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The views expressed are those of the authors, not of the FAOA, the Department of Defense, or the Armed services or any DoD agency, and are intended to advance the FAO and defense international affairs profession through academic dialog.
LETTER from the EDITOR

Fellow Foreign Affairs Professionals at Home and Abroad,

I hope you are well! In this issue we are launching a new type of content - “leader profiles”. The profiles are transcribed interviews with leaders from government, military, the private sector, nonprofits and academia. This edition’s interview is with Julian Setian, CEO of SOSi and goes into some of the backstory of how SOSi came to be what it is today. I think you will find it interesting, especially when Julian shares his advice to those transitioning out of the military. In our next edition you will see an interview with General Hayden as well as a book review of his book. If you know of a leader that could provide valuable insight to our community, I invite you to conduct an interview and submit the transcript (with approval from the interviewee) to editor@faoa.org. This can be an efficient way to promote ongoing programs and initiatives across our specialty. Leader profiles will be peer reviewed for relevance to upcoming issues, but the content of the interview will not be altered if the interview is approved to publish.

As a reminder, the FAOA Journal is a peer reviewed journal. Giving and receiving criticism well in the public sphere is a test of our diplomatic ability as a professional community. The peer review process is designed to maintain a professional standard of writing and content, and create a construct for civil discourse. Our all-volunteer editorial board consists of FAOs and foreign affairs practitioners who work together to provide feedback to authors. Book reviews, essays, research papers, and letters from the field generally receive review from four or five members of the editorial board; and authors receive direct feedback from the Content Editor, John Haseman before submission are approved to print.

There are a few exceptions. Papers that have won awards through PME institutions, or been published previously in scholarly journals, may be expedited through the peer review process. Info papers from institutions, proponents, or the BOG do not receive peer review, but are edited for accuracy and format by the editor in chief. Letters to the editor are reviewed by the content editor and editor in chief, but not the editorial board. Letters that are written in response to previously published articles provide FAOA the opportunity for ongoing dialogue on a topic. Our LinkedIn group also provides a forum for public discussion of journal content.

Our peer review process is the result of many years of working with an all-volunteer staff while trying to continually raise the bar. We hope that you will suggest ways to improve the process, and that you will also continue to support the community by submitting articles, interviews, letters and more. Perhaps you will even consider joining the editorial board.

Sincerely,
Graham
Editor’s Note: Colonel Kruse won the FAO Association Writing Award at the Joint Forces Staff College with this thesis. In the interest of space we publish this version without research notes. To see the full thesis with all research materials, go to www.faoa.org. We are pleased to bring you this outstanding scholarship.

Disclaimer: The contents of this submission reflect my original view are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

Introduction

The National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) stems from a 1992 Department of Defense (DOD) desire to create and expand military security cooperation efforts in Eastern European countries. Sensitive to Russian concerns that U.S. active duty military cooperation activities would appear threatening, the DOD established the National Guard State Partnership for Peace program. Starting in the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, this program paired U.S. National Guard soldiers and airmen with their partner countries’ militaries creating an environment to build partner capacity, support military reform and professionalization efforts, and develop and facilitate security relationships. Success in the Baltic States led to an expansion of partnerships across Europe, creating today’s environment of 22 active SPPs stretching across Eastern Europe.

With the dismantling of the Soviet government in 1989, the U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military capability in Europe has steadily decreased. At the height of the Cold War the U.S. Army stationed over 300,000 soldiers in Europe, today it maintains a force of 30,000. Post 9/11, NATO operations in Afghanistan and U.S. operations in Iraq forced the U.S. and its NATO partners to focus on conflict outside of Europe, prioritizing defense spending on stability operations in the Middle East. NATO viewed the former Soviet satellite countries as fertile ground to expand the NATO membership, encouraging democracy and pro-western governments. NATO saw Russia as a potential partner in European security, and if not a real partner, a weak government without the resources to contest NATO expansion. However, the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014 and active support of the Ukrainian separatist movement, signaled to the world that Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Russian state were no longer interested being an active partner in European affairs and global security.

NATO and U.S. European Command (EUCOM) quickly moved to reassure the other Eastern European nations. NATO expanded multinational exercises; the U.S. increased rotational units and infrastructure reinvestments to build capacity to deter Russian aggressiveness. As the U.S. government expands its efforts to reassure our European allies, it must take advantage of every opportunity to build relationships and strengthen the resolve of our European partners, and the SPP can help do that. The U.S. Government must expand the National Guard State Partnership Program as part of its strategy to increase security assurance and deterrence in Europe -- particularly in Eastern Europe and the Baltics.

For almost twenty-five years, the NG SPP has fostered democratic movements in the former Soviet Bloc countries. Many of these countries credit the SPP as an integral part of preparing them for entry into the NATO alliance and the European Union. The SPP provided a template of how citizen soldiers could provide a common
defense for a democratic form of government without having to support a standing army. Experts contend that the best method to defeat or deter a “hybrid threat” as posed by the Russians in the Ukraine is a strong central government that is responsive to its citizens. The SPP has demonstrated the ability to bring all elements of DIME (diplomatic, information, military, and economic) from partnered U.S. states to leverage a whole of government (WOG) response to building responsive governance. EUCOM commander General Breedlove describes the SPP as one of his premiere tools representing 23-24% of all the engagements that he has in Europe. For a small investment, the Secretary of Defense has fielded a small footprint security cooperation effort that most Ambassadors credit with being their number one security cooperation tool to professionalize their host nation defense and emergency management forces.

Important expansions of this program include legislative action creating a permanent authorization for the program making it a program of record with a dedicated central transfer account that will allow the U.S. Congress to invest into this small footprint deterrence effort. Creating clear legal authority will allow Geographical Combatant Commanders (GCCs) to rely on the program as part of their theater strategy enabling deliberate planning to incorporate the program into theater intermediate military objectives. Identifying the ERI as one of the named operations supported by mobilization orders provides the increased presence and boots on the ground that EUCOM needs. Authorizing greater participation of civilian expertise from partnered state government and academia allows the program to attain the whole of government, soft power approach that strengthens host nation governments. Expanding the NG SPP needs to be an integral part of the U.S. Government strategy in Europe.

Background

As the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1989 and 1991, leaders in the U.S. Government sought ways to decrease instability and to foster fledgling democratic governments in the former Soviet countries. One way identified was to promote military-to-military engagements in the newly independent states in Central and Eastern Europe. Goals for these engagements included supporting subordination of the military to civilian control, fostering respect for human rights and creating defensive oriented military forces. Most of these nations had armies based on the Soviet model built to counter and defeat NATO military threats. In 1992, EUCOM established a Joint Contact
Team (JCT) of Special Forces to begin these engagements. As the JCT began to engage Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, it became evident that leaders of those nations were concerned that an active U.S. military presence would antagonize their Russian neighbor. The Baltic country governments also desired to establish a reserve-centric defense establishment, which the U.S. National Guard and Reserve would serve as an excellent model.

The State Partnership Program began in 1993, in direct response to the Baltic countries’ request. The 1993 National Security Strategy directed the Department of Defense to take an active role in strengthening nations, fostering prosperity and enhancing security. In the spring of 1993, NGB proposed the National Guards of Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Maryland as state partners to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, over time creating a national level program. The SPP leverages leadership and troop exchanges conducting training exercises fostering deep ties to the militaries of 22 European nations and 69 countries globally.

As a security cooperation program, the SPP endeavors to align the goals of both the U.S. State Department and DOD in the partnered country. National Guard leaders work with host nation militaries to develop exercises and exchanges that fit into the GCC campaign plans intermediate military objectives. The Secretary of State is required to concur with any proposed partnership, while the Chief of Mission (Ambassador) must approve any activities before execution. The strategic goal of the SPP is to create long-term relationships that contribute to global security. The program supports two integrated lines of effort within the Chief National Guard Bureau’s campaign plan: first to broaden the professional development of U.S. Army and Air National Guard members, while simultaneously supporting the Geographical Combatant Commander’s strategic security cooperation goals. This program utilizes a broad range of security cooperation activities: emergency management, disaster response, public health, critical infrastructure protection, cyber defense, natural resource protection, leader development, and peacekeeping operations.

These examples, while not a complete list, demonstrate the diversity of the SPP allowing participants to align the National Guard capabilities to the priorities of the GCC and the U.S. Chief of Mission. The most important aspect of the program is the enduring and long-term relationships developed between leaders in the program, and the interagency and international cooperation it fosters. These activities directly contribute to an improved security environment for the GCC while increasing cooperation, interoperability, and mutual understanding between partners at all levels. The program also provides a stabilizing influence as citizen soldiers demonstrate a commitment to civilian control of the military not often found in the traditions of the partnered country. An additional program capability is to bring civilians from U.S. government and academia to partnered nations to facilitate governmental and educational training to enhance support to civilian society.

The SPP is a Joint program managed under the Secretary of Defense by the Under Secretary for Policy. Congress appropriates funding to the OSD to support the SPP and OSD allocates it to the Chief of the National Guard Bureau for execution. GCCs commonly provide funding for portions of the program activities, and overall the program is relatively small. In 2011, OSD provided $6.1 million to NGB, while GCC provided an additional $7.1 million for a total program expenditure of $13.2 million supporting over 700 partnership events in 65 countries. In 2014, $10.3 million funded over 600 SPP events, 174 of these engagements occurred in EUCOM at total cost of $2.7 million.

Since the program’s inception in 1993, there has been an ongoing evaluation to assess attainment of program goals. The 2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) required the Government Accounting Office (GAO) to submit a report to Congress studying the following areas: (1) the extent that the SPP was meeting stated program goals and objectives, (2) the types and frequency of activities and funding levels of the program, and (3) challenges DOD faced in implementing the program.

The 2014 Report to Congress provided analysis and recommendations for the program. The GAO found that the program lacked centralized goals, objectives, and metrics to measure success. It recommended that the Chief of National Guard Bureau in conjunction with GCC and embassy teams to create a comprehensive oversight framework for each partnership. The report identified that documentation supporting the SPP was inconsistent from one partnership to the next, and its lack of completeness calling into question the ability to audit activities. Addressing this finding the GAO recommended Congress direct the program administrator, the Under Secretary of Defense-Policy; develop guidance that included agreed upon terms and references supporting a global database of activities. Finally, Congress asked the auditors to identify any challenges DOD faced in implementing the program, recommending that DOD provide clear guidance on how the funding could support civilians participating in the program and developing annual training for program coordinators on the use of funds associated with the SPP.

Utilizing Title 32 National Guard soldiers poses some challenges; program participation is a temporary duty, not a deployment, and because the SPP does not fall under a named operation, it is not subject to any of the established mobilization authorities. As temporary duty, typical missions are three to five National Guard personnel for five to fourteen days. Program activities fall under four general definitions: Senior Leader Engagement, Subject Matter Expert Exchange, Conference or
Workshop attendance, and Exercise participation. National Guard participants mentor, advise, and share best practices with their partners within the program. Because of the temporary nature of the program, EUCOM does not consider it a presence effort, however, the EUCOM benefits from the stability that the program develops from the relationships built over decades, and the exposure to positive influences of how government and the military are subordinate and supportive to society.

Currently, EUCOM has 22 nations partnered with U.S. National Guard states. All of these partnerships focus on the former Soviet Bloc countries, many sharing borders with Russia, stretching from Estonia in the north, through Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, to Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan in the south.

**European Flashpoint**

On December 25, 1991, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev resigned as the eighth and last leader of the Soviet Union, ending the Cold War and creating a European environment allowing the former Warsaw Pact and Soviet Republics to gain independence. With eleven partnerships formed in 1993, the SPP quickly became an enabler to help countries gain NATO membership with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic becoming the first former Soviet satellites to join the NATO alliance in 1999. The year of 2004 ushered in an additional seven new members (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) into NATO membership. By 2008, both the Ukraine and Georgia were actively seeking a path to membership. Due to Russian protests, NATO voted to temporarily deny membership to both Georgia and Ukraine during the April 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest. In August of 2008, Russia moved to stop the NATO membership drive by supporting a separatist rebellion in Ossetia region of Georgia. After a four-day Russian invasion that pushed the Georgian forces out of the region, it became clear that NATO was unable to support Georgia and that Russia viewed NATO membership as a direct threat.

In 2010, Ukraine elected Viktor Yanukovych as president. He immediately started aligning Ukraine with the Russian interests. This realignment spurred popular protests in 2013, leading to a general uprising in 2014, Yanukovych fleeing Ukraine, and the government reforming under leadership seeking greater attachment with Europe. The large ethnic-Russian population in eastern Ukraine initiated a separatist movement with support from Russia. March of 2014, Russia invaded and annexed the peninsula of Crimea from Ukraine, laying claim to the majority of the Ukrainian Navy. Overall, this situation appeared similar to the Georgian experience with Russia ushering in a revised form of “hybrid” war. Fostering conflict in support of a fringe element, while denying direct involvement, Russia strategically sowed distrust with the European allies, while calling into question their ability, and desire to respond to Russian aggression. While currently under a shaky cease-fire agreement, eastern Ukraine remains a violent war zone.

With the start of the separatist effort in Ukraine in 2013, EUCOM moved quickly to reassure allies in the region, by deploying troops to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, all containing large ethnic Russian minorities. EUCOM Commander General Phillip Breedlove and his subordinate U.S. Army Europe Commander (USAREUR) LTG Ben Hodges crisscrossed the region over the last three years supporting joint exercises and reassuring allies that the weight of the U.S. military was behind the NATO deterrence effort. Meanwhile, NATO defense ministers pushed for greater coordination and increases in defense spending for member nations, culminating in the formation of the first NATO Multinational Division Southeast headquartered in Bucharest, Romania in Dec 2015.

Across the region, NATO and USAREUR conducted multinational exercises like Atlantic Resolve and Anaconda in Poland, Saber Strike in the Baltics, Rapid Trident in Ukraine and Saber Guardian in Romania. These presence activities provided reassurance to the populations and governments that NATO and the U.S. remain capable and willing to defend their national interests, all in an effort to make the 30,000 permanently stationed soldiers look like 300,000. Meanwhile, the U.S. government created the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) fund to provide the required resources for this expanded activity. Congress appropriated $1.0 billion in 2015, provided an additional $800 million in 2016 and appropriated $3.4 billion in FY17. The NGB SPP received specific attention in all these appropriations as well with $24.3 million earmarked for the SPP in the FY16 allocation, and $39.3 million in the FY17 budget. Throughout this period it was the relationships formed by the NGB SPP that LTG Hodges credits with “smoothing the path”, creating the environment that allowed the active deployment of forces into
the region. LTG Hodges credited a “shared understanding between America and the allies that was already present in the region,” stating the greatest benefit of the SPP was that trust was already established. LTG Hodges likes to use the quote “you can’t surge trust” when he describes the SPP.

The NGB SPP has risen to meet the EUCOM call for forces as well. EUCOM, as the GCC, oversees the SPP activities in Europe, with state leadership taking its direction from EUCOM commander. General Breedlove’s guidance to Adjutant Generals leading SPP states, during the current difficulties, was to continue to do what they have been doing but to do it more often as the U.S. attempts to maintain a “persistent presence” in all countries in the region. The NGB SPP allows leadership to keep presence across the geographically large region, with a relatively small force presence.

SPP Case Study: Minnesota’s Partnership with Croatia

State Partnerships are whole of government (WOG) engagements that touch all aspects of national power. Diplomatic, informational, military, and economic ties are developed and strengthened within a successful SPP partnership; Minnesota’s partnership with Croatia demonstrates this success. Minnesota’s participation in the SPP, celebrating its 20-year anniversary with Croatia in 2016, is a compelling case study that highlights the value of the program and its ability to build relationships that are contributing to regional resilience and deterring Russian aggression. Good governance is the cornerstone to deter the hybrid threat posed by Russian aggression, and the SPP provides some of the best examples possible of good governance.

Minnesota and Croatia have been state partners since 1996, participating in more than one-hundred bilateral military and civilian engagements. The program has expanded from mil to mil exchanges, creating partnerships that now include the efforts of many organizations and individuals including private firms, civic groups, and non-profit agencies. Croatian military leaders credit the SPP with helping their country gain membership to North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 2009 and the European Union in 2013.

The diplomatic relationships built between the Minnesota National Guard (MNNG) and Croatian leaders are the cornerstones of the partnership. MNNG Adjutant General, MG Richard Nash spends countless hours cultivating professional and personal relationships with senior leaders across Croatia. Relationships with the Croatian President, Minister of Defense, and Chief of General Staff provide direct connectivity to decision makers in the Croatian military. This connectivity is of paramount importance to the EUCOM commander as he essentially has a two-star general officer liaison to the Croatian government, as well as similar relationships in the other 21 SPP partnerships in Europe. The MNNG has leveraged state WOG assets to expand beyond military-diplomatic engagements to state government level engagements with the Minnesota Governor, Lt Governor, and Secretary of State meeting with the Croatian President, Prime Minister, and Minister of Defense in multiple meetings across the years of the partnership. Finally, academic exchanges are the latest level of relationship building with professors from the University of Minnesota guest instructing at the Croatian University in Split, Croatia.

State Partnership programs are low cost- high return, security cooperation activities, playing a critical role in deterrence efforts of allied partners. The MNNG/ Croatian Cyber Protection Partnership provides an excellent example of how small footprint deterrence influences the information portion of DIME. In June of 2012, the MNNG sent its first team of computer network defense (CND) specialists to work with Croatian computer network personnel. This initial assessment trip laid the groundwork for a series of workshops that have matured over the last four years to become the Summer Cyber School. The CND oriented course expanded to include a technical track, a management track and a forensic track, providing training to Croatian Army, Navy, Air Force, Police and National Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) personnel. In 2015, professors from the University of Minnesota joined the MNNG instructors to assist professors from the University of Zagreb in providing graduate-level instruction in risk management, effective communication, mobile device tracking and vulnerabilities, and network penetration. This level of sophisticated training would not be possible without the civilian background and certifications that the MNNG citizen-soldiers bring to the partnership.

Professionalizing and expanding the capacity of partnered militaries remains the focus of the SPP effort in the military portion of DIME. Another vignette demonstrating the small footprint- high return of the SPP is the MNNG’s efforts to assist the Croatian military in building a master plan for its Slunj training center, a former Yugoslavian Army base in the heart of Croatia. In August of 2015, Croatian Chief of Defense General Drago Lovic asked the MNNG to assist in building a long-range construction plan for the Slunj training center. General Lovric and staff visited the MNNG’s Camp Ripley Training Center gaining a perspective on the design and operation of U.S. military bases. In April 2016, MNNG Garrison Commander COL Scott St. Sauver led a team with extensive experience in installation and training management to Croatia to walk the ground and use their expertise and master planning tools to assist the Croatians in planning multiple ranges and urban training venues. COL St. Sauver combined his team of Camp Ripley subject matter experts with experts from the Colorado Air National Guard Airburst Range, F-16 pilots from the Air Force and the Minnesota Air National Guard and the
Joint Tactical Air Controllers from the Croatian Military. This collaboration enabled the NATO certification of the current design and future expansion of the Slunj Air to Ground Gunnery Range as a NATO capable bombing range. The team also validated the feasibility for eight ranges and the base document for a development plan that would guide the Croatians to 2024. The Croatians gained in-depth knowledge of how the U.S. Joint Force designs training areas and ranges providing them greater interoperability and capacity as they provide NATO an expanded training capability in the region.

Finally, the economic portion of DIME becomes the future of the SPP with a deliberate effort by the MNNG to take the relationships created between the Croatian Government and Minnesota State Government entities and facilitate trade relations discussions between MN and Croatian international and domestic business leaders. In July 2016, these efforts proved successful when St Paul Minnesota business leaders joined the MNNG Adjutant General in Croatia in July 2016 to observe the 20th anniversary of the MNNG/ Croatian SPP.

Partner nation interoperability and capacity building remain the heart of the SPP. Challenging this success are aspects of the program that must expand to meet the deterrence needs in Europe.

**Expansion of the State Partnership Program.**

The U.S. Government must expand the National Guard State Partnership program as part of its strategy to increase security assurance and deterrence in Europe. This expansion must incorporate legislative, policy, and planning changes to synchronize and focus the efforts of the 22 partnered nations. Legislatively Congress must permanently authorize the program, making it a DOD program of record and providing a centralized line of accounting for the Secretary of Defense. Congress needs to create a named operation for its European activities; creating a named operation to support the European Reassurance Initiative funding creates an entirely new avenue for National Guard participation.

U.S. Government Policy adjustments must see expanded involvement of the Department of State, requiring Chiefs of Mission to assist in defining the military to civilian operations. As the two-star liaisons for the EUCOM, the 22 State Adjutant Generals partnered in Europe must be included in the development of DOD and State Department policies and directives. Finally, the Secretary of Defense must task GCCs with conducting deliberate planning to identify intermediate military objectives that the SPP will be the means to support. GCCs must identify specific ways to use the SPP for each partnered nation so that the program objectives gain synergy with the theater campaign plan rather than the individual whims of the supporting adjutant general and partnered Chiefs of Defense. Change starts with legislative action.

**Legislative**

Congress must recognize the SPP as a DOD program of record. This recognition will create a particular line of accounting in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) allowing the program to receive Program Object Memorandum (POM) budgeting. Permanently authorizing the program allows the Secretary of Defense to effectively budget for execution. Permanent authorization removes program uncertainty and the requirement for Congress to approve it as a temporary program every five years. As a Joint program under the Secretary of Defense, permanent authorization creates a budget line item and a dedicated central transfer account to account for SPP funding, answering the criticism from the 2014 GAO report that program auditability was in question.

Congress can also expand the versatility of the program by creating a named operation to support the funding in the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI). Although originally intended to be a one-time push of funding to reassure NATO allies in 2015, the threat to the region that Russia continues to display created a need for subsequent ERI funding commitments in 2016 and 2017. The reality is that Russia will continue to create outside threats to foster interior solidarity; the current uncertainty created by Russian aggressiveness will not diminish as long as perceived vulnerabilities exist.

The Service Secretaries and the EUCOM commander must utilize 12304b authority to mobilize National Guard soldiers in support of the SPP program, allowing the NG to be operational for longer than 29 days. National Guard units can be involuntarily mobilized under five different mobilization authorities, all based on who conducts the mobilization (Congress-12301a, President-12302 or 12304, Secretary of Defense 12304a and Service Secretaries-12304b). Service Secretaries can mobilize up to 60,000 National Guard soldiers for 365 days for pre-planned missions in support of a GCC. Incorporating the SPP into EUCOM’s theater campaign plan, and actively using this authority allows for longer deployments (90-180 days) in support of program activities, thus reinforcing the Geographical Combatant Commanders’ desire to expand the “persistent military presence” across Europe. Creating permanent legal authorities for the program will drive policy changes that will make the program more useful.

**Policy**

In the realm of policy adjustments, the U.S. State Department and its Ambassadors in Europe must be active participants in defining the military to civilian operations. Chiefs of Mission must describe the types of program support required for their particular Mission Support Plan and how the SPP could support objectives within the plan. As the SPP expands beyond its whole of government approach, the State Department must be an active participant in defining the role of business leaders.
and academics from partnered states. The U.S. State and Defense departments must consult the State government leadership of the 22 SPP partners as they define program activities in policies, instructions, and directives. These leaders often have decades of experience coordinating with their SPP partner, as well as complete understanding of the second and third order effects faced with National Guard operations. To facilitate this policy coordination, Congress must require the State Department with surveying its Chiefs of Mission on their support requirements. Leaders must apply this study to drive program planning.

Planning

The final and most important recommendation is to fix planning within the program. Holistically the SPP lacks deliberate planning at the theater level. While component commanders and Chiefs of Mission are required to approve planned partner training, National Guard state leadership and their partnered Chiefs of Defense develop this training in a vacuum without direct higher-level guidance. Commanders use their judgment to determine if training requests from partnered nations fit into the GCC intermediate military objectives. The SPP Strategic planning must start at the Secretary of Defense level with guidance to GCCs to develop specific tasks inside of their intermediate military objectives for the SPP to support. In the Minnesota SPP Vignette, the MNNG leadership may determine that helping expand the military facilities in Croatia supports EUCOM’s campaign plan, while EUCOM leadership may wish to apply those resources in another location or capacity. To support this planning, the Chief of National Guard Bureau must define the core capabilities of the SPP.

About the author

Colonel Lowell Edward Kruse is currently serving as the commander of the 347th Regional Support Group, Brooklyn Park, Minnesota. Commissioned in 1989 into the U.S. Army from South Dakota State University ROTC, Colonel Kruse earned a BS in Dairy Science Production from South Dakota State University and a Masters in Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College in 2014. Prior to his current command, COL Kruse served as the G4 for the Minnesota Army National Guard and commanded the 1/151 Field Artillery Battalion.
The Russian Way of War: Implications for the U.S. Army

By Colonel Stephanie R. Ahern, U.S. Army

Editor’s Note: Colonel Ahern’s thesis won the FAO Association writing award at the U.S. Army War College. In the interest of space, we publish the text of the thesis without the author’s extensive research notes. To see the full thesis with all research materials, see www.faoa.org. The Journal is pleased to bring you this outstanding scholarship.

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The Russian Way of War: Implications for the U.S. Army

In Crimea, Donbass, Aleppo, and over the English Channel, Russia is using its still-modernizing military to (re)gain territory, secure geopolitical access and influence, convey geopolitical strength domestically and internationally, and test the political resolve of others. Many of these actions and objectives are counter to the interests of the United States or its allies. While national security experts rightly debate Russian motivations and ways to incentivize more responsible Russian behavior, the U.S. Army must scrutinize how competing powers like Russia operationally and tactically approach warfighting to be prepared for whatever strategic challenges await.

Russia’s military has had battlefield successes in Ukraine using what many call the “New Generation Warfare” or “Gerasimov’s doctrine.” Using a variety of military and militarized (e.g., intelligence, cyber, local militias, etc.) national security tools, Russia seized a neighbor’s terrain almost bloodlessly and then initiated a pro-Russian insurgency on foreign soil. Once “gray zone” tactics met resistance, conventional Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (hereafter, Armed Forces) engaged using advanced, lethal technology and a more agile force structure. Many question if Russia’s current practices are new, if General of the Army and Chief of the General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, was describing Russia’s military doctrine, or if the Russian military has been merely reviving its conventional military in line with its “historical significance of military strength.” And yet, Russia has proven proficient at using massed artillery, layered sensors, electronic warfare, offensive cyber operations, and sniper units to achieve its objectives. However, as capable as Russia’s conventional and spetsnaz forces have been in Ukraine, the U.S. Army cannot also presume the Russian military would fight in the same manner against a technologically-advanced state.

To be able to deter, and defeat if needed, the Russian military, the U.S. Army must understand how Russians approach warfare – including how they man, train, equip, and organize their military – in addition to the Armed Forces’ ongoing combat operations. Recent publications provide excellent tactical and operational analyses of the Russian military, including the Foreign Military Studies Office’s (FMSO) 2017 report on The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces (hereafter, RWW). In particular, RWW identifies important details on the Armed Forces’ composition, structure, way of fighting, and modernization plans, stemming in part from Russia’s real and perceived threats. The RWW also describes major reforms Russia began two months after it invaded Georgia in 2008.

By any standard, the “New Look” reforms have been extensive and impressive. Expecting $700 billion in funding by 2020, the Armed Forces have rapidly advanced their conventional and nuclear capabilities, significantly enhancing their equipment’s lethality, survivability, navigation, steering, communications, and comfort. Their more agile and streamlined force structure facilitates combat readiness, rapid deployments, and sustainment. An intensified “snap inspections” and training regimen has notably improved readiness. These reforms also enabled Russia to reduce its bloated officer corps, eliminate skeletal units, and consolidate organizations in ways harder for its military officers to oppose. In preparing for future warfare, the U.S. Army should also consider closely the challenges and opportunities resulting from these reforms.

This paper analyzes the strategic implications of Russia’s way of war and its recent military reforms within three sections. First, the paper builds on tactical and operational analyses of how the Armed Forces approach war against a competing power to outline seven strategic insights and their implications for the U.S. Army. Second,
the paper presents key alternative implications for the U.S. Army from the literature. It concludes with five thematic recommendations the U.S. Army should consider for future military challenges posed by a competing power such as Russia. This paper aims to advance U.S. Army thinking, deliberately leaving to others the political implications of these issues, predictions of where and for what the U.S./NATO might face the Russian military, or appropriate U.S. joint force or NATO responses.

Strategic Insights and Their Implications

This section identifies seven strategic insights of the Russian way of war and their implications for the U.S. Army, building on the RWW’s and others’ tactical and operational analyses. After each insight, the paper explains the implications and identifies specific recommendations. The paper’s final section will address what should be done more holistically about these issues.

Russia can and will prosecute a different type of warfare than the United States

Russia is willing and able to prosecute a different type of warfare than the United States. This difference stems largely from an overriding focus on destroying the enemy, with fewer political, societal, and legal constraints. Russian artillery – its “God of War,” akin to the U.S. “King of Battle” – illustrates Russia’s long-standing way of warfare that diverges from the West. Organizationally, Russian ground forces are “an artillery army with a lot of tanks.” Despite having precision technology, the Armed Forces generally prefer massed, non-precision-guided munitions, even in urban terrain, due to a reported 80-to-1 munitions cost differential, mathematical probability of destruction, projected terrain problems for artillery spotters, and expected munition survivability in an electronic warfare environment. They use artillery to clear city blocks from several kilometers away, and their thermobaric munitions can create shockwaves resembling nuclear explosions. An artillery targeting error in combat would also likely be accepted as “an accident due to the ‘fog of war.’”

This different way of warfare extends far beyond artillery. For instance, Russian doctrine expects victory or decisive defeat to be any battle’s probable outcome, while stability operations are noticeably absent. Anti-personnel and anti-vehicle land mines remain critical to Russian offensive and defensive operations. Russian mechanized flamethrowers are an increasingly important part of their tactical formations, used in busting bunkers, clearing light infantry, and in combined arms operations in urban or mountainous terrain. The Armed Forces generally have looser rules of engagements than Western forces and lack a “zero defects” mentality. Russians tolerate structural corruption and tend “to interpret morally right as legally right,…[since] In the Russian view, it is far better to have an army with the best and brightest, albeit ethically challenged, than an army of the ethical, but less capable.” The Armed Forces also expect most service members to specialize tactically in their branch or functional area, rather than requiring joint or broadening experiences. This specialization promotes tactical excellence and leaves to others force development, doctrine, whole-of-government strategy, “winning hearts and minds,” and stability operations tasks.

The implications of a distinct Russian way of warfare are important for two key reasons. First, just as coalition members operate with national caveats, the United States should expect adversaries to employ capabilities consistent with their training, legal authorities, and societal norms. As Clausewitz noted, overcoming an enemy requires matching his capabilities and will. It is important to be aware that Russian and American military capabilities, ways of employing their militaries, and national wills differ substantially. Mirror-imaging one’s way of warfare onto others can create inefficiencies, promote a false sense of security, and/or prompt avoidable, aggressive responses. To minimize the chance of mirror-imaging how others wage war, a charge of which some argue the United States is already guilty, the U.S. Army should take deliberate steps to incorporate Russian (and other potential competitors’) “ways of warfare” insights within its analyses, options, and plans, including through rigorous red teaming efforts.

Second, there are ways that potential competitors, to include Russia, could employ military power that would be incompatible with U.S. values, public opinion, and historic way of war. Russia’s Armed Forces are allowed and able to prosecute wars in ways and places the U.S. public would (thankfully) not endorse. For instance, the Armed Forces will fight ruthlessly, even in urban warfare, where their tactics lead to high levels of civilian casualties. If in their interest, Russia may be capable of seizing, defending, or controlling dense urban areas using tactics abhorrent to the West. If the U.S. Army underestimates Russian callousness, U.S. military plans could inadvertently place local civilians at increased risk. Civilian leaders could also require the U.S. Army to alter mid-conflict its objectives or tempo in ways unrelated to U.S. military objectives in order to stop Russian attacks against civilians. This strategic insight does not eliminate the Army’s need to plan for and remain prepared to complete any mission tasked. However, to help political leaders make informed choices, the U.S. Army should incorporate U.S., allies’, and adversaries’ ways of warfare within planning, wargaming, and other analyses of potential missions in megacities, dense urban areas, or other extreme security environments to be able to convey clearly the costs, benefits, and risks in quantifiable and “expected pain” levels of various options.
Russia Operates from a Position of Domestic and Regional Instability

The second strategic insight is that Russia operates from a position of domestic and regional instability. Domestically, Russian governance and security challenges are well documented, stemming in part from its geography, economics, demographics, and multiethnic population. For instance, Russians must secure territory in eleven time zones with harsh climates, diverse terrain, borders without natural barriers, less-developed rural road systems, and twice the U.S. coastline. Russia’s economic struggles emanate from sanctions and lower oil and gas prices – as well as financial overstretch, chronic mismanagement, decreased Russian consumer spending, and widespread corruption. The ethnically Russian population is dispersed and aging. Russia also remains ethnically and religiously diverse, as was the Soviet Union. However, some minorities are increasingly restless, especially in the Northern Caucasus, sparking concerns from a growing Muslim population and fighters returning to Russia after fighting in Iraq and Syria.

Russia also operates from a position of intensifying regional instability. In addition to a long history of invasions, current threats now require Russia “to defend in 360°.” The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has steadily extended eastward after the USSR collapsed. Moscow viewed Western energy deals in the Caspian Sea region in the 2000s “as an assault on a traditional sphere of influence.” Russia believes the United States engineered the Color Revolutions and other unrest along Russia’s periphery. Russia also perceives threats along the Black Sea, Pacific Coast, and Arctic; across the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia; and with an increasingly influential China. Since the Cold War, the Armed Forces have also been in conflict within Russia (Chechnya, twice) and in five neighboring states: Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Georgia; Transdniestria, Moldova; Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia and Azerbaijan; and Crimea and Donbass, Ukraine. In consequence, Russia arrays its forces across its vast landmass and has military bases and testing facilities in Georgia, Armenia, Tajikistan, Moldova, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan.

In addition to specific challenges, Russia and the United States have different policy ends: Russia wants a secure regional sphere of influence and global great power status, while the United States wants to maintain the existing international order and support all interested countries – including former Soviet republics and satellites – in becoming liberal capitalist democracies integrated within the global economy. As a result, and despite a dramatic military overmatch with most neighbors, Russia views its neighbors “less as potential friends than as potential beachheads for enemies.”

Russian leaders are also desensitizing their people to military conflict to increase the society’s willingness to wage future wars. As Russia’s economy began slowing in 2013, “the Kremlin has sought to make military glory the new centerpiece of Russian pride and identity.” Russia’s information operations are extensive, effective, and well-honed, even as Russia intensifies media control and declares dissenters to be foreign operatives. A 2016 Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI) study also found that a majority of Russian respondents “indicated that ‘small wars’ or military operations such as those in Ukraine and Syria are considered justified, defensive, victorious, and preventive, undertaken to avoid a ‘great war’ and ‘because the besieged fortress must be defended.’”

Together, these factors shape the Armed Forces’ capabilities, doctrine, treaties, and willingness to initiate conflict. For instance, Russia (like the USSR) has an all-mechanized force, which practices regularly to deploy long distances within Russia to counter threats. Russia has continued stockpiling and training with anti-personnel and anti-tank mines, with no projected plans to sign the Ottawa Convention. Russia’s recent military successes have also raised nationalistic pride that eroded dramatically post-USSR. While its recent interventions have proven costlier in time, money, and lives than expected, in the future Russia may threaten or undertake military aggression to pursue what some have dubbed “public relations-wars”: using its military to rally domestic support, strategically shock the West, and signal strength to Russia’s neighbors without accepting major risk.

The United States has a pivotal role in assuring allies and deterring further Russian aggression within a broader framework of U.S., multinational, and alliance responses. The European Reassurance Initiatives will help the U.S. Army prepare for and support NATO allies’ militaries in defending against cyber and conventional attacks. However, the U.S. Army should use strategic patience and great care when engaging with non-NATO former Soviet republics. Outreach to these partners may be wise if done in a way that deliberately strengthens U.S./NATO’s position. However, the U.S. Army – acting in line with U.S. policy – must expect Russians to assume U.S. ulterior motives, which may also evolve strong Russian responses.

Russia’s Military Believes Nuclear War Could Be a Reality

Russia’s “escalate to deescalate” nuclear doctrine is often-cited and its implications remain actively debated. However, as the RWW makes clear, nuclear warfare is a foundation of Russian offense and defense doctrines. The Armed Forces’ defense tactics include the ability to “withstand the effects of [tactical] nuclear weapons” and repel precision strikes from multiple domains. Many combat vehicles are designed to survive in nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) environments, and Russia retains detachments designed to destroy high-end threats, including tactical nuclear systems. The Armed Forces simulate tactical nuclear explosions in wargames and exercises, and...
their past five annual military exercises included large-scale “interstate wars, with a possible use of nuclear weapons.” For the past three years, and reminiscent of the Cold War era, Russia also “conducted an unprecedented number of exercises and surprise inspections involving strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces.”

The implications of the Armed Forces’ nuclear expectations are open to interpretation yet clearly significant. Before 9/11, the U.S. Army regularly trained on NBC challenges; Russian training today may reflect a similar focus on this high impact threat. Russians must also prepare for non-NATO (i.e., state or non-state) threats.

However, military preparation for nuclear warfare could reflect Russia’s policy option seriousness. These preparations could also improve Russian political leaders’ confidence in ordering nuclear strikes. Due to its catastrophic consequences and given Russian preparation for nuclear warfare, the U.S. Army should not by-design or by-default plan to conduct “on-the-job-training” once in a nuclear environment. Instead, the U.S. Army should reenergize a portion of its training within a contaminated environment, especially nuclear. Proliferation makes future nuclear battlefield employment increasingly possible, and the U.S. Army must remain confident operating against any actors willing and able to use these capabilities.

Russia’s “Military” Does Not Equal the “U.S. Military”; However, Russia’s Perspective of the “U.S. Military” Does Not Equal the U.S. Perspective of the “U.S. Military”

When comparing the Russian and U.S. military capabilities, one must understand that Russia (and the USSR previously) uses the term “military” in a much broader way than the West. The U.S. military includes only those personnel and capabilities in the Department of Defense (DoD; e.g., Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps) and Coast Guard. In contrast, Russians define “military power” as the country’s overall strength, including intelligence and internal security, while the Armed Forces comprise “fighting power.” Russian military forces focused on external threats are generally in the Ministry of Defense (MoD), while internally-oriented military forces are in the Ministry of Interior (MVD) and Federal Security Services (FSB, formerly the Committee for State Security or KGB), and their subordinate Border Troops. The new Russian National Guard consolidates some internally-focused, active duty military forces, rather than following a U.S. model of citizen soldiers with state and federal responsibilities. Specialized spetsnaz units are also within MoD and other security services, although Russians use elite MoD conventional forces to conduct U.S. Special Operations-like missions, including serving as “little green men” (or “polite men,” in Russian terms).

While the Russian term “military” is more inclusive, their Armed Forces have a much narrower – and more traditional – mission than their Western counterparts.

As discussed in the first insight, the Armed Forces concentrate on destroying their enemy with all available means, whether in the defense or offense. Like their Soviet predecessors, most officers and all enlisted are highly specialized and tactically-focused for their careers. Russian commanders study, train for, and apply combat power (“getting steel on target”), allowing the General Staff, MoD, and other ministry officials to apply or integrate other tools of national power.

Importantly, though, Russians believe that U.S. warfare includes far more than the U.S. military. General Gerasimov described Western “hybrid warfare” as the “indirect and asymmetric methods,” to include color revolutions, the Arab Spring, and non-governmental organizations allegedly used against Russia and its allies.” Fyodor Lukyanov also argued that Russia’s interpretation of war now follows the U.S. model, including unmanned aerial vehicles, cyberspace operations, and sanctions.

There are three important implications of this different “military” definition. First, the U.S. Army cannot expect adversaries to be constrained by blurry boundaries among national security tools (e.g., diplomatic, information, military, economic), including public or private entities’ actions. Second, as a 2016 RAND report argued, the U.S. military should scrutinize how best to provide for “the common defense” in cyberspace, as rapidly-evolving cyber capabilities defy traditional military threats (e.g., they are not geographically bounded, easily attributable, and promulgated by military experts). Third, as Robert Jervis argued forty years ago, states frequently misperceive states’ intentions. Forward-stationed units and multi-national training will likely help assure allies. However, without deliberate outreach, these actions could be received (or portrayed) by adversaries as encircling and threatening.

To address effectively this differing view of “military,” U.S. Army leaders should assume Russians will interpret their actions and words within a broader national security (rather than solely military) context. The U.S. Army should expect Russia to use non-traditional military tools to advance its national security, while also expecting Russia to believe that the United States is directing actions of NATO and European governments. Leaders must anticipate that Russia’s vast state media enterprise and asymmetric methods, to include color revolutions, the Arab Spring, and non-governmental organizations allegedly used against Russia and its allies.”

Russia’s Post-2008 Military Modernization is Real, but it was Undertaken and Appears More Dramatic for a Host of Reasons.

The fifth strategic insight is that Russia’s post-2008 military modernization has made a remarkable difference
Adversaries may be willing and able to prosecute warfare in urban populations or megacities in ways and for durations that the American people would not likely accept.

However, the U.S. Army should ensure it prepares against Russian – and not Soviet – forces. Russian force structure, personnel policies, and training are no longer designed for extended, high-intensity warfare or large-scale power projection deployments. Its logistics systems and large conscription force remain key military liabilities. Russia’s military budget also remains one-tenth of the U.S. military budget. Just as U.S. and NATO leaders should not presume these reforms indicate the start of a new Cold War nor Russian interests in directly confronting a militarily-superior NATO, the U.S. Army can help its civilian leaders carefully develop proactive and reactive responses to Russia’s long-overdue military modernization efforts.

Russia’s Military Has Learned from the United States’ and Its Own Combat Experiences

The sixth strategic insight of the Russian way of war is how many military lessons the Russians have observed and experienced post-USSR. Russians and Chinese have studied closely U.S. operations and technology used in the 1990-1991 Gulf War, Kosovo, and post-9/11 counterterrorism and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. For instance, since “Russia believes that the U.S./NATO will maintain air superiority,” Russia’s missile, electronic warfare, and air defense capabilities were designed to mitigate and counter these U.S./NATO advantages.

In addition, the Russians have learned many lessons from their own combat. For instance, battles in Chechnya reinforced Russia’s need for more professional, “contract” soldiers. Lessons from Grozny (1994) also prompted the Russians to develop an urban-capable direct fire vehicle, called “Terminator 2,” which “can reportedly clear the enemy from a city block at a distance of 3km.” While strategically successful against Georgia in 2008, Russia’s military losses inspired development of the “next generation of electronic intelligence and jamming systems.”

in Russia’s military might, yet it was undertaken and appears even more dramatic than it actually is for a host of political, economic, and military reasons. Politically, the Russian leadership is committed to the reforms’ success, as evidenced by the assignment of Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister to oversee the Russian defense industry and Russia’s version of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. Economically, Russia’s gross domestic product rose almost ten-fold from 1999 to 2008, from $195.9 billion to $1.66 trillion, largely aligned with oil prices. This growth enabled a 31% increase in Russia’s defense spending from 2008-2013. Militarily, Russian leaders had internal and external motivations to demonstrate a military reinvigorated from “the once powerful Russian military [that] struggled to defeat ‘a band of irregulars fighting with little more than the weapons on their backs’” in Chechnya. The Armed Forces’ underwhelming (albeit successful) actions in Georgia also provided Russian political leaders with motivation and popular support to override reform concerns of influential military officers, who had helped block previously-proposed defense reform efforts.

While these modernization programs are significant and noteworthy, the changes appear even more dramatic for three reasons. First, despite several reform attempts, the Russians spent minimally on defense and completed no successful post-Cold War modernization program until 2008. Due to Russia’s “long neglect” of its military’s modernization, some argue “the revival of Russia’s conventional military was just a matter of time.” Second, the U.S. and Soviet Cold War nuclear capabilities developed on different cycles, with the Russians now modernizing nuclear capabilities the United States will need (and expects) to replace in the mid-2020s. Third, most considered the Russian threat to be a Cold War relic until Russia seized Crimea and began fighting in eastern Ukraine in 2014. As a result, Russia progressed significantly for six years before most realized these changes mattered.

There are distinct military implications of these insights. The U.S. Army once again has a land-based, competing power threat. These conventional capabilities provide Russia military tools – in addition to its nuclear weapons – to pursue its vital national security interests without catastrophic effects. While the 21st century Russians are not the U.S. Army’s Cold War enemy, the U.S. Army should reinvigorate planning, doctrine, equipping, training, education, and wargaming efforts to ensure the U.S. Army remains ready and able to defeat this capable Russian opponent in the European theater of operations. For instance, the Armed Forces’ advanced artillery, air and missile defense, and electronic warfare capabilities will require developing similar or leap-ahead U.S. counter-measures, while in the near-term, the U.S. Army should train to operate with low (or no) electronic signatures.
that Russia believes will be needed against most future adversaries. The Armed Forces also exhibit qualities from their deeply impactful “Great Patriotic War” (World War II) experiences, including embracing flamethrowers (as Nazis used against them) or preparing seriously for Arctic operations (as did Finnish forces, allowing the Finns to repulse for some time the Soviet attack).

There are three strategic implications of these Russian lessons learned. First, the Russians also have battle-hardened service members, who have continued to learn and adapt within combat. Second, however, Russia’s combat operations have also been against “lower-end” (albeit lethal) opponents, rather than competing powers. While the Armed Forces do regularly train against high-end threats, they similarly lack experience against a technologically-advanced adversary. Third, and reinforcing previous insights, their Armed Forces must prepare for full-spectrum operations due to myriad domestic and regional threats.

Based on these insights, the U.S. Army should study Russia’s repeated post-Cold War (including ongoing) military interventions to better understand how the Armed Forces fight adversaries employing largely-asymmetric tactics. However, U.S. Army leaders must also remember that Russia is a thinking and adapting adversary that will fight differently against a competing power. Building on knowledge of the Russian way of war, the U.S. Army should continue preparing holistically to be able to conduct combined arms maneuver and wide area security against competing powers like Russia. Intensifying and focusing training on this threat will help. Critically, though, U.S. Army leaders must develop the leadership skills and critical thinking tools through rigorous education to anticipate how Russia may adapt for the next conflict. The U.S. Army should also assign top quality officers earlier and more often within the institutional Army to better leverage their experiences and develop more future senior leaders with this expertise.

Russia’s State-Directed Military-Industrial Complex Has Nonreplicable Advantages

The final strategic insight of the Russian way of war is that Russia’s state-directed military-industrial complex has distinct advantages that U.S. and European industries cannot replicate. Russian public-private collusion is not unique, yet Russia’s research and development abilities remain cutting-edge and focused on leap-ahead technologies. This centralization also allows Russia to direct production and impose standards across Russian manufacturers, including developing one turret for multiple chassises. This design minimizes production, operations, and maintenance costs and simplifies future upgrades and equipment repurposing. These cost-conscious and “plug-and-play” capabilities will likely benefit Russia and its future export customers.

The implications of Russian defense sector control could be significant for U.S. security cooperation efforts and U.S. defense industries. For the United States, in addition to U.S. companies earning significant profits, foreign military sales (FMS) is also a “fundamental tool of U.S. foreign policy” reinforcing national relationships, defense engagements, and equipment interoperability. However, as countries seek lower defense expenditures, U.S. partners may find Russian equipment and a less-arduous FMS process too appealing to ignore. Other countries may also purchase advanced Russian technologies that place real constraints on U.S. military options. The 2017 National Defense Authorization Act took important steps to better align the U.S. security cooperation process. The U.S. Army should build on this initiative, working closely with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, and combatant commanders to press for meaningful FMS process reforms based on the strategic and operational imperative. The U.S. Army should also continue working with these DoD officials and international partners to identify partners’ military interests and needs, and then propose additional ways to train and engage with partners to convey U.S. commitment, mitigate FMS procedural problems, and help partners improve their military abilities and interoperability with the United States and regional partners.

Alternative Arguments

Especially since Russia annexed Crimea in February 2014, scores have analyzed Russia’s military actions and implications for U.S. and NATO forces. This paper identified seven strategic insights and implications primarily for the U.S. Army. Cumulatively, these recommendations aim to deter an evolving yet rational competing power. However, not all agree Russia is evolving, deterrable, or a worth-detering threat. This section will address each counterargument in turn.

First, many argue Russia is pursuing a “New Generation Warfare” (NGW) or new “hybrid warfare.” Most clearly argued by Dr. Phillip Karber, NGW is described as a “concerted effort to conduct warfare in a new way” by combining five elements of “low-end, hidden state involvement with high-end, direct, even braggadocio superpower involvement.” Most credit General Gerasimov for developing this “new” hybrid doctrine, in which “little green men,” information operations, and cyber operations combine with enough conventional power to achieve political effects without triggering a NATO response. However, as the RWW and others note, General Gerasimov was describing multifaceted warfare targeting Russia and its allies. Russians also primarily use “new generation warfare” in military publications to describe their new equipment. In consequence, it seems reasonable to study Soviet and long-standing Russian practices to help contextualize how Russia may fight a competing power in the future.

Second, others emphasize a resurgent and revanchist
Russia, threatening imminently the Baltics and NATO’s and Europe’s resolve. For instance, a 2016 U.S. Army War College report outlines ways Russia could undermine NATO, and then uses insights from a senior Lithuanian general to press for urgent NATO action in the Baltics: “There is a race for the Baltics, the side which comes first with substantial forces will prevail. To prevent conflict, there must be strength and resolve.” If NATO acts with determination, war can be averted and peace preserved. However, the window of opportunity for the Allies is closing.” While few predict a direct Russia-NATO conflict, many do expect Russia will continue using military force to pursue more modest political objectives. As the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) argued, Russia has developed an “infatuation with military power as a quick fix to its foreign or domestic problems…that is tactically confrontational, although not strategically bent on destroying the West.” The EUISS also argued Russia used its Armed Forces to prevent former republics from entering the “European Neighborhood,” as more rule-oriented, transparent EU-compliant economic systems would make Russian elites incapable of maintaining their current business advantages. Regardless of Russia’s intentions, this paper identifies ways to reduce military weakness that could also strengthen NATO’s political calculation.

Third, many argue Russia is declining and the United States must focus on its real threat, China. In the longer term, they may be correct. However, while Russia retains a massive nuclear arsenal, advanced conventional and unconventional military capabilities, and nationalistic identity, one should expect the Russian military to be used to counter real and perceived threats. In fact, some believe Russia’s struggling economy makes military operations and a permanent war footing more likely. To be able to provide U.S. political leaders diverse response options against the Russian military, the U.S. Army has significant work to complete.

Recommendations for the U.S. Army With Respect to Competing Powers

In addition to recommendations presented with each strategic insight, this section addresses briefly five additional recommendation themes for the U.S. Army to be better prepared to counter militarily competing powers. These can be grouped by headings: increase forward stationing; incorporate human geography; plan for politically-sensitive operations (e.g., urban combat, use of nuclear weapons); prepare to fight in technologically-degraded environments; and develop adaptability at all echelons. To present adversaries with multiple dilemmas, as denoted in the Army’s Operating Concept, the U.S. Army should continue pressing to (re) establish more permanent forward presence, especially in allied countries. As discussed in TRADOC’s draft multi-domain fires publication, the U.S. Army’s ability to establish a hardened presence within an adversary’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) “bubble” provides unique advantages for the joint force. The U.S. Army should also increase military-to-military partnerships and targeted building partnership capacity efforts via the Strategic Partnership Programs, including with NATO allies and countries across Central Asia. That said, forward presence and partner engagements should be recognized for the political tools they are, and the United States must use discriminatingly these powerful signaling tools with respect to non-allied partners.

The U.S. Army should update its concepts and doctrine to better account for human geography, which makes significant political and military differences for both (or all) sides when securing populations. The U.S. Army will need to operate – “win in a complex world” – differently against a competing power if fighting among hostile people, those with contested loyalties, or supportive societies (i.e., do the people want to be “liberated,” or is the U.S. Army reinforcing a U.S.-aligned, locally disliked government). This distinction is also not limited to warfare with a competing power, having important planning and operational implications for offense, defense, stability, and COIN operations. The U.S. Army must be prepared to operate globally in environments of strained governance and strong propaganda. If an adversary is welcomed by most local people, the U.S. Army may be wrongly assuming that “Future enemies will act to remain indistinguishable from protected populations and infrastructure,” such as how Russians were received in Crimea (but not eastern Ukraine) and Hezbollah and Hamas have gained legitimacy in their environments.

The U.S. Army should also plan deliberately for politically-sensitive military operations. The U.S. Army should conduct the planning and analysis to be able to articulate precisely to U.S. defense and political leaders the military risks of urban warfare. Adversaries may be willing and able to prosecute warfare in urban populations the U.S. Army should be prepared to operate without GPS capabilities and air support; to survive a high volume of artillery, including munitions with or replicating weapons of mass destruction; and to fight an adaptive and mobile enemy.
or megacities in ways and for durations that the American people would not likely accept. Policy makers must be given options that fully articulate the risks and likelihood for success. The U.S. Army and DoD should also (re)energize its planning, wargaming, and analysis for nuclear operations, and wargames should continue post-nuclear explosion. As the Armed Forces expect to conduct offensive and defensive operations after a nuclear strike, the U.S. Army should also reinvigorate training within a nuclear environment to ensure leaders and Soldiers are confident operating in contaminated areas.

The U.S. Army should also prepare to fight competitors who can attack and degrade U.S. technological advantages. Whether fighting against the Russians or those using their equipment or tactics, the U.S. Army should be prepared to operate without global positioning system capabilities and air support; to survive a high volume of artillery, including munitions with or replicating weapons of mass destruction; and to fight an adaptive and mobile enemy bent on destroying its adversary. The combat training centers’ opposing forces should in part employ Russian tactics and military decision making process, both of which are well advanced and highly structured at the tactical level. To be ready for future A2/AD environments, U.S. ground forces should continue analyses, planning, and wargaming on employing and defending against multi-domain fires. The U.S. Army can make important warfighting contributions to the joint force using multi-domain fires, including creating windows of air defense suppression, countering a rapidly-moving enemy employing massed artillery, and closing with and destroying large combined arms formations supporting or supported by unconventional forces.

Finally, the U.S. Army should develop adaptability at all echelons. Professional military education (PME) should incentivize leaders at all levels to challenge the status quo, think critically, and better understand competing powers and other adversaries. Whether learned in formal PME institutions or through online platforms, Sun Tzu’s adage about knowing the enemy and oneself remains worthwhile. Scholars and researchers with language and cultural experience – such as those at FMSO – likewise remain critical resources for the U.S. Army, and leaders should continue leveraging their expertise for critical challenges ahead.

**Conclusion**

In closing, the implications of the Russian military reforms are real, and DoD is rightfully taking this challenge seriously. For instance, the Third Offset Strategy smartly aims to develop leap-ahead capabilities, operational concepts, and “human-machine collaboration” to deter Russia (and China) from initiating great power wars. The DoD remains publicly committed to modernize its nuclear capabilities within the next decade, as originally scheduled. In addition to re-emphasizing decisive operations training, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps are also actively developing new concepts – from which other doctrine, organizational, training and education, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities changes will follow – to counter a Russian high-end threat.

While the Russian military has advanced dramatically since 2008, the U.S. Army should not overreact to this military threat. Russia’s force structure, logistics, personnel, industry, and mobilization systems are no longer designed to support extended, large-scale warfare. Since 2013, Russia’s economic growth has slowed substantially due to oil prices, sanctions, and a host of internal problems (e.g., corruption, mismanagement, etc.). While Russia has cut other programs instead of its military spending, Russia cannot modernize its entire force given its strained current (and expected future) economics and other operational activities. However, if willing to incur dramatic economic and reputational costs, Russian leaders could aggressively pursue actions against the United States and NATO. To help deter a worst case event, the U.S. Army must be prepared for whatever challenges await. And yet, understanding how Russians approach war, while keeping their successes and problems in context, will enable U.S. leaders to pursue political and military objectives that appropriately maintain respect for this resurgent Russian power without overestimating Russia’s military capabilities.
Editor’s Note: Captain Neville’s thesis won the FAO Association Writing Award at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. Because of the length of the thesis, the author provided this shortened version for publication in the Journal. To see the entire thesis, please visit www.faoa.org. The Journal is pleased to bring you this outstanding scholarship.

Introduction

With the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, hybrid war became a buzzword in political and academic circles. This article examines state-sponsored hybrid warfare applications using an historical example. The analysis seeks to determine why a country was or was not successful in its execution of hybrid war, and it assesses the geo-political context of cost, benefit, and risk for an aggressor state contributing to its decision to engage in hybrid warfare. The specific case study selected is Germany’s 1938 annexation of Austria. In this example, Germany went on the offensive, deliberately choosing hybrid tactics to obtain an objective.

Ultimately, the article objective strives to deepen our understanding of hybrid war, and to extrapolate how one seemingly minor hybrid event can be tied into a broader goal of an aggressor state in its interactions with a defender state. The analysis of this case study, in addition to case studies about the 1923 German Communist Revolution, the 2008 Russia-Georgia War, and the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, suggests that the length of the conflict, local support, consolidated leadership, international response, and the power balance between the two states involved have contributed to the success of state-sponsored hybrid war.

The Re-emergence of Hybrid War

In January 2013, Chief of the Russian Army General Staff General Valery Gerasimov spoke at an annual session of the Academy of Military Sciences about the importance of “non-direct and asymmetrical operations,” which would be vital for Russia to incorporate to ensure future success. He stated that “the role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness.” Mark Galeotti argued that this sentence in Gerasimov’s speech meant Russia must look to non-military methods to achieve its strategic goals. The speech has been referred to as the Gerasimov Doctrine and was seen by many academics and government officials in the West as a new emphasis for Russian military policy.

In the spring of 2014, in what some considered an application of the Gerasimov Doctrine, Russia annexed the Crimea from Ukraine. Russia continued to apply this doctrine when it, through various means, destabilized the Ukrainian provinces of Donetsk and Lugansk. In December 2014, the U.S. State Department’s International Security Advisory Board stated the annexation of Crimea was “the first time one nation has seized and annexed territory from another in Europe since the end of World War II.” These events have unnerved the many nations that make up the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU).

Non-linear or hybrid war pertains to a combination of economic, social, cyber, military, media, and political means used to achieve a particular goal. Waging war using these methods is not new. Williamson Murray noted that “the historical record suggests that hybrid warfare in one form or another may well be the norm for human conflict rather than the exception.”

A state that wages war using hybrid or non-linear tactics does not solely use conventional military means to accomplish its goal. In a world with varying degrees of conventional military power, it is logical to assume that if a state can achieve its objective without crossing the threshold of conventional war, it will do so. Russia
The Anschluss

One line of Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf reads: “German Austria must be restored to the great German Motherland.” [Emphasis added] Mein Kampf was published in 1925, but it would not be until 1938 that Hitler’s dream of Austria’s annexation was realized. Germany used a hybrid combination of military, economic, and political tactics to gradually increase pressure on the Austrian government. Consolidated leadership and weak international response contributed to Austria’s annexation. Ultimately, the five-year length of the conflict and local Austrian support led to the successful Anschluss.

German and Austrian Background

Hitler was not the first person to push for Anschluss. Debates in Austria and Germany on Anschluss had been waged since the beginning of the nineteenth century. The Austrian Republic was born from the ashes of the Hapsburg Empire at the end of World War I. It would not have survived had it not been supported by the Allied Nations who, wanting to contain Germany, specifically forbade any type of Anschluss. Despite the Allies’ wishes, conversations about the Anschluss were not uncommon in Austria and Germany during the inter-war years, and became even more frequent after Hitler became chancellor in Germany in 1933.

The Anschluss was heavily pushed by the Austrian Nazi Party (ANP). The ANP hoped to seize control in Austria, using the same terror tactics and methods that its fellow members had successfully used in Germany. These tactics, however, had the reverse effect in Austria, and were condemned by the Austrian government and a large portion of the population. It did not help that the Anschluss was not Hitler’s top priority at this point in time. Though Hitler agreed with the goals of the ANP, he was too busy consolidating his power in Germany to provide much direction.

From 1933 until the Anschluss in 1938, Austrian Nazis did whatever they could to try and gain power. They used both official and illegitimate means in their efforts. These included rallies, secret meetings, beatings, bombings, and propaganda. The German Nazi Party aided the Austrian Nazis by providing leadership, personnel, propaganda, and money. Nazi propaganda was very prevalent during this time period, though it is difficult to determine how effective it was.

Hitler also used the economy (an important hybrid tool) to pressure Austria. This included banning Germans from vacationing in Austria. This hit Austria especially hard because thirty percent of Austria’s tourist traffic came from Germany. The economic squeeze was eventually accompanied by blocking Austrian imports. Hitler hoped these measures would increase domestic pressure on Austrian Chancellor Englehart Dollfuss to capitulate on his policy against the Nazis. In the end, while Hitler’s economic policy was not successful in changing the course of the Dollfuss regime, its effects were painful to the Austrian government. Ending Germany’s economic policy was a key point of the 1936 agreement between Germany and Austria (made notably after Dollfuss’ death). Though not successful by itself, Germany’s use of its stronger economy, combined with other hybrid tactics, was a determining factor of the Anschluss.

The Surprise Plebiscite

Four days after the Berchtesgaden Conference of 1938, Hitler gave an ominous Reichstag speech. In this speech, Hitler spoke of “‘ten million Germans living on the borders of the Reich…who [Hitler] would not allow to be deprived of the ‘right of racial self-determination.’” These ten million Germans were in Austria and Czechoslovakia, and Hitler’s implied threat was well understood. With pressure continuing to increase, Austrian Chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg attempted to hold off a German
invasion by appealing directly to the Austrian people on their feelings about Anschluss.

A surprise plebiscite was scheduled for March 13, 1938. Hitler demanded the plebiscite not go forward, and due to the implied threat, the plebiscite was cancelled. Schuschnigg resigned as chancellor and while a new Nazi-lead government was being formed, Hitler ordered the invasion of Austria. When told the plebiscite was cancelled, Hitler allowed the invasion to continue, but gave specific instructions that the army was to avoid force at all cost.

At the last minute, Hitler ordered all the military invasion units to muster their bands and collect their regimental colors “so the march-in at dawn should appear ceremonial rather than warlike.” Hitler wanted to create an image of respectability, hiding the fact it was actually an invasion. Using both the threat of military action, and masking the real purpose behind that action are important components of hybrid war.

On the morning of March 12, the day before the plebiscite was going to take place, German troops crossed into Austria and were greeted by cheering crowds. Hitler crossed the border near his birthplace of Braunau on the Inn at 1640 on March 12. The enthusiasm that greeted Hitler after he crossed the border helped cement his decision to go through with the Anschluss. On March 13, Hitler announced to a group of Austrian Nazi leaders that, “At this moment an important law is being issued. Article 1 read ‘Austria is a province of the German Reich.’” Hitler had achieved his goal and Austria and Germany were now one country.

What Made this Hybrid Conflict Successful?

Hitler used hybrid means in his quest for the Anschluss. More specifically, Hitler used the Austrian Nazi Party, the German economy, Nazi propaganda, and the German military to achieve his goal. How these tactics were used provides some insight into hybrid war.

On their own, Germany’s use of the economy, military, propaganda and local support did not achieve Hitler’s foreign policy goal of Anschluss. The propaganda was merely annoying to Austria. The German economic tactics did not seriously hurt Austria’s economy. There was no actual German plan for the invasion of Austria. The Austrian Nazi Party was heavily monitored (and sometimes outlawed) by the Austrian government. However, it was the combination of all these elements that really helped sway the tide against the Austrian government -- this, and the fact that these steps were taken over a five-year period.

Another factor that benefited Germany was that it was stronger than Austria militarily and economically. This strength allowed Germany the freedom to try different hybrid techniques without fearing major reprisal from Austria. Austria needed Germany more than Germany needed Austria, and both countries knew it. Germany successful used its power leverage against Austria, knowing that Austria could not (and therefore would not) do much about it.

Lessons Learned about Application and Execution of Hybrid War

Local Support

Through the ANP, Nazis had penetrated all aspects of government and society. Nazi sympathizers in the police and government frequently provided information to the party, which was then shared with the German Nazis. Hitler was able to obtain a copy of Schuschnigg’s concession points before he even left Austria for the Berchtesgaden Conference. Hitler used this information ruthlessly to his advantage with his demands on the Austrian chancellor. News of the plebiscite was also leaked to the party by a Nazi secretary of one of Austrian ministers.

Having local support provides legitimacy to the actions of the aggressor state. If handled properly, the aggressor state can also create an extensive intelligence network amongst the local population.
fairly easily. In this conflict, Hitler had the Austrian government so thoroughly penetrated that Austrian events were known in Germany often before they were known in Vienna. Not having local support and intelligence would have significantly decreased the chances of a successful Anschluss.

**Propaganda**

It is not easy to determine how effective propaganda is. Just because a large volume of propaganda is made does not mean it is consumed at the same level. Regarding Nazi propaganda in Austria, what is of note is that the propaganda was consistent, and that “it helped to maintain the morale of [Nazi] party members while sowing distrust and pessimism among government loyalists.” It was a vital component of Hitler’s hybrid war with Austria, and the Nazis were quite effective at disseminating their propaganda through various means including radio, airplane, newspapers, and leaflets. Despite the many promises of non-interference from Germany, Nazi propaganda was constant in Austria in the years leading up to the Anschluss.

**Economy**

In 1934, when the Austrian government outlawed the Nazi party, Hitler was quick to use Germany’s economic superiority to compel Austria into giving into Nazi demands. It was not immediately successful. It did, however, hurt Austria’s already weak economy, and after enduring two years of this limited economic relationship, Austria was willing to do whatever Germany wanted in order to remove the economic barriers between the two countries. Despite its initial failure, the use of the economy is an important aspect of hybrid war, and contributed to Germany’s victory over Austria in 1938.

**Military**

Throughout the years Germany was re-arming, no plans were ever seriously considered to invade Austria. Though Germany could have crushed Austria’s military fairly easily, the threat of military action was more effective in accomplishing Hitler’s goal. The threat of military invasion was used often. It was mentioned in the “Plan of Action for 1938” discovered by the Austrian police. Hitler had also threatened the use of military force when speaking with Schuschnigg at the Berchtesgaden Conference. The use of military threat played a key role in Germany’s hybrid war with Austria.

**Leadership Consensus**

Another important factor in Germany’s successful annexation of Austria was Hitler himself. After Hitler came to power in 1933, he systematically removed anyone he thought would be a danger to his regime. In doing so, Hitler’s word became law, for both the German and Austrian Nazis. In most cases, what Hitler wanted, he obtained. Hitler made no attempt to hide his desire for an Anschluss with Austria. This wish, coupled with Hitler’s complete control of the government, ensured resources were allocated to secure Hitler’s objective. Having one person calling the shots instead of the squabbling amongst a committee can make a difference in a hybrid conflict.

**Further Considerations**

The one hybrid element that Hitler had the least control over was the “support” provided by the Austrian Nazi Party. Sometimes it was very helpful, as when Hitler was told about Schuschnigg’s ten points before he even left Austria. Sometimes it made situations worse, like the failed putsch attempt in 1934. More than once, Hitler had to order the Austrian Nazis to refrain from violence and work “legitimately” with the government. That Hitler had to order “peace” more than once speaks to his control of local support in Austria. Despite the overzealousness of some members, the Austrian Nazi Party was a critical hybrid element in Germany’s conflict with Austria.

The other factor that ended up being out of Hitler’s control was the timing of the Anschluss. Though the pressure was increasing against Austria toward a seemingly inevitable conclusion; no one, including Hitler, expected the Anschluss to happen when it did. Jurgen Gehl stated, “the annexation of March 1938 was forced upon [Hitler] by events… and only when he found—to his own surprise—no resistance, he let himself be persuaded by Goring into the annexation.” Despite the surprise, Hitler was able to take full advantage of the situation because of hybrid tactics used against Austria over the previous five years.
International Response

The lack of international response contributed to the Anschluss. Had Hitler tried to annex Austria when he first came to power in 1933, he would have met stiff resistance from Italy. Italy’s attitude toward German annexation shifted over the years as it came under increased international scrutiny for its wars in Ethiopia and Spain. Eventually Mussolini agreed to look the other way on the Austria question in return for German support.

After learning what he could achieve with Austria, Hitler used the same threat tactics against other countries. No country wanted to confront him. When the Anschluss actually happened, the international response was small. Hitler received some token protests, which he ignored. Britain, France, and the United States recognized the Anschluss before a Nazi plebiscite took place on 10 April.

Broader Geo-Political Context -- Why Choose Hybrid Strategy?

In addition to examining why the Anschluss was successful and exploring what can be learned about this hybrid conflict, it is important to apply the case study to a broader geo-political context. More specifically, why would a state choose to use hybrid techniques to achieve its goal?

At the beginning of 1938, Germany was well on the way if not already the strongest country in Europe. Other European countries realized this, and because of their war weariness, did what they could to prevent conflict from starting. Germany had developed the economic and military might to do what it wanted without much concern over international response to its actions. Also, because Hitler had consolidated power, he could act without fear of losing control domestically.

The benefit to using hybrid tactics for Germany in this situation was clear: Austria was annexed and became a part of the Third Reich. Germany was able to accomplish this without shedding blood, relatively little economic cost, and receiving weak protests from the international community. Germany’s international situation was much different in 1938 than it was in 1933, and the Anschluss confirmed to Hitler he could further act in Europe with fear of much reprisal. It was a win-win situation for Germany.

It could be argued that one of the costs to Germany was the length of time it took for the Anschluss to happen. In reality, length of time allowed Germany to re-consolidate its power and be in a better position internationally to annex Austria. It took almost six years for this goal to be achieved, which is not an insignificant amount of time. One of the reasons Germany was successful, however, was that it used hybrid techniques during those six years, which slowly increased pressure on the Austrian government. In other words, Hitler was able to successfully prioritize his goals, focusing on strengthening Germany economically and militarily instead of constantly worrying about the Anschluss.

No conflict is exactly the same. Germany and Austria’s relationship was unique, sharing a common border, language, history, and culture. Germany arguably could have used the same hybrid tactics against a different, smaller country with similar results, though it seems unlikely the results would have been quite as successful. The many similarities between Germany and Austria made it easier for Germany to employ hybrid tactics and take advantage of the weaker Austria.

Christian Nunlist and Martin Zapfre describe hybrid war in the European context as “a long-known, politicized form of warfare below the threshold of full-blown conventional war that combines subversion and low-key political violence with external military pressure.” This is exactly what happened to Austria from 1933 to 1938.

Hitler’s success with the Anschluss is due to Germany’s successful use of hybrid tactics. Hitler also had the patience to wait for the proper moment. As the Nazis had thoroughly penetrated the Austrian society and government, Hitler knew he had time to focus on re-arming Germany and consolidating his power within the Reich.

Russia’s conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine were started because those two countries were interested in adopting a more Western style of government. This threatened Russia...
instead of worrying constantly about the Anschluss.

However, the timing of the actual Anschluss was forced on Hitler by Schuschnigg’s surprise plebiscite. Despite the surprise, Hitler was able to take advantage of the situation, in no small part because of Germany’s greater military, economic, and political might. With the combination of hybrid tactics and the support of the local population, Hitler was able to achieve his goal without a shot being fired.

Additional Thoughts on Russian Hybrid Warfare

Russia has used and furthered its foreign policy strategy by using hybrid war. Russia has declared it promotes international stability, but in reality it is seeking to improve the balance of power in its sphere of influence while at the same time using foreign policy to garner domestic support. Russia’s conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine were started because those two countries were interested in adopting a more Western style of government. This threatened Russia, which took steps to neutralize the possibility either country would be able to permanently “go West.”

The analysis of Anschluss, in addition to the other case studies suggests that the length of the conflict, local support, consolidated leadership, international response, and the power balance between the two states involved have contributed to the success of state-sponsored hybrid war.

State-waged hybrid war is successful if the offensive state is able to secure the support of the people in the area where war is being waged. The proof of this hypothesis can be found in the successful Anschluss and the creation of two frozen conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine. A major factor in the Soviet Union’s communist revolution failure in 1923 was the lack of local German support. Local support can provide a form of legitimacy to the aggressor state, as well as a reason to intervene in the defender state.

Cultural and ethnic similarities between the aggressor and defender state seem to make a difference, if only because it allowed both countries to understand each other better. It also contributes to the degree the intelligence services have penetrated the other country. Russia has probably been more successful in penetrating the Ukrainian government than in penetrating the Chinese government because of the shared culture and ethnic history.

More recently, Russia used local support as a means of ensuring it would always have a voice in Georgia and Ukraine, but its actions have come at a cost. Russia was initially able to gain an operational advantage in both Georgia and Ukraine, but the long-term impact of Russia’s actions on that local support is uncertain. Pavel Luzin argued “there is no doubt that Ukraine has left Moscow’s sphere of influence.” There is also a feeling of resentment against Russia in Georgia. The longer these conflicts go on, the greater the resentment in Georgia and Ukraine will grow.

While the length of the conflict seems to favor the stronger state, it also can undermine the aggressor state’s ability to convert the hearts and minds of the local people to the aggressor state’s cause. The length of the conflict seemed to aid Nazi Germany’s influence in Austria and

How Is This Case Study Relevant to Contemporary Russian Actions in Ukraine?

The relationship between Germany and Austria during the 1930s has many similarities with the current relationship between Russia and Ukraine. Germany and Russia were essentially controlled by one person, Hitler and Putin. This allows these leaders the freedom to dictate what they want without concern of internal dissension within their countries. Like Germany, Russia is stronger than Ukraine militarily and economically, which allows Russia the ability to push (or bully) Ukraine when it feels the need to because Ukraine needs Russia more than Russia needs Ukraine.

Also like Germany and Austria, Russia has been able to thoroughly penetrate the government as well as other aspects of society in Ukraine. This provides an information flow to Moscow which gives Putin an upper hand when making decision regarding Ukraine. It also lets Putin covertly affect the Ukrainian government while maintaining a strong front of deniability that he is meddling in Ukrainian affairs. Hitler did the same in Austria, promising non-interference while pumping more Nazi propaganda into Austria at the same time.

As with the Anschluss, Russia was able to annex the Crimea successfully with only a token international response. Russia was condemned by most countries and sanctions have affected its economy. But these responses have not been enough for Russia to stop meddling in Eastern Ukraine or return the Crimea. Austria only received its independence after a costly and lengthy war, something the West does not seem willing to start over the Crimea annexation. Indeed, most countries agree that Ukraine will never get Crimea back.

One of the main differences between Germany and Russia was in their position within the international balance of power before the annexation of Austria and Crimea. Germany in 1938 was on the cusp of being the strongest country in Europe, and used that strength to conquer most of the continent. Russia, on the other hand, has been trying to regain the prestige it enjoyed during the Soviet regime. Russia is the most dominant power in Eastern Europe, but not within Europe as the whole. NATO and EU are stronger militarily and economically than Russia, and Russia knows this.

Germany and Russia were successful in their use of hybrid tactics, and achieving their goal of annexation within minimal international response. The long-term consequences of Germany’s action are known, but what will happen to Russia remains unclear.
Russia’s influence in Georgia. The same cannot be said, however, for what is currently going on in Ukraine. Pavel Luzin argued that the length of the conflict actually hurts the aggressor more than it helps. He stated: “the longer [the war] lasts, the lesser the chance of victory for the aggressor. Russian history shows that the average life span for a proxy power is a few months to a half-year. What follows is either political corruption or the aggressor is no longer depended upon. If the government that launched a hybrid war does not shift the conflict into an official level and begin to operate openly, the political goals of the war are unattainable.”

By Luzin’s definition, Russia has lost its political goals in the Ukrainian conflict. The international response plays an important role in hybrid war. The lack of international response contributed to a successful Anschluss. A small and disjointed international response allows the aggressor state to continue the hybrid conflict. An exception is the recent 2014 Ukrainian conflict, where the U.S. and the EU answered Russia’s actions by placing sanctions. The sanctions have hurt Russia’s economy, but they have not been enough of a retort to get Russia to change its action in Ukraine. It is difficult to ascertain the effectiveness of the international response to an aggressor state’s action when there is a lack of consensus on what that response should be. Russia has taken advantage of the West’s fragmented response to continue to push its interests within its sphere of influence.

There has been much debate on whether or not Russia had a grand strategy when it started its conflict in Ukraine. Andrei Kolsenikov wrote “the [Putin] regime has demonstrated no ability to think strategically -- let alone to establish clear, achievable goals or to offer a model of what the future should look like.” Olga Oliker agreed and stated: “Predicting Russian behavior is hard because Russia does not have a strategy. While it has strategic goals, it pursues them primarily by seeking opportunities, rather than developing clear plans.” Oliker makes a valid point. Russia took advantage of the new Ukrainian government’s impotence by seizing Crimea. Russia also saw an opportunity to act in the Donbas, but that experience has not been as successful and has left Russia in a quagmire.

Despite the feeling many have that Putin lacks strategy, he should not be underestimated. Fiona Hill counter-argued: [Putin] thinks strategically, and has had great advantages over Western leaders in his ability to translate that thinking into action. What we often fail to appreciate, however, is how dangerously little Putin understands about us -- our motives, our mentality, and also, our values. Only by trying to appreciate how Putin sees us can we see the logic in his actions—the logic he follows—and thereby gets some idea of what he wants, where he might be headed, in Ukraine and elsewhere in Europe and Eurasia.

Lack of understanding breeds more conflict. Until a greater effort is made to understand the motivations behind Putin’s decisions, conflict will inevitably continue.

“Hybrid War” has been used in dozens of publications to describe Russia’s actions in Crimea and the Donbas. Though the methods used by Russia were not new, the way in which they were applied has generated much discussion and concern at a strategic level. “The concern,” noted Nico Popescu, “is not so much about Russia’s tools and capabilities (be it tanks or TV channels), but about how their combined use can affect political and strategic realities within the EU and NATO.” There is no question that Russia has affected these realities, and capitalized on the lack of coordinated Western response to push its agenda further.

What then, should be the process going forward? The world needs to recognize when hybrid tactics are being used so that an appropriate response can be made. What that response should be depends on the hybrid tactic. Instead of blindly reacting to the use of an aggressive hybrid tactic, leaders should take a step back and to try and determine what the aggressor state’s next step will be. This is not easy, as an important aspect of hybrid war is deception. Examining historical hybrid incidents will also help, as the length of the conflict matters a great deal in hybrid war.

Regarding Russia, putting more effort into diplomacy and better understanding the rationale and motivation behind Putin’s actions will also help. Russia has major concerns about Western expansion and interference in Eastern Europe. Oliker wrote: “A quick skim of Russian government statements going back to the Yeltsin years makes clear that if the United States had long ago written Russia off as a rival, the Kremlin continued to view Washington as consciously and intentionally working to weaken Moscow and its global influence.” NATO and the EU may be trying to expand, but it is not because they wish to check Russia’s power. Instead, the West wishes to spread democracy and ensure an individual’s rights are protected. Those desires, however, are an antithesis of what Putin has created in Russia. Putin consolidated his power by removing rights, not giving them.

In the meantime, Russia will continue to use hybrid tactics to protect its sphere of influence, in the hopes that the world will return to the balance of power that existed during the Cold War. How successful Russia will be in this endeavor remains to be seen.

About the Author

Captain Seth Neville is a U.S. Air Force intelligence officer focused on Eastern Europe. He is assigned to the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) regional headquarters at Ramstein Air Base, Germany. Captain Neville has served in intelligence staff and command billets in the U.S., Europe, and Qatar. He earned a Master of Arts in Security Studies from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School and graduated “with distinction” from the NPS in 2015.
Baltic Flashpoint
Collective Defense for the 21st Century

By Major A.J. Goldberg, U.S. Marine Corps

Editor's note: Major Goldberg's thesis won the FAO Association writing award at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Marine Corps University. In the interest of space we publish this abridged version. To read the full thesis, including all research notes, click on this link to our website: www.faoa.org. We are pleased to bring you this outstanding scholarship.

Disclaimer: The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the individual student author and do not necessarily represent the views of either the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, the Canadian Armed Forces, or any other U.S. or Canadian governmental agency. References to this study should include the foregoing statement.

Executive Summary

A Russian invasion of the Baltic States may occur in the near future, or it may not materialize for a decade. While the timing and character of Russian activity may vary under a number of plausible scenarios, the threat does not diminish. The United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies must recognize the materializing threat of such an invasion of the Baltic region and find practical solutions to defend against this contingency.

There are three steps that NATO can implement to field a force capable of defending and, if necessary, reestablishing Baltic sovereignty.

One measure must be for Baltic security forces—unified with NATO—to streamline a rapid and effective response to Russian early provocations in the Baltic region. This avoids giving Russia the opportunity to prepare the battlefield for future operations and negates Russian justification for larger escalation in the region. The initial response from NATO need not be proportional to the provocation; rather, it should establish escalation dominance to shut off the opportunity for further ratcheting up the pressure on the Baltic States.

If the Russians initiate “ambiguous warfare,” stirring up local unrest with the objective of justifying intervention to protect Russian nationals or national interest, they should see from the start they would encounter a firm limit on their room for maneuver. Though a NATO response to the slightest Russian incitement in the Baltic States must be immediate and firm, it does not need to be kinetic. Through Baltic reconciliation with its Russian minorities, it is possible to create an atmosphere in which passive civil defense can halt a Russian intrusion.

Secondly, NATO must continue to build a strong security network between its members and partners in the High North to glean efficiencies and ensure unity of effort in a confrontation with the Russians. NATO is already undertaking measures such as “smart defence,” which NATO defines as “a cooperative way of thinking about generating the modern defence capabilities that the Alliance needs for the future.” The larger effort to coalesce the military capabilities of NATO members and partners in the region lies outside the bounds of this paper; however, the network envisioned calls for Poland and the Nordic and Baltic countries to modularize military capabilities in order to glean operating efficiencies in the European High North.

Finally, NATO must deny Russia “a quick victory” through focused training and material resourcing of the Baltic defense forces for guerrilla warfare in order to gain an asymmetrical advantage over the anticipated Russian adversarial force. These actions will firmly show America’s commitment to European security and give Russia pause before it can launch an operation in the European theater. This effort should aim to create a sustainable capability for resistance pending the reinsertion of large-scale NATO forces.

Background

From the Arctic to the Eastern Mediterranean, Russia is probing the standing geo-political order to gauge
where opportunities exist to rebrand itself as a global superpower. The Baltic States represent an excellent opportunity for Russia to challenge NATO’s security guarantee over nearly all of Europe. A combination of geography, proximity, and historical precedence make the Baltic States extremely vulnerable to nefarious meddling from the Russian government. The Baltics constitute the Achilles heel of the NATO alliance due to their small national defense forces and the minor footprint of NATO personnel in the High North. Thus, a potential confrontation between NATO and Russia in the Baltic States is a prospective crisis for the global community, one that warrants preparatory efforts across the national instruments of power.

To Russian President Vladimir Putin, the Baltic States are an easy target to make NATO – and therefore America – experience humiliation on the world stage. Pressuring NATO on their eastern periphery would be a likely method for Putin to seek retribution for the embarrassing downfall of the Soviet Union. Putin has “claimed that his actions had flowed from the illegitimate way in which the USSR came to an ignominious end.” If the Baltic States were to be destabilized through direct Russian military aggression, the long-held prestige of the NATO alliance would be shattered and Putin’s vision achieved. The world expects the United States, as the linchpin of NATO, to honor its treaty obligations and uphold the security of all NATO members. If the U.S. does not stop a Russian annexation of all or part of the Baltic States, it will experience disgrace on the world stage and abdicate its 70-year reign as the guarantor of European security. Global allies of the U.S. would question American resolve and rethink longstanding security pacts that have stabilized volatile regions of the world.

The 2014 Ukrainian crisis sent shock waves through Western capitals, shattering the comfortable geo-political order that Europe had enjoyed since the end of the Cold War. To the Russians, asserting power on their western periphery had more to do with recapturing its traditional “zone of influence.” Preoccupied with concluding the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, managing crises deriving from the Syrian Civil War, and shifting precious military resources to the Pacific region, the U.S. and NATO allies were caught flat-footed by Russia’s incursion into Ukraine. Although Russian action in the Baltic demands a far greater risk calculus for Putin than previous ventures in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria, given the very fact of the Baltic States’ NATO membership, NATO must be prepared for Russia to attempt to reassert its power over the Baltics.

Geopolitical stakes are high: Because of the NATO factor, a Russian attack would oblige the alliance to implement the principle of mutual defense stated in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty: “an attack against one ally is considered as an attack against all allies.” Failure to defend the Baltic members would result in the utter discrediting of NATO, and with it the collapse of European security and American leadership.

The dilemma facing the alliance is that while NATO will not act until Russia crosses a formal red line, once Russia does cross the threshold, NATO will not have time to mount an effective defense of the Baltic region. The challenge is therefore to find not only a convincing, credible deterrent but also, in the event of the Russians overrunning the Baltic States, to establish an effective capability for retaking the territory. The West must backstop its initial responses to Russian threats or intimidation against NATO members, at however low a level, with sufficient force below the nuclear brink to deter, defend, and if necessary, retake Baltic territory.

NATO will have a limited response time to an initial Russian attack due to the lack of natural boundaries and short distance between the Baltic States and Russia. A series of recent war-games conducted by the RAND Corporation determined that Russia could overwhelm Baltic Defense Forces and press upon the Estonian and Latvian capitals within 60 hours. Other estimates forecast an even quicker Russian advance upon the Baltic capitals. General Pavel, the acting NATO Military Committee Chairmen, states that Moscow would be able to conquer the three Baltic States within 48 hours. The RAND report determines that such a quick defeat would leave NATO with three undesirable options: 1) recapture Baltic territory through a long and difficult counter-offensive, 2) escalate the conflict, or 3) “concede at least temporary defeat” and accept the “disastrous” implications for the NATO alliance and Baltic citizens.

The new European front to face Russia consists of the “Nordic five” (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden), the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), and Poland—known by the acronym NBP9. Though all countries in the NBP9 are exposed to Russian intimidation, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are the ones most vulnerable to interference by the Russian government. Their unique geographic location, combined with the multitude of options the Russian Government can use to jeopardize their sovereignty, make the Baltic region a likely flashpoint between Russia and NATO. Russia’s Western Military District, headquartered in St. Petersburg, can prepare five brigades for combat operation within a week of notification, with six more brigades ready within a month. The rapid mobilization of Russian forces so close to the Baltic region is partially facilitated by the majority of the Russian population living west of the Ural Mountains. Additionally, Russia’s Western Military District can easily be reinforced with personnel and equipment from the Central and Southern Military Districts, “or by calling up mobilization reserves.”

The Kremlin’s renewed fondness for large-scale military exercises has focused on improving joint operations and a rapid response against a “conventional highly-equipped adversary.” Russia will continue to improve
its conventional capability over the next decade with the aim of creating a “modern, well-equipped military force by 2020.” The current threat posed by Russia, combined with its military modernization program, gives NATO a closing window of opportunity to address their deficiencies in responding to a Russian move against the Baltic States. While Russian forces are actively participating in campaigns in the Eastern Ukraine and Syria, NATO has the opportunity to prepare for potential future Russian aggression in Europe’s High North. NATO can only achieve deterrence of a Russian incursion into Baltic territory if it is serious about defending its member states with a credible and capable approach.

NATO requires a persistent, near-term strategy for such a defense—one that can realistically be implemented. Russia’s recent undertakings in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria demonstrate not only that military force is a significant component of its foreign policy, but also that Moscow will likely continue to challenge NATO with the concerted use of “nontraditional military and security operations.” Russia’s campaigns in its near abroad demonstrate an ability to operate comfortably in close proximity to its sovereign borders or in the vicinity of long standing military bases (as with Syria). Both geographic location and historic significance to Russia make the Baltic States an attractive target. An attack on them might serve to restore Russian nationalistic pride, while simultaneously embarrassing NATO and threatening the existence of the alliance. The depth of mutual antipathy stemming from past Baltic-Russian confrontations, along with the connections between national identity and Russian foreign policy, highlights the potential for future conflict in the region. It is therefore essential to grasp the degree of antagonism that exists between Russia and its smaller neighbors. Such an understanding requires a venture into Baltic history.

Central Idea

The United States sits at the crossroads of escalation dominance and credible deterrence. A US reluctance to use nuclear weapons to stop a Russian invasion of the Baltics places the United States at the loosing position of the escalation ladder. According to Joint Publication 3-0, “Deterrence should be based on capability (having the means to influence behavior), credibility (maintaining a level of believability that the proposed actions may actually be employed), and communication (transmitting the intended message to the desired audience) to ensure greater effectiveness.” The United States cannot solely rely on its nuclear forces or its ability to launch deep conventional strikes to deter Russia from invading the Baltics because the credibility of employment is questionable. The United States, in conjunction with its NATO and European allies, must have more options available to deter and, if necessary, defeat a large scale Russian invasion of the Baltic region.

From examining how the United States and its NATO allies dealt with past Russian threats, it is possible to extract useful strategies to deal with the present day challenges of Baltic security. Certainly the United States and its NATO allies have had their resolve tested in the past. Throughout nearly the entire Cold War, NATO stared down an impressive Soviet war machine poised to storm across the Fulda Gap into West Germany. The Soviet onslaught never came and the Cold War ended without a direct engagement between the Soviets and NATO. What prevented the Soviets from attacking? It was the desire of Secretary of Defense McNamara to prevent the “nuclear threshold” from being passed and to rely on conventional means to defend Europe. The roughly 250,000 American service members stationed in West Germany during most of the Cold War likely gave the Soviets pause before mounting an invasion. However, European leaders were not entirely sure they could hold back Soviet aggression with purely conventional means.

European leaders feared the Soviets would be tempted into waging conventional war if the United States’ nuclear guarantee was not on the table. Additionally, European governments sought to avoid increasing defense expenditures and conscription service lengths—both required to maintain a sizable conventional force in Europe. Thus in 1967, “a compromise was reached” when “NATO adopted the strategy of flexible response.”

The concept of flexible response holds that NATO forces would “attempt” to drive back a Soviet invasion using solely conventional means if achievable. If NATO conventional forces were routed, a “gradual nuclear response” would be initiated to signal NATO resolve to defend Western Europe. If this failed, a continuous climb on the escalation ladder would hopefully persuade one side or the other to cease hostilities before mutual assured destruction occurred. In his book Strategies of Containment, author John Gaddis describes flexible response (referred to as symmetrical response) as the method to provide policy makers with a wider array of options, rather than merely depending upon escalation or embarrassment. Though the premise of flexible response provides varying levels of reaction, it lets the adversary decide the “nature and location” of combat.

And yet mainly through the policy of flexible response, and perhaps some luck, the United States was able to deter a Soviet incursion into Western Europe. While the policy of flexible response had several tenants, its main focus was to limit warfare to the conventional realm; holding nuclear weapons as an insurance policy in the event a subjective line was crossed. Michael Carver writes if war “is to be limited in its effects, it must, as Clausewitz recognized, be limited in its aims.” The United States and the Soviet Union acknowledged limits during the Cold War, prompting both sides to develop their conventional forces as the first and, hopefully, only method of engagement if war materialized.

Assuming that world leaders are rational players in
the game of geo-politics, the first use of nuclear weapons would be a paradigm shift that pushes war into what Clausewitz portrayed as “something pointless and devoid of sense.” Such tensions troubled NATO in the 1960’s, driving the alliance to adopt the strategy of flexible response, while France withdrew from the organization. Fifty years later, as NATO once again faces a Russian threat, it is neither credible nor acceptable to rely on nuclear weapons to deter the escalation of a grey zone crisis. If a war is fought over Baltic sovereignty, it will be conventional forces that will have to win the day because NATO will be hesitant to release nuclear weapons. The threat of nuclear war between Russian and the United States would serve as incentive to keep conflict both conventional and contained to the Baltic States. Ultimately, NATO requires a consolidated approach of intertwining methods to fight and win a war within the Baltic region that is below the nuclear level.

Rapid and Effective Response to Initial Provocation

A fast Russian intrusion into the Baltic region with massive conventional forces can be immediately answered with like force from NATO. However, if Russia uses hybrid warfare to ambiguously start operations in the Baltics, then a whole of society approach, relying on a unified Baltic population, is required to effectively counter nefarious activities. Uniting Baltic citizens to passively resist Russian incitement will help neutralize hybrid warfare, as it takes away freedom of action to manipulate the population. The ability of Russia to utilize disenfranchised portions of the population to bring about political turmoil, as it did in the Ukraine, is a tactic that can only be countered with Baltic efforts to console their embittered Russian ethnic minorities. If ethnic Russians living inside the Baltic States can be better included in the national identity of the region, then as Maciej Bartkowski highlights in her work on passive defense, the application of “non-violent civilian based defense” efforts would yield the response needed to halt Russian belligerence.

The most effective Baltic response to counter initial provocations by the Russians is to better assimilate the ethnic Russian minority that resides in the Baltic States and serves as the main conduit for Russia to instigate social volatility. Though the Russian minority has dwindled in each Baltic State since the end of the Cold War, Russians still represent a sizable minority with “25.6 percent of the total population in Estonia, 28.8% in Latvia, and 6.4% in Lithuania.” Since the Baltic States have gained independence, Russian ethnic minorities in the Baltic region have experienced difficulty gaining citizenship, particularly in Latvia and Estonia. A STRATFOR global intelligence report indicates, “[R]oughly 7 percent of Estonia’s total population and 13 percent of Latvia’s are non-citizens and barred from voting in national elections.”

Each of the Baltic States cedes air defense responsibilities to stronger regional NATO allies

Though each Baltic government is seeking to better appease its ethnic minorities through cultural concessions, there would be no better way to galvanize the population than to offer easier paths to citizenship. This is the model Lithuania has accepted with the “jus soli principle of citizenship or the ‘right of the soil’ principle.” This policy provides citizenship to every person born in the country, regardless of parental nationality. Differing from the more inclusive Lithuanian policy, Estonia and Latvia have enacted the policy of “jus sanguinis, or the ‘right of blood’ principle.” Through this policy, citizenship is determined by the origins of the parents and not by a child’s birth. The successful initiatives undertaken by the Lithuanian government may instill a sense of nationalism into all of its citizens. A similar program initiated in Estonia and Latvia would help integrate ostracized Russian minorities into society. A populace in solidarity denies Russia a mechanism to generate social unrest and better allows passive resistance techniques to take hold against ambiguous Russian incursions.

National unity in each Baltic State would make possible the non-violent resistance of all citizens in the event of externally motivated civic unrest or a foreign incursion. NATO must encourage Baltic defense officials to work with local Baltic community organizers and activists “to develop ground mechanisms for the rapid deploy-
2014, a newly formed group titled “European Russians in Latvia” was created with the aims of “counterbalancing” extremist elements of the Russian community and supporting Latvia’s “orientation toward the West.” Continued immigration reform and inclusion policies by the Baltic governments will promote a true heterogeneous society that is capable of implementing passive resistance to effectively respond to initial Russian provocations.

A Baltic desire to build a multi-cultural society based on trust and common citizenship will not only establish a first line defense against foreign powers, it will serve as respectable gesture to the Russian government to value the contributions of Russian heritage in forging a new national identity. In a best-case scenario, Putin may view Baltic reconciliation efforts as an acknowledgment of continued Russian relevance, providing the ego-stroke Putin would need to deescalate hostilities. If Baltic-Russian relations deteriorate to the point of open hostilities, then civil passive resistance techniques can be developed “independently” of more traditional kinetic defense options, and “NATO could wage them at different times depending on whether it faces a hybrid or conventional assault.”

It is in the best interests of NATO to promote passive civil defense techniques, as it provides the alliance with a tactic that can stand-alone or be integrated into an overlapping network of defensive methods for the Baltics. NATO Director of Intelligence, Rear Admiral Heimbigner, suggested that through key leader engagements and closer cooperation, NATO could help to create the context for greater political inclusion and regional stability that serves to enhance collective defense. Progressive reforms undertaken by the Baltic governments will likely garner world commendation and set the conditions necessary for passive civil defense to flourish. These actions can deny Russia the tempestuous environment required to launch hybrid warfare and effectively halt initial Russian provocations before escalating into violent action.

Efficiency through Unity of Effort

The threat of Russian aggression extends beyond the Baltic States and potentially threatens the sovereignty of all countries within the NBP9. Fortunately, the combined gross domestic product (GDP) of the NBP9 is $2.3 trillion, which exceeds the Russian GDP by approximately $600 billion. These countries have the means, resources, and technologic edge to defend against a Russian assault. However, this essential core of nations is split – “into NATO and non-NATO, EU and non-EU...heavy spenders on defense and free riders.” The United States has increased its efforts to merge disparate interests in the high north with the founding of the Enhanced Partnership in Northern Europe (e-PINE) in 2003, to focus on “cooperative security,” “healthy societies,” and “vibrant economies.” While the United States’ establishment of e-PINE has improved engagement with the member states of Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, and Sweden, the “forum for policy coordination” has not produced the tangible security requirements necessary to assure allies and deter aggression.

However, there is a successful multi-lateral arrangement between the Nordic nations that has produced tangible steps towards implementing a cooperative defense that seeks long-term solutions to complex problems. The structure called Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFCO) is comprised of all five Nordic Nations, with their main purpose being “to strengthen the participating nations’ national defense, explore common synergies and facilitate efficient common solutions.” The essence of NORDEFCO is to glean efficiencies through commonality in acquisitions, procedures, and intelligence sharing.

For the countries of Sweden and Finland, NORDEFCO provides defense cooperation with neighboring countries “without having to confront the messy and complex issues of membership” within NATO. Both Finland and Sweden have been members of NATO’s Partnership for Peace program since 1994, but have not applied to be full participating members of the alliance. Despite reluctance to join NATO, both countries are increasing their military cooperation within NORDEFCO and their Baltic neighbors. In 2015, Sweden proposed to NORDEFCO “the feasibility of assembling a modular-style Nordic-Baltic Battle Group (NBBG)” be examined to better safeguard the stability of the Arctic and Baltic region. The integration of Finland and Sweden into a smart defense of the Baltic region would have serious consequences for Russian offensive plans.

Within the maritime realm, Sweden and Finland preside over the strategically important Gotland Island and Aland Islands within the Baltic Sea. These islands are strategically located within the Baltic Sea and can be used to cover the forcible entry of NATO forces in a Baltic Russian war scenario. Furthermore, these islands can potentially host an array of lethal systems to include surface to air missiles, naval mines, and anti-ship cruise missiles that can counter the anti-access/area denial capability that emanates from the Russian semi-enclose of Kaliningrad. NATO should encourage greater participation of Finland and Sweden in security cooperation endeavors by offering the flexible terms inherent in the NORDEFCO memorandum of understanding. NATO implementation of a NORDEFCO model to bound the NBP9 countries in a cooperative framework—one that allows “countries to pick and choose the activities and forms of cooperation they find most appealing”—will further advance “interoperability” and “cost efficiency” to enable unity of effort in facing the Russians.

Deny Russia the Quick Victory

A smart defense for the Baltics requires planners to utilize the principles of economy of force to withstand…
Russian superior numbers and advantageous logistic footing. The hard reality facing NATO is that permanently garrisoning foreign troops on Baltic territories will violate an international treaty signed between the alliance and Russia. Basing rights are a “delicate question” as the 1997 Founding Act between NATO and Russia maintains “permanent foreign troops” will not be stationed in new NATO member states. Blatant NATO disregard for the Founding Act may force Russia to preemptively attack the Baltic States before permanent forces take root. Additionally, failing to honor the treaty will negate all hopes of lowering tensions with Russia to once again normalize relations.

Even if NATO is comfortable with placing troops in the Baltics on a rotational basis, there is still the question of materializing the sizable force required to deter, and if necessary defeat, Russian forces in a budget constrained and overly obligated alliance. The recent announcement that the United States would deploy an additional armored brigade to Eastern Europe increasingly displays NATO commitment to Baltic security; however, an additional 4,500 troops cannot alone match the sheer volume of troops, and speed of their deployment, the Russians can commit to a conflict in the Baltics. If 60 hours is the current estimated rate for Russian forces to reach the edge of Tallinn and Riga, then renewed focus must center on strengthening the organic Baltic States’ defense forces in combination with increasing NATO troop rotations to the Baltics.

The Baltic States have been active partners within the NATO alliance. All three countries have sent military forces to Iraq and have participated in NATO operations in Afghanistan. Though each country’s gross domestic product (GDP) is relatively small, the Baltic States are striving to meet the NATO mandate that all alliance members spend two percent of their GDP on defense. Estonia currently meets the two percent expenditure requirement, with Latvia recently pledging to increase its defense expenditures to two percent and Lithuania committing to 1.5 percent of its GDP.

Understanding they lack the budget and infrastructure to support an air force, each of the Baltic States cedes air defense responsibilities to stronger regional NATO allies. The Baltic States actively make up for their deficiencies in air policing by regularly participating in NATO “out-of-area operations.” When it comes to defending their sovereign territory, the Baltics should take a similar approach and relinquish the procurement of heavy mechanized forces to larger NATO countries. In place of matching Russian armor formations with comparable force, the Baltic States must develop a niche asymmetrical capability that capitalizes on speed, mobility, and lethality to counter the predictably larger Russian force.

The Baltic defense forces are keenly aware of the Russian military’s success during their conflict with Georgia in what has come to be known as the 5-Day War. Specifically, Baltic defense officials are reviewing how Georgian armor fared against Russian forces. The highest percentage of Georgian military equipment destroyed by the Russians during the conflict was tanks. Georgian armor units suffered for a variety of reasons to include lack of trained tanks crews and poor maintenance. Another factor that contributed to Georgian tank losses was the dynamic use of light anti-tank weapons on the part of the Russians and local militias within South Ossetia. At the very beginning of the conflict, South Ossetia forces destroyed three Georgian tanks with the employment of Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG) -7 weapons systems. Further on in the conflict, Russian Airborne Forces operating two stalled BMP-1 vehicles delayed an entire Georgian engineer convoy with the use of RPGs and the BMP-1’s small 73mm cannons. What the Baltic States are learning from the battle “is that they need lots of anti-tank missiles.” In 2013, the three Baltic States spent a combined $63 million to purchase Carl Gustav anti-tank rockets from Sweden. The Baltic States are also acquiring US manufactured anti-tank Javelin missiles, with Estonia purchasing $55 million worth of the missiles in 2014 and Lithuania seeking to purchase $55 million in missiles in 2016. NATO training efforts in the Baltics must expand on the strides the Baltic States have already made in preparing their light infantry to face off against Russian armor.

According to the Rand Report titled, Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank, it would take approximately 10 days for NATO heavy armor to start reinforcing the Baltic States from Grafenwoehr, Germany. If the Baltic States prepare for a war fashioned on mobile strike and guerilla action, it would be feasible to delay Russian forces from capturing the entire Baltic territory, giving NATO reinforcements the toehold needed to begin a counter-offensive. To do this the Baltic States will have to accept some hard truths: mainly the Baltic population centers will be destroyed and/or occupied by Russian forces. The static defense of Baltic cities would most likely turn them into urban wastelands and spell defeat for the Baltic militaries. However, if Baltic forces followed the partisan model during Soviet occupation, they could establish bases of operation in the Baltic wilderness and use guerilla tactics to delay the Russians. This would cede Baltic territory to the Russians, but the Baltic military would continue to operate.

Another facet of this type of strategy that may be difficult for the Baltic States to accept is they will likely bear the initial blunt of casualties for the NATO alliance. This is not to say NATO forces will be absent during the opening days of war; however, NATO operations would be limited in scale, involving special operations forces and company sized landing teams to assist with forward air control missions and intelligence collection. Significant NATO reinforcements would only come after much of the Baltic territory is presumably in ruins. While accepting
the costs of a mobile defense would be difficult for Baltic political leadership, the alternative maybe even more damaging. Asking NATO to hold Russian forces firmly outside the borders of the Baltic States would require deep strikes within Russia with either conventional, or worst, tactical nuclear weapons. If this occurred, it is safe to assume Russia will respond harshly in the Baltics and will likely use tactical nuclear weapons on Baltic territory. An asymmetric defense of the Baltics would be violent and destructive; however, implementing this strategy will make the opening days of conflict equally painful for Russian forces while giving NATO the time required to mount an adequate counterattack.

Conclusion

An assumption of this paper is the first use of nuclear weapons in a conflict between NATO and Russia is unpalatable for either side. Thankfully, there seems to be historical precedent for this statement as no nation has employed nuclear weapons since the Second World War. The policy of flexible response provided Western leaders with scalable options to deter Soviet aggression that did not automatically default to a nuclear option. Likewise, a present day NATO defense of the Baltics cannot inevitably mean the employment of nuclear weapons against Russian forces. In a Baltic Russian War scenario, the threat from either side to employ nuclear weapons would alert Russian and NATO strategic forces and threaten the northern hemisphere with general nuclear war. Western politicians would likely find it difficult to convince their constituents that risking New York and London for the sake of Tallinn and Riga would be a worthwhile endeavor.

The Baltic States are full NATO members and may be dismayed over Western leaders’ reluctance to defend Baltic territory using all available means and to their aversion of possible Russian retaliatory strikes on Western countries. The reality of the situation is Western leaders would likely try to contain any a Russian/Baltic conflict squarely within the Baltic region—not wishing to further escalate the war. If NATO were to unambiguously threaten all out nuclear war against a Russian incursion into Baltic territory, it may increase the deterrence factor into a Russian calculation. However, if Russia calls the Western bluff and invades, NATO is left with the sole grim option of responding with nuclear weapons. It is very likely Western political resolve will be too weak to initiate the first use of nuclear weapons or even conventional attacks into sovereign Russian territory. Even if the West does initiate strikes (conventional or nuclear) into Russia, it can safely be assumed the Baltic States will be devastated by Russian retaliatory strikes.

Thus, NATO planners must accept the ground truth of ensuring security by preparing a smart defense, which involves several overlapping layers of Baltic protection, below the nuclear threshold, to defeat Russian aggression within Baltic territory. The solutions provided in this paper—passive civil resistance, unity of effort, and mobile (guerrilla) defense—give NATO customizable options to defend against Russian aggression in the Baltics. Using the three solutions in conjunction with each other creates an effective network of defense, which consequently increases deterrence.

The first and most important step to the implementation of this system is Baltic reconciliation with its ethnic Russian minorities. This step lays the foundation for implementing an effective communal resistance to foreign meddling. It also forces the adversary to reveal their intentions with more blatant, conventional means by denying the opportunity for ambiguous methods of subversion.

An unambiguous Russian assault into the Baltics can initially be countered by asymmetrical kinetic action. The end state for Baltic militaries must be an adequate delay of Russian forces to allow for the influx of NATO reinforcements. The means to accomplish this will be through a mobile defense that capitalizes on the lethality of anti-tank weapons, mines, and precision strikes assisted by joint terminal attack controllers (or like capability). To ensure the commonality of weapons, procedures, and planning for a Baltic campaign, NATO must facilitate a regionalized approach for defense integration that synchronizes the efforts of the Nordic States, the Baltic region, and Poland.

National determination is a key trait amongst Baltic citizens who will undoubtedly resist any infringement upon their sovereignty. However, for the Baltic citizens’ fight to be effective against foreign occupation, their efforts must be organized in a congruent manner to establish a smart defense of the Baltic region. If NATO wishes to protect Baltic independence, then it must be prepared to fight and win inside the Baltics. Expansion of fighting outside of Baltic territory is a response option for NATO only after Russia decides to broaden the conflict. NATO’s ability to defeat Russian forces within the Baltics places the burden of escalation upon the Russians and will ultimately cause them to abandon Baltic ambitions according to traditional deterrence theory.

About the Author

Major A.J. Goldberg is an intelligence officer at the Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. He is a graduate of Villanova University and earned a masters degree in military science at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. Major Goldberg has served as an intelligence officer in tactical and operational units in the Marine Corps and joint commands. He has deployed in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as multiple contingency response actions.
Editor’s Note: Lieutenant Colonel Haynes’ thesis won the FAO Association writing award at the Joint Forces Staff College. This version is published without the author’s research notes. To see the complete thesis, visit www.faoa.org. The Journal is pleased to bring you this outstanding scholarship.

Disclaimer: The contents of this submission reflect my original views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

Introduction

The Command, Control, Battle Management Communication (C2BMC) System located in an undisclosed Air and Army Missile Defense Command Operations Center lights up with early detection of multiple launches and begins tracking an impending large raid of ballistic missiles posing an imminent threat to the region. Chaos ensues as the staff alerts the Joint Forces Commander of the threat and begins orchestrating the defense battle plan. Battle control managers begin diligently coordinating extremely time-sensitive engagement decisions based upon a pre-planned prioritized defended asset list, and initiate taskings to the limited amount of interceptors available to thwart the raid.

Nearby, a regional strategic partner’s Air and Missile Defense Operations Center with a network of theatre ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems has yet to be alerted of the imminent threat to the region. Chaos ensues as the staff alerts the Joint Forces Commander of the threat and begins orchestrating the defense battle plan. Battle control managers begin diligently coordinating extremely time-sensitive engagement decisions based upon a pre-planned prioritized defended asset list, and initiate taskings to the limited amount of interceptors available to thwart the raid.

In Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD): Vision 2020, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey provided a strategic overview of the future of IAMD in addressing such a scenario as described above. General Dempsey’s message paints a picture of an evolving and increasingly capable threat within an expanding battle space emerging at a time when the United States government and the Department of Defense (DoD) face difficult budgetary challenges constraining our ability to meet the increased IAMD capability demands of our Combatant Commands.

Further, allied and partner nations have a sustaining desire in IAMD capabilities for protection of their own national interests, and are looking to cooperate with the United States to enhance their security against globally expanding threats. General Dempsey prescribed the need to establish agreements and partnerships with our strategic partners, to leverage and distribute information regardless of source or classification to our own forces as well as selected partners, and to establish as the IAMD baseline an interdependent and interoperable system of systems to include U.S. and partner nation capabilities.

The General’s expectations in IAMD 2020 Vision derive from U.S. national security strategic guidance directing Combatant Commanders to identify and pursue opportunities to integrate and enhance interoperability with our strategic partners within their geographic regions. In support of vital United States Security Interests, the DoD must make critical cost benefit assessments while engaging with Allied and Partner nations to cooperatively develop BMD systems and enhance interoperability of all nation’s BMD assets through the establishment of an effective, efficient, and fully integrated Command and Control system.

The Current Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) Environment

The BMDS provides a multi-layered defense capability for both homeland defense and regional theater defense. The operational battle space is divided into a Boost/Ascent Defense Segment, Midcourse Defense Segment, and Terminal Defense Segment (see Figure 1). The Terminal Defense Segment is sub-divided and defended with systems operating in lower-tier and upper-tier atmospheric zones. The BMDS operates as a “system of systems” consisting of three functional areas (see Figure 1): (1) Sensors, which are comprised of land, sea and space-based radar and surveillance systems for ballistic missile threat detection and tracking;
(2) Interceptors, which are defensive missiles designed to intercept/defeat theater, regional and intercontinental ballistic missiles; and (3) a C2BMC system that integrates the individual BMD elements, manages the network of Sensors, provides operational situational awareness and communications to the Combatant Commanders and lower-echelon war fighters, and enables planning for BMD operations. As currently constructed and operated, C2BMC is a misnomer, as the interceptor systems are network-linked for communication and situational awareness to the Unified Combatant Command operational centers; however, “control” is commanded by individual fire control systems at the tactical level. The Missile Defense Agency is the technical authority with system-level responsibility for integrating the BMDS, while the elements are operated by U.S. military personnel assigned to the Unified Combatant Commands.

To provide viable regional missile defense architectures, MDA is focused on “integration of national sensors into a single network, reliable and seamless command, control and communications and coordination of national missile defense capabilities” with our strategic partners. The MDA-developed C2BMC system relies primarily on a Link-16 data exchange system to connect all the BMDS Sensors with U.S. theater, national, and regional commands. The Link-16 messaging system enables an operational-level view of missile launch detection and tracking from the ballistic missile operating areas of greatest interest. Currently, Link-16 messaging provides only situational awareness to operational systems. However, future upgrades to BMDS are intended to provide launch-on-remote (LOR) and engage-on-remote (EOR) capability to the system. LOR and EOR technology upgrades provide upper-tier elements tracking data with enough fidelity to point and shoot in the right direction prior to their organic sensors picking up the track, thereby expanding the battle space. These LOR and EOR upgrades are critical, as advances in adversaries’ weapons technologies presents “challenge(s) of detecting, tracking, and engaging these systems (and) has compressed response times and decision cycles.”

**Integration of Foreign Partner Systems into the BMDS**

In the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates described U.S. strategy as follows: “a primary U.S. emphasis is on ensuring appropriate burden sharing. The Administration recognizes that allies do not view the specifics of the missile threat in the same way, and do not have equal resources to apply to this problem, but there is general recognition of a growing threat and the need to take
steps now to address both existing threats and emerging ones.” The 2010 report outlines the United States’ BMDS strategy to pursue a phased adaptive approach in a regional context, working with allies and partners to strengthen integrated architectures tailored to the unique requirements of each region. However, regional integrated architectures are very early in development, and will take time, resources and diplomacy to mature. “Regional IAMD architectures are not built in a day or on a whim. Painstaking establishment of bi- and multi-lateral agreements forged through cooperation and communication will pave the way for more effective regional IAMD.”

Allied and strategic partner cooperation concentrates predominantly in the Terminal Defense Segment to provide regional/theater missile defense. The United States has continued to strengthen agreements with varying levels of interoperability with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Israel, Japan, South Korea, and Australia. U.S. allies and strategic partners continue to expand upon regional missile defense capabilities either through procurement of U.S. systems via foreign military sales (FMS); cooperative development with the U.S., as in the case of Japan with the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor, and Israel with the Iron Dome system; or development of their own systems such as South Korea with its Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) system. Figure 2 illustrates Allied and strategic partner regional ballistic

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<th>Country</th>
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<th>U.S.-Owned Systems Hosted:</th>
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<td>Denmark</td>
<td>PAC-2 and PAC-3 batteries</td>
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<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>PAC-2 battery</td>
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<td>France</td>
<td>Future: Developing short-range BMD capacity that could soon be operational</td>
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<td>2 PAC-2 batteries</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Systems purchased from the United States:</td>
<td>Systems purchased from the United States:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 PAC-2 batteries</td>
<td>6 PAC-2 batteries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Systems purchased from the United States:</td>
<td>AN/TPY-2 Radar and 12 Multinational PAC-3 units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AN/TPY-2 Radar</td>
<td>AN/TPY-2 Radar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other systems: DOD officials said that Israeli BMDS will be provided to the United States through the United States</td>
<td>Other systems: DOD officials said that Israeli BMDS will be provided to the United States through the United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10 PAC-3 batteries</td>
<td>Future: THAAD equipment delivery by end of 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>Systems purchased from the United States:</td>
<td>Future: THAAD equipment delivery by end of 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 Ships equipped with Aegis BMD and SM-3 interceptors, PAC-2 and PAC-3 batteries</td>
<td>Future: THAAD equipment delivery by end of 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Systems purchased from the United States:</td>
<td>Systems purchased from the United States:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 Ships equipped with Aegis BMD and SM-3 interceptors, PAC-2 and PAC-3 batteries</td>
<td>4 Ships equipped with Aegis BMD and SM-3 interceptors, PAC-2 and PAC-3 batteries</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 2: Allied Contribution to Regional BMD**
Impediments to “Seamless” Command and Control

Integration and interoperability is not a new challenge for BMDS development. Integrating a system of systems operated and developed by multiple defense contractors for different Service Departments with unique requirements, processes, and priorities is no easy feat. The DoD faces greater political and technical challenges when expanding integration and interoperability requirements with either foreign-developed systems or for operation in multi-national command centers. Further, application of the U.S.’s BMDS phased adaptive approach strategy to tailor the architecture to the unique requirements of the particular region creates additional complexity since no cross-domain command and control system solution exists.

From a broad political sense, foreign disclosure matters present challenges for implementation of architecture solutions regardless of region. The DoD’s August 2013 Report to Congress on Regional Ballistic Missile Defense stated a key consideration for cooperative development of regional deterrence architectures will be how to address foreign disclosure requirements with each BMD partner. To this end, MDA International Security Policy states “foreign disclosure planning must be incorporated into all MDA programs and initiatives that might involve foreign governments, international organizations, or foreign entities.” The challenge C2BMC faces is that it is not the originating class authority (OCA) for the majority of the performance data of the representative BMDS systems. In other words, C2BMC ingests actual or near-representative performance data from various BMDS element capabilities, as well as ballistic missile threat data secured from various forms of intelligence-gathering capabilities, but does not have authority for designating the data classification level. Release of this data for integration with foreign command and control or planner systems, or display of this information in multi-nation command centers requires buy-in and approval from multiple stakeholders.

Technical and foreign disclosure authorities at the element level have a narrow view when making cost/benefit calculations of data releasability for their system. Data that reveals qualitative reliability performance measures generates the greatest concern at the element level. Furthermore, cross-domain solutions for data labeling are non-existent, thus classification levels of data elements available from C2BMC system get broadly labeled as SECRET NOFORN. The challenge will only grow in complexity when future development spirals of C2BMC integrate and display tracking data sourced from advanced Sensor systems with higher security classifications. As a result of these challenges, Combatant Commanders face difficult decisions with nebulous data when trying to implement strategic guidance to integrate foreign partner capabilities into the equation.

FMS restrictions of our most advanced technologies in weapons systems hinder integration and interoperability of command and control systems with our regional partners. EOR and LOR technologies required to maximize engagement coordination is currently restricted to U.S. weapons systems. Without EOR and LOR capabilities enabled in the weapons systems, the best our advanced warning information can provide our strategic partners is a spot in the sky to look at in preparation for the threat to come into view of their radar. These limitations severely hinder any advantage of engagement coordination with our allied and strategic partners.

In regions and partnerships where foreign releasability is less restrictive, technical issues hinder implementation of a fully integrated command and control solution. In the European Command Theater, the Obama Administration has adopted a four-phase initiative dubbed the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to deploy U.S. missile defense capability providing regional defense under the NATO umbrella. “Link-16 will network the two relocatable TPY-2s planned for Europe and space-based satellites and airborne sensors with Aegis BMD ships, the Aegis Ashore system, and the air operations and C2BMC command center in Ramstein, Germany. Altogether, this network will expand the coverage area to allow missiles to engage on remotely obtained sensor data.” Interoperability with NATO’s Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) to serve as a command and control communications network is a key part of this initiative. However, integration of ballistic missile defense systems owned by our NATO Allies is inadequately addressed in the EPAA architecture. These systems are not sufficiently advanced in technology to take advantage of sensor information provided by Link-16 for LOR or EOR operations, and thus provide marginal contribution or cost benefit to the regional defense umbrella.

Another impediment to seamless command and control is a lack of a standard interface communication schema. Air and Missile Defense Mission Planning systems are a relevant and representative example of this interoperability challenge (see Figure 3). Mission planning systems are developed for each of the elements by the Service Departments. For example, Patriot, Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) and AEGIS all have their own tactical-level defense planners. The Navy and Army have also developed operational-level planners residing in Operations Control Centers that interface with the tactical element planning systems to provide a multi-element integrated defense planning capability. The Air Force is developing its own operational planner to integrate air and missile defense plans. C2BMC also has an operational-level planner that interfaces with the Service’s operational planning systems to provide a BMDS-level operational
planning capability for the Combatant Commands. A diagram illustrating how these systems interoperate and communicate is provided as Figure 3.

The issue illustrated in Figure 3 is the various communication language protocols used between each system. As an example, the C2BMC Planner has three different language protocols (CIXS 3.5; CIXS 3.6; and MD NS 6.4) it must communicate in to interface with other planning systems. Several of the interfaces were designed to the limitations of the systems, in lieu of a common standard defining the communication protocol for system development. Further, the operational planning systems have independent development cycles with databases that lag in representing the most recent fielded Element capabilities. Thus, red (threat) and blue (friendly) force data passed from the C2BMC Planner to the element tactical-level planning systems via the Service’s operational planners go through multiple translators and conversions, and are binned into generic categories rather than illustrated specifically in the output defense design. Integration of foreign-developed systems that are generally less advanced in technology will further complicate the matter.

**Figure 3: BMDS Mission Planning System Interoperability Diagram**

**Recommendations to Better Command and Control Interoperability**

The U.S. and its strategic partners face critical cost benefit investment decisions in order to expand the BMDS capability. “Command and control interoperability makes for cost effective burden sharing, especially in this era of declining defense budgets.” Cost-effective political determinations in the political area of foreign disclosure/releasability, and cross-domain technical standards and improvements would enhance command and control interoperability with our allies and strategic partners.

In coordination with other U.S. Government Departments, the Department of Defense should lead an intergovernmental review panel to conduct a strategic-level enterprise assessment of foreign disclosure/releasability of BMDS data and provide for recommendation to the heads of Defense, State and Homeland Security Departments for approval. A thorough cost/benefit analysis should be conducted as part of this review to assess the expansion of capability of our partner BMDS assets against any increased risk/vulnerability from disclosure of information. The strategic view should present a global view of how interoperability improvements will
enhance the BMDS capability to defend against threats to regional security. The recommendations from the review should be codified in bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements with our strategic partners. Following the results of this strategic review, the Department of Defense should task and fund MDA as the technical authority to establish standards and invest in technical improvements to command and control system architectures to facilitate the safe/secure handling and communication of data across joint and partner-nation systems. An interoperability standards technical review board should be established to define and institute universal BMDS requirements for cross-domain data classification/releasability marking standards and common machine-to-machine communication language protocols. These common standards will facilitate sharing of data across our BMDS systems and provide a common protocol for integration with foreign systems.

Technical improvements should also be made to design capabilities into system elements and the BMDS architecture to allow foreign release authority filtering capability, enabling users to share data that has already been cleared with a pre-determined disclosure authority. This filtering capability will allow Combatant Commanders to share real-time information with strategic partners, eliminating on-site man-in-the-loop decision requirements from a foreign disclosure authority and optimize situational awareness in an operational scenario. Finally, technology improvements should be provided to foreign partners per the policies determined from the strategic review to establish those systems as viable contributors to the BMDS architecture.

Counter Points

In the current resource-constrained environment, critics may argue investments should be made in procuring as many advanced interceptors as possible to counter any particular threat. This view fails to consider the calculus involved with the growing threat as adversaries increase their arsenal and global reach. “No longer can the United States reasonably expect to unilaterally defeat most air and missile threats with its own active defense systems or to outpace growing threat capabilities by outspending all of its potential adversaries.” Cross-domain investments into technical standards and improvements would enhance command and control interoperability with our allies and strategic partners. In conjunction, loosening FMS export restrictions and application of diplomatic pressures to our allies to share in the cost would more efficiently address the necessary expansion in capacity required.

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Conclusion

Investments in cooperative development and diplomacy to enhance BMDS interoperability with strategic partners to enable a fully integrated Command and Control system will advance the security of the United States and better mitigate the growing adversarial threat. In Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD): Vision 2020, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey clearly outlined the need to expand the C2BMC architecture to incorporate allied and strategic partner capabilities into the BMDS architecture. Putting this vision into action requires continued global strategic thinking to make the right cost benefit investment decisions. The decisions are less resource constrained than politically constrained by entities with limited global views. Forging ahead to realize General Dempsey’s vision of an IAMD baseline with interdependent and interoperable system of systems to include U.S. and partner nation capabilities requires the continued leadership at the top levels of the U.S. Government. Breaking down the barriers of foreign disclosure and data releasability, and investing in C2BMC architecture improvements, provides future war fighting commanders with the most efficient and effective Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense System required to counter a ballistic missile raid scenario within their regional area of responsibility.

About the Author

Lieutenant Colonel Jason P. Haynes is an Acquisition Program Manager at the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Armament Development Systems, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. Previous assignments include multiple tours as a squadron commander and maintenance officer assigned to the 908th Airlift Wing, 919th Special Operations Aircraft Maintenance Group, 729th Airlift Mobility Operations Group, 100th Airlift Wing, 16th Special Operations Wing, and the 52nd Fighter Wing, as well as multiple deployments in support of Operations DESERT STORM, PROVIDE COMFORT, ALLIED FORCE, and ENDURING FREEDOM.
Editor's Note: In the interest of space we publish this thesis without research notes. To see the full thesis with all research materials, please visit www.faoa.org. The Journal is pleased to bring you this outstanding scholarship.

Overview

The United States faces many challenges to its national security interests today from nation-states as well as from non-state actors. Of these, religious extremist terrorism from Islamic groups presents the most complex danger. The use of porous borders across the Western Hemisphere to infiltrate trained and capable terrorist operatives into the U.S. is one aspect of this complex problem set. The introduction of harmful materials across the U.S. border with Mexico is another facet of the threat. The precarious levels of security in Central America and Mexico, combined with the lack of resources applied to combating the expansion of sophisticated criminal organizations, provides an opportunity for extremist terrorist groups to inflict harm on the U.S.

Terrorism, however, is not a tactic only used by religious-based extremist groups. Ideologically-based organizations in Latin America flourished in the latter half of the 20th century in countries like Colombia and Peru, and used terrorist tactics to attempt to influence political change. Even today, former insurgency groups use terrorist tactics across the Western Hemisphere to achieve their ends. Latin American terrorism today is no longer driven by ideology, but rather is directly linked to drug trafficking and to a myriad of other transnational illicit activities. The increase in the trafficking of drugs from South America, through Central America and the Caribbean, into the U.S. has transformed the security environment in the hemisphere. The rise of powerful Transnational Crime Organizations (TCO) that enlist the services of Latin American terrorist groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and Shining Path (SL) of Peru, to secure and facilitate their operations, has led to the virtual dismemberment of citizen security in the Americas.

Transnational organized crime (TOC) in Latin America has developed rapidly since the U.S. war on drugs began in the 1980s. What started as family-run drug trafficking ventures, and later morphed into more sophisticated drug trafficking organizations of the early 21st century, are now intricate multinational corporations. These organizations traffic globally not only in drugs but in persons, weapons and a myriad of illicit goods as well. Latin American TOC networks are vast and influential, with reach into government, police and the military. Today’s TCOs are businesses focused primarily on maximizing their profits and exploiting the demand for the products they provide. Additionally, some of the most prolific TCOs, such as Sinaloa, the Zetas and other Mexican cartels, aim to achieve power and control over local and regional government organizations where these groups operate and are rivals to each other.

The trafficking of cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and forms of manufactured substances is the primary source of revenue for these organizations. The insatiable U.S. drug market helps to explain the existence of the grid of infiltration routes and related support networks that expand from the Pacific to the Caribbean Basin, and are balanced on the land avenues of approach across the U.S.-Mexico border. These complex webs exist to produce, transport and distribute the product into the U.S. and the profits back to the drug lords.

The convergence of TCO and Latin American terrorist organizations is well known, but the existence of a possible nexus between the same TCOs and Islamic extremist terrorist groups is still undetermined. Although there have been cases of Islamic extremist terrorism in the Americas, such as the 1992 and 1994 bombings in Argentina by Iran-backed Hezbollah, and the 2014 arrest of a suspected Hezbollah operative in Peru, the intent of these attacks or plans to conduct attacks differed from those of other Islamic extremist groups. Hezbollah’s actions in the region are primarily focused on terrorism financing for their own operations elsewhere.

The exploitation of TOC networks into the U.S. by extremist terrorist groups could take place with or without the knowledge of these criminal organizations. Extremist terrorist groups could potentially use TOC networks to smuggle operatives to conduct terrorist acts against the U.S. or its interests in the Latin American region. These
networks could also be used to launder operational funds and harbor terrorist activities such as training camps and recruiting sources in the U.S. and the rest of the region. Finally, extremist terrorist organizations may use existing TCO networks to introduce a weapon of mass destruction or elements of such a device to be deployed inside U.S. territory.

The U.S. government and many of its partners in Latin America have developed separate strategies to combat TOC as well as terrorism in the Americas, but these do not focus on the confluence with Islamic extremist terrorism in the Americas. The possible emergence of collaboration, willing or not, between Islamic extremist terrorism and TOC in Latin America could force a strategic shift to the south. Such a close and imminent threat has the potential to generate a strong policy response from the U.S., likely triggering a de facto closure of the U.S. southern border. A measure of this magnitude along the border would in turn have a significant impact on the economies of not only the U.S., but also of Mexico and Central America as well. Conversely, it would affect the economic interests of TCOs in the region as well. This loss of access through the U.S.-Mexico border would directly affect the flow of illicit goods and money in either direction, putting at great risk the very existence of the most developed TOC groups.

In such a scenario, all sides have something to lose and it is likely not a desired end state for Latin American TCOs. The possible emergent threat of a nexus between Islamic extremist terrorism and TOC would warrant a reevaluation of the U.S. Homeland Security strategy and a new look at the current allocation of national security resources. Southern U.S. states would likely see an increase in federal support, a restructuring of their collective security posture, and a renewed popular and political focus toward the region. Resources for U.S. partners in the Western Hemisphere to counter terrorist and TOC activities and collaboration would also increase, with more military collaboration and further U.S. involvement in Latin American affairs. Such a convergence would have a direct effect on the political, social and economic state of the Americas, likely putting at risk the great progress that the hemisphere has earned over the past few decades.

Transnational Organized Crime

The rise of TCOs in Latin America was closely tied to the formation and growth of the leftist guerrilla movements of the region during the political turmoil of the 1970s and 1980s. Then, leftist movements became militarized organizations who fought against right-wing dictatorships. Movements such as the FARC and the National Liberation Army (ELN) in Colombia, and SL in Peru, were ideological paramilitary groups who fought to instill political change in their countries. After years of conflict and changes in the Latin American political landscape, these paramilitary groups lost some political legitimacy and relevance. As the war on drugs increased in intensity across the hemisphere, these guerrilla movements and insurgencies saw a strategic shift in their purpose and became part of the drug trade business, working closely with some of the most prominent TCOs, protecting terrain, facilitating production, securing trafficking routes, and moving materials. Latin American TCOs and the former guerrilla movements found synergy and common interests to use the skills developed over decades of war in return for monetary gain. The guerrillas became mercenaries for the drug cartels and entire communities developed as narco-economies, heavily dependent on the production and distribution of illicit substances.

TOC in Latin America is closely associated with the more prominent gangs such as Mara Salvatrucha and 18th Street, including their leadership. Gangs have enjoyed a considerable growth particularly in impoverished urban communities across Central America. Although TCOs and most gangs are generally distinctive groups, they maintain a mutually beneficial association that is like that between the Latin American guerrilla movements and the TCOs. This collaboration provides TCOs with workers to distribute drugs and soldiers to conduct assassinations on their behalf, while providing gangs with useful connections and logistical support. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) assesses that these gangs and the TCOs they are associated with, have become a “transnational concern that demands a coordinated, multinational response to effectively combat [their] increasingly sophisticated networks” which expand their influence and activities cross-border. Both TCO and the associated gangs have well developed logistics networks into the U.S. and follow a sort of business model.

TCOs in the Western Hemisphere thrived in recent decades, adopting 21st century business practices. Their activities include the movement and sale of illicit substances, trafficking of weapons and persons, human smuggling, money laundering and a myriad of other illegal activities that provide them various streams of revenue. The convergence of the former guerrillas with the gangs, the cartels, and the different levels of drug trafficking organizations in support of TCOs create a powerful and influential alliance. Its purpose is primarily to increase profits. These conglomerates are not motivated by ideology but by money and power instead. These profits allow TOCs to gain even more power and influence.

According to the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), illegal TCO activities undermine citizen security and the rule of law, while obstructing economic development and steadily preventing governance. The powerful effects of these TCOs on society and the effectiveness with which these nodes operate, create disruptive waves across whole societies and their institutions. The rapid and violent expansion of “TOC in the Americas has resulted in the “near collapse of societies” in several countries. Although the governments of the
The U.S. Congress to enforce the 2008 Merida Initiative assist involved with, thwart the $2.5 billion designated by the U.S. government officials began to redefine its defense strategy. In the wake of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in New York City and Washington D.C., the U.S. worked to redefine its defense and security strategies.

Terrorism

This paper’s use of the term Latin American terrorism is intended to put under one umbrella those guerrilla movements born in the second half of the 20th century that originally aimed to effect regime change in their respective countries, and which were primarily ideologically motivated with distinct political goals. Similarly, the use of the term Islamic extremist terrorism refers primarily to the various Middle Eastern groups which use terrorist tactics and a version of the Islamic religion to affect political and social change in one way or another. The convergence of Islamic extremist terrorism with TOC networks in Mexico and Central America is the central issue.

All terrorist organizations use various methods to intimidate or influence a sector of a population through the conduct of violent acts designed to instill fear, but not all terrorist groups are motivated by the same themes. Some terrorist groups such as those that originate and are predominant in the Middle East are motivated and driven by religious beliefs, like Al Qaeda or Daesh. These groups also operate globally instead of locally. Other terrorist groups such as ETA in Spain and the Red Brigades in Italy, are or were motivated by a desire to affect political change in their respective geographic areas. Many of these groups evolved through the years and tried to adapt to the changing political context in their regions. Over time, several of these politically-driven terrorist groups such as the Latin American terrorist groups, struggled to maintain their identity and the relevance of their cause. Islamic extremist groups in contrast, maintain constant relevance through the interpretation of their chosen religion.

Latin American terrorist groups, most notably the FARC and SL, were created during the second half of the 20th century as insurgencies aimed to effect political change and counter the wave of right-wing dictatorships passing through the Western Hemisphere. For many years the FARC and SL battled with their respective governments’ militaries and law enforcement agencies to claim their political goals. These and other Latin American guerilla movements were ideologically motivated and had clear political goals within their own territories. These groups did not generally project their power outside of their countries’ borders to further their political goals. For the most part, movements such as the FARC were anti-government insurgencies fighting to liberate their people from what they viewed as oppressive governments, fighting for the poor and the working class. It was later in the dawn of the 21st century that these groups began to use terrorist tactics by targeting civilians and non-combatants in cities and rural areas, and to kidnap for ransom. Initially these groups would kidnap drug traffickers, knowing that their families had the funds to make payment.

Things changed in the 1980s and 1990s however, with the spread of democracy throughout Latin America, and these insurgent groups began to lose their ideological legitimacy. The rise of powerful drug cartels in both Peru and Colombia around the same period provided an opportunity for these groups to survive, since the cartels needed foot soldiers to protect their business. The ideological crises that the Latin American insurgencies were going through propelled these groups to join forces with the drug cartels. Their leftist plight took on a secondary role protecting the drug business. Over time, the relationship between the cartels, the family clans and the insurgencies became mutually beneficial. The insurgents would guarantee and protect the passage of drugs through the territories they controlled in exchange for a tax.

Soon the growing cartels began to employ insurgent units, primarily to protect their shipments outside of their country of origin, and to exert more pressure on government military and security forces. These new activities and tactics changed the character of these organizations and so changed their purpose. More aggressive military campaigns by the sitting governments and their allies, primarily the U.S., also pressured the character of these groups to change. Then, in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in New York City and Washington D.C., the U.S. worked to redefine its defense and security strategies. U.S. government officials began to use the term “narco-terrorism” to define the activities of groups like the FARC, ELN and SL in Latin America,
and these insurgency movements started to officially be considered terrorists.

Since then, the governments of the U.S. and of many Latin American countries have classified several of these guerrilla movements as terrorist organizations because of the tactics they use to intimidate communities, to control trafficking routes, to collect taxes and generally to rule their operational environment. These terrorist organizations however, have a nature and character of their own, and differ greatly from many other terrorist groups around the world. Although the methods of these extremist groups may be similar, including not only violence, but also involvement in drug trafficking and illicit industries, the goals of leftist versus Islamic terrorist groups are quite distinct.

Although Latin American terrorist groups today are part of the threat that TOC represents to U.S. national security and the security of several Latin American countries, these terrorist groups by themselves do not pose a direct threat to U.S. national security. Groups such as the FARC and SL do not aim to inflict harm on the U.S. through the execution of terrorist acts on U.S. soil or against U.S. interests overseas. They do harm the U.S., however, by facilitating drug and other illicit trade into the U.S., Mexico, and Central America by terrorist tactics, but this does not equate to a terrorist threat to the U.S. Terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda and Daesh, however, do intend to cause physical and psychological harm to U.S. targets on its soil and overseas. Their goals, though political and ideological as well, are driven primarily by an extreme religious ideology that guides them to kill non-believers and to terrorize western cultures and other foreign powers in general.

**Islamic Extremist Terrorism**

Islamic extremist terrorist groups such as Daesh (also known as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant or ISIL and Islamic State in Iraq and Al Sham or ISIS), Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah, for example, have clear political goals that they aim to fulfill through the conduct of terrorist activities. Their goals are primarily political but heavily influenced by their religious beliefs. Their goals are also global, in contrast in principle with the local or regional goals of many other terrorist groups, to include Latin American terrorist groups. Daesh, for example, aims to establish a caliphate, as an independent and sovereign nation based solely on Daesh’s interpretation of Islam, “under the rule of a community of religious scholars guided by a supreme leader, the caliph,” believed to be the successor of their prophet.

Al-Qaeda has political goals like Daesh, but their primary wish is to rid what they consider their holy land of non-Muslims. This expulsion of the infidel is closely linked to their goal to establish an “ultra-conservative interpretation of sharia-based governance spanning the Muslim world,” which extends well beyond the Middle East. The global aim and reach of Daesh and Al-Qaeda greatly differentiate them from other terrorist groups. Their aim is to inflict harm upon the U.S. and on U.S. soil if possible, as was done on 11 September 2001 by Al-Qaeda and more recently on 2 December 2015 by Daesh sympathizers in San Bernardino, California.

These two groups present the most serious U.S. national security concern emanating from Latin America along the southern avenues of approach. Although not native to the Western Hemisphere, these groups may take advantage of the region’s porous borders to infiltrate the U.S. Daesh and Al-Qaeda would be the most likely terrorist groups to exploit the vulnerability of a relatively permissive operational environment in Central America and Mexico. Infiltrating the well-established TCOs’ networks and passages into the U.S. would present a significant challenge to the security, defense and intelligence communities charged with protecting the U.S. Organizations such as Hezbollah have already achieved this convergence, but their ends differ from those of Sunni extremist groups.

The Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah is active in Latin America and it has been linked to TCOs in the region. Hezbollah maintains a sophisticated funding campaign and cash flow through the large Lebanese community in Latin America. Despite these facts, Hezbollah’s strategic priorities are different from those of Al-Qaeda or Daesh. Although Hezbollah has operated and conducted attacks in Latin America, their operations in the region today are primarily focused on establishing funding streams back to Lebanon, rather than to conspire against U.S. territory or interests in the Western Hemisphere. This proved convergence, however, has the potential to develop further and become a direct threat to the U.S., particularly as extremist elements may take advantage of the growing Muslim community in Latin America.

The Muslim population of the Western Hemisphere has increased significantly in the past decade and is projected to continue growing. This population is anticipated to increase from 2.3 million in 2010 to an estimated 5.6 million by 2030. As the Muslim population in Latin America grows, so does concern that young men and women will become subject to extremist supporters and recruiters, although there is no clear evidence that the rapid growth of the Muslim faith in the region is linked to religious extremism or terrorist tendencies. Still, extremist views do proliferate in some of these communities. The hotbed for Islamic extremist ideology in Latin America is the Tri-Border area in South America where Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil meet. There are also extremist nodes in all the major Latin American cities. These communities play a critical role in the possible eventual convergence between TOC and extremist Islamic terrorism.

The creation of large Islamic cultural centers throughout the region, funded by foreign governments, inflames concerns that terrorist groups may take advantage of
these facilities to enlist support for their cause. Iran is the primary funding source for Shia mosques in Latin America, while Saudi Arabia funds most Sunni mosques. The overt allocation of resources on the part of these and other governments to fund construction and other projects in Latin America gives way to suspicion that something larger is at play. The Iranian government has been linked to extremist Shia groups in the region, principally Hezbollah. Iran is known to have links to some drug cartels through its diplomatic corps and actions by covert Iranian Revolutionary Guard and Quds Force personnel. Similarly, the presence of Sunni extremist cells within several of these communities is evident and the radicalization of young Muslims takes place throughout the region. Both of these groups take advantage of the region’s “loosely-regulated financial institutions, easy access to forged identification documents, and the drug trade,” to conduct recruiting efforts as well as to collect funds that are filtered back to Islamic extremist organizations.

Despite their methodical similarities, Shia and Sunni extremists have different aims and support different causes. Sunni terrorism aims to harm the U.S. and its interests directly, and therefore presents the most significant threat for the use of TOC networks. Iran-backed Hezbollah, in contrast, is primarily concerned with its foes in Lebanon, Syria and elsewhere, so it launderers funds across the Atlantic to purchase weapons and other military equipment. Both groups have the potential to harm the U.S., its allies and its interests, but the Sunni extremist sector is the most worrisome and the most likely to exploit the current routes into the U.S.

**Evaluation of Risk**

The risk of a convergence of TOC and Islamic extremist terrorism is the use by these terrorists of illicit communications and logistics networks through Central America and Mexico to enter the U.S. undetected. Islamic extremists could use these networks in a variety of ways, smuggling trained operatives to conduct a terrorist attack inside the U.S., laundering operational funds to existing sleeper cells, harboring terrorist activities such as training camps and recruiting sources in or close to the U.S., and introducing a weapon of mass destruction or elements of such a device within U.S. borders. The physical movement of personnel, materiel and equipment through these elaborate networks presents a high risk to U.S. national security.

The existing networks that originate in Central America, travel through Mexico, and end in the U.S., are communication webs developed initially by the drug cartels to introduce their product into the profitable U.S. market. These smuggling routes are also complex communication routes with an elaborate grid of support and security assets to ensure the safekeeping of the cargo. No one TCO owns a specific route, but instead each controls sectors or operational areas on which networks are developed. These organizations tend to be “territory-bound organized crime groups” and aim to control large areas to maintain flexibility. TOC traffics with illegal substances, weapons, money, and people, all of which enter the U.S. through covert routes. Along the way, the organizations’ structures make use of transportistas or coyotes, who ensure that the product arrives safely at its destination.

Smuggling or trafficking activities from Latin America into the U.S. take place over land, by sea, and air. The U.S. Department of Justice estimates that the majority of the illegal drugs that enter the U.S. are smuggled overland, across the southern border, and a lesser amount through the Canadian border. The same arteries used to smuggle drugs into the U.S. are, for the most part, used to smuggle people and Central America is a “global pathway” for human smuggling into the U.S. The indiscriminate smuggling methods used by human smugglers take subjects from all over the world to nine primary crossing areas along the U.S.-Mexico border, from the Rio Grande in Texas, through Tucson in Arizona, to San Diego in California. An estimated 300,000 “irregular immigrants” enter the U.S. clandestinely over the Mexico border each year through these primary areas, helped by well developed TCO networks. The nearly unimpeded movement through the porous borders in the region presents a considerable weakness for terrorist organizations to take advantage of and gain undetected access into the U.S.

The evidence of a convergence between terrorism and TOC is limited, for the most part, to the already explained association with Hezbollah in certain areas of the hemisphere, as well as the association with Latin American terrorist groups. There are instances of collaboration between Al Qaeda and Latin American TOC in West Africa, where Latin American traffickers of drugs work with the terrorist group to smuggle illicit substances to Europe. The extent to which this Al Qaeda link extends to the Americas is still unknown, but the existence of this nexus gives validity to the theory that Islamic extremist groups could take advantage of the existing trafficking networks in the Western Hemisphere. This ongoing collaboration makes the U.S. more vulnerable, particularly given the operational sophistication of the Latin American TCOs and their strong hold in the region.

There are several recent cases that involve the illegal smuggling of Middle Eastern military-age males into the hemisphere. Some of these individuals were detained in Latin America with false documents, which supports theories of a link to TOC, which provided the documents. In November 2015, Honduran authorities detained six Syrians “travelling on doctored Greek passports” from Costa Rica, whose projected destination was the U.S. A month later, six other Syrian individuals were detained in Argentina, also carrying false Greek documentation. Although these cases do not necessarily prove an Islamic extremist terrorist link, they point to the vulnerability of
the hemisphere’s borders and to the operating procedures that extremists could use to gain clandestine access into the U.S.

Such vulnerability is also evident in the case of one of the individuals responsible for the Paris attacks of November 2015, who entered Europe “among migrants registered in Greece.” This connection points to the facility with which anyone with the right networks and $10,000 can cross borders undetected and eventually gain access to the U.S. The most interesting recent case, however, is that of Paris attacks suspect Al Sakhadi Seham, who traveled through Ecuador and Colombia months prior to the terrorist attacks, with a stolen Israeli passport, bribing immigration officials along the way. Such procedures are common practice by TOC in the Americas, who make use of their long-established human trafficking networks to gain access into the U.S. The facility with which a willing foe can exploit these networks presents the biggest challenge to U.S. national security in the region.

The danger of a willing collaboration between TOC and Islamic extremist terrorism is considerable. Such collaboration can be profitable for both parties. Al Qaeda needs money to fund its operations and they obtain it through drug trade into Europe. Latin American drug smugglers need to get the product to Europe, and Al Qaeda is their conduit. It is a mutually beneficial association, although their ideologies and goals are vastly different in the end. This very fact makes the possible association of these same groups in relation to the networks feeding into the U.S. more plausible. This willing association of convenience poses an important risk and a challenge to U.S. authorities, who work to balance the security needs of the country with their duty to protect the U.S.

Such an association, however, presents an existential risk to TCOs and could have a negative impact on their bottom line. As noted previously, the strategic and operational goals of Islamic extremist terrorist organizations are vastly different from those of Latin American criminal organizations. It is not, for example, in the economic interest of Latin American TCOs in general to allow an Islamic extremist terrorist organization to take advantage of the established transnational organized crime communication and logistics networks into the U.S. because such an association would jeopardize the productive business of illegal trafficking. TOC is not a monolithic entity or syndicate, and each organization with a certain level of authority and power may make its own decisions, but organized crime is a business and it is “motivated by a desire to make money.”

TCOs likely estimate that the U.S. response to the known collaboration with Islamic extremist terrorist groups would be considerable. The U.S. response to a significant terrorist event on U.S. soil emanating from Latin America would arguably trigger a unified and strong response. The forceful implementation of immigration laws, the tightening of border security procedures, an increase of resources applied to border security, and an increased domestic political focus on the U.S. southern border, would have a severe monetary impact on Latin American TOC. Such an event would capture the attention of the U.S. public and trigger the enactment of increased security measures in the southern U.S. states. The possible virtual closure of the U.S.-Mexico border and other access routes into the U.S. would greatly affect the profit margins of Latin American TOC, and their financial losses would be devastating. A terrorist attack of these characteristics would also be detrimental to Latin American relations with the U.S. in areas of security, immigration, and commerce.

The most dangerous scenario to the U.S., however, is the possible use of illicit networks into the U.S. by Islamic extremist terrorist groups without the express knowledge of TOC. Total ignorance of such a situation would be impossible. Some actors within the TOC networks would know if Islamic terrorist groups were using their procedures, systems and personnel to gain clandestine access into the U.S. It may be possible, however, for terrorist groups to make use of these networks without the full knowledge of the major TOC players consciously deciding to support religious extremist terrorists. With a history of collaboration, it is possible that certain terrorist groups and TCOs “may procure each others’ smuggling services and remain unaware of each other’s affiliation.”

Although there is currently no evidence of a formal nexus between Islamic terrorist organizations and TOC in Latin America for the purpose of conducting terrorist acts against the U.S., the potential for an unintended association between the two does exist. In a 2014 posture statement to the U.S. Congress, retired Marine General John F. Kelly, then the Commander of SOUTHCOM, declared that TOC posed a serious national security concern to the U.S. for three particular reasons: “the spread of criminal networks into U.S. territory, the public health effect that illicit trafficking poses,” and the potential that terrorist organizations would “seek to leverage those same smuggling routes to move operatives with intent to cause grave harm to our citizens or even quite easily bring weapons of mass destruction into the U.S.”

The possibility of Islamic extremist networks infiltrating the Latin American TOC grid with trained, tactically proficient and motivated terrorists to introduce personnel, weapons or equipment into U.S. territory presents, at a minimum, a vital threat to the U.S. These conditions warrant a re-examination of the efficacy of the U.S. interagency counter-terrorism strategy focused on Latin America and the Caribbean with the inclusion of the U.S. present strategy to counter TOC. The U.S. government currently lacks an “overarching national strategy or policy to address comprehensively the confluence of terrorism and transnational crime.” Such a composite strategy would necessitate a reassessment of the ways and means allocated to both the counter-terrorism and counter-TOC.
initiatives in the Western Hemisphere, not only for the Department of Defense, but more importantly, for the other agencies engaged in this effort, as well as for partner nations in the region.

**U.S. Policy Recommendations**

Joining the current efforts of the governments of the U.S., Mexico and those of the Central American region, as well as those of their neighbors to the south and other powers in Europe and Africa, would give this fight its best chance to succeed. Such a partnership would require the equal and well coordinated efforts of the interagency from each of these countries to ensure that a multilateral approach is effective and absolute. This partnership already exists in many ways, as seen in the work that SOUTHCOM has been engaged in for the past fifteen years, with an all-inclusive approach to countering TOC, but a lack of resources and operational forces diminish its intended effectiveness. The recommendations that follow would propel some of such ongoing efforts in the region to succeed and could empower the exploration of new areas to apply collective effort.

**Make the Western Hemisphere a strategic priority.** From a policy perspective, the U.S. government should reprioritize the importance that it places on the issues threatening the security of the Western Hemisphere. Although there are efforts being made to work with and assist partner nations in their fight against their own existential threats, the U.S. government has not prioritized Latin America in terms of political emphasis, whole of government engagement, and resource allocation. The issue of immigration is at the forefront of the current political rhetoric, but this phenomenon is simply an effect of the many ills that affect the Americas. These ills, which are now directly affecting the U.S., should put Latin America on top of the deck once again.

As was seen during the 2014 flood of over 50,000 unaccompanied children from Central America and Mexico to the U.S. southern border, Latin American families are willingly sending their children across dangerous borders over thousands of miles to escape the terror they live under. This fact and the almost half a million migrants from Central America and Mexico who were intercepted at the Mexico border in 2015, should give the U.S. government cause to reassess its commitment and investment in the development of the region in all areas. The U.S. as a whole has not yet accepted that the negative effects caused by TOC across Latin America are at its doorstep. A confluence of TOC, its networks, and Islamic extremist terrorism in the Americas, together with a lack of proactive and all-inclusive policy measures, adds seriousness to the issue. Raising the level of strategic importance given to Latin America would better position the U.S. to face a terrorist threat originated in the region.

**Unite Effort.** There are numerous U.S. strategies to combat TOC, illegal drugs, violent extremist groups and international terrorism in Latin America and other parts of the world. Efforts such as the Department of Justice’s Law Enforcement Strategy to Combat International Organized Crime, or the Director of National Intelligence’s National Intelligence Strategy and others, come short in their ability to provide effective and efficient solutions because they are, for the most part, unilateral efforts. A 2010 Congressional Research Service report investigating international terrorism and transnational crime, found that surprisingly, “none of these strategies provided the U.S. government with a comprehensive whole-of-government approach to combating the nexus of transnational crime and terrorism.”

Great efforts are being made by various U.S. agencies and departments to battle human smuggling, narco-trafficking, clandestine terrorist travel, money laundering, drug trafficking, and other activities related to the nexus of TOC and Terrorism, but none of these are interconnected. Individual agency efforts are valuable but the expenditure of resources provides limited success.

A common, joint and multinational approach to countering the collaboration of TOC and Islamic extremist terrorism would greatly increase the odds for success. A united front with a leadership chain that could orchestrate all efforts and bring harmony to the operational process, would be better poised to effectively take on this regional problem. Improving interagency and international cooperation across borders could be done with the establishment of a joint command element overseeing all intelligence, law enforcement, financial, diplomatic, military and economic initiatives with an overarching and all-inclusive strategy to prevent extremist terrorists from using established TOC networks from attacking the U.S. or its allies in the region.

A Geographic Combatant Command such as SOUTHCOM could be the proponent for this effort, but the creation of a Joint Task Force (JTF) dedicated expressly to countering this nexus would add efficiencies to the process. The role of SOUTHCOM would still be critical and therefore, the Task Force commander would be assigned to the command, providing strategic guidance and the proper allocation of resources. At the same time, SOUTHCOM would be able to coordinate more effectively with the Central Command, for example, in cases when networks transcend into a different theater of operations, which they often do.

This concept of a JTF is not new and there is such an effort already in place within SOUTHCOM called the Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S). This joint task force consists of an interagency and multinational effort in the Americas for the conduct of “detection and monitoring operations” to facilitate the “interdiction of illicit trafficking and other narco-terrorist threats in support of national and partner nation security.” Although
its net effectiveness is debated, the construct of this task force is efficient. It includes personnel from the militaries and law enforcement agencies from multiple Latin American countries, plus members of the interagency, and it coordinates interdiction operations throughout Latin America. The consolidation of command and control under one symbolic room is what gives this task force credibility and what has the power to make it effective, but to be truly successful it needs to be backed by a solid flow of operational resources.

Make resourcing these efforts priority one. Funding to support engagement with Latin America in general, as compared with other areas of the world, is inadequate. A new approach to tackling the Islamic Terrorist-Transnational Crime nexus would necessitate a considerable increase in resources at all levels and across all the agencies participating. The resource allocation for all involved would need to be raised, from the U.S. Border Patrol, to USAID, and to law enforcement authorities at the State and local levels across the U.S. southern border.

One of the primary U.S. government proponents for security engagement in the Americas, SOUTHCOM, is under-resourced and “grappling with the cumulative effect of the various budget cuts enacted over the past few years.” A bigger focus on the region, and a clear intent to combat Islamic terrorism emanating from Latin America, would require a significant reallocation of counter-terrorism resources to shift from other areas of the world to the Americas. As it is, the current funding levels that SOUTHCOM receives to counter illicit trafficking, but not terrorist threats, amounts to “five percent of the capacity it needs” to attain a measured success.

Conclusion

During his last testimony to Congress in 2015, General John F. Kelly expressed that although not in great numbers at this point, Sunni extremists were “involved in the radicalization of converts and other Muslims” in Latin America. These same individuals actively provided “financial and logistical support to designated terrorist organizations within and outside Latin America.” There were also cases of radicalized young men from the Americas traveling to the Middle East to fight for their Jihad. The potential for one or more of these battle-hardened individuals, or other Islamic extremists, to conspire against the U.S. from the Western Hemisphere is not only possible, but likely. Many of these youths are acquainted with criminal elements in their places of origin and may have relationships established or familial ties to members of TOC. The willing collaboration by an organized crime element and a determined Islamic extremist to use the existing communication networks to cause harm on the U.S. presents a dangerous and realistic threat to U.S. national security.

The unwitting collaboration between members of these two elements is the most dangerous scenario. Islamic extremist elements may use these networks to clandestinely infiltrate operatives, support elements or a weapon of mass destruction into the U.S., without the general knowledge of the hierarchy in a specific TCO. As exposed earlier, Islamic extremist terrorist groups already have established relationships with TOC in Latin America, and may intend to exploit these to infiltrate into the U.S. It is entirely possible that Islamic terrorist elements may have already used TOC networks to enter the U.S. undercover.

The U.S. strategy to combat TOC acknowledges the possible nexus of “crime, terror and insurgency,” but falls short of recognizing its impact on U.S. national security. Although this strategy calls the crime-terror nexus “mostly opportunistic,” it does highlight the concern that a penetration by terrorists into the U.S. as a critical issue.

The convergence of TOC and Islamic extremist terrorism in Latin America exists and presents a strategic challenge for the U.S. and for its allies in the region. It only takes one trained, properly equipped and motivated individual to carry out a significant terrorist attack. Single-man events are, however, not normal procedure of Islamic terrorists, who prefer to carry out complex terrorist attacks in centers of gravity whose destruction with a high casualty rate, would have the most impact on their enemy. This threat warrants an increased focus on the region and a deliberate collective strategy to prevent another terrorist attack on U.S. soil.

About the Author

Colonel Ricardo Gonzalez is a Latin America FAO and is the Chief of the Americas Division at the Deputy Directorate for Politico-Military Affairs-Western Hemisphere, Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate on The Joint Staff, Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J-5). Colonel Gonzalez earned a Masters of Arts degree in Latin American Studies from Ohio University and a Masters Degree in Strategic Studies from the Argentina Army Staff College. He served as Army Attaché in Buenos Aires, Argentina, and as the Senior Defense Official and Defense Attaché in Belmopan, Belize. Colonel Gonzalez graduated from the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, in 2016 with a Master of Science in Strategic Studies.
Editor's Note: In the interest of space, Mr. Bunnin's article is published here without research notes. To see the full paper with all research materials, visit www.faoa.org.

Background

In the immediate aftermath of World War II, India and Israel -- two countries birthed from the Paris Peace Conferences at the start of an era of European decolonization -- seem to be engaged in a calculated rapprochement with one another. This development is one that may have been impossible even a decade ago. Their historical relationship, based on diverging paths emerging from British colonial rule, had previously been one of covertness and mistrust. But with the formalization of diplomatic relations between the two states, had previously been one of covertness and mistrust. But with the formalization of diplomatic relations between the two states at the Madrid Peace Process nearly a quarter of a century ago, the common threads of domestic and international terrorism that plague both states, and steadily improving people-to-people relations through cultural exchange, the relationship is improving. What will be the ramifications of such a strategic partnership for the international order, and particularly for the United States? A furthering of bilateral relations between the two can be seen as a strategic win for the Americans, especially if they do not have to devote significant time and resources in order to allow it to flourish. At the moment, the relationship is being nurtured by both sides of their own accord, based on shared mutual interests.

The relationship can be seen in terms of bilateral entente based on mutual concerns about violent extremist threats in both states, or in neighboring states. Given heightened global concerns about violent extremism since Da’esh has shown itself to be highly capable in exporting terror, defense and security ties (D+S) may buttress the Israeli-Indian partnership. However, the relationship must strive to move away from simply a defense and security orientation to more of an intermeshed relationship complete with improved cultural and social ties, so as to encourage better military cooperation, if and when needed.

That said, military and security cooperation remains at the core of this relationship and will continue to do so in the future. Given that there is extensive literature on the historical underpinnings of this burgeoning ‘Special Relationship’ in Asia, this short paper will outline the recent developments in military and defense cooperation between the two, and analyze the impact these deals have for future defense-based accords. Furthermore, the essay will attempt to analyze the impact of these recent deals on the relationships India and Israel maintain with other states, and the geopolitical and strategic implications that will arise from Israeli-Indian rapport. The paper argues that the alliance and military cooperation will continue into the future for three key reasons: a similarly aligned ethos for countering violent extremism, booming cultural and economic ties, and the U.S. factor, which must be accounted for in any situation when a state has dealings with Israel.

Recent Developments: 2015, A Year For The (Cheque) Books

In the past decade India has imported more than $10 billion worth of Israeli-made defense equipment. These purchases were mostly behind the scenes, with their details not readily made available for public scrutiny. That much stated, 2015 was a remarkable year for the two states’ diplomatic cooperation. It saw the head of state and the prime minister of India both make official state visits to Israel and Palestine, and Moshe Yalon, Israel’s serving defense minister, made the first ever such visit to India in February at the Aero-India exhibition in Bangalore. India’s Air Force stands to gain the most from deals with Israel, as the Israeli Air Force is widely considered as one of the world’s best. India’s military stands to gain tactical and strategic advantages at all levels, land, air, sea, as well as in other areas not confined to material capacity. In 2014, for example, India agreed to purchase Spike anti-tank guided missiles and launchers from Israel (opting this route over similar offers from the United States, it must be noted). The two countries also agreed to greater intelligence sharing, and to coordinate efforts to combat violent extremism, which has been a threat to both states since their founding.

The expo event marked the first major India-Israeli defense deal of the year, with the finalization of an agreement two years in the making on the joint development of medium range surface-to-air missiles (MRSAM). This was done to replace India’s old Russian manufactured air defense systems, the Kvadrat and OSA-AKM, which had been India’s primary anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense apparatus for decades. The deal was India’s largest joint venture [JV], and sees Rafael, Israel Aerospace Industries,
India’s Defense Research and Development Organization, and the Indian Air Force all team up to build two regiments of 36 launchers. Prospects for future engagement to produce the air version of MRSAM are also being considered as part of the deal.

This was only the beginning of what was an exciting year for both sides in terms of groundbreaking defense accords. Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon put it aptly upon his state visit, “We are open to more or less [selling] anything.” This sale was followed by an announcement of further cooperation on the Barak-8 missile system. Designed in JV with Israel, the Barak-8 was initially developed to combat Hizbollah, the Iranian-backed armed Islamic militant group based in Lebanon. It is an advanced SAM that gives the Indian and Israeli militaries a much better defense against domestic and international security threats. The Barak-8’s range is thought to be up to 150km (93 miles). It can be mounted either on naval vessels or on land systems.

India’s longstanding conflict with Pakistan over the disputed Kashmir region, as well as the threat of Islamic and Hindu extremists present throughout the country, often begets trouble for India. The two issues are intrinsically related, because of Pakistan’s outsized influence on India’s minority Muslim population. Lashkar-e-Taiba, the group that committed the 2008 Mumbai bombings, has shown itself to be perhaps the most prominent and dangerous of all the extremist groups present in India.

India has shown a willingness to cooperate with all actors on defense cooperation, including Russia, much to the consternation of the U.S.; the days of non-alignment seem long ago. The addition of the Barak-8 to India’s military arsenal, as well as the approved sale of Barak-1 SAMs that will arm India’s battleships over the next 5 years, underscores India’s commitment to Israeli defense ties. The two countries also signed an agreement to sell Israeli-made Heron drones for a hefty $400 million price tag, which will significantly bolster the depleted Indian air force. These drones are added to an Indian UAV fleet that already featured Israeli-made Harpy drones. Thus, 2015 has ushered in an era of more open and normalized India-Israeli defense relations.

More recently, India made a several defense deals in 2016, making India the world’s leader in arms imports, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). This fact, coupled with an increased defense budget and a ‘Made in India’ initiative, make prospects for future engagements such as these all the more likely.

D+S rapprochement alone does not always a strong alliance make. Rather, in this specific case between India and Israel, it is part of a much grander strategy for both countries, as the world’s political scene shifts from uni-polarity towards, arguably, a more unstable one of multi-polarity. That is at least due in some part to the U.S.’s reluctance to act as the world’s intervening hegemon any longer.

**Terrorism and Culture, Do a Strong Bond Make**

When ties between states, however many may be included, are built on an intermeshing of cultural and social politics with a crucial grounded basis of real-politic, more often than not, the relationships will be enduring ones. These relationships may not always be necessarily beneficial for both/all sides involved. History provides us with numerous examples. In the ancient Greek city states, despite feudal differences and several wars, ties between Athens and Sparta were ultimately strengthened by the Persian threat that was perceived by both sides to be of a greater threat to them than each other. However, they were additionally made stronger by social and cultural links based on common ethnicity and heritage. In more modern times, one may analyze the phenomenon that is the European Union as well as just about any relationship the U.S. has built over the years, given how diversity has defined the country from its birth, and its well-documented history as the world’s preeminent spender on military materials and capabilities.

One may look at the India-Israel relationship as functioning in a similar fashion. It is a relationship that this author terms as ‘layer-cake’ tie-building. For India and Israel, because they maintain historical ethnic and cultural ties based on similar ethics and morals in each state’s respective dominant religions, Judaism and Hinduism, this is a task that is much easier than for some engaging in like bilateral engagements. Indeed, Jews have lived for a thousand years in India without having to fear persecution for their faith; something that is abnormal for the rest of the world, but not India. As Shoba Narayan, a writer in Bangalore puts it, “The cultures are so similar – the

The relationship must strive to move away from simply a defense and security orientation to... an intermeshed relationship complete with improved cultural and social ties... to encourage better military cooperation...
commitment to education, the ability to delay gratification, hard work, the guilt, the fatalism. And I think this is because we are both old cultures.”

Cultural-religio politics makes for a potent combination for nation-building efforts. It can be argued that it is because both Israel and India share this same dichotomy in their respective histories, in addition to holding similar ethics and morals because of the dominant religions that drive nationalist politics in each, that they have made efforts to build this relationship, even covertly. A similar, “political culture” due to how both feel beleaguered in their own regions by religious disintegration, external state threats, and extremist factions such as Hizbollah, Da’es, Al-Qaeda and other Islamic militants, underscores these cultural-religio ties, and indeed strengthens them. Of course, the tasks of diplomacy are not quite the same as those of politics, and for the relationship to fulfill its potential for the future, the United States will have to play a key role as a sometime intermediary. This is for a plethora of reasons, not the least of which is how the U.S. plays a vital role as arms dealer for both states, an important aspect to remember when considering its impact on a relationship that has lately been built on defense ties.

In 2015 India became the number two purchaser of U.S.-made arms, behind only Saudi Arabia. The U.S. is moving ahead in its friendship with Modi’s India, as it sees the state as a key deterrent to a rising China. New economic deals between the U.S. and India will continue to condition this partnership. The U.S. has a vested interest in improved Indian security, prosperity, and stability, seen as helping to deter Islamist militants who would travel from the subcontinent to join ISIL in Syria, or indeed, for Da’es to set up a base on the Indian subcontinent.

The U.S. is essentially a middle-man in this complex triangle of ties forged of mutual national interests, security concerns, economic, and cultural-religious ties. American engagement is necessary for promoting Israeli-India ties in future years.

Defense remains at the core of the Israeli-India relationship and will continue to be so in the future. Unfortunately, both countries will continue to see extremist insurgencies pervade their communities for the foreseeable future. With the Syrian war, and Da’es and other extremist groups in Iraq and Iran causing Israel constant security problems, and the two-state solution not likely to be reached anytime soon, Israel faces mounting terror threats that require innovative strategic thinking. In India, the Kashmir issue is still a threat to stability after a brief hope for conflict resolution. This will only spark further unrest in a region that ultimately could trigger a nuclear war; all the more reason in addition to the many other terror threats endemic in the country, for increased Israeli-Indian defense cooperation.

In the short term the relationship will blossom with the reelection of conservative Israeli prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu and his Likud party, and the 2014 election of Modi’s BJP party. The two leaders’ affinity for one another is well known, as Modi made an effort as far back as 2006 when he was leader of the Gujarat state to forge better ties with Israel; Prime Minister Netanyahu has simultaneously been a prominent figure in promoting an agreement to solve the longstanding conflict over the Kashmir region between India and Pakistan. He went even further by stating at the COP21 climate summit last year that, “We [India and Israel] have the best of relations, and they can be made even better.” The two charismatic and controversial leaders will be critical in furthering ties. Paradoxically, however, what may ultimately undermine these developments is not the touchy Palestine issue, which has in the past been a source of consternation and a thorn in the sides of both actors in their quest for full, open rapprochement. Rather, it is the prospect of a nuclear-free Iran that is welcomed back into the fold of the international community (though clearly not with open arms by some).

India has long maintained strong ties with Iran, and should Iran renege on its agreements to de-militarize its nuclear program, India would have some measure of sway over Iran. India is thus a key strategic ally for the U.S. and Israel in protecting their own ‘Special Relationship’. Officials in Israel and the U.S. must be wary of the potential for a change in leadership in India that could potentially see a retrograde in relations to that of decades ago. Nonetheless, the prospects at this point look very healthy for a defining “Jerusalem-Delhi romance” going forward. Only time will tell if it is defined in this century by how it began formally at the end of the last: by defense, defense, and more defense.

Should Iran renege on its agreements to de-militarize its nuclear program, India would have some sway

About the Author

Jarrett Bunnin is a researcher for Wikistrat, the world’s first geopolitical, crowd-sourced strategic consultancy, and is a non-resident intern researcher at the Hudson Institute’s Center for Political-Military Analysis. Elsewhere, he has worked for The AEGIS Trust, a genocide prevention NGO, and specializes in matters pertaining to national and international security on a variety of levels. He holds degrees from the London School of Economics and the University of Arizona.
Our Strategic Center of Gravity + Teamwork, Tone, Tenacity

Remarks by Rear Admiral (Ret) Paul Becker, USN to FAO luncheon at Fort Myer Officers Club on October 11th, 2017

I see the smiles, I feel the energy, I sense the camaraderie ... I can tell I’m not in the Pentagon!

At the risk of destroying my bona fides early in this presentation, I readily admit to not being a FAO. However, as a former Intelligence Officer and Assistant Naval Attache I share that in the course of 30 years in uniform I served alongside FAOs, am a big fan of who FAOs are and what FAOs do. Which is why I jumped at the chance to share some thoughts regarding the FAO profession and leadership tools that any FAOs can and should apply in any assignment.

I’ll start by citing the 2016 National Military Strategy which identifies the network of U.S. alliances and partnerships around the world as our strategic Center of Gravity (COG). At the strategic level, a COG is a source of power for physical or morale strength which enables freedom of action. At the operational level, a COG enables the projection of power when and where necessary. So FAOs, who are renown for their regionally focused skills with cultural and language expertise, play a critical role in enabling U.S. global and regional leadership by enhancing relationships with other nations which build and reinforce our strategic and operational COG’s.

The challenge I present to FAO’s around the globe: Don’t just get bogged down in exercising daily tasks associated with a FAO’s core capabilities of language and cultural skills. Take a step back and consider more than just “what” you’re doing. Consider “why” you’re doing it in the context of strengthening our COGs. FAOs should realize, either through their own self awareness or via collaboration with other teammates on their staffs, the attendant threats to our COGs from our adversaries and how we can be proactive in addressing them. I share the following intelligence community maxim which has just as much applicability to the FAO community in this area: “Always take a moment to consider is the enemy winning or am I?” FAO’s, because of their unique language and cultural expertise, often provide key perspective on this foundational question in support of U.S. national security objectives.

I also urge FAOs to stay closely connected with all elements of their staffs, and in particular with the Director of Intelligence (J2, or service equivalent N2, S2, G2, A2). FAOs are not intelligence officers, and intelligence officers are not FAOs. However, together they create an incredibly powerful complementary team that can contribute context, nuance and understanding to essential elements of information in support of command objectives. Don’t be shy FAOs, insert yourself into all staff processes and offer your expertise. You’ll be surprised how many others welcome your offer and will use your skills to add value in ways you may not have considered possible from the narrow perspective of your particular role in an Office of Defense Cooperation, or large Service or Joint staff’s Plans & Policy Directorate.

When you interact with your staff, FAOs, use these leadership benchmarks to guide your activities: “Teamwork, Tone, Tenacity.” Why these three? There are loads of lists which highlight positive leadership traits and actions that help make people and organizations great. For example: Marcus Aurelius’ “Meditations” references 10 rules for being an exceptional leader. GEN (Ret) Colin Powell has “13 Rules for Leadership.” John Maxwell authored a best-selling book citing “21 Irrefutable Laws of Leadership.” So why in an ocean of descriptors, adjectives and narratives is it worth focusing on “Teamwork, Tone, Tenacity?” Because these three attributes form a superior set of mutually reinforcing behaviors aimed at meeting mission, taking care of people and developing subordinates. And while FAOs are highly trained in language and cultural expertise, they are first and foremost commissioned U.S. military officers whose leadership skills we must always honed. “Teamwork, Tone, Tenacity” also happen to fit together well in a short, actionable, memorable phrase. Aurelius, Powell, Maxwell and others...
all offer valuable advice, but that advice takes time to recall and apply. “Teamwork, Tone, Tenacity” is user-ready in the fast-paced, pressure-packed, information-intensive environment in which FAOs operate in today. The guidance is immediately retrievable because it focuses on intent instead of tasks, and cognitive skill research indicates that human minds are well conditioned to remember directions and phrases that flow in sets of three. (Cases in point: "Lights, Camera ... Action," “On Your Marks, Get Set ... Go,” “Ready, Aim ... Fire,” “Earth, Wind ... Fire,” “Duty, Honor ... Country.”) now add to them “Teamwork, Tone ... Tenacity”).

Leaders and followers can recall and execute specific practices associated with “Teamwork, Tone, Tenacity” rapidly in any situation from a contested combat zone to a boisterous board room. And when a leader’s clear, actionable, memorable guidance (i.e. “Commander’s Intent”) is known and understood by those seeking to achieve a common goal, the chance of achieving and perpetuating success is greatly increased. A few comments about each of the three T’s:

Teamwork: Teamwork begins by building trust. A leader has many responsibilities, and one of the most important is building relationships, because the result of relationships is trust and the by-product of trust is loyalty ... and loyalty to the team is the essence of workplace morale, whether wearing ACU’s, a flight suit or a business suit. A culture of teamwork is imbued into the organization from the top. The best military teams I ever encountered were those led by Gen (Ret) Stan McChrystal in southwest Asia and Gen (Ret) Martin Dempsey in Washington because they established a command climate where trust and loyalty between every echelon and every member of the team was the norm, and where every teammate had an understanding of what needed to be accomplished. It’s worth adding that teamwork is especially important when two parties disagree on an issue, because with teamwork you have something to fall back on in such situations - and that is knowing the character of the individual you’re working with - which prevents a professional relationship from devolving into accusatory discourse and incivility. This is a lesson that can be well applied elsewhere in today’s society. For the record, the greatest ‘Teamwork’ FAO I ever met was LTC Ed Cox, USA, with whom I worked and tackled and conquered every setback and in organizational disarray, they placed the objective and how to implement a solution. The most tenacious leaders I ever served with were Army COL (Ret) Annette Torrisi and Intelligence Specialist Master Chief Petty Officer (Ret) Todd Schroeder who each provided me a healthy dose of junior subordinate “reverse mentoring” along the way. Arriving on short notice into Afghanistan in 2009 when our coalition was suffering setbacks and in organizational disarray, they placed the burden taking on and solving our toughest unit problems ahead of their own personal comfort and ambition. Each demonstrated more than just endurance and persistence in a hostile environment, but persistence with a purpose and a relentless focus combined with a certainty of what was going to transpire. For Annette and Todd failure was never a permanent option, just a temporary obstacle. For the record, the greatest ‘Tenacity’ FAO I ever met was LTC Ed Cox, USA, with whom I worked on the PACOM staff from 2011-13 and tackled and conquered every southeastern Asian challenge thrown his way during a turbulent period of regional events.

In summary, “Teamwork, Tone, Tenacity” are easy to recognize, easy to remember and easy to apply. I’m fortunate to have benefitted from seeing them personified by outstanding warriors, leaders and FAOs across several decades. Together they comprise the gold standard of leadership and should continue to be the benchmark for today’s leaders in the FAO community.

Rear Admiral Becker served for 30 years as a Naval Intelligence Officer in peace, crisis and combat. His Flag assignments included: Director of Intelligence (J2) for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon, the US Pacific Command in Hawaii and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Joint Command in Afghanistan. He served as the Assistant Naval Attache to France from 1997-2000.
Letter to the Editor

An Apology

I would like to apologize sincerely to Colonel Luke Donohue, U.S. Army, Colonel Jason “Brad” Nicholson, U.S. Army, and Lieutenant Colonel Matthew Kopp, U.S. Army for the harsh tone and strong emotional language I used in my letter to the editor critiquing their article “FAO 2025 and Beyond, a Strategic Vision for the U.S. Army Foreign Area Officer Program.”

I have been told that some readers stated that I used ad-hominum, or personal attacks, toward the authors. I did not explicitly make, and absolutely did not intend, any ad-hominum invectives toward them. I abhor personal attacks, and am sorry that my tone and words read that way.

However, those readers were 100% right that my letter was emotional, heated, and frankly, discourteous. It was an example of how one can go too far to make a point. In retrospect, I should have been more measured.

Not only out of courtesy—and that is a very important reason to be measured; but also, because not being measured resulted in my message being lost in a heated, bad delivery. Strident, sharp language, even if accurate in content, is counterproductive, and uncomfortable for professionals in all but the most extreme situations; and this was not an extreme situation.

So, I am sorry to have written my critique in a way that offended Colonels Donohue, Nicholson, and Kopp. I have not personally met these officers, yet I am sure, by position and experience, that they are fine FAOs and excellent officers. As I mentioned—honestly—in my original letter, I was and am grateful that they presented their ideas; not so much for their particular ideas or content, but because they serve as a model for others on how to contribute.

The lesson for me is not new, but one I clearly ignored in this case: Don’t get lost in the details of an issue to the extent that one forgets civility and professionalism in exchanges. For that I am sorry!

The FAO profession is not broken. However, for the future, FAO proponents and stakeholders will need to focus on problems that are grounded in a valid, data-driven, needs assessment; and thoughtfully consider recommendations that are based on comprehensive, critical analyses of all current FAO professional training and education. Anything less will hurt, not help the FAO profession.

Sincerely,

Mark Brice Chakwin
Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired)
As the Air Force Foreign Area Officer program enters its 13th year in 2018, it continues to grow and develop, with an expanded number of FAO billets worldwide and a pool of certified FAOs rapidly approaching the services’ target inventory. With the recent publication of a new governing instruction for Air Force FAOs, a number of significant changes have taken place.

One of the biggest changes this year is the program’s name. The Air Force FAO program is now a FAO program. Previously known as the Regional Affairs Strategist (RAS) program, it was designated as “Foreign Area Officer” with the publication of an updated Air Force Instruction 16-109, the Air Force document which governs Air Force International Affairs Specialist programs, in July 2017.

The RAS designation was conceived when the program started in 2005 to purposely differentiate it from previous Air Force FAO programs that lacked adequate resourcing, program management or focused development of its officers. However, now that the current program has fully matured, it became appropriate to begin utilizing terminology consistent with the joint community. In addition to removing confusion among the other services, the name change will also reduce confusion within the Air Force. The term RAS was often conflated with another International Affairs Specialist program, the Political-Military Affairs Strategist (PAS) program.

Another significant change under the new Air Force Instruction is the consolidation and realignment of the previous nine FAO regions into five, which correspond to the geographic combatant commands: SOUTHCOM, EUCOM, AFRICOM, CENTCOM and PACOM. This will more effectively align FAO capabilities with warfighter requirements, create efficiencies in program management and provide more opportunities for FAO to serve assignments in their broader region.

As of January 2018, the number of certified FAOs in the Air Force stood at 576. Because the Air Force runs a dual-track FAO career field, with officers alternating between FAO assignments and assignments in their core career fields, the Air Force has established a target inventory of FAOs at a ratio of 2.3 FAOs for every FAO billet (accounting for officer who may be in PME or core command assignments). The Air Force expects to reach its target inventory of 784 FAOs within the next couple of years.

The number of Air Force FAO billets worldwide is currently 341, a figure which has grown over the past two years following a series of worldwide billet reviews undertaken by the career field manager.

These reviews, which involved a line-by-line review of Air Force positions with billet owners at the combatant commands, Air Force components and the Air Staff, corrected many errors and resulted in the conversion of some non-FAO positions to FAO. As the process continues, program officials expect the number of billets to continue to modestly increase.

Finally, Headquarters Air Force is in the process of “right placing” the bulk of FAO initial skills training management and sustainment training functions with Air Education and Training Command and the Air Force Culture and Language Center, respectively. Most of those functions currently reside at Headquarters Air Force. By transferring those functions over the course of the next year, the Air Force will leverage the right expertise and recognize efficiencies, permitting the Air Force FAO proponent office to focus more of its efforts on career field development and improvement.

Transparent Language is the developer of the CL-150 Matrix for Critical Languages (CL-150). The CL-150 is a constantly evolving infrastructure of innovative technology, content and services providing economical and effective learning, sustaining and assessing of 120+ foreign languages for the Joint FAO Program and the greater U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and Intelligence Communities. The purpose of the CL-150 is to improve the economics and effectiveness of language learning for both general use and for special purposes such as humanitarian relief, international relations or military liaison. The CL-150 is available to all FAOs via FAOweb (fao.nps.edu) and all US Government personnel (with a .gov or .mil address), language schools, and language programs via the Department of Defense’s language portal, Joint Language University (jlu.wbtrain.com). Access is sponsored by the Defense Language and National Security Education Office and by Joint Language University. For more information, visit transparent.com/government
The Future of African Peace Operations examines the current roles played by the African Union (AU) in performing peace operations in Africa and suggests several modest reforms designed to improve its effectiveness. Through a series of ten essays examining African peacekeeping efforts, the editors demonstrate how the AU’s founders designed its security elements to confront different problems than it currently faces. The works of several African scholars featured in the book buttress the editors’ foundational argument that several organizational changes and immediate actions may be necessary if the AU is to measure up to the task of improving peacekeeping in Africa. What they outline however, provides a rare look at the complex problems facing those who seek to keep the peace in Africa, rather than focusing problems spawned by those who seek to disrupt it.

The editors outline the changes and challenges of African peacekeeping operations over the last few decades, focusing on how the AU members have adapted their peacekeeping strategies and forces since the AU first incorporated the idea of an African-led peacekeeping force. The book does a great service in describing how the AU, designed to mitigate international clashes and defend civilians, now focuses more on the offensive in intranational conflicts. It also provides insightful analysis of how this transition has hindered African peacekeeping by overemphasizing military solutions to problems more likely solved through improved governance or policing. The changes to the AU’s structure that the book suggests are modest, but the editors admit the reforms’ fundamental links to the roles and organization of the AU would prove difficult to implement.

Peacekeeping efforts like those in Somalia, Mali, and the Central African Republic, the authors argue, demonstrate the structural limits of the AU for creating and employing adequate models for peacekeeping. The authors call for several reforms to the AU, including the utilization of a better-tailored mix of military, law enforcement, and civilian government personnel. They argue that changes to the AU charter could empower AU forces to react more quickly and more sustainably to the current range of hybrid subnational, terrorist, and criminal threats. They outline how the support of the United Nations remains integral to the peacekeeping process, even as it becomes increasingly AU-led; and they highlight how the AU has made progress in some aspects of operational support like funding and logistics, but still requires significant additional improvements and reform. Ultimately, the proposed refinement of the existing AU structure offered would only serve as a detailed set of first steps within a much more significant, longer term process of reform. As the editors show, there are many questions to answer in regard to the AU’s most optimal structure, and much work to do before the proposed changes can be implemented in practice.

While the book does an excellent job of examining the multi-faceted inner workings of African peace operations at the international level, it is dense and unapologetically academic. The book is filled with acronyms and jargon with few in-text explanations of their significance. Readers with a background in the region will be several steps ahead. Despite these hurdles, an accessible list of abbreviations and acronyms, and mercifully short chapters ultimately make the book a manageable and informative read.

About the Reviewer

Captain DePaul has previously worked as analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency and received his Master’s degree in Strategic Leadership in 2014. While his efforts have focused on South and East Asia, it also has provided a gateway to understanding the strategic intersections of our global interests in other regions, primarily Africa and Latin America.
Craig Deare, a practitioner and academic, is uniquely qualified to write this book. After growing up in Mexico, he served in the U.S. Army as an intelligence and Foreign Area Officer (FAO) for Latin America and later as Assistant Army Attaché in Mexico City.

After a brief introductory chapter, Deare begins the book with a long chapter giving a historical overview of Mexico, with some emphasis on the role of the Mexican military over time. Since I first began working in and conducting research on Mexico 55 years ago (1962), I thought seriously about either skipping the chapter entirely or simply skimming it. I am very glad I did not do that because I found fascinating pieces of Mexican military and general history that I did not know. Like all who have studied Mexico I was well aware of the myth of los niños heroes, especially the story of one cadet at the Colegio Militar, who leaped to his death wrapped in the Mexican flag, to escape capture by the attacking American troops. The only problem with this story, as Deare points out, is that it never happened. The cadet’s body was recovered killed by gringo bullets and American troops hauled down the Mexican flag and raised the Stars and Stripes in its stead. I also did not know of President Truman’s 1947 visit when he and the U.S. Ambassador laid a wreath in honor of the cadets who lost their lives 100 years before. Nor did I know that although the American press gave this act high praise, the Mexican press considered it an insult to the honor of Mexico. For this, and many other interesting facts and interpretations, I am very glad I read the chapter in its entirety.

One somewhat disconcerting aspect of the historical overview was that after going through all the Mexican presidents post la Revolución from Carranza through Miguel Aleman, Deare skips to Gustavo Diaz Ordaz. He leaves out the 12 years of Adolfo Ruiz Cortines and Adolfo Lopez Mateos. Although he mentions Lopez Mateos on later pages, Ruiz Cortines appears not to have existed at all.

Deare then turns his attention to the Mexican military on the eve of the post-Cold War era. He notes the division between the Army and Air Force in one ministry, the Secretaria de Defensa Nacional, and the Navy (including its Marines) into another, the Secretaria de Marina. Most important, he notes their decidedly different histories, with the Navy tracing its origin and lineage to 1821 while the Army dates itself from 1913 in the midst of la Revolucion. Yet, even this is complicated by the Military Academy, which draws its lineage back to, at least, los niños heroes, and emphasizes their sacrifice in the face of the gringo onslaught even including the mythical leap to death wrapped in the Mexican flag. Added to that is the fact that the Army is the senior service. Deare uses these differences to explain, in part, the relatively warm and cooperative attitude toward the U.S. by the Navy in contrast to the aloofness of the Army.

From this point, Deare moves on to what is part memoir and part analysis. As a Major, he served as the sole interpreter for Secretary of Defense William Perry’s initial visit to his Mexican counterpart, General Enrique Cervantes. Deare notes the opposition to the visit from the State Department and shows how this promising initiative was hampered by the American bureaucracies in both State and Defense. Nevertheless, it achieved significant success due to the personal rapport between the two principals that carried over well beyond the initial visit. However, it did not survive the departure of Secretary Perry. The lesson Deare draws is the importance of personal relationships. The truth of this extends well beyond Mexico, certainly to all of Latin America and to other parts of the world as well.

A lesson that is more peculiar to Mexico and Mexican/U.S. relations – especially defense relationships – is that everything is about Mexico’s sovereignty. Deare discusses in detail the fiasco of the American transfer of 72 UH 1-H helicopters under the Excess Defense Articles program that fell apart because nothing any of the players

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**BOOK REVIEW**

**A Tale of Two Eagles**

The US-Mexico Bilateral Defense Relationship Post Cold War

Reviewer: Lieutenant Colonel John T. Fishel, U.S. Army (Retired)
could do was able to divorce the American laws and policies from the perception of insult to Mexican national sovereignty. In the end, Mexico shipped them back calling them “junk.” This story took place during the presidency of Ernesto Zedillo and Deare has organized the book around those presidencies, known in Mexico as sexenios.

With the next sexenio of Vicente Fox, Deare moves from what was part memoir to a more conventional academic analysis based on his experience and expertise as well as numerous interviews with participants on both sides of the Rio Grande. In his concluding chapter, he regrets that he could not arrange interviews with the Secretarios de Defensa and other senior actors in Defensa. As he states, the analysis would be richer, but he compensates well with recollections from senior U.S. actors and several Secretarios de la Marina.

Among the many insights in the book is how skilled leaders including President Calderon, Secretarios General Cervantes, General Galvan Galvan, General Cienfuegos and Admirals Saynez and Soberon on the Mexican side became open to working with key US leaders. Among these were Secretaries of Defense William Perry, Robert Gates, Leon Panetta, and Chuck Hegel. Deare also singles out Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen and General Martin Dempsey, as well as two NORTHCOM commanders, Admiral Winnefield and General Jacoby.

The bottom line is that the development of defense-to-defense and military-to-military relations between the U.S. and Mexico over the last quarter century is a function of the history of the two countries, the structures of their defense establishments (which are very different), and the roles played by individual leaders on both sides. If any single factor is dominant it is the role of the individual leaders.

Craig Deare’s A Tale of Two Eagles is an outstanding explication of the bilateral defense relations between these two countries. But it is also a superb study of the different nature of interagency relations within each country. Finally, it shows one career pattern for an American Army FAO from recruitment through military retirement and beyond. This is a book that practitioners and scholars of Latin American affairs, international relations, and defense matters should all read and take to heart. It should also be required reading for all FAOs, past, present, and future.

About the Reviewer

Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) John T, Fishel served as a FAO in USSOUTHCOM, where he was Chief of the Policy and Strategy Division of the J5. After retiring from the Army he served as a civilian professor at the Army Command and General Staff College and as a founding professor at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University. Since 2006 he has been on the faculty of the College of International Studies at the University of Oklahoma.

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Graham: If you could, just, talk about your own biography, and the history of the company, and how you came to the company, and then after that, drill down a little bit into the language/culture/Intelligence portfolio that you have.

Julian: So, first of all, the company was founded by my mother. We’re actually a family-owned business. We’re really proud of that fact, because there just aren’t that many companies in our size-bracket in the Defense and Intelligence business that are private, family-owned businesses without any outside institutional money. It’s something that we include in our company profile when we talk about the business, because it really speaks to the level of commitment and responsibility that we have to our customers, as well as our agility and ability to react quickly to their requirements. We have been in business for twenty-eight years. We were founded in 1989 to provide foreign language and cultural advisory services to the Federal law enforcement community. Our first clients were the Department of Justice, FBI, Drug Enforcement Administration, and U.S. Customs Service – which, of course later became Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and moved under the Department of Homeland Security when it was formed. Our core expertise was to provide contract linguists to support the Federal law enforcement agencies’ Title III wire-surveillance programs, collecting and analyzing, intercepted telephonic communications and wire communications, and then preparing those products for criminal trials, and testifying as expert witnesses. That was our focus for about ten years. Nobody was really paying attention to us. We thought of ourselves first and foremost as a language company.

Then 9/11 hit, and the fact that there weren’t enough foreign language speakers in the Federal government became front page news. If you remember, the intelligence failures that led to the attacks were attributed to the government’s lack of foreign language expertise. Vast amounts of information that had been previously collected, sat unprocessed for years, because there weren’t enough qualified linguists to triage the data. So, we were catapulted onto center stage. We were hired as a sub-contractor on this relatively small contract to provide contract interpreters to the U.S. Army, which was the Executive Agent for providing contract interpreters to the entire Department of Defense. Our first assignment was to hire and deploy contract interpreters to Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan, Iraq, and six or eight countries that were indirectly-associated with OEF and OIF. So, we quickly expanded between the years 2002 to 2006. We became one of the two or three largest suppliers of contract foreign language support to the Department of Defense and Intelligence Community. We had people who were embedded with units in Iraq and Afghanistan. We helped collect and analyze information across all the Intelligence domains for the Intelligence Community and the Intelligence directorates of the Armed Services, while we simultaneously continued to build our business with the Federal law enforcement community. We were one of the first and largest companies in that space, and that really gave us a platform to grow and diversify into other adjacent areas. We rapidly became known as a true “mission-support” company because we were at the tip of the spear of the military’s operations. We started branching out into immediate adjacent areas, providing direct analytical support to the Government’s
HUMINT, Counterintelligence and SIGINT programs. In the mid-2000s, we also shifted from being a subcontractor to a prime contractor; we started focusing on overseas logistics and capacity-building. That’s where the level of sophistication of the business really grew. We went from supplying people to providing turnkey solutions. We were awarded a contract to stand up and manage the Counter-Narcotics and Border Training and Customs Academies in Afghanistan; we were hired by the U.S. Strategic Command in Omaha, Nebraska, to stand up a 24/7 forward media watch center supporting the Joint Staff and the regional combatant commands. We had a variety of programs supporting the military’s LLSO (Low Level Source Operations) mission. We started getting involved in information operations, doing media-related work, production, dissemination, pre- and post-dissemination assessments … and we grew quite a bit. Over the course of the last fifteen years, our compounded annual growth rate has been over thirty percent. When the military pulled out of Iraq, a good chunk of our business started to whittle, but we were able to quickly replace it. Because we’d built this expertise in providing mission support and overseas logistics services, we started to pursue business in the foreign military sales domain. Our general thesis was that, with the change in Administrations, as the U.S. Government began to pull back its overseas commitments, our international partners would step up and take responsibility for their own security. That meant more throughput in the foreign military sales program. So our focus was on providing long-range logistics and supply-chain management services to the large OEMs, to the companies that were selling boats, air defense systems, planes, etc., seeing if we could wedge our way into this niche area, providing support and a variety of other related services to foreign military sales contractors, and continuing to support the military in deployed areas. One of the other big shifts that we noticed was that the government, and the military in particular, was looking for smaller, nimbler contractors than the ones they typically had in the past. The days of the hundred thousand troop deployments were probably over, and it was more about supporting small, mobile units anywhere in the world, on a moment’s notice. So we felt like it was the right time for us to enter the market and to start to compete with some of the larger companies that have traditionally dominated that space. We’ve been pretty successful. Today, our biggest base of operation in that space, is in Iraq. We’re currently providing all the life support and logistics services to the foreign military sales contractors operating there, and we’re housing and feeding the majority of U.S. military forces in central Iraq. So that’s become a major component of the work that we do. Foreign language work still remains a pillar of the business, but, really the bulk of our work right now is actually in providing long-range logistics and base operations support, supply-chain management, turnkey medical support, fire and crash rescue, all the sorts of things that you see in those deployed environments – wholesale, retail, fuel and food distribution, etcetera.

Graham: So, what current work are you doing that would be relevant to foreign affairs professionals, or FAOs, or Linguists?

Julian: We won a contract a year ago to train foreign assistance officers deploying to work in the embassy in Saudi Arabia. We hold four classes a year, develop a curriculum, and actually deliver the training to twenty or thirty personnel at a time. That’s in direct support of this community. We employ quite a few people who are former FAOs and Linguists.

Graham: Things have changed in the last year, world events, and politically in the U.S. How is SOSi adapting?

Julian: I think the fact that we’re nimble and agile, by virtue of our size and ownership structure, makes us much more competitive than we would have been in the
mid-2000s. We’re adapting by trying to hire as many
foreign and foreign-born, hyphenated U.S. nationals as we
can, people who really understand these overseas environ-
ments so that we’re not always showing up with prior
military members alone. It’s having the right mix between
prior military members who understand the mission, and
people drawn from the civilian sector who really, genuinely
understand the areas and the environments where we’re
working, that is a critical ingredient in our success.

Graham: The military sometimes does something called
heritage recruiting. They look for people who are born in
another country or grew up in a different culture. They
bring a lot to the table.

Julian: They just bring a very different perspective to the
table. First of all, I think, people who are native foreign
language speakers are capable of thinking on different
planes. They don’t just understand the language. They
are able to immerse themselves in relationships in a way
that people who have learned fluency in foreign languages
can never. I mean, it’s very difficult. There are people
who can do it, but it’s not common. It’s not just about
having foreign language skills, it’s about having the cultural
sensitivities that are critical to relationship-building. When
you’re in a negotiation, you want somebody who can
interact and engage with a foreign counterpart on their
level. I think that having “heritage speakers”, as you put
it, is critical. There are some people, I think, who learned
languages as second or third languages, who are capable
of developing the skill, but it takes a long time. I think it’s
a very small percentage of people who have the capacity
to do that.

Graham: What are some trends in the defense industry
that you’re seeing at your level that Foreign Area Officers,
who are either Active Duty, or recently transitioned,
should know about?

Julian: I’ve noticed that the U.S. military has had to
become far-more competitive than it’s ever been in the
past in promoting U.S. defense sales. There is growing
competition around the world and, frankly, we hear a lot
of complaints about the U.S. Government Acquisition
system and how slow and cumbersome it is. What that
generally means is, Foreign Area Officers have to develop
their business skills in a way that they probably didn’t have
to fifteen or twenty years ago. Fifteen or twenty years ago,
our systems and all the support activities that go with
them, sold themselves. Today, we have to be much more
proactive in actually selling U.S.-manufactured equipment
and the services that go along with it. You have a lot
of smaller technologies and smaller platforms that are
being purchased overseas, but just because the world’s
evolving….

Graham: I think technology is kind of language and, if
you have heritage speakers in the language of technology,
people that grew up using the technology, there’s a
difference between someone who’s very comfortable with
technology because they grew up around it, and someone
who isn’t. And so, sometimes it’s harder to teach the latter
person how to speak about technology.

Julian: The Government, particularly the military, thinks
in overly simplistic terms when architecting contract
programs that facilitate cross-border communication
and deal-making. The reality is, every single “Linguist
Program”, whether it’s inherently Government or run
by a contractor, usually requires some level of technical
expertise that extends beyond just simple foreign language.
It’s one thing to provide translators to go on patrol. It’s
a wholly different thing to employ a linguist who works
as a political advisor to a senior commander. It’s a wholly
different thing for a linguist to be imbedded in a security
cooperation office at one of our embassies in the Middle
East. Then, of course, there are the foreign language
speakers who support our various Intelligence activities.
More often than not, they have to have foreign language
or cultural expertise. In some cases, it’s in the least obvious
areas. For example, doing “pattern-of-life” analysis from

*Balad Airfield*
geospatial data. Having somebody with cultural expertise actually involved in a program like that, in my opinion, is critical, because it’s hard to do “pattern-of-life” analysis without the help of a person who really understands the context and the environment. There are lots of nuances that people who are not from those areas of the world would not pick up.

Graham: Well, we’re seeing a convergence in a lot of specializations. Increasingly, you have to have to be very broad in addition to being deep. If you are deep in diplomacy and languages, you do have to be broad enough to deal with the technologies all around you. Geospatial imaging capabilities, as they get more and more granular, need people that have the cultural awareness to know what they’re looking at and make sense of it.

Julian: Yes, exactly. That’s kind of what I was referring to.

Graham: Do you have any advice for transitioning veterans who are not sure what they want do next?

Julian: I have lots of advice. First of all, the Aerospace and Defense industry is a good place to transition because while it’s in the private sector, and obviously there are lots of characteristics about being in private industry that are very different than being in the military…. it’s probably a good stopover,… because most of the companies in this space already employ lots of veterans, it’s going to be somewhat familiar given the types of things that we do, and the types of people we employ. Managing people, leading people, is something that I think military leaders do better than anyone in the private sector. I mean, the military cultivates leadership far better than any other institution on the face of the Earth. … However, I get concerned sometimes that retired military members are programmed for so long to take direction, that there’s a tendency to take for granted that someone else is going to come up with the creative ideas that they’re there to execute. Being a “thought-leader”. That is, being innovative, creative and thinking out of the box, are very important components of leadership in the private sector. I would argue in, in many respects, much more so than in the military, and so being prepared for that type of leadership is critical. Creativity is not something you can delegate.

Graham: I think it’s really great advice. So you are saying we need to get our military thinking creatively during the transition process and earlier in order to make a strong transition. There are a lot of veterans who have a rocky transition. And, one of the, as you mentioned, natural steps would be to come back to the defense industry and use the skills that they developed and the knowledge they developed in the same ecosystem they were in. How do you find those types of people? Do you go through any kind of recruiting platform, or what’s your process?

Julian: I’d like to say there’s some institutional process that we’ve mastered that identifies the most capable people. When we’re interviewing candidates, we’re looking for people who think out of the box, who are resourceful… and who are prepared roll up their sleeves and get their hands dirty. Nothing replaces experience, so people who are humble, bold, and have a passion for experiential learning are generally the ones who are the most successful. We’re looking for people have the capacity to operate and think creatively and unconventionally when tackling problems. That’s why our customers hire us. The government wouldn’t need us if we were just like them.
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