective anti-drug strategy, then the United States should seek a policy that is inclusive and progressive in nature, rather than exclusive and penalizing. Tow policy options are available: 1) conditional unilateral qualification; and/or 2) multilateral approach.

Conditional Unilateral Approach Option

The United States could continue to maintain the current course of action with respect to the certification procedure with the modification of allowing for what Senators Hutchison and Domenici call "qualified certification."

Advocates for the current process argue that "it has proved to be a remarkably effective diplomatic instrument for keeping all governments aware of the need to pull their weight in the international drug effort." However, the certification process as it is currently designed is neither inclusive nor progressive. It could be argued that sanctions do nothing to enhance political will or international cooperation in the counter-narcotics arena. Nonetheless, certification depends mainly on the individual country, since the country itself decides how much resources, manpower and effort will be assigned to fight the production, processing, and transshipment of narcotics. While the current certification process is not based on "shared responsibility, reciprocity, balance, and consensus among the states," it holds the individual countries responsible for their efforts, by scrutinizing their failure or success in the international forum.

The dilemma for the United States stems from the fact that the current law, FAA Section 490, requires that the president either certify, de-certify, or certify vital national interest only. Any country that is less than fully certified automatically is subject to sanctions. Therefore, as stated by Senator Domenici "the fatal flaw of the current law is that it rigidly requires the president to make a choice between 'full cooperation' and 'no cooperation' when in reality many countries fall somewhere in between."

The creation of a "qualified certification" category would recognize the efforts made by the individual country, even if they did not meet the UN standard, recognizing the attempt made by the country's people and government. Furthermore, this proposal which is very similar to the granting of probation, would require that high-level personnel from the military, judiciary, legislative and executive branches of government meet with their counterparts in the respective country to map out goals and strategies for the next review. This procedure would stress U.S. coordination and direct cooperation with the countries of the region. The modification would allow for the removal of the confronta-
(Continued from Full-Tracking, page 11)

Two of the OAS's goals, as stated in the final act of the Summit of the Americas, are to "fight against the threat of drugs" and "transform drug trafficking into a capital crime in all member states." The OAS also plans to: (1) establish an Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) to fight drug trafficking; and (2) implement the U.S. policy of "conditionality" (i.e., the possibility of economic sanctions on countries failing to meet the U.S. certification requirements).

Multilateral Approach Option

Although the Second Summit of the Americas did not produce any earth-shattering breakthroughs, the one area Latin American leaders felt positive about was the possibility of modifying the current U.S. drug certification process. The International Herald Tribune printed the following, under the headline of "Summit of the Americas: A Meeting of Equals at Last; Latins No Longer Junior Partners":

"Latin American officials, for instance, believe that a great leap forward was made in the creation here of a Multilateral Counter Drug Alliance that would use the Organization of American States (OAS) as a tool to evaluate each country's record of combating drug trafficking."

Shortly after the conclusion of the summit, the OAS, more specifically the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD), started to lay the foundation to develop a multilateral process to "evaluate national and regional progress in fighting illegal drugs." A multilateral system would help to solve the current antagonism present in the region toward the U.S. certification methodology. Further, it would assist supporting the development of strong civil and government institutions, due to its high degree of legitimacy. This laudable and viable effort on behalf of the OAS marks the first time that the nations of the region have sought to address the certification problem in unison. However, the CICAD seeks to establish a certification mechanism that would not involve sanctions, which the United States would in all probability find unsatisfactory. This one element of the policy -- no sanctions -- could very well be the demise of the proposed system.

Mrs. Elaine Baker, the Jamaican delegate to the CICAD, has clearly stated that any multilateral mechanism developed by the OAS should be consultative and transparent, as well as non-punitive. The literature researched to date reflects that most of the thirty-two member nations, with the possible exception of the U.S., support a non-punitive approach. A multilateral system based on "respecting each country's jurisdiction, sovereignty, and legal structure . . ." while noble, would lack a mechanism that would ensure compliance and accountability, the very elements that make the current U.S. policy so potent. This could be overcome if the OAS procedure had a built-in penalty system. Penalties could range from probation to economic sanctions and be implemented through a series of well-defined thresholds.

Another element that is lacking in the CICAD approach is funding. Any policy without budgetary backing is meaningless. Any multilateral system would require significant economic resources to develop and implement. Significant economic cost would be associated with anti-drug programs that focus on strengthening institutions -- ranging from the peasant society to government -- in the countries of the region. Although a multilateral system would have significant legitimacy, it would lack credibility if the enforcement procedures were neglected. However, this could be overcome by a "fairshare" approach, measured either in resources or manpower hours contributed and monitored by the OAS.

A more credible multilateral mechanism would be one were the participating nations not only promote shared responsibility, reciprocity, balance and consensus, but has an establish procedure for effectively dealing with nations that fail to meet the OAS expectations that goes beyond dialogue, support and promotion of mutual confidence.

CONCLUSION

The narco-trafficking problem in the region is significant and complex. This problem does not only threaten civil society as a whole, but also represents what Tom Clancy calls "a clear and present danger" to the international community. The assumption that political will and international effort is needed to effectively combat this threat provides a solid foundation from which to build a multilateral strategy. Nonetheless, there is a long and arduous road ahead before a sufficiently capable multilateral system can be developed and implemented. The U.S. drug certification policy, although severe and at times slanted, is in fact a significant and effective tool in the U.S. anti-drug strategy. However, this essay argues that it is time that the U.S. modify the certification mechanism and move to a more inclusive and progressive approach to the problem.

Samuel R. Berger, the National Security Advisor to the President, maintains that "[w]e would have to obviously have a long discussion with congress before there were any changes in U.S. law." This may well be the case, but Senators Hutchison and Domenici have already begun to lay the groundwork within congress that will permit the modification of administration policy.

What should that policy be? This essay recommends that the United States needs to adopt an incremental approach towards multilateral certification. The first step would be to grant the administration authority to "conditionally qualify" countries that fall short of the United Nations resolution and the conditions established by the FAA Section 490, but have demonstrated a clear resolve in combating the threat of drugs. This eliminates the all or nothing approach, and recognizes effort and sacrifice. Additionally, a conditionally qualified country would work with a committee of experts in illegal drug related matters (composed of members of the OAS) to develop goals and strategies that would lead to full certification. Failure to meet the developed standards (Continued on Full-Tracking, page 13)
prior to the administration's review would result in decertification and application of the sanctions required by law. This procedure, which would be transitory in nature, would remain in place for five years or until a multilateral system can be developed by the CICAD and approved by all participating countries. If the OAS fails to draft a credible and sustainable plan, the United States would revert back to unilateral certification.

Second, the OAS has five years to develop and institute the concepts through which the Multilateral Counter-Drug Alliance would evaluate a country's record in stemming the flow of illegal narcotics to include sanctions for production, processing, transshipment, money laundering and consumption. The multilateral policy should have three main pillars: funding, cooperation, and sanctions. The OAS multilateral policy should be sufficiently funded to develop, support, and promote programs that fortify civil society and government institutions throughout the region in the struggle against drugs. Additionally, the program should emphasize cooperation among the actors, thus capitalizing on unity of effort. Finally, the multilateral system must have a way of penalizing those nations that fall short of the program goals. Holding a nation accountable for its action in the international community will assist in developing a sense of responsibility and teamwork among the participants.

The above counter-narcotics policy would contribute to eliminating the perception among our Latin American allies that they are junior partners in combating the drug trade. It also supports the U.S. strategy of engagement and support for democracy, without sacrificing the country's national interests. Furthermore, the implementation of an inclusive policy would ultimately lead to enhancement of a cooperative partnership that seeks coordination and integration of the region's efforts in the war against drugs.

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These embittered ex-ELAS leaders were the inspiration for and the nucleus of the DAS or Democratic People's Army which came into being as the result of a Politburo level meeting in Bulgaria in December 1945. At this meeting, members of the Central Committee of the KKE and representatives of the Yugoslav and Bulgarian General Staffs agreed to reorganize an insurgent Army to fight the Greek government (O'Ballance, 1966, 121).

Initial actions centered in the north, especially in Macedonia and Thrace, where the rugged mountains favored guerrilla tactics. The Communist forces, which never surpassed 28,000, were overwhelmingly outnumbered by the 265,000 troops of the Greek National Army (GNA) and Gendarmerie or national police force. To partially offset this numerical inferiority, the DAS received substantial military aid and advice from Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria. With this assistance, the guerrillas had an advantage in moral, tactics, terrain, and, to some extent, talent. The GNA pursued a static defensive strategy which was inappropriate against a guerrilla enemy and often lacked effective leadership. Within seven months, the DAS claimed to dominate three-fourths of Greece, and the GNA was left in disarray (Shinn, 1986, 52-53).

The problem was clearly beyond the resources of Britain, who was suffering from its own post-war economic shortages. On 21 February 1947, the British informed the US that they were pulling out of Greece (Paterson, 1991, 450), and on 3 March the Greek government formally requested US aid (O'Ballance, 1986, 137). On 12 March, President Truman announced the Truman Doctrine which stated that "I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." On 22 May, Truman signed a bill authorizing $400 million in aid to Greece and Turkey. By 1952, Greek forces would receive $500 million in US aid (Paterson, 1991, 449-451).

But the most valuable aspect of this US assistance was the person of Lieutenant General Van Fleet who on 7 February 1948 was appointed to command USMAPG. Van Fleet concentrated his efforts on two basic programs. The first was to retrain and reorganize the Greek Army, and the second was to cut off the flow of supplies reaching the guerrillas from Greece's northern borders (McCaffrey, Dec 1992, 10).

To accomplish this first objective, Van Fleet attached American officers to the Greek General Staff, to each corps headquarters, and to the headquarters of each fighting division. A major benefit of this dispersion was to ensure that General Staff orders were being carried out. A contemporary report noted that previously top level plans "invariably have been changed by politicians somewhere along the line. Political control of the 132,000-man Army has been so great that members of Parliament often have vetoed military orders, had Army units stationed in their own areas regardless of military need elsewhere" (USNWR, 5 March 1948, 31).

This phenomenon had contributed to the defensive strategy thus far employed by the Greeks. Van Fleet and his men retrained the Greeks "to fight a mobile, offensive war instead of simply garrisoning key towns and villages - a policy which in the past had left most of the countryside at the mercy of hit-and-run raids" (Stavrianos, 1952, 203).

Van Fleet also endeavored to reorganize the GNA at the highest levels in order to decentralize command and to encourage greater initiative on the part of field commanders. The field army was reorganized into five corps instead of three. In the past, each corps commander had been directly responsible to the National Defense Council for operations. Now they would come under the control of the Chief of the General Staff (O'Ballance, 1966, 166). There was also a reshuffling of senior Greek officers, involving the gradual replacement of less efficient and energetic commanders and staff officers (O'Ballance, 1966, 187).

The most notable of these personnel moves occurred on 25 February 1949 when "with Van Fleet's hearty approval" (Time, 23 May 1949, 27), General Alexander Papagos, the hero of the Greek victories in the Albanian campaign of 1940, became Greece's Commander-in-Chief. Part of Papagos' conditions for accepting this post was a streamlining of the National Defense Council. With Papagos firmly in charge, GNA operations could proceed according to a coordinated central strategy that would allow "the country to be treated as a whole and to be swept through from south to north" (O'Ballance, 1966, 187-188).

Van Fleet also discovered that it was not just the hierarchy of the Greek Army that required attention. There was also a shortage of trained junior officers, and to correct this problem he set up training schools to increase the supply. In so doing, Van Fleet had to massage the Greek sense of pride which was slow to admit that more training was needed (Time, 23 May 1949, 27).

But the key element Van Fleet brought to the retraining of the Greek Army was his own strength of personality. The 23 May 1949 issue of Time featured Van Fleet on the cover and describes the accomplishments in Greece as being brought by Van Fleet's "unrelenting pressure" (Time, 23 May 1949, 27) and notes that Van Fleet "has a heart every bit as stout" as the Greeks he is advising (Time, 23 May 1949, 26). But the author's strongest compliment may be that Van Fleet "has given the Greeks a great more than [US arms and supplies]. He has given them hope" (Time, 23 May 1949, 26).

Armed with this new enthusiasm and emphasis, the Greeks launched an anti-guerrilla offensive on 15 April 1949 designed to surround and annihilate the guerrilla concentrations in northern and central Greece. The two principal operations, DAWN and CROWN, were directed against guerrilla concentrations near Rmeli in central Greece and in Grammos near the northern border (Condit, 1967, 514). CROWN was the Greek's first effort to capture Grammos, and they fought well. They inflicted severe casualties on the guerrillas but were unable to destroy them. The bulk of the enemy was able to withdraw into Albania (Condit, 1967, 515).

In spite of this failure, it can be argued that at this point the tide was turned. LTC Edward Wainhouse writes that "Despite the fact that the guerrillas at the end of 1948 still were 23,000 strong, the initiative had passed to the GNA and a confident, more experienced, and better trained national army was ready to launch its offensive in the spring of 1949" (Wainhouse June 1957, 24). In just a short while, Van Fleet had made a big difference.

It was this steady improvement in the Greek Army that al-

(Continued on Van Fleet, page 15)
allowed Van Fleet to implement the second of his programs -- to seal off the guerrillas from their lines of communication on Greece's northern border. He did this by an autumn 1948 offensive which involved clearing operations beginning in the south and moving northwards. This process would drive the guerrillas back to their main base in the Grammos-Vitsi region where the final blow would be struck (Condit, 1967, 516). Along the way, the army and the police took steps to negate or destroy the guerrilla intelligence net by arresting or temporarily detaining known Communist sympathizers or suspected informants prior to initiating offensive operations. These efforts were very successful (Wainhouse, June 1957 and O'Ballance, 1966, 192-193).

The Greek Army was now able to secure its lines of communication and prevent the enemy from re-infiltrating into areas that had already been secured (Condit, 1967, 516). The results were dramatic. By 16 March, the Greek government was able to announce that the Peloponnesian were completely clear of guerrillas and the Greek Army could thus be released for operations on the mainland (O'Ballance, 1966, 189). This capability was first exercised in the mountain ranges to the north and northwest of Athens. The GNA units were used to seize and hold passes and peaks while the LOK (Commando) and other infantry battalions trained in antiguerrilla warfare spread outwards in movements to contact (O'Ballance, 1966, 192).

The conflict between Tito and Stalin benefited the Greeks when on 10 July, Tito announced his intention to progressively close his borders with Greece. The guerrillas received increased assistance from Bulgaria and Rumania, but the main center of DAS activity was Albania (O'Ballance, 1966, 195). Given this situation, the guerrillas amassed 7,000 troops in the Vitsi range region and another 5,000 to the south in the Grammos Range. From these positions, the guerrillas hoped to launch offensive operations (O'Ballance, 1966, 196). But since most of the other parts of Greece were now clear, General Papagos was able to concentrate six of his eight field divisions against the guerrillas in these areas. Under these circumstances, Van Fleet stated on 23 June that he was "very optimistic" about the situation and that he was "confident that [the Greek Army] can do the job by winter" (Stavrianos, 1952, 203).

On 5 August, Papagos initiated his attack on the Grammos Range, and on the 10th he attacked the Vitsi. Initially there was little progress. Then, slowly but surely, and largely thanks to 51 Curtiss Helldivers supplied by the US to the Greek Air Force, the guerrillas fell back. On 28 August, the Greeks seized and blocked the two main passes from the Grammos Range into Albania (O'Ballance, 1966, 198-199).

The changing political landscape began to greatly benefit the Greeks. With Yugoslav aid drying up, the guerrillas became dramatically dependent on Albania. However, Albania now had on its border a Greek Army that "with US aid... had been converted over-night from an ill-equipped, dispersed, and not-too-efficient army, into a formidable, well-equipped, competently led fighting force with guns, trucks, tanks, and over fifty modern aircraft. If Greece chose to swoop into Albania to try and encircle the Greek insurgent elements sheltering there, there was nothing the tiny, rag-tag Albanian Army could do to stop her..." (O'Ballance, 1966, 199-200). Being a pragmatist, Hoxha, who by this time was the Albanian Prime Minister, announced that all Greeks found in Albania would be disarmed and detained (O'Ballance, 1966, 200). On 16 October 1949, from a secret radio station in Rumania, Greece's Communist guerrilla leaders announced a "cease-fire" in order to "prevent the complete annihilation of Greece" (Time, 24 October 1949, 32 and O'Ballance, 966, (Continued on Van Fleet, page 16)
Contemporary reports and later analysts give much of the credit for the United States' first Cold War victory to General Van Fleet. Time described the victory as "a great day for Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet and the Greek people to whom he had tried so hard to bring peace" (Time, 24 October 1949, 32). In commemorating Van Fleet's death in 1992, Army likened Van Fleet's efforts in Greece to those of Baron Friedrich von Steuben and the Marquis de Lafayette during the American Revolution: "As Baron von Steuben, he was the trainer of their armies, and as the Marquis de Lafayette, he was the leader from overseas who helped secure their freedom on the field of battle" (McCaffrey, Army, December 1992, 11). Perhaps, President Truman put it best when he succinctly stated that "I sent him to Greece and he won the war" (McCaffrey, Army, December 1992, 11).

As today's Army increases its involvement in security and stability operations, as FAOs assume greater visibility and responsibilities, and as the military continues to try to do more with less, the example of General Van Fleet in Greece represents a standard for study and emulation.

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The history of conflict in Vietnam might cause some people to pause when they find that you were on your way there to immerse yourself in the culture. Images from the Vietnam War do not necessarily lend themselves to a yearning for the beautiful beaches and verdant landscapes that are a reality there today. Conflict with major world powers, dating all the way back to 111 BC with the Chinese, and later the Japanese and French, and between the North and South, seems the norm. Vietnam has been conquered and colonized so often it is refreshing to learn that relatively recently new businesses have cropped up and opportunity exists for the Vietnamese to build a robust economy. Activities for western visitors that will make them feel right at home are prevalent, and tourism is increasing.

The Air Force recently sent seven officers to Vietnam to participate in a ground breaking language immersion program. The officers took part in a four week immersion in Hanoi, the first such immersion program in Vietnam sponsored by the Air Force Foreign Area Office (FAO) Prop-\textit{onent Office}. The participants came from varied backgrounds: operational, support, intelligence, logistics; from bases throughout Asia and the US. They all had some background of Vietnamese language, but were not necessarily fluent speakers—yet. This program is designed to encourage a commitment to continued learning and study of all languages and cultures in the world, and to provide the tools and the experience to do so.

In order to support the USAF mission of Global Engagement and US interests and responsibilities worldwide, the Language Immersion Program has emerged as a key tool to prepare our future leaders for their role in the new world order. Immersion program participants were exposed daily to the living language, and developed the awareness that may be critical to future operations in Southeast Asia. Living as locals, students had the opportunity to become attuned to the thought processes of the Vietnamese. They learned the subtleties of a region that is likely

(Continued on Hanoi, page 24)
In an effort to bring professional military education to the Marines of BLT 3/6, the Air Combat Element and the Force Service Support Group, CWO2 Rick Lyons, USMC, the disbursing officer and I traveled 40 miles northwest of the exercise area in Egypt to El-Alamein. We successfully arranged for 100 marines to visit the El-Alamein War Memorial and Museum at the conclusion of joint exercises with Arab, Italian, French and British Forces in October 1997. Being half-Egyptian myself and fluent in Arabic I not only haggled for discounted tickets and a bus, but acted as the translator for Major Hassan, an Egyptian Army Tank officer and museum director. The tour was a welcome break for the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) (SOC) and offered a unique opportunity to visit a battle site in which the legendary Erwin Rommel’s Afrika Korps faced General Bernard Montgomery’s British Eight Army.

The tour began with the Allied Forces Hall, which a lighted map of the battle outlined the tactics and strategy of both Rommel and Montgomery. While translating for Major Hassan the marines would learn how El-Alamein was not only the first battle won by allied forces but also the first battle in which both mechanized infantry and air forces were effectively combined by British forces. Nazi battle standards of the Afrika Korps, maps and notes captured from Axis forces graced the allied hall. From there the marines filed into the Italian Hall where period uniforms, equipment and weapons were displayed along with decorations, medals and battle flags. Among the items found beneath the sands of El-Alamien was a ford jeep intact with its munitions, according to Major Hassan the jeep was cleaned of decades of sand and debris, gas was then placed in the jeep and it ran perfectly. The Egyptian curator also explained that period mines, munitions and other items are found by local Bedouins, during a Bright Star exercise, a British soldier brought home a live World War II grenade that tragically exploded while the soldier handled the ordnance at home maiming him.

The Egyptian hall contained a description of the role Egyptian forces played in providing logistical support to British forces, processing POWs and providing vital intelligence on enemy movements. In the center of the hall, is a life-size figure of Corporal Hassan (No relation to the museum director) a Sudanese soldier of the Egyptian border guards serving along the Libyan border that shot down a German fighter plane and took the pilot hostage. The director explained it was a one in a million shot that brought down the Messerschmidt and it was the talk of Cairo at the time. Photos of Egyptian officers receiving the Legion of Merit from General Eisenhower show the little discussed role African and Egyptian forces played in the Second World War. From there the British hall where uniforms and weapons of the British Eighth Army were on display, it included Arab headdress that matched the khaki desert uniform. Also on display were rations, and common survival items the British soldier carried with him. Finally, the last hall in the tour took Marines to the German hall where among the displays of uniforms and helmets was Field Marshal Rommel’s two-seater motor bike, goggles, cap and scarf which was donated by his son Manfred Rommel during the re-dedication of the Museum in 1989. The Desert Fox would reconnoiter battle sites driven on the motorbike.
The Israeli Connection is an interesting book that sheds light on the unlikely partnership a nation struggling for survival forms. However, the author is indicting the Israeli military establishment arguing that backing military juntas and dictators that are gone in fortnight and change their policies on a whim is no way to create a lasting foreign policy. Middle-East FAOs as well as other area FAO specialists should find Beit-Hallahmi’s work an interesting read.


The Janet and John Wallach are both free-lance writers who together have written three books on the Middle-East that primarily focus the Palestinian and Israeli conflict. Desert Queen is the biography of one of the most important shapers of modern Middle-East history who receives little attention because of her gender. Gertrude Bell like T.E. Lawrence longed for the open expanse of the desert, of its solitude and the tribes that made up the Arabian Peninsula. Lawrence of Arabia and Gertrude Bell began their Arabian adventure through archeology and discovering the untouched regions of Central Arabia called the Najd. I enjoyed the book because the Najd is where I spent my childhood and reading the pages of the tribes of Arabia, I could easily see the faces and wise men my grandfather used to introduce me to during our trips to the desert. Gertrude Bell unlike Lawrence of Arabia would go on to be a prolific author and an architect of the Arab Revolt on which T.E. Lawrence found fame executing the plans laid out by Gertrude, Percy Cox and General Allenby during World War I.

On the outbreak of World War I and Ottoman Turkey’s alliance with Germany, people who wandered the desert, spoke Arabic and traveled extensively through Arabia became prime of paramount military value. The Turkish Army with its bases in Syria and Arabia threatened England’s access to the Suez Canal in Egypt and her empire in India and Eastern Asia. Gertrude after being held captive by the Bin Rashid tribe and her interaction with fierce tribes like the Howeitat, Shammar, and Anazeh reported to the British Consul in Constantinople that the Ottoman grip on the Arabian tribes was loosening. She also reported that the Bin Rashids a tribe supported by the Ottomans were self-destructing with murderous plots for power and inter-family rivalry leaving the oldest leader of the tribe a mere seventeen years of age. The Ibn-Saud the arch-enemy of the Rashids had allied themselves with the British and tribes of Islamic radicals taking over vast tracts of central Arabia and finally vanquishing the
against foreign oppression. But the Boxer Rebellion is only the best known and most violent display of anti-foreignism that has repeatedly occurred in China since the 19th century. Often this anti-foreignism has been intertwined with Chinese nationalism and the quest for modernization, as well as with the need to demonstrate that China has stood up to the West. This anti-foreign element could be seen in such comic heroes as “Soccer Boy,” who in a CD-ROM version could fight and win the Opium War, or in the popular television soap opera, “Foreign Babes in Beijing,” which pandered to the “most negative Chinese views of foreign women.” The runaway bestseller of the summer of 1996, “The China That Can Say No,” written by five co-authors who have never traveled outside of China, reflected what the authors called a “post-colonial sentiment” that resents “American demonization of China over issues ranging from arms proliferation to human rights and family planning” and “abstract struggles with China over ideology and politics,” which ultimately seek to contain China’s growth and development as a strong competitor to the United States.

American paternalism versus Chinese admiration and criticism

The foreign military suppression of the Boxer Rebellion, which included American forces, devastated parts of Northern China where the uprisings occurred. The ruins of the Old Summer Palace (Yuanmingyuan), even today, almost one hundred years after the sanguineous imperial grounds were occupied and razed by foreign troops, remain a potent symbol of a time when China was impotent to expel foreigners from its soil. Heavy compensation was demanded of China in the Boxer Protocol of 1901 in retribution for the loss of foreign property and personnel. The debt, which was not amortized until December 31, 1940, amounted to $333 million with interest, a tremendous sum considering that the Qing government’s annual income at the time was estimated to be about half that amount.

Despite great internal suffering and disorder China successfully survived imperialist pressure during the late 19th century and early 20th century. In the end, the “breakup of China” did not occur, partly owing to Chinese dexterity balancing one imperialist power against the other. Nonetheless, the trauma of Western aggression in China left a wellspring of anger and resentment for past wrongs which reflexively permeates Chinese nationalistic views of the West today.

The United States role in China during the late 19th century and early 20th century was at best ambiguous. Throughout the period the United States was proud it did not try to establish any colonies in China. The United States, however, readily took advantage of the most favored nation (MFN) clause, which Fairbanks characterized as a “me-too policy,” which gave each treaty power all the privileges any other power acquired in China from the beginning of the treaties established between 1842-44, following the Opium war. The United States also participated in the violent suppression of the Boxer Rebellion, as well as the imposition of indemnities, but remitted part of these indemnities in 1908 and the remainder in 1924 on the provision that these funds “would continue to be made available by China mainly for educational purposes.” The United States Open Door policy toward China, which became the traditional basis of United States policy for decades, helped preserve China’s unity by restraining dismemberment by foreign powers, but was intended not to protect China, but rather to ensure equality of access among the contending foreign powers.

By the beginning of the 20th century the United States had developed a paternalistic view of China, seeking to save China by transforming it along American lines in religion, politics, economics, and technology. During this time, support for the Nationalist Party (Guomindang or Kuomintang, KMT), under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi) who along with his wife, Song Meiling, embraced Christianity, developed in the United States, setting the stage for its involvement in the Chinese Civil War.

The United States supported the Nationalist government in its resistance to the Japanese invasion, and became openly allied with China after Pearl Harbor. As the war in the Pacific came to an end, however, Americans became disillusioned with the corruption and inefficiencies of the Nationalists. Some United States military officers familiar with China, such as Marine Captains Evans Carlson and Colonel David Barrett (the head of the first contingent to the Yenan Observer Group, the “Dixie Mission”), as well as other China observers, such as Edgar Snow, advocated cooperation with the Chinese Communists. These ideas, however, were anathema in the anti-Communist atmosphere following the end of World War II.

During the Chinese Civil War, the United States, despite its reservations toward the KMT, continued to provide support and assistance even after the Nationalists fled to Taiwan in 1949. This United States involvement in the Chinese Civil War hardened into Cold War polarization with the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, providing a legacy of support and assistance to Taiwan that has continued even with normalization of relations with the PRC in 1979, and will complicate bilateral relations for the foreseeable future.

IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES

“Some senior Chinese Communist Party leaders still see U.S.-China friction in terms of Cold War struggle between political systems - a perception which is mirrored by many in Washington.” David Shambaugh

After World War II, Sino-American cultural differences and historical experience were intensified through an ideological prism that pitted Western democracy and capitalism against spreading communism. The founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 was a turning point. In the United States, the victory of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) resulted in an ethnocentric and hysterical political debate, influenced by anti-Communist sentiment, over how the United States “lost China.” Some of America’s most experienced and knowledgeable China experts were targeted in the process.

Despite the fall of the Berlin Wall, the reunification of Germany, and the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, ideological differences remain germane to present and future relations between China and the United States. The Chinese criticize the United States for retaining Cold War thinking, while claiming China has transcended ideology to pursue a pragmatic modernization agenda. They emphasize the socialist rather than the communist nature of the post-Deng China, using a cumbersome, but politically correct phrase “socialism with Chinese characteristics” to describe the political nature of the Chinese state. Further, they point out that China dropped its pursuit of global communism, while the U. S. continues to pursue global democratization.

Even though communism in China today lacks ideological substance, it retains the authoritarian domination by the tiny minority of communist party members. The CCP represents only 4.5 percent of the
population, but dominates over 50 percent of the positions in the Chinese government, and retains control over the commodities, regulations, and investment funds, which fuel the market economy.\(^{59}\)

Further, as John W. Garver has argued, the CCP cadres, like the aristocratic Junkers of pre-World War I Germany, can be viewed as ideologically anti-capitalist. The CCP pursues economic norms only to improve socialism, not transform it, and to keep it firmly under the CCP dictatorship.\(^{60}\) The CCP cadres, like the Junkers, form a closed elite system. New members are added, not based on open competition or merit, but “via a rigorous, top-down process of recommendation and sponsorship by existing members, together with...review of candidates’ ideas, activities and social origins.”\(^{61}\)

In the United States, no clear post-Cold War paradigm has emerged that would permit a dramatic abandonment of the goal to transform residual communism. If anything, the objectives of United States policy have been broadened to target all other non-democratic authoritarian forms. Whether communism holds minority power over a tiny and impoverished island, such as Cuba, or an unpredictable but fast declining country, such as North Korea, or the fastest growing economy and one quarter of the world’s population in China, the ultimate goal for the United States is to encourage the spread of democracy to all countries.

This “change or die” attitude toward the CCP has been characterized by the Chinese as the threat of peaceful evolution. Some American officials would take this goal even further, as Senator Jessie Helms did in his sponsorship of Radio Free Asia, by seeking nothing less than the speedy overthrow of the CCP, regardless of the consequences. Until and if CCP rule in China and/or the United States anti-communism view is eliminated, ideology will persist as an important dynamic of the relationship.

**CONCLUSION - POLICY PROSPECTS**

The up and down pattern of the historical relationship between the United States and China, compounded by cultural, philosophical and lingering ideological differences, suggests that it will be extremely difficult to develop mature and stable state-to-state relations. Lacking the impetus of an overarching issue or common enemy, as occurred during the Second World War and the last two decades of the Cold War, differences will likely continue. Current events do not bode well for relations between the United States and China, the success of the 1997-98 summits not withstanding.

President Jiang Zemin has consolidated his power base in the post-Deng era. He has personally invested considerable prestige in promoting ties with the United States, and for the moment relations, including military contacts, appear to have the green light at the highest levels of the Chinese leadership. To support this present trend, the virulent anti-Americanism that characterized the official and public media reporting in China during 1997 have largely disappeared, replaced by more benign, even romantic, views, such as American Flying Tigers helping protect Chinese cities during World War II.

While Jiang’s position seems secure, a scandal weakened United States President may prove to be more of a liability than an asset in helping to sustain the latest upturn in Sino-American relations. The Administration’s China policy, which has felt the bipartisan sting of criticism, since President Clinton’s first term, has failed to rebuild a sustainable consensus. This policy remains overly dependent on economic interests as the raison d’être for relations between the United States and China. The concept of the “strategic partnership” is too ill-defined and justified to garner broad political support. Finally, a laundry list approach to justifying the latest resurgence of Sino-American relations will likely prove too weak to counter the next crisis, whether it
and plan engagements with allied forces in the desert. Upon his defeat in 1942, the Afrika Korps led allied forces on a chase to Tunisia. Upon surrounding the elite German unit it was found that the majority of their Panzers had been destroyed and they had been using captured allied tanks and vehicles and scavenging for petrol in an effort to keep what remained of axis territory in Africa.

It was a delightful afternoon and marines of the 24th MEU accompanied by Colonel Richard Natonski, USMC (MEU Commander) entered the underground command bunker where General Montgomery spent several months planning and counter-attacking German and Italian forces. The museum is built around the bunker which house model figures of generals, the wounded and other scenes recreating life under the sands of the Egyptian desert. Major Hassan thanked us for our visit and the MEU commander presented him with 24th MEU coin. The Marines roamed the outer gardens of the museum which had on display at least three dozen tanks, vehicles and anti-aircraft guns found in the desert. Marines couldn’t resist the gift shop haggling for perfumes, papyrus and other items for friends and relatives. It was an enjoyable PME and having visited Egypt many times, this was my first time in the Western Desert, which exposed me to a part of the country I had not seen. It was great to translate all the pertinent questions marines asked and the fascination and interest they had in a vital chapter of the Second World War. These opportunities could only be possible as a United States Navy Medical Service Corps Officer. Among the marines and sailors that accompanied me, LT Gerardo Cruz, MSC, USN would earn his Surface Warfare Medical Department pin and would go on to make us proud in Central America as part of humanitarian efforts in the wake of Hurricane Mitch. Colonel Richard Natonski, our MEU Commander would pick up the star of Brigadier General this year. The MEU Sergeant Major along with a few of my friends of the 24th MEU (SOC) are currently aboard the USS Nassau Amphibious Ready Group currently deployed in the Adriatic Sea and should be relieved by the USS Kearsarge soon. My thoughts are with them.

LT Aboul-Enein served as linguist/Mid-East advisor to COL Richard Natonski, USMC during Exercise Bright Star 97 and as an Arabic linguist to the Commandant of the Marine Corps during his Bright Star visit to Egypt. Currently Plans, Ops, and Medical Intell officer at Naval Hospital Great Lakes, he is author of The Monarch and His Army: An Examination of Power Relations in Saudi Arabia which appeared in the August 1997 edition of the Marine Corps Gazette and is the newest columnist on Mid-East affairs for the FAO Association Journal.

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Rashids in their capital of Hayil. Growing up in the region, I am familiar with the geography of Arabia, yet my main criticism of the book is that there are no detailed maps of the region and which areas is controlled by what tribe. It was in this atmosphere that Gertrude along with British diplomats and military planners concocted the Arab Revolt. Using the discontent of the tribes against the Ottoman Turks, the British through Lawrence of Arabia where able to occupy 40 Turkish army divisions in a vain effort to subdue Arabia. These divisions lessened the Ottoman impact to contribute to the German and Austrian alliance against Britain and France.

After the war Gertrude Bell made many enemies within the British government as she pressed on for Arab rights and was instrumental in carving out modern Iraq from the remnants of the defeated Ottomans. She went on to advise, live and die in Iraq, committing suicide in 1926 at the age of fifty-eight. She would miss the demise of the monarchy she helped create in Baghdad, that involved a bloody military coup de’etat in 1958. What is extraordinary about Gertrude Bell is as a woman, she traveled the treacherous deserts of Arabia, Syria and Iraq earning the reputation Daughter of the Desert, Queen of the Desert and being named an honorary man by one tribe. The Arab tribes accepted her as an equal and she was valuable because like T. E. Lawrence she did not shy away from telling her superiors what she thought when it came to Middle-East affairs. Also unlike many colonial administrators and military men who had nothing but contempt for anything not British. Gertrude Bell had a healthy respect for the local customs and traditions of the Bedouin, Druze and Turks that allowed her to observe their strengths and weaknesses.

Bell’s description of the desert as a quiet unlike mountains of the Alps or forests of Europe is right on the mark. Her gravesite is still in Baghdad.

The NTC Librarian Annie helped me obtain this interesting book, about this tenacious woman. Ask her to assist you in getting Desert Queen through inter-library loan, she found it for me at the Lake Forest Library.

(Continued from El Alamein, page 19)
is hard evidence of possible Chinese interference in United States elections, proliferation, or other issues, such as the trade imbalance.

Only a strong U.S. President could convince the American public over congressional criticism to support a nebulous and contradictory China policy. Congressional impeachment proceedings will likely paralyze the President’s ability to carry out foreign policy at a critical time in the Sino-American bilateral relationship. Since China is neither friend nor foe, it is likely that relations will be allowed to drift, wasting the opportunity of the last year to move the bilateral relationship to a more mature level.

Although Jiang’s commitment to relations with the United States seems secure, he must deliver on Chinese domestic expectations, such as an end to the Tiananmen sanctions. A weakened U.S. President, however, may not be able to overcome congressional criticism to make such a step, nor will he be able to pursue United States interests as confidently and forcefully as he needs to deal with this difficult relationship. If the President fails to deliver on both Chinese expectations (perceived and real) and/or American expectations, another downturn will likely result, leading to another misstep in Sino-American relations.

END NOTES
1. The elements of power can be distinguished between “natural determinants (geography, resources, and population) [which] are concerned with the number of people in a nation and with their physical environment. The social determinants (economic, political, military and national morale) concern the ways in which the people of a nation organize themselves and the ways in which they alter their environment.” David Jablonsky, “National Power,” Resident Course 2, Vol. 1, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1993, pp. 50-82, quoted on p. 2-23, Non-resident Course 2, Vol. II.


5. Ibid, xvi.

6. Ibid, xvi.

7. Ibid, xviii.


9. The Chinese commonly say they have over 5,000 years of continuous history, which coincides with the earliest known dynasty the Xia (2200-1750 BC). Westerners often use 3,000 years as a benchmark, which is up to the Shang Dynasty (1750-1040 BC), which followed the Xia.


11. Ames and Hall, 182.


13. Ibid., I.


16. Ibid., p. 4.

17. The Chinese government claims sovereignty over four island atoll groups in the South China Sea - the Pratas Islands and Reefs, the Paracel Islands, the Macclesfield Bank, and the Spratly Islands. Claims of Chinese sovereignty first appeared in Western records in the late 19th century, during the late Qing Dynasty. Marwyn S. Samuels, Conquest for the South China Seas (New York: Melhuen, 1982).

18. I would like to thank David Finkelstein for his insights on this discussion.


20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.


24. Ibid., p. 3.


27. Ibid., 19.

28. Ibid., 302. Xu, who never visited the U.S., was a great admirer of George Washington for his leadership of the successful revolution against British rule, and his decision to retire to private life after office, which appealed to Chinese meritocracy ideals. He wrote favorable accounts of the American political system, based on information he gathered in China, which remained highly influential for decades.


31. Ibid.

32. In the early 1990s in Beijing it was common to hear reporters complain that editors did not want to publish positive stories about China. Even reports of grass roots democracy did not interest editors. Although the media have finally picked
up on village elections, the trend toward negative and exotic reporting still is prominent. In 1996, however, the Chinese official press matched, if not exceeded, negative reporting in the United States.

33. Ibid.

34. John W. Dower investigates this racial element in War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986). Examining the racial aspects of the war between Japan and the United States, he observes the negative racial stereotyping occurred on both sides, and notes how quickly and easily these “patterns of thinking . . . were transferred laterally and attached to the new enemies of the cold-war era: the Soviets and Chinese Communists, the Korean foe of the early 1950s, the Vietnamese enemy of the 1960 and 1970s, and hostile third-world movements in general” (Ibid., 14).

35. The Mongols invaded China and established the Yuan Dynasty (1279-1368).


37. For reading on this subject see Peter Ward Fay, The Opium War, 1840-1842 (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1976), and Hsin-pao Chang, Commissioner Lin and the Opium War (New York: W.W. Norton and company, Inc., 1964).


39. The siege of the Peking legation, which lasted from June 20 until August 14, 1900, is the best known event of the Boxer Rebellion. Approximately 475 foreign civilians, 450 troops from eight countries, and about 3,000 Chinese Christians resisted the eight-week siege until rescued by foreign forces. Two hundred and fifty foreigners, mostly missionaries, were killed throughout China during the summer of 1900.


44. Zhang Zangzang, Tang Zhengyu, Song Qiang, Qiao Bian, and Gu Qingsheng.


50. Fairbanks, Reichauer, and Craig, 578-579 and 460.

51. Ibid., 325.

52. Ibid., 248


56. Schaller, Tuchman, and Shewmaker, 202-203.


58. Richard M. Fried argued in Nightmare in Red: The McCarthy Era in Perspective (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990) that American anti-Communist sentiment preceded both the Cold War and Senator Joseph R. McCarthy’s assault on domestic communism. He also argues that even after Senator McCarthy was censored in 1954, anti-Communist sentiment declined but did not die out.


60. Ibid., 16.

61. Ibid., 17.
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