THE JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ

The Official Journal for the FAOs, International Relations Specialists, and Partners associated with the FAOA Korea Chapter
Korea Chapter
FOREIGN AREA OFFICER ASSOCIATION

"Producing the premier leaders of the Republic of Korea-United States Alliance since 2020"
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Cover photo: A color guard team from the 3rd
U.S. Infantry Regiment (The Old Guard)
supports an Armed Forces Full Honor Wreath-
Laying Ceremony at the Tomb of the Unknown
Soldier at Arlington National Cemetery, Virginia,
U.S., on May 20, 2021. The wreath was laid by
President Moon Jae-in of the Republic of Korea.
Credit: Elizabeth Fraser/DVIDS
Dear Joint Foreign Area Officers of the FAOA Korea Chapter,

A global security environment defined by multiplying threats, shifting power dynamics, and rapid technological change has effected a reorientation of U.S. national security posture toward inter-state strategic competition. This shift has renewed focus on maintaining our competitive military edge and highlighted the importance of our greatest strategic advantage: a global network of alliances and partnerships that no competitor or adversary can match.

Maintaining this advantage is not preordained, however, nor can we take our longstanding network of alliances and partnerships for granted. Accordingly, national leadership has made it a priority to reinvigorate our alliances and partnerships across the globe. This reemphasis, and its convergence with U.S. Air and Space Force leadership’s focus on accelerating change and strengthening collective space capabilities to better compete, underscores the importance of security cooperation.

Secretary of the Air Force International Affairs (SAF/IA) advances U.S. national security by cultivating deep, enduring relations through security cooperation with our allies and partners. Security cooperation enables our allies and partners to develop air and space capabilities and capacity that allow us to share the burdens of collective security, while also facilitating U.S. access, basing, overflight, and domain awareness that underpins our global reach.

As the lead integrator of the Department of the Air Force (DAF) security cooperation enterprise, SAF/IA is laser-focused on supporting the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and DAF priorities, in particular strengthening our allies and partners. FAOs are a crucial part of that mission, which is why International Airman/Guardian development and talent management is one of our main lines of effort.

Simply put, airman-to-airman relationships serve as the building blocks for our long-term strategic and defense partnerships. And a primary reason why the DAF excels at partnership is because of you, our FAOs! As language-enabled, culturally astute, and operationally relevant regional experts, FAOs are the face of the DAF to our international partners, so we are optimizing development and management in order to best position FAOs to build deep and enduring ties.

Evolution of Air Force FAO Career Field

One of our signature efforts thus far has been the evolution of the Air Force FAO career field. In January 2021, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force established the Air Force FAO program as a core career field that selects, trains, develops, and utilizes officers to serve in all FAO roles. The intent was to increase FAO effectiveness with our allies and partners and in the Joint community by focusing FAO development on International Airmen skills and experiences, rather than challenging officers to hit milestones in two separate career fields.

The Air Force FAO career field combines the best aspects of Joint service programs with enhancements that strengthen the DAF’s ability to provide optimized support to the NDS. FAO management as a core career field reduces the demand on other functional career fields and enables Air Force FAOs to periodically serve intervening operational tours in billets enhanced by language and regional experience in their origin career field. This keeps FAOs operationally relevant and leverages their expertise to infuse the DAF with internationally minded officers in this extremely dynamic security environment.
The transformation ensures better return on investment for FAOs and requires less overall resourcing for training, sustainment, and manpower from other core career fields.

Another evolution to the Air Force FAO program is the foreign-speaking Overseas Developmental Education (ODE) program as a FAO accession source at the O-4 level. Candidates remain selected through the Central Board with the understanding that graduates will re-core to the FAO career field following requirement completion. We all know the friendships established in the classroom can carry on throughout one’s career and many of those classmates ascend to key positions within their military. The ODE accession path will leverage strategic developmental education opportunities at partner international schools to further strengthen relations with our allies and partners.

The U.S.-ROK Alliance—Exchanges Are Our Strength

One of our most important alliances is with the Republic of Korea (ROK). The DAF and Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF) have a long history of cooperation based on shared values and robust personal relationships that were developed through extensive airman-to-airman interactions. The DAF utilizes various exchanges with the ROKAF to strengthen our partnership and is immersing our Air and Space Force members to develop those bonds from the outset. In the ODE program, one U.S. Air Force officer attends a year-long ROK Joint Forces Military University Command and Staff Course on a biennial basis. Previously, those officers would often follow on to various assignments at Osan Air Base, but they now will re-core to the U.S. Air Force FAO career field as an INDOPACOM specialist in Korea. As a reciprocal exchange, ROKAF also sends one student to attend the U.S. Air Command and Staff College as part of their Professional Military Education.

Additionally, 28 ROK cadets have graduated from the U.S. Air Force Academy (USAFA) under the four-year international cadet program since 1972. To further that partnership, SAF/IA recently signed an agreement establishing a cadet exchange between the U.S. and ROK Air Force Academies in which USAFA cadets will now attend the ROK Air Force Academy (ROKAF) for a semester. The first U.S. cadets will be sent this fall to ROKAF, where they will gain additional regional perspective by being immersed in Korea’s rich cultural history.

The U.S. Air Force Military Personnel Exchange Program (MPEP) is also vital to advancing our ability to perform interoperable activities with our allies and partners. Currently, we have one reciprocal exchange with ROKAF – a Korean instructor at USAFA and a U.S. Air Force instructor at ROKAF Air University. These exchanges are priceless opportunities to forge deeper relationships and to share best practices beyond what is taught in schoolhouses or in the technical orders.

Last but not least, we are strengthening our relations in the space domain. We have opened most of our international space courses to the ROK, which is a burgeoning space power, and look toward liaison officer and MPEP opportunities to further bolster our partnership as it extends into the high frontier.

In Closing

The U.S.-ROK Alliance is the linchpin of peace and security on the Korean peninsula and in the Indo-Pacific. And our alliance is fortified by common interests and a cultural understanding that extends across generations.

As FAOs, you are the connective tissue to your countries, and by having open lines of communication – freed from the constraints of bureaucracy and red tape – we can find creative solutions to shared challenges and strengthen our collective security. As such, SAF/IA will continue to develop innovative ways to efficiently and effectively meet the growing demand signal for critical International Airmen skills.

On behalf of the Department of the Air Force, thank you for the important and outstanding work you do every day for the United States of America.

Major General John R. Gordy II
A Message from the President

Dear Members, Partners, and Leaders of the FAOA Korea Chapter,

I am extremely humbled at the outpouring of support I received after being elected as the second Foreign Area Officer Association, Korea Chapter President. What began as a group of friends getting together brainstorming ideas has now burgeoned into an official non-profit organization complete with an all-volunteer staff, multiple organization partnerships, distinguished members with storied careers, and this official serialized publication.

As I consider this privilege of leading our organization, I recall my own beginnings as a FAO. As a young infantry officer, the work that FAOs did for our respective services was beyond my imagination. The depth of knowledge and wealth of experience that FAOs brought to the table were astonishing. Increasingly, other thoughts occurred to me: What if we disparate specialists could share those skills and knowledge? How many of our military, diplomatic, and civilian senior leaders also know what we bring to the table?

This is why I envision the future of our small organization along three main efforts:

Be hub of networking
FAOs are as effective as their relationships. As we prepare to transition to 48P, I have been encouraged by the various out-of-region FAOs arriving in the Republic of Korea and the unique insights they bring. The Korea Chapter will be a trusted nexus for these individuals and Northeast Asia FAOs through which we can connect with one another and other valued members and organizations working for our Alliance.

Offer unique professional development opportunities
As FAOs, we are able to access and leverage unique personalities and training opportunities unlike many other of our conventional colleagues. As an official organization of FAOs and international specialists, the possibilities for professional development and discussions with senior leaders are only limited by our creativity.

Tell the FAO story
How many times have you had to explain what a FAO is and what capabilities we bring to the table? How well are our strategic level commanders and diplomatic counterparts versed on how to best employ their FAOs? Let us help to tell the FAO story and craft it so that our skills are employed strategically and prospective FAOs will know well what we do.

As all great undertakings start from humble beginnings, thank you from the bottom of my heart for your interest and your support. For the FAOs and audiences throughout the peninsula and around the world, please never hesitate to reach out to me (presidentfaoakc@gmail.com) and enjoy this latest issue of The Joint Communique.

Warm Regards,
Wei C. Chou
A Farewell from the Editor

Dear Readers,

As Editor in Chief of The Joint Communiqué, I have had the privilege of counting among my colleagues FAOs and civilians dedicated to the ROK-U.S. Alliance and the values it upholds. Together, we have created a journal that, according to your feedback, is engaging, perceptive, authoritative, readable, attractive, and—though we are all volunteers—professional. I would like to extend my gratitude to our assistant editors and graphic designers for their commitment and effort; to our researchers and other contributors for their enthusiasm and good judgement; to the board members for their trust and support; and to you readers for being so receptive to this endeavor. Sadly, I must already move on, but I leave confident in the knowledge that the FAOA Korea Chapter and The Joint Communiqué are in supremely good hands.

Since our previous issue, the ROK-U.S. Alliance has become even stronger thanks to a successful summit between President Joe Biden and President Moon Jae-in held at the White House at the end of May. Three articles in this current issue reflect on the outcomes and significance of this historic meeting.

Soo Kim, a policy analyst at the RAND Corporation and a Distinguished Member of the FAOA Korea Chapter, asks how the People’s Republic of China will interpret the words and actions of the two presidents, including the awarding of a Medal of Honor to Korean War veteran COL(R) Ralph Puckett Jr. and the termination of the Revised Missile Guidelines. COL Shawn Creamer examines this decision on the RMGs in more detail, arguing that, with U.S. cooperation, the ROK can now explore opportunities to develop more suitable strike capabilities. And Grace Kim, a researcher at the Center for Future Defense Technology and Entrepreneurship at Seokyeong University, explores the breadth of possibilities for collaboration during this new and exciting era of space innovation and exploration.

Next, Associate Researcher Sean McCauley analyses current levels of support among young South Koreans for unification with their northern neighbors. Once a tenet of student politics and pro-democracy activists, the idea of a reunified Korean Peninsula is increasingly treated with apathy, suspicion, and derision by the youth of today.

We end with reviews of two very different but equally fascinating new books. Serving U.S. Army FAO Jason Halub offers his opinion on Empire and Righteous Nation, in which the renowned Norwegian historian and Yale University professor Odd Arne Westad unpacks six centuries of China-Korea relations, taking the reader on a journey from Ming and Joseon courts to the halls of power in present-day Beijing, Pyongyang, and Seoul. And Tuyet Duong, an attorney specializing in immigration and human rights issues, shares her experience of reading Crying in H Mart: A Memoir by Korean American Michelle Zauner, a.k.a. Japanese Breakfast, who weaves a delicate tapestry of tempting food and tender memories of a mother lost too soon.

With best wishes,

Hedd Thomas

Shawn Creamer is a U.S. Army colonel currently serving as the Deputy Director for Strategy, Plans and Policy at United States Forces Korea.

Tuyet Duong is an attorney who specializes in immigration and human rights issues in multiple sectors.

Jason Halub is a U.S. Army Foreign Area Officer currently serving at United States Forces Korea.

Grace Kim is a researcher and PR manager at the Center for Future Defense Technology and Entrepreneurship at Seokyeong University.

Soo Kim is a policy analyst at the RAND Corporation and an adjunct instructor at American University.

Sean McCauley is an instructor based in the Republic of Korea with a background in political advocacy.

Emily Stamp is an English instructor based in the Republic of Korea with a background in International Conflict Studies.
When U.S. President Joe Biden and Republic of Korea (ROK) President Moon Jae-in held their first summit on May 21, North Korea was not the only elephant in the room.

Rather, in the broader context of the Biden administration’s foreign policy priorities and the Moon government’s own geopolitical concerns, China was probably the larger presence.

Judging by media reports and statements from officials in both Washington and Seoul in the lead-up to the summit, the North Korea issue and the ROK’s hopes of securing Washington’s assistance in navigating a quagmire over COVID-19 vaccine supply and distribution were the two most pressing items on the agenda for both leaders.

So it came as little surprise when Biden and Moon announced their commitments to ongoing dialogue with North Korea on denuclearization and to the KORUS Vaccine Partnership. But when it came to the People’s Republic of China, the messaging was far more subtle.

While the two leaders used expressions that clearly referenced China such as being committed to an inclusive, free, and open Indo-Pacific region, as well as the rules-based international order and democratic values, they evaded any explicit mention of Beijing.

This may be a reflection of the high anxiety felt in Seoul when it comes to crossing Beijing by being seen to stand unequivocally with Washington on matters concerning China-U.S. relations and the competition for influence in the region.

I have three observations from the Biden-Moon meeting that may help parse the allies’ tone toward China and what we can expect when it comes to future engagements with Beijing.
First, the Medal of Honor ceremony.

Biden awarded 94-year-old Korean War veteran COL(R) Ralph Puckett with the nation’s highest military recognition for his actions during the conflict. Notably, Puckett led his soldiers against Chinese forces during the battle for Hill 205, part of a counter-offensive that marked the entrance of China’s People’s Volunteer Army into the Korean War.

The ceremony can be interpreted as recognizing Puckett’s valor and sacrifices in the war not only against North Korea but also against the Chinese military serving alongside North Korean troops fighting against U.S. and ROK forces. Seen from Beijing, Moon’s presence at the recognition ceremony—he is the first foreign leader to ever attend a Medal of Honor ceremony—as well as his lauding of Puckett as “a true hero of the Korean War” would have been unsettling, to say the least.

Second, the termination of the Revised Missile Guidelines, which had previously limited the ROK’s ballistic missile range to 800 km.

The United States had previously capped the ranges and payloads of Seoul’s missiles in part to avoid disconcerting China and Russia, and creating a catalyst for an escalation of the arms race.

From a technical perspective, termination of the missile guidelines allows Seoul to develop long-range precision-strike capability. Furthermore, the ROK may prioritize the development of intermediate-range ballistic missiles capable of reaching targets beyond the Korean Peninsula.

This does not only mean that Seoul, with its fast-developing weapons technology, will be able to deter and defend against potential threats from North Korea. It also means Seoul will help to enhance Washington’s missile network across the entire Indo-Pacific theater to counter China’s aggression.

Finally, Taiwan.

In the joint statement, Washington and Seoul agreed on preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. Biden and Moon also underscored the importance of multilateral cooperation and coordination to address issues critical to regional stability, including freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea.

In the follow-up media conference, Moon responded to a reporter’s question on the China-Taiwan issue by saying that it was of importance to both the United States and the ROK while noting the “special characteristics” between China and Taiwan. Moon’s response seemed an earnest, strenuous effort to maintain a reasonable distance from exposing Beijing before an international audience, lest Seoul bear the consequences in the form of diplomatic and economic pressure from Beijing.

“\nAs for peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, [President Biden and I] agreed how important that region is, especially considering the special characteristics between China and Taiwan. We decided to work more closely on this matter going forward.\n
—President Moon during the Moon-Biden Summit Press Conference, May 21, 2021\n\nChina, for its part, subsequently warned the United States and the ROK against “playing with fire” and remarked that the leaders’ joint statement was discouraging, reminding

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the international community that the Taiwan issue is an internal matter to China not subject to discussion by outsiders.

By all appearances, Washington and Seoul presented a coordinated approach on matters concerning China on the international stage. This, however, may not be a true indication that Seoul is completely on board with Washington’s efforts to counter Beijing’s aggression, as well what the United States sees as challenges to democracy and the rule of law, and China’s somewhat brooding presence in the region.

ROK officials, quickly perceiving China’s close scrutiny of the meeting, owned up to the joint statement’s explicit mention of cross-strait relations but appeared to seek vindication by reminding Beijing that the statement steered clear of specifying China by adhering to “phrases in generalities” and underscoring the importance of regional peace and stability.

The ROK-U.S. summit reaffirmed the countries’ shared history and common security interests and primed atmospherics to facilitate future-oriented expanded cooperation beyond matters concerning the immediate edge of the Korean Peninsula.

This, if implemented thoroughly and across overlapping issues and initiatives—the Quad, for instance—may not only enhance Washington’s position in the region but strengthen Seoul’s own fortitude when it comes to standing up to China’s aggression and occasional pressures, as well.

The ROK’s ambivalence and hesitation when it comes to articulating a clear position, either way, remains a significant sticking point in the allies’ ability to stick together and move forward on current and emerging challenges of common concern.

Such equivocation may breed tensions in the alliance and encourage Beijing to pressure Seoul even more. In the interests of shared democratic values and protecting the international rules-based order, Seoul may wish to consider whether to make an unequivocal strategic decision regarding its bilateral relations with both Washington and Beijing.

Soo Kim is a policy analyst at the RAND Corporation and an adjunct instructor at American University. She is a Distinguished Member of the FAOA Korea Chapter.
Strategic Choices After the Revised Missile Guidelines

Developing Suitable Strike Capabilities on the Korean Peninsula.

By Shawn P. Creamer

Ballistic missiles first arrived on the Korean Peninsula in 1976 after Egypt transferred the Scud-B 300 kilometer (km) short-range ballistic missile to North Korea. While the U.S. had deployed some tactical missiles such as the nuclear-capable 400km-range MGM-1 Matador cruise missile in 1958 and the 139km-range MGM-29 Sergeant missile to Korea as early as 1963, the Scud arrived in large numbers and altered the conventional long-range strike balance in the North’s favor. The Republic of Korea (ROK) responded to the Scud’s arrival by actively pursuing ballistic missile capabilities to both counter North Korea’s long-range missile fire advantage and to hedge against its fears of American abandonment.

The ROK and the U.S. enacted Missile Guidelines in 1979, which restricted ROK missile development and missile fielding in exchange for American technology transfers. Over time, what became known as the Revised Missile Guidelines (RMG) evolved with the ROK Government being granted increased range and payload limits for its missiles. RMG amendments were both a reflection of Seoul’s increased roles and responsibilities within the ROK-U.S. Alliance combined defense posture and an incremental response to continued, significant advancements to North Korea’s ballistic missile program and their growing operational missile arsenal.

The RMG was an early, self-imposed effort by the U.S. to limit the spread of ballistic missile technology and reduce a major driver to regional missile arms races. Self-imposed transfer restriction efforts by the U.S. and others within the international community evolved into an international norm and into the voluntary Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 1987. The MTCR standard is to restrict ballistic missile development transfers and exports to systems limited to 500-kilogram warheads and 300km ranges. Also in 1987, the U.S. and the Soviet Union expanded their arms control agreements by enacting the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which restricted both nations from developing, testing, or possessing ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 500-5,500km.

While the U.S. and its allies, such as the ROK, exhibited restraint in their development and fielding of short and intermediate range missiles, other competitor and adversarial nations such as the People’s Republic of China, Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan did not. By 2014, the U.S. alleged that Russia was in violation of its INF Treaty commitments by developing a ground-launched intermediate range cruise missile. Missile advancements and growing arsenals by the aforementioned powers began to substantially alter the strategic space by threatening to overwhelm friendly ballistic missile point and area defense systems and by creating a rather sizable long-range firepower gap. The RMG stayed within MTCR limits until 2012, when the U.S. agreed to expand the RMG range limit to 800km and later waived payload limits in 2017. The U.S. elected, after numerous demarches to Russian counterparts over their INF Treaty violations, to formally withdraw from the INF Treaty on August 2, 2019. The ROK and U.S. Governments reached consensus during their May 2021 Presidential Summit to terminate the RMG.

So now that both the RMG and the INF missile restrictions are terminated, where do the ROK and the U.S. go from here? Ultimately, Seoul’s future missile developments are sovereign decisions for them to work through and chart what capabilities to develop, just as the U.S. will decide how it will develop its own long range strike capabilities now that the INF Treaty is no longer a barrier. However, the two allies have a deep history of collaborating on collective defense contributions as part of their Alliance partnership. The lifting of INF / RMG restrictions on both partners offers a unique opportunity to deepen their defense relationship by collaboratively working together not just on their missile strategies, but there is also significant room for them to cooperate through technology sharing and co-development. The opportunities are
The two sides reaffirm that close coordination on all matters related to global nonproliferation and safe, secure, and safeguarded uses of nuclear technology remain key characteristics of the alliance, and the U.S. recognizes the ROK’s global role in promoting nonproliferation efforts. Following consultations with the U.S., the ROK announces the termination of its Revised Missile Guidelines, and the Presidents acknowledged the decision.

—U.S.-ROK Leaders’ Joint Statement, May 21, 2021

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limitless should the two allies take the deliberate step forward to advance and expand their defense relationship into other domains, perhaps even developing a common intermediate range missile system together or developing unilateral systems which share common components to achieve production economies of scale.

Long-range strike appears to be emerging as a unique feature of future war, perhaps even shifting the balance from offensive maneuver as the dominant form of war to one where the defense and fires have more profound influence. This is especially true given many nations globally already fielding robust arsenals or in the process of developing one. Long-range strike offers countries like the ROK an affordable way to implement coercion theory into their defense strategies, including deterrence by denial and/or punishment options. Moreover, some nations with both the means and capability may be able to construct a long-range fires capability that provides it an ability to adopt a compellence theory approach into their long-range strike strategy for certain threats they might face. The ROK is such a nation with the means, capability and a high-threat environment, that exploring the utility of incorporating aspects of both deterrence and compellence theory into their long-range strike strategy might be appropriate for its government to consider as it moves forward.

The ROK already has a relatively mixed suite of ballistic missiles with ranges out to 800km and land attack cruise missiles with ranges out to 1,500km. In addition, the ROK Government is developing a 3,000km land attack cruise missile. So now that the RMG is lifted, the ROK Government should consider adding to its long-range strike capabilities by developing a 1,500-to-2,000km ballistic missile system and perhaps a 3,000km variant so that the ROK Armed Forces can defend Korean sovereignty at distance.

Adding more robust long-range strike capabilities to its arsenal gives the ROK tools to bridge escalation gaps that currently exist on the Korean Peninsula between it and its nuclear-armed adversary. Most importantly for the ROK, both unilaterally and in concert with its U.S. ally, long-range strike helps keep access open, especially if the two allies continue to improve their joint and combined fires networks, where targeting is ubiquitous to enable strategic and operational maneuver from distance into the last tactical kilometer. It is therefore incumbent that the ROK Government resource its long-range strike capabilities to defense levels by pursuing campaign-level quantities and avoiding the mistake of resourcing to deterrence levels and thereby placing the resourcing burden for conflict on the U.S.[i]
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U.S.-developed intermediate-range missile systems, possibly armed with hypersonic glide vehicles, are likely to be problematic to forward-station in countries such as the ROK. The vigorous and sustained Chinese information, diplomatic and economic punishment response to past deployments of advanced U.S. capabilities to the ROK, and the perceived meek U.S. support to its ally, has negatively shaped ROK Government receptiveness to the forward stationing of advanced U.S. capabilities on the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, it is probably best for the ROK to step forward and sign up to field the Alliance’s intermediate-range missile capability, with advanced U.S. intermediate missile capabilities being reserved for the following two scenarios: 1) deployments forward to the ROK for contingencies or a resumption of hostilities in accordance with our Mutual Defense Treaty; and 2) temporal, short-term deployments to message adversaries and competitors to not threaten or pressure our ROK ally from pursuing their sovereign right to develop and field commensurate military capabilities with the understanding that the temporal deployment will endure as long as the third party coercion lasts.

In closing, the RMG had outlived its usefulness, and it was encouraging to see both nations finally decide to terminate the agreement. The recent abrogation of the INF Treaty and the moves by the U.S. to recreate its short and intermediate range missile forces, provides a unique opportunity for the two allies to work together. The U.S. should encourage, assist, and if necessary, defend the ROK Government’s development and fielding of mixed short and intermediate-range missile capabilities so that the ROK can adequately defend its sovereignty at distance against current and future threats. Whichever direction the ROK Government elects to pursue in terms of missile development, Korean policy makers may find it useful to revisit the advice that Yulgok Yi gave to the Joseon Dynasty in the years prior to the Imjin War: “Yu Bi Mu Hwan,” or, “When you are prepared, you have nothing to fear.”

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the FAOA, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

[i] This statement distinguishes arsenal sizes into two basic categories, those that are either deterrence or defense level sized. Deterrence arsenals are limited in size, and are only capable of supporting limited engagements, while defense-sized arsenals consist of larger stockpiles, capable of supporting high-intensity fighting over a sustained period of time. Defense level arsenals allow a nation to continue fighting, giving time for the nation’s military-industrial complex or international sales to ramp up production and delivery to continue the fight without pause.

Shawn Creamer is a U.S. Army colonel currently serving as the Deputy Director for Strategy, Plans and Policy at United States Forces Korea. He is a graduate of The Citadel and Webster University. He has been a U.S. Army War College Fellow at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Security Studies Program and is a fellow with the Institute for Corean-American Studies.

A ROK Hyunmoo-2 missile is fired during a combined ROK-U.S. military exercise, July 5, 2017. Credit: ROK Ministry of National Defense
Charting the Path Forward
The ROK-U.S. Alliance and the Future of Aerospace and Defense Innovation. By Grace Kim

The recent Biden-Moon summit marked a significant step towards aerospace cooperation between the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the U.S., and for the civilian Korean aerospace industry. The ROK-U.S. missile guidelines that have long held back the development of Seoul’s ballistic missile and space launch vehicles for the last fifty years are now removed.

The bilateral agreement dating back to 1979 that limited the missile development range up to 180 kilometer (km) was signed to prevent provoking an arms race with North Korea. Following the North Korean provocations in 2010 that sunk a ROK corvette and shelled Yeonpyeong Island, restrictions on Seoul’s launch range inched-up from the original 180km range to 300km to eventually 800km, which could range the furthest island in North Korea. Regulations eased from 2001 to 2017, further eliminating restrictions on the range of missile launches, removing limits on the weight of warheads and allowing for heavier launches. When the 1979 agreement was limited, the ROK joined the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), making it eligible to receive technologies for peaceful space exploration activities.

Since 2020, the U.S. regulations on ROK space activities have eased significantly. The July 2020 ROK-U.S. policy revision removed restrictions on the use of solid propellant. Korea’s satellite launch vehicles that have so far relied on liquid oxygen could now use a much cheaper, by about ten times, and a more reliable source of propellant. Liquid propellant compared to solid fuel has to be injected into the engine immediately before the launch and carries the risk of spillage. Solid fuel can be readied with much less pre-launch preparation and offers greater mobility when launching heavier operational missiles or rockets. U.S. and Russian ICBMs, such as the Atlas and the R-7, have initially used liquid propellant but the later vehicles used solid propellants. The May Biden-Moon Summit then peeled back the range limit on ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles. Korea could now develop ballistic missiles or launchers capable of delivering heavier than 500-kilogram payloads and at a launch range greater than 800 kilometers. Low earth orbit satellites (LEOs) run at altitude of 500-to-2000km.

The summit was a mark of renewed trust between the two countries, clearing the path for Korea to develop launch vehicles with domestic resources. Korea can now finally build rocket missile technologies that can compete with other countries on equal footing without range restrictions.

In the following months, the ROK also became the first nation to join the signing of the Artemis Accord, a project supporting Moon to Mars exploration by 2024. On the same day, the U.S. and the ROK signed an agreement on the “civil global navigation satellite systems cooperation,” under which the U.S. will support the ROK in developing its own GPS, named Korean Positioning System (KPS). Moon’s recent declaration to land on the moon by 2030 became more tangible.

Korea in the “New Space” Era

The Korean aerospace industry has been historically characterized by high entry barriers—where the R&D is kept largely within the government and large defense conglomerates with a small number of connectors. Adoption of commercial technologies into the military sphere is challenging with lack of cooperation and information sharing among the firms, startups, and small businesses. Korea also has limited resources of hardware, and has relied historically on foreign companies to acquire the critical technologies for independent development, where each technology is administered under the ITAR. According to the Korea Institute of Science and Technology Evaluation and Planning (KISTEP), Korea’s technical competence in the aerospace industry is at about 60% of that of the U.S.

Innovation in aeronautics has been largely historically led by Europe or the U.S. The recent policy changes, however, allows Korea to support a commercially driven space sector and to foster domestic R&D of domestic technologies without restrictions. While Korea’s aerospace and defense (A&D) industry is still in its infancy with a share of the global A&D market standing at around 0.6%, influx of new technologies is reshaping the landscape of the Korean A&D ecosystem. It is an opportunity for Korea to invite new entrants such as startups and to join the global dual-use innovation ecosystem—diffused with technology companies, innovators, and R&D efforts leading the next generation of
advanced science and technologies applicable in the A&D space.

Korea’s state investment in space has increasingly enabled a large and dynamic market for space-based products and manufacturing services. NARA Space Technologies is a Korean startup leading development of CubeSat, or miniature satellites under 500 kg that require less labor to build and are much less expensive. NARA Space Technologies works closely with research labs and partners to develop an array of space products and has participated in eight out of the 18 CubeSat projects in Korea. Innospace Co. is another Korean startup that developed first-of-its-kind hybrid rocket engine of solid and liquid oxidizers. Compared to other conventional engines that use either liquid or solid fuel, the hybrid engine achieves both high stability and price efficiency. Innospace is now testing placing a payload of 5 in low orbit. SpaceX’s Falcon 9 can lift 22.8 tons to Earth’s low orbit.

In May of 2021, President Moon also emphasized the role of the private sector in Korea’s space capabilities. He showed renewed commitment to foster private sector-led growth and to build an “innovative industrial ecosystem that nurtures global space companies such as SpaceX.” Project ‘Nuri,’ also known as KSLV-II, is anticipated to launch in October of 2021 is unlike the previous space launch vehicles, built with purely domestic technology. Since 2010, a budget of 1.95 trillion won has been invested in Nuri, building up the parts and technologies priming it to be the first space launch vehicle produced from Korean core technologies. The government plans to upgrade the Nuri and launch a lunar lander directly to the moon by 2030, and is conducting a preliminary feasibility study for the Nuri upgrade project. The first test flights are planned for February and October of 2021. Korea is planning to build an indigenous space launch vehicle (for small-sized satellites) by the end of 2025.

In January, Hanwha, a Korean defense prime, bought a 30 percent stake in Satrec Initiative (SI), a Korean satellite manufacturer established by engineers at KAIST Satellite Technology Research Center (SaTRec); these same engineers launched Korea’s first satellite, KITSAT-1 in 1992. SI is credited as the sole player in Korea capable of developing both satellite systems, payloads, and ground control stations. Hanwha also recently joined hands with KAIST and launched a “space hub” to develop inter-satellite links (ISL) that allows satellites to quickly process high-capacity data while exchanging data with lasers.

"Between 2023 and 2025, the scope of communications will be limited to land and sea. It will be expanded to airplanes and Urban Air Mobility in 2025-2030, and to 6G internet by 2030," said Hanwha’s Spokesperson Choi Jae-woo. Hanwha declared it will deploy 2,000 satellites in low Earth orbit by 2030 and have spent over KRW 500 billion in the satellite communications business.

Korea is well-poised to launch small earth observation satellites and achieve its ambition to commercialize 6G mobile telecommunication networks by 2028. A 6G network can be commercialized when high-performance networks are combined from the ground and in space. "We will take the lead in the future network market by securing 6G technology, which will be the core infrastructure of non-face-to-face digital society," Prime Minister Chung Sye-kyun said.

The ROK is a rare market with high digital penetration and an equally concentrated digitally literate consumer base. Its strong information and communication technology (ICT) infrastructure underpins Korea’s capacity to build services and technologies allowing the Korean players to deliver on AI, cyber, and 5G technologies at a more operationally intensive and greater scale than other competing nations. Emerging technologies that deploy in space in satellite imagery analysis or protection of assets, such as telecom, AI, internet connectivity, and cyber are expected to gain tremendous global market share.

ROK-U.S. Space Collaboration

The history of Korean aerospace technology development is underpinned by years of close collaboration with the U.S. The ROK’s first public multipurpose satellite, Arirang-1 also known as KOMPSAT-1, was launched with the aid of technical components from an American company, TRW, and was launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. Korea’s largest network provider, KT, worked with Lockheed Martin to develop its first Koreasat-1 and 2.

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protocols. Recently, Hanwha Systems, Korea’s largest defense conglomerate, signed an agreement with the U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command Armaments Center (DEVCOM AC) to conduct research and development on a range of defense solutions. They are expected to coordinate on modeling, prototyping, and developing armament systems, robotics, and others.

North Korea’s continued provocations over the past 70 years only stressed the need to support the development of weapons systems and advanced S&T in the domestic A&D industry. The ROK-U.S. Alliance provides an excellent mechanism to explore combined defense innovation opportunities by leveraging a 70-year relationship and integrated military forces under a combined command structure. The Combined Forces Command (CFC), currently led by U.S. Army General Paul LaCamera, includes ROK and U.S. troops working side-by-side every day from guard posts and operations centers to higher level staff offices. Most warfighting processes under the Combined Forces Command require the ability for both Korean and American troops to operate together on combined technology platforms with integrated capabilities. Additionally, the ROK and U.S. military share similar doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures, and troops regularly train together in large-force exercises at both the operational and tactical levels. These exercises provide perfect opportunities for the Alliance to prototype new technologies for military operations and warfighting. From an operational perspective, Korea provides a unique opportunity to prototype and test new defense technologies as part of a bilateral defense innovation effort.

The ROK-U.S. Alliance also benefits from a shared threat perception as both nations view security on the Korean Peninsula as a vital national interest. Additionally, Korean law and domestic politics generally do not preclude the acquisition or development of new weapons systems for defense. With the recent U.S. consent to allow the ROK to launch space vehicles with range greater than 800km, new opportunities for collaboration in space are rapidly emerging. At the 50th ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting (SCM), held in October 2018, the defense ministers of the two countries published a joint communiqué in which they agreed “to hold discussions on a joint vision to further develop Alliance defense cooperation in a mutually reinforcing and future-oriented manner in consideration of potential changes in the security environment.”

The spurring of innovation in the private sector spills into the education and training sectors of the military’s doctrines, strategies, and operational tactics. For the ROK and the U.S. to continue to maintain their technological superiority in the space domain, they need to secure technologies as means
to deescalate international political tension and strengthen partnership with allies. Allied innovation effort protects U.S. and ROK space vehicles and will help deter against aggressive space ambitions that may employ offensive counterspace capabilities designed to disrupt assets.

Preparing for war in space will also require substantial cooperation between the public and the private sector. The military will need to proactively respond to the rapidly evolving threats and adopt new technologies with agility and speed. International programs such as the xView series, an international computer vision competition run by the Defense Innovation Unit or Hacking 4 Allies (H4A) invite startups with dual-use capabilities to connect with the end-user, the military. Hacking 4 Allies partners with allied nations, universities, and defense agencies for entrepreneurs to participate in a “common problem-solving lexicon [with allies to] make the world a safer place.” These programs help shape the development of technologies for defense applications, build a bilateral innovation pipeline with allies, and strengthen technical cooperation to carry out joint operations. Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Kevin Fahey noted ten science and technology priorities areas for U.S. and the ROK as the following: Hypersonics, Directed Energy, Command, Control, and Communications, Space, Cyber, Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning, Missile Defense, Quantum Computing, Microelectronics, and Autonomy.

Accelerating startups based on the ROK-U.S. Alliance fosters development of the use of space in the military and will help secure military superiority in the space domain. A bilateral innovation program that builds a pipeline of startups under shared technical priorities will capitalize on the existing strengths of each nation and help collectively respond to the geopolitical technological competition. For startups, it offers a channel to apply their technologies into the defense sector without fear of potential technology transfer misuse.

Washington and Seoul share a history of aligning efforts on shared priorities and on the peaceful exploration of space. In summer of 2021, the Presidents of the U.S. and the ROK have reaffirmed their commitment to continue to work together for joint response capabilities against security threats in the space. Both nations will need to align tactical and operational strategies, but also vitalize bilateral innovation frameworks to meet the evolving technological needs in the military. Harnessing innovation in space will not only allow for the two nations to align national, security, and economic interests, but also deepen partnership in priority technology areas in a cooperative framework to effectively prepare for the battlefield of the future.

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Between a Rock and a Hard Place
Regional Remifications of the Liancourt Rocks Dispute.
By Emily Stamp

The U.S. wants an effective security partnership amongst its allies. However, relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) are regularly fraught with tension that cannot be solved easily, creating gaps in the East Asian security apparatus that can be exploited by their mutual competitors, including the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia. The most high-profile of these ongoing issues is the Liancourt Rocks dispute.

Known as Dokdo in Korean and as Takeshima in Japanese, the Liancourt Rocks are a pair of islets and numerous surrounding rocks in the Sea of Japan (East Sea). Almost equidistant between Honshu and the Korean Peninsula, they are administered by the ROK as part of Ulleung County, North Gyeongsang Province. Despite claiming that the Liancourt Rocks are not contested territory, the ROK pours millions of dollars into promoting Korean sovereignty over them to visitors through video advertisements on the subway to Incheon Airport, organized tours, and merchandise. The result is a politicized public consciousness over the islands. Foreigners travelling to the country, who have no pre-existing knowledge of the remote volcanic rocks may wonder why there are souvenirs on sale for a place called Dokdo next to those for more well-known destinations like Jeju Island and Seoul.

For years, the issue of sovereignty over the Liancourt Rocks and the dispute over maritime rights has been a cause of tension between the ROK and neighboring Japan. The 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, which ended Japan’s role as an imperial power and its post-war occupation by the Allied Powers, did not directly mention the islands, failing to award them specifically to one country or the other. Korea was not invited to negotiate or sign the treaty due to disagreements on whether the Korean people should be represented by the ROK or North Korea, which were then at war. The ROK nonetheless assumed de facto control over the Liancourt Rocks and has maintained a presence there since 1954. Japan has continuously protested its neighbor’s claims that the islands are, historically and geographically, an irrefutable part of Korean territory.

The Liancourt Rocks hold an outsized role in Korean national identity and politics. They are embedded in shared historical narratives of a post-colonial Korea, with disputes being politicized to promote positive ratings for domestic leaders. On this one issue, North Korea and the ROK are aligned, the former having publicly refuted Japanese claims to the islands. Any concession to Japan regarding their sovereignty would therefore be seen in North and South alike as patently unpatriotic. The symbolic value of the islands aside, a claim to the Liancourt Rocks includes ownership of the maritime area around the islands, increasing the size of the nation’s Exclusive Economic Zone, meaning access to important trade routes, abundant fish stock, and natural gas deposits. It has also sometimes functioned as an outpost and surveillance point, such as during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05.

While it is unlikely that Japan will ever forcibly challenge the ROK’s administration of the Liancourt Rocks, the dispute regularly becomes a flashpoint between the two states. The latest example of this is the controversy caused by the official map of the Tokyo 2020 Olympic Torch
Relay that seemed to include the islands as part of Japan. This led to outcry among lawmakers and the public in the ROK and for calls for a Korean boycott of the 2020 Summer Olympics. Additionally, Japan recently released its annual defense paper, in which, as for the last 17 years, it claimed the islands as an ‘inherent part of the territory’ of Japan.

The U.S. remains officially neutral in the Liancourt Rocks dispute, despite the U.S. Board on Geographic Names, in 2008, changing their name and country from Dokdo and Korea, to the Liancourt Rocks and Undesignated Sovereignty (although it quickly backtracked days later). But the U.S. has stated that the ROK’s biannual military drills on and around the islands are not conducive to improved relations between Tokyo and Seoul. Nonetheless, both the ROK and Japan are mature, democratic states that should be able to sort out their own issues without their mutual ally's help - the U.S. does not need to ‘choose’ a side, nor would this magically resolve this issue. However, U.S. neutrality towards the dispute does create the potential for tensions between the two crucial U.S. allies to be exploited by other regional actors, namely the PRC and Russia.

While the Chinese Communist Party has yet to publicly support either claim to the Liancourt Rocks, it has its own increasingly pressing territorial dispute with Japan centered around the Pinnacle Islands. Known in Japan as the Senkaku Islands, in the PRC as the Diaoyu Islands, and in the Republic of China (ROC) as the Diaoyutai Islands, the five uninhabited islets and three barren rocks that rise out of the East China Sea 120 nautical miles northeast of the ROC are administer-ed by Japan. Tokyo regards this as its most volatile territorial dispute and fears losing credibility in its claim over the Liancourt Rocks if it does not resist Chinese encroachment on the Pinnacle Islands. The commonalities in the positions of the ROK, the PRC and, indeed, the ROC vis-à-vis Japan stem from their histories as colonies or occupied territories of the Empire of Japan. All three countries share a national sentiment that Japan has never fully accepted responsibility for its past imperial aggressions. In the ROK, this has resulted in its population fearing a resurgent Japan more than the rising influence of the PRC, especially regarding territorial disputes, which are seen as mirroring a colonial encroachment. Beijing could appeal to this sentiment should it seek to further erode trust between Tokyo and Seoul and thus complicate U.S. security interests in Northeast Asia.

Russia has recently displayed increasingly close military cooperation with the PRC. In 2019, the pair conducted an aerial patrol over the Liancourt Rocks, forcing both the ROK Air Force and Japan Air Self-Defense Force to scramble fighter aircraft in response. The exercise highlighted defensive flaws, with Tokyo disputing the ROK’s ability to fire warning rounds. A similar exercise in 2020 over different airspace demonstrated that this vulnerability has and could be effectively exploited at any point. Both Russia and the PRC are likely to be motivated by the opportunity of undermining U.S. influence in Northeast Asian security. The perceived weak spot between two key U.S. allies due to the Liancourt Rocks dispute is thus a cause of concern with regard to future bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral cooperation. The fact that Japan also has a territorial dispute with Russia, claiming the four southernmost Kuril Islands off the island of Hokkaido as its own Northern Territories, further complicates matters. Japan, the Kuriles/Northern Islands, and as aforementioned both China and the ROK share similar island claims and any favorable action to one would help another against Japan’s claims, further creating regional tension.

The U.S. wants a peaceful resolution to the long-lasting Liancourt Rocks dispute. However, it has maintained neutrality and political distance from the issue, allowing the PRC and Russia to manipulate an easily triggered nationalistic flashpoint and expose a vulnerability in Japan-ROK-U.S. security cooperation, threatening the effectiveness of the partnership. But it does not need to directly engage by choosing a side. Instead, to prevent exploitation and manipulation of tensions by the PRC and Russia, it could leverage trilateral cooperation and facilitate diplomacy to deescalate friction in the Japan-ROK relationship, and allow them to resolve issues, even if it is unrealistic to suggest that this would occur quickly. However, if the Japan-ROK relationship continues to deteriorate then the foundation of the U.S. Indo-Pacific defense strategy and its management of Chinese expansion in the region is at risk.

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A House Divided Against Itself
Attitudes Toward Unification Among South Korean Youth.
By Sean McCauley

On a stage in Pyeongyang in front of North Korean supreme leader Kim Jong-un and 150,000 of his beleaguered subjects, Republic of Korea (ROK) President Moon Jae-in delivered an historic speech advocating unification of the two nations. “We lived together for 5,000 years and have been separated for 70 years. I propose today to completely end this 70-year hostility and take a big step of peace to be united again.” Though every ROK president has made overtures toward an end to the division of the Korean people, Moon is perhaps the most determined. He argues that the ties that bind the two states together are deeply rooted despite decades of strife. This is a sentiment shared by many of his generation who has kept the dream of a united Korea alive throughout tumultuous times. However, a recent poll conducted in 2019 by the Korea Institute for National Unification found that around 40% of young South Koreans prefer “peaceful coexistence” over unification. Indeed, there is strong evidence that the dream of a united Korea is not widely shared among younger generations of Koreans. For many young South Koreans, their communal identity stops south of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).

For younger Koreans, born after the transition to democracy, the vision of a united Korean Peninsula is not only unrealistic, but increasingly undesirable. In her research paper, Uri Nara, our nation: Unification, identity and the emergence of a new nationalism amongst South Korean young people, Louise Campbell argues that Koreans born after the 1980s are the first to define themselves exclusively as “South Koreans.” Included in her methodology, were interviews of 76 students from different universities throughout Korea. Her findings support similar studies that have shown a decreasing enthusiasm for a united Korea. Additionally, a growing number do not share an identarian attachment to those living in North Korea. For example, when asked the question, “Just because the two Koreas are one people does not necessarily make them one nation,” 49% of respondents in their twenties agreed. According to Campbell, appealing to nationalism as a means of unifying the two countries is
For many years, the youth of Korea held similar views. A poll conducted in 1994, for instance, showed an overwhelming majority in favor of unification, with only 11% against. However, the momentous changes of the past few decades and new economic and cultural realities have altered the national mindset. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the subsequent economic shocks in North Korea, and the rise of neo-liberal economics has undermined many of the ideological tenets of the student groups. The traditionally left-wing movement found its message challenged by a population more content with its newfound affluence and less enthusiastic about propping up its troublesome neighbor. Additionally, having achieved democratic elections, the movement found it difficult to gain traction within a society that was more in tune with other liberal democracies. For the generations born after the transition to democracy, long held narratives that have shaped the social fabric of the peninsula are not as sacred as they once were. Decades of conflict and division have rendered the North as an almost mythical entity in the minds of many, especially for Koreans born after 1995. Having lived for decades with the threat of conflict escalating into all-out war, and now with the threat of nuclear annihilation looming overhead, it is not hard to imagine that, for some, unification is far from desirable. This stark generational difference has been termed "North Korean Fatigue" by Yoo Ho Yeul, a professor of North Korean Studies at Korea University. According to Yoo, "[younger generations] think they are South Korean and they can’t identify not truths but false excuses."

“Are all forms of reunification good? Yes, they are. There is no supreme ultimatum except for reunification. If reunification means that split nations become one, and if it means the advance of national history, all that is valuable should be accomplished within reunification. Communism, democracy, equality, liberty, and prosperity all, they cannot be substantial if they conflict with reunification. When all truths, all ethics, all virtues run contrary to reunification, they are no longer persuasive to the public at large.” A more recent study conducted by Hankook Research seems to confirm that South Koreans born after 1995 were significantly less likely to share a feeling of “belonging” with Koreans as an ethnic group than those born after 1968 and before 1980. This lack of enthusiasm is surprising considering the role that the youth of the ROK have had in developing the Korean national project. Since the Japanese occupation, the student movement has often acted as the vanguard and moral compass of the Korean nation. At every significant moment throughout the twentieth century, the student movement was at the forefront of the national struggle. Young Koreans bravely championed seminal events in Korean history, from the March 1st Movement to the Gwangju Uprising. The movements have always carried with them the desire for a united and democratic Korea. These two ideas were inseparable to those involved in the struggles and a reunified Korea was of paramount importance to the national psyche. Activist Chang Jun-Ha put it bluntly:

"Decades of conflict and division have rendered the North as an almost mythical entity in the minds of many, especially for Koreans born after 1995. Having lived for decades with the threat of conflict escalating into all-out war, and now with the threat of nuclear annihilation looming overhead, it is not hard to imagine that, for some, unification is far from desirable. This stark generational difference has been termed "North Korean Fatigue" by Yoo Ho Yeul, a professor of North Korean Studies at Korea University. According to Yoo, "[younger generations] think they are South Korean and they can’t identify as belonging to the peninsula.\"
themselves as a member of the one unified Korea. A unified Korea may be good in terms of economic or other personal interests but [...] once they have considered the costs and burden, they do not think it is natural to have a unified Korea.”

Certainly, there is evidence that attitudes among the youth have hardened toward the North in recent years. For instance, a 1992 survey showed that 80% of students expressed interest in the unification movement, but a decade later, only 52% did, according to Campbell. Questioned on their motivations, those who support unification claim that nationalism must compete with other motivators such as potential economic benefits, and increased competitiveness on the Asian continent. Campbell’s study found that 36% of young people imagined that family life among average North Koreans was very different, compared to a study in 1998 that found that only 18% shared this view. For many, it would seem that economic concerns are a significant barrier to unification. In the same study, 66% believed that unification would result in higher rates of crime; 48% thought that unemployment would rise, and 64% believed that the gap between the rich and poor would widen. On the more practical considerations of unification, the economic disparity between a notably prosperous industrialized nation and a developing nation that has been regarded as a so-called basket case since the 1990s sheds doubt on the practical implications of combining two very different economies. To use a historical example, East Germany’s GDP at the fall of the Berlin Wall was two-to-three times smaller than its western counterpart. A 2015 estimate puts the GDP of the ROK at nearly fifty times that of North Korea. These economic realities have led to a near universal consensus among those in the political class that, in the event of unification, it would be less a coming together of equals, than a total absorption by the South. It is a prospect that is unlikely to reach a broad consensus.

As Koreans south of the DMZ shred their ties to the north, it seems likely that the border between the two countries becomes permanent and peaceful coexistence becomes the ultimate goal. In this scenario, it is likely that the United States Forces Korea (USFK) will continue to have a significant role in the future of the peninsula to ensure the sovereignty of South Korea from the north as well as other regional actors. The People’s Republic of China has made it abundantly clear that a united Korea is not in their interest. Much of their support for the North is motivated by preventing a shared border with a US ally. China’s principal concern is to keep the peninsula out of total American influence. South Koreans, meanwhile, view China’s machinations with suspicion, with over 83% viewing the country as a threat to national security. Confronted by two adversaries, Koreans of all ages seem to look to the U.S. for support. The USFK enjoys popular support from a broad section of the population, with young Koreans sharing these sentiments as well (63% support a continued US presence compared to 67% overall). Over 70% believe that U.S. forces should be stationed in the ROK to ensure the security of the peninsula. Many young South Koreans value the Alliance and its continued existence. The USFK is seen as an indispensable counter to the threats from across the Korean Demilitarized Zone.

Time is jeopardizing the goal of Korean unification. Should more young South Koreans disassociate from North Korea, it would be very difficult to imagine any successful undertaking of a united Korea. The volatility of the region especially, in light of the North’s nuclear ambitions, will now doubtlessly affect the future of the reunification movement. Whatever the path chosen by the people of the ROK, it will be its youth that shapes its future.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the FAOA, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

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Great Power Competition, Ideology, and Identity
A Review of Odd Arne Westad’s Empire and the Righteous Nation: 600 Years of China–Korea Relations. By Jason Halub

China and Korea share a long, interconnected history that continues to shape current relations between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and both the Republic of Korea (ROK) and North Korea. Odd Arne Westad’s Empire and Righteous Nation (Belknap Press, 216pp, $29.95) succeeds in unpacking the past 600 years of China–Korea relations from the Ming (1368-1644) and Qing (1636-1911) dynasties’ relations with Joseon Korea to the PRC’s contemporary interactions with North Korea and the ROK. Westad, a renowned diplomatic and global historian who has written extensively about China and East Asia, stresses the importance of these relationships to the broader East Asia region. This review essay will briefly explore some of the key themes covered in Westad’s narrative, which include the effects of shifting regional power dynamics, the role of ideology in state-formation, and the development of modern nationalism in China and in both Koreas.

Westad organizes his narrative into three chronological chapters that cover 1392-1866, 1866-1992, and China and Korea today. 1392 marks the founding of Joseon Korea by General Yi Seong-gye following his usurpation of the throne from King Gongyang, the final ruler of the Goryeo dynasty. During this political transition, East Asia was a region in flux. Just 14 years earlier, in 1368, a rebel general named Zhu Yuanzhang defeated the Mongol Yuan dynasty in central China and established the Ming dynasty. The Mongol defeat sent ripples across East Asia, particularly in Goryeo, where the rise of the Ming provided the context and conditions for Yi’s rise to power and founding of a new dynasty in Korea.

The near contemporaneous rise of Ming China and Joseon Korea also set the contours for relations between the two polities, which were grounded in neo-Confucian ideology.[1] Westad notes how Ming China faced the challenge of how to regulate domestic and external inter-polity relations as Zhu attempted to build a successor empire to the Mongol Yuan dynasty. Zhu sought to legitimate his imperial project by portraying the Ming as authentically Confucian (even as he continued Mongol-style autocratic approaches to imperial governance). For Zhu, adopting neo-Confucianism as his state ideology proved useful because it reinforced hierarchy and service to the emperor while connecting the Ming to dynasties such as the Song (960-1279) and Tang (618-907). Similarly, Joseon founder Yi Seong-gye leveraged neo-Confucianism to implement a top-down revolution to remake the Korean state around the three primary Confucian social bonds, namely those between father and son, ruler and subject, and husband and wife. To preserve Korean sovereignty, Yi and his successors adopted a policy of sadae (serving the great), whereby the Joseon kings deferred Korea’s external relations to Ming China. Ultimately, Joseon Korea served as a model for other countries on the periphery of the Ming Empire, such as Vietnam, to follow.

Joseon Korea may have served as the model state in Ming China’s so-called tributary system in East Asia, but this regional order did not go unchallenged. Westad highlights the impact of the Japanese warlord Hideyoshi Toyotomi’s
China and Korea are neighbors, and there have been close relations between them for as long as there has been what could meaningfully be called "China" and "Korea," which is for at least 2,000 years. —Odd Arne Westad, Empire and Righteous Nation: 600 Years of China-Korea Relations

The invasion of Joseon Korea in 1592 and 1598, and the rise of the Manchu Qing dynasty, founded in 1636, which defeated the Ming in 1644. These new shifts in regional power dynamics contributed to changes in Korean identity while reinforcing the role of neo-Confucian ideology in Joseon Korea. Hideyoshi’s invasions spurred a wider sense of nationhood among Koreans, albeit an identity tied to the Confucian order. Joseon elites came to see Korea as a “righteous nation” that was ideologically pure and culturally superior to the Manchu Qing dynasty. Nevertheless, the Joseon policy of sadae persisted, and Joseon kings continued to defer to the Qing dynasty on matters of foreign relations until the late 19th century when, the rise of Meiji Japan (1868-1912) presented an unprecedented challenge to the existing Qing imperial order in East Asia.

Westad discusses how the rise of imperial Japan and the subsequent colonization of the Korean Peninsula severed Chinese imperial political influence in Korea. From the 1890s-1945, important ideological changes occurred within Korea as Korean nationalists, breaking with the sadae policy, sought to de-center Korea from the Chinese cultural and political orbit and search for indigenous origins to craft a new Korean identity. This new Korean nationalism was systematically suppressed by the Japanese colonial system, but it provided an ideological template from which Korean leaders in the post-World War II environment would draw. The defeat of Japan and subsequent spread of the Cold War in East Asia ushered in a new power dynamic in which the United States and its allies vied for regional influence against the Soviet Union and the newly founded PRC. This era of great power competition erupted into conflict with the outbreak of the Korean War (1950-1953) and led to the division of the new Korean nation division of the new Korean nation-state, even as both North Korea and the ROK laid claim to a shared ethno-nationalist identity.

Westad’s Empire and the Righteous Nation is a useful resource for practitioners and scholars alike. His narrative astutely demonstrates the importance of China-Korea relations to the broader East Asia region and how key aspects of this relationship stretch back to the political and cultural foundations set forth by the Ming and Joseon dynasties. PRC leaders, harkening back to a shared neo-Confucian ideology, expect that both the ROK and North Korea should act in deference to Beijing’s interests. Westad persuasively concludes that “China’s Korean policies can easily be seen as a weathervane of how China will behave towards other [countries], farther afield.” In his evaluation, the PRC’s behavior is at best only modestly encouraging, Beijing’s initial willingness to work with other countries to solve the North Korean nuclear crisis during the 2000’s. However, the PRC’s unwillingness to take a stronger stand to rein in North Korea’s aggressive behavior is concerning not only for the region, but the rest of the world.

China and Korea are neighbors, and there have been close relations between them for as long as there has been what could meaningfully be called "China" and "Korea," which is for at least 2,000 years. [...] China today borders fifteen other countries, and Korea has been its closest and most constant neighbor.

—Odd Arne Westad, Empire and Righteous Nation: 600 Years of China-Korea Relations

[i] Neo-Confucianism is a school of Confucian thought that emerged in eleventh- and twelfth-century Song China and combines the ethical aspects of the five relationships (father-son, ruler-subject, husband-wife, older brother-younger brother, and between friends) with metaphysical concepts and practices from Buddhism and Daoism.

Jason Halub is a U.S. Army Foreign Area Officer currently serving at United States Forces Korea.
Grief, Family, and Food
A Review of Michelle Zauner’s *Crying in H Mart: A Memoir.*
By Tuyet Duong

One should ingest *Crying in H Mart: A Memoir* (Knopf, 256pp, $26.95) as one consumes a feast of banchan (a panoply of small side dishes) at a Korean restaurant, each chapter to be gobbled, eaten, and chewed happily at a brisk pace while waiting for the entrées to arrive. This is the perfect post-pandemic book, one that makes the reader feel joy and pain at the small details while healing from the travails of everyday life and the sometimes-arduous march toward death.

Michelle Zauner is a Korean American musician, director, and writer best known for her indie rock band, Japanese Breakfast. This, her first book, is a memoir that details a cultural and gastronomical journey through vignettes of her relationship with her recently-deceased mother—childhood trips together to Seoul to visit relatives; sampling various Korean dishes for the first time; mother-daughter immigrant inter-generational conflicts and bonding; and the difficult path of a child burdened with parental expectations who pursues the non-traditional life of a musician.

I devoured this literary treat hungrily over the course of 48 hours and emerged feeling that this savory piece joins the canon of must-read Korean American literature. It captures the diasporic journey that Korean American women experience as they join their American spouses in the U.S. It also curates a broad range of wonderful Korean dishes, exquisitely describing the taste, appearance, origin, meaning, and history of each.

In one scene, the author shares a bowl of naengmyeon (cold buckwheat noodles) with her aunt and uncle in Seoul, who recount the history of how the delicacy from northern Korea rose in popularity after refugees introduced it to the South, and how it was chosen as the main dish during the May 2018 inter-Korean summit between Republic of Korea President Moon Jae-In and North Korean leader Kim Jung-Un. The mouth-watering description of the food itself makes the reader want to run out to gobble up a refreshing bowl of naengmyeon while contemplating the rocky journey to reconciliation between North and South.

In relation to H Mart—the Korean American supermarket chain that appears in the title of the memoir—the author uses the venue and its customers as her muse. “In the H Mart food court, I find myself again, searching for the first chapter of the story I want to tell about my mother.” The first chapter hits the reader just as the odors of the kimchi and banchan aisle in H mart hit the shoppers. One immediately sinks deep into the heart of the author’s grief over her mother’s untimely death.

Zauner describes a scene between mother and daughter that captures the anguish and joy of the archetypal relationship. When she cries over a small wound as a young child, her mother yells, “Save your tears for when your mother dies!” This is the type of idiomatic quote that I, as a
Tuyet Duong is an attorney who specializes in immigration and human rights issues in multiple sectors. She served in the Obama Administration as a Senior Advisor at the White House Initiative on Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders, where she worked on immigration policy, Asia-Pacific business issues, and public private partnerships.

In one especially poignant moment, Zauner’s mother captures their intergenerational struggles with a question that she answers herself: “You know what I realized? I’ve just never met someone like you.” Her observation encapsulates how we all struggle with our unchosen family, and how we fail to truly see the unique beauty and character of those who are closest to us and right in front of our eyes. With age and distance, we have an opportunity to appreciate the flavors and strengths of our loved ones.

The author relishes every opportunity to position Korean cuisine at the center of daily life, culture, family, and love. It is a joy to read this book simply for the portraits painted of the various food. When Zauner makes kimchi at home for the first time, she meditates on the power of this staple of Korean cuisine to illustrate the cycle of life and death, fermentation, and the healing of trauma. Cooking becomes her way to cope with her sadness and unending tears and grief. She writes of concocting dishes that “you can sink into” and making “the kind of food you could crawl into and that required sleeping off. The kind you’d order on death row.”

While reading Zauner’s loving descriptions of her mother’s favorite American and Korean dishes, and while absorbing the snippets of conversations with and memories of her mother, it becomes apparent that Crying in H Mart: A Memoir is a daughter’s eulogy for her mother. The last quarter of the book is filled with melancholy and could be called anti-climactic, but it was clearly written primarily for the author herself. She wrote it as a personal catharsis, a historical document, and a journey of love.

Zauner composed the music for Psychopomp, Japanese Breakfast’s debut solo album, while her mother was losing her battle with cancer. Its lo-fi beats and poetic lyrics align perfectly with the wistful mood of her memoir. The two could even be enjoyed together, at the same time. The album cover features a riveting vintage photo of her young mother reaching her hand out to the viewer. When I saw this picture online, it crystallized the longing that Zauner captures in her memoir. She pines for her mother’s love throughout her life; she forever seeks the approval and the smile of the seeking woman on the album. I relate to that longing. My mother and I fought over many of my life choices and her communication often left me wanting. But when she made my favorite Vietnamese-French fusion food and fusses over my appearance and hair, I knew she was telling me, she loved me.
Partners

The FAOA Korea Chapter would like to thank the following organizations for their generous support:

The Korea-United States Alliance Foundation is an organization committed to promoting the ROK-U.S. Alliance and the contribution of the United States Forces Korea to security and peace on the Korean Peninsula. The Foundation exists to financially support the management and operations of the Korea Defense Veterans Association; to strengthen the ROK-U.S. Alliance through programs that facilitate education, discussion and research on the Alliance; and to promote the honor and welfare of both countries’ armed forces personnel and their families.

The Korea Defense Veterans Association’s mission is to enhance the ROK-U.S. Alliance by advocating for the Alliance and supporting the people who built and serve the Alliance. KDVA seeks to enhance, advocate for, and educate about the ROK-U.S. Alliance; recognize and support service members, government civilians, and their families who have or are serving in the ROK-U.S. Alliance; serve its members with professional networking, mentoring, volunteering, and researching opportunities; honor and support the veterans who defended South Korea during the Korean War.

The United States Embassy Association is a private, non-government, non-appropriated employee organization, established under the rules of the U.S. Department of State for the benefit of its members. It provides activities, facilities, programs, personal services, and lodging in order to bring a little bit of America and community spirit to the lives of employees assigned abroad.

The Center for Future Defense Technology and Entrepreneurship stands at the forefront of the global defense innovation ecosystem. As the only defense innovation hub in South Korea, we aim to advance the global defense innovation ecosystem through events, publications, strategic network partners, and in-house experts and advisors.

The Sejong Society is a non-partisan, and all-volunteer tax-exempt organization dedicated to informing, developing, and connecting young professionals interested and engaged in U.S.-Korea affairs. Our ultimate goal is to inspire the next generation, regardless of political and career affiliations, of Korea and Northeast Asia specialists.
Calendar of Events

August 2021

Wednesday 4th: Coast Guard Birthday (U.S.)
Sunday 8th: Tokyo Olympics Closing Ceremony
Sunday 15th: Independence Day (ROK) / Liberation Day (DPRK)
Sunday 15th-Friday 27th: Combined Command Post Training (CCPT) 21-2

September 2021

Monday 6th: Labor Day (U.S.)
Wednesday 8th-Friday 10th: Seoul Defense Dialogue
Tuesday 14th-Monday 30th: 76th UN General Assembly
Friday 17th: National POW/MIA Recognition Day (U.S.)
Saturday 18th: Air Force Birthday (U.S.)
Monday 20th-Tuesday 22nd: Chuseok (ROK)

October 2021

Friday 1st: Armed forces Day (ROK)
Sunday 3rd: National Foundation Day (ROK)
Saturday 9th: Hangul Proclamation Day (ROK)
Wednesday 13th: Navy Birthday (U.S.)
TBD: FAO Conference 21-2

Background image: A member of the ROK Air Force’s High-Altitude Low-Opening Parachute Team rehearses for the 2019 Air Power Day at Osan Air Base, ROK. Credit: Greg Nash/DVIDS
Distinguished Members

Sheena Chestnut Greitens

Sheena Chestnut Greitens is an Associate Professor at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin. From 2015-20, she was an assistant professor of political science at the University of Missouri and founding co-director of MU’s Institute for Korean Studies. Her work focuses on East Asia, authoritarian politics, and American national security. She holds a doctorate from Harvard University; an M.Phil from Oxford University, where she studied as a Marshall Scholar; and a bachelor’s from Stanford University.

Derek Grossman

Derek Grossman is a senior defense analyst at RAND focused on a range of national security policy and Indo-Pacific security issues. He served over a decade in the Intelligence Community, where he served as the daily intelligence briefer to the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the assistant secretary of defense for Asian & Pacific Security Affairs. He holds an M.A. from Georgetown University in U.S. National Security Policy and a B.A. from the University of Michigan in Political Science and Asian studies.

Kongdan “Katy” Oh Hassig

Kongdan “Katy” Oh Hassig is a Senior Asia Specialist at the Institute for Defense Analyses. She was formerly a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution and a member of the Political Science Department of the RAND Corporation. Dr. Hassig is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, an elected member of the Board of Directors of the United States Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, and a member of the Board of Directors for Korea Economic Institute of America. She is the co-founder and former co-director of The Korea Club of Washington, D.C.

Soo Kim

Soo Kim is a policy analyst at the RAND Corporation and an adjunct instructor at American University. Her research interests include the Korean Peninsula, Russia, Indo-Pacific strategy, near-peer competition, decision making, propaganda, and the intelligence community. She served as an analyst in the Central Intelligence Agency and also worked at the Department of Homeland Security. Kim earned a B.A. in French from Yale University and an M.A. in International Relations/Strategic Studies at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.

Sung Hyun “Andrew” Kim

Sung Hyun “Andrew” Kim is a Non-Resident Fellow at Harvard’s Kennedy School. Prior to this, he was a visiting scholar at Stanford University. Mr. Kim retired from the Central Intelligence Agency after 28 years of service and was the first Assistant Director of the CIA, Korea Mission Center. As the Chief of CIA Station in three major East Asian cities, Mr. Kim managed the collection, analysis, production, and distribution of information that directly affected national security. He is a recipient of the CIA Director’s Award and the Presidential Rank Award.
Heino Klinck

Heino Klinck is a former U.S. Army China FAO who last served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia. His experience includes 2+ decades abroad; leading strategy efforts in a Fortune 100 company; senior political-military roles in the Pentagon; analytical and operational responsibilities in the intelligence community; and diplomatic postings in Europe and Asia. Mr. Klinck has a B.A. and M.A. in International Relations from Boston University; an MBA from the University of London; an M.S. in Global Strategy and Security from the University of Rome; and he was awarded a Fellowship by Stanford University’s Asia-Pacific Research Center.

Mark William Lippert

The Honorable Mark William Lippert has a distinguished career in the United States government that spanned approximately two decades. From 2014-2017, he served as the U.S. ambassador and plenipotentiary to the Republic of Korea. He previously held positions in the Department of Defense, including as chief of staff to Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel and as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs. He graduated from Stanford University with a B.A. in Political Science and holds an M.A. in International Policy Studies from the same institution.

Curtis "Mike" Scaparrotti

General (Retired) Curtis "Mike" Scaparrotti led a distinguished, 41-year career in the U.S. Army, and most recently served as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and Commander of U.S. European Command. Prior to this, he served as the Commander of U.S. Forces Korea/United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command from 2013 to 2016. GEN(R) Scaparrotti graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1978, and his education includes the Command and General Staff College, the U.S. Army War College, and a Master’s degree in Administrative Education from the University of South Carolina.

Suzanne Vares-Lum

Major General (Retired) Suzanne Vars-Lum served 34 years in the U.S. Army. She is an influential executive with leadership and planning experience spanning the Indo-Pacific region, violent extremist organizations, and natural disasters. She most recently served for five years as one of the most senior leaders in U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and now serves as a strategic consultant and advisor. Vares-Lum received a B.A. in Journalism and an M.Ed. in Teaching from the University of Hawaii at Manoa, and a Master’s degree in Strategid Studies from the U.S. Army War College.

Major General Mark Gillette, Honorary Member

Mark Gillette is a U.S. Army major general and the Senior Army Foreign Area Officer. He has extensive experience from various political-military assignments throughout Asia. MG Gillette holds a Bachelor of Science degree from the U.S. Military Academy, a Master of Social Science from Syracuse University, and a Master of Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College. He is currently assigned as the U.S. Senior Defense Official and Defense Attaché in Cairo, Egypt.

MG Gillette advised and supported the initiatives of the co-founders of the FAOA Korea Chapter—both leading up to the organization’s establishment and during its formative period. He continues to play an active role in the events and activities of the FAOA Korea Chapter today and is a key advocate for the development of its membership. In recognition of his significant contribution toward accomplishing the mission of the FAOA Korea Chapter, MG Gillette was presented Honorary Membership on July 23, 2020.
Board Members

Wei C. Chou, President

Wei C. Chou is a U.S. Army Northeast Asia FAO. He holds a Bachelors of Science degree from the United States Military Academy and a Master of Arts degree from the University of Hawaii as an East-West Fellow. After eight years as an airborne and mechanized infantryman, Wei served across a range of FAO capacities in Hawaii, Japan, and the Republic of Korea.

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Chris Hobgood, Vice President

Chris Hobgood is a U.S. Army Northeast Asia FAO. He holds a Bachelor of Science degree from Lander University; a Master of Science degree from Webster University; and a Master of Arts degree from Middlebury Institute of International Studies. Chris has over 22 years of service and worked in a variety of FAO assignments by advising senior military and civilian leaders with regional expertise on the Indo Pacific region as a Security Cooperation officer, a political-military officer, and Senior Defense Official / Defense Attaché.

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Raphael Sadowitz, Treasurer

Raphael Sadowitz is an active-duty Lieutenant Commander in the U.S. Coast Guard currently serving as the Coast Guard Liaison at the U.S. Embassy Seoul. He holds a Bachelor of Science degree from the U.S. Coast Guard Academy and a Master of Science degree from Boise State University.

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Josh Duran, Secretary

Josh "Duran" Duran is an active-duty Lieutenant Commander in the U.S. Navy. He holds a Bachelor of Science degree from the U.S. Naval Academy. After serving eight years as a Naval Intelligence Officer, he has served two additional tours in the Republic of Korea as an FAO.

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Adrian Romero, Chief of Public Relations

Adrian Romero is an active duty Warrant Officer in the U.S. Army. He holds an A.A. degree in Applied Science and is currently pursuing an M.B.A. He has over ten years of work experience in the Indo-Pacific region.

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Staff Members

Editor in Chief
Hedd Thomas is a writer and editor. He holds a B.A. from Newcastle University, England and an M.A. from Bangor University, Wales. He has edited publications in Belgium, the United Kingdom, and the Republic of Korea. He has written for numerous newspapers, online publications, and magazines.

Assistant Editor
Emily Stamp is an English instructor. She holds an undergraduate M.A. from the University of St. Andrews, Scotland and an M.A. in International Conflict Studies from King’s College London, England.

Assistant Editor
Aa-young Kang is a journalist with an interest in technology and culture. She has published in a number of media outlets including WIRED, The Korea Times, and SCMP. She holds a Bachelor of Journalism from Dongguk University.

Assistant Editor
Apoorva Jayakumar is a Masters student pursuing a Global Economy and Strategy major at Yonsei Graduate School of International Studies. She enjoys reading and writing about Indo-Pacific strategy & policy.

Marketing Coordinator
YoonJeong Choi is a student pursuing an AB-DTA/MRP degree at Bellevue College in Washington State. Her interests include e-commerce and fashion.

Senior Researcher
Amos Oh is a U.S. Army Strategist with extensive policy and planning experience. He is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy and also earned an M.P.A. from the Harvard Kennedy School. He is currently pursuing a Ph.D. in Political Science and International Relations at the University of Southern California.

Associate Researcher
Michael Brodka is an intelligence professional specializing in geopolitical affairs. He holds an M.P.S. degree from George Washington University and is currently pursuing an M.P.S. degree at Georgetown University.

Associate Researcher
Sean McCauley is an instructor based in South Korea. He is a political science graduate of the University of Alberta with a special focus on international relations; and he has extensive background in political advocacy in Canada.

Graphics Designer & Social Media Assistant
Sara La Cagnina is a Communications Coordinator who graduated with an M.A. in International Tourism from the Università Della Svizzera Italiana. She has extensive experience with digital communication and event coordination.

Graphics Designer & Social Media Assistant
Sun Reong Ok is a student pursuing a B.S. in Foreign Affairs at Silliman University, the Philippines. She grew up in the Philippines, and her interests include human rights and diplomacy.
About the Korea Chapter

The FAOA Korea Chapter was founded in July 2020 in accordance with Article VII of the FAOA Charter. It is a 501(c)19 non-profit organization, consisting primarily of current and former Foreign Area Officers and International Affairs Specialists who advance the Republic of Korea-United States (ROK-U.S.) Alliance through events and activities that promote mentorship, education, research, and connection.

Our Mission

To develop and inspire leaders engaged in the advancement of the ROK-U.S. Alliance.

Our Core Values

- Commitment to Leader Development
- Pursuit of Inspiration

Lines of Effort

Mentor

Mentor leaders engaged in advancing the ROK-U.S. Alliance and help them grow as individuals and professionals in their respective careers.

Educate

Educate leaders on Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME) actions and their Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, and Infrastructure (PMESII) effects as they pertain to the ROK-U.S. Alliance.

Research

Enable, support, and encourage leaders to conduct research on topics relevant to the ROK-U.S. Alliance and provide opportunities to publish in peer-reviewed journals and publications.

Connect

Connect leaders in the military engaged in advancing the ROK-U.S. Alliance with leaders of industry, government, business, and think tanks to expand social and professional networks and facilitate the exchange of information.
CALL FOR ARTICLES

Contribute to the journal of the FAOA Korea Chapter, *The Joint Communiqué*, for the 4th quarter of 2021.

Deadline for submissions: Monday, September 20, 2021
Contact: editor.faoakc@gmail.com