Dealing With Saddam
Airport Survival in the Third World
A Norte-Americano’s First Week
Poland In NATO: Historical Dimension
South Asia: Time For Reevaluation
FAO’s: Full-Tracking Now A Viable Career
Sub-Saharan Africa
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PURPOSE: To publish a journal for disseminating professional knowledge and furnishing information that will promote understanding between U.S. regional specialists around the world and improve their effectiveness in advising decision-makers. It is intended to forge a closer bond between the active, reserve, and retired FAO communities.

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SUBMISSIONS: The Association is a totally voluntary enterprise. For the Journal to succeed, we need articles, letters to the editor, etc. Contributors should mail articles to the above address or to the FAO Proponent Office, ODCSOPS-DA (DAMO-SSF), Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20310-0400. Articles are subject to editing by the FAO Journal Staff, to ensure that space constraints of the publication are met.

WEB SITE: The Association Web Site is at — WWW.FAOA.ORG.

ADDRESS CORRECTIONS: FAOA is a private organization. We rely on the membership to update their mailing addresses on a regular basis.
Dear Fellow FAOs:

For a long time I have considered whether the FAO Association should fulfill more than a role as a facilitator for professional and regional discussion within the specialty. It seems to me that we should also fulfill the role of advocate and, even occasionally, of lobbyist for causes that directly impact on the good of our members. I am not suggesting that either of these functions become our main thrust, but only that important issues that affect us should not be left unsaid.

In that vein, one of our members recently brought just such an issue to my attention, and I in turn want to pass it along for your individual consideration. A sister non-profit, professional association, the American Foreign Service Association has been actively engaged in lobbying Congress for increased support for Embassy Security worldwide. This is an issue of great importance not only to the Foreign Service Officers of the Department of State, but to every active duty Foreign Area Officer (and many reserve FAOs and retirees as well).

Think about how many of us trained or are training at embassies around the world. Think about how many of us are serving at embassies in Attaché, Liaison, or Security Assistance positions around the world. The upgrading of the security at those embassies SHOULD NOT BE A SMALL ISSUE TO ANY OF US.

Admiral William Crowe, a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, chaired Accountability Review Boards for the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam embassy bombings. In his report to Congress he noted that 14 years after a similar commission headed by Admiral Bobby Ray Inman gave its security recommendations to Congress, less than 12 percent of our embassies meet the security standards set by that original commission.

Again, this is a serious issue that demands some sort of action by Congress. The question is what can we collectively or individually do about it? As an organization, we can lend our formal support to the American Foreign Service Association’s campaign, and I will be taking this up with the Board of Governors. Individually, each of us can write our congressmen as concerned private citizens. Now if we were really a professional “machine” we would provide ballot-like postcards to which you would only have to sign your name. Unfortunately, we are not such a “machine” and actually expect members to pick up pen and paper and make their feeling known on their own. So, bottomline, if you agree that this is an important issue, do something about it!

Scouts Forward,

Joseph D. Tullbane, III.
President, FAOA
**Association Scholarships . . .**

Dear Editor,

I read with considerable interest your paragraph in last quarter’s Association News on a future scholarship program for the FAO Association, but was disappointed that we are taking the same tired “give a son or daughter a scholarship to college” approach that so many other non-profit organizations have taken. The scholarships are seldom enough to really help someone faced with four-years of college and I think a waste of money. It appears to me that a FAOA scholarship program should somehow cater to and directly benefit the membership. Have you explored any other possibilities for better tailoring the program to us, the members? Even if it is deemed good to “give a son or daughter a scholarship to college,” can’t we do something for the rest of us?

Jim Philips
SE Asian FAO

**EDITOR’S NOTE:** Jim, We have discussed something similar to what you are talking about on the Board. One of the key aspects of the Association is that it seeks to not be like every other ordinary non-profit association. One of our ideas is to offer a “project scholarship” aimed at FAOs who are near grad schools or regional programs and wish to take single courses to enhance or improve their regional FAO skills. In fact, the holdup on getting our scholarship program on the street centers on this concept. Since no one else does such a thing, we are having to create the rules/eligibility from scratch. Right now, the thinking is to try to serve both masters — offer one scholarship aimed at someone seeking a four year degree and 2-4 of the “project scholarships.” Would welcome your comments. JDT

**African Regional Specialty . . .**

Finally, an article for us African regional specialists! I really enjoyed Major Toomey’s humorous escapade in the hinterlands of Ghana that appeared in last quarter’s issue of the journal. It reminds me of me twenty plus years ago. I hope that we will see more on this largely forgotten segment of the Globe.

Roger Bergson
Retired 48J (Sub-Saharan Africa)

**EDITOR’S NOTE:** Roger, you will be even happier this quarter because we have yet more articles on your neck of the woods. What we lack is an article by a distinguished retired African FAO, such as yourself, telling us more about the good old days in darkest Africa. JDT

**The FAO Basic Course . . .**

Sir,

I am hoping to be accessed into the Foreign Area Officer field in the next year or so and have been conducting some research on how FAOs are trained. I understand that there is a FAO Basic Course held at Defense Language Institute in Monterey, CA. Can you tell me anything about the course? Is it required attendance for all Army FAOs or just available to those that get their language training on the West Coast? I’ve heard that it is not required, but feel that any new FAO would want to go if possible. I know that I’m getting ahead of myself but is there some way to get the material given at the course if by chance I do my language training on the East Coast or in-country? Are there any plans for the course to become a joint course with Navy, Marines, and Air Force officers in attendance? The cross-Service fertilization might really add something to it.

Debra Gardner
CPT, Ordnance

**EDITOR’S NOTE:** Dear CPT Gardner, First, good luck in getting FAO. Second, to answer your question. There is a one-week long FAO Course offered in Monterey as an orientation of new Army FAOs and their spouses to the specialty. The Army Proponent has found that if the pros and cons of our interesting but sometimes difficult specialty are laid out completely, newly accessed families will more readily buy into the lifestyle and be more willing later in their careers to take on the hard assignments. While not required, the course is reasonably valuable but is only offered to those officers taking language at DLI — it is a money thing. For other officers the Proponent has tapes of the sessions as well as copies of the slides available. On the positive side, the Proponent is trying to get 10 TDY-and-Return slots for officers on the East Coast, under OPMS XXI. As far as your other question about the possibility of making the course a “joint” course, the Army proponent has offered seats to the other Services and the Marine Corps looks like it might take the Army up on its offer. Further, the Air Force sent a Proponent representative out to the course as an observer this month, so maybe they will join us too. JDT
By Ambassador Edward L. Peck

DEALING WITH SADDAM

Per-cep-tion, n. 1. An immediate or intuitive recognition.

Perceptions are all that matter in human relations. Neither inherently bad nor necessarily incorrect, they nonetheless control how we see, and how we react to virtually everything. They can replace reality without even the most ephemeral linkages to it, and become highly resistant to modification once established.

This can be troublesome in foreign relations, where misleading perceptions can result from differences, both real and imagined, in culture, ethnicity, religion, policies, or politics. In dealings between and among sovereign nations, the important thing is not what you say you are doing, think you are doing, or even are actually doing. What matters is what others perceive you to be doing, because that will determine how they respond.

Superpowers, regional or global, increase the potential for perception-related problems. They are often concerned with and involved in issues well beyond their own borders, adding the additional distortion of distance. They can influence far-off events, a capability itself influenced by how they are perceived.

In the United States, by a wide margin the only remaining global superpower, have a strong self-perception of ourselves as, inter alia, the moral leaders of the world. That image does not consistently bear a close resemblance to the way others perceive us, which affects how they deal with us. The undesirable aspects of all these factors at work were revealed by the most recent, as yet unresolved stand-off between President Clinton and Saddam Hussein.

WHERE ARE WE?

IRAQ DIDN’T WIN, BUT WE REALLY LOST!

In the four months spanning the end of 1997, the rest of the world watched in combined distress and bemusement as we aggressively fumbled our way to what was universally perceived as a major foreign relations debacle in the Middle East. It has had an impact on how we are seen that is as unfavorable as it is unfortunate. If it had been a soccer game, in which international spectators voted to determine the score, they would probably have made it Iraq 25 – US 0. Not because Iraq did anything right, but because we did almost everything wrong.

Diplomats have a responsibility to report the views of other countries honestly and accurately, whether or not the information is welcome. That knowledge in theory contributes to more effective policies, but no one in Washington enjoys bad news. There is a tendency to stifle the flow of such information, and ignore it when it comes. This is particularly true when we embark on a policy first, and then insist that the rest of the world agree and follow, as was the case in the Saddam crisis.

We obstinately refused to listen as the rest of the world tried to tell us that we were wrong and alone. The only significant domestic debate was between those who wanted to bomb Iraq and those wanted to bomb Iraq using larger bombs. Virtually nothing appeared which represented a rational opposing view.

The tone and content of this article have therefore been strengthened somewhat, in the belief that readers already know and understand the other side. In a world in which increasing interdependency is desirable and unavoidable, a hard look at the compelling gap between how we saw ourselves and how others saw us has value. Their perceptions are not necessarily any more accurate or valid than ours, but it is perhaps significant that ours were shared by hardly anyone.

It is in this context that what follows must be read. It is not in any manner whatsoever intended as a defense of Saddam Hussein, support for any of his policies, or as an assault on any of ours. With the foregoing caveats firmly in mind, here is how we were seen almost everywhere as the result of our recent efforts to bring down Saddam: as an arrogant, insensitive, immoral — and inept — bully.

IMPERIOUS AND HYSTERICAL – Disturbing and Disturbed.

- Our objective for the last seven years, openly articulated by two Administrations, is “Get Saddam,” and we have made little effort to hide it. Abrupt attempts to cloak it under various international causes were therefore seen as deceitful, and not very bright.

- Declarations that we have the right to decide who runs Iraq were frightening. Our leaders talked openly about taking out Saddam because — very simply put — we do not like him. TV and radio polls on whether we should kill the leader of a Moslem Arab country thousands of miles away were equally chilling glimpses of the American public’s
profound concern for international law and the rights of sovereign nations.

No one gives us the responsibility of determining who is in charge anywhere. We have deposed the leaders of Panama and Haiti, actions which were not necessarily viewed with equanimity, let alone satisfaction, by governments in the hemisphere or elsewhere. No one can stop us, alone or in combination with others, which adds an element of genuine apprehension to our interaction with the rest of the world. They fear, and that’s the right word, that we have become far too powerful, and far too aggressive and arrogant as a result.

- We insist weapons inspections must be completed before the embargo can be lifted, but Presidents Bush and Clinton have both publicly stated that it will never be lifted until Saddam is gone – and we have the veto. Inspections have thus been perceived, correctly, as cover for “Get Saddam.”

- The bellicose assumptions that the Gulf States, the UN, everyone, would support military action against Saddam to help us achieve that goal were flat wrong from the very start. We refused to acknowledge the fact, or understand where we went wrong, and persisted in trying to secure commitments, doing additional damage to our role and to our image.

- As the failure of the policy became increasingly clear, we fell back on hyperbole to try to whip up support, which made us look worse. The President endlessly insisted that Saddam “threatens the children of the world,” despite the manifest lack of agreement, even in the Middle East. Our UN Ambassador told the National Press Club that, “we must ensure Saddam is aware that everything he does further solidifies the UN against him,” which was just plain wrong. The Secretary of State, speaking to a Columbus Town Meeting and the world on CNN said, “Let me make you a bet. We care more for the people of Iraq that Saddam Hussein does.” She got loud cheers, even as we were preparing massive air attacks on totally defenseless Iraqis.

- The world perceived anti-Saddam media ravings as irrational – and racist. The normal restraints of reason were swept away: anything at all could be said, and was. A November 5th Washington Post op-ed piece was revealingly titled, “The Genuine Article: When Policymakers Face the Truly Evil.” It lists atrocities Saddam committed personally, then forever defines responsible journalism with a line that cries out for enshrinement on the masthead: “Whether each and every story is true is not important.”

- In December, the US Prevented Tarik Aziz, Iraq’s Deputy Prime Minister, from addressing the UN Security Council. We expressly created the UN to provide a forum in which nations could discuss and resolve differences, and we were hoping to use the Security Council as a front for the planned attacks on Aziz and his county, but he was not allowed to speak to it. Everyone noted that at the very time we were pushing Northern Ireland and Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, we refused to talk with Iraq. More on this later.
growth of extremism; the popular view of America; and the views of the Arab governments that support it.

• The most pressing Middle East agenda item for the people who live there was also left out of the discussion. We remain unwilling to acknowledge the perception of the rest of the world, and certainly the Arabs, that the lack of progress in finding a reasonable solution to the Israeli-Palestinian issue threatens the future and stability of the region far more than does Saddam or his remaining materials of mass destruction. It is also viewed as in a large part the fault of the United States.

SELECTIVELY MORAL —
Which is not moral at all.

• Our insistent self-promotion as the champions of human rights everywhere is seen in the Middle East to exclude everyone in Iraq, Kurds in Turkey, Kurds in Iraq if attacked by invading Turks, or Palestinians anywhere.

• We ringingly condemn as heinous Iraq’s crime of not fully complying with a UN resolution. At the same time we fully and unstintingly support Israel, ignoring – and in fact facilitating – its refusal to comply with a number of UN resolutions. This perceived double standard totally negates any claim we could make to moral standing in the region. It is also highly offensive, implying that others are unaware of the facts.

• Similarly, our repeated insistence that Iraq must not be allowed to destroy the credibility of the Security Council by ignoring one of its resolutions is perceived as preposterous. We actively obstruct the implementation of every single resolution on the Middle East – except one.

• Everyone knows it was the US – and not the UN – which imposed the two no-fly zones in Iraq, under the rule of “might makes right.” Everyone knows that in the northern zone, inside Iraq’s sovereign borders, we installed an embarrassingly inept CIA operation to overthrow Saddam – until he flushed it out in 1995. Both actions are gross violations of international law and the UN charter.

HEARTLESS AND BIASED —
Unacceptable in an Ally.

• WW II in the Pacific started with Pearl Harbor, and ended with atomic bombs. We then occupied Japan, for seven years; the embargo on Iraq has entered its eighth. It is everywhere perceived – correctly – as an American effort to force a popular uprising to oust Saddam by restricting the importation of everything, not just weapons-related material. All the Iraqi people can do, however, is suffer. Marches on the Palace in Baghdad are extremely short, and you are only around to take part in one.

• Our leaders continuously stressed the unacceptable dangers to the region posed by a country that invades its neighbors, meaning Iraq. Arabs more logically think of Israel’s multiple invasions, and its continued occupation of portions of Lebanon, and Syria, and Palestine, all of which we not only condone but finance and support.

• We condemn Saddam for harsh mistreatment of the Kurds. The Arabs perceive Israeli persecution of the Palestinians and Turkish persecution of the Kurds, carried out with our weapons and geopolitical protection, as equally unacceptable.

• We are determined to permit no comparisons between the policies of Iraq and Israel; the Arabs are determined to insure their policies are compared. THE DIFFERENCE IS PERSPECTIVE, AND IT IS A MAJOR DIFFERENCE.
As we entered 1998, pressures continued to build for a one-sided war, but UN Secretary General Annan secured a resumption of inspections. Everyone knew the attacks would not accomplish anything other than further suffering and death, but we had left ourselves no other option unless Saddam blinked – and he did.

He was coerced into letting the highly-suspect inspections resume, but without prospects for an end to the sanctions (as far as we know). This reduces the likelihood that he will cooperate for long, since he is getting very little in return, and raises the question of “What Then?” Before going into that issue, it is worth a look at how we got to this point.

WHERE WE WERE

HOW DIFFERENT IT ALL WAS THEN

During the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980’s, we perceived the same Saddam Hussein in a markedly different light. He was not a friend, nor did we like his suppressive internal policies or the expansionist goals we knew he harbored, but we saw mutual advantage in working with him. At that time, our primary objective was to insure the Ayatollah did not spread Iranian fundamentalism westward. We concluded that Saddam could help, and openly supported him with intelligence and materiel, including chemical and biological agents (no secret then but a fact that we know). This reduces the likelihood that he will cooperate for long, since he is getting very little in return, and raises the question of “What Then?” Before going into that issue, it is worth a look at how we got to this point.

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[ It is instructional to note, in the context of this discussion, that the Israelis were more on the Iranian side. While they did not like Ayatollah Khomeni, his beliefs or goals, but perceived Saddam as posing a greater threat. “The enemy of my enemy is my friend” is as true in Tel Aviv as it is in Damascus, Buenos Aires, or St. Louis.]

The invasion reversed our relationship with Saddam from a hesitant but forthcoming cooperation to an implacable hostility, for two reasons we considered important. First, it caught us totally by surprise, publicly embarrassing the self-declared champion and protector of Kuwait (and the other oil states). Second, it changed our perception of his threat from potential to actual. We took the lead in mobilizing the military coalition that removed him from Kuwait, which makes sense, and have ever since been dedicated to removing him, which does not.

It is important to remember that Desert Storm was made possible by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Throughout the Cold War, neither superpower ever took on the other’s friends directly because of the risk of a global conflagration. A surrogate was required, and we had none in the Middle East. If the Soviets had still been a major player, we would probably have been unable to take an open military role, and Iraq might still be in Kuwait.

Americans are convinced that it would be a far better world if we had “finished the job,” i.e., gotten Saddam. Ignoring for the moment the serious question about what would have happened if we had actually tried to do it, there may be some utility in considering why we did not.

- There was no legal mandate. The UN called for pushing Iraq out of Kuwait, period. It was on that basis that Arab countries provided facilities, and/or took an active role in the fighting. Without their cooperation, it would have been impossible to launch the overwhelming forces that finished the fighting in less than two weeks, with limited loss of life on our side.

- More importantly, had we continued into Iraq the coalition would instantly have ceased to exist. No Arab government would ever, under any circumstances, be involved in an American invasion of another Arab country. No Arab government could survive for long if it did. We would have lost their bases, territorial airspace, political support, and a great deal more. Arab unwillingness to be involved in a US assault on Iraq, absent an overwhelming justification such as the invasion of Kuwait, is a sobering reflection of how we are seen in the Middle East: as a bigger threat than Saddam. They perceive us as far more interested in advancing Israel’s objectives than theirs.

- If we had been able to “Get Saddam” and/or topple his government – and the operative word is IF – we would probably have created a worse problem. As discussed below, Iraq is held together by a repressive regime, but it is held together. The most likely outcome would have been a bloodbath, with no benefit for anyone, and even Washington could see that.

- Finally, it is impossible to predict what the results of “finishing the job” might have been. The American public uses the phrase to mean knocking over the regime and then going home. This, of course, is precisely what the Arabs were and are worried about.

WHERE WE ARE HEADED

AND THIS IS THE HARD PART

The Middle East region is the focus of a major share of our limited international attention, for a host of valid reasons, and Iraq is just one of them. For the Arabs, for evident reasons, developments in that country have vastly greater significance. Saddam rules it, a country the UN said we have bombed into a pre-industrial stage. We have coerced the Security Council into maintaining an embargo that has achieved nothing but immense suffering for the Iraqi people and a harsh view of the United States. We cannot keep major military forces on continuous alert indefinitely. At some point in the near future there will have to
AIRPORT SURVIVAL IN THE THIRD WORLD
By MAJ Comer Plummer

“Il n’y a plus de place, monsieur.”

I could see it coming. She had now tapped that return key a few times too many. Normally, once or twice and “voila”, your boarding pass. The fact that I had confirmed my reservation the day before did nothing to relieve my anxiety. This was the only airplane out for the next few days. The ripple affect of missing this flight would throw my carefully planned itinerary into utter chaos. Another airport, another FAO experience.

For most all FAOs, the first immersion experience is the arrival airport, and the last, the airport of departure. The wave of that initial sensation of your first Third World airport is something few FAOs or their families ever forget. For FAOs - ICTers, SAOs, DATTs and the like – this is only the beginning of a recurring challenge that is negotiating this obstacle course. While all airports are not created equal, if your travels will take you to/from those located between 40N and 30S, I offer the following survival tips:

The cardinal sin for a FAO is to not comply with the entry requirements for a given country. This information is available in a number of sources, foremost, the Foreign Area Clearance Guide. The Consular Section of your embassy can assist you here as well. You can also access this information through the FAO, DoS, and country web sites. Research and confirm. This is your responsibility. Arriving without a visa or required immunization is not the way to impress your hosts. Testing the needle recycling program of a developing country is not a way to enhance your longevity.

Money is another challenge. Carry small bills and change for tips. This amount will vary, but should be about five, one-dollar bills or the local currency equivalent. Coming in, you’ll need more money for a taxi (if appropriate) and tipping the hotel bag handler. No self-respecting FAO should borrow money from the expediter for this or any purpose. Keep an emergency stash of cash. Since many currencies are virtually non-convertible outside their countries, most FAOs try to draw down their cash before flying out. This can invite disaster since, in many instances, the airport imposes taxes on outbound passengers. If you find yourself flying at odd hours, this can be a problem, since, when present, currency exchanges are only open during peak hours. I recommend you keep 50-100 USD cash concealed on you (a good idea in general) to guard against such a problem.

Arrange for an expediter. Yes, I know, you’re a FAO. You will feel oddly pampered by someone guiding you through the airport, filling out your embarkation/debarkation cards and generally holding your hand. There will very likely come the day, however, when you too will encounter that disinterested ticket agent who will tell you that your confirmed ticket is worthless. Then expediter says those magic words “wait here” and disappears to chat with his airport buddies behind the counter. A few moments later he just as routinely hands you your boarding pass. Problem solved. If you don’t have an expediter, then take a baggage handler. While they won’t do you any good then there’s baggage. Take a carry-on. It’s a pain and a war – everyone has a parachute kit bag they try and stuff in the overhead – but essential. Carry your toilet articles and a change of clothes. Rare is the FAO who has not experienced baggage problems on ICT. Know your baggage weight limitation and pack accordingly. What you are allowed for checked baggage weight can vary dramatically between carriers. Unsuspecting FAOs have paid hundreds of dollars in excess baggage fees. This is NOT refundable.

Then there’s baggage. Take a carry-on. It’s a pain and a war – everyone has a parachute kit bag they try and stuff in the overhead – but essential. Carry your toilet articles and a change of clothes. Rare is the FAO who has not experienced baggage problems on ICT. Know your baggage weight limitation and pack accordingly. What you are allowed for checked baggage weight can vary dramatically between carriers. Unsuspecting FAOs have paid hundreds of dollars in excess baggage fees. This is NOT refundable.

Stay alert and ask questions. User friendly airports they aren’t. Once you enter the door, you will be swimming in a cultural experience of the first water. Things we take for granted, the arrival/departure screens, signs marking corridors, even which airline is at what counter frequently don’t exist. The public address systems, when present, are a listening exercise that makes any DLI experience a farce. No relaxing at the gate. It’s not uncommon for an airport to have one waiting room for all flights.

(Continued on airport, page 27)
NATO's transformation

The NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) is an international organization with a politico-military character, founded by the Washington Treaty on 4 April, 1949. The Organization, at the beginning, consisted of 12 members (Belgium, Denmark, France, Netherlands, Island, Canada, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, United States, Great Britain, Italy). Its membership was expanded several times; in 1952 Greece and Turkey joined, in 1955 Germany, in 1982 Spain and in 1999 Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. In the 'cold war' the NATO's main objective was to defend the security and sovereignty of its members against of the Warsaw Pact (dissolved in 1991).

The highest executive body of the Organization is a Ministerial Council, consisting of the representatives of all members who meet twice a year under the chairmanship of the Secretary General. Other structural bodies are: the Permanent Council of NATO (ambassadors), the Defense Planning Council, the Nuclear Planning Council, the North Atlantic Co-operation Council, etc. The strategic area of NATO operation is divided into three commands: Supreme Allied Command Europe, Supreme Allied Command Channel, Supreme Allied Command Atlantic.

The transformation of the security environment in Europe since 1989 has had a profound impact on the North Atlantic Alliance. In addition to major reductions in the levels of armed forces and in the aspects of their readiness, availability and deployment, it has led to a number of new or much expanded tasks for the NATO. These include establishing a process of dialogue and cooperation with the states of Central and Eastern Europe and the newly independent states on the territory of the former Soviet Union; developing a close working relationship with other European institutions, notably the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Western European Union; and introducing new command and force structures which reflect the changed strategic environment.

In 1990, the London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance issued NATO’s New Strategic Concept. The process of NATO's transformation contains three aspects:

a) strategy and military structure;

b) cooperation with post-communist states;

c) NATO's participation in conflict prevention / resolution.

During the Brussels summit in January 1994 a new formula of cooperation with the post-communist states was elaborated and the 'Partnership for Peace' program was adopted. This program is open for the state members of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Priorities of the Polish foreign policy.

Basic objectives of the Polish foreign policy follow:

1. Integration with the Euro-Atlantic security structures and economic organizations;

2. Keeping and developing relations and mutually profitable co-operation with all neighbors of Poland;

(Continued on page 9)
(Continued from page 8)

3. Strengthening of the Polish position in the region through active participation in the existing structures of the regional co-operation;

4. Enhancing and boosting relations with all countries of the world and creating favorable conditions for mutually profitable co-operation.

Realizing its own concept of the security, Poland is also ready to contribute to security and stability of the European continent as a whole. It can be achieved through participation in the international security structures, such as a NATO, but also the Western European Union. Poland considers the North Atlantic Alliance the main mechanism guaranteeing the security of the state and irreversibility of the democratic changes in our country. It is in the Polish interest that the North Atlantic Alliance still remains a system of collective self-defense, based on a permanent presence of the United States in Europe. Taking into consideration the fundamental changes in the international relations, Poland actively supports the extension of hitherto prevailing Alliance's activity into new tasks and new operating areas, not limited to the territories of its members only as well as the NATO's readiness to cooperate with other institutions responsible for security and peace in Europe.

Poland's road to NATO

After the collapse of the old structure of the Warsaw Pact (1991) Poland found herself in an area of undetermined security. The heads of all Polish governments formed since 1989 have in their Parliament exposed stressed the need to work consistently towards Poland's membership in Euro-Atlantic institutions. On this particular issue, Poland's leading political parties have been unanimous for long. Public opinion polls, too, have been showing that the majority of the population favors the country's quick adherence to NATO.

The NATO summit in Brussels in January 1994, published the Partnership for Peace Framework Document. The next month, in February 1994, Poland signed this document. She was also the first Central European country to prepare a Presentation Document to the NATO Headquarters and to adopt an annually adjusted Individual Partnership Program.

In January 1995, Poland and the other Partnership for Peace signatories were included in the NATO Planning and Review Process, involving two-year preparation programs for the selected military units meant to upgrade their operational ability to Alliance's standards. The individual dialogue according to the '16 + 1" (NATO's 16 plus aspiring countries) formula, begun in spring 1996, and resulted in the staging of direct co-operation between Poland and the Alliance. Upon request, in April 1996, Poland presented her Individual Discussion Paper on NATO enlargement, visions of an enlarged Alliance and of a broadly understood new European security architecture; it pointed out how Poland could contribute to the strengthening of NATO and the extent to which she could meet the membership criteria.

In the beginning of July 1997, the NATO summit of the heads of states and governments in Madrid decided to invite Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to begin talks on membership in the Alliance. The decision was included in "Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Co-operation'. The Declaration further determined that it was the aim of the Alliance to sign an Accession Protocol at the next session of the North Atlantic Council (December 1997) and to conclude the ratification process in time to allow the invited countries to obtain 'effective' membership by April 1999.

In December 1998 the ratification process by 16 members of NATO had been completed. On 29 January 1999, the Secretary General of the Alliance, Mr. Javier Solana, sent formal invitations to the governments of Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary. On 26 February the President of the Republic of Poland, Mr. Aleksander Kwasniewski, signed the ratification document. This document was conveyed to the US Secretary of State on 12 March, 1999. On that day Poland became a full-fledged member of the North Atlantic Alliance.

Historical dimension.

On 12 March, 1999, a period in the European history was closed. The enlargement of NATO finally cancelled and annulled the unjust order imposed by the Yalta Agreement (1945).

The enlargement of NATO expands Europe's zone of stability and the family of democratic states. The Alliance enlargement also has strategic value. It widens a NATO-controlled security zone and rolls back its eastern border from the integration center. Poland also has military significance that is important to NATO. Owing to its sizable economic and military potential, Poland is not only a consumer of security but a state capable of effectively supporting implementation of the Alliance's tasks.

NATO is not a source of threat, on the contrary, it is a stabilizing factor in Europe. The future of democracy in Eastern Europe has not been prejudged so far. There are many organizations in Russia and Belorussia openly propagating slogans of restoration of the Soviet Union with its former spheres of influence. There are also new kinds of threats: international terrorism, uncontrolled transfer of mass destruction weapons. As long as the threat of destabilization exists, a strong NATO is necessary.

As of March 12, 1999, Poland became an integral part of the new European order. The Polish people, having been fighting for their independence for almost 200 years, need peace and stability. Membership in NATO can be seen as a big success of the Polish foreign policy, which creates a unique chance for future generations to live without a danger of external aggression. Poland was and continuously is ready to develop cooperation with all its partners and in all spheres, for mutual benefit, social progress and common well-being.
FOREIGN AREA OFFICERS: Full-Tracking Now A Viable Career

By COL (R) John B. Haseman

Single-tracked Foreign Area Officers. For years the army personnel management system insisted this was not a possible career choice and encouraged personnel assignment officers to insure that Foreign Area Officers shuttled back and forth between their basic branch and their functional specialty. The wise officer generally followed that guidance in order to maximize promotion potential. But now the new army personnel system has made single-tracking as a FAO a distinctly possible career choice. The change in policy will provide the army with a highly educated and informed corps of regional experts, and it is preaching to the choir to praise this important decision.

I was one of the few Foreign Area Officers to single-track as a FAO under the "old" system. For the final 20 years of my 30-year career I had only FAO or school assignments. This resulted in a tremendously interesting and rewarding career, and I made it to O6 in the process. I thought that FAOs who are now contemplating the potential of a single-track FAO career pattern might find my experience helpful as far as the possible mix of assignments that a regional specialization career can bring.

I present this summary not as an "I love me" experience, but as an illustration of what a long (20 years or so) FAO career can mean in terms of assignments, professional education, and career rewards and challenges. Timing and luck are important because slots change, people extend or curtail their overseas tours of duty, and world events influence -- and mandate -- career choices. But perhaps captains and majors in particular would find the career possibilities interesting.

20-YEAR FAO CAREER, CHRONOLOGY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assignment</th>
<th>Years</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Language School (prior to FAO status)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Command (TRADOC)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional military education (CGSC)</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Language School</td>
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<td>Security Assistance</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Command (TRADOC)</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Defense Attache System</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>(AWC by corresponding studies)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Army Staff</td>
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<td>Language School</td>
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<td>Defense Attache System</td>
<td>7</td>
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My career was unique. I know of no others who had quite the same mix of assignments and experiences as I. Remember that the period from 1975 to 1995 was a period in which personnel policy "required" duty in basic branch assignments as part of a full career pattern. Yet the times, and the circumstances, allowed me to continuously request, and receive, FAO assignments. Part of this was because my branch -- Military Intelligence -- did not begrudge my detail to FAO assignments because the mix of MI and FAO was a good fit. This compatibility might not exist in other situations, particularly for combat arms officers. Nonetheless it was possible for me, and may well be possible for you, to have a successful 20- or 30-year career by primarily single-tracking in FAO assignments.

Here's how my career went.

First off, I became a FAO in an unusual way. My interest in Southeast Asia began as a college student and was cemented in stone during two combat assignments in Vietnam. I fell in love with Southeast Asia despite the circumstances of the war, and in particular was attracted to the challenges typified in my second Vietnam assignment as a district-level advisor.

After the Vietnam War I went to Thai language school in 1973 and then to an MI assignment in Thailand. It was at that point, in 1974, that I found out about the FAO Program. I applied while a captain in Bangkok, and the army personnel system responded quickly. They determined that I had already been language trained (Thai), had a masters degree (which I had earned on my own), and was in an "in-country" assignment. I was instantly blessed as a fully-qualified Thai FAO. (Note: The original individual country FAO codes for Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines were later consolidated into the Southeast Asia specialty code.) No special graduate degree program. No in-country training. No foreign staff college. I became an instant FAO. That part of my career experience is unlikely to be repeated today!

Following my Thailand assignment I returned to CONUS to prepare to attend Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. The assignments folks were kind enough to position me in advance by assigning me to a FAO billet as a war-gamer at the Combined Arms Center. Along the way I was promoted to major. At the start of my CGSC year I asked to sponsor a foreign student officer from Southeast Asia, and was paired with an Indonesian officer. When assignment request time came I asked to go back to Thailand. The assignments officer's response was, "There are no slots there, but we do have a spot in Indonesia," and the army personnel system responded quickly. They determined that I had already been language trained (Thai), had a masters degree (which I had earned on my own), and was in an "in-country" assignment. I was instantly blessed as a fully-qualified Thai FAO. (Note: The original individual country FAO codes for Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines were later consolidated into the Southeast Asia specialty code.) No special graduate degree program. No in-country training. No foreign staff college. I became an instant FAO. That part of my career experience is unlikely to be repeated today!

My first FAO assignment in Jakarta (1978-1981) was to the security assistance organization there, the Defense Liaison Group (now the Office of the Military Attaché for Defense Programs). I spent two years managing the International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program, during which I sent more than 500 Indonesian officers to US military schools. That period laid the foundation for an extensive network of friends that served me well in later assignments in Jakarta. Then I extended
my assignment for a third year in order to become the Army Division Chief (an O-5 slot). The request was approved "on the come", and fortunately my selection for lieutenant colonel came shortly after I began the job. My final year was spent managing and coordinating foreign military sales, delivery of equipment, and overseeing army training and schooling for Indonesian officers going to the US.

Reassignment to CONUS took me back to a FAO billet at Fort Leavenworth as Activities Officer for all foreign students at CGSC. I planned to spend three years at Fort Leavenworth, so I bought a house and settled in to my assignment working with the dozens of foreign officers attending CGSC.

Less than six months later I got a call from the FAO assignments officer asking "Did you really mean it when you said you would go back to Asia at any time?" Well, yes, I meant it, and, surprise, they wanted me to go back after less than a year in CONUS. Instead of three settled years I got 11 months.

This was one of those coincidences where good luck and timing -- as well as my willing availability -- all worked. It seems that the officer selected for a position was deemed unacceptable by the host country military, based on prior experience with him. This is an important lesson: assignments can, and are, influenced by the host country. I was asked to be the Assistant Army Attache, a billet that required both a FAO and fixed-wing pilot qualification -- the Jakarta Defense Attache Office is one of several with a C-12 aircraft. But because of the short-notice assignment, the Defense Attache (DATT) was told he could have a pilot or a FAO but not an officer with both qualifications. Presented with potential candidates in both specialties, the DATT chose to have a FAO and get by with one less pilot in the military community. That's how I got back to Jakarta.

This illustrates another important factor. I did not know personally the Defense Attache who picked me, and he did not know me. He had the cold facts of my career background to look at. But he also had anecdotal references from many people who knew me personally -- the assignments officer, people on the embassy staff with whom I had previously worked, and senior officers in the Indonesian armed forces who also knew me from my three years in Jakarta. The reputation you build along the way does stay with you, and fortunately for me I had established myself as a professional and others had confidence in me. So off I went to Jakarta again (1982-1985) for my first of an eventual three years in the attache business. In the career advancement side, I returned to CONUS in 1985 and was assigned to the "obligatory" assignment in the Pentagon. I became the senior Southeast Asia Analyst in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (now Deputy Chief of Staff -- DCSINT) -- a FAO billet, not an MI slot. My time in ACSI benefitted again from fortuitous timing. In 1985 the start of the "People Power" movement in the Philippines brought that country to the front pages of the world's newspapers -- and to a high priority for the Army Staff. For many months I was the Army point of contact for intelligence and analysis on the situation in the Philippines. I coordinated papers throughout the intelligence community. More importantly, I spent many hours briefing my bosses within ACSI as well as the ACSI himself, as well as others on the Army staff. I got a lot of "face time" with the Army Chief of Staff and Vice Chief, and accompanied the Chief of Staff on a quiet visit of encouragement to his Philippine counterpart.

About the time that the Philippine situation resolved itself I started reading the O6 FAO vacancy list. This was 1985-86, and I confirmed with the FAO and DAS personnel offices that the Defense Attache billet in Jakarta would come open in 1990. Hoping to be promoted to Colonel, I wanted my career arranged to be available for that assignment. But by happy coincidence (remember, timing is important) I also found out that there was a vacancy in 1987 for the Defense Attache billet in Burma, and no candidate had surfaced. I told the assignments folks that I wanted that job, because the timing was such that I could go to Burmese language school, agree in advance to a three year assignment in Burma instead of the required two years, and then transition directly to the DATT assignment in Jakarta.

The assignments officers agreed that it was a good fit. But there were several challenges to be overcome. First I had to be selected for promotion to colonel. Second, I had to be released from my army staff job "ahead of term" -- in other words, get out of the Pentagon after only one year on the army staff. I
took my request to my boss, the ACSI. I will always be grateful to General Sidney ("Tom") Weinstein for his perceptive understanding. After looking me straight in the eyes and asking "is this what you really want?", I assured him that I had given it a lot of thought, and wanted to pursue a career in the attaché system. He approved my release from the army staff and I entered Burmese language training at the State Department -- studying my third Southeast Asian language. And I was selected for promotion to Colonel. And off I went to Burma.

I wish I could say that my three years as Defense Attaché in Burma (1987-1990) was a wonderful assignment. Burma itself is a wonderful country, with friendly, gracious people and a fascinating culture and history. Unfortunately it is afflicted with one of the world's most ruthless military dictatorships, the "counterparts" with whom I interacted as a major part of my duties as Defense Attaché.

After experiencing the inspiring period of pro-democracy demonstrations, which brought literally millions of Burmese people past the front of our Embassy, we also had to experience the brutal repression of those demonstrations. This is where I learned the hard lesson that not every government is nice, not every government subscribes to American principles, and dealing with such governments and living in such an environment is tough duty. There are many such countries remaining in the world today and there are Defense Attaché Offices in many of them. Duty in such places is stressful. That is part of the FAO's career and lifestyle. I spent two of my three years in Burma as a front-line critic of the Burmese military, in accordance with U.S. policy (and my own conscience) and at the direction of and in total agreement with the courageous and able U.S. Ambassador to Burma.

My assignment in Burma was a tremendous challenge, one that I enjoyed both for knowing the people of Burma and for the privilege of serving on the front line of American foreign policy. But I didn't enjoy the Burmese army rifles pointed inside my car window, or the tank guns leveled at our embassy staff convoy. I'm glad we only had to do one evacuation of Embassy families, and that the really dangerous period was only three months long. What you do on duty lives after you too -- I have been persona non grata in Burma for much of the time since the end of my assignment there. That means it has been difficult to return as a tourist to visit the people and places I came to like so much.

The career plan I established for myself worked out just fine. In 1990 I transferred directly from Burma to Indonesia, and began a four-year period as Defense Attaché in Jakarta. This was undoubtedly the high point of my career. All of the friendships formed during my first two assignments in Indonesia came to fruition. Officers I had met as young captains and majors were now the senior leaders of the Indonesian armed forces. Our friendship, based on mutual trust and understanding forged during years of personal contact, gave me an unusual degree of access to the leadership of the country.

The Indonesia military played a major role in government then, and still does today. This meant that I became the Embassy's point man on a variety of issues, military and non-military. Human rights, labor rights, hydrology, and medical research became as important to my daily work plan as the more traditional components of attaché duty. My prior experience in Indonesia made me an important part of the Country Team's deliberations on policy recommendations and implementation. It was the high point of my military career.

I left Jakarta in 1994 for a final six months at Fort Leavenworth, and retired in 1995. In my retirement in western Colorado I spent much of my time writing for publication -- on Indonesia and Southeast Asia -- and doing the occasional consultation project on the region. I travel back to Asia at least three or four times a year and I have maintained my friendships and contacts in Thailand, Indonesia, and other countries in the region. In effect I am a true "retired FAO". My interest in the region has not ceased with my retirement. From time to time I return to Washington for short consultations on Indonesia with our government agencies, and I actively follow political-military developments in Indonesia and the region.

I had a full and rewarding career, 20 years of it single-tracking as a Southeast Asia FAO, and I would not have changed a bit of it. Admittedly, luck and timing were important to my career pattern. But the important thing is that I worked to influence the luck and timing by taking an active role in managing my career.

The assignments I had will occur in most FAO career patterns today. Overseas, I served in both security assistance and attaché billets. In CONUS I was assigned to a major command (Leavenworth) and the army education system (also Leavenworth) as well as the army staff. I fitted in professional military education along the way. The one career stop I missed, which is important in FAO career progression, is assignment to the regional major command or army component -- in my case, Pacific Command and US Army Pacific. I strongly recommend assignment to the major command in the region of your specialization.
because it provides the world view of policy and programs in which you become involved in your in-country assignments.

To summarize, here are some of my "lessons learned" that I commend to you as you plan your own FAO career.

1. You must take an active role in planning and managing your own career. Find out what jobs are available for that next assignment, and the "next-next" one. Stay informed on what future career opportunities may be available to you. Be a chess player -- plan your career several moves in advance. Your personnel assignments officers will appreciate your participation in the process and help all they can to make it work.

2. The personal and professional reputation you establish in both duty and off-duty performance along your career path will be key to your success. Your work with fellow military personnel is only part of it. The civilians you will work with in embassy assignments abroad will also become important as "the word" about you spreads. Also important is "the word" among the host country military officers with whom you work. Remember the negative example of that unfortunate guy whose "unsuitability" created the vacancy that made it possible for me to go back to Jakarta even though I was not a pilot. Work hard and make sure that "the word" about you is positive, professional, knowledgeable, adaptable, and oriented toward multi-agency and international team play.

3. Timing is important. So is luck. Sometimes they work for you and sometimes they don't. Your challenge is to give luck and timing the best possible chance to work on your behalf.

4. Duty locations that were terrific good fun as a captain or major might not seem so attractive when you are a lieutenant colonel or colonel. Your family has priorities. So does the army. Unfortunately, when as an O5 or O6 you are asked to take a job in the proverbial Timbuktu's of the world it might not be the right time for you and your family. You might be forced to choose early retirement because of your family situation. Think about this when you plan your career. It was not a problem for me because I'm a lifelong bachelor. I doubt if there are many like me still out there today.

5. Foreign Area Officer duty is a fantastic experience. The overseas assignments in particular place you at a high level of policy determination and implementation. You work with the top levels of the host country armed forces. You are also working in the proverbial goldfish bowl, where everything you say and do is widely observed. It is important that you give this the attention it deserves.

6. Finally, both you and your family unit must be strong. Overseas assignments are not always comfortable, healthy, or enjoyable. There are stresses and temptations that can play heavily on you and your family. My advice here is simple: don't go if it won't work for you and your family. And if you do go, be absolutely straight when it comes to the government's money, the alcohol that flows at social events, and the other temptations that might come your way. If you stray you WILL get caught, sooner or later.

7. Be professional in everything you do, and you will have a terrific time as a "full time FAO."

COL (R) John B. Haseman has stayed busy since retirement. He is a Southeast Asia Expert writing for Jane's Weekly and contributes regularly in regional academic and government sponsored conferences in Washington, D.C.

As part of the Foreign Area Officer Association's social outreach program, we continue to sponsor a semi-annual welcoming cocktail party and mixer for the new officers and their spouses entering FAO training. This year we were lucky to have MG Robert J. St. Onge, Jr., the FAO Proponent Chief and Director of Strategy, Plans, and Policy for the Army Staff. Approximately 130 people were in attendance, including COL Devlin (Commandant of DLI/FLC), Ambassador Peck, our own President Dr. Tullbane, and members of the FAO Proponent Office. The reception kicked off one-week of briefings and discussions on the future of FAO and FAO training for the newly arrived officers.

SEMI-ANNUAL FAO COURSE RECEPTION GREAT SUCCESS!!
The United States unexpectedly found itself with two new nuclear states with whom to contend early in the summer of 1998. Indian and Pakistani scientists detonated somewhere between three and eleven nuclear devices that summer. Yet, United States policymakers chose to treat this momentous security development as a failure of nuclear nonproliferation regimes or the latest manifestation of a parochial, regional arms race. Staff around the U.S. government dedicated little intellectual 'horsepower' to examining the effects of these events on the United States' global security strategy or on adjacent regions. Most policymakers, government analysts and members of the media, continued to view South Asia through the prism of narrow, single-issue imperatives. Working-level U.S. foreign affairs officials, civilian and uniformed, did not recognize the failure of this methodology and evaluate existing strategies in the wake of these irreversible events.

OFTEN OVERLOOKED

United States policy makers for the most part fail to notice South Asia's impressive potential. Most Americans only know the region through the 1960-era film "Gandhi" or possibly a non-Western history course from secondary school days. South Asia's numbers can stagger the imagination. Fully 25% of the world's population live in this relatively small, geographic area -- India has about a BILLION people itself. In other words, future consumers of American goods and services greater than all of Europe continued (including Russia) live within an area about the size of Canada. True, more than 800 million people live at or below the poverty level; yet, considerably more than 300 million people are middle-class or above. The region has produced some of the world's finest scientists and institutions of higher learning. South Asia has deposits of oil, natural gas, iron, coal, gems, and a myriad of other important and strategic natural resources. Natural resources notwithstanding, the region continues to produce the bulk of the world's opiates (legal and illegal). Finally, this region has the world's largest concentration of combat arms battalions, along with two 'blue water' navies, modern air forces, competent special operations forces, short-and-medium range missile forces, as well as violent government and independently sponsored terrorist organizations.

Democracy is present throughout the region -- the isolated and landlocked states of Afghanistan and Bhutan along with politically isolated Myanmar (Burma) the only exceptions. Still, democracy lives side-by-side with feudalism and religious fundamentalism (and growing xenophobia). The vast bulk of the Asian Subcontinent's people lives under democratically elected leaders, though. India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Nepal have functioning Westminster-style parliamentary democracies; albeit, how well functioning is a matter of continuing debate within those countries. Sri Lanka and Maldives have Presidential-style parliamentary democracies. Indian and Sri Lankan democracies have functioned almost continuously their fifty-one years of independence. Bangladesh, Pakistan and Nepal have short, and spotty histories with Western-style democracy; however, commitment to the concept by their political elites is almost universal.

Senior leaders in the United States tend to miss South Asia's successes. South Asia's achievements over the last few decades are generally unfamiliar outside of a small cadre of specialists. The region has growing democratization, increased economic liberalism and scientific advancement, all of which contributed to improved defense forces. Indian and Pakistan have missile forces with the ability to reach out well beyond 1000 kilometers. Also, both nations are working toward having much longer ranged missiles in the future. These newly nuclear capable nations have robust pharmaceutical and chemical industries. These industries presumably possess the ability to produce simple chemical and biology munitions. Moreover, India continues to work towards a medium-ranged missile system and modern space program. Bangladesh and Sri Lanka have growing pharmaceutical and chemical industries. Even isolated Bhutan has developed a budding computer assembly industry, with a goal of fully manufacturing computers early in the next century. Many of the industries maturing in the region have dual military-civilian applications, with little oversight or observation from the outside world.

MISUNDERSTANDING OR LACK OF RESPECT: CAUSE FOR CONFLICT

South Asia's political, military, scientific and professional elites generally perceive a subtle, and sometimes not so subtle, lack of respect on the part of United States officials. The saying 'perception is reality' appropriately describes this situation. No amount of verbal expression to the contrary appears to penetrate the widespread South Asian viewpoint that the United States does not thoughtfully consider South Asia, or its requirements. Actions take on greater meaning than words. Post-May 1998 nuclear detonation interviews with Indian and Pakistani leaders always returned to the theme 'now the United States will take us seriously,' implying that the United States did not prior to the detonations.

Also, the non-nuclear South Asian states' elites voice similar sentiments. Decision-makers across the region quickly point to the half century of neglect and lack of bilateral visits by senior United States policymakers. This situation turned around dramatically in the wake of India's May 1998 nuclear tests. Regional political leaders point to the United States' tendency to sermonize to them on issues ranging from dowry to global security policy. Indian leaders in particular note that United States policymakers do not treat Europeans in the same manner. (continued from South Asia, Page 14)

(Continued on page 15)
condescending (from an Indian standpoint) fashion. Military leaders point to the lack of substantive cooperation between their countries and the United States. Scientific leaders have the perception that Western colleagues judge South Asian scientific efforts as rudimentary, rather than on par. Finally, South Asian professionals believe Western associates denigrate their skills because of a lack of Western university credentials. In the end, South Asia's elites tend to see insult rather than misunderstanding when dealing with the United States' policymakers.

The configuration of the United States government's bureaucracy contributes to a failure to fully comprehend the region. Few in the United States have first-hand experience with South Asia or have ever studied the region in detail. Transnational issues and their narrow specialists tend to dominate United States policy for the region as a result. This factor alone gives South Asian leaders the impression that their area of the world is of little consequence. The Department of State's South Asia Bureau is the only section in the United States government that focuses exclusively on the region as a whole. However, that bureau divides the region into Pakistan-Afghanistan-Bangladesh (the Muslim countries) and India-Burma-Nepal-Sri Lanka (the Hindu and Buddhist countries) directorates, unnecessarily establishing staffs with competing imperatives. The other agencies and departments of the United States government licate South Asia with Southwest Asia or as a part of an Asia/Pacific zone. Southwest Asian or East Asian concerns and issues take the forefront of effort in these various MESAs, NESAs and Asia/Pacific sections because of the ongoing commitment of United States forces in those regions.

The Department of Defense, with the most people and best funding, does not assist itself in dealing with the region and developing a comprehensive strategy to support policymakers. Afghanistan and Pakistan are in the Commander-in-Chief (CINC) Central Command's area of responsibility (AOR). The remainder of the region is in CINC Pacific Commands AOR. This administrative division contributes significantly to the bureaucratic 'fog of war' and failure to 'see' the region. The separation of the region along the India-Pakistan 'fault-line also apportions the few Foreign Area Officers of the Department of Defense who specialize in the region between the two CINC-doms. Additionally, crises in Southwest Asia, China, and Europe siphoned off South Asian specialists working in various MESAs, NESAs and Asia/Pacific sections because of the ongoing commitment of United States forces in those regions.

Few in the United States government (civilian or military) closely follow events in this region, resulting in misinterpretations between South Asian elites and United States policymakers. The Department of Defense, including the CINC-doms responsible for the region, has less than twenty officers from all Services working on South Asian issues and strategy. The Intelligence Community, too, has very few individuals dedicated to "seeing and knowing" South Asia to assist policymakers.
utes to policymakers' inability to properly develop an effectual strategy in the wake of growing bilateral concerns. The United States' lack of expertise contributes to the South Asian general perception of a lack of respect. The United States loses ability to effectively influence the region as a result.

A FEW FINAL NOTES

United States policymakers have paid little attention to South Asia since the end of World War II. American foreign policy leaders tend to push South Asian countries' individual security concerns to the background, often belittling those concerns in the process. Scarcely appreciated is the seriousness of regional border tensions since the United Kingdom's withdrawal. Of the world's seven acknowledged nuclear states, three if those nations converge in the mountains of South Asia (India, Pakistan, and China). Facts often missed by security policymakers: China and India fought a war as recently as 1962 and have continuing, unresolved border issues; and, India and Pakistan have fought four wars (one as recently as 1971), not counting constant border skirmishes over unresolved border issues. South Asia's large armed forces today center on individual concerns with regional neighbors or internal security matters. The region's nuclear powers, too, focus on regional players, if we take their leaders at face value. United States policymakers continue to address little attention toward the region's conflict potential because of this perception. However, Indian and Pakistani submarine units, air forces, and missile forces today can impact the Arabian Gulf region if their governments so chose. Moreover, all South Asian intelligence services, while focused on the region and inward for now, can easily support operations on a global scale given the number of their expatriates working in North America, Europe and Southwest Asia.

WHERE CAN WE GO FROM HERE?

South Asia requires more attention, resources and effort, on our part. The region's military, scientific and commercial potential makes a good argument for this additional allocation of resources, even without the nuclear issue present. The region's growing power will impact more and more on United States interests. United States policymakers require the best advice and information available. Clearly India and Pakistan will continue their search for Great Power status, driving increased effort to acquire additional nuclear, chemical, biological, missile and conventional assets. However, United States policymakers show little concern over burgeoning India-China competition or the tacit alliances of India-Russia and Pakistan-China, all of whom have continuing border issues and animosities going back centuries. Unifying study and analysis could a single CINC-dom and moving the region out from various MESAs and NESAs in the government could immediately improve "seeing" the region -- without prohibitive expenditure of additional resources. To conclude, the past's benign neglect towards the region should change to guarantee that a repeat of the information and policy shortfall in the wake of India's May 1998 nuclear detonations does not occur.

END NOTES:

1 India's government stated that their scientists detonated five nuclear devices; while Pakistan's government informed the world that it's scientists set off six devices. However, Western, in particular United States, sensors could not verify that eleven explosions occurred. Each nation did have at least one confirmed detonation thereby demonstrating that both India and Pakistan have a nuclear capability.

2 Figures obtained from the Department of State indicated that South Asians apply for and get the overwhelming majority of the so called 'high tech' worker visas for employment in the United States information technology industry -- attesting to their quality given the fact that these visas are only granted to United States corporation-sponsored applicants.

3 Combat Arms battalions include: air defense, armor, artillery, aviation, engineers, infantry, and special operations forces; for the purpose of South Asia, this category also takes into account paramilitary forces.

4 A look at Time, Newsweek, and the New York Times for the third week of May 1998 or the last week of June 1998 provides an overview of different interviews that stress the 'respect' theme.

5 A short list of the many "global-wide" issues dominating discussions with South Asian elites, without prioritization, is: child labor, narcotics production and smuggling, missile proliferation, nuclear test ban treaty, software piracy, intellectual property copyright infringement, and human rights violations.

6 Myanmar is the only 'traditional' South Asian country not located in the DOS South Asia Bureau.

7 The majority of government agencies place South Asia as a subsection of a MESA (Middle East and South Asia) or a NESA (Near East and South Asia) section; although, some departments place the region in the broader collective of Asia.

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Civilian Employer Discrimination Against Reservists

By Mark Riley

As I am writing this in mid-May, the U.S Armed Forces continue to enforce the "no-fly" zone over Iraq, conduct peace-keeping and monitoring operations in Bosnia and bomb military targets in Serbia and Kosovo. In order to support these ongoing operations, the President just several short weeks ago authorized a call-up of more than 33,000 members of the reserve components for Operation Allied Force, the largest call-up of military reservists since the 1991 Persian Gulf War. And things could get worse. A major ground war in the Balkans, in which a significant portion of the NATO forces would be American, remains a distinct possibility. Some are concerned that Iraq and/or North Korea will take advantage of the United States' distraction with the Yugoslavia situation to initiate hostilities. Russia's stability is more uncertain than at anytime since the break-up of the Soviet Union a decade ago. The way things are going, there is a high probability that additional reservists will be called up during the next year.

Make no mistake about it, our citizen-soldiers make significant sacrifices when they are called to active duty. While the usually unexpected disruption of his family life is probably the most difficult burden that a reservist voluntarily shoulders, not far behind is the interruption of his or her civilian career. The requirement of a military reservist to take a leave of absence from a civilian job can, if not properly handled, have serious adverse consequences -- consequences that will affect the civilian career long after the reservist has completed his or her military obligation.

I was recently contacted by a distraught reserve component Captain. “Captain Patriot”, as I will refer to him in this article, had been working for the same large East Coast retail chain for the last nine or ten years in middle-level management positions. His civilian supervisors had never given him anything but exceptional input from his civilian employer, he fully expected to receive. When Captain Patriot asked his supervisor for an explanation, he was told that management had passed him over because he had missed over 300 days of work during the last nine years while fulfilling his obligations as a military reservist. During this period, Captain Patriot had spent approximately four months on active duty for training at his basic officer course; served one weekend per month in an inactive duty status; and spent two weeks each year on required Annual Training. He also served on active duty during the Gulf War.

Fortunately, Congress long ago passed legislation aimed at protecting the non-career military service member from discrimination by his or her civilian employer because of his or her affiliation with the armed forces. Non-career military service members (i.e., members of the Reserves or National Guard and regular force members who serve no more than five years on active duty) are protected from employment discrimination and loss of employment benefits by the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. § 4301 et seq.

Under USERRA, an individual may be absent from his or her civilian job to perform military service for up to five years and still retain reemployment rights with the civilian employer. There are important exceptions which can result in an extension of this five-year limit, including an initial enlistment lasting more than five years, periodic training duty, and involuntary active duty extensions and recalls, especially during a time of national emergency (i.e., Desert Storm, Desert Thunder, etc.). Reemployment protection does not depend on the timing, frequency, duration, or nature of the service member’s military service. USERRA also mandates that a returning reservist be re-employed in the position that he or she would have attained had the service member not been absent for military service (the “escalator” principle), with the same seniority, status, and pay, as well as other rights and benefits determined by seniority. Likewise, USERRA requires that reasonable efforts (such as training or retraining) be made to enable the returning service member to refresh or upgrade his or her civilian skills in order to qualify for reemployment. If the service member cannot qualify for the escalator position, USERRA requires that he or she be offered alternative re-employment positions. Under USERRA, an individual who is performing military service is deemed to be on a furlough or leave of absence and is also entitled to the non-seniority rights accorded other individuals on non-military leaves of absence.

In short, the civilian employer is prohibited from penalizing a service member because of the time he/she has spent performing military duties. Furthermore, the employer is obligated to insure that the service member retains the same seniority rights and benefits that would have accrued had he or she worked continuously in the civilian job during the period of military service.

In order to be eligible for protection under USERRA, the service member must meet the following threshold requirements:

- The service member must give his or her civilian employer advanced written or oral notice for all military duty unless giving such notice is impossible, unreasonable, or precluded by military necessity. (Although the service member must provide notice to the civilian employer, there is no requirement to obtain the employer’s approval to undertake military duties. The civilian employer may not forbid the service member from participating in military service, terminate the service member for undertaking military duties, or in any other way penalize the service member for carrying out his or her military obligations.)
- In the case of a service member serving less than 31 days on active duty, the service member must return to his or her civilian job at the beginning of the next regularly scheduled work
A service member is not eligible for USERRA benefits if he/she received a dishonorable or bad conduct discharge; was discharged under other than honorable conditions; was dismissed from the service under the provisions of '1161(a) of Title 10; or was dropped from the rolls pursuant to '1161(b) of Title 10.

If a service member believes that his or her civilian employer has discriminated against the service member because of his or her military status, the service member may wish to determine if he or she has a viable claim against the employer under USERRA. In general, if the service member is also a federal civilian employee, he or she must file a complaint with the United States Department of Labor who will investigate the employee’s complaint. In the case of an individual who is employed either by a state government or by a private employer, the service member has the choice of either filing a complaint with the Department of Labor or filing a civil suit against the civilian employer without going through the Department of Labor. The following outlines the basic procedure for pursuing a USERRA claim against either a state government or private employer.

The Department of Labor, through its Veterans’ Employment and Training Service (VETS) offices, is responsible for enforcing USERRA. A service member, who believes that his or her employer has violated USERRA, may (in lieu of contacting a private attorney) first contact the local VETS office in order to give the Department of Labor an opportunity to solve the problem. The VETS representative will interview the service member and conduct an investigation. If VETS believes the complaint to be valid, it will contact the offending employer and attempt to remedy the service member’s problem and bring the employer into compliance with USERRA. If VETS is unsuccessful in resolving the problem satisfactorily, the Department of Labor will notify the service member that efforts to administratively rectify the situation were unsuccessful and that the service member may file suit against the employer.

At this stage of the complaint process, the service member has the choice of either requesting that the Secretary of Labor refer the complaint to the United States Attorney General or hiring a private attorney to represent him or her in the matter. If the Attorney General accepts the service member’s case, then a Department of Justice attorney will represent the service member. If the Attorney General declines to represent the service member, the plaintiff service member may still retain private counsel.

The federal district courts have jurisdiction over all USERRA suits and the action may proceed in the U.S. District Court for any district in which the private employer of the person maintains a place of business. State statutes of limitations do not apply in USERRA proceedings. If there is a finding that the employer violated USERRA, the court may order one or more of several different remedies. The court may order the employer to comply with the provisions of USERRA. It may also order the employer to compensate the employee-service member for any loss of wages or benefits suffered by him or her due to the employer’s failure comply with USERRA. If the court determines that the employer willfully failed to comply with the provisions of USERRA, the employer may be required to pay the service member an amount equal to the amount of lost wages or benefits as liquidated damages. Additionally, the court may use its full equity powers, including temporary or permanent injunctions, temporary restraining orders, and contempt orders to fully vindicate the rights of the plaintiff service member.

No fees or court costs may be charged or taxed against any person claiming rights under USERRA. If the plaintiff retained private counsel and prevails in an action or proceeding to enforce USERRA rights, the court may award reasonable attorney fees, expert witness fees, and other litigation expenses.

According to one VETS official I contacted, the vast majority of all complaints can be resolved by a VETS mediator. Most employers are anxious to avoid the negative publicity that can result from appearing not to support employees who are fulfilling their military obligations. Additionally, the Department of Labor can exert considerable leverage by virtue of the fact that companies in violation of USERRA are ineligible to be awarded or to keep U.S. Government contracts.

At a time when increasing numbers of reserve component men and women are serving their country, it is important that not only that reserve component service members but also regular force commanders and supervisors be aware of the protections USERRA mandates for military reservists. The foregoing discussion only scratches the surface of USERRA and the issues involving the reemployment rights of reserve personnel.

This article is of an informational nature and is not intended to be either a comprehensive treatise on USERRA or to answer all of your questions on this subject. Every case has its own unique set of facts and circumstances. If you are aware of or suspect civilian employer discrimination against a reservist in your organization, you should urge that service member to seek assistance from either your command's Staff Judge Advocate’s Legal Asst Office, a Dept of Labor VETS office, or competent private counsel.

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A NorteAmericano's first week at the Bolivian Escuela de Armas

By CPT Christopher J. Porter

NOTE FROM AUTHOR: Bolivia is a new Army FAO training site. This article presents a sequence of events and observations made during my first week of training at the Escuela de Armas, Cochabamba, Bolivia. I hope that it will provide the reader with interesting information, and future FAO trainees with something that will give them an idea of what to expect in their first days of ICT. CJP

As the first U.S. officer to attend this course in Bolivia, I was treated royally by the host country's military. On Thursday before the beginning of the course LTC Fernandez, the U.S. Army Attaché, officially presented me to the Commander of the 7th Division (Airborne) -- the unit posted in Cochabamba. When we arrived the entire division staff lined up to greet us in a receiving line and from there we were ushered into the commander's office, where we discussed many issues ranging from the physical fitness program of the Bolivian Army to the eradication of coca. From the 7th Division Headquarters we drove to the Escuela de Armas (my home for the next few months) and I was presented to the Commandant. We discussed the course curriculum, the FAO training program and its specific travel requirements. The Commandant and Deputy Commandant queried me as to my sports interests and sincerely offered any assistance that I might need during my stay. With that the Attaché departed and I was alone at the school with my 2/3 DLPT Latin American Spanish.

One difference between their army and ours is that their officers serve about five years as a Sub-Teniente (2LT) five years as a Teniente (1LT) and another five years as a Capitan. I was also surprised to find out that every officer in their army received airborne training and commando operations training as Sub-Tenientes. These course are the first thing that they undertake as newly commissioned officers. The jump course is approximately two months long and is immediately followed by the commando course (two months of basic weapons training and six months of extensive special warfare training, to include dismounted patrolling, combat swimming techniques, explosives, sniping, jungle and mountain warfare). In their system, it is the Sub-Teniente that assumes the role of training troops, that we allot to our NCO Corps. Further, officers at all grades routinely attend other Latin American military schools (for example one of my friends there attended flight school in Brazil while another attended flight school in Ecuador.

The school's mission is to train Bolivian Army officers in their five separate branches (these are Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, Engineer, and Communications. All officers are branched into these branches, so it is not uncommon to see female officers with infantry and cavalry colors (even though they are part of the Female Auxiliary Services). The school, itself, presents two separate courses: the Basic Course for Sub-Tenientes and Tenientes; and the Advanced Course for Captains. Each of the courses run one-year in length and covers general military knowledge and branch specific material. The course in which I was enrolled is the Advanced Course, a sort of combination of our own advanced course and CAS3. It is a Captains' course but there was one Major (delayed attendance due to injury) and a few Tenientes due to be promoted shortly. The course runs from 25 January to 13 December and is broken into three phases:

-- A common task module very similar to CAS3;
-- A branch specific module; and
-- A functional area module, concentrating on specialties such as personnel, intelligence, operations, or logistics.

I was informed that the school is in the process of changing its program of instruction. They are experimenting with my class and trying a less dogmatic approach to training. In the past, the course was an exercise in rote memorization. Students were required to regurgitate textbook answers verbatim. Now they are shooting for more of a thinking approach with a less restrictive answer key. All the tests are essay.

The daily training schedule is the same every day except

(Continued on Norte Americano, page 20)
The first day of training was a bit confusing because no one really knew where to put me. After a couple of hours, I was placed in Section B and assigned a sponsor. My sponsor is a cavalry officer who attended DLI at Lackland AFB in Texas and speaks English quite well. He also has an MA in Foreign Affairs and is in the process of finishing his law degree at night. During the first day of instruction I learned that the Bolivian Army is very officer dependent. Their NCO Corps is virtually non-existent and the sergeants are given very little responsibility. My fellow students were surprised when I described the U.S. Army NCO Corps and its system of professional development and promotion. They were even more interested in the duties and responsibilities of the Battalion Command Sergeant Major as the senior enlisted advisor to the Commander and the roles of NCOs as teachers and mentors to Platoon leaders and Company commanders. I, in turn, learned that the Bolivian Army uses a Second Commander or what the British call 2IC. This officer (usually a Major or another Lieutenant Colonel) performs all of the duties one would expect of a Battalion XO. What makes this position unique is that unlike our XO, the Second Commander is in the chain of command, and everything (including all Company commander communications) goes through him to the Battalion Commander.

**TUESDAY, Day 2: Organizations and Functions of the Staff**

On my second day, I was invited to go early to school with a classmate who had duty as the Officer of the Guard. Usually the uniform of the day is class B, but when they have OG duty they wear fatigues. He told me that each officer is issued a Browning Hi-Power 9mm pistol, a saber, and a bayonet for the FN/FAL (standard issue rifle) upon graduation from the military academy. He keeps them with him (not in an arms room) for his entire career. Even in the school environment the officers went armed with loaded weapons. As OG, my friend was on duty for 24 hours and still expected to attend class the next day. He checked the guards, ate at the mess hall, and did most of the same things as our SDOs.

The subject of the days class covered the duties and responsibilities of the Battalion Staff. The information was very similar to what I received in the Infantry Officers' Basic Course. The instructor was a very lively Lieutenant Colonel who kept the class interested and frequently asked me to explain how we did it in the U.S. Army.

**WEDNESDAY, Day 3: Scientific Methods of Investigation**

Today's topic was really dry. A female Ph.D. was the instructor. She knew her subject, but had enormous difficulty dialoguing with a room full of Bolivian Army officers. At the end of the day, we were divided into small groups of six officers each and were required to decide on a topic for a one-month research project. Our group came up with three ideas -- Peacekeeping Operations, Pre-military Training versus One-year Conscription, and Physical Fitness. During the ensuing discussion about which we should choose, I was able to learn more about the Bolivian Army.

In discussing the Peacekeeping topic, I found out that Bolivia has three battalions in training for UN missions. These units are all-volunteer and are composed of professional soldiers only (all of the soldiers are sergeants and the officers are hand-picked). The units are currently in training at the mountain school, the jungle school, and the commando school, respectively. The Bolivians hope to use the UN experience to inject new purpose into their army and already have provided an officer to the Argentine Battalion in Cyprus. They are currently 12th on the list for missions and are anxiously awaiting their first unit deployment.

The next interesting topic discussed was pre-military training versus one-year conscription. The former program is designed for citizens who are enrolled in a university or college. It is offered by the government as an alternative to one-year of conscription so as not to delay their studies. Students receive military training one-day a week for two years. In the past, people with money could avoid national service all together but the Minister of Defense and the President (a former general) have made universal national service obligatory and the pre-military training program was designed as a compromise. The focus of the discussion was that the pre-military service program was ineffective and that the only method to get real soldiers trained for the service was for everyone to do the one-year conscription and to leave the pre-military program for women.

The Physical Fitness topic was considered a "throwaway" and in the end Peacekeeping Operations won out as our group's topic of choice.

**THURSDAY, Day 4: Staff Operations Continued**

We continued the discussion about the operation of the various Battalion staff elements and did a practical exercise during the morning. We were given the resumes of 15 officers and NCOs and were tasked with placing them within the staff as either primary or assistant staff officers and NCOs. Each team presented their staffs to the class. I was amazed at how emotionally charged the debate on choices was. In the end the instructor told the groups that there was no "right" solution, however, it made me very aware of the fact that the Bolivians are highly conscious of their academy class standing and follow-on courses such as the
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:
A Crisis Management Perspective

By LTC(R) Grant Hayes, African FAO

While the this Administration’s attention, like many before it, is not necessarily focused on sub-Saharan Africa, our Government is nonetheless spending plenty of time and money watching all the developments across the sub-continent, dispatching peace missions to war-torn regions and evacuating Americans from numerous African countries in crisis, if not at war. Here is an overview of some of the ongoing crises with which the foreign policy, national security and intelligence communities have been wrestling over the past year. Situations in Africa move remarkably rapidly sometimes so some of the descriptions of political and military situations in various African countries will have changed by the time this goes to press.

West Africa is beset by crisis. There have been so many evacuations of all Americans or ordered departures of official Americans over the past year or so that we’ve probably lost track. Sierra Leone remains a country at war between a dubiously elected president supported principally by Nigerian forces and rebels who are committing atrocities we have only just seen in Rwanda in 1994, though not on as large a scale. In Guinea-Bissau the President, who has been supported by the Senegalese, appears to be just coming to terms with his former army commander who had rebelled against him and caused several months of conflict within this small country. Liberia purportedly achieved democracy with the election in 1997 of former warlord Charles Taylor as President. However, in reality Taylor’s ensuing autocratic rule has prevented any semblance of democratic and economic development in that war-torn country. On a brighter note Nigeria just had national elections after many years of despotic military rule and newly elected President Obasanjo is due to be inaugurated on 29 May. While it remains to be seen how long the military will allow this former general to lead his country in the democratization process, there is greater hope for Africa’s largest country than ever before. There are other smaller crises and relative success stories -- like Ghana -- but space precludes recounting them all.

Central Africa is a region at war and perpetual crisis. There are no less than eight southern and central African countries involved in the ongoing conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DROC) as well as an assortment of rebel and insurgent groups with differing agendas. Little progress is being made towards bringing the combatants to the bargaining table and the Congolese war has the potential, according to some analysts, to absorb an even greater number of African players. Meanwhile an insurgency has once again arisen in DROC’s western neighbor – the Republic of Congo. Apart from Angola which already had troops stationed in what is also called Congo-Brazzaville, the ongoing conflict in that country has not spilled over yet into the DROC. However the potential exists. Then in the Central African Republic (CAR), the UN has deployed peacekeepers for an indefinite period. Of course ongoing insurgencies in both Uganda and Rwanda have repercussions on the degree to which those countries support the Congolese rebels in the DROC. Arguably the central African region is the most conflict-ridden in sub-Saharan Africa right now.

Southern Africa’s relative stability since the end of apartheid in South Africa has been shattered by both the DROC conflict and the resumption of open and larger hostilities within Angola between the government and the principal rebel movement – the Union for the Independence of Angola or UNITA. Since both Angola and DROC are members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), one of Africa’s most successful regional groupings, the SADC countries have been embroiled in both conflicts to varying degrees. The conflicts portend a negative impact on business as usual for that regional economic organization. Then there is internal political, economic and social turbulence in normally calm Zimbabwe which may threaten the nineteen years of relative stability in that country as well as its leader – Robert Mugabe – and his regime. South Africa is fast approaching its second set of elections in its post-apartheid era without the benefit of the stature of its great statesman and current President – Nelson Mandela. Recent political violence exacerbates an already significantly violent crime rate and less than hoped for economic development. Southern Africa and all its potential for stability and leadership of the rest of the sub-continent is clearly being rocked back on its heels by both international conflict and internal difficulties within its most significant member countries.

Eastern Africa has not been spared the trials and travails of the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. A border war broke out in May 1998 between two friends – Ethiopia and Eritrea – over some real estate. That conflict unfortunately has continued into 1999 with little success envisioned at the bargaining table despite the best efforts of the USA and several others. The “E” War (for lack of a better term) has also generated some negative regional implications in feudal Somalia and Sudan, where the Islamic-oriented Khartoum Government has been battling the more Christian and animist southern rebel groups for 15 years now. Kenya continues to be beset by a number of internal political and economic difficulties with which the Moi regime continues to wrestle. And one of Africa’s poorest countries, Tanzania, continues to deal with the myriad political and economic problems while hosting the Rwandan genocide trials and efforts to somehow resolve the ethnic conflict that has been going on in Burundi for a number of years.

I have done an injustice in attempting to cover the turmoil in sub-Saharan Africa in such a brief manner. Having set the stage, what I hope to do is generate some discussion of these issues and events primarily with our African foreign area officers serving with great distinction as attaches and security assistance officers in a number of these countries about which I have written so briefly.
ASSOCIATION NEWS

FAO Association Leadership in Transition

The staffing of the Association has always been a catch as catch-can affair, sometimes with only one person working all the issues (Dr. Tullbane) and sometimes with as many as 5-6 volunteers working the issues. Right now we have four volunteers doing most of the work — Dr. Tullbane does membership and the journal, LTC Gotowicki (Attaché to Yemen) does the web site, LTC(P) Volk is putting together the scholarship program, and Joyce Tullbane is our accountant (working with the Board of Governors’ treasurer). Besides these hard working individuals, there are four Board of Governor members, other than Dr. Tullbane that live in the DC area and are generally available to help out when needed. These are: COL Ferguson, COL Smith, Mr. Herrick, and Mr. Olson.

Why mention these people by name? First, it is important that the membership know who is doing the work and providing the support for the organization. Second, it is important to realize that we are all volunteers. We don’t even have part-time employees yet. Every penny that you send in dues goes specifically to support our programs and not to administrative overhead. Circumstances may soon change that, but for now . . . A third reason for this outline is that the association is entering a time of transition. Dr. Tullbane, our founder and president is finally moving out of the military-industrial complex and into the real world. Actually he is moving into academia, so there might be some argument that he is still not moving into the real world but into another form of unreality. In any case, he has been appointed to the position of Associate Dean for International Studies and Director of the Center for International Education at St. Norbert College in De Pere, WI. St. Norbert’s is a small four year liberal arts college and is one of the top small colleges in the mid-west. While he will still attempt to maintain ties to the association, his departure from DC and the center of our activities will obviously cause a “ripple” in the organization. Some of the Board members residing in DC are preparing to take up the slack.

Membership. This is the single area where the staff has the most contact with the membership-at-large. Members send in changes of address, they send in questions on professional issues and ask career advice, they air their concerns for how the association is being run, and they send in dues. This is accomplished by a combination of “snail-mail,” “E-Mail,” and “voice-mail.” Therefore, someone must man the answering machine, check the association mail box regularly, keep up with the e-mail traffic, and in general, funnel the message traffic to the person who can best answer it. Finally, there is maintaining the data base and sending out renewal notices when memberships are up. Together, this job is very important, but not terribly time consuming. However, it requires that the membership person reside near the mail box, since changing association mailing address would add to the confusion of the upcoming transition period. So, this is clearly a job that Dr. Tullbane will have to turn over to someone else. You as the membership can help out during this period by keeping message traffic to a minimum and by renewing your memberships promptly.

FAO Journal. Producing the journal quarterly is an interesting process that entails four distinct steps. Putting together the articles is the first and easiest part of the process. The second part of the process is getting the Service Proponents’ input to the journal — this is both time consuming and fairly frustrating for the editor. The Proponents are chronically “behind the power-curve.” The third part of the process is delivery to the commercial printer and his printing of the document. Last, but definitely not least, is the bundling and mailing through the U.S. Post Office Bulk Mail System. Beginning in September, we will experiment with contracting the fourth phase of this process out to the commercial printer. It could be a great solution, but could also be a disaster, so bear with us! If the issues of proponent input and the bulk mailing above can be solved, Dr. Tullbane would remain the editor of the Journal, but if not someone else will have to pick up the slack. Happily, the association will now have at least two months to resolve this dilemma, before it goes critical. From your perspective, don’t worry, we will have this resolved and you will get your September issue of the journal in early October (as normal).

Association Accounting. Mr. Olson, the Treasurer of the Board of Governors, will at least temporarily take the job of accountant and check writer for the association. If you are sending in a receipt or need payment for a FAOA program activity just realize that as of next month your letter will pass through at least two sets of hands before a check gets issued.

Bottomline. The next few months are going to be a little hectic here at FAOA headquarters. Bear with us as we transition to the new staff. We are pledged to do our best to keep up all the services to our membership.
In general terms, the Arabs welcome our interest in their affairs, but only if we also pay close attention to their interests. If the US, presenting itself as a great friend and strong ally, brushes aside issues they consider vital, the Arabs will not see us as either. We do not have to agree with the reaction, or like it, but obstinate refusal to acknowledge its existence and the reasons for its existence creates larger problems.

Our media united in reviling the Gulf States for not being real allies, because they were unwilling to go along with what we wanted. An alliance, however, is between sovereign nations that share the same objectives, and we were not perceived as qualifying when it came to what we have done, and want to do to Iraq.

With Oslo only a word, the Arabs had been signaling growing dissatisfaction with our perceived humanitarian, moral, political, and military double standard well before the Iraqi weapons flap. Almost all of them decided not to attend the US-sponsored Doha business summit with Israel in December, in an effort to call attention to their serious concerns over Israeli-Palestinian issues. It is not clear they succeeded, even with Saddam’s help.

No one doubts our solid commitment to Israel’s future and security, but we need to accept that the Arabs see certain aspects of that relationship—and as a result our relations with them—from a different perspective. Accepting the existence of other perceptions, and trying to understand why they exist, does not require abandonment of or apology for any policy we pursue. The knowledge can, in fact, contribute to making it more successful. In any aspect of human affairs, losing sight of how others may view what you are trying to achieve will make achieving that goal more difficult.

As we consider how to salvage our broad Middle East interests, a number of key points need to be borne in mind. First, our “Get Saddam” policy is recognized as an embarrassing failure everywhere—except here. Our enemies could not have crafted a more damaging scenario. Second, like it or not, Saddam rules Iraq and may do so for a long time to come. Third, our current policies limit real chances to avoid highly negative consequences.

Saddam has no incentives to continue cooperation with the weapons inspections [Editor’s Note: Since this article was written Saddam has in fact kicked out the UN weapons inspectors]. He knows that linking completion of the inspections to raising the sanctions is a chimera. We are out to get him, weapons be damned, and sanctions will not be lifted until he is gone. He also sees that the inspections can never be completed if what we are now looking for is measured in pounds. No UN Inspector will ever be able to certify that there is not a small bag of anthrax somewhere in the UN Inspection Headquarters itself, let alone in the city of Baghdad, and even less so in the 170,000 sq. mi. of the country of Iraq.

The Administration has limited it own options, solidly insuring that we look bad whatever happens—and perhaps even worse if nothing happens. There are only four realistic choices. The first two make no sense, and the other two will be hard for us to swallow. They are:

- **Unilateral Military Action** would achieve only one thing for certain: universal opprobrium. If Saddam does nothing or just stalls, we will have no justification for this course of action in the eyes of the world. If we attack a totally defenseless Iraq, we will look very, very bad. Further, missiles and planes demonstrably ineffective for attaining the highly questionable objective of “Getting Saddam,” so we might gain nothing, while losing a great deal in terms of global leadership, honor, and respect.

- **Assassination** would be difficult—Oh! And it’s against the law. After all our mindless ranting, however, if anyone kills Saddam we will be blamed—for gross interference in another country’s internal affairs; and for all the negative results of the action, which almost certainly will be numerous, severe, protracted, and pervasive.

- **Modify the embargo**, and everyone potentially wins. There is no rationale whatever for a total embargo if what we are really concerned about is Saddam’s military threat. Food, medicine, clothing, most things a nation imports do not threaten anyone. The Iraqis are suffering from eight years of war with Iran, the major destruction of Desert Storm, and seven years of sanctions. They are unable to do anything to change their government, and insisting on the sanctions casts us in the role of dissipter, oppressor, and menace.

A focused embargo, monitoring and preventing the import of the items that contribute to war-making capabilities, would be an entirely different matter. It would accomplish reasonable objective, that of reducing the threat, and also be entirely acceptable to a wide range of nations whose opinions and support are important to us.

Such a move would require the Administration to back down from its current stance. That would be difficult to do, without some development that would provide at least a “fig leaf” of justification, but one is available.
Dialogue with Iraq would permit maintaining the current embargo long enough to establish a less-punitive system. It would be a hard sell domestically, however, precisely because the Administration’s demonization of Saddam, with the hysterical support of the media, has been such a huge success. How can we possibly talk to the vilest creature that ever crawled over the surface of the planet, someone who is “worse than Hitler,” in the words of President Bush?

Saddam is an odious and brutal dictator, but we have effectively worked with and even actively supported a number of odious and brutal dictators when we perceived it to be in our national interests—some of them for many years. While Saddam is not our Iraqi leader of choice, he may remain in power for quite a while and we need to reevaluate in light of that compelling fact. He will not be around forever, and a sound policy would be aimed at maximizing the possibility that pressures resulting from his departure do not rupture the delicate fabric of Iraq as a nation. We cannot do this if we insist on its total isolation, and eliminate any possibility of playing a role ourselves.

In order to attain the things that we consider desirable for the peoples of the Middle East, the basic required condition is stability. It is the *sine qua non* for regional peace and all things that flow from it: Democracy, Free Market Economies, Self-determination, Justice, Human Rights, and Development. Instability is therefore to be avoided at all costs in that potentially unstable region.

**Consider.** Vile though he may be, Saddam serves our interests in the region as the cork that keeps Iraq in the bottle. When he goes, the country will probably implode. It is not a question of worrying about perhaps getting someone worse, it is the strong likelihood of getting no one at all. There is no mechanism to produce a replacement, no hierarchy or second in command, no opposition party waiting in the wings.

There is only the Shia, the Sunni, the Barzani Kurds, the Talabani Kurds, the Yazidis, the Turkmen, the Sabaeans, the Assyrians, the Chaldeans, the several Orthodox sects, the Party, and the Army. If Saddam goes in the near term, there will be no unassailable replacement; he has take care to insure that there are none remaining. When he dies, and all the above groups rush into the streets to settle their bitterly divisive, long-standing grievances, they will not use ballots that have been carefully saved for the occasion.

In the horror of Bosnia, only three groups are involved—Iraq has many more. Bosnia is in stable Europe—Iraq is in the Middle East powder keg. The Bosnian conflict has remained relatively contained; the Kurdish question and Islamic schisms cross several important borders. No one in the entire region will benefit from a collapsed Iraq.

Written while the brutal war in Afghanistan was being fought, journalist Edward Girardet introduces readers to the war that drained the Soviet Army of its will to fight. The unsuspecting rugged terrain would be the final catalyst that would spur on the collapse of Communism. However, nothing is simple in Afghanistan and this book takes us into the kaleidoscope of different Mujahideen factions as well as the communist Afghans who brought upon the land the might of the Soviet war machine.

The author examines the two communist parties, the Parcham and Khalq, revealing their history, development and the personalities of their leaders. In April 1978, the communists would take over Kabul and a string of events would lead to the Soviet Invasion in December 1979. Soviets would entangle themselves in local communist politics with a daring assault by Russian airborne troops on the palace of President Hafizullah Amin. Moscow would find a suitable replacement in the form of another part boss President Najibullah, propping his regime and army with Soviet forces. Mujahideen (freedom fighters) would initially learn the hard way how to tactically deal with a fully equipped modern mechanized force. Chapters deal with how both sides adapt and cope with new tactics, from the introduction of the Soviet Mi-24 Hind helicopter to weed our guerillas hiding in the mountains to the Mujahideen acquiring modern weapons and using them against these threats. Readers are taken to a fascinating glimpse of guerilla warfare, as invading Afghanistan would be easy, holding onto it would frustrate Soviet forces and intensify the ferocity of both sides.

Among Mujahideen you learn that the ethnic group called Pushrots think and fight differently from Hazaris, Tadjiks and Baluchis. The author delves into the different styles of fighting and training among the Mujahideen. It would be a Tadjik commander with his village in Northern Afghanistan that would organize the Mujahideen well enough to repel the Red Army eight times. Ahmed Shah Masood studied Mao’s writing on Guerrilla Warfare and organized his forces into moutariks (mobile forces) and sabhets (local defense units). Each moutarik unit was composed of 75 men and received regular pay and subsistence for their family. In return, they fought the Red Army in the hills and fields constantly harassing mechanized units. Each moutarik unit also had an artillery component made up of a ZPU-2 anti-air gun, Rocket Propelled Grenades or mortars. The local defense units were village-based fighters and farmers organized in groups of 50 to 100 men, that kept Soviet forces occupied while the villagers escaped to the hills or until mobile (moutarik) units arrive to envelope Red Army units in fields of fire. Many Mujahideen leaders would send their lieutenants for training under Ahmed Shah Masood. Other Mujahidden leaders described range from the fundamentalist group, Hizbi-Islami led by Gilbuddin Hekmetyar to moderates like Sibghatullah Mujaddadi.

Dissention among the Afghan communist army units was so prevalent that the Russians did not issue them certain weapons, fearing they would desert and turn over those weapons to the Mujahideen. As you read the chapters on Soviet propaganda and the dreaded Afghan secret service created by the communists called KHAD you realize this is a regime doomed to failure. Girardet’s book is a true find for those wishing to understand the Afghan War and are interested in guerilla warfare. The author spent several years reporting in Afghanistan for the Voice of America and National Public Radio.


Professor of Political Science at Tel Aviv University, Shaul Mishal is a prolific writer on Palestinian affairs. *The PLO under Arafat* is his third book on the subject. It unravels the organization and its various factions and spends many chapters explaining the different methods of these factions in their quest for Palestinian statehood. To understand how Arafat rules the former Occupied Territories of Gaza and the West Bank it is crucial to understand the deep divisions within his Palestinian National Council (PNC). It is also important to understand the development of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) which sprang from Arafat’s group Al-Fatah in the late sixties. The author examines key covenants and doctrines that have blocked peace attempts with the Israelis for four decades. Some Palestinian organizations resort to Marxism like George Habbash founder of the radical People’s Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), other Palestinians have allied themselves with Syria or Iraq becoming a tool for the advancement of their respective brands of Baathist (Arab National Socialism) ideology. The Syrians formed Al-Saiqa (Thunderbolt) and would advance Syrian interests during the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1984). The Iraqis would create the Arab Liberation Front (ALF).

It would be a long and tortuous road for Palestinians as they experimented with Nasserism and tried to cope with changes in the region brought about by the Camp David Peace Accords. The book does not cover the Intifah (Palestinian Uprising) when one day in 1987 Palestinians rejected the notion of linking their problems to the Arab world and began pelting Israeli army units with rocks taking matters in their own hands. These Palestinians were driven by a sense of economic desperation and hopelessness that was not given enough coverage in this book. What the author does offer is insight into why Arafat cavorts with radicals like Hamas while placating liberals who are able to deliver a more dignified face to his regime and political apparatus. With the election of Ehud Barak as new Israeli Prime Minister on May 17th readers will come to understand the dynamics of the relationship Israeli politicians have with Yasser Arafat.
An additional reason to consider a dialogue is that talking to him is the only rational way out of the current box. What is needed is the certainty that everyone clearly understands the rules, and the consequences of violations. In other words, we talk, directly, with the objective of reaching mutually acceptable goals.

Consider. At the height of the Cold War, when we and the Soviets were at daggers drawn, when worldwide nuclear annihilation was a mutual button-push away, we maintained extensive, comprehensive contacts. Not because we liked the Soviets, trusted them, or approved of their policies, but precisely because we did not. And still we do not talk to Iraq.

For the same reasons, we held talks with North Vietnam while we were bombing them and troops were killing each other on the ground. Similarly, we encouraged the Serbs, Bosnians, and Croats into talking in Dayton almost before all the bodies were cold, and helped them to work out an agreement – which may yet hold. And still we do not talk to Iraq.

Consider. We strongly support efforts to end decades of hatred and bloodshed in Northern Ireland. We actively urge the Israelis and the Palestinians to get on with their own difficult negotiations. The parties in these two disputes have real problems, not the least of which are their locations. They do not even have borders to fight over, but spill each others’ blood on the very ground they contest. They share not only the land, but also hatred, distrust, and at least some mutually exclusive objectives. Nonetheless, we see – and they do as well – that there is the possibility of a solution if all sides can attain at least their minimal goals. And still we do not talk to Iraq.

Consider. We have nothing that even approximates that level of disagreement with Iraq. In fact, there are no bilateral issues at all. The only problems are those we perceive Saddam may have with others, and which we choose to consider as our own. There is no proximity factor either: he is way over there. He certainly does not threaten us, nor, to hear them tell it, does he threaten his neighbors in a manner they consider critical.

We should be talking to him now. Certainly not appeasement or unilateral concessions, but an effort to see if we can get what we each must have. In other words, the objective of any negotiation: a mutually acceptable agreement, which all parties are interested in sustaining because all parties perceive benefit. If talks succeed, everybody wins; if they fail, we would be no worse off than we are right now.

The principal obstacle to beginning to talk with Iraq is Dual Containment, one of the most counterproductive policies imaginable. To advance our objectives in a region we consider vital for economic, geopolitical, religious, historical, and ethnic reasons, we came up with a decision to have absolutely nothing whatever to do with two of the most important countries with said region.

Look at the situation. Iraq and Iran are both large nations, located strategically, with relatively large populations, important neighbors, enormous oil resources, and potentially vast wealth. Whether we like it or not, they will both play a significant role in the region for the foreseeable future – and we do not talk to them, at all, not even at the UN. That is more than bad policy, it is no policy at all.

Our leaders endlessly proclaimed that we were “letting diplomacy run its course” before launching attacks on Iraq, suggesting a lack of understanding as to what diplomacy really is. The people who were going to talk to the Iraqis had no intentions of bombing them; the people who were going to bomb Iraq had no intentions of talking to them. The resultant silence is not diplomacy, not if you are serious about solving problems.

Elsewhere in the world, in China for example, Constructive Engagement is the policy of choice for the administration, and it make complete sense. Keeping channels of communication open insures that each side knows what the other thinks, avoiding the errors of letting other convey messages. We still do not know for sure what Saddam said to either the Russians or to Annan.

By remaining in contact, you can promote your objectives, endeavor to exert moderating influences, stress the advantages of acceptable behavior, and underline the costs of doing otherwise. Talking does not imply acceptance – by either side – of the other’s policies, nor does it constitute capitulation. It does make possible an effort to deal with problems, and reduce them to manageable proportions, which benefits everyone concerned.

The Administration painted itself into a corner in the very early stages of the Iraq crisis. There are two lessons that we have a tremendous difficulty remembering: Keep your mouth shut; and Keep your options open.

We did neither, but there is still time to advance our objectives and salvage our regional reputation. All it will take is the courage, wisdom, flexibility, foresight, tenacity, intelligence, understanding, strength, and willingness to learn — things that have made our nation great. We have them in abundance. What is required is a the readiness to put them to use.

Ambassador Peck served in several Middle Eastern posts during his distinguished career in the Foreign Service. Since his retirement, he has served as a consultant to both the Departments of State and Defense on foreign policy matters. He has also appeared as a television commentator on the Middle East.
Sometimes the only way to know when to get in line is by following the herd. When a group stands, look at the boarding cards and ask where they’re going. If that’s not enough, in many countries, they have a second automation backup system – this one for the routing of baggage. According to this system, which I call the “tarmac shuffle”, a passenger points out his bags on the tarmac prior to climbing into the aircraft. This, so I understand, absolutely ensures the right bags get on the right plane. Failure to do so means your baggage does not get loaded. No matter that your bags have been tagged at the counter. And, of course, no one is going to tell you this beforehand. So, a word to the wise: if you see a mass of baggage in your path as you make for the stairway, better start looking for yours.

While much of this seems humorous, as any well-traveled FAO can tell you it is this kind of thing that one can only laugh about when it’s a distant memory. Real world airport problems can be a trip-ending experience for FAOs; for family members it can be a nightmare that discourages future interaction with the host nation culture. Manage the experience as a critical event in your planning. Use the above tips as a start. Help visiting FAOs negotiate this obstacle. Bon voyage!

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**FAO ARMY RESERVE NOTES** By COL Gary Tregaskis

Reserve Officer? Going before a promotion board this year? I had the opportunity to sit on a selection board last fall at AR-PERSCOM. Here are observations that you might find helpful.

Well before the board, you’ll get a thick packet and a copy of your micro-fiche. Two absolutes: Your micro-fiche will be incomplete; and you must follow the instructions in the packet “TO THE LETTER.”

Attack the incomplete official record on your micro-fiche first. It is by far the more time intensive requirement. Get CERTIFIED COPIES of any missing OERs. Details of the requirement are clearly laid-out in the instruction packet. BOTTOM LINE — your senior rater must certify and sign the copy for it to be accepted as valid. Having a complete record of your OERs is critical to a successful board experience.

Does your board have a military or civilian education requirement? If so, send copies of diplomas. They are the easiest to read and verify attendance and qualifications. Transcripts are very hard to read on micro-fiche. If you send one, circle the notation that indicates the date that the course was completed or the degree was awarded. While the Secretariat seems to accept copies, the requirement is for originals or certified copies.

Awards? Similar rules apply. Originals or certified copies.

The instruction packet suggests a letter to the Board President, a biographical Summary, an Officer Record Brief (ORB), and an official photo. They are not required, but send an important message to the board: “Promote me. I’ve put forth extra effort.” Be sure you have records to support every claim you make. You’d be surprised how the inconsistencies “jump” off the page at the readers. Confine your letter to one page — no exceptions!! Longer letters are not read. Remember, the board has thousands of records to review and yours with be lucky to get one minute of attention from each board member.

Some suggestions about the letter. Stick to the facts and don’t complain. State clearly what separates you from all others and warrants your promotion over them. Point out recent awards, tours beyond the Annual Training requirement, and civilian credentials that contribute to your value to the Army (language skills, graduate education, publications, professional certification). Remember to be brief, succinct, hit the high points only. Last, explain any periods for which you have no OERs. If you spent two years in the IRR while getting a Master’s or completing a Ph.D., say so. Better to explain than to leave the impression that you don’t care about your reserve career.

Last, the official photo is at the top of your file and is important. Make sure that it conforms to official standards.
In this issue I would like to provide readers some online resources to monitor events in Indonesia. Indonesia has the largest Muslim population of any country in the world, is the 4th most populous nation on earth, and sits astride several key sea lines of communication. It is undergoing a huge transformation, and that change was vividly demonstrated on 7 June when Indonesia held its first free elections in 44 years. As of this writing, the outcome is still unclear, but it is unmistakable that the political landscape of Indonesia will radically change. 48 political parties and more than 11,000 candidates are vying for 462 of 500 parliamentary seats (38 seats are reserved for the military). The leading political party is Megawati Sukarnoputri’s Indonesian Democratic Party–Struggle (PDI-P). The current government’s party, Golkar, is led by Indonesian President B.J. Habibie and will also draw a substantial number of votes due to its entrenched presence at the local government level. Other key parties are the National Mandate Party (PAN) led by Amien Rais, and the National Awakening Party (PKB), led by Abdurrahman Wahid, who is also the leader of Indonesia’s largest Muslim Group, the Nahdlatul. The issues surrounding this election and those faced by the new government over a very short period of time are truly prodigious.

One of the most pressing of these issues is the status of East Timor. On 8 August, the East Timorese will vote on acceptance of an autonomy program under the guidance of the Indonesian government. If autonomy is not accepted, then the question is whether the new government will grant East Timor independence. Other issues include separatist movements in Aceh and Irian Jaya, sorting out ethnic and religious violence, the role of the military, and economic recovery. These issues are not going to wait for any new government, and instability as part of a governmental turnover, may well exacerbate these problems.

To follow these events a good online start-point is the Asia Society’s web page at http://www.asiasociety.org. This site has an abundance of information concerning all of Asia. For Indonesia especially, I went directly to their special reports section to Edward Master’s Indonesia’s 1999 Elections: A Second Chance at Democracy (May 1999). This provides background and an overview on the lead up to the current elections, political parties involved, military activities, etc. There are also special reports concerning Timor, Aceh, Ambon, religious tensions, separatist movements, and the Chinese minority. Other sites of interest that can help one track the outcome of the elections, as well as follow events as they unfold, are the following:
http://students.washington.edu/loren -- A well maintained site with links covering politics and many of the human rights issues as well. However, one should be aware that some of the sites linked from here are in Indonesian. The Indonesian National Election Commission runs a site with the most current information on election results, political candidates and press releases. It is located at http://www.kpu.go.id. Also, Inside Indonesia magazine, located at http://www.insideindonesia.org is published quarterly by the Indonesian Resources and Information Program (IRIP). The IRIP comprises academic specialists on Indonesia, members of overseas aid agencies, development action groups and trade unions in Australia. The Jakarta Post is online at http://jakartapost.com:8890 but I have not been able to bring it up.

I look forward to hearing your thoughts, ideas, and reviews in this column (rundles@pom-emh1.army.mil).

William J. Duiker, in his book, Vietnam: Revolution in Transition, has taken a large, complex subject and covered it in a clear and concise manner. He provides excellent summaries throughout that bring his text together and highlight his key points. His ability to cover much-debated subjects, such as the US involvement in Vietnam in a balanced fashion is one of his strongest traits. The book is a straightforward introductory text on Vietnam, divided into well-organized chapters that make for trouble-free locating exactly what one is searching for. It is an ideal book for someone starting from scratch studying a nation that has had such an impact on the American consciousness. Besides its role in our military history, Vietnam’s importance is also based on its strategic location just south of the People’s Republic of China.

Vietnam’s long and “Jekyll-Hyde” relationship with China is one of the major themes throughout the book. Under direct Chinese control for a 1,000 years, Vietnam has looked to China as a model for art, literature, architecture, social customs and many religious beliefs. However, conflict between the two has periodically erupted, giving rise on both sides to an undercurrent of suspicion and wariness that permeates all bilateral relations. How these two nations interact and work to resolve their issues will be an important component in developing a peaceful and prosperous Asia over the coming decades.

Conflict with the West, is another theme that weaves itself through Vietnamese history. The Indochina Wars, first with the French, then followed by the United States, represent important periods in Vietnamese history. Duiker covers these in a neutral and impartial manner. I found his assessment of the roots of failure in the Diem regime to be an excellent example of his clear and concise writing style. His discussion of why the communist North succeeded in its conquest of the South is also admirably summarized. He argues that there is no doubt that the US did not militarily lose the war; instead, he writes, “To the contrary, US military superiority had significantly blunted Communist momentum in the late 1960’s, the Tet Offensive notwithstanding. The US failure, above all, was in not overcoming the disparity between political capacities of the Communists and those of its ally in Saigon.” (p.77) It is interesting to note that the same political capacities that led the North to victory after so many years of war, should today be one of its main obstacles to prosperity.

The unified Vietnamese government’s attempt at assimilation of the South (still incomplete) and problems of its huge political bureaucracy provide the reader with a good understanding of some of the dilemmas faced by Vietnam’s postwar leadership.

(Continued on SE Asian Reviews, page 31)
Basic and Advanced Courses. Class standing affects everything to include selection for attendance at foreign military schools.

After the siesta, we came back to class for a Physical Fitness Test. Our groups formed up in the parking lot and the Lieutenant Colonel conducted an in-ranks inspection. We then fell out to warm up, had our weight recorded, and began the PT test. The test consisted of a seven-minute continuous evaluation that required you to rotate through seven stations. At each station, you perform the required exercise for 30 seconds with an instructor counting repetitions and recording them. You get a 30 second rest while moving to the next station. It seems very simple but was a very tough session, especially when you consider that it was conducted at 9000 feet altitude. The stations were: Stationary Running - 55 high steps in 30 seconds; Situps - A combination of flat leg situps and a crunch - 35 in 30 seconds; Pushups - touching the ground with chest - 35 in 30 seconds; lateral jumps - similar to football drills where you bounce through tires - 55 in 30 seconds; Squat Thrusts - 18 in 30 seconds; 3-Meter Shuttle Run - back and forth 7 times in 30 seconds; and Modified Pushups - elevating upper body only (legs remain flat on the ground) - 35 in 30 seconds. This last would seem to be easy, but as the last event was a real measure of muscle fatigue. The test was a real challenge.

FRIDAY, DAY 5: Conduct of Research

This day was a continuation of the scientific methodology class. About halfway through the class we revealed our research subjects.

During my first five days isolated in an Spanish immersion environment, my language improved two fold, especially in listening ability. I was cleared looked at as an anomaly, but by the end of the week the Bolivians were much more open and friendly with me. Overall, the first week was very busy and I'm looking forward to the next few months.

One criticism that could be leveled against the book is its lack of in-depth analysis, the proverbial “so what.” With so many books about Berlin’s history available, this one adds nothing new to the story. However, I find that acceptable. This book will contribute to the European FAO’s cultural literacy in ways that a scholarly history cannot. McDonough’s vignettes provide just enough substance to whet your appetite and awaken the desire to search for more information. Additionally, there is enough variety in the book to pique each reader’s curiosity in a different way. The book is rather long at 540 pages, but is easily consumed in small bites like a currywurst and pommes frites. This book is not at the top of the ten books you should read this summer. But it is an ideal companion for reading while eating lunch at your desk or sipping a Berliner Weisse at a café on the Ku’damm.

EUROPEAN / EURASIAN REVIEW CORNER
By LTC Rick Runner


Like many FAO’s who have explored the cities within their regions, I have often wondered about the history witnessed by the cobbles and old buildings of Europe’s streets. I’m not referring to the well-documented and often-written about events, but rather the simpler occurrences. Berlin: A Portrait of its History, Politics, Architecture, and Society describes many such episodes in the history of Germany’s capital. Written by Giles McDonough, a former correspondent for London’s Financial Times (an excellent newspaper for European FAO’s), this book is a collection of written snapshots that capture the texture and flavor of Berlin throughout its history. Using the city’s architecture and geography as a background, McDonough describes the simpler aspects of Berlin’s history such as education, Berliner slang and humor, crime, working-class life, food, drinking, markets, cafés, theater, art, and the life of high society and the diplomatic corps. He organizes the history of the city into its various incarnations: trading village, royal residence and garrison town, the capital of Bismarck’s Germany, the industrial city, the cosmopolitan city of the early twentieth century, Hitler’s Berlin, the divided city of the Cold War, and the Berlin of reunited Germany. With McDonough’s book, it is not difficult to look into the face of Berlin while at the same time to see German history through Berlin’s eyes. It is an interesting and effective approach to cultural literacy.

One criticism that could be leveled against the book is its lack of in-depth analysis, the proverbial “so what.” With so many books about Berlin’s history available, this one adds nothing new to the story. However, I find that acceptable. This book will contribute to the European FAO’s cultural literacy in ways that a scholarly history cannot. McDonough’s vignettes provide just enough substance to whet your appetite and awaken the desire to search for more information. Additionally, there is enough variety in the book to pique each reader’s curiosity in a different way. The book is rather long at 540 pages, but is easily consumed in small bites like a currywurst and pommes frites. This book is not at the top of the ten books you should read this summer. But it is an ideal companion for reading while eating lunch at your desk or sipping a Berliner Weisse at a café on the Ku’damm.

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GREETINGS TO FAOs WORLD-WIDE!
The late Spring/early Summer period is normally a busy time for the Proponent. Accession letters and questionnaires for the newest year group, In-Country Training (ICT) interviews and budget briefings for those going overseas, preparation of briefings for the June Foreign Area Officer Course (FAOC), etc., etc. Add to this a couple of new and unique events like the opening of new ICT sites, coordination for OPMS XXI initiatives, and the excitement involving Career Field Designation (CFD) and you have a diverse palette that is keeping our crew gainfully employed. Although a number of these items are still in the “working phase”, allow me to address each of these areas with a few comments that may clarify points of confusion.

NEW ACCESSIONS
Questionnaires have been sent to Year Group 93 officers being accessed as candidates for the FAO Functional Area. Key to note here is the word “candidate”. From the time of accession to the time training begins, the population of accessed candidates will shrink somewhat, as the population is culled to match training starts that are driven by Army requirements. If you’re being accessed and have preferences for being assigned a particular Area of Concentration (AOC), build your case with any additional items you feel make you more qualified. Include Defense Language Proficiency Test (DLPT) score(s) for foreign language(s), time spent in the region, undergraduate studies that were weighted towards the respective region, etc. ONE MORE PIECE OF ADVICE: We’d like to see FAOs get their first choice, but some will understandably have to be given their second, third, or even their fourth. GIVE SOME THOUGHT TO YOUR SECOND AND THIRD CHOICES! Above all, don’t nurture an attitude that is closed to anything but your first choice. Following the crowd is not always the best course of action. FAO promotions to O-6 this year were above the Army average, but some of the shortage AOCs had selection rates even higher than the FAO average.

NEW ICT SITES
We’re currently working to place ICT trainees into new sites in Slovakia, Estonia, Ethiopia and Morocco, in addition to a new site we’ve recently opened in Senegal. The Defense Attachés / Army Attachés in the respective countries have completed the yeoman’s work required to overcome the bureaucratic and logistical hurdles. The result will be a more diverse opportunity for 48s going to ICT.

CAREER FIELD DESIGNATION
The year 2000 will see some major changes in the Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) and particularly in the way FAOs are managed. We’re convinced OPMS XXI will add stability and focus to the management of FAOs. It should also clarify the criteria for FAO selections and promotions. A necessary first step in the process has been the CFD board for YG’s 80 & 86. The results from this board have recently been released. Two observations:

- Most officers (approx. 80% for both year groups) designated to the Operations Career Field got their first choice.
- An even higher percentage (upwards of 90% for both year groups) designated to the Operations Support Career Field got their first choice.

The above remarks probably offer little consolation to those smaller percentages that did not receive their first choices, but speaks well for the process as a whole. From the proponent perspective, there were concerns with some of the shortage branches (MI, SC) that were compelled to “hold more tightly” to their personnel than some of the other branches. To any FAOs that were asking for Ops Spt and designated Ops, I’d offer the following advice:

- Wait until the smoke clears (current guidance is two years) and if still interested, ask about being re-designated.
- Even if redesignation is not possible, maintain your FAO qualifications (primarily a current DLPT score) and stay on the “radar screen” of the FAO Assignments Team. In those cases (and it occurs often) where PERSCOM is having difficulty filling a position, it might be possible for you to be assigned to a FAO position on an exception basis.

FOREIGN AREA OFFICER COURSE (FAOC) 99-2
The FAO Proponent was in Monterey during 07-11 JUN speaking to the group of FAOs currently assigned to the Defense Language Institute (DLI). The purpose of this program is to familiarize the FAOs on the roles, duties and career development objectives of serving FAOs. Our experience in the past has been that this activity is an interesting and rewarding experience for the students and briefers as well. In this regard, FAOC 99-2 was no exception.

In closing, I’d like to pass on our collective thanks to those with whom we’ve been in contact, either per telephone, fax or email. We appreciate your interest and enjoy hearing your comments and suggestions for improving our program. Stay in touch and continue to be our best ambassadors!

STRATEGIC SCOUTS !!

ARMY NOTES
LTC Richard Pevoski, FAO Coordinator
With the release of ALMAR 015/99, the Commandant made his views on the importance of the FAO and RAO programs very clear. “MAGTFs operating in regions and countries where we have little experience, much less linguistic and cultural knowledge, will increasingly turn to regional experts, particularly FAOs/RAOs, to make a tremendous difference in operational and warfighting capabilities.” Perhaps even more importantly for those officers in or considering applying for these programs, he was careful to emphasize the Corp’s determination not to neglect them at promotion time. “We cannot afford to overlook, or mismanage, the valuable and expensive expertise resident in our FAOs/RAOs,” he wrote; “while these officers may not have been afforded the opportunity to command at each grade, their overall value to the Corps will be significantly enhanced.”

The Commandant’s guidance is not the only sign of the increased emphasis on the FAO/RAO programs at HQMC. Additionally, CMC has directed that the position of International Affairs Officer (IAO) Coordinator will be a full-time billet, expected to be implemented this summer. Other enhancements include an ongoing project to formally designate billets throughout the Corps as being FAO/RAO billets, and the development of a comprehensive, total force, data base which will be tied in with the Manpower Management System to better manage regional expertise.

Preliminary efforts by HQMC to identify appropriate FAO/RAO billets show some 235 billets in which the Marine Corps would benefit if filled by FAOs or RAOs. This initial effort, which included prioritizing the billets, will be staffed to the operating forces and billet sponsors for validation, modeling to ensure feasibility, and final structure. This structure, with additional information such as special requirements and expected rotation date of incumbent, will be accessible on the World Wide Web.

A number of other improvements will be seen in coming months as well, including an overdue revision of the Marine Corps order on the programs, and the development of an orientation course for FAOs and RAOs entering the program through the study-track. As always, input from FAOs and RAOs in the field is very helpful as we attempt to capitalize on the tremendous potential inherent in having a cadre of officers with regional expertise.

EDITOR’S NOTE: Questions on the Marine Corps FAO/RAO programs should be referred to the Marine FAO Proponent Office (addresses and phone numbers are included on page 33 of this publication).
As our contribution to the FAO Journal, this article provides an update of our program’s recent activities.

With the summer rotation in full swing the FAO branch has several personnel changes to announce. Lt Col Brian Vickers has replaced Lt Col Bill Huggins as the Branch Chief. Lt Col Huggins was tasked to lead the Air Force’s International Affairs Staff Action Group. Lt Col Vickers, a career Intelligence Officer, is a graduate of the Air Force’s Foreign Area Studies Program with a graduate degree in Eastern European Studies. We also bid farewell to Capt Cara Agahanian who was with the Air Force FAO program from its inception. Her replacement, Capt Tariq Hashim, is a fluent speaker in both Arabic and French.

Since the last edition of the FAO Journal, two more FAO selection boards were conducted. Thirty-eight applicants were selected from the March board and another 28 from the May board. To date, the Air Force FAO branch has held four boards selecting a total of 261 officers as FAOs. The next selection board will be held on July 13th.

The Language and Area Studies Immersion Program (LASI) continues to be a success. Our most recent program was held in Hanoi, Vietnam (story next issue). With an increase in funding for FY00, the FAO Proponent Office will offer 28 immersion programs in 26 different languages. This will allow 168 Air Force officers an opportunity to improve their language skills.

In April the FAO Proponent Office sponsored the attendance of four Air Force officers to the Foreign Service Institute’s (FSI) area studies short course. Another six are attending this June followed by four in August. This program falls under the umbrella of the Air Force’s Professional Continuing Education (PCE) program. Allocated school slots for FY00 have been increased to 35 compared to 12 for FY99. The future goal of program participation will focus on having officers attend as near as possible to their PCS to a region where the course content will benefit them.

As with any new program the goal is to keep moving forward, but also to improve already established areas. On this note, Air Force Instruction 16-109, the governing regulation of the Air Force FAO program, is being revised. This process includes a thorough review of the prerequisites required to become an Air Force FAO. Another project in process is an Air Force-wide review of officer billets that need to be certified as Language Designated Positions (LDPs). Each command has been tasked to survey their billets and provide input into this process. In the upcoming months the FAO Proponent Office hopes to implement its new Area Studies Advanced Program (ASAP). This program will offer an individual 4-6 weeks of travel and research in countries of their regional specialty. The proposal for this program is in the final stages of Air Staff review.

With the new Fiscal Year right around the corner the staff at the FAO Proponent Office will continue to energetically develop a FAO program that supports and enhances Global Engagement.
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