A CENTURY OF FOREIGN MILITARY INTERACTION
SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF FOREIGN AREA COMPETENCY

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Strategy

by
JOSEPH W. PIONTEK, LCDR, USN
B.S., United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, 1987

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1999
AD BELLUM, PACEM PARATI

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A Century of Foreign Military Interaction: Security Implications of Foreign Area Competency

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This study assesses the evolution of foreign area expertise in the U.S. armed forces during the twentieth century. It focuses on the development of foreign area officer (FAO) programs as the services adapted to incremental requirements for regional expertise, particularly so in the post-Cold War era. This study describes the background of each service's FAO program and investigates the individual progress made by each service in developing foreign area competency commensurate to current and anticipated missions. It assesses the confluence of FAO program objectives with service and national military objectives.

This study concludes that the foreign area expertise capabilities in the services as of April 1999 are not equal to the levels required to support the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy objectives effectively. That said, this study shows that the Department of Defense has demonstrated both unprecedented recognition of the deficit in foreign area expertise and the resolve to develop capabilities commensurate to requirements. Furthermore, the study also reveals that the process for developing this expertise is well underway, although the individual services differ significantly in their approaches and levels of commitment.

Foreign area officer, FAO, security assistance officer, SAO, multinational operations, national military strategy, national security strategy, DOD directive 1315.17, in-country-training, defense language institute, LATP, FASP, FAST, MAAG, MAO, CTF, Navy FAO, OPMS XXI

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

A CENTURY OF FOREIGN MILITARY INTERACTION: SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF FOREIGN AREA COMPETENCY by LCDR Joseph W. Piontek, USN, 151 pages.

This study assesses the evolution of foreign area expertise in the U.S. armed forces during the twentieth century. It focuses on the development of foreign area officer (FAO) programs as the services adapted to incremental requirements for regional expertise, particularly so in the post-Cold War era. This study describes the background of each service’s FAO program and investigates the individual progress made by each service in developing foreign area competency commensurate to current and anticipated missions. It assesses the confluence of FAO program objectives with service and national military objectives.

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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Introduction

This study assesses the evolution of foreign area expertise in the U.S. armed forces during the twentieth century. It focuses on the development of Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Programs as the services adapted to incremental requirements for regional expertise, particularly so in the post-Cold War era. In the last decade of the twentieth century, the U.S. armed forces led or participated in 40 percent more overseas and multinational operations than in the rest of the century combined (figure 1). With increasing frequency, names of places like Kosovo, Albania, Bosnia, Mogadishu, Liberia, Kuwait, and Port-au-Prince become household words in the U.S. and foster mental associations to cultures and people like Kurds, Serbs, Hutus, Tutsis, Somalis, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims. The diversity of cultures in which U.S. forces must operate successfully is significant and deserves serious consideration on the part of planners.

Fig. 1. Twentieth Century U.S. Overseas Operations by Decade
This study concludes that as of April 1999, the foreign area expertise capabilities in the services are not equal to the levels required to support the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Military Strategy (NMS) objectives effectively. That said, this study shows that the Department of Defense (DoD) has demonstrated both unprecedented recognition of the deficit and the resolve to develop capabilities commensurate to requirements. Furthermore, the study also reveals that the process for developing this expertise is well underway, although the individual services differ significantly in their approaches and levels of commitment.

The end of the Cold War in 1991 significantly altered the nature of U.S. armed forces readiness and involvement. The May 1997 Concept for Future Joint Operations issued by Joint Chiefs of Staff expands the message of the July 1996 Joint Vision 2010. U.S. strategic planners anticipate the high level of multinational operational activity to continue across all regions of the globe well into the twenty-first century. This fundamental change in nature and frequency of "military-diplomatic interaction with foreign government defense and military establishments" creates an acute and increased requirement for military officers with regional and foreign area expertise.

The U.S. DoD noted this requirement. On 22 February 1997, DoD signed Directive 1315.17 Service Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Programs into effect (see appendix B). The directive (DoDD 1315.17 from this point forward) required that all services develop, maintain, and monitor a FAO program. The services have done so, the questions is to what effect? DoDD 1315.17 established broad outlines, allowing the programs to be "suitable to specific needs of each of the Military Services." This study describes each service's FAO program and endeavors to assess the progress made in providing officers with regional expertise commensurate to current 1999 missions and those anticipated at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

This topic is important because a national security policy of engagement implies new and demanding roles for FAOs. To the FAO awakened by men armed with AK-47s who later
conducts hostage release negotiations with rebels during the in-country portion of his FAO training, the significance of this issue is tactical and immediate. More commonly though, the significance is at the operational level. Deployment of U.S. Forces to a combined joint task force (CJTF), a peacekeeping operation, a humanitarian assistance mission, or any other multinational operation without the benefit of regional expertise unnecessarily jeopardizes the success and safety of U.S. forces. Understanding the culture of enemies, allies, partners, and hosts is paramount to successful human interaction and is not a new demand. Human nature is the force, the logic, and the rationale behind this critical fact, and human nature is not readily subject to change.

The status of the military FAO programs provides a useful barometer to measure the degree and scope of U.S. military commitment and capability for regional engagement. Assessing the status of the various FAO programs of the services will answer this study’s primary question, Does the level of foreign area competence in the services match the demands made of the services in the NSS?

Approach

This study answers the primary question in three steps. The first step defines the nature of the service FAO with emphasis on the historical description and importance of regional specialists and their predecessors. What are FAOs? How and why did service FAO programs evolve? What was a FAO’s mission and purpose during the Cold War? How did the services support a FAO’s career during that period? The first step provides a thorough overview of FAO history and develops appropriate reference points.

In the second step, the study covers the transition in FAO missions from the Cold War into the post-Cold War “engagement era.” Specifically, the measures the DoD has or has not directed in response to the changed military environment. The flow of the discussion is “top down” in nature. In such areas as affect the status of U.S. service FAO programs, the study traces
the development of legislation that led to major revisions in national defense policy and military structures. The period this study covers during the second step starts with the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and ends with the DoDD 1315.17 in 1997. With the direction of national policy and the DoD response to that direction established in directives and standards of performance, the study shifts focus to the services’ FAO programs.

The third step is the heart of the assessment. In it, the study assesses the individual service’s response to national and DoD directions. The study identifies and discusses baseline requirements for five critical components of effective FAO programs. The components include FAO program management, program self-assessment, and three distinct aspects of FAO training. The methodology of the third step is a comparative assessment. The study compares and contrasts the status of every service FAO program component to the respective baseline requirement. Two data points result from this comparative assessment. First, the obtained results define, identify, and track service specific transitions in FAO programs between pre- and post-Cold War eras. Second and more pertinent to the primary question, the results are the basis for assessing the capabilities provided by U.S. service FAO programs.

Assumptions

Several assumptions are germane to this study. The first assumption is the U.S.’s global position with its requirement of unique political, economic, and military leadership. One year prior to the new millennium, only one nation—the United States of America—is able to play such a lead role on the global stage. The number of nations capable of playing significant secondary roles has multiplied. No longer focused by the prism of conflict between two superpowers, the world is a diffracted kaleidoscope of regional security systems and conflicts. The Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff (CJCS) 1997 NMS states that the U.S. military’s fundamental mission is that of fighting and winning the nation’s wars. The issue that demands an assumption is the nature of the type of “wars” in which the nation may involve its military. To this, CJCS
repeatedly points out in the 1997 NMS that the U.S. military should anticipate involvement in multinational operations and military operations other than war (MOOTW) on a regular basis.

This study does not engage in a critical analysis of the NMS. On the contrary, it assumes the accuracy of the NMS in assessing increased involvement in multinational operations and MOOTW. The 1998 edition of the NSS in no way contradicts this assumption. It reaffirms the concept of greater international interdependency through the term of “globalization” which it defines as “the process of accelerating economic, technological, cultural and political integration.”

That said, the most basic assumption to accept is that regional expertise is critical to success in all organizations embodying the elements of national power. This is particularly the case for the military of a nation espousing a strategy of engagement or multilateral assertiveness. The complexity and expanded scope of post-Cold War political, military, and economic realities drive a heightened requirement for regional military expertise. Although this military requirement applies to the armed forces of all nations, its emphasis is logically proportional to the size of the role that nation plays. As the lead nation, the U.S. has a significant demand for regional expertise. This awareness extends to all facets of society. U.S. national leadership is committed to a strategic approach of global engagement as stated in the 1998 NSS. Just as the U.S. Government does, U.S. commerce, education, religious, charity, and media organizations all have the pressing need and responsibility for increased awareness in global matters. The alternative, that is, the absence of necessary expertise, means giving up leadership and the risk of diminished global influence.

Definitions

With one notable exception, the terms used in this study are in accordance with Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. According to Joint Pub 1-02, FAO stands for Food and Agriculture Organization (United Nations
term). In this study, the only meaning for the acronym FAO is foreign area officer. The study will address any other Joint Pub 1-02 terminology deviations upon usage. Additionally and for emphasis, the term “military” applies to all services, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard when not operating as a military service in the Navy by agreement with the Department of Transportation.⁹

As the central topic of this study, the term “U.S. service FAO” demands a definition. However, as of March 1999, there is no official definition for FAO in a joint publication. The lack of such a definition foreshadows some of the discussion in this study on the status of U.S. service FAO programs. A discussion will cover details surrounding this issue later in the study.

Nonetheless, the definition that is used in this study is extracted from DoDD 1315.17 (appendix B). This directive is pivotal to this study. It provides the highest level (DoD) definition for a FAO, as well as FAO program guidelines and military applicability, which will be discussed later. The military services FAO (all services) will maintain the capability to engage in constructive, mutually supportive bilateral and multilateral military activities and relationships across the range of operations [and] be versed in political-military affairs; familiar with the political, cultural, sociological, economic, and geographic factors of the countries and regions in which they are stationed; and proficient in the predominant language(s) of the populations of their resident countries and regions.¹⁰

Although extracted from a 1997 directive, the definition also explains in general terms the historical mission of the predecessors to FAOs in 1999. The same definition will apply to the term “regional expert.” Differences between service cultures and how these differences affect the expectations of the respective services’ FAOs will also be addressed while covering FAO history and FAO program assessment.

**Delimitation**

This study recognizes the importance of those FAOs serving in the Guard and Reserve. However, the study does not address the organization, management, or training of nonactive duty
officers. A mobilization of the Reserves would present a scenario that is beyond the scope of this study.

In a similar vein, other than as a source for FAO corporate knowledge and FAO Cold War experience used heavily in this study, the very significant area expertise that resides with former military attachés and retired FAOs is not factored while assessing the status of FAO programs. That said, much of this expertise is still associated with the military, and the study recognizes that it is formative in molding the capabilities of FAO programs.

Although this study delves into each service’s FAO program, it will not attempt to validate a specific number of FAO billets for any of the services or attempt to derive detailed syllabi for FAO training programs. The study will address any deficiencies in the FAO program progress encountered in the course of research, but detailed manpower, personnel, and training requirements exceed the scope and intent of this study.

A significant parameter to this study is the focus on FAOs as opposed to the Army Special Forces (SF) officers who also receive regional training. The distinction between these two is not always clear for they even share a common history in the USA. The primary distinction is that SF mission is almost exclusively tactical in nature while the FAO mission most often requires regional strategic knowledge. This study will address the commonality of missions these two groups can share, but because the service FAO proponents do not control SF programs or billets, the study will largely exclude SF considerations.

Background

The most graphic marker for the beginning of the end of the Cold War took place on 9 November 1989, when the citizens of Berlin started tearing down the Berlin Wall. On 26 December 1991, the rump Soviet parliament passed its final resolution, acknowledging the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet Union set in motion fundamental
shifts in superpower national security and national military strategies. This marked the end of over four decades of FAO involvement in Cold War actions and operations.

Between those two dates, the U.S. fought the Gulf War. A harbinger of change was the intricacy of the effort to manage the coalition during Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1990-1991, which had included cooperation from the Soviet Union at the United Nations (UN) Security Council. This proved an accurate precursor to the combined nature of the majority of U.S. military operations since. The U.S. NMS published in January 1992 recognized that the U.S. no longer required a large, single-focused, forward-deployed military structure overseas to protect U.S. security interests and those of our allies. The 1995 National Military Review, which drew heavily from the 1993 Bottom Up Review (BUR), pointed out the involvement of U.S. armed forces in twenty-seven operations between 1991 and 1994. The nature, length, and degree of involvement of the U.S. military forces in these operations covered a broad spectrum.

Active and retired U.S. military personnel can increasingly claim involvement in at least one of the many multinational operations in which the U.S. has participated in the last decade of the twentieth century. The scope and breadth of the missions have expanded significantly. They include direct involvement and leadership in regional security concerns, such as the Gulf War, the deployment of Patriot missile batteries to Saudi Arabia and Israel, and proposed ballistic missile defense programs for Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan. Other missions include contingency operations, such as Operation Pacific Haven, which relocated Kurds to the safety of Guam and the peacekeeping and peacemaking, missions to Bosnia. Still other missions include the humanitarian efforts, such as Operation Support Hope in Rwanda and Operation Fiery Vigil to assist the victims of the Mount Pinatubo eruption in the Philippines. Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) are required when the collapse of a foreign government threatens the safety of American citizens, as was the case in Liberia, Albania, and Sierra Leone. Additional multinational coordination and area expertise is required for antiterrorism operations, such as the
cruise missile strikes against the facilities supporting the operations of Bin Laden. Military involvement in the war on drugs demands counterdrug missions Operation Selva Verde in Colombia. Multinational and coalition air strikes and inspections are conducted to curtail the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq. Finally, ongoing missions to former Warsaw Pact and former Soviet Union countries for arms control inspections and confidence-building missions continue.

Considerable effort also falls under the training umbrella during multinational exercises, such as those conducted with the military organizations of the member countries of Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the follow-on Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). Thus far, forty-four countries in Europe and Eurasia, including all nineteen NATO countries, are EAPC members. U.S. forces have gained and continue to gain first-hand experience with the peculiar challenges inherent to working with a wide array of different countries and their militaries while conducting multinational operations. U.S. forces have worked with former adversaries as partners, and in places like Kuwait, Liberia, Bosnia, Turkey, northern and southern Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, and Rwanda. The post-Cold War era has and will continue to provide plentiful opportunities for nations to practice multinational operations.

The 1997 and 1998 NSS, the 1997 NMS and the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report lend credence to this idea. All highlight the growing frequency and involvement of the U.S. military in multinational operations and MOOTW. These documents project that involvement of this nature will continue for the foreseeable future. In September 1998, the CJCS, accompanied by the service Chiefs, testified before Congress that military readiness has suffered as a result of decreased funding and manning while experiencing a concurrent increase in operational tempo. A quick review of past military activity lends further credence to the NSS, NMS, and QDR data and their corresponding projections. Including the separate major operations of Vietnam, the count from 1962 to 1989 yields forty-seven overseas military operations. In the
last nine years since 1990, a similar count reveals over one hundred overseas operations, all of which required either direct multinational coordination and or extensive area expertise as a minimum.

U.S. Forces conducting “short-notice contingency operations” overseas, working “unilaterally or in cooperation with friendly nations,” are frequently organized into a Joint Task Force (JTF) or a Combined JTF (CJTF). Military commanders and staffs repeatedly identify coordination issues between themselves, allies, and coalition partners as critical to the performance of U.S. military forces participating in multinational operations in support of U.S. policy. U.S. joint doctrine on multinational operations captures this feedback and directly addresses the need for the Joint Force Commander (JFC) to plan for increased liaison and advisory requirements when conducting multinational operations. Language barriers, varied cultural backgrounds, and different military capabilities and training may detract from effective coordination with multinational partners. Liaison and advisory teams must be adequately organized, staffed, trained, and equipped to overcome these detractors.

Trained military area specialists provide sophisticated insight into those regions where military operations are probable. They offer valuable information on the culture, habits, and values of friend and foe alike. In such environments, the qualified service FAO is particularly well suited to provide the JFC with the regional expertise and liaison building-blocks needed.

Significance

The rapid rate of change in international and regional politics since 1989 calls for scrutiny and monitoring. The rate of advance in digital technology and its inevitable application to military operations has the potential for redefining the standards with which to gauge a nation’s power, influence, and wealth. Concurrently, the decrease in direct influence by competing global ideologies has led to a corresponding decrease in regional stability and an increase in transnational threats, such as terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, international drug trafficking, and even serious environmental concerns. Ironically, on a global scale, the new
freedom and reduction in large, national spheres of influence have provided an environment where excellent potential for growth and positive change exists with an equivalent potential for conflict and disaster.

The rapid pace of change within the U.S. military and the growth in its assigned missions correspond to the global situation depicted in the previous paragraph. DoDD 1315.17 confirms the fact that national military leadership has recognized the importance of area expertise and has directed the services to increase capabilities in this critical military function. It is the undeniable fact that the human element will continue to play a critical role regardless of the degree of digitization, especially in the area of politico-military aspects of multinational operations.

However, a comprehensive overview of the status of U.S. service FAO programs does not exist at this time. Validation of the absence of such an overview came in the universal response from the FAO trainees, active duty FAOs, and retired FAOs interviewed in the course of the research. All FAOs interviewed expressed interest in the status of FAO programs, yet the overall knowledge level concerning FAO programs and future developments was poor. For example, virtually none were aware that DoD 1315.17 required all services to establish FAO programs or the implications of that directive.

Generally, U.S. Army FAOs were more knowledgeable on the details of their services’ program. This is primarily because they are faced with the prospect of making an Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) XXI driven, personal career decision for or against opting for the new career FAO track. Although problematic, the issue is not that the average, dual-track active duty FAO is not up to speed with the latest and changing program developments. Neither is the issue that information is not available, because it is increasingly available with the advent of sources such as the F.A.O. Journal and the FAO Internet homepage. The FAO Association, a nonprofit organization run by former and active duty FAOs, provides these two excellent sources of information.
The issue is that although there is a renewed, DoD-wide mandated emphasis on regional expertise, no significant goals and no implementation road markers have been established to reflect status or progress of the FAO programs in this period of considerable transition. At both service and joint levels, there is limited administrative restructuring and little measurable progress. In operational terms, \(^{20}\) there is an “end” generally stated in a DoD directive that, indeed, links service FAO programs to providing support for the national strategy of engagement. Yet there is apparently no comprehensive, structured plan (course of action) linking the “ways” and “means” to accomplish that end successfully.

As stated earlier, this study will describe each service’s FAO program and endeavors to assess the progress made in providing officers with regional expertise commensurate to the demands of service missions in support of national objectives. Assessing the status of the service FAO programs will answer this study’s primary question: Does the level of foreign area competence in the services match the demands made of the services in the NSS? Specific significance of this study is evident at two distinct levels. At a national security level, it will facilitate a readiness determination of an asset and capability emphasized in the NSS. It will provide the readiness status of an essential force enabler for U.S. military multinational capabilities. It will also evaluate general DoD support and service prioritization to FAO programs. On a practical planning and management level, it will provide a current snapshot of FAO capabilities that will facilitate identification of general DoD shortfalls and training redundancies. For this reason, training program developments to meet post-Cold War demands are of particular interest. Furthermore, because it will look at all services, the joint nature of the research will also provide individual services with a comparative assessment of their FAO programs.


4Ibid., par 4.2.


8Ibid.

9DoDD 1315.17, par 2.

10DoDD 1315.17, par 3.1.


13Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, *National Military Strategy Background Briefing* (News briefing given at the Pentagon, Washington, DC by a senior military official on Wednesday, 8 March 1995, 1 p.m.).

15Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Statement by General Henry H. Shelton, USA Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Before the Committee on Armed Services, 105th Congress U.S. Senate, 29 September 1998.

16See appendix A.


CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

This chapter lists the sources of information used in this study. The purpose is to present the scope, parameters, and medium of data investigated and accessed during the course of research. This process reinforces the relevance of the topic.

Many sources mention the importance of regional experts in the military, and even more sources expound on the nonmilitary significance and valuable insight that detailed knowledge of foreign cultures and languages brings. In contrast to the wealth of sources on the importance of regional expertise, few sources specifically address the military programs required to manage, foster, and provide the U.S. military with these experts. This study joins a limited number of other sources—four to be specific—in describing and assessing the organizations charged with those functions, that is, the U.S. service FAO programs.

This study differs from the previous sources in that it is the first comparative and qualitative assessment of service FAO programs since the DoD directed all services to develop FAO programs. The significance of assessing the progress and status of FAO programs in the post-Cold War applies to all services. However, it is of particular significance for the Navy FAO program, the newest and least established of all the service FAO programs.

This study organizes referenced literature and sources into four categories. The first category is comprised of four previous studies on service FAO or FAO-related programs. As such, these studies present regional expert related information and conclusions according to the findings of their time. This study addresses this first category of sources in chronological order.

The second category includes the sources of information on historical functions and missions of FAOs up to and including the Cold War period. The third category consists mainly of the national policy changes that drove and defined the transition in FAO missions.

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accompanying the end of the Cold War. The fourth category of sources is comprised of the DoD and service documents that describe and proscribe the standards developed for the FAO programs because of the new missions. The fifth and final category of sources describe and reflect the current capabilities of the FAO programs.

The timeframe under which the four sources in the first category fall is fortuitous. A research group conducted the first study between 1969-1973 during the same time the U.S. Army was creating the first centrally administered FAO program. An Air Force major completed the second study as part of his master’s degree in June 1989 just before the end of the Cold War. The third study dates from April 1997 and thus follows DoDD 1315.17’s effective date of February 1997. However, with the exception of a single interview, all sources used in the study are from 1996 or earlier. The fourth source is a detailed survey and analysis report completed for the U.S. Army FAO program in March 1998, well after DoDD 1315.17. These four primary sources of information provide useful and focused data updates in the development and transition of FAO programs.

Two trends in the sources are worth pointing out even before covering the contents of the sources in any detail. First, the Army remains the service with the most developed and organized FAO program. Both the first (1969) and last (1998) sources are professional studies contracted by the Army to ensure the viability of the Army FAO program. Second, the two middle (1989 and 1997) sources reflect the trend in the military toward concern with greater interoperability and “Jointness.” U.S. Air Force officers authored both of these sources and they address the FAO programs of all services. By default, the earliest study addressing U.S. service FAOs focused on the U.S. Army FAO program, as it was the only one in existence in 1969.
Previous FAO Program Studies

Ray B. Sizemore Jr. is the author of the oldest comprehensive study on FAO programs identified in the course of this research. Starting in 1969, the Department of the Army contracted Human Sciences Research, Incorporated (HSR), of McLean, Virginia, to conduct a series of studies. The charter for the studies was to develop appropriate training requirements for the members of the newly created Army Military Assistance Officer (MAO) Program. The first of the HSR studies focused on the curriculum of the MAO Command and Staff Course. As they are not pertinent to this discussion, this study will not reference them any further.

The other HSR studies in the series outlived the MAO program as a separate entity. The U.S. Army Foreign Area Specialist Program (FASP) had been in existence under various names--as the foreign area specialist training (FAST) program--since shortly after World War II. By 1973, the Army had combined the MAO program and the FASP to create the U.S. Army FAO Program. The 1973 HSR study report submitted to the Pentagon did a remarkably good job of keeping pace and focus as the subject of its study transformed into the FAO program.

The 1973 HSR 163-page report provides great insight to the status of the Army FAO program management at its inception. It “illuminates FAO Program policy, operations, and training” through the results of a survey of “actual on-the-job experiences of officers assigned to FAO billets, and those working with them.” A telling observation comes because of conducting the study during a period of transition. In its preface, the study mentions that the variety of training requirements and duty positions of the new FAO program cannot be treated “as if they represented truly comparable sets of outlooks and experiences, for in fact they do not.” Yet, it acknowledges the “considerable justification for the common training and career management of FAO members” while still allowing for “specialized training geared to the particular categories of job function.” It is interesting that the first study comparing FAO programs twenty years later makes virtually the same observation about the FAO jobs, regardless of the service.
The HSR was also directed to develop a FAO program monitoring system to provide regular and continuous feedback from the experiences of the FAO specialty program. The Army was just implementing the new OPMS that included the Specialty Management Branch. The HSR opted to use a survey feedback questionnaire as the basis for the monitoring system. The 1973 HSR study explains the questionnaire development process and the management of the monitoring system. It also includes the prototype questionnaire and the results of that prototype (428 usable responses) questionnaire. The HSR questionnaire captures observations and attitudes on program management, utilization, in-country training, language training, assignment patterns, FAO spouses, career branch attitudes toward FAOs, and FAO job experience.

The details contained in the survey results are enlightening. This study will discuss them in depth during chapter 4. However, the significance of the 1973 HSR study goes beyond the details. The study proves that the need for continuous feedback in a FAO program was recognized since the earliest days of the formal program. Besides the HSR survey details, the assessment portion of this study will address the application of the survey concept to the U.S. service FAO programs of 1999.

The second source providing specific insight and information on service FAO programs is the 1989 Naval Postgraduate School thesis by U.S. Air Force Major Randy P. Burkett. His thesis is titled “The Training and Employment of the Area Specialist in the Military.”


The value and strength of this study rest in three areas. The first is the detail it contains on the history of U.S. FAO programs. The second area is the seven-page section titled “The need for FAOs: What are FAOs and why do we need them?” This section ends with concerns over
the increased roles and demand for FAOs “if the ‘post-Cold War’ era actually dawns”, which provides some useful references and arguments for consideration in this study.

The third and most important area is the aforementioned detailed contrast of all services’ FAO or FAO-like programs as of 1989. The author examines the philosophy that each service employs in defining the goals of their FAO program, and by extension, the criteria (programs and training) the services use to qualify their officers as area specialists. The study includes conclusions on the programs’ capabilities and recommendations for improvements of the same.

Furthermore, as did Mr. Sizemore Jr. for the HSR study, Major Burkett used a survey to gather original information for his study. Major Burkett’s survey compiled the opinions of 453 graduates of the Naval Postgraduate School’s National Security Affairs and Area Studies Master’s degree. The survey measured the graduates’ opinions of how well their training matched their later assignments as area specialists. 12 The survey does not contain responses from USMC graduates, as the USMC FAO program did not support graduate degrees for their FAOs at the time.

The Burkett thesis observes that the needs of the services for FAOs are more similar than the services realize or desire to acknowledge. The author emphatically states that the services are “rapidly running out of excuses for not working together.” 13 Specifically, the author points out that regardless of service, FAOs of different services will inevitably find themselves “working together in one of four areas: as attachés, in intelligence organizations, on security assistance teams, or as political-military advisors on service or joint staffs.” 14 The study supports the author’s claim that the Army FAO assigned as an attaché has more in common with the Air Force FAO assigned as an attaché than he does with the Army FAO assigned to an intelligence billet.

Given the results of the study’s survey and the above arguments, Burkett concludes by asking the question why are the military officers not trained together at one facility? In his answer, he proposes that if the “appropriate officials” of each of the services were to
communicate, coordinate, and develop uniformity of standards and objectives for FAO training and utilization, the future area expert needs of the country would be much better served. Eight years passed before DoDD 1315.17 and the very first movements among the services in this direction.

The third primary source referenced in this study is the U.S. Air Force Institute of National Security Studies Occasional Paper Number 13 (INSS OP 13), authored by U.S. Air Force Majors James E. Kinzer and Marybeth Peterson Ulrich. OP 13 is titled Political-Military Affairs Officers and the Air Force: Continued Turbulence in a Vital Career Specialty. As the title indicates, this source’s main topic is not specifically FAO programs, but it nonetheless evaluates the Air Forces’ new FAO program and contains valuable information as it compares it to the Army and Navy FAO programs. Published in April 1997, this source sheds relatively current light on the status of political-military and regional expertise programs in the U.S. military and the U.S. Air Force in particular.

The observations are not flattering to the U.S. Air Force. OP 13 “highlights the deficiencies of the Air Force’s system for preparing and utilizing political-military affairs officers to help develop and implement the military dimension of US foreign policy.” The study first provides solid arguments supporting the growing need for officers with international relations skills and regional expertise in the post-Cold War environment. It then identifies the significant “gap that exists between those needs and the ability of the Air Force to meet them with qualified officers.” The Air Force equivalent to a FAO program, the Foreign Area Studies Program (FASP) program has existed since 1969. Focusing on the Air Force, the authors point out that a 1991 U.S. Air Force Inspector General report found FASP lacking in management and results. Of the six major findings and forty-four recommendations for improvement, the Air Force had not corrected any of the findings as of April 1997.
The OP 13 provides insight on two subjects of value to a study on FAO programs. Although the authors focus on U.S. Air Force deficiencies in the political-military arena, they use data, arguments, and criteria that provide a useful model for assessing the status of service FAO programs. Data, arguments, and criteria of OP 13 include post-Cold War requirements, program tracking and assignment problems, service culture bias toward FAO and political-military jobs, proper utilization, and the challenges of specialized versus general training. This study will make use of this information during the assessment of current FAO programs. The other subject and its value to a study on FAO programs is not quite as straightforward.

The authors of OP 13 draw a distinction between FAOs and political-military affairs officers that is not always clear. Much of the discussion for political-military affairs officers is based on the transitions and status changes that FAO programs had experienced as of 1997, yet the conclusions and recommendations are all expressed in terms of requirements for political-military affairs officers. Although not specifically stated, the distinction in OP 13 appears to be that many Pentagon, Air Staff, Joint Staff, and Office of the Secretary of Defense political-military affairs billets do not require all the specialized regional training that FAOs receive. The study emphasizes the growing importance of “policy sensitive billets” in the military that demand the “most-capable and best-prepared officers” if political leaders are to receive the “very best advice and their policies are to be competently executed.”

The value of this distinction is that it reflects the diversity of separate but related political-military and FAO functions that are rapidly growing in importance and demand in the post-Cold War era. The point then is that the military needs officers skilled in political science, policy formulation, and regional expertise more than it has in the past. The authors argue that the demand covers a greater scope of missions than defined by or assigned to FAO programs.

OP 13 concludes that superficial adjustment to the current organizational structure for management of these areas will not suffice to match the identified deficiencies. OP 13 is also
successful at conveying a sense of urgency to the recommendations. Not only are these areas more important than before, but the "international environment is likely to be unforgiving in the face of further neglect." 23

As the discussion of the sources in this first category of service FAO or FAO-like studies turns to the final source of the category, it is important to keep the timeframe of these studies and papers in mind. The authors gathered the information contained in OP 13 during the same period the services were meeting and providing input to DoD for the content of DoDD 1315.17. Even with the progress of DoDD 1315.17 in 1997 toward recognition of deficiencies and greater support of FAO programs, the message of the studies on FAO related subjects since 1989 is that the efforts are falling short of the requirements. The final source represents an advanced, detailed analysis of the Army FAO program. It is one services' response to understanding the thorough restructuring and reorganization needed to make their FAO program viable and equal to the changed demands of the post-Cold War environment.

The last source in this category is the survey and analysis project conducted by AB Technologies, Inc. for the U.S. Army. The final report dates from March 1998 and presents concrete recommendations on restructuring the FAO program based on program authorizations. It applies a conceptual approach to determine Army FAO program authorizations.

The concept is that a direct and proportional relationship between authorizations and career progression is ideal. Equating authorizations and career progression to two pyramid shaped objects, the author reasons that the greater the similarity of these two objects, the more likely it is that promotions and career development will be driven by requirements. 24 Of course, these two pyramids do not exist in a vacuum. The FAO career progression pyramid must reflect set values within the Department of the Army standard progression tables. Thus, the authorization pyramid receives the focus of attention for restructuring. A program with symmetry
between “pyramids” is both responsive to requirements and viable for those choosing it as a career path.

With the premise and concept of the project clarified, the project states its goal as the examination of the elements that compose the authorization pyramid. The report explains that there are actually nine smaller pyramids, one for each FAO regional Area of Concentration (AOC), that make up the aggregate authorization pyramid. The examination must consider each of the smaller pyramids individually, as the regional AOCs are not interchangeable.\(^{25}\) The complexity of managing a correctly structured FAO program grows, because the managers must balance regional requirements and authorizations within overall requirements and authorizations.

Within the aggregate authorization pyramid, the AB Technologies report identified a gap of 155 Lieutenant Colonel and 236 Major FAO positions between the “various Army data base and the actual recognized and authorized positions” worldwide.\(^{26}\) The report continues this level of detail within each of the nine Army FAO AOCs. Recognizing that increases in force size to close this gap are not realistic with the drawdown of the military, the report examines and offers alternate restructuring strategies. Upon concluding that the restructuring was viable, the report then recommends the changes in policy, training, and program management required to create the restructured FAO program.\(^{27}\) Therein lies the true value of this source to a study on service FAO programs.

The report provides a concept and recommended solutions for bringing the Army FAO program into balance by 2010. While it is obvious that these exact solutions will not pertain to the other services’ FAO programs, a viable, detailed restructuring approach complete with methods, models, and computations is available.

The four sources making up this study’s first category of referenced literature have been addressed first because their broad FAO content often overlaps the specific topics of the remaining categories. To some extent, all of the sources in the first category provide information
on the historical functions and missions of FAOs and FAO programs. The Burkett thesis is perhaps the best, with the Sizemore authored, HSR report a close second. While discussing the nature and history of FAOs in the second category, this study will reference these two sources, but it will also address several other important references.

**Historic References to Area Expertise**

Detailed knowledge of your enemy's ways has been valued as long as written history has been able to record the fact. The sources that support this concept are varied and colorful. The following paragraphs highlight the references, pertinent sources, and topics that build the foundation of the FAOs historical mission up to and during the Cold War.

The greatest history book ever written contains some of the earliest examples of the value of foreign area knowledge. In the 11th century BC, Moses' connection to and his understanding of Egyptian attitudes, strengths, and weaknesses facilitated a course of action that eventually led to the release of a nation of people from enslavement by another. In his thesis, U.S. Air Force Major Burkett refers to the same concept expressed several centuries later in military terms by Sun Tzu. Around 550 BC, Sun Tzu wrote:

> If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory you will suffer defeat. If you know neither yourself nor the enemy, you are a fool and will meet defeat in every battle.

The concept does not apply solely to enemies. Early American history provides an example where knowledge of multiple cultures by one individual not only supported the mission but directly prevented enmity. From May 1804 to September 1806, Meriwether Lewis and William Clark led the Corps of Discovery across much of the North American continent. For more than half of the two-and-a-half year trip, they employed Toussaint Charbonneau as a guide and interpreter. However, it was Charbonneau's Native American wife Sacajawea, who proved the greater asset. She proved critical in demonstrating the peaceful nature of the mission and was
solely responsible for the availability of food, horses and local guides that allowed the expedition to continue successfully.  

References to U.S. military officers providing critical insight into foreign cultures kept pace with the U.S. increased overseas involvement at the turn of the nineteenth century. One of the best examples is the life and experiences of General Joseph W. Stilwell, (1883-1946), the original China FAO. Two primary sources provide insight into the challenges Stilwell faced and his accomplishments while serving overseas. The first is Stilwell’s memoirs The Stilwell Papers arranged, edited, and then posthumously published by Theodore White in 1948. The second reference source is Barbara Tuchman’s Stilwell and the American Experience in China: 1911-1945, a book for which she received her second Pulitzer Prize in 1972. These two references define what the role and function of a service FAO was long before the military structured the concept in a program.

One other essential reference joins those on General Stilwell in defining the function and significance of a FAO. The U.S. Marine Corps Small Wars Manual published in 1940 reflects growing recognition of the importance of knowledge of foreign cultures to military operations overseas. This manual was primarily the result of the lessons the Marines learned while conducting Latin American operations in Cuba (1906-09), Nicaragua (1909-1933), Haiti (1915-20), and the Dominican Republic (1916-24). The lessons in the manual though, have not aged at all and are still valid fifty years later. Forces in Somalia, Bosnia, or Kosovo would profit with a review of this manual.

The Small Wars Manual paragraph addressing attitude and bearing of Marines interacting with foreign cultures is explicit. It states “A knowledge of the character of the people and a command of the language are great assets.” The manual is more emphatic in the sentence following the one just quoted:

Political methods and motives which govern the actions of foreign people and their political parties, incomprehensible at best to the average North American, are practically
beyond the understanding of persons who do not speak their language. If not already familiar with the language, all officers upon assignment to expeditionary duty should study and acquire a working knowledge of it.\textsuperscript{35}

A year after the publication of the \textit{Small Wars Manual} the U.S. was fighting in World War II. Among a great number of other developments, World War II was also responsible for the rapid and extensive growth of both U.S. civilian and military intelligence organizations.\textsuperscript{36} This growth reflected the trend of increased U.S. interaction overseas that had started at the beginning of the century. The demand and requirement for foreign area expertise followed pace.

As the U.S. military moved through World War II and into the Cold War, the operating environment changed considerably and the focus for military officers with foreign area expertise changed in tandem. One of the first references to address the need for Russian area experts in the military is no other than the Summary Report by the Commanding General of the U.S. Military Mission to Moscow. The report covers events and observations from October 1943 to October 1945. It strongly recommends the establishment of a special course and the training of as many “young Regular Army officers as possible in knowledge of the Russian language and the Russian people.”\textsuperscript{37}

Two years later, the first official references concerning FAO programs emerged. The Burkett thesis contains detailed information on the documentation surrounding the infancy of the Army FAO program. Additionally, Burkett makes an important distinction between the history of service FAO programs and the language programs that existed to teach attachés even before World War II. Burkett defines the attaché as an officer “who is specifically trained to represent U.S. interests in a specific country”, in contrast to the FAO’s regional base of knowledge to be applied to “different jobs within the region, attaché being only one of them.”\textsuperscript{38}

With the 1947 publication of Department of the Army \textit{Circular Number 83}, the U.S. Army established the formal program from which the 1999 FAO program evolved. Army \textit{Circular Number 83} created the language and area training program (LATP). However, the LATP only
lasted six years. Concurrent with the end of the Korean War in 1953, the Army modified and renamed the LATP to the foreign area specialist training (FAST), the name referenced above in category one during the discussion of the 1969 HSR report.

The sources that best captures the focus and nature of the service FAO program during the Cold War are the course manuals from the different FAO training facilities. The 1979 U.S. Army War College individual study project of Army Lieutenant Colonel Verner N. Pike, Military Police Corps, contains a wealth of information on Cold War FAO programs. His project is titled “The Role of the Foreign Area Officer in National Security Policymaking in the 1980s.” In it, Lieutenant Colonel Pike makes observations and recommendations on functional skills, overseas training and language preparation, graduate education, the FAO course itself, and on the identification of general officer FAO billets. Additionally, the work includes as annexes both the 1977 *Foreign Area Officer Course* (Fort Bragg, North Carolina) Program of Instruction and the 1979 *U.S. Army Russian Institute Course Bulletin* (Garmisch, Germany).39

The regulations and instructions of the different services in the mid-to-late 1980s codify the roles, functions, and definitions of FAO programs as the Cold War draws to an end. In a similar fashion to the Pike project, the Burkett thesis contains in appendix A, the current instructions and regulations governing the FAO or FAO-like of all the services as of 1989. These sources reflect the state of FAO programs as they were before the end of the Cold War. Burkett’s foreshadowing of the end of the Cold War has already been referenced, as he voices the opinion that there may well be an increased need for FAOs “if the ‘post-Cold War’ era actually dawns.”40

**Post-Cold War Evolution of National Policy**

The end of Cold War was much closer than Burkett anticipated. When it arrived though, an inevitable period of considerable transition would follow before the first changes to FAO regulations and instructions appeared. The third category of sources referenced in this study
address the national policy changes that drove and defined the transition in FAO missions accompanying the end of the Cold War.

The first official announcement of this change dates to the President’s Aspen Institute speech on 2 August 1990. The information in the 1994 BUR and the 1997 QDR serve as further markers along the post-Cold War transition path for the U.S. military and will be referenced during this study. However, it is necessary to digress to 1986 in order to appreciate some of the sources and impacts on the U.S. military and their FAO programs.

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Goldwater-Nichols) is a driving force behind much of the way the entire U.S. Department of Defense operates at the end of the twentieth century. Although it predates the end of the Cold War, it has molded the structure of the DoD and guided much of the transition the U.S. military has experienced in the post-Cold War era. Among other requirements, the act mandated that the President formulate and present a yearly NSS to Congress. This necessitates a focused effort at presenting a clear and defensible direction for the defense of the nation. The lack of the same was one of the arguments behind the Act.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act also empowered the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff (CJCS) and directed the primacy of Jointness over independent service activity. As the upper echelon of the national military structure, the CJCS and the Secretary of Defense develop the military aspects for the President’s NSS. As Goldwater-Nichols directly necessitated a focused approach to the formulation of national security strategy, so did it indirectly necessitate the clear and defensible formulation of a national military strategy. To meet this responsibility as well as the newly empowered joint coordination of military activities worldwide, the CJCS developed the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). One of the central documents that is produced by the JSPS is the NMS. Unlike the President and the NSS, the CJCS is only required to review the NMS on an annual basis. If conditions require, CJCS modifies and then publishes the revised edition of
the NMS. "The NMS articulates how the United States will employ the military element of power to support the national security objectives found in the President’s National Security Strategy (NSS)." The JSPS has greatly focused national military planning and prioritization efforts and the effect has cascaded down through the services.

Conceptually then, all military programs—including FAO programs—support the NMS objectives, which, in turn, support the NSS. Thus, the editions of NSS and NMS from 1990 to the present cover the transition in national policy that drove and defined FAO programs after the end of the Cold War. The Secretary of Defense Annual Report to the President and to the Congress as well as selected Congressional Records, supplement the information and policies outlined in the NSS and NMS. However, in addition to these national level documents, this study investigates other sources with reference to FAOs that reflect the transitions within the individual services.

The U.S. Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps jointly prepared and published two primary examples of sources that describe change at the service level after the Cold War. The two pivotal white papers ...From the Sea (1992) and its update Forward...From the Sea (1994) announced and described a "landmark shift in operational focus and a reordering of coordinated priorities of the Naval Service." Because the Navy FAO program is particularly new, the transition in Navy philosophy, doctrine, and mission focus contained in these two documents is of special importance to this study.

The Joint Staff and the other services followed the USN and USMC with the publication of the commonly known "Service Vision Publications." The Joint Electronic Library (JEL), found in both CD-ROM version and on the Internet contain the Joint Staff’s Joint Vision 2010, the Marine Corps' Operational Maneuver from the Sea, the Air Force’s Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21st Century Air Force, and Army’s Army Vision 2010,
as well as the Navy’s *Forward...From the Sea*. These sources provide further insight into the services’ perceptions of the changed requirements in the post-Cold War environment.

Articles in military journals and periodicals provide additional perspectives and arguments on the new demands and requirements anticipated during and after the transition into the post-Cold War environment. Articles, such as the *Joint Force Quarterly*’s interview with General Colin Powell and article by Lieutenant General Redden on the future of joint doctrine provide substance to the subject of transition in military strategy and policy. *Military Review* has numerous articles addressing the changed roles and new missions the military must master to be successful after the Cold War. The *Army Times* and the *Army Link* articles give interpretations on the meaning and substance of national military strategy. The U.S. Army School of the Americas (USARSA) quarterly journal *Adelante* provides specific insight to anticipated changes in South America after the Cold War. The U.S. Army War College quarterly *Parameters* contains articles on the cultural complexity of the environment in which the U.S. military will have to function. The media’s questions contained and answered in news briefings by the Office of the assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) reflect the nature of the public’s interest and concern in the military’s transition after the Cold War.

The above discussed, third category of referenced literature covers a wide range of formats and sources. In summary, Goldwater-Nichols created the impetus for change and DoD and CJCS clearly articulated the changed environment and corresponding new directions in national military strategy. The scope narrows considerably in the fourth category of references. This refined scope is a function of the category’s singular focus on the DoD and service documents. The fourth category discusses the documents that describe and proscribe the standards developed for the FAO programs because of the new post-Cold War requirements.
DoD and Service FAO Documents

As stated on page 6, DoDD 1315.17 (22 February 1997) is a pivotal reference to this entire study. This DoD Directive marks the first time in U.S. military history that all services were required to create a FAO program. In many ways, it validates the recommendations made by earlier FAO program studies like the Burkett thesis. It is the first response from the DoD directing the U.S. military as a whole to develop new capabilities to meet a critical area of demand in the post-Cold War environment. The value of this document to this study is that it sets the initial parameters and DoD standard for required, service FAO programs. It allows the evaluation of how well the DoD has met the new demands articulated at the national level in the NSS and NMS and expressed in public literature.

The services responded to DoDD 1315.17 by reviewing, revising, or drafting new instructions delineating proprietary FAO programs. The Army reviewed DA PAM 600-3, Chapter 40 and significantly restructured their FAO program in synchronization with OPMS XXI. The Marine Corps was already instating changes and is reviewing USMC Order 1520.11D. They have opted to integrate the FAO program into a new, larger program identified as the International Affairs Officer Program (IAO) which also includes USMC Regional Area Officers (RAOs) and International Relations Officers (IRO). The order is complete and entered the staffing stage in September 1997. The Air Force published AF Instruction 16-109 “Foreign Area Officer Program” on 1 June 1998. The Navy drafted and signed Chief of Naval Operations Instruction (OPNAVINST) 1301.10, “Navy Foreign Area Officer Program,” on 23 April 1997.

The value of these instructions as sources to this study is twofold. First, these instructions are the primary references for judging the services response to having a FAO program. Does the service’s program meet DoD standards? Second, a comparison reveals the strengths, weaknesses in addition to the perceived nature, expectations, and functions that the
services have of their own programs. The study scrutinizes the standards outlined in the service
FAO program instructions for applicability and feasibility. Armed with this information, the
study can begin to assess whether or not the FAO programs are meeting the services’ own
standards and more importantly, the services’ own needs.

Sources to Assess FAO Program Capabilities

An assessment of service FAO programs is only possible with information to compare to
defined standards. One method to gather this information is to analyze the results of a survey, an
approach used by the HRS report, the Burkett thesis and the AB Technologies Project to identify
FAO program strengths and weaknesses. In the absence of original survey information, this study
collects information on service FAO programs as captured in published articles authored by
seasoned FAOs, interviews with FAOs, and information provided from the FAO program
proponent offices. Additionally, the information outlined in the current FAO schoolhouse syllabi
provide information on the general standards that the programs are training to. These sources
comprise this study’s fifth and last category of referenced literature.

The value of the Internet as a source for current information cannot be overemphasized.
The literature review that fails to highlight the value of the Internet risks a loss of credibility. The
FAO programs of the Navy, the Air Force, and the Army all have Internet websites. These
sources provide a wealth of current information and the planned programmatic changes as well as
the anticipated effects on the program. As a reference source, they offer direct access to the
official positions that often prove more current that the services’ published manuals.

In a similar fashion, several military facilities involved in different phases of FAO
program training have Internet websites. They include the Defense Language Institute (DLI) and
the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, and the Marshall Center in Garmisch,
Germany. For contrast in nature of mission and programs, Special Forces FAO program
information can also be accessed on their own Internet website.
The Foreign Area Officer Association (FAOA) is an immense source of information on current FAO concerns, experiences, and program changes. The FAOA's F.A.O. Journal and Internet site record the experiences of FAOs from all services in the field as well as the most important program developments in the eyes of the service proponents. Articles debate planned changes to training syllabi used in FAO schoolhouses even before utilization in the training courses.

Periodical articles serve a dual function. Earlier discussion indicated the use of periodical articles in defining the roles and needs for FAOs in the post-Cold War era. However, in reflecting the need for FAOs they also describe the status of the FAO programs and the capabilities of the FAOs they produce. Articles often reflect information contained in nondisclosed military operation after action reports. As such, they address the experiences, the shortfalls, and the successes that FAOs have experienced in post-Cold War overseas military operations.

Interviews with FAOs and former FAOs provide perspective on training and mission issues in the direct fashion that no other source can match. Interviews with former FAOs provide depth and substance of information, as many of them, by the very nature of their expertise, continue their involvement in multinational and military operations in the civilian sector. Current FAOs provide detailed insight into the strengths and weaknesses of the training received and how it was or was not applicable to the mission that they were required to perform.

The variety of sources available supports the scope of this study. The organization of sources into the five categories discussed above provides a structure for understanding the collection, discrimination, and presentation of FAO program-related information. The composite sources provide the informational basis for credible analysis and assessment of service FAO programs. The study will next address the method used to analyze the information obtained from the composite sources.


5Sizemore, ii.

6Ibid.

7Ibid., i

8Ibid., iii

9Burkett, 138.

10Ibid., i.

11Ibid., 7-14.

12Ibid., i

13Ibid., 137-138.

14Ibid., 139.

15Ibid., 140.

16Kinzer and Peterson Ulrich, ix.

17Ibid.

18Ibid., 29.

19Ibid., iv-vi.

20Ibid., 8.
21Ibid., 2.
22Ibid., 8-9.
23Ibid., 40.
24Tullbane, i.
25Ibid., i.
26Ibid.
27Ibid.
28Exodus, chapters 1-15 NEB (New English Bible).
30Grace Raymond Hebard, Sacajawea (Glendale, California: Arthur H. Clark Co., 1933), 53-70.
34Ibid., 26.
35Ibid.,
37U.S. Department of State, "The U.S. Military Mission to Moscow, October 8, 1943 to October 31, 1945, Part I: Summary Report by the Commanding General" (report submitted by USMILMIS Moscow to the U.S. Department of State, 1945), paragraph 36.
38Burkett, 15.
40Burkett, 13.


CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

Introduction

This chapter explains the organization of this study. The purpose is to establish the steps and outline the framework for the comparative assessment of service FAO programs. Familiarity with the progression of arguments and the structure of the information presented greatly assists in the assimilation of a large volume of data and provides valuable reference points.

The study and assessment of service FAO programs covers several academic disciplines. This study combines several typical methodologies during the research process. This study is not a historical treatise, but history provides context and a needed reference point to the assessment of current FAO programs. This study is not a discourse on the formulation of national military strategy and policy, but an understanding of that process is necessary to define the purpose and function of the U.S. service FAO. Finally, this study is not a dissertation on the cultural and functional differences between the U.S. military services, yet those differences play a significant role in assessing the status of the U.S. service FAO program.

This study organizes the assessment of service FAO programs into a three-step process. The first two steps establish the background, the reference points, and the assessment parameters while the actual assessment takes place in the third step. Additionally, an important theme spans these three steps. Throughout, the study recognizes there were, and still are significant differences between the FAO programs of the different services. As such, in step three of the assessment, the study addresses service FAO programs individually. A detailed discussion of the three steps and the underlying theme follows.

Methodology Step One

In the first step, the study establishes the origins of FAO programs and defines the essence of FAO capabilities and traditional FAO missions. Early on, the first step also identifies
and introduces five critical components of an effective FAO program for reference throughout all three steps. These five components are the criteria used in step three to conduct the comparative assessment.

The discussion in step one covers considerable detail on pre-Cold War FAO history and evolution of the first FAO programs. The Cold War era encompasses significant developments in service requirements for language and area expertise, and the discussion addresses the emergence of more organized language and area expertise programs. The end of the Cold War serves as a significant point of reference and departure into an era of unprecedented demand for FAO capabilities within the services. The accelerated evolutionary process for FAO programs started shortly before the Cold War ended and it shares similarities with the evolution of jointness in the military.

Before the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, there was no NMS to articulate the strategy and goals of the DoD as there is in 1999. The strategy, however, was clear after forty years of enforcement and practice. In 1978, John Lewis Gaddis presented a reassessment of the national military strategy of containment. He expounds on the term and concept originally presented by George F. Kennan in 1947. Former CJCS General Colin Powell, restated that containment was the national military strategy during the Cold War in the 1996 summer edition of Joint Forces Quarterly.

Cold War containment provides the setting with which to understand the initial correlation between national policy and the function and purpose of FAOs. This understanding facilitates the discussion of trends in FAO missions, training, and career progression as the services transitioned from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era. It is important to appreciate the transition’s starting point. Without this historical reference, the transition of the programs, the trends in the programs, and the context of an assessment of post-Cold War service FAO programs
remain incomplete. Table 2 facilitates the correlation of FAO program trends to U.S. policy and key events.

**Methodology Step Two**

The second step addresses less dated FAO program history. It tracks the rationale and the forces driving and directing change in service FAO programs between 1989 and 1997. Step two ends with the identification of written requirements and standards for FAO programs at the DoD level.

The goal of step two is the identification of DoD requirements and the impetus for the revised requirements in the post-Cold War period. The revision of national security policy is the primary force behind these changes, indicating appropriate nesting of military programs within national security policy. The discussion follows a top down direction covering in turn national policy and objectives, military policy and objectives, and finally the joint doctrine and DoD directives that establish DoD programs. This flow from general policy to specific programs supports the logical derivation of FAO program standards and requirements. The starting point of this process is the chronology of national decisions accompanying the end of the Cold War that affected service FAO programs.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 transformed the structure and organizational dynamics of the U.S. military. Because it created the impetus for such significant change, the study will briefly address the Goldwater-Nichols Act history. Among other results, Goldwater-Nichols generated a wave of requirements for assessing and capturing the desired national intentions with respect to the use and function of the military. The **BUR** and the **QDR**, the 1997 and 1998 editions of the **NSS**, and the 1997 **NMS** are national-level documents that respond to Goldwater-Nichols’ requirements.

The last of these documents is of importance as the discussion narrows to the specifics of requirements and standards of FAO programs after the Cold War. The 1997 **NMS** outlines three
strategic concepts and two national military objectives. The three concepts are to “shape the international environment, respond to the full spectrum of crises, and prepare now for an uncertain future.” The accompanying objectives are to “promote peace and stability, and when necessary, defeat adversaries.” These national military objectives should and, indeed, do drive DoD goals and the programs established to reach those goals. Continuing the flow from general to specific, the discussion turns to the two primary tools DoD uses to translate national objectives into working concepts and programs.

Doctrine and directives are the venues used to establish parameters for DoD programs. Specifically, joint doctrine and DoD directives capture the revised DoD requirements and standards for service FAO programs in the post Cold War. Until 1997, there was no DoD standard for service FAO programs. Post Goldwater-Nichols joint doctrine is saturated with references to the increased need for regional expertise (traditional FAO billets), but each service initially had its own interpretation and response to this growing need.

At least in theory, this condition changed on 22 February 1997 when Deputy Secretary of Defense John P. White signed DoD Directive 1315.17 Service Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Programs in effect. General in nature, this directive establishes the minimum requirements and standards for DoD FAO programs. This study does not limit FAO program requirements to those established in DoDD 1315.17. Joint doctrine and other military periodicals establish unofficial requirements through the level of proficiency demanded from regional experts. The service FAO program assessment process in this study considers these unofficial requirements.

**Methodology Step Three**

In the third step, the study conducts the comparative assessment of the individual service FAO programs. The service’s response to national and DoD directions is only a portion of the assessment. The assessment considers the actual viability of the program with respect to how well the service manages it, how well it takes care of FAOs in the program and how well it trains
FAOs to accomplish FAO missions. Assessing the status of a program in transition—such as that of the U.S. service FAO in the post-Cold War period—poses challenges, but these challenges are surmountable with carefully selected and clearly defined criteria.

Step three restates the five critical components of effective FAO programs introduced in step one. It then clearly identifies and discusses baseline requirements for each of the components and several sub-components. The components include FAO program management, program self-assessment, and three distinct aspects of FAO training. The sub-components are primarily under the program management component and include number of FAO billets in the program, FAO proponent office size (manpower), number of fully qualified FAOs, and FAO career progression strategy (see table 3).

With criteria established, the study assesses each service's response to the same standard, even while considering service-specific details. Every service responded to DoDD 1315.17 with a service specific FAO program instruction or directive. These service instructions address the requirements stated in DoDD 1315.17, but the selected criteria and comparative quality of this study's methodology allows an assessment of program viability beyond the strict content of the instructions. The discussion and assessment of actual service FAO program capabilities follow the outline established by program components and sub-components.

The study gathers and compiles information on service FAO program capabilities across the spectrum of required FAO program activities. This information is available through the research of career management strategies, FAO assignments, and FAO training programs to name a few of the many sources listed in chapter 2.

The study identifies indicators of current capabilities. The re-written service FAO program instructions provide evidence of change to FAO training programs, but interviews and visits to FAO training centers confirm the status. Other indicators include service program
abilities to respond to changes in traditional, service specific FAO missions, and changes in the
demands made in attaché and Security Assistance Officer billets.

Internal changes in the offices managing FAO programs since DoDD 1315.17 are also
considerable indicators of program capabilities. FAO career progression has undergone
significant change. The impact of OPMS XXI for the Army FAO program is one prime example,
the effort in the re-coding of billets and sub-specialties in the USN is another. FAO retention
and promotion rates in the military are worthy of separate research. However, this study will only
treat retention and promotion indirectly to identify their impact on U.S. service FAO programs.

As mentioned above, the third step is the actual comparative assessment. Through it, the
study compares and contrasts the status of every service FAO program component to the
respective baseline requirement. Two data points result from this comparative assessment. First,
the obtained results define, identify, and track service specific transitions in FAO programs
between pre- and post-Cold War eras. Second, the results are the basis for assessing the
capabilities provided by U.S. service FAO programs.

Service Prerogatives

Any discussion of U.S. service FAO programs must address the underlying theme of
service cultural and functional differences. During the Cold War, the scope of each service’s
FAO program roughly corresponded to the degree of foreign interaction that service anticipated.
The U.S. Army (USA) was by far the leader with a relatively well developed FAO program, with
the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC), the U.S. Air Force (USAF), and U.S. Navy (USN) all
developing their programs to lesser degrees. A service independent approach was typical of the
U.S. military before 1986, but the Goldwater-Nichols Act highlighted the need for greater
coordination and directed the reorganization of programs for greater efficiency.

However, although the services have made considerable progress toward “jointness”
since 1986, the tradition of parochialism remains. Service FAO programs experience their own

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share of parochialism. This study acknowledges the purview that each service has over its program, and considers this fact when assessing the FAO programs as described in the three-step methodology above. DoDD 1315.17 does not establish overly specific guidelines, intentionally allowing the individual service to mold the program to its specific needs. The assessment in Chapter 5 will address the reasons for this leeway.

This hybrid research methodology developed and described above is appropriate for assessing the status of military programs with the historical, political, military, and management implications that FAO programs have. The methodology also allows for the growing and evolving strategic, operational, and tactical considerations of the FAO's mission. The service FAO program is not unique in this sense. Related fields, such as psychological operations and civil affairs, would require similar methodologies. In this study, this approach will provide the basis for making a thorough and accurate assessment and then allow the drawing of appropriate conclusion.

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5Anthony Defrias, LT U.S. Navy, Bureau of Naval Personnel FAO Billet Coordinator, phone interview by author, e-mail 8 April 1999, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS.
CHAPTER 4

FAO PROGRAM HISTORY

Pre-Cold War FAO Background and Service Trends

This chapter establishes the background of FAOs and FAO programs in U.S. military history. The purpose is to provide necessary reference and antecedent to the service FAO programs that exist in 1999. At the end of the twentieth century, the preponderance of U.S. military operations overseas has created an unprecedented demand for foreign area expertise. Without the benefit of the historical perspective, it is easy to overlook the importance and relevance of foreign area expertise and miss the lessons the U.S. military has already learned.

The assessment of FAO programs in this study commences with the description of FAOs and their roles during the Cold War. This four-decade era provides a point of departure for it contains the direct precursors of the programs that exist in 1999. Earlier examples of individuals whose foreign area expertise facilitated political, economic, and military success and awareness are plentiful. Much earlier examples validate the critical importance of foreign expertise, but the individual’s circumstances are difficult to relate to a modern, institutionalized military program. No current military program could accommodate that length of in-country-training (ICT) in its FAO training syllabus, but none could argue against the value of the knowledge gained by Marco Polo during the twenty-four years he lived in the Orient (1271-1295).

Intense economic and diplomatic struggles accompanied by mutual suspicion and hostility characterized the ideological rivalry of the Cold War. The arena for this rivalry covered the entire globe. This environment placed a heightened premium on foreign area expertise, for it demanded not only the thorough understanding of history, culture, and language of the Soviet Union, but of any world region or country where these ideological rivals clashed. Equally important, the same premium applied to building and maintaining strong ties and cooperation
with a multitude of new allies. There is no substitute for educated insight into another culture’s priorities and patterns of behavior.

Japan announced its World War II surrender on 14 August 1945. Two months later, U.S. military officials were already detailing the clash of interests between Russia and the U.S. in their reports to Washington. In his October 1945 summary report, the Commanding General of the U.S. Military Mission to Moscow (USMILMO) addresses future relations with Russia.

"The present Soviet foreign policy appears to be aimed aggressively at the domination of all her neighboring countries by military (including the secret police)."¹ By 1947, the U.S. was sending aid to anti-Communist groups in Greece and Turkey under the Truman Doctrine.² In the same year, Walter Lippmann, the man whom author Kenneth W. Thompson refers to as "America’s premier diplomatic columnist and political philosopher"³ introduces the term "cold war" in his book The Cold War: A Study in U.S. Foreign Policy.⁴

The Commanding General of USMILMO also addressed the urgent need for area expertise and recommended a method for gaining such knowledge.

It is believed that the United States should adopt a policy at once [author’s emphasis] of training as many young regular Army officers as possible. . . . This can best be done by following the system formerly used in China and Japan of attaching officers to the Military Attaché as language students. A special course should be developed and officers rotated as frequently as possible.⁵

It is interesting that he refers to the historical precedent established in the Orient, a direct reference to the language program that trained FAO legend General Joseph Stilwell (1883-1946). Commonly considered the original China FAO, Stilwell set FAO standards in the 1920s well before any systematically managed FAO program existed.⁶

The discussion in this chapter addresses several topics. The topics include the nature of FAO programs during the Cold War, FAO roles and missions during the Cold War, and how the programs trained FAOs to succeed in their missions. The discussion establishes a baseline concept for FAO programs in the post-Cold War era. Before addressing these topics though, the
study of FAO programs demands an excursion into the evolution of FAO programs to appreciate the origin of key factors that influence the programs of 1999. A primary value of investigating the pre-Cold War evolution of FAO programs is that it validates five critical components that have historically defined the structure of an effective and balanced FAO program. Both positive and negative examples factor in to this validation. In 1997, DoD 1315.17 specifically addresses four of these components and implies the fifth. 7 The components include:

1. Central and coherent management of the program and community by an accountable office

2. A periodic program-wide detailed assessment to monitor viability and direction

3. Advanced language training

4. Postgraduate area studies

5. A period of ICT where the degree of expertise the individual obtains is directly proportional to the length and extent of the immersion.

There is an additional value attached to investigating the pre-Cold War evolution of FAO programs. The analysis of historic correlation between American interests abroad and the amount of support and effort expended by the services to foster foreign expertise are of paramount interest to this study. Ideally, national interests drive the formulation of foreign and security policy and the objectives contained therein. Likewise, the requirements and expenditures for development of foreign expertise and awareness should support these objectives. If the foreign policy is one of isolation, there should be minimal support for developing expertise, while the opposite applies if the policy involves frequent interaction abroad. That said, there is an inevitable lag between the official formulation of a new direction in foreign and security policy and the realization of programs to execute it. For the DoD then, the question is how well the services anticipate and prepare for changing requirements, and conversely, what risks they perceive they can take by assigning lower priority to the development of foreign expertise.
Historic trends in this correlation provide insight into the level of support services in 1999 should allot to the development of foreign expertise. The establishment year of the first U.S. FAO program is subject to interpretation. However, if one applies the five components of a FAO program as a guide, the logical choice is 1947. That year, Department of the Army Circular Number 83 established the Language and Area Training Program (LATP). The establishment of LATP at the start of the Cold War is no coincidence. It denotes awareness of the need for foreign area expertise.  

Burkett references an undated source titled *The Foreign Area Officer Program: An Overview of the History of the Program* as the most "comprehensive single overview" for FAO programs. The author is Captain David W. Davis, but no other information on the publication is available. Burkett concurs with Davis' determination that the LATP is the most useful starting point. The LATP included a year of university language study at Colombia, Yale, Princeton, or Stanford, followed by another year concentrating on country specifics, such as geography, history, culture and others. Burkett goes on to describe that a third and sometimes fourth year were then spent abroad "primarily studying the language and 'soaking up' the culture."  

A primary distinguishing factor between the LATP and the earlier attaché language training programs was the systematic management and tracking of the qualified officers by the service. Then as now, a cornerstone of any FAO program is an appropriately manned proponent office responsible for the management of billets and administration of the FAO's interests. Without this oversight, the program cannot and will not function effectively. The LATP was the first program to enjoy this level of dedicated support. Burkett acknowledges earlier language training programs, but draws an additional and significant distinction between the earlier programs and the LATP. In the process, he also clarifies the essential difference between an attaché and a FAO. The difference is one of scope.
The attaché is “specifically trained to represent U.S. interests in a specific country, while the
FAO must be more regionally minded and may be used in many different jobs within the
region, attaché duty being only one of them.” This distinction remains valid in 1999. Stated
differently, not every FAO will be an attaché, but every attaché should be a FAO.

Thus, for the reasons mentioned above, this study considers the creation of the LATP in
1947 as the establishment date of formal FAO programs. However, as stated earlier, the study
will also address details of the earlier language programs. These early programs highlight the
changing emphasis the government and, by extension, the services placed on developing foreign
expertise. In doing so they reflect the historical roles and relationships that different services
have had with the federal government, the Department of State and diplomacy. This lends
heightened perspective to modern FAO roles, particularly in the case of the U.S. Navy as pertains
to this study.

Of all U.S. armed services, the Navy has by its very nature the longest and most varied
history of foreign interaction. This history is singularly rich in tradition and impact on U.S.
diplomacy. Primarily during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the U.S. Navy
exercised a particular style of veiled-threat diplomacy as a matter of course. Geographic and
transportation realities of the age dictated that a naval officer was often the sole U.S.
representative in a foreign capital and a U.S. naval ship the most effective venue for “showing the
flag.” The communication between State and Navy Departments to coordinate sailing orders with
diplomatic requirements was extensive, approximately four thousand individual communications
between 1865 and 1877. “Secretaries of state often placed higher value on the information and
opinion about diplomatic situations provided by professional naval officers than that supplied by
the still marginally professional civilian officials.” Yet, there is no indication of systematic,
institutional foreign area training for the naval officers who were trusted with both exercising
diplomacy and carrying out national policy over wide areas of the world.
In his book *Language Competence: Implications for National Security*, Kurt E. Müller traces the federal advocacy for U.S. Navy academic endeavors in foreign naval literature back to President John Adams in 1800. In recognition of the value of languages, the U.S. Military Academy (USMA) offered language training to cadets as early as 1803. U.S. Naval Academy (USNA) midshipmen instruction included Spanish and French when the curriculum transitioned to a four year program in 1850. Thus, two centuries ago, the U.S. federal government was already concerned with the implications of foreign language expertise to the military.

This concern did not abate over time. For the Navy, Müller notes the role of the Office of Naval Intelligence and its first director, Lieutenant T. B. M. Mason. A linguist, Mason organized the translation and compilation of foreign language documents to make foreign advances in naval science more available to U.S. naval officers. By 1902, the Department of the Navy benefited regularly with a well-established procedure for such translations. As a counterpoint, Müller adds that by the end of the nineteenth century, the Army was sending scholars abroad to study the organization and training of foreign armies.

World War I brought the importance of language skills for dealing with both allies and foes to the forefront of Army leader's awareness. The public and policy makers did not necessarily share the sentiment. Müller relates some of the public manifestations of the isolationist period between World Wars. These include blatant discrimination against the use and teaching of foreign languages, particularly German. "In Nebraska, a teacher was convicted for teaching German privately. (That conviction was upheld by the Nebraska Supreme Court but was overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1923 [see *Meyer v. Nebraska*, 262 U.S. 390])." Even the considerable U.S. involvement in the Caribbean during the early decades of the century in countries like the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Haiti (see appendix A) failed to provide sufficient impetus for change in language programs and the development of foreign expertise. World War I did.
By the end of World War I, the Army and Navy both supported language training abroad. The Army "language officers" program of 1919, a program discussed below in conjunction with General Stilwell,20 was the first to systematically develop language ability for commissioned officers in peacetime. The Navy reacted similarly. By 1922, the Navy was regularly sending officers to study Japanese in Tokyo for three years.21 One could view the reaction by both the Army and Navy as positive, particularly in the face of American isolationist sentiment of the time. Unfortunately, World War I also marks the first time this century that the U.S. participated in coalition wars, and the services proved ill prepared to provide the level of foreign expertise the operations required.22

In conjunction with the level of preparation and training in foreign area expertise, it is important to distinguish between pre and post-commissioned language training. The study mentioned the long-standing language requirements at the Naval and Military academies. Although indicative of a well-rounded education and highly recommended in any higher education curriculum, this level of training by itself cannot develop area experts. A higher degree of exposure to a foreign culture, preferably complete immersion if possible, is required before an individual gains the insight that allows "area expertise." The experiences of General Joseph Stilwell shed great light on the organizational and training details of the earliest U.S. Army program designed with that higher degree of exposure in mind.

In her book Stilwell and the American Experience in China, Tuchman references in detail what is perhaps the very first systematic U.S. military program geared specifically toward developing foreign country experts. As well as the isolationism mentioned earlier, the scope and carnage of World War I created antipathy among the American public for war and military related subjects. Returning to the U.S. from that war in July of 1919 but committed to a military career, Stilwell soon decided he wanted to distance himself from such sentiments as much as possible. The U.S. Army Military Intelligence Division’s (MID) in-country language training
program had just developed past the concept stage and assignments to Japan were already full. 23 The relationship between assignments and timing has not changed much over the years. Stilwell volunteered for assignment to China.

On 6 August 1919, Stilwell received his appointment as the very first U.S. Army Chinese “language officer.” 24 He spent four years immersed in the culture, living and traveling extensively throughout the entire country. From the foreign country training perspective, Tuchman captures the essence of Stilwell’s experience in a particularly noteworthy phrase. She reports that by the end of his tour as a language officer, he had “functioned with Chinese under Chinese conditions.” 25 This phrase sets an elegant and irrefutable standard with which to measure the validity of the ICT phase of any foreign expert program. Indeed, it is conceivably a standard with which to measure FAO qualification.

According to Tuchman, the U.S. Army General Staff’s objectives in directing the MID’s language officer program was to organize and standardize the information gathering efforts of the military attachés. The desired outcome was a “well-chosen, well-trained corps of attachés having, it hopefully prescribed, ‘detailed knowledge of the language, military establishments, political conditions and customs of foreign nations’ and ‘a true appreciation of . . . their probable reactions in peace and war.’” 26 With this program description, it is clear that the U.S. Army was intent on having capable and qualified military’s attachés with solid foreign country expertise. Conceptually, this 1919 definition of the role of a foreign country expert remains accurate in 1999, particularly so for the “probable reactions” portion. One can argue that the sheer size and regional variety of China by default makes it an “area,” but countries like China are the exception. The 1919 attaché language training program falls short of a true FAO program in terms of scope and central, systematic management.

Over the next twenty-two years, through prohibition, the great depression, and twenty-one of the twenty-six years of the League of Nations (1920-1946), the nature of U.S. foreign
country expert and language officer programs did not significantly develop or expand. Early in 1941, a handful of U.S. Navy and Army officers were in Tokyo attending the language officer program established in 1919. The Naval officers departed in July to Shanghai. The Army officers delayed their departure and the Japanese interned them for approximately six months before release and return to the U.S.  

In 1941, World War II and the new threats to U.S. national interests instigated changes to language training programs that would directly affect the emergent FAO programs. The isolationism that characterized the inter-war period created conditions that found the services ill-prepared for the foreign expertise requirements of their overseas operations in a truly global war. This would mark the second such occurrence in slightly more than two decades. If two points determine a line and three points a pattern, U.S. preparedness for conflict abroad on the eve of World War II was one point short of an established pattern of national, shortsighted indifference. The delayed entry of the U.S. into World War II allowed for partial rectification of the deficiency with changes to old programs and the creation of several new ones.

In October 1941, the Navy commenced Japanese language-training programs at the University of California at Berkeley and Harvard University. The Army followed one month later with its own program at the Presidio of San Francisco. National interest did not restrict the effort to Japanese. Even earlier that year, Burkett points out that the Rockefeller Foundation “donated $50,000 to the American Council of Learned Societies to help set up intensive language training in a host of unusual languages.” The targeted languages included Arabic, Burmese, Japanese, Russian, Mongolian, Malay, Kurdish, and Thai, and specifically omitted those most frequently taught in U.S. schools, such as French, Spanish, German, and Italian. The American Council of Learned Societies was the group responsible for the language training methods used by the military.
In consonance with U.S. involvement overseas, service language training programs bloomed during World War II. In 1942, the Army and the Navy jointly established the Army Special Training Program (ASTP); a program “designed to provide college-trained men for leadership roles in the Army.” Although larger in scope than just area and language training, it nonetheless established official quotas for area and language proficient officers needed by the services. The funding needed for new schools as well as training at existing ones followed. During the war, the services established numerous university campus and military base ASTP sponsored area and language programs across the country. One of the main facilities was the Military Intelligence Service Language School at the Presidio of San Francisco, California. Many instructors and students were of Japanese decent, and because of the Japanese-American internment camps, the school relocated in 1942 to Camp Savage, Minnesota. After World War II, the ASTP-sponsored programs consolidated, reorganized, and relocated to a central facility at the Presidio of Monterey, California. The Navy moved its language training programs to the Naval Intelligence School in Washington, DC. In 1947, at the same time that George Kennan’s “X” article “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” appeared in Foreign Affairs and Walter Lippmann was coining the term Cold War, the Army facility at Monterey was designated the Army Language School (ALS).

As evidenced by the 1945 Military Mission to Moscow Commanding General’s report, the Cold War confrontation lines were quickly taking shape along with collective recognition of the need for greater foreign expertise. The establishment of the LATP was only one of many changes that reflected significant restructuring within U.S. national government organization. In 1947, Congress passed the National Security Act. In addition to establishing the National Security Council, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and creating the U.S. Air Force, the act also established the Central Intelligence Agency for collection abroad. For historical perspective on U.S. foreign involvement, it is useful to remember that this was the
period of the Marshall Plan (1947-1952), the Berlin Airlift (1948-1949), and the Truman Doctrine (1947-1953). The new international environment at the conclusion of World War II had extensive consequences for the U.S. armed forces and the area and language programs of the services.

**Cold War FAO Programs**

The establishment of the LATP in 1947 provides a reference point from which to begin the discussion of Cold War FAO programs. This section of the chapter addresses the nature of FAO programs and the function and mission of FAOs during the Cold War. The section consists of four subsections. The first two subsections are reference material and are not in chronological order. The first subsection establishes the basis of what the military expected of Cold War FAOs and the second subsection addresses several overarching FAO program Cold War concepts and trends. The third subsection reverts to the chronological evolution of FAO programs continuing where the LATP in 1947 stopped and the fourth subsection continues in chronological order addressing the emergence of professional FAO programs.

**FAO Cold War Billets**

The categorization of FAO billets listed in commissioned studies, such as the one conducted for the Army by Human Sciences Research, Inc (HSR) shed great light on the nature of Cold War FAOs. HSR submitted their findings in a report to the Pentagon in 1973. The HSR report provides a useful categorization of FAO billets by “function and function-by-location.” Table 1 lists the HSR report categories and indicates the distribution of billets by percentage.35

The table of FAO billet categories above provides useful information, but it is limited to a specific timeframe. It reflects only a snapshot in the development of Army area and language programs. The categories gain greater significance when analyzed within the context of FAO program evolution. With this in mind, discussion will first center on several larger
concepts affecting FAO program development during the Cold War before addressing details and highlights of area programs during the same.

Table 1. Army FAO Billets (1973)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Billet</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Advisor and Liaison</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Attaché</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Military School Faculty</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Military School Staff</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Intelligence Officer - MAAGS-Missions-MILGRPS</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Intelligence Officer – Other</td>
<td>32.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Operations and Logistics Officer – MAAGS-Missions-MILGRPS</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Operations and Logistics Officer – Other (except 4, above)</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 CA, PSYOP, UW Officer – MAAGS-Missions-MILGRPS</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 CA, PSYOP, UW Officer – Other</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Evolving Concepts and Trends

Table 1 (1973) is limited to a description of Army billets. No such detail is available for the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. This study will later address the training of personnel from all services for MAAGS and MILGRPS duty. Throughout the Cold War, these services filled attaché positions much as they had since before World War II.

The nature of the service’s perceived Cold War mission directly influenced the prioritization emphasis placed on their respective area expert training programs. The gradual emergence of area expert programs within the services as the Cold War progressed reveals a noteworthy characteristic of service support for foreign area expertise. History indicates that the services were responsive to the demands for foreign area expertise, but the delays in the service’s response were chronic. With the exception of the Army, the services repeatedly assigned the development of foreign area expertise programs a low priority.

However, compared to the rate of change in the area and language programs before World War II, the development of FAO programs during the Cold War was rapid. The
accelerated rate of change is logical if one considers the breadth of new global responsibilities that the U.S. assumed as a Cold War superpower.

Ideally, one would expect services to develop foreign expertise in anticipation of or at least as required, to meet the demands of overseas operations. A direct cause and effect relationship is, however, not realistic. Analysis of the specifics in FAO program history reveals some of the variables that make such anticipation difficult. However, the same analysis reveals several constants and trends that have implications for current and future FAO programs.

Anticipating the nature, length, and location of overseas operations is a difficult proposition at best. Having a sole, primary rival in each other as the U.S. and the Soviet Union did during the Cold War simplified such anticipation, but did not make it easy. With the exception of a foreign policy that anticipates outright aggression, such as that of the German National Socialist Government in the mid to late 1930s, it would be folly to expect any country to anticipate locations and nature of conflict in enough detail to commit significant resources to equally detailed programs any more than a few years in advance.

Throughout the Cold War though, the U.S. did have the luxury of accurate anticipation of a significant, constant threat. The global scope of U.S. interests and responsibilities started during World War II and continued unabated throughout the Cold War. The constant of a single global threat has given way to global commitments, regional conflicts, and a diversity of threats from state and non-state actors. The DoD and the services have not ignored the strategic implications of developing competent FAO programs and have sought to leverage that knowledge to maximum effect. This fact was clear during the Cold War, but the services still had to prioritize it among many other competing demands. There were also other hurdles in the path of developing area expertise commensurate to the growing need.

Additional variables hinder a clear and direct cause-and-effect relationship between foreign expertise development and degree of overseas involvement. As they do in 1999,
administrations during the Cold War had to contend with significant political and world events, changes in domestic laws and legislation, public support and interservice rivalries while formulating national security and foreign policy. These variables and the sometimes-related changes in national policies caused irregularity and haphazard development of foreign area programs within and among the services. Indeed, the frequency with which the services restructured, combined, and separated FAO programs could strengthen an argument supporting poor control and direction FAO programs. Yet, any evolving and adaptive program displays similar changes. The concept of greater interest is the reason driving the need for such changes. One can best detect and identify the reason as a trend over time.

Table 2 provides cross-reference tabulation of major developments in FAO programs to U.S. national policies and significant events of the same period. The table summarizes significant events, levels of foreign involvement, administration policies, and the potential correlation to developments in FAO programs.
Table 2. Correlation of Twentieth Century FAO Program Trends to U.S. Policy and Key Events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administration</th>
<th>Key Foreign &amp; Domestic Events</th>
<th>Overseas Ops</th>
<th>National Security Policy</th>
<th>Military Strategy</th>
<th>Approach and Doctrine</th>
<th>FAO Programs and Service Decisions</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Truman (1947-1953)</td>
<td>Korean War (1950-1953)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Containment</td>
<td>Deterrence</td>
<td>Truman Doctrine</td>
<td>LATP (1947)</td>
<td>3.5x Increase in Military Spending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR Invades</td>
<td>NATO &quot;forward strategy&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goldwater-Nichols Act (1986)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

END OF COLD WAR
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administration</th>
<th>Key Foreign &amp; Domestic Events</th>
<th>Overseas Ops</th>
<th>National Security policy</th>
<th>Military Strategy</th>
<th>Approach and Doctrine</th>
<th>FAO Programs and Service Decisions</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Assertive Multilateralism</td>
<td>Imperative of Engagement</td>
<td></td>
<td>DoDD 1315.17 (Feb 1997)</td>
<td>FAO program required by all services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Navy FAO (Apr 1997)</td>
<td>QDR (May 1997)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>USMC RAO (Apr 1997)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Army OPMS XXI (1998)</td>
<td>If selected, the FAO will serve in Functional Area 48 (FAO) billets only.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>USAF FAO Program (June 1998)</td>
<td>USAF Instruction 19-109 (01 JUN 98)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Viewed individually, the information would be interesting, but not particularly revealing. With the single exception of Vietnam, it is difficult to associate a single administration or event with a major change in FAO programs. For Vietnam, the caveat is the considerable duration of U.S. involvement. The table shows that during the Cold War, the linkage between national policies and FAO programs is too extended and diverse to allow direct and specific associations.

Viewed collectively though, the information in table 2 reveals several important trends and associated facts. First, regardless of administration, policy, strategy, military budgets, or doctrine, the Army supported a foreign area expertise program throughout the Cold War. The fact that the Army continuously maintained a program and routinely modified it for greater effect indicates the reasonable prioritization of the program. As an example in contrast, the Army tactical nuclear weapons program did not survive the duration of the Cold War. Second, table 2 reveals the trend of growing recognition and value placed on foreign area expertise. Foreign area programs during the Cold War received slow but incremental recognition as distinct communities—not just within the Army—but within all the services. This gradual growth includes the area expertise and politico-military programs established by the Navy (1971), 36 USMC FAO (1975), 37 and U.S. Air Force (1984). 38 If the growth only took place during periods of increased military spending, the rationale would be suspect. However, the trend was progressive throughout an era when the services competed fiercely for “slices of the same budgetary pie.” 39 One can always find exceptions to the rule, but the accepted assumption is that a service will first fund high priority programs in response to bona fide requirements. This lends credence to the growing recognition of FAO programs during the Cold War.

This second trend also supports a concept that although directly related, transcends a discussion of FAO programs. The table illustrates a critical fact recognized and addressed at the
dawn of the Cold War. The conceptual job description of officers in the U.S. armed forces was changing, adapting to the growth and permanency of U.S. international commitments. In his 1975 Army War College research project, *The Foreign Area Officer Program: The Efficacy of Combining the Foreign Area Specialist and the Military Assistance Officer Programs*, Lieutenant Colonel Gerald S. Griffith identifies the acknowledgement of the “expanded military role” of officers as early as 1941. He quotes John W. Masland and Laurence I. Radway in their 1957 book *Soldiers and Scholars* where they note the increased involvement of officers in the realm of strategic planning foreign affairs. “By December 1941, major aspects of national security policy . . . began to come within the sphere of the senior military officer.” Colonel Griffith also quotes a 1969 *Army Digest* article by Colonel Johnathan F. Ladd titled “Military Assistance Officer Program--Career with a Future.” After World War II, “officers of the U.S. Army frequently found themselves in positions of responsibility in overseas areas that, by their very location and nature ‘required the exercise of skills and judgement not traditionally associated with the duties of Army officers.’”

There is one additional broad concept to address before discussing the details and highlights of specific area programs as they evolved during the Cold War. It is important to realize that it was not just the nature of the skills and knowledge of the officers that was evolving, but the nature of the armed forces. The concept receives particularly support from the observation that emphasis on FAO programs (prioritization) during the Cold War paralleled the growth in U.S. overseas involvement. This increased involvement and the associated growth in FAO programs took place almost in spite of itself, regardless of the influence of other variables. This observation proves especially true of the post-Cold War era. It will be a primary topic of discussion following the chronological development of area and language programs during the Cold War.
Program Evolution Highlights

In contrast to the steady and virtually unchanged language programs of the U.S. services prior to the LATP, Cold War FAO programs changed frequently. The direction of change and degree of support for FAO programs between 1947 and 1989 followed parochial lines. The Cold War priorities of the individual services played the largest role. Occasionally, the competition between branches of the same service determined the evolution of foreign area expertise.

Services developed priorities in response to the services’ primary missions. Before the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, service secretaries enjoyed a large degree of autonomy and the nature of service specific missions were often a function of the service’s interpretation of foreign policy. The administrations formulated foreign policy in reaction to real or perceived threats and interests. However, within the parameters of the overall strategy of containment, both DoD and the services faced increasing demands for foreign area expertise as the Cold War progressed.

In their book *American National Security*, Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor Jr., and Lawrence J. Korb observe that in 1947, “the Truman Doctrine represented a marked departure from the U.S. tradition of minimal peacetime participation in international affairs.” Jordan, Taylor, and Korb also address the military strategy decision the Truman Administration faced in implementing the new policy of containment. The dilemma between selecting mobilization or deterrence for effective implementation of containment is interesting, but not germane to this study. What is relevant is that because of the global nature of containment, either option required considerable growth in foreign area expertise within the services.

Concern over the inability of U.S. military capabilities to meet the new challenges of the Cold War resulted in a comprehensive study and consequent report delivered to the newly formed National Security Council (NSC). The report, presented in April 1950 (NSC 68), recommended the “substantial increase in defense expenditures” but faced the challenge of
justifying the same to the American public.\textsuperscript{47} By June though, the Cold War turned hot as fighting erupted on the Korean peninsula.\textsuperscript{48} In fiscal year 1950, defense spending was $13.0 billion. By 1953, it had reached $50.4 billion.\textsuperscript{49}

Korea marked the first regional conflict between the ideological rivals of the Cold War. With an overseas conflict and a greater than 3.5 time increase in defense spending, one might expect significant changes in FAO programs. Changes did come, but they were minor and a more a function of parochial struggles within the Army, than a direct response to requirements. With respect to the LATP of 1947, Burkett describes the “infighting between the Army intelligence community and the operations community” as the biggest catalyst for change in the evolving Army FAO program of that period.\textsuperscript{50} He concludes that the intelligence community controlled the decision making between 1947 and 1957.\textsuperscript{51} The most significant change of the period was in 1953 when the requirement for a “strategic intelligence course” was added to the program. Among other changes that year, the LATP was renamed the Foreign Area Specialist Training (FAST) program. Although the new acronym lacked reference to language, language training still figured heavily in FAST objectives.

In addressing its own history, the ALS in Monterey (the Defense Language Institute (DLI) since 1963) proudly points to the rapid expansion the school underwent in 1947-1948 to “meet the requirements of America’s global commitments during the Cold War.”\textsuperscript{52} The ALS did focus greater attention on the instruction of Korean, but Müller characterizes the effort as suffering from a “short war mentality.”\textsuperscript{53} Even with recent World War II exposure to operations in the Pacific Theater, the armed services faced a deficit of competent language experts to meet the requirements of operations in Korea. Solutions included a three-month course to convert Japanese linguists to Korean linguists.\textsuperscript{54} It was only “after the Korean War (1950-1953)” that “the ALS developed a national reputation for excellence in foreign language
education.” During Vietnam though, DLI again faced the daunting task of expanding language-training programs to accommodate the military’s rapidly increasing demands.

Between 1965-1973, “more than 20,000 service personnel studied Vietnamese through the DLI programs, many taking a special eight-week military adviser ‘survival course.’” In 1987, Dr. James C. McNaughton, the Command Historian at the DLI wrote an unpublished paper titled “Vietnamese Training in the Department of Defense, 1955-1973.” McNaughton’s paper highlights problems and shortcomings of language training efforts in support of operations in Vietnam. Particularly with the perishable nature of language proficiency, it is a challenge for any organization to maintain large numbers of language qualified personnel. Yet, if the nature of the organization guarantees repeated foreign interaction in the interest of national security, the programs responsible for meeting the challenge should receive substantial support both during and between the inevitable periods of higher demand. In this sense, DLI and the services were ill prepared for Vietnam.

The study has pointed out that U.S. preparedness for conflict abroad on the eve of World War II was one point short of an established pattern of national, shortsighted indifference. The delayed entry of the U.S. into World War II allowed debate over military readiness for World War II, but Vietnam allowed no such debate, providing a clear third point. Kurt E. Müller includes a valuable 1963 White House memorandum in his Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) paper on language competence. The internal correspondence is from President Kennedy to Secretary of Defense McNamara and indirectly captures the status of military readiness and prioritization placed on language and foreign expertise.

White House
Washington, D.C.

February 15, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

64
One of our Military Social Aid[e]s to the White House is about to go to Laos as an Assistant Military Attaché. I do not want to interfere with his assignment, but I find this morning that he has only very limited knowledge of French. I do not see how he could be effective in Laos without knowledge of the language. I would think that the Army might have many officers who have language facility.

I would like to receive a report on whether Attachés are expected to have language facility in French or Spanish before they are sent to countries where these languages are spoken. I do not think we should expect an Attaché to pick up the language upon his arrival there.

Would you let me have your thoughts on this.

John F. Kennedy

Müller notes with interest that the concern was for the language of the colonial power as opposed to the national language, a fact of considerable, renewed import in the last decade of the twenty-first century as the U.S. faces the challenge of interacting effectively with the nations of the former Soviet Union. This observation serves as a valuable reminder of the continuous need for maintaining language and area expertise within the services. As the emphasis on Vietnamese language training shows, prioritization of support for foreign expertise development within the services were often inadequate during the Cold War. Yet FAO programs did advance, and the services attempted to reduce the foreign area expertise deficit within the scope of their perceived missions. Because of the nature of its Cold War mission, the Army demand for foreign expertise was greater than the other services. However, because of its relatively well-developed FAO programs, it also enjoyed less of a area expertise deficit than the other services.

Army language and area programs led all services’ programs in all aspects throughout the Cold War. The aspects include variations of the five FAO program components mentioned earlier: central administration of the program; feedback and monitoring; language training; post-graduate area studies; and in-country training. According to Burkett, operational requirements had their first organizational effect on the Army FAST program in 1957. One could view these changes as a continuation of the infighting between intelligence and operations communities, but records indicate the driving force in this case was the broadening
requirement for foreign area expertise across the entire service. Between 1957 and 1967, the Army FAST program grew rapidly in response to service branches needs to include even those of the Judge Advocate General Corps and the Corps of Engineers. Growing U.S. involvement in Indochina was the obvious catalyst of this process.

In the absence of educated anticipation and proper planning, necessity and reaction will eventually drive requirements. The military did not initially anticipate the area expertise requirements that increased assistance to Vietnam placed on the military. The requirements did, however, serve to highlight deficiencies in the Army’s capability to provide advice and assistance to foreign nations. In reaction, the Army conducted a series of studies to assess training, training redundancies, and organizational procedures. Two assessments with significance for FAO programs were the Haines Board (1966) and the follow-on Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPERS-40) (1968) studies. The Haines Board recommended the expansion of the FAST to “encompass all of the areas now identified as politico-military activities--languages, regions, psychological operations, civil affairs and related (but unspecified) subjects.” Burkett does not acknowledge any reason, but according to Griffith, the U.S. Army Chief of Staff “deferred action on this recommendation primarily because of the FAST [Program] intelligence thrust.” Further examination of the findings were ordered. The result was the DCSPERS-40 study.

The DCSPERS-40 study recommended a completely new career program separate from the FAST to handle the political-military activities. This recommendation was taken, and after a brief period during which it was called the Overseas-Security-Operations program, the program was renamed the Military Assistance Officer Program (MAOP) and established in early 1969. The Army concurrently renamed FAST to become the Foreign Area Specialist Program (FASP). Although the two assessments differed on organizational solution and demonstrated the continued competition between Army communities, they did indicate that the
Army was engaged in managing the foreign expertise programs and was aware of the importance of area expertise. This awareness also affected a third, closely related but different Army program that was undergoing its own evolution during the Vietnam years.66

U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) trace their official origins to a 1942 joint Canadian-American venture. After several name and location changes, the U.S. Army Special Warfare School was established in 1956 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. In 1969, at the same time that the Army established the MAOP, the Army renamed the Special Warfare School. The new name was the U.S. Army Institute for Military Assistance. Because of the established courses and facilities, non-SF military assistance officers started to train at Fort Bragg. Although training in both groups shared an emphasis on foreign language and culture, the focus, scope, and objectives of the two groups was not complimentary. This merger of SF and FAO training was the beginning of a mixed and sometimes confusing relationship between SF and FAO programs that continued throughout the Vietnam years.

The Army's efforts at Fort Bragg in 1969 are significant. They indicate widespread institutional recognition within the Army of the importance of having personnel capable of effective interaction with foreign cultures. However, they also highlight a pitfall of programs dedicated to train military personnel for foreign interaction and assistance. The Army did not yet appreciate that military interaction with a foreign culture at tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war differs greatly.67 The Army strove to generate the capabilities needed to meet rapidly expanding requirements driven by the decisions of the policy makers. To expedite the process, the Army merged the training efforts at the cost of addressing the divergent objectives of foreign interaction at the different levels of war. Still, the programs and efforts were considerably more advanced than any of the other services.

The Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps efforts to develop foreign area expertise programs during the Vietnam years were limited. In 1971, the Navy designed a very
promising program called the Country and Regional Specialist Program (CARS), but CARS lacked adequate support in the form of central direction or specific training. Conceptually, the program was very advanced. Burkett references a 5 May 1971 Navy Times article that describes the purpose of CARS. “this program was supposed to create CARS officers who would ‘have specialized in politico-military affairs, strategic planning and foreign areas’, and ensure these officers became ‘true specialists in their regions of expertise and be fully utilized to meet commitments for area-trained officers.’” 68 The CARS program existed unchanged as late as 1989 in the Naval Military Personnel Manual, 69 but never commanded the prioritization needed to generate adequate interest or support. The 1999 version of the Naval Military Personnel Manual no longer contains any reference to the CARS program. 70

The Marine Corps and Air Force refrained from developing foreign area programs until well after the U.S. withdrew troops from Vietnam. Earlier, DoD partially ameliorated this comparative deficit by establishing an unprecedented program in October 1957. 71 The services lacked qualified personnel to fill MILGRP and MAAG billets, and had neglected training programs to qualify personnel. In response, DoD established the Military Assistance Institute in Arlington, Virginia. Although the course was only a month long and “primarily concerned with developing a military assistance program administrator,” it demonstrated a degree of concern at the DoD level acute enough to trigger specific action directed at military personnel at the service level. There are telling parallels between the DoD establishment of the Military Assistance Institute in 1957 and DoD issuing Directive 1315.17 in 1997. The similarities lend new perspective to the relative importance of FAO programs to the military.

Emergence of Professional FAO Programs

Overall, Vietnam shifted the focus of Army foreign expertise programs from quality to quantity. 72 After the surge in foreign area expertise requirements caused by Vietnam, the services logically reduced the volume of personnel receiving foreign area and language training.
Although limited to a specific region, the increased commitment and strengthening of NATO is representative of U.S. international priorities after Vietnam. For once, foreign expertise programs did not completely revert to the levels of inadequacy experienced before the conflict.

The incremental involvement of the U.S. military in foreign operations (see appendix A) between 1973 and 1986 compared to the involvement of previous decades could hardly escape the attention of military leaders. The role of the U.S. and her military forces on the international stage were increasing and the matching requirement for greater competency in foreign area expertise was becoming clear. However, the real threats of Soviet conventional and nuclear forces and the need to counter them in kind demanded absolute priority. Eventually though, the proven failure of conventional forces in an insurgency situation, nuclear parity between superpowers and the ramifications of mutually assured destruction slowly forged an environment requiring greater interaction and foreign area knowledge for effective politico-military interaction with allies and adversaries. By the early 1980s, all services had responded with at least modest investment of resources and effort toward developing foreign expertise capabilities.

Earlier trends in FAO program development did not disappear. The period between Vietnam and the end of the Cold War was subject to the same extensive parochialism that marked earlier and continuing service interaction. The concurrent building of a modern, professional military also affected the evolution of FAO programs. The end of the military draft in 1973 and the lessons learned in Vietnam drove the U.S. military to reassess its functionality and organization. After Vietnam, the U.S. Army reduced its size by half, and the other services experienced similar reductions. The period between 1973 and 1986 was marked with numerous changes to both service organization and the services foreign area programs. The overall effect was the professionalization and streamlining of FAO programs, but even within the most developed FAO program, the Army program, the transformation toward greater professionalism had to contend with several obstacles.
A November 1998 interview with Lieutenant Colonel (ret) John Cary, Army FAO and former Army Attaché to Morocco, revealed that the number of FAO and MAO positions during Vietnam had blossomed to almost 3,000. Lieutenant Colonel Cary’s insight was strengthened by a tour working in the Army FAO proponent office in Washington, DC. A graduate of the Special Warfare School FAO program at Fort Bragg, he recalled that the entire globe was covered in six months. Lieutenant Colonel Cary mentioned that the course’s use was limited due to the scope allowing only superficial exposure, but did speak highly of the exceptionally enlightening and productive one-week trip to Washington, DC.76 Reconfirmation of the value of this trip came during an interview with another former Army FAO.

Lieutenant Colonel (ret) Anthony D. Marley, a former Security Assistance Officer to Cameroon who remains actively involved in the region described the trip as a “wonderful experience for young FAOs to see and get exposed to the architecture of the system.”77 During this trip, the students visited the agencies and organizations that were to benefit the most from the insight a FAO could provide “down range.” However, less than 50 percent of those with a FAO code actually attended the six-month course. Furthermore, only 20 percent were getting dedicated language training and graduate education in area studies. After Vietnam, there was a need to distinguish between the trained FAOs and those who had received the code but only minimal training.

In March of 1973, the Army combined the MAOP and the FASP programs into the FAO program that is the foundation of the program that still exists in 1999.78 As mentioned earlier, the Army FAO billets of table 1 date from the same period. In 1975, the Army overhauled its personnel management system with the introduction of the Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS). The next major change for the Army FAO program did not come until 1985, but it too resulted from assessments studying the organization and professionalism of the Army. The Hutton Study of 1982 and the Officers Professional Management Program study in 1983 both
recommended a realignment of the Army FAO community. Burkett explains that in 1985, the “Enhanced FAO Program” assigned FAO proponent responsibilities to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS), established a typical Army FAO career path, and outlined the training requirements for the professional FAO. Furthermore, Burkett points out the significant organizational change in streamlining “1,300 FAO billets down to 760 true positions.”

Eventually, because of the 1985 Enhanced FAO Program, FAO training for all Army FAOs ceased at the Fort Bragg Special Warfare Center. After a pause, SF FAO training resumed. It continues in 1999 with a syllabus focused at the tactical level requirements (Warrior-Diplomats) of SF interaction with foreign cultures. The Enhanced FAO program established a shortened one-week FAO introductory course at the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center in Monterey. This course was the prelude to three required training components of the enhanced FAO program. The three components had existed in some form since before World War II and included professional language training, postgraduate level area studies, and a period of ICT. The formalization of these components with an assigned proponent clearly responsible for the program validated an evolutionary process and established a clear standard for the other services to emulate. Because of prioritization of perceived missions though, other services did not truly match those time-proven FAO program components until directed to by DoD in 1997.

Similar to the Army, the relative emphasis placed on foreign area expertise reflects the greater probability of Marine Corps officer in-country interaction with foreign militaries and civilians. As mentioned in chapter two, the U.S. Marine Corps Small Wars Manual published in 1940 reflected the Marine Corps recognition of the importance of knowledge of foreign cultures to military operations overseas. An identifiable Marine Corps FAO program emerged in 1975 with the publication of Marine Corps Order (MCO) 1520.11. The first revision followed shortly. According to the 16 May 1978 version (MCO 1520.11A), the goal of the program was “to
prepare participants for future assignments to high level Marine Corps/Joint/Combined Staffs in operations, planning or intelligence billets and/or with the Defense Attaché System."82

The emergence of an Air Force FAO program supports the argument for the slow but eventual reaction to a growing demand for foreign area expertise on part of all the services. In technical terms, the nature of the Air Force mission during the Cold War was not unlike that of the Navy. From the service perspective, Cold War military strategies of nuclear deterrence, massive retaliation, flexible response, and strategic sufficiency depended on a high degree of technical proficiency. Expertise in the language and culture of the opponent did not factor heavily into strategic bombing or sea-lane control. Yet, in recognition of the growing split between the Air Force’s need for and the availability of foreign area expertise, the Air Force introduced the Area Specialist Program in August of 1984.

Air Force Regulation (AFR) 36-16 of 3 August 1984 was not extensive. In just three and one-half pages and one attachment, it outlines the program and the geographic regions of specialization. 83 In contrast to the components of the Army FAO program, the initial Air Force Area Specialist program did not assign management responsibilities to a proponent nor did it provide funding for any training. Essentially, officers first had to be fully qualified in their primary mission, or Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC). Then, if they had on their own volition completed formal academic area related studies and proven language proficiency, they were eligible to obtain the Air Force Area Specialist identifying code added as a prefix to their AFSC. This program proved no more than an underutilized tracking system for individual qualities with no support or direction for the development of area expertise. However, the 1984 program did establish the concept. A 1987 revision of the AFR 36-13 outlined a much larger program 84, although a later assessment of the program by the Air Force Inspector General found both the original program and its successor program still wanting. 85
The old 1971 Navy CARS program continued unchanged in support or effect as late as 1989. In 1977, the Navy did commence supporting a politico-military subspecialty with the introduction of the National Security Affairs curriculum in 1977 at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. The functionality of this politico-military sub-specialty is comparable to that of the Air Force Area Specialist code. It provided no funded training of its own and was used simply to identify those officers who had by virtue of their own selection of post graduate studies, accumulated a certain degree of area knowledge. Language skill was not required and training was by exception only, attaché duty being the prime example.

With respect to utilization of politico-military skills, the Navy estimated that only a maximum of 50 percent of the officers completing the National Security Affairs and receiving the politico-military sub-specialty ever serve in a politico-military coded billet. Furthermore, although these billets included “fleet staffs, numbered fleets, the Naval Academy, the War College, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unified Commands and Specified Commands and others,” the heaviest user of officers with politico-military sub-specialties was the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, the same office that had purview of the sub-specialties program. Compared to other areas within the Navy, the prioritization for developing a foreign area expertise program was low.

With good reason, the areas on which the Navy did focus between Vietnam and 1986 were those driven by Cold War “blue-water” missions. The sheer size of the Soviet Navy was cause for concern, and developing a capable counter balance did not allow for high prioritization of a corps of land-oriented, foreign area experts. By 1978, the Soviet Navy had 740 major ships compared to the 289 of the U.S. Navy. Although its validity is still contested by some, the 1974 quote from the Chief of Naval Operations captures U.S. Navy concerns well. Upon his retirement, Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr. “stated that the Soviets’ ‘capability to deny us the sea lanes, which is their job, is greater than our capability to keep them open, which is our job.’”

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There is no debate as to the primary Navy mission during the Cold War. Unfortunately, the requirements levied by other missions tended to suffer.

During the Cold War, the naval requirement for qualified personnel in attaché, security assistance, theater intelligence, and politico-military billets at higher headquarters remained comparable to the other services. The overwhelming focus on operational capabilities and the associated effects on career paths created a climate under which the quality of training and preparation of the personnel assigned to such typical FAO billets suffered by comparison. After an April 1989 interview with the Navy Captain in charge of the office that managed the Navy politico-military subspecialty, Burkett concluded that a naval officer could arrange a “strictly political-military [sic] officer career path” by working with his detailer, but to do so will almost certainly mean the officer will not advance beyond the 0-4 (paygrade) level. The Navy highly discourages this type of specialization.”

Such perspectives are useful examples of the degree of entrenchment in parochial views and Cold War focus that existed unchecked among the services until just before the end of the Cold War. With respect to FAO programs, the services had barely started to respond to the growing degree of overseas involvement. For the Navy and Air Force in particular though, it was apparent that an external source of considerable force would be required to instigate the needed increase in foreign area competence. The ability of the services to meet the demands for rapid adaptation to the post-Cold War environment is central to the next topic addressed.

FAO Program Evolution after the Cold War

Service FAO programs in 1999 are direct products of two fundamental changes in the organization and functions U.S. armed forces. The organizational change was the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the functional change was the increased application of the services to nontraditional, peacetime engagement roles since the end of the Cold War. From a broader national perspective, these two changes reflect the efforts of decision-
makers to streamline and bond the military instrument of power into a coherent national system focused on achieving national objectives. From the narrower perspective of service FAO programs, the changes compounded to induce a milestone shift in military service priorities resulting in unprecedented emphasis on the development of foreign area expertise.

Goldwater-Nichols made the DoD and the services address inefficiencies and redundancies within their organizations. Essentially, long overdue legislation outlawed the historic and chronic lack of interoperability between services and imposed unity of effort over the entire military. An essential aspect of Goldwater-Nichols was the revolution in national accountability and management it introduced. The ramifications of the yearly requirement for the President to submit a NSS to Congress are extensive (section 603 of the Goldwater-Nichols Act). Formulation of a NSS forces national leadership to continuously monitor, assess and then publicly identify and prioritize national objectives. The clear need for a similar product from the national military leadership led to the emergence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-authored NMS. An analogous response proceeded down the chain of command causing every major command to assess and define its mission in terms of support to the NMS objectives. The resulting assessments all tied to the formulation of the NSS and NMS, set the stage for recognition and heightened awareness of the criticality of foreign area expertise.

In the late 1980s, military planners and strategists faced a daunting task as they set about assessing the environment and missions the services were to meet. No strategic planner could fully anticipate the magnitude or rate of change that would follow after the citizens of Berlin tore down the Berlin Wall in November 1989. Furthermore, the services and their emerging FAO programs faced the historical paradox of militaries after conflict. The end of the Cold War brought with it the inevitable and predictable search for peace-dividends in which the downsizing of military forces overseas figured prominently. For example, the U.S. reduced its presence in Europe from 344,078 troops in March of 1989 to 115,255 in September of 1996.
Additionally, all services and, consequently, most programs faced considerable budget reductions. In such an environment, one might expect service priorities to reflect a considerable and matching reduction in support for foreign area programs.

Initially, this was the case. The U.S. Air Force Institute for National Security Institute Occasional Paper 13 (INSS OP 13) of April 1997, explains the deadly effect that the combination of service culture infatuation with operational missions and the post-Cold War drawdown had on service political-military programs. In short, "As promotion opportunities tightened, FAOs were frequently passed over." However, after a period of devastation to FAO program manpower structures—the services are still making up the loss of an entire generation of FAOs—the services commenced a reversal. While the services continued cutting multiple programs, the FAO programs that had historically suffered from lack of support, started to receive unprecedented attention. The reasons for this are contained in the NSS and NMS and most evident in the dramatic increase in the execution of military operations overseas.

To achieve stated national objectives, the strategic direction contained in the NSS and NMS must consider both current realities and future projections. The "current" reality of the early to mid-1990s was that U.S. national interests were inexorably and increasingly associated with military involvement overseas. In the 1997 NSS the President referred to the "imperative of engagement," stating "we will remain engaged abroad and work with partners, new and old, to promote peace and prosperity." The projection for the rest of the century did not differ significantly. With reference to the future, after stressing the importance of international leadership, specifically mentioning multinational cooperation in Bosnia and Haiti, the 1997 NSS goes on to state "[o]ur achievements of the last four years are the springboard for tomorrow's better world." The 1998 NSS retains the 1997 section and message of "the imperative of engagement" virtually unchanged.
For the services, the evidence of the national command authority’s intent to implement these strategic directions was difficult to ignore. Between 1980-89 the U.S. was involved in twenty-one named overseas operations, between 1990-99, the U.S. has already conducted 100 (see appendix A). A reduction in forces stationed overseas did not equate to a reduction in overseas operations; in fact, it was an inverse relationship. The number and variety of overseas operations coupled with shrinking assets created a complex new military operating environment that demanded new approaches and the development of new capabilities to facilitate those approaches.

Translating national level strategies into functioning programs in the services is an ongoing process, and has never been an easy one. The Strategic Assessment 1996 produced by the National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is subtitled Instruments of U.S. Power. This assessment dedicates an entire chapter to the topic of defense engagement in peacetime. Referring to “advisory assistance and maintaining service-to-service contact” the assessment states “For years, the armed services minimized these nonstandard programs and criticized them for diverting resources and undermining force readiness.”99 The assessment continues on a positive note, remarking that the “defense community’s past resistance to using non-combat means to project U.S. influence is slowly giving away,” and concludes that the difference is a direct result of the post-Cold War NSS objectives.100

Measurable indications that the DoD and services were evolving and responding to the requirements levied by the new strategic direction were reflected in assessments like the 1993 BUR and the 1997 QDR.101 Concurrently, joint doctrine was capturing and codifying many of the changed requirements.

The 1993 BUR drew popular criticism for overestimating security threats.102 The review assessed military needs based on two simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRCs) and according to critics, did not providing large enough peace dividends.103 The nature of the threat
may have been misidentified, but in light of JCS testimony on military readiness before Congress in late 1998, the magnitude of the threat and the funding needed to meet security challenges may have been more accurate than previously thought.

Criticism notwithstanding, the BUR demonstrated DoD and service institutional readiness to reassess the function and mission of the U.S. armed forces. In view of the criticism it received, the willingness of DoD to repeat a very similar process in less than three years with the QDR strengthens the notion that the military was open to self-assessment. Most telling for the future of FAO programs though, was the basis upon which required capabilities were established. Although the QDR modified the basis of the required capabilities from conducting two simultaneous MRCs to engaging and defeating aggression in “two distant theaters in overlapping timeframes,” both of the BUR and the QDR were based and calculated in terms of foreign involvement. 104

The emphasis on jointness that started with Goldwater-Nichols in 1986 and continued under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had established itself as a priority among service planners by 1995. The drafting, approval, and publication of joint doctrine were central to this process. Joint doctrine establishes “fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of two or more services in coordinated action toward a common objective.” 105 Published in January of 1995, Joint Publication 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, addresses the changing nature of military missions in the post-Cold War environment. In reference to the increasing need to work effectively with the militaries and people of foreign governments, Joint Pub 1 addresses multinational endeavors. “There is a good probability that any [author’s emphasis] military operation undertaken by the United States of America will have multinational aspects, so extensive is the network of alliances, friendships, and mutual interests established by our nation around the world.” 106
In January 1995 the Joint Staff made the official connection between these new requirements of multinational operations and an existing FAO program. In the January 1995 Overseas Presence Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment, The Director of Strategic Plans and Policies (J-5) coins the term “Foreign Military Interaction” (FMI). J-5 defines FMI as “initiatives whereby U.S. defense personnel--by direction of U.S. Defense authorities and in coordination with the U.S. country team--interact with foreign defense personnel on a systematic and cooperative basis to achieve national security objectives.” The assessment goes on to group identified FMI programs by funding source. It lists the Army FAO program under the DoD category.

These developments had a major impact on the evolution of service FAO programs. The BUR, QDR, and joint doctrine the higher level NMS and NSS all share common and repeated references to the need for greater cooperation and reliance on allies and coalitions in a new international security environment. The 1997 QDR expressed this concept with particular clarity:

In regions where the United States has vital and important interests, U.S. Military helps bolster the security key allies and friends and works to adapt and strengthen core alliances and coalitions to meet the challenges of an evolving security environment. This engagement forms bilateral and multilateral relationships that increase military transparency and confidence. In addition, the U.S. military often serves as a preferred means of engagement with countries that are neither staunch friends nor confirmed foes. These contacts build constructive security relationships and help to promote the development of democratic institutions today, in an effort to keep these countries from becoming adversaries tomorrow.

The significance of the quote is that it proves that by 1997, DoD and the services had unequivocally recognized that in the post-Cold War environment, national vital and important interests often depend on peacetime foreign military interaction. As did the JCS J-5 while addressing FMI, the national level military leadership realized that the success of such interaction demands foreign area expertise. This awareness provided the impetus that led to the Service Foreign Area Officer Programs directive, DoDD 1315.17.


9Ibid., 15.

10Ibid., 16.

11Ibid., 17.

12Ibid., 15.


14Ibid.


16Ibid., 20.

17Hagan, 87.
18 Ibid., 43.
19 Ibid., 93.
22 Müller, 44.
23 Tuchman, 77.
24 Ibid., 77.
25 Ibid., 112.
26 Ibid., 77.
27 Müller, 96.
28 Ibid.
29 Burkett, 93.
30 Müller, 104.
31 Ibid., 99.
32 Ibid., 102-103.

34 Ibid.

36 Burkett, 59.
37Chuck Owens, LtCol USMC, USMC FAO Proponent Chief, phone interview by author, notes, Fort Leavenworth, KS/Washington, DC, 09 April 1999.

38Burkett, 64.


42Griffith, 22.


46Ibid.

47Ibid., 68.

48Ibid.


50Burkett, 16.

51Ibid.

52Defense Language Institute, The Defense Language Institute Catalog.

53Müller, 104.

54Ibid.

55Defense Language Institute, The Defense Language Institute Catalog.

56Ibid.
57 Müller, 75.
58 Ibid.
59 Burkett, 14.
60 Ibid., 17.
61 Griffith, 17-18.
62 Ibid., 17-18.
63 Burkett, 19.
64 Griffith, 18.
65 Ibid., 27.


68 Burkett, 59.
69 Ibid.


72 Griffith, 24.
73 Burkett, 18
74 Jordan, Taylor, and Korb, 79.
75 Ibid.


78 Burkett, 20.

79 Burkett, 20.


83 Burkett, 65.

84 Ibid., 66.


86 Burkett, 60.

87 Ibid.

88 Ibid.

89 Hagan, 329.

90 Ibid., 328.

91 Burkett, 59-60.


100 Ibid.


CHAPTER 5
COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF SERVICE FAO PROGRAMS

This chapter is the heart of the study’s comparative assessment of FAO programs. In the first section of the chapter, the study identifies and addresses the assessment criteria—also referred to as FAO program components—and relates them to how they appear in DoDD 1315.17. The second section of this chapter assesses how each service has supported its need for foreign area expertise and met both the assessment criteria and the program requirements established by DoDD 1315.17. The second section addresses each service individually in a subsection. A central theme to the entire chapter is the concern over DoDD 1315.17 implementation the authors of INSS OP 13 expressed only two months after the issuance of the directive. They wrote “implementation, with all the thorny issues that entails, is left to the services; no guidance is offered on how to put the directive into practice.”

DoDD 1315.17

On 22 February 1997, the Department of Defense issued directive 1315.17 and with it, “establishe[d] policy and assign[ed] responsibilities for the development of FAO programs within the Military Services” (see appendix B). The signing of DoDD 1315.17 was an unprecedented and seminal event in the evolution of FAO programs—there is no similar development to compare it to in all of FAO program history. For the first time, all services were required to create and maintain a program specifically focused on developing military foreign area expertise. At the time of this writing, the services have had two years to respond.

A comparative assessment of FAO programs is the most useful vehicle to address the details of DoDD 1315.17 and the consequent service FAO programs. A comparison requires criteria. This comparison will apply the five critical components that have historically defined the structure of an effective and balanced FAO program discussed early in chapter 4. Although

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DoDD 1315.17 uses generic terms acceptable to all services, it is significant to note that it addresses all five:

1. Central and coherent management of the program and community by an accountable office

   Organizationally, the most fundamental component of any program is the head office.

For FAO programs, the proponent office fulfills this function. The history of FAO programs has shown that the services' initial versions of foreign area and political-military programs often tried to do without this central direction and oversight. The difference is dramatic, as DoDD 1315.17 tasks these proponent offices to not only ensure smooth coordination of FAO program administrative affairs, but more importantly, to ensure FAO community interests and FAO careers are not neglected. This is particularly significant in the areas of billet identification and realistic promotion opportunities.

Without a clear list of designated FAO positions, a job or tour as a FAO loses relevance when compared to other service communities. Until DoDD 1315.17, promotion boards had difficulty recognizing or quantifying the value of many FAO jobs. DoDD 1315.17 states “the Heads of DoD Components shall designate officer positions in their organizations that require the qualifications listed above and shall so inform the Secretaries of the Military Departments, using departmental or Joint Manpower Program processes, of their requirements.”

DoDD 1315.17 goes one step further in ensuring that FAO programs will present viable career opportunities. It directs that “Military Services shall develop procedures to ensure competitive career advancement for officers in the Service FAO Program.” It is of interest to note that the same sentence provides allowances for service interpretation by ending with the phrase “that best supports the DoD elements and Military Services’ requirement for qualified FAOs.”

2. A periodic program-wide detailed assessment to monitor viability and direction

   A program can exist without feedback from the organization, but it will inevitably lose focus of changes in the operating environment. Whatever training, preparation, or direction had
existed will lose relevance to the actual needs of the organization. This is particularly true of new programs; those services with the least amount of FAO program history are particularly susceptible. DoDD 1315.17 does not stress this component, mentioning only that the FAO program developed by the service must “develop, retain and monitor [author’s emphasis] officers.” The degree of monitoring is open to interpretation, and pertains more to tracking qualifications than assessing the quality and impact of the program.

3. Advanced language training

Language proficiency is without a doubt the basic building block for any area expertise with operational implications. Communication skills are at the core of a FAOs mission and a language barrier is simply unacceptable. DoDD 1315.17 does well in specifying that service FAOs must posses “Foreign language skills at the professional level in the predominant language used by the populations of the countries or regions in which they specialize.” The requirement is clear, the methods of ensuring that requirement is met is left entirely to the service.

4. Postgraduate area studies

This component distinguishes the FAO from the linguist. The implication is that although all FAOs should also be linguists, it is possible to speak a foreign language and yet have only a superficial understanding of the vital historical, political, and military issues of the region. DoDD 1315.17 again reflects the experience of its authors as it specifically addresses this component. The service FAO must possess “Graduate-level education focusing on, but not limited to, the political, cultural, sociological, economic, and geographic factors of specific foreign countries and regions.” An important and logical caveat is made for those officers who’s professional background or “duty experience” has given them significant in-depth exposure to the culture. However, this subjective assessment of what constitutes enough “duty experience” posses potential problems to the service. The authors of INSS OP 13 also found that: “The idea that foreign duty experience could be a substitute for graduate education instead of a
supplement . . . problematic."
Ultimately, it is a disservice to the service if the FAO program qualifies individuals who lack appropriate knowledge of the cultures, institutions, and systems of his or her assigned region.

5. A period of In-Country Training (ICT) where the degree of expertise the individual obtains is directly proportional to the length and extent of the immersion

Considerable debate surrounds this component of FAO programs. ICT defines the true value of a FAO. If a FAO program supported no other training, a period of genuine ICT would produce the most competent FAO. One need only to look at the example set by General Stilwell in the second decade of this century. As inferred by the term genuine, this component demands a primary distinction from a potential equivalent. ICT must be a dedicated period of training focused on exposure to the culture, not an overseas assignment where some exposure was absorbed indirectly as the officer concentrated on another mission. Any officer who has had an overseas tour knows that it is quite possible to live overseas and never truly leave the U.S. military environment.

ICT is the most critical component of a valid, effective, and balanced FAO program. No FAO program can justly claim to have area experts providing insight into the minds of another people’s culture if those FAOs have never interacted in depth with those people in their environment. However, it is also the most difficult FAO training to establish and manage. Regrettably, although DoDD 1315.17 implies that this level of expertise is what is required, it does not direct the services to include ICT as part of the FAO program. The best explanation is the demand that ICT places on resources in the form of both time and money.

Compared to other forms of FAO training, ICT is complicated to manage and often cost prohibitive. In many regions, particularly those that are in turmoil or in adversarial political-military relationships with the U.S., the infrastructure to support a dedicated period of ICT is simply not available. The irony is that these are the very regions that hold the greatest potential for the need for FAOs.
In the past, Army and USMC programs created ICT sites for FAO trainees by assigning them to the country’s U.S. Embassy or alternately, the trainee attended the country’s war college. The 1998 AB Technologies *Foreign Area Officer Survey and Analysis Project* final report lists several considerations that must be resolved before establishing an ICT site. These include housing, medical, mail, administrative, financial support, and supervision. Additionally, such a site requires host-nation permission and Department of State approval. Finally, in the case of embassy internships, the number of trainees is restricted due to the size of the embassy and embassy staff. In some regions, the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union are a prime example, these restrictions are partially offset by the opportunities that arise from the establishment of new embassies. The estimated cost for establishing an ICT site in a new country is $100K, while “Adding a new trainee to an existing site ranges from $30K - $50K, depending on the region." The difficulties and costs of ICT make the search for alternate, albeit less effective, ICT options popular.

One such alternative is a larger capacity overseas training base located as close as feasible to the region of interest. The FAO program at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies offers such training. The program is the 1993 successor to the U.S. Army Russian Institute, which existed in Garmisch since 1947. The current program is unique and exceptional for the opportunities it offers in lieu of direct ICT in the regions and states of Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union. During the first six months of the 18-month program, the FAO trainees not only further their language training, but also interact with foreign military officers and defense officials who are themselves attending other programs offered at the Marshall Center. A stateside location for such training would not duplicate such opportunities, as the number of foreign officials would decrease to the detriment of the interaction.

During the remaining year, the FAO trainees ideally spend approximately six months in non-resident training, receiving actual ICT as they conduct in-country travel and fill internship
positions. In an interview, Lieutenant Colonel Sharp, the director of the Marshall Center FAO program cited several examples of FAO trainees who both during training and later as qualified FAOs assigned to the country, established unprecedented rapport with foreign officials as a result of previous Marshall Center interaction. The remaining six months are dedicated to advanced area studies in Garmisch, where the trainees once again have the opportunity to interact with foreign officials.

The total cost is approximately $60K per trainee for the entire year. The training is well worth the exposure and contacts that the trainees receive and make. For FAO ICT in those regions and countries of the world where the infrastructure and instability makes ICT sites extremely difficult, an overseas training base, such as the one in Garmisch offers an effective and comparatively cost efficient ICT alternative. Although it does not enjoy quite the same accessibility due to the vast expanses of the Pacific Ocean, the arguments for a regional training base are equally valid and applicable to the Area Pacific Center in Hawaii.

As stated earlier, it is important to acknowledge that these regions are those where the expertise and rapport of a FAO may be needed most. Of the five components of a balanced FAO program, the ICT opportunity is the one that will enable the FAO to be truly effective in an overseas, multinational operation.

In addition to the five components, DoDD 1315.17 also addresses the critical issues of FAO program scope and manning. These two issues must be clear before covering service-specific interpretations. The policy paragraph of DoDD 1315.17 opens with an assertion of the significance of military-diplomatic interaction. It does not specify an increased demand, but the date of the directive speaks for itself. The assertion is important for two reasons. First, DoD had not done it before in this forum. Second and more importantly in considering service interpretations of the directive, it states that this interaction is “essential to develop and maintain the capability to engage in constructive . . . multilateral military activities and relationships across
the range of operations” (author’s emphasis). The issue is that this new directive is not a vehicle focused at developing a corps of embassy office-based attachés. The services are responsible for developing FAO training and qualifications commensurate with the diversity of overseas operations (see appendix A) to which all services must be able to respond.

The other critical non-component issue in DoDD 1315.17 is manning considerations. The directive applies not only to the services, but also to CJCS, the Combatant Commands, the Defense Agencies and the DoD Field Activities. DoDD 1315.17 refers collectively to all the latter as “DoD Components.” The significance of this fact is that it validates the “expanded military role” of officers discussed earlier in this study. The “increased involvement of officers in the realm of strategic planning and foreign affairs” noted as early as 1941 is commonplace, institutionalized, and, indeed, required of FAOs in 1999. The trend and its implications have not escaped public attention. The extent to which this thought is accepted is apparent in the tacit expectation of an officer’s future role as described in Robert D. Kaplan’s latest book, An Empire Wilderness. Kaplan writes “foreign policy will over the decades be increasingly influenced by the military as war, peacekeeping, famine relief, and the like grow too technical and complex for civilian managers to control.” Kaplan foresees future challenges, but for the present, this joint vision must also accommodate a FAO manning challenge, the burden of which DoDD 1315.17 places squarely on the military services.

After describing what qualities a FAO serving in any service should possess, DoDD 1315.17 bluntly reminds the services, “The DoD Components require officers with similar capabilities to serve in their organizations.” Regardless of the benefits that such interagency may bring, the objective observer must also acknowledge the considerable manpower loss this creates for the services. The more the nature of the service demands operational duty, the harder it is for that service to accommodate the loan of highly qualified officers to “DoD Components.”
As stated above, DoDD 1315.17 is a two-page example of compromise and accommodation of service interests. This description does not detract from the importance of the document. It merely highlights the fact that parochialism is still a considerable factor. The motivation behind the divergent service interests is of interest to this study. After a decade of mandatory jointness and almost equal time since the end of the Cold War, in an era with more named overseas operations than ever before in U.S. history--an era where the need for foreign area expertise is impossible to ignore--the services still hesitate to allocate service assets to non-traditional programs. Depending on the service, some hesitation and resistance is prudent and justified. However, in light of the current and foreseeable demands for foreign area expertise, most is not.

Service Responses to DoDD 1315.17

Table 3 cross-references the five components of a balanced FAO program with the basic response of each service to DoDD 1315.17. Although the table facilitates ready comparisons between the services, it is important to address the nature of each service while making an assessment and before drawing any conclusions. As it is the most complex and robust program, the study will first address the Army FAO program. In addition to the Army specific details, the initial discussion will also explain the significance of the criteria within each of the program components. The issues discussed apply to all of the services, and the sections of the remaining three service FAO programs support but not duplicate this information.
Table 3. Comparison of FAO Programs and Components (April 1999)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program Components</th>
<th>ARMY</th>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>USAF</th>
<th>NAVY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Central Management</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Approximate FAO Billets (spaces)</td>
<td>766</td>
<td>23-225 (Reassessing)</td>
<td>250 +</td>
<td>246+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Proponent Office Size (Officers)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1 part-time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Fully Qualified FAOs (faces)</td>
<td>1300</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Functional Area/Eventual Single Focus</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Sub-specialty/Dual Track</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Program Assessment/Studies**      |      |      |      |      |
| 1. Last Program Assessment/Study   | March 1998 | Program in midst of overhaul | 1999 Report to The Air Staff | Program still in formative stage |
| 2. Assessment Conducted by:        | External by AB Techn. | Internal by Proponent | Internal by Proponent | In Pursuit |

| **Funded Language Training**        |      |      |      |      |
| 1. Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center, Monterey CA | 93 ACS+ FAO Course | 10/year | Only if LDP | Only if LDP |
| 2. Civilian Institutes              | 93 ACS | No   | No   | No   |

| **Funded Postgraduate Area Studies** |      |      |      |      |
| 1. Civilian Universities            | 93 ACS | 0    | 10   | 0    |
| 2. War Colleges                     | 93 ACS | 0    | 0    | 0    |
| 3. Naval Postgraduate School        | 93 ACS | 17   | 0    | 0    |

| **Funded In-Country-Training**      |      |      |      |      |
| 18 Month Requirement                | 12 month Requirement | 80 x 1 Month Immersion in 98' | None |

U.S. Army

The Army had the smallest transition to make in satisfying the requirements established in DoDD 1315.17. In fact, because the Army already had a comparatively robust FAO program, very few changes would have been required to meet the directive guidelines. However, during the same time the services were providing input to the drafting of DoDD 1315.17, the Army was embarking on the Force XXI review. In July of 1996, the Army expanded this review to include a comprehensive study of the Army Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS). The Army completed the study, and the revised OPMS (OPMS XXI) was implemented starting on 1 October 1997. Full implementation will take five years with the final changes scheduled for 2002.15

OPMS XXI represents the Army effort to shape and prepare the Army officer corps for the next century. It is a direct response to Army recognition that the nature of military operations
and thus skills required by the Army have fundamentally changed since the end of the Cold War. The changes with the highest profile are those that respond to the extensive changes in warfare technology. Yet, in evaluating the needs of the service, the Army leadership also identified foreign area expertise as a critical area that needed increased support. OPMS XXI extensively modified the Army FAO program and in many ways validates the arguments supporting the growing requirement for service FAO programs. As one would expect of a revision to a personnel management system, the Army FAO program component area that OPMS XXI affected the most was the central management component.

Because the number of FAO billets ultimately drives the size and cost of the service FAO program, the determination of FAO billets deserves keen consideration. In preparation for and conjunction with OPMS XXI, the Army FAO proponent office made an astute investment. It commissioned a thorough survey and analysis to determine the changes the service would have to implement if it were to meet the increased, post-Cold War foreign area expertise requirements with a smaller Army. AB Technologies responded with an in-depth, worldwide study that identified shortfalls and recommended solutions to FAO program structure, training, composition and size. Such a study is feasible and of extremely high value for any service. Specific details of the AB Technologies study are mostly beyond the scope of this study, but several points are outstanding for their relevance to all FAO programs.16

The AB Technologies study determined the optimal FAO authorization structure through surveys, interviews, and coordination with Unified Commands, Army Major Commands (MACOMS), Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM), and the Army FAO proponent office. The study validated their findings and then compared them to the existing structure. It developed methods to bridge the differences and analyzed the viability of these methods. The methods prove applicable to any service, and include: internal reorganization; re-coding of select positions and sub-specialties; absorbing select positions and sub-specialties; a significant delay to the start
of training programs to allow junior officers to establish primary career fields; and cross-over of
fully trained FAOs after non-selection for command. Using these methods, the study asserted
that the Army FAO program could recover and optimize a deficit of 155 O-5 and 236 O-4 FAO
positions. It also provided the Army with the list of designated FAO positions as required by
DoDD 1315.17.

The high number of billets or "spaces" in the Army FAO program makes sense when
considering the nature of Army operations on the ground overseas. Historically, it is not
surprising that the Army has had the most robust FAO program. However, while the
identification of Army FAO unique functions in the latest edition of (DA PAM 600-3) supports
this observation, it also reveals another noteworthy fact. Not only have the functions changed
since the 1973 categorization of the HSR report (see table 1), but it is impossible to ignore that
many of the functions apply equally to all services.

Table 4. Army FAO (FA 48) Billets from DA PAM 600-3 (October 1998)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Billets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Worldwide Defense and Army Attaché Positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 CONUS and OCONUS Security Assistance Officer Positions (SAO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Advisors to Senior Commanders on Division, Army, Major Commands (MACOM) and Joint Staffs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Liaison Officer Positions to Foreign Armies and Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Instructor Duty Positions at USMA, Command General Staff College, Army War College and other Military Schools</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Goldwater-Nichols issued in a new era of emphasis on joint service. Within a matter of
years, the competition between the service for "joint" billets to allow their officers to meet "joint
tour" requirements for career advancement was well developed. This competition insured a fair
and proportionate distribution of service billets at joint headquarters and on other "DoD
Components" staffs. The requirements for FAOs as defense attachés, security assistance officers
(SAO), regional analysts, academic educators, and instructors are similarly proportional among
the services. The one logical deviation is that of the Army with respect to attaché and SAO positions. Virtually every country has some form of ground force, but not all countries have an air force and many have no coastline to protect or homeport a naval force. Yet, with the growing emphasis on jointness, the growing similarity of billets and required skills is more apparent than it was at the beginning of the decade, and even then, studies had already identified the trend.

In 1989, Burkett set out to investigate the training and employment of area specialists. He believed that “the commonality of FAO missions should have more influence on the design of FAO training programs (to include the mix of language and area expertise as well as the mix of academic training and practical experience) than the self-perceived service differences.” After surveying 483 graduates of the Naval Postgraduate School National Security Affairs Area Study Masters degree program, Burkett concluded: “The survey of FAOs used in this thesis has shown that the needs of the FAOs in the field are very similar. More differences exist between the requirements of the specific FAO jobs than exist between the needs of the services.” Flowing parallel to jointness, Burkett’s findings have only gained validity over the last decade.

The second sub-component of central management as defined in this study is proponent office size. The significance of this figure is straightforward. It allows a basic assessment of how capable a proponent will be in managing the number of FAOs the service has identified. The size of the proponent office in relation to the number of FAOs is also significant in that it is a direct reflection of the support and prioritization the service has awarded its FAO program after DoDD 1315.17. It is the first investment of resources the service has to make if it is serious about developing a viable FAO program. The Army has supported its FAO proponent office well, assigning seven officers to manage the program and coordination of 786 FAO billets.

The third sub-component, the number of qualified FAOs in the service would also appear to be a straightforward figure. On the surface, it reflects the service’s ability to fill the designated billets with fully trained and qualified FAOs. This study does not investigate in any detail the
additional percentages of FAOs needed to fill all billets. As of April 1999, the Army has 1300 qualified FAOs and 729 in training to meet future requirements. It is worth noting that as in any program with rotating assignments, the program needs a surplus above the basic number of billets.

Below the surface, this figure can be deceiving. It depends on the strength of FAO training in that particular service. If the service is establishing a new FAO program or seeking to significantly expand an old program, it is logical to initially select and designate those officers who happen to have the required language skills and area exposure by chance or fortune. This creates an initial base and surge of qualified individuals, but this tactic will inevitably deplete the original pool of talent within a service. The FAO program should and, indeed, needs to continue tapping into this source of skilled officers as it will naturally replenish with service accessions, but not to the extent of the original pool. This approach is tantamount to depending solely on officers with private pilot licenses to support a service’s aviation program needs. Without a viable training program, the method will not sustain FAO program authorizations and requirements over time. With its long history, current organizational assessments and established training programs, the Army FAO program does not face either problem.

The fourth and fifth sub-components deal with FAO career viability within the service. As mentioned above, this issue was critical enough for DoDD 1315.17 to specifically address by directing the services to ensure “competitive career advancement” for FAOs. In response to OPMS XXI initiatives, the Army restructured Army functional areas (FA) and their management. Army Major Zsolt Szentkiralyi captures the objective and importance of this restructuring in an article published in the Foreign Area Officer Association Journal.

For the Army to win on a future battlefield, we need the “skill overmatch” to execute the “technology overmatch” which we describe in Army Vision 2010. The problem is that we are not growing the specialist needed for that future vision. We must update the way in which we manage officers to ensure that the Army of the future will have enough of these specialists in the right skills and at the right grades. Being able to fight is essential, but it
is not enough; we also need the officers who know how to “run” the Army and “prep the strategic battlefield” for the operational force.\textsuperscript{21}

The FAO functional area, FA 48, is implementing the recommendations and findings provided in the AB Technologies final report. The restructured management system specifically identifies and institutes a career path for FAOs that allows competitive chances of promotion and ensures the enough qualified FAOs at the “right grades.” The system answers the direction given in DoDD 1315.17 concerning competitive promotion and virtually corrects the proclivity of the previous system for having a significant lack of qualified O-6 FAOs to fill critical senior positions requiring acute awareness of foreign affairs. It is a system worth discussing, particularly since it significantly modifies the Army’s previous “dual track” career system, a system which all other services are either still using or have just adopted.

Under OPMS XXI and DA FAM 600-3, Army FAOs do not even begin FAO training until they have complete initial training and service in an operational force career field. After FAO training, qualification, and a utilization tour as a senior O-3 or junior O-4, the officers must make a significant career decision. The Army calls the process Career Field (CF) designation. They will elect to either remain in their operational CF and compete in the “command track” for promotion, or select to re-designate to the FAO specialist CF, competing only against other FAOs for promotion. If the FAO pursues the command track but is not selected for battalion command, he or she will be transferred to the specialist career field as an O-5 and compete against other FAOs for O-6 at a 50 percent promotion rate.\textsuperscript{22} If the FAO makes O-6 in the command track, he or she is still qualified for FAO assignment as an O-6.

Conversely, if the officer selects the FAO specialist CF, he or she will fill only FAO or FAO related billets, and compete against other FAOs for promotion to O-4 (70 percent promotion rate) and O-5 (50 percent promotion rate).\textsuperscript{23} This system clearly addresses and corrects the condition that existed in the previous Army “dual-track” system that forced FAOs to compete for

100
promotion with officers who were not peers. Without the new system, it would be difficult for the Army to comply with the guidance in DoDD 1315.17.

The second component is as critical as it is self-explanatory. The Army is the only service to commission an external, thorough review and assessment of its FAO program. The findings and solutions provided by the AB Technologies survey and analysis project reveal the benefits of such a study. Perhaps the largest benefit is the inherent objectivity of an independent assessment. DoDD 1315.17 confirmed the need for greater area expertise within all the services. The objective for FAO programs is quite clear. Extraneous considerations are of minimal influence to an independent assessment. This allows a focused approach to identifying the requirements for the effective confluence of ways and means to reach the stated objectives. In the absence of a commitment to an independent assessment, an internal is the next best option.

Table 3 shows that all services have either completed or are in the midst of reorganizing their FAO programs. While a positive indication of compliance with DoDD 1315.17, the telling factor of the amount of focus these internal assessments contain and can then bring to bear on program reorganization is the size of the proponent office. Regardless of dedication and skill, it is clear that an office of one is at a severe disadvantage when conducting such an assessment, not to mention the impact on effective management of the program itself.

The remaining three FAO program components form the basis of FAO training, and are addressed collectively. DoDD 1315.17 calls for language skills and graduate level education or “duty experience.” Table 3 indicates that the Army FAO program funds between 93-107 billets of Advanced Civil Schooling (ACS) per year. These billets distribution differs slightly every year depending on the officer’s acceptance to civilian institutions across the nation. The Army complies with DoDD 1315.17 requirements and further maintains that a FAO is not fully qualified until he or she has completed ICT.
The degree to which the Army supports its FAO training program sets a standard for all the services. Arguably, the higher volume of personnel in the Army FAO program facilitates and justifies the establishment of robust training programs with corresponding training budgets. While this is true, it is also true that regardless of volume, the billets that FAOs fill--regardless of service--demand proficiency in virtually the same set of skills. Where the Army FAO is comparatively well prepared and trained, the services that do not support such complete training risk finding their FAOs deficient in basic skills and knowledge. This situation applies to the language and graduate studies requirement, but is most apparent in the ICT portion of training.

This study previously identified the significant benefits of ICT. Starting with the example of General Stilwell in China, the irreplaceable and inimitable value of extended exposure to a foreign culture needs no further elaboration. Regardless of language and graduate degrees, qualifying an officer as a FAO and assigning them to a critical post overseas without ever having been in the area is hazardous to the individual and the service. The operational analogy is that of sending a student aviator to solo in an aircraft on the first day after completing ground school. Some students will survive and may even excel, but the probability of success is exponentially higher if the trainee has the benefit of prior, personal exposure to the environment. A FAO training program that includes ICT is simply superior to one that does not.

The options for ICT vary with the restrictions and limitations of the regions of the world. This study does not address the rationale or reasons for these variations. The issue is that there are multiple approaches to facilitate ICT, and a FAO program needs to consider all options in the process of establishing a training regime that produces truly qualified FAOs. In the case of those regions where one service has established a larger capacity training base, a logical option is for all services to consolidate resources to support and use the base for their FAO ICT training. The Army's FAO Training Program at the Marshall Center is a prime example of a facility that would benefit all services by applying such an option.
Overall, the Army FAO program exceeds all DoDD 1315.17 requirements. It sets a standard for all FAO programs within all five components of the program. The Army FAO program enjoys the benefit of long tradition within the Army, a factor than cannot be discounted when assessing its ability to develop and implement changes. The Army FAO program, through a detailed external assessment, the implementation of OPMS XXI and the support of senior leadership has entered a new phase of greater capability and viability as the twentieth century comes to a close. With respect to the growing demand for foreign area expertise based on the number of overseas operations, these changes have decidedly “shaped” and “prepared” the Army to allow it to “respond” with success.


U.S. Marine Corps

Next to the Army, the Marine Corps is the U.S. service with the traditional mission that most readily supported arguments for a clear and focused FAO program. Consequently, the Marine Corps already had a FAO program in 1997 that encompassed most of the requirements established by DoDD 1315.17. Nonetheless, the Marine Corps is thoroughly revising its FAO program to meet the increased demands for foreign area expertise internal and external to the Corps.

As with all the services since DoDD 1315.17, the Marine Corps FAO proponent office embodies the central management component of the program. The first sub-component, the number of FAO billets in the Marine Corps, is not available as of April 1999. This is a function
of the Marine Corps effort to re-code all FAO billets. Significant implications of this effort extend beyond the size of the FAO program to all components of the FAO program.

The Marine Corps responded to the greater need for area expertise in the post-Cold War era by deciding to establish a detailed hierarchy of FAO billets. The Marine Corps FAO proponent office has focused its efforts on identifying and classifying the various levels of area expertise actually required by approximately 200 FAO billets. The challenge is that depending on the criteria applied the number of FAO billets can fluctuate between twenty-three “hard-coded” critical billets demanding a fully qualified FAO and 225 billets that only require some degree of foreign area expertise. The Marine Corps must still make a final determination on FAO program size, but as the effort is in “narrowing down which billets should be coded as FAO billets,” it is probable that the number will be considerably smaller than 225. The balance will consist of billets identified as not requiring the complete set of skills that a fully qualified FAO must possess. These billets will be filled with officers who are not fully qualified FAOs but have some basic degree of exposure and or training. With this strategy of matching proficiency to billet requirements in mind, the Marine Corps expanded their categories of experts and established the Regional Area Officer (RAO) in April 1997.

According to Marine Corps Bulletin 1520 (MCBUL 1520), the RAO program along with the extant FAO and International Relations Officer (IRO) programs “provides the Marine Corps with a nucleus of officers who are capable of filling requiring and advanced understanding of political-military matters and international affairs.” The creation of the RAO designation rounded out the categories within the hierarchy of foreign area proficiency the Marine Corps had established. A later discussion of the three training components of a FAO program will explain the hierarchy of Marine Corps FAO proficiencies and their corresponding programs.

The second and third sub-components of central management are FAO proponent office size and number of qualified FAOs, respectively. The Marine Corps FAO office is staffed by one
O-5 and assisted by an O-4 from an associated but separate office. The current number of fully qualified FAOs is 184. In a static environment, this ratio may suffice, but considering the ongoing re-coding of all the FAO billets in the entire program, it certainly strains the limit of effective program management. While the existence of a FAO proponent office meets the basic requirements of DoDD 1315.17, the personnel constraints placed on the office affect the ability to “develop, retain, and monitor” FAOs.

The re-coding of FAO billets least impacts the final two sub-components of central management. Table three shows that the Marine Corps adheres to the dual-track approach of career advancement for FAOs. In the Marine Corps, the FAO designation is an additional Military Occupational Specialty (MOS). Viewed optimistically, this means that a Marine Corps FAO has the opportunity to excel in two completely different areas. Realistically, the officer cannot pursue both simultaneously with equal energy. A tour in an additional MOS billet is a tour away—often a career damaging tour—from a primary MOS billet. While this has always been true, it is especially true of additional specialty areas with long training requirements like that of a FAO. A Marine Corps FAO can easily be away from his or her primary MOS for three years of FAO training plus a two-year follow-on utilization tour. 28

At the core of the problem is not the duality of pursuing two distinct career paths, but how the Marine Corps manages the divergence. Burkett pointed out that “The problem of trying to create and maintain an individual who is both a soldier and a statesman has no ideal solution.” 29 While this is true, the strict dual-track approach is further from ideal than other options. The dual-track’s fundamental flaw is that it pits the individual against the system, placing the entire onus on the individual to manage all transitions between billets in primary and additional specialty areas. In a dual-track system, there is general guidance, but no recognized or approved career path. Progression becomes an ad hoc process, normally at the peril of the individual for risking time away from his or her primary community. Promotion rates historically
reflect the lack of clear institutional recognition of an alternate career path. The results are to the detriment of both the individual and the pool of qualified personnel from which the additional specialty community can later draw.

The Marine Corps, and all other services still employing a dual-track approach will only solve the problem when they institute a formally recognized, alternate career path for those officers serving in both primary and additional specialty billets. Additionally, the problem will only grow in scope because the revolution in military affairs (RMA) favors specialization. Unlike the Army with its FA and CF designation process, the Marine Corps has not yet identified a viable solution to the problem.

In this sense, the Marine Corps FAO program falls short of the DoDD 1315.17 requirement to “ensure [author’s emphasis] competitive career advancement for officers in the Service FAO program.” 30 DoDD 1315.17 qualifies the direction on advancement by stating “that best supports the DoD elements and Military Services.” 31 If desired, a service may completely refrain from making changes. However, in light of the increased demand for foreign area expertise and the re-coding efforts, the number of qualified personnel required will increase. In November 1998, the FAO proponent office chief encouraged “all FAOs to talk about the program at any opportunity, and refer interested officers to me.” He continued, writing in the F.A.O. Journal “there are more billets out there than we can fill with our designated FAOs right now.” 32 Without competitive chances greater than the ones resulting from a dual-track approach, the Marine Corps stands a good chance of future shortfalls in qualified personnel for the mid and senior level FAO billets.

The Marine Corps is actively engaged in the second FAO program component, the assessment component. The reviews are mixed. The latest Marine Corps FAO program assessment process, an internal one, started before 1997 and DoDD 1315.17. This assessment is still ongoing two years later. The duration of the assessment period is troublesome until one
remembers that the Marine Corps FAO proponent office is staffed by a single O-5 and assisted by an O-4 from an associated but separate office.

Other factors influencing the progress of the assessment are Marine Corps operations tempo and the corresponding, evolving requests for FAO expertise coming from within the organization. The Marine Corps FAO proponent is not only assessing the program to re-code existing FAO billets, but is concurrently attempting to create and implement structures to meet new demands. The Marine Corps FAO proponent anticipates an increase in internal billets providing FAO expertise to Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTAF) and component commanders. Additionally, the “Marine Corps FAO Notes” section of the September 1998 F.A.O. Journal explains that the Marine Corps is “developing the structure for the planned 1999 activation of the Marine Liaison Groups (MLG) at I and II MEF’s [Marine Expeditionary Force].” The article goes on to explain “Since the MLG mission will include providing regional, linguistic, and cultural expertise to commanders, FAOs will be in high demand for the MLG.”

The national leadership frequently calls upon the Marine Corps first to respond to many of the nation’s overseas operations. As the frequency of these operations increases, it is clear that the Corps is determined to adapt as much as needed to provide the desired capabilities. Despite the efforts of the Marine Corps FAO proponent office, it appears that the operations tempo and rate of change has turned an internal assessment process into a moving target. While one could argue that this provides maximum flexibility, it inhibits closure on conclusions and the ability to address future problems, such as competitive career advancement for FAOs. The Marine Corps would benefit from commissioning an external assessment, or alternately, from an increase in the personnel assigned to the proponent office.

The training components of the Marine Corps FAO program meet and exceed DoDD 1315.17 requirements. The Marine Corps funds graduate-level area studies, language training and ICT for their FAO program. As mentioned above, the Marine Corps has developed a
hierarchy of programs to match a particular billets required level of proficiency. The Marine Corps also has an “experience track” variant for every “study track” listed below. This allows the Corps to tap into that pool of area expertise talent that some officers will have by virtue of their backgrounds.

Marine Corps FAOs are the most proficient area experts and have received the greatest degree of training. First, as graduates of DLI, they have received language training and must demonstrate proficiency in the primary language of their assigned region. Second, the Marine Corps will not designate an officer as a FAO until he or she completes a period of six to twelve months of ICT. Finally, starting in 1997, the Marine Corps added the requirement for a graduate degree in area studies. FAOs are the primary candidates for attaché, SAO, and military-to-military program assignments demanding the highest levels of foreign area proficiency. It is of interest to note that for its Former Soviet Union region FAO ICT, the Marine Corps coordinates with the Army FAO Training Program at the Marshall Center. The Marshall Center is able to modify the curriculum to account for the shorter training period (twelve versus eighteen months) of the Marine Corps students.

Marine Corps RAOs are those officers who “through graduate education and subsequent assignment” gain “expertise in a specific geographical region.” The Marine Corps funds area studies for approximately seven RAOs a year at the Naval Postgraduate School, but does not normally provide language or ICT for these officers. Some RAOs receive language training, but only on a limited case-by-case basis. The fiscal year 1999 RAOs focused their graduate area studies on one of six regions: Latin America, Former Soviet Union, Middle East, Southwest Asia, East Asia, or Eastern Europe. These officers are the primary candidates for assignment to out of continental U.S. (OCONUS) joint, unified, and component level staffs.

Marine Corps IRO qualifications, requirements, and training received are identical to those of RAOs with the single exception that they are not focused on a specific geographical area.
Their options for graduate education expand to include studies in international affairs, foreign policy, and other political-military areas. They are primary considerations for Marine Corps continental U.S. (CONUS) billets to major staffs and to other DoD components as stated by DoDD 1315.17.

Overall, the Marine Corps FAO program meets all DoDD 1315.17 requirements with the exception of a clearly stated approach for “ensuring competitive career advancement” for Marine Corps FAOs. The Marine Corps is revising the governing FAO program order along with the recoding of billets, but the order is not yet available. Within the five FAO program components the Marine Corps program does well with training requirements, particularly for the standards established before awarding the full FAO designation. A lack of proponent office personnel hampers the components of central management and program monitoring through assessment. The significant program revisions and prolonged internal assessment compounded the deficits as they detract from the normal administrative and future planning functions of effective program management. The Marine Corps is “preparing” and slowly “shaping” its FAO program and foreign expertise capabilities. However, the Marine Corps should strongly consider allocating greater assets to the management of the program if it is to “respond” effectively to increased demands anytime in the near future.

The governing document for the Marine Corps FAO and IRO program is Marine Corps Order 1520.11D. The current version dates from April 1995. The Marine Corps proponent office plans to activate an Internet page in the spring of 1999. The proponent also intends to post the recoded FAO billets on the page at that time. Internet links to all current FAO, IRO, and RAO instructions and bulletins are available at http://tripoli.manpower.usmc.mil. Additionally, the Marine Corps proponent contributes to the F.A.O. Journal of the F.A.O. Association. This journal and a wealth of FAO information for all services are available at http://faoa.org.
Given the disarray that marked the Air Force Area Specialist Program of 1984, the status of the Air Force FAO program in 1999 is impressive. The Air Force has dedicated considerable assets to the FAO program. The foundation of the program is solidly established, and the Air Force proponent office is aggressively implementing the remaining portions of a comprehensive FAO program plan that will complete the infrastructure of the program. The primary motivator is the recognition by the Air Force that the Expeditionary Air Force (EAF) concept demands extensive foreign interaction. A cadre of professional foreign area experts significantly increases the chances of successful operations. In response, the Air Force FAO program has dramatically evolved and improved its capabilities over a short period.

A quick review of the central management component of the Air Force FAO program on table 3 immediately reveals the source of momentum that drove the rapid and effective evolution of the program. The size of the Air Force FAO proponent office is unique among the service FAO programs of similar size. A staff of seven full time officers reflects a definite level of commitment to the Air Force FAO program. It remains to be seen whether the Air Force will continue with this level of support. However, the accomplishments of the Air Force FAO proponent office during the initial two years of the program indicate an accurate determination of required resources if the service is committed to designing and establishing a viable new program expediently.

The Air Force FAO program not only enjoys the benefit of current, ample organizational support, but it enjoyed it even before the implementation of DoDD 1315.17. The Air Force vision statement of global engagement and the developments surrounding the EAF concept motivated Air Force leadership to consider the ability of the service to perform effectively in foreign environments with renewed intensity. Initially, the Air Force charged a Foreign Language Skills Process Action Team (PAT) with several tasks, one of which was to define
“future language requirements for changing U.S. Air Force roles and missions within the National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement.”35 The PAT, completed in December 1995, identified severe shortcomings in the management and capabilities of Air Force foreign language programs. Among other recommendations, the PAT recommended “establishing a single office of proponency in SAF/IA [Deputy Undersecretary of the Air Force for International Affairs] for officer foreign language issues.” The Air Force had started to focus significant efforts in the direction of developing greater foreign language capabilities well before DoDD 1315.17. This fact is significant because it allowed the Air Force FAO program to benefit from the framework already established by the focus on foreign language skills.

The Air Force FAO proponent was officially established in June 1997. The office dedicated the first year to drafting the Air Force FAO instruction and obtaining the resources and funding “necessary to implement a robust sustainable program.”36 The Air Force published a very thorough FAO program instruction, Air Force Instruction 16-109, on 1 June 1998. The instruction contains a chapter dedicated to management. The IPT (Integrated Process Team) concept is indicative of the level of support the program receives.

The FAO IPT will facilitate planning, programming, and coordination for FAO and officer foreign language programs, issues and initiatives. The IPT will transition into a working group once the FAO concept has been fully developed and coordinated. The working group will concentrate on implementation of FAO policy and plans.37

The Air Force approach to identifying FAO billets justifies this level of coordination. The Air Force FAO program has not created any new billets since DoDD 1315.17. Instead, it is fully engaged in recoding 250-350 existing billets from a variety of related programs. So far, the Air Force FAO proponent has converted all attaché billets as well as some of the international political-military officer billets. The proponent is also in the process of identifying and converting those Major Command (MAJCOM) positions better filled by FAOs.

To generate the initial pool of officers to fill those billets, the Air Force component has convened FAO selection boards. Three boards have met since January 1999 and qualified 235
officers (134 fully qualified) with the FAO Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC) of 16F. The first board qualified over 150 officers, the second just over forty, and the latest board less than forty.\textsuperscript{38} For the moment, the Air Force FAO proponent has scheduled selection boards at six week intervals. Selection boards are labor intensive. A FAO proponent office with a smaller staff would not be able to meet this schedule. However, the manpower strength of the Air Force FAO proponent office allows it to not only process the applications of those interested in the program, but to identify those who qualify outright by virtue of previous assignments to key billets.

In addressing Air Force FAO development programs, the Air Force FAO instruction states "The FAO Proponent Office will monitor U.S. Air Force officer attendance at foreign Professional Military Education (PME) programs. Officers who attend foreign PME will generally be designated FAOs upon completion of the school."\textsuperscript{39} It is a prime focus of the Air Force FAO program to capitalize on the foreign area skills Air Force officers have acquired, be it prior to service or as a result of education provided by the Air Force. This capitalization is only possible with a well-staffed office, a cost easily offset by identifying qualified officers already in the service.

However, efficient identification and designation of qualified officers already in the service cannot meet the requirements of the service. As discussed earlier while addressing the approaches to creating a pool of qualified FAOs, the number of individuals selection and designation boards can generate will eventually stabilize at a number lower than that of the initial boards.

Aware of this inevitability, the Air Force FAO program has focused efforts at identifying, supporting and encouraging the development of FAO skills even before the officer receives a commission. This effort applies to undergraduate foreign language studies and foreign area studies. The Air Force FAO proponent directs this effort at U.S. Air Force Academy and Air Force ROTC cadets, as well as the candidates of officer accession programs. Through the
databases maintained by the Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC) the FAO proponent office identifies and tracks officer language skills for FAOs and potential FAOs.

The FAO AFSC is a mid-career (sub) specialty. The FAO proponent must wait until the officer is qualified in a primary specialty, but then is able to recruit FAOs using the language information in the AFPC database for reference. “Line officers with foreign language skills are considered as a primary resource for selection and assignment to FAO positions.” The Air Force FAO proponent office took an additional and innovative step, at least for service FAO programs, to support and expand its visibility within the service.

During February 1999, “about 3,000 copies of a the program brochure were mailed to senior leaders, base education offices and the 147 AFROTC detachments. A second mailing is in the works.” Also along these lines, the Air Force FAO proponent office has authored “articles describing the program [which] are scheduled to appear in Airman magazine and AF Policy Digest.” With this degree of support and the Air Force FAO proponent “source of momentum” so fully engaged, it is clear that the Air Force has taken the DoDD 1315.17 requirement for developing a suitable FAO management program seriously. There is little doubt that the Air Force will successfully create the initial pool of FAO talent the program requires. The remaining question is what measures the Air Force FAO program is implementing to provide Air Force FAOs with competitive career advancement opportunities so as to retain sufficient numbers of qualified personnel.

The Air Force FAO program faces the same dilemma as all the services employing a dual-track approach to FAO careers. The study has already pointed out the shortcomings of the dual-track system. The Air Force FAO instruction relies on a pyramid illustration to complete the explanation that “Officers awarded the 16F AFSC should anticipate recurrent assignments when not serving in their primary career track.” The Air Force FAO homepage, a first-rate product, explains “When not serving in billets essential to their primary specialty, FAO's may serve in
FAO-designated billets requiring foreign language and regional political-military expertise. As such, the FAO AFSC, 16F, is career broadening. The basic argument, one understood by every officer in uniform, remains; career broadening is good, but not at the risk of career.

DoDD 1315.17 allows the service to determine the system that best suits the needs of each service. However, the service electing to follow a strict dual-track approach still risks a deficit of qualified FAOs to fill critical O-5 and above billets that demand foreign area expertise. The central management component of the Air Force FAO proponent is strong and currently reinforced by both an effective information campaign and the high degree of support from Air Force senior leadership. It remains to be seen whether these advantages will ameliorate the traditional weakness of the dual-track approach the program has adopted.

The second component of the Air Force FAO program, the component of program assessment, needs only the briefest of mention. With the strength of the FAO proponent office, the Air Force FAO program is able to effectively monitor and report the status of the program. The 1999 report to the Air Staff is the most current example. The proponent is also considering the implementation of a direct FAO feedback system for even closer monitoring of overall program effectiveness. If the senior leadership decreased their support and the other Air Force FAO program innovations proved ineffective in countering the weaknesses of the dual-track system, such a feedback system would provide the first indications of trouble.

All three training components of the Air Force FAO program meet DoDD 1315.17 requirements, yet there is no coherent training pipeline. The FAO training philosophy of the Air Force FAO program initially paralleled that of the designation process. It focused almost exclusively on the efficient capitalization of extant and related Air Force training programs. As such, the FAO instruction dedicates greater detail to specifying the accreditation of the institution where the training took place than it does to describing the training the FAO proponent office will fund. While this is fiscally prudent, it also presents several limitations and pitfalls if the
proponent attempts to extend it past the utility it brings in building the initial pool of designated officers. A service cannot abandon it and ignore the new talent that enters the service already qualified, but it cannot remain the sole source in a sustainable program.

The Air Force FAO program is starting to transition out of that initial buildup phase. With that transition, the training opportunities are expanding and evolving away from the strict prudent option toward a better-funded, higher-quality set of training opportunities. Thus far, the options presented indicate a well-balanced program. Provided the Air Force funds these programs, the Air Force FAO program will continue to meet DoDD 1315.17 requirements and should provide competent area experts for the Air Force.

To understand the changes in training opportunities the Air Force is introducing, it is useful to understand the way Air Force categorizes FAOs. The Air Force separates FAOs into three levels of skill development that directly correspond to the FAO qualification given. Level I is referred to as the language skills group, the officers with basic foreign language proficiency that are potential FAO candidates. Level II is the entry-level FAO, the officers with improved language proficiency, a master's degree in area studies and most importantly, some exposure to the region of specialization. Level III includes the fully qualified FAOs. These officers have completed a tour in a FAO coded billet.

With respect to language training, the Air Force FAO program has not and will not fund training to bring an officer to a level I designation. As mentioned earlier, the proponent is actively encouraging and recruiting cadets to pursue the language training needed to qualify and become a part of the "language skills pool." In a similar vein, the proponent encourages commissioned officers to pursue postgraduate scholarship programs in area studies enroute to qualifying for entry-level FAO designation. Again, the idea is to capitalize on the skills obtained by the officer through extant programs.
In early 1999 though, the FAO proponent office has taken the postgraduate education process to the next level and invested considerable effort in building the number of Advanced Academic Degree (AAD) billets available for FAOs. While not funded slots, they are essentially reserved for the FAO proponent's use. Although not for a graduate degree, the proponent has also expanded the number of Professional Continuing Education (PCE) slots. The FAO proponent office secured twenty-two slots at the Foreign Service Institute for the two-week area course. Additionally, the proponent is working with the U.S. Air Force Special Operations School (SOS) to expand the number of seats available to FAOs in the area orientation courses. According to the Air Force FAO proponent office, "We will be encouraging units to request that their FAOs attend the U.S. Air Force SOS classes en-route to the FAO assignment."45

The growth in non-funded training opportunities is positive, but the Air Force FAO proponent also recognized that it could not satisfy all requirements through non-funded programs. As mentioned earlier, the transition to greater training opportunities has started. The Air Force FAO instruction states that "area studies may be offered to qualified candidates as availability and funding allow." In 1999, the Air Force FAO proponent funds ten positions a year at civilian universities.46

The final component of the Air Force FAO program, the ICT component is slightly more controversial than the language and area studies components. Recalling previous discussions on the direct correlation between exposure to the environment and actual area expertise, the degree of exposure required before designation as an entry-level FAO is disconcerting. The Air Force places disproportionate weight on the value of the master's degree in area studies. Although a worse case scenario, an Air Force attaché, despite CONUS DIA training, could potentially arrive in country having spent only a single tour in the region years before. In all likelihood, that tour was as a junior officer assigned to an operational unit. The probability of extended exposure to the culture under those circumstances is low. Alternately, in the operating environment of 1999,
a FAO assignment to a relatively stable unit located in CONUS can quickly turn into a forward deployed, in-country experience. ICT is critical to effective FAO performance.

Interestingly, the Air Force recognizes this fact by only awarding the full FAO designation to those officers who have completed a FAO in-country assignment. As mentioned, foreign MPE students are an exception, as the billet does not belong to the FAO proponent. Additionally, the Air Force has also "grandfathered" full FAO designation for the officers who have successfully completed attaché tours. Both cases are sound.47

ICT is expensive, especially to a new program with no established infrastructure in overseas locations. In the most obvious example of the Air Force transition toward greater funding and improved training opportunities, the Air Force funded 80, month long in-country language immersion trips for entry-level FAOs during 1998. Of even greater promise, the FAO proponent reports in April 1999 that

To further enhance both the language and area studies programs, we are developing an Area Studies Advanced Program (ASAP). Under this program, officers present a proposal to conduct in-country language and area studies. This program is still in the coordination phase, but we hope to implement by next year.48

The benefits of such a program would be considerable for those select officers who were able to participate, but there are also dangers. The foreign MPE student does not have a choice, but the FAO designing his or her own ICT should guard against a proposal for studies at one foreign institute. The danger lies in exposure to a very limited section of the region. According to the Air Force vision statement in support of global engagement, "The FAO offers regionally-oriented international politico-military expertise and foreign language proficiency to the planning and execution of AEF [sic] operations."49 However, a year ICT in Moscow, for example, while exceptional compared to no ICT at all, will produce neither regional nor Russian area expertise – it will produce a Moscow expert.50

If funding for ICT is available, the Air Force should also consider greater use of overseas regional training bases where they are available. To date the Army FAO Training Program at the
Marshall Center is the only one. A single Air Force officer attended the facility during 1998. These facilities have an established infrastructure, offer a modifiable syllabus and have inherent regional opportunities due to the number of foreign officers that attend the Marshall Center. Exercising such an option would provide the Air Force with economical and effective ICT.

Overall, the Air Force FAO program has blazed a path toward a robust and sustainable program. The ability of the program to develop and evolve so quickly is directly attributable to the support of senior Air Force leadership and the strength and size of the management within the FAO proponent office. However, those leaders should strongly consider further support, particularly in funding for ICT. The Air Force FAO program would also benefit from a closer look at the pitfalls of the dual-track approach and the ramifications it will have on FAO chances for competitive career advancement. Nonetheless, the Air Force FAO program can claim that it is well on its way to developing competent FAOs. These FAOs will allow EAF commanders to realistically “consider requesting FAO augmentation to AEF [sic] lead elements to support a variety of aerospace operations, ranging from force protection, to operational planning, to coordinating host nation support.” The Air Force is definitely investing resources and time to support its published statement that “FAO regional expertise and language skills constitute a ‘force multiplier,’” contributing to an effective engagement strategy in support of U.S. politico-military objectives.

In April 1997, the office of the Chief of Naval Operations published Instruction 1301.10, (OPNAVINST 1301.10) and created the Navy FAO program. The creation of the Navy FAO Program only two months after DoDD 1315.17 required it was an encouraging first step. Unfortunately, that initial push was not indicative of the amount of support the program was to receive thereafter. The Navy FAO program has struggled to overcome the natural bias that a traditional sea-based service has toward allocating resources to the development of land-based foreign area experts.

In contrast, the mission of the Navy--as reflected in naval doctrine and Navy posture statements--is steadily evolving *Forward... Away From the Sea* and toward greater foreign interaction with allies and partners against regional threats in the world’s littorals.

To develop the initial cadre of FAOs, the Navy has taken the logical approach of capitalizing on extant talent and training opportunities within the service. The Air Force, sharing the same challenge of creating a completely new program, took the same approach for the very same reasons. Two years later, the difference between the results achieved by the services is apparent. It is directly attributable to service prioritization of resources. Although certainly not ignored, the Navy FAO program has not evolved at a rate that matches or anticipates the growth of foreign area expertise requirements inherent to the nation’s NMS concept of global engagement.

A review of the central management component of the Navy FAO program provides the first indication of the minimalist approach the Navy has taken toward supporting the Navy FAO program. OPNAVINST 1301.10 states the Navy FAO program “is designed to train and develop commissioned officers to meet worldwide Navy requirements for officers possessing foreign area expertise.” A program of such scope requires dedicated management. However, the Navy
FAO program proponent consists of a single officer who manages the Navy FAO program as one of several duties.

As was the case with the Marine Corps FAO, the existence of a designated Navy FAO proponent office met the basic DoDD 1315.17 requirement. Yet, the limitation of a single individual to the office truly constrains how much the program can implement and manage. The fact that the Navy FAO proponent office had no previous program experience to draw from and the fact that the office chief could only dedicate part of the day to the program further exacerbated this limitation.

As a new program, one of the first tasks the FAO proponent office needed to complete was the identification of FAO billets. Again, the Navy and the Air Force shared the same approach. For the last two years, the Navy FAO proponent has steadily worked at refining a list of FAO billets, but progress has been tedious. In creating FAO billets, the Navy, like the Air Force, is not creating new billets but recoding existing ones. In part, the slow rate of progress is again a factor of the manpower limitations of the FAO proponent office addressed previously. However, it is not the single factor.

The general lack of awareness of the value and application of foreign area expertise within the Navy influences the billet recoding process. The conversion of a billet to a FAO billet is difficult to justify if the command owning the billet has no appreciation for what the FAO can do. This lack of awareness is due to a combination of the overwhelming focus of the service on operational warfighting missions and the relative low visibility of the Navy FAO program. The former will not and should not change significantly, but it will have to expand in scope if the Navy is to embrace new forms of warfare in foreign, non-traditional naval environments.

Exposing and educating the officer corps, both senior leaders and junior officers, to the "weapons" that a FAO brings to the fight will counter the latter. The Navy FAO Internet homepage and the prominent placement of FAO community news in Perspective, the naval
personnel command periodical for officers, are excellent venues the FAO proponent office already uses. However, true appreciation and visibility, particularly from senior officers, will only come when fully qualified FAOs are filling the right billets, which again brings the discussion back to the need for effective central management in the from of a adequately staffed FAO proponent office.

As the size of the FAO cadre ultimately drives the size of the FAO program, the determination of a relatively constant number of billets takes on heightened significance for a new program. The Navy FAO proponent has identified 112 key FAO positions, but the current total number of billets is slightly under 300. Of those 300 billets, approximately fifty-five are restricted to the intelligence community. The Navy FAO homepage displays a worldwide comprehensive list of FAO billets organized by region. Thus far, the Navy FAO proponent office, in conjunction with the Bureau of Naval Personnel (BUPERS) has focused on recoding the billets which are Navy equivalents to the Army categories listed in table 4. These positions are the traditional politico-military, higher headquarter, service, and joint staff, advisor, and attaché billets. Noticeably absent are billets for instructor duties at service schools and another even more important category.

The identification of key Navy FAO billets should extend beyond those traditionally associated with intelligence and analysis. The demand for area expertise is not limited to the embassies and analysis cells of regional intelligence centers and theater headquarters. The broader scope of threats and missions in the post-Cold War environment present challenges to deployed naval forces that would not have been considered possible a decade ago. With the implementation of the MLG, the Marine Corps is laying the groundwork for the availability of built-in FAO expertise to the commander. The Air Force also sees a critical “force multiplier” role for FAOs in the EAF. The Navy should strongly consider the benefits that FAO billets afloat
would provide battlegroup staffs. Currently, even if the Navy were to identify and approve such positions, it would not be able to fill them with qualified FAOs.

As mentioned earlier, the Navy targeted the resident talent within the officer corps to build the initial pool of FAOs. Despite manpower challenges, the Navy FAO proponent coordinated and convened annual FAO selection boards during fiscal year 1998 and fiscal year 1999. The Navy FAO program has awarded the FAO additional qualification designation (AQD) to over 380 officers, but separates the group into two levels of qualification. A navy FAO is either fully qualified or considered to be in training as a FAO-designee. As of April 1999, there are only sixty-seven Navy officers with the full FAO AQD.

While OPNAVINST 1301.10 “highly encourages” Olmsted Scholars and the officers who have enjoyed foreign PME to apply for FAO qualification, it is not required of them. The Navy should consider making this process automatic. With a pool of sixty-seven officers, the Navy cannot fill the FAO billets it has identified with qualified officers. As of April 1999, a full 82 percent of Navy FAO billets are filled by non-FAOs. The remaining 18 percent include those FAO billets where the skills of a FAO “in training” are adequate. There is cause for concern, particularly when considering that the current deficits will compound due to the Navy selection of a dual-track system to manage FAO career paths.

The Navy FAO program joins the Marine Corps and Air Force FAO programs in implementing a system that has proven its inadequacy. The Navy FAO program complies with DoDD 1315.17 requirements to “ensure competitive career advancement” but the message to the young officer entertaining a naval career is not encouraging. The Navy is particularly susceptible to creating the conditions that will make FAO tours unattractive and detrimental to a naval career. The tacit implications of the preference for officers with greater “haze-gray and underway” time is an undeniable during Navy selection boards. Naval officers learn this lesson early on in their careers. The other services have versions of the same, but while the dual-track
system is a poor option for any service, no other service exposes its officers with an additional MOS or secondary AFSC to quite the same career risk.

The Marine Corps has an established FAO community and a perilous but recognized FAO training track. In the Air Force many officers do not fly. The Army places extreme value on “muddy-boot” time, but has recognized and addressed the problem with OPMS XXI Career Field designation process. The emphasis of the Navy is apparent even in the OPNAVINST 1301.10 description on FAO career progression and assignment. The Navy FAO instruction states that “When not [author’s emphasis] serving in billets essential to their community, FAOs will serve in FAO-designated billets requiring regional politico-military expertise.”58 Left unchanged, the Navy faces a deficit of trained and truly qualified FAOs to fill the sensitive senior positions requiring regional expertise.

For the Navy, the discussion on the FAO program component of assessment is not extensive. The Navy needs to re-assess naval requirements for foreign area expertise and should consider a comprehensive overhaul of the current FAO program. The first area assessed should be the FAO proponent office and what the Navy realistically expects it to achieve. As long as Navy senior leadership opts for marginal resourcing and support for the Navy FAO proponent office, the Navy will have at best, a marginal FAO program. Conversely, judging by what the Navy FAO proponent office has accomplished with the current level of support, an adequately supported office will greatly enhance the capabilities of the program.

All three training components of the Navy FAO program meet DoDD 1315.17 requirements. While true, the statement is hollow. The Navy FAO program has no training pipeline and has never had a FAO training budget. Furthermore, although DoDD 1315.17 does not make ICT a mandatory part of a FAO program, the Navy is the only service that does not offer some form of ICT. These facts highlight two points: (1) the degree of latitude the services
have under DoDD 1315.17; and (2) the fact that the Navy FAO program is either under-
resourced, not concerned about the proficiency of Navy FAOs, or both.

The study has referenced the similar challenges faced by Navy and Air Force FAO
programs. With respect to FAO training, both services initially sought to maximize those FAO
related training opportunities already offered by the service before committing FAO program
resources. The discussion points for the initial Air Force training program are equally valid for
the Navy.

The issue is the length of time the service can continue to depend on its initial strategy.
As stated earlier, the approach of depending solely on extant training opportunities is only valid
as a starting point while building a pool of qualified individuals. The program cannot adhere to
that training scheme and remain viable. If viewed as a programmatic stage of development, the
transition of the Air Force program toward sustainable viability is evident. The Navy program
risks viability by not progressing past the stage of sole dependence on extant programs and by not
supporting any form of ICT.

An explanation of Navy FAO levels of qualification and requisite skills provides limited
structure to the discussion of Navy FAO training. OPNAVINST 1301.10 indicates two
categories of Navy FAOs, but does not list corresponding requirements for proficiency or
qualifications in any detail. Under selection procedures, the instruction only states that “selection
will be based upon the officer’s overall professional performance, foreign language proficiency or
aptitude, politico-military, and area studies education, and regional experience.”59 If the officer’s
record indicates the correct mix of qualifications and potential, the officer will “be awarded a
FAO designation code specifying a region of expertise.”60 Further on, the instruction lists
requisite FAO skills. The indication is that the skills represent the standard that a partially
qualified FAO or FAO in-training must meet for full designation. There are only two and again
lack detail: “(1) language proficiency; and (2) pol-mil education associated with the officer’s
designated region or actual regional experience.”

The distinction between the selection criteria and the requisite skills is not readily apparent, implying that the selection board determines what is adequate.

One of the draws of a viable FAO program for young officers is the enhanced opportunity for postgraduate education and language training. Entering its third year of existence in 1999, the Navy FAO program continues to place the onus of training and skill acquisition completely on the individual. As mentioned, there is no Navy FAO training pipeline or funding for training as of April 1999. The training opportunities as they appear in OPNAVINST 1301.10 will not interest many potential FAOs. “O-3 FAO designees will be assigned, when possible, to specified FAO training billets during shore rotations in order to gain either language training and regional experience, or postgraduate education in order to be fully qualified as an O-4.”

The problem is the virtual absence of specified training billets. One exception is the language training the officer will receive at DLI if selected for assignment to a Language Designated Position. However, this was also the case before the Navy FAO program, so there is no real additional incentive. The second exception is not a reality in 1999, but is the first indication that the Navy FAO program is evolving, despite a lack of funding, into a more viable program. The Navy FAO proponent office is making a dedicated effort to obtain quotas for the Area Studies Curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). These quotas will be reserved by NPS for exclusive assignment to Navy FAOs or FAOs in-training. The Navy FAO proponent and NPS are coordinating eighteen seats for fiscal year 2000, twenty seats for fiscal year 2001 and up to twenty-two seats each for fiscal years 2002 and 2003. However, this positive development in Navy FAO training cannot begin to compensate for the largest flaw in Navy FAO training, the complete absence of ICT.

This study has repeatedly stressed and demonstrated through historical examples the importance that exposure to the assigned foreign culture has for the FAO. The degree of
expertise the individual possesses is directly proportional to the length and extent of the
immersion during ICT. OPNAVINST 1301.10 defaults to the expertise of the selection board in
determining the level of exposure the potential area expert has. As is the dependence on extant
service training opportunities, this approach is not ideal but acceptable for a limited period during
the initial buildup phase of a new FAO program. The FAO proponent office should make every
effort to develop more effective training opportunities, and abandon the subjective determination
of skills as soon as feasible.

Overall, the Navy FAO program faces a major program development decision. The
procedures implemented to establish and create the program have outlived their primary utility.
Additionally, the minimal support given the program has hampered the ability of the program to
function and develop. If the Navy desires to sustain a viable FAO program, it must allocate
greater resources to the management of the program and provide increased training opportunities.

In the Department of the Navy 1999 Posture Statement: America’s 21st Century Force,
the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine
Corps refer to the growing frequency of multinational operations and the expectation that the
trend will continue well into the twenty-first century. In the chapter titled “Shape, Prepare and
Respond: Ensuring Operational Primacy,” the posture statement lists sixty-nine separate exercises
conducted with over fifty foreign nations and thirty-seven separate naval operations conducted in
all regions of the world during 1998 alone. While addressing the human resources portion of the
Navy and Marine Corps in a subsequent chapter, the posture statement specifically mentions the
Navy FAO program and importance of foreign area expertise stating that “These area specialists
are essential to furthering the nation’s engagement strategy.”

Provided the Navy dedicates adequate resources to a revised FAO program, the Navy will
develop the foreign expertise assets it will require as the Navy enters the twenty-first century.
Left unchanged, the current Navy FAO program will simply not meet those requirements.
1Kinzer and Peterson Ulrich, 34.


3Ibid., par. 4.3.

4Ibid., par. 3.4.

5Ibid., par. 4.2.

6Ibid., par. 4.2.2.

7Ibid., par. 4.2.1.

8Kinzer and Peterson Ulrich, 34.


14U.S. Department of Defense, Directive 1315.17, par. 3.2.


16Tullbane, Foreign Area Officer Survey & Analysis Project Final Report.

17Ibid., i.

19 Burkett, 5.

20 Ibid., 138.


22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.


29 Burkett, 39.

30 U.S. Department of Defense, Directive 1315.17, par. 3.4.

31 Ibid.

32 Chuck Owens, “USMC FAO Notes.”

33 Ibid.

34 U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Bulletin 1520 FY 99, par 3C.


42 Ibid.


46 Ibid.

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid.


51Ibid.


54Department of the Navy, OPNAV Instruction 1301.10, par.2.b.


57U.S. Department of Defense, Directive 1315.17, par. 3.4.

58Department of the Navy, OPNAV Instruction 1301.10, par.3.C.

59Ibid., par.3.B (2).

60Ibid., par.3.B (3).

61Ibid.

62Ibid., par.3.C.

63Foster, interview.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS

The primary question addressed by this study is whether the levels of foreign area competence in the services match the demands made of the services within the NSS. The answer is no. Overall, the foreign area expertise capabilities in the service in April 1999 are not commensurate to the needs of the missions DoD must perform in support of the objectives contained within the NSS and the NMS. That said, the study of this topic has demonstrated that the DoD has demonstrated unprecedented recognition of the deficit and the resolve to develop capabilities commensurate to requirements. Furthermore, the study has also revealed that the process for developing this expertise is well underway, although the individual services differ significantly in their level of commitment.

This chapter organizes the conclusions of the study into a DoD (national level) topic and a service topic. The first topic covers the broader trends and implications that the collective foreign area expertise capabilities of the services historically had and will have on national security objectives. The second topic addresses the current, more specific capabilities of service FAO programs.

Looking back over the twentieth century, the growing rate of interaction between the nations of the world emerges as one of the predominant features. The historical review of foreign area expertise capabilities within the military over this period lends valuable perspective to the overall assessment. The review indicated that with few exceptions, U.S. national leadership was generally neglectful of foreign area expertise requirements until the end of the Cold War. The exceptions were always reactive, driven by conflicts overseas where the services would relearn two lessons. First, after responding to government prioritization, the services would realize that they had relegated the mission of developing language and area experts to a level that was below the actual needs of the service. Second, that it was not possible to effectively recover from this
deficiency as quickly as needed. The development of these critical capabilities takes time, not to
mention the practical and domestic difficulties posed by establishing schools to teach the
language of the enemy during a conflict with that very same enemy. Recognition, development,
and support of foreign area expertise have historically lagged actual requirements for the same.
The DoD and the services never adequately anticipated or integrated foreign area expertise
capabilities into long term plans.

Nonetheless, this study identified that neglect of foreign area expertise started to decrease
during the Cold War, particularly so for the Army. With the national security policy of
containment came the realization of prolonged foreign interaction for the military. The Soviet
threat strongly influenced the development and focus of FAO programs. Understandably, the
prioritization of foreign area expertise programs was significantly lower than Cold War priorities
on nuclear and conventional capabilities. Both Korea and Vietnam proved the continued reactive
nature of military foreign area expertise capabilities. The duration of involvement in Vietnam
did, however, have a lasting effect on the emphasis placed on foreign area expertise because of
the infrastructure build up to support MAO functions and non-conventional warfare missions. In
the last decade of the Cold War, the increase in overseas military operations brought greater
visibility and national level recognition of the need for foreign area expertise.

This study has shown that overseas operations have increased exponentially in the last
decade of the century. The transition for the services away from a Cold War focus and into the
current realities of high volume joint, multinational, interagency, and overseas operations has
stressed the requirement for foreign area expertise as never before in history. The National
Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies 1998 Strategic Assessment
anticipates that the trend of globalization and interdependence will continue and assesses the role
of the U.S. Department of Defense in that future environment. To “improve the odds of reaching
a desirable future” this document identifies four key interests “the United States should pursue
... to affect the design and use of its military capabilities." \(^1\). All four emphasize the U.S. military's increased requirement to actively work with allies and effectively engage rogue states.\(^2\) DoDD 1315.17 demonstrated a generally corresponding and unprecedented level of problem recognition, requirement anticipation and FAO program support.

Parochial service views and interests diminished the potential of DoDD 1315.17. These factors heavily influenced the language of the directive and left significant implementation issues open to the subjective interpretations of the services. Nonetheless, DoDD 1315.17 is an encouraging step on the part of the DoD to meet one of the most apparent needs of the U.S. military in anticipation of the inevitable trends of continuing globalization. For the individual services, it has catapulted the FAO issue into a whole new realm. Instead of a debate over the need for and existence of FAOs and FAO capabilities, the discussion is one of degree of support, viability, and training to develop the adequate proficiency.

The demand for foreign area expertise in 1999 outstrips the ability of the services to develop and provide it. The statement applies to the Army, but only because of the nature of the Army's mission and the magnitude of the demand. The Army FAO Program develops both the greatest number and the most competent FAOs. In addition to what is undeniably the best FAO training program, the greatest strength of the Army FAO program is the career viability for Army FAOs under OPMS XXI. The infrastructure of the program is sound. Despite disproportionate losses of FAOs because of the drawdown, the Army FAO program has professionally reassessed its status and with OPMS XXI, charted a new course. If followed, this should allow the Army to meet service requirements for foreign area expertise at the outset of the twenty-first century.

For the Marine Corps, the Air Force, and the Navy, a common trend explains the disparity between the foreign area competence required and that available. With varying degrees of intransigence, all services hesitated to allocate scarce resources to a non-operational program. In response to DoDD 1315.17, the services initially designed FAO programs to meet the services'
traditional interpretation of FAO missions, such as attaché, analyst, and advisory positions (see table 4). In general, these three services underestimated the extremely critical demand for foreign area expertise implicit in the number of overseas operations and exercise all services are increasingly involved in (see figure 1 and appendix A). Hesitation to change is natural in organizations as steeped in tradition as the military—a certain degree is even prudent. The danger is that as figure 1 indicates, the rate of change at the end of the twentieth century demands greater flexibility and response with less hesitation.

The Marine Corps had the luxury of not having to create a FAO program in response to DoDD 1315.17, and thus could afford a greater degree of prudence. Two years later though, the Marine Corps FAO program is in the midst of a major overhaul and instruction review to better allow the Corps to meet their growing foreign area expertise requirements. The identification and filling of FAO billets within the MLGs will prove that the Marine Corps is headed toward correcting deficits in the new requirements for foreign area expertise.

The Air Force and the Navy had to create FAO programs. As such, they both faced the additional obstacle of having to first establish an initial pool of FAOs by qualifying extant talent and then transitioning to a more permanent and sustainable FAO program structure. After DoDD 1315.17, the Air Force did not issue a FAO program instruction for over a year. The Air Force spent the time gathering the information, support, and resources it would need to implement a sustainable FAO program. Almost a year after issuing the instruction, the Air Force FAO program is transitioning to a sustainable program. The Air Force does not yet have the foreign area expertise capabilities it needs to support deployed EAF. However, if the current level of support continues, implementation of a viable program to meet both EAF and traditional FAO billet foreign area expertise requirements by 2005 should be a reality.

The Navy published a FAO instruction almost immediately after DoDD 1315.17 but the program has not enjoyed either adequate organizational support or resources. After the initial
blush of success from tapping into the pool of talent resident in the officer corps, the Navy FAO program has not progressed toward a viable and sustainable program. The inherent foreign area expertise requirements for a service that conducts over one hundred exercises and operations with foreign military forces in a year extend well beyond traditional attaché billets. The Navy FAO program does not currently have nor has it started implementing changes to develop the foreign area expertise capabilities it requires to effectively conduct the missions required in an "engagement era." A comprehensive assessment and overhaul period is due.

With the exception of the Army, all services have opted for a dual-track approach for FAO career progression. This study has repeatedly presented the fundamental flaws of this approach. Because it does not fairly support the career aspirations of an officer, a dual-track approach ensures lower interest from talented individuals, poor retention of those who do attempt to juggle two careers at once, and a deficit in truly qualified foreign area experts to fill senior positions in the later stages of a career. The Marine Corps, Air Force, and Navy FAO proponent offices must reassess the viability and implications that a dual-track approach will have on their programs.

The variances between the services for the training and qualifications required of their respective FAOs raises concern. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the requirements for ICT. In describing General Stilwell’s four years of training in China, Barbara Tuchman’s captures the essence of what the goal of ICT is and what it allows in a simple statement of fact. Of Stilwell, she writes “He had functioned with Chinese under Chinese conditions.”3 An individual with little or no direct exposure to a foreign culture will poorly serve the operational commander, ambassador, or CINC. All services should require a minimum of twelve months of ICT before qualifying a FAO to serve in a sensitive position overseas.

The end of the millennium provides a convenient reference point for reflection. Although not gone, both the physical and mental constructs of a half-century of Cold War are starting to

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fade. This fact and the beginning of the information age have combined to destroy multiple political barriers and weave the interests of many separate nations into an increasingly fine-spun global fabric. The NSS, NMS, and the joint and service visions indicate full awareness of this fact and the expectation of the globalization trend to continue. The development and protection of U.S. national interests is more dependent on the ability to successfully interact with foreign cultures than ever before in history. The services are obliged to develop greater foreign area expertise capabilities within their organizations if they are to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century successfully.

**Topics for further research**

This thesis addresses the increased requirement within the DoD in general and the specific services for area expertise, but does not investigate details of joint demands, requirements and ramifications. Many FAO billets are inherently service specific and require the professional knowledge the FAO must have before any FAO training or tours. Examples include the Army FAO attached to a deployed division staff, Air Force FAOs serving with an EAF, the Marine Corps FAO supporting the MEF while attached to the MLG and the Navy FAO serving on the battlegroup staff. However, because many of the more traditional billets at joint headquarters and regional analyst positions are not service specific, the identification of these billets and their distribution among the services bears research.

Additionally, what of the considerable foreign area expertise requirements of a forward deployed Joint Task Force (JTF)? The current assumption is that the Army will provide this support. What of the JTF that is strictly an air campaign or primarily airborne logistics, what of the JTF afloat? If it is a large, long duration multinational operation, is it realistic, advisable, or even desirable for one service to meet all the requirements? These questions offer significant research possibilities.
A second associated area requiring study is that of FAO training programs. With the great similarity in the skills that a FAO must develop, there is no obvious reason for the services to have separate training programs. The initial indication in this study is that even certain ICT applications like the regional training centers may pose significant advantages for all services. Additionally, cursory fiscal logic argues that the pooling of resources and a larger student base would have benefits to training program infrastructure. Joint exposure and greater uniformity of foreign area expertise are other possible outcomes. Further research is required to determine the feasibility and desirability of such initiatives.

Finally, within the next five years, a study should assess the viability of DoDD 1315.17. The ramifications of globalization and the tempo of U.S. military operations overseas will certainly continue to mold the relationship between services and the synergistic capabilities the services develop jointly. The requirement within the services for foreign area expertise will not diminish, but the guidelines and requirements contained in DoDD 1315.17 risk losing relevance. A study focused on the revision of the Department of Defense Directive on Foreign Area Officer Programs will be appropriate by 2005.


\[2\text{Ibid.}\]

\[3\text{Tuchman, 112.}\]
APPENDIX A

U.S. OVERSEAS MILITARY OPERATIONS (1900-1999)

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