19 | THE CASE FOR A LESS “SELECTIVE SERVICE”

BRIGADIER GENERAL MARY-KATE LEAHY, U.S. ARMY

9  A Look at North Korea
11  Foreign Policy in Vietnam
14  Airpower Solutions for Mauritania
21  Win Friends and Influence People with Security Cooperation
25  Authorities of the DNI are “Insufficient”
34  Security Engagement for an Unpredictable World
38  Military Capacity Building
43  LREC for the Joint Force
51  Turkey: A Misunderstood Ally
56  On the Importance of Uniform Parity
59  The U.S. Against the Archenemy

NEWS FROM THE FIELD

05  Disaster Relief
47  Strategic Gift-Giving
32  Marketing Skills for Security Cooperation
48  Updates from Monterey
SUBSCRIPTIONS & MEMBERSHIPS
Subscription to the journal comes with membership in the association. Library and institutional rates and bulk discounts are also available. Membership and subscription information may be obtained online at www.faoa.org

SUBMISSIONS
Contributors should email articles to editor@faoa.org. Further information of submissions, format requirements and assistance can be found on the back cover of this issue and online at www.faoa.org

EDITORIAL BOARD
Joseph Bincarousky, Maj, USAF
Mark Brice Chakwin, COL, USA (ret.)
Mike Ferguson, COL, USA (ret.)
Jeff Hoffmann, USAFR (ret.)
Jason C. Howk, MAJ, USA
David Mack, LtCol, USAF (ret.)
Jason Nicholson, LTC, USA
Dan Singleton, MAJ, USA
Phil Yu, CAPT, USN
Vincent Alcazar, COL USAF retired
Vincent Duenas, MAJ, US Army
Robert Friedenberg, COL US Army retired

The Editorial Board uses a “peer review” method for coordination of journal submissions. Board members represent varied International Affairs backgrounds from all services including active, civilian, reserve, and retired. If you are interested in serving on the editorial board, please email editor@faoa.org

ISSN 1551-8094

JOURNAL STAFF
Graham Plaster, LCDR USNR, Editor-in-Chief
John B. Haseman, COL US Army-Retired Chairman, Editorial Board
Craig Byrnes Webmaster
Maridee Hargus, Administrative Assistance

FAOA BOARD OF GOVERNORS
PRESIDENT
Kurt Marisa, Col, USAF (ret.)
VICE PRESIDENT
Robert Timm, COL, USA
SECRETARY
John Krause, Maj, USMC (ret.)
TREASURER
Jeff S. Hoffmann, USAFR (ret.)
MONTEREY Rep
Mark Chakwin, COL, USA (ret.)
EDITOR IN CHIEF
Graham Plaster, LCDR, USNR
CONTENT EDITOR
John Haseman, COL, USA (ret.)
Ivan Raiklin, MAJ, USA
Robert Fagan, COL, USA (ret.)

The Foreign Area Officer Association (FAOA) Journal of International Affairs is the publication for Regional and International Affairs professionals of the FAOA Association, a 501c(19) non-profit Veterans’ organization. The views expressed are those of the authors, not of the FAOA, the Department of Defense, or the Armed services or any DoD agency, and are intended to advance the FAO and defense international affairs profession through academic dialog.
IN THIS EDITION

9 | Book Review Essay: A Look at North Korea, Major Jason Halub, U.S. Army

11 | United States Foreign Policy in Vietnam, Lieutenant Colonel Timothy G. Sumja, U.S. Air Force

14 | Providing Airpower Solutions to Mauritania, Major Jonathan Wallevand, U.S. Air Force

19 | The Case for a Less “Selective Service”, Brigadier General Mary-Kate Leahy, U.S. Army

21 | How to Win Friends and Influence People Using Security Cooperation, Colonel Todd A. Cyril, U.S. Army

25 | The Current Authorities Granted to the Office of the DNI are Insufficient, Commander Erik M. Dullea, United States Navy Reserve

34 | International Security Engagement for an Unpredictable World, Lieutenant Colonel Mark J. Teel, U.S. Army National Guard

38 | Military Capacity Building: Programs to Perpetuate Regional Instability, Major Alan E. Van Saun, U.S. Army


51 | Turkey: A Misunderstood Ally, Major Jeff Jager, U.S. Army

56 | “You Me, Same Same”: The Importance of Uniform Parity for FAOs, Lieutenant Colonel Erich Henry Wagner, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve

59 | The Next Adversary: The U.S. Against the Archenemy, Captain Daniel Sheets, U.S. Air Force

NEWS FROM THE FIELD

5 | Contributing to Disaster Relief, Lieutenant Colonel Joe Evans, U.S. Army


47 | We Should Use Strategic Gift-Giving to Build Our Partnerships, Lieutenant Joshua Aisen, U.S Navy

48 | Updates from the FAO Association at Monterey, Colonel Mark Chakwin, U.S. Army - Retired
Fellow Foreign Affairs Professionals at Home and Abroad,

The next president of the United States will inherit a complex array of foreign policy and defense challenges, not least of which being an increasingly polarized and disenchanted electorate at home. Nothing will be simple.

The unified political will that existed just after 9-11 has been fragmented and turned in on itself. The public’s awareness of details surrounding Syria, Iraq, Russia, the South China Sea, Cuba, Iran (and the list goes on) are drowned out by sensational, popular news. The signal is lost in the noise.

For this reason FAOs play a critical role for such a time as this. The task of communicating the truth from the ground is incredibly important now so that decision makers know facts and can craft policy around achievable objectives.

All of you know, better than most, how U.S. policy is being implemented, whether it is working, and what might be done to improve it. This journal is your platform to articulate those ideas. Through professional, civil discourse we aim to continually improve the profession and serve the nation well.

This edition includes several “news from the field” essays that provide a slice of life from the perspective of a foreign affairs practitioner. We have also continued to print award winning papers from the war colleges and papers written in response to previously published pieces.

We currently publish three editions a year and have a backlog of content (at any given time) for the next two editions. However, I would like to see the number of submissions continue to grow. If you would like to be published in the journal, the process is simple. Submit a research paper, OpEd, letter to the editor, book review, “news from the field” essay, or response paper for something previously published to our Content Editor, John Haseman, who is the Chair of our Editorial Board (Editor@FAOA.org). All content submitted to the Editorial Board is reviewed by three to five FAOs who serve as volunteers. This is a time consuming task. Once there is a consensus that the piece meets the standard of the journal, the articles are passed to me for prioritization and layout.

As with every FAOA journal edition, it is our hope that the articles and award winning papers included here will spark the kinds of important discussion that lead to real solutions. Please feel free to leave comments in the Foreign Area Officers Association LinkedIn group regarding any of the content, or shoot us a letter to the editor editor@FAOA.org.

As we continue to professionalize the journal, our goals are to make it:

• A professional stepping stone to help you in your career as a warrior-scholar
• A community of voices representing the diversity of regions, specialties, and experiences in our network
• An advocacy platform to inform the defense community about the value of the FAO profession
• A resource to help those who aspire to become FAOs understand the work and make an informed decision when applying
• A bridge for FAO community partners, in the public and private sectors, to stay connected and abreast of industry thought leadership

Please join us and become a part of this important conversation at a critical inflection point in our history. Whether new to the community or a seasoned FAO, I invite you to write for the journal.

Sincerely,

Graham
devoted much of my time and energy to disaster preparedness during the first nine months of my assignment as the Chief of the Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) in Nepal. Nepal is prone to natural disasters, including floods during the monsoon season, landslides and avalanches in the mountainous region to the north, and earthquakes.

The focus changed suddenly on April 25, 2015 when a 7.9 magnitude earthquake struck central Nepal, to include the densely populated Kathmandu valley. We quickly shifted from disaster preparedness to disaster response. The earthquake was followed by countless aftershocks, including a second 7.3 magnitude earthquake on May 12. All of this occurred less than two months from the start of the monsoon season, necessitating a rapid and comprehensive response.

The purpose of this article is to discuss the key lessons learned from a defense cooperation perspective. The topics contained in the subsequent paragraphs reflect my own observations following the earthquake in Nepal. Some of it may not apply to natural disasters in other parts of the world. This particular event was a learning process from the beginning. The normal way of doing business changed and the stakes immediately became a lot higher. The critical preparations that my host-nation counterparts and I had emplaced were about to be tested by a catastrophic natural disaster that tested everyone’s commitment to teamwork.

The role of the ODC after the earthquake was dependent on a variety of factors that included the absence of the SDO-DATT who was on leave, the availability of a U.S. Army Special Forces training team, and the specific Emergency Action Plan for U.S. Embassy Kathmandu.

As the senior military representative on the ground after the earthquake there was the immediate need to account for all DoD personnel in country and designate roles and responsibilities for each. We first established Liaison Officers
with all of the major response command and control nodes, to include the Nepalese Army’s Multi-National Military Command Center (MNMCC) and the Ministry of Home Affairs’ National Emergency Operations Center (NEOC). I also worked with the Nepalese Army to help integrate the U.S. Special Forces training teams into the response operations, to include search and rescue efforts.

It was clear from the Nepalese Army’s initial response and feedback from other international partners that preparation is the key to a successful response. This applies not only to disaster specific preparation activities, but also internal groundwork. It is imperative to know the people that you are going to work with and how to best work with them. There is no time in the immediate aftermath of a disaster to develop the key personal relationships needed to facilitate the response. The specific topics that I will address in this article include interagency coordination and cooperation, military-to-military support, and the importance of the bigger picture.

**Interagency Coordination and Cooperation**

The necessity of interagency coordination is emphasized in almost every aspect of our staff and joint assignments. During disaster response, the ability of different agencies to coordinate and cooperate takes on a new dimension and is of the utmost importance. We facilitated this in Nepal through joint efforts of the country team and incorporating civilian and military representatives from the Government of Nepal, as well as representatives from civil society, into our numerous exercises and training events. The number of different types of organizations involved means that simply working in the interagency is not enough. We must work with at least nine different types of actors who are involved in disaster response. These groups include civilian government, military forces, and non-governmental organizations (NGO/INGO) from the United States, the host nation, and a variety of international partners. It is important to understand that each of these organizations may view things differently, use and understand a different language and terminology, and employ methods which are incompatible with the others. As the Security Cooperation Officer, it may be a unique opportunity, or even a requirement, to serve as a link between these different elements.

We were able to achieve this by participating rather than simply acting as a facilitator for the disaster response preparation activities before the earthquake. Additionally, the magnitude of a major natural disaster exceeds the capacity for one person or organization to fix independently. It is essential that everyone involved identify their most appropriate role, accomplish that portion of the mission and then help others to accomplish theirs.

I conducted an initial aerial reconnaissance and assessment with the Nepalese Army in addition to assessing the utility and success of our pre-earthquake disaster preparation projects. After the arrival of the Joint Task Force (JTF), I assisted with coordination between the JTF and the Nepalese Army. The planning for long-term recovery began immediately, which required extensive coordination with USAID. Throughout this process we continued to work military to military support for the Nepalese Army, which included expediting the delivery of disaster communications equipment for units providing relief and conducting engineering assessments of damaged buildings to prepare for future safe demolition training, retrofitting, and reconstruction.

There is also a tenth group that is often overlooked; the affected community. In addition to cooperating with the other responders, we also must work with the victims of the disaster from the local communities. Many of the host nation response elements and relief organizations may fall into both categories. An example of this, in the case of the 2015 Nepal Earthquake, is the Nepalese Army first responders and some of the NGOs who had lost their homes and were operating out of damaged buildings. This example indicates, however,
that victims can still contribute to the relief effort. The overall coordination and planning must take into consideration whether an entity is providing relief, is a victim, or both, in order to achieve the most effective response.

**Military-to-Military Support**

The primary role of a Security Cooperation Office is to provide U.S. military support to the host nation security forces. In many cases, including Nepal, the host nation military and other security forces play a key role in disaster response. This results from the logistical capacity, size, command and control capability, training, and geographic presence of security forces throughout a country. However, most U.S. government aid money cannot be used to support the military despite its role as the primary first responder. Additionally, a Joint Task Force (JTF) that is deployed in support of the disaster response is unlikely to have a mandate for military-to-military support. For these reasons it is essential to maximize existing programs. There is unlikely to be any immediate funding or new processes available for a security cooperation office in the immediate aftermath of a disaster. The standard programs will continue to operate at the normal slow pace. It is possible, however, to expedite existing cases or alter the scope of planned programs to suit the immediate need. A great deal of flexibility, creativity and patience is required to enable this to occur.

There will be a lot of discussion about additional funding and expedited support, although this may not materialize as support through the security cooperation office. There will be other actors and new faces who become involved in the process. The process may be unable to maintain pace with the response or changing dynamics in the immediate aftermath of the disaster. For example, Afghanistan and Iraq operate under modified rules that allow security cooperation efforts to complement combat operations, but this does not apply to military support during a disaster response. The key to success is to be creative and remain persistent. The new faces and different rules may lead to confusion with host nation partners who are likely comfortable with their pre-existing relationships. They will continue to look to the security cooperation office as a reliable partner who can provide support in their time of need. It is a delicate balancing act to sustain these relationships while supporting the overall U.S. government process that is temporarily imposed.

**The Bigger Picture**

Throughout the response to a natural disaster there are many bureaucratic hurdles, and these can be exacerbated when the disaster also affects the host nation government. Government agencies are required to adhere to legal precedents and have a tendency to follow pre-established response plans. This can be a tedious process and exceptionally frustrating given the urgent need for most requests. It is important to avoid becoming frustrated and to find a way to gain support without breaking the law or adding more confusion. While many elements of your established support network will genuinely offer their full support and sympathy, the suffering on the ground is not as real to those who are thousands of miles away. A sense of compassion is inevitable but must be combined with a professional outlook that incorporates the established procedures towards a goal of providing timely and relevant support.

In addition to providing assistance to those affected by the disaster, part of doing the right thing is to take care of yourself. This includes ensuring that you monitor your own health and safety, as well as that of your family and subordinates. It is easy to become caught up in the importance and urgency of the work but this can have negative results. A lack of sleep and food will result in poor performance, bad decisions and can also increase the safety risk for yourself and those around you. In addition to normal safety precautions, which must be carefully monitored, there should be special emphasis placed on risk assessments. The normal systems of communication, transportation and other life support are likely to be disrupted. The risk assessment is especially important for temporary duty (TDY) support who are unlikely to be as knowledgeable or comfortable operating in the affected area.

The pace of operations for a security cooperation office increases exponentially after a major natural disaster with constant new developments and unforeseen changes. It is easy to become so caught up in the process, and our own efforts, that we lose sight of the intended goal. This can be mitigated by getting out of the office and visiting your counterparts, even if just for a courtesy call or to check and see how they are doing. This gesture will be appreciated, no matter how busy someone might be, and will also broaden your perspective on what is happening. The near-term requirements can be related to life or death issues that are of the utmost importance but it is necessary to remain aware of the normal requirements.

In the aftermath of the 25 April earthquake in Nepal, we continued sending students abroad to courses and training events. All of this occurred while conducting search and rescue operations, helping to coordinate the interagency response within the Embassy, and with my locally employed staff living in tents. It can be difficult to remain aware of existing and future requirements in this type of situation.

Although time may seem to have stopped in the immediate environment, the world does not stop turning and many of the normal requirements and activities need to continue. The preparation time and requirements for an event that will occur in a few months will quickly pass you by, leaving a significant administrative burden once the current crisis has passed. It is critical to remain aware of the bigger picture so that you are not set up for failure when the host nation is ready to resume some sense of normalcy. Additionally, assuming that your priorities were correct in the first place, the things that were important before the disaster will remain important during and after.
Conclusion

Learning how to work within and among the different agencies and nationalities that respond to any crisis is the most important lesson. It is impossible to fully capture the nuance required to negotiate these relationships, but this should be exactly our strength as foreign area officers.

The United States has a tremendous capacity to utilize military support for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. The vast resources and deployment ability allow for a rapid and comprehensive response to almost any part of the world. These assets can help to prevent the unnecessary loss of life and to assist the international community in preventing further disaster that might arise from an inadequate or delayed response. It is essential that an embassy’s military team is able to contribute to this overall effort. The security cooperation officer should have a good understanding of the disaster response plans and processes in the Combatant Command, host nation, and other supporting agencies. Host nation understanding of our processes will also help to facilitate our response. This understanding can be developed by incorporating and synchronizing the concepts and explanations for each of these plans and processes into disaster response exercises and training. Additionally, the security cooperation office and the Defense Attaché Office should both be included in the Combatant Command’s emergency response planning process despite the distractions and other competing priorities. It would also be advisable for the U.S. government to consider adjusting the security cooperation process during a disaster response in a similar way to war-time scenarios to allow for the assistance to be timely and relevant. It would be helpful to have at least one method of support that will allow the security cooperation office to provide timely direct support to the military first responders.

It is impossible to be completely prepared for a major natural disaster. The loss of life and destruction will be inevitable. However, the level of preparation and effectiveness of the response will help to mitigate the damage. Also, there are going to be very few people who can communicate your on-the-ground perspective of the damage and the overall efforts, which makes it all the more important for you to provide input. Support to the host nation military will be a complex process, given the U.S. laws and restrictions on aid money, and the overall military-to-military relationship will be tested severely during the response operation. Finally, it is important to remain aware of our own health and safety, the reason for the process, and the eventual return to normalcy. These objectives can be achieved with good preparatory work, stamina, and patience.

About the Author:

Lieutenant Colonel Joe Evans is a U.S. Army South Asian FAO who is currently serving as the Chief, Office of Defense Cooperation in Kathmandu, Nepal. He previously served on the Pakistan Desk in the Joint Staff J5, South Asia Desk for the Army International Affairs Division, and attended the Pakistan Army Command and Staff College in Quetta. As an Infantry Officer in the 10th Mountain Division he served multiple deployments in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kosovo. The author is also a graduate of the Catholic University of America with an M.A. in World Politics.
At the time of this writing yet another crisis has erupted on the Korean peninsula. North Korea has purportedly planted anti-personnel mines along the South Korean side of the Demilitarized Zone that have maimed two South Korean soldiers. Additionally, North Korea is threatening to attack the United States if the annual joint ROK-US military exercises proceed as planned. While Western media often portray North Korea’s actions as pure lunacy, two recent historical works, Charles Armstrong’s Tyranny of the Weak and Andrei Lankov’s The Real North Korea, demonstrate that North Korea’s leaders are actually quite rational in their dangerous policy approach. Both accounts provide valuable insight into a country that is often misunderstood and an international problem that remains unresolved.

Tyranny of the Weak examines the history of North Korea’s diplomatic relations from 1950 to 1992. Armstrong argues that, despite its small size and relatively few resources, North Korea made the most out of a limited hand by playing off the Soviet Union and China against one another to maximize aid and maintain independence. Armstrong also highlights the impact that the Korean War had on North Korea’s development, showing how competition with South Korea and its superpower sponsor, the United States, influenced Kim Il Sung to prioritize heavy industry and excessive military spending at the expense of more sound economic policies. Nevertheless, North Korea was able to maintain these policies through substantial injections of aid from the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, China. Moreover, exploiting the rivalry between North Korea’s two Communist backers allowed Kim Il Sung to eliminate domestic political contenders, such as the “Yan’an” and “Soviet” factions, and place members of his own family and trusted “Guerilla” faction into positions of power throughout the government.

One of the most insightful points in Armstrong’s account is Kim Il Sung’s obsession with sovereignty, which led him to pursue a policy of Juche, or self-reliance, and maintain equidistance from both Beijing and Moscow while extracting aid from each. This emphasis on sovereignty and Juche, in turn, led to a further militarization of North Korean society that made the country even more reliant on Soviet aid to survive. However, by 1988, the Soviet Union was restructuring its economy and reducing aid to countries such as North Korea and Cuba, which were strategically important, but an economic liability. Meanwhile, China was growing closer to both the U.S. and the USSR, which, as Armstrong points out, “eliminated Pyongyang’s ability to play off the two Communist superpowers against one another.” By the end of 1991, the Soviet Union was no more and foreign aid had dried up. North Korea became “truly ‘self-reliant’ for the first time” and the consequences were dire.

Andrei Lankov’s The Real North Korea picks up where Armstrong leaves off and primarily focuses on the development and policies of the North Korean state since the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. Lankov argues that North Korea’s leaders have few options but to continue to employ the dangerous diplomacy of nuclear brinksmanship and coercive threats to survive. Since North Korea no longer receives Soviet aid, the country’s leaders have relied upon a coercive diplomacy whereby they will first generate a crisis and then offer to come to the negotiating table in exchange for concessions. Part of the reason for persisting in this seemingly reckless approach is that the existence of an ethnically homogenous and prosperous South Korea makes liberalizing the


Companies and governments trust JTG’s expertise, client-focused processes and efficient use of technology for developing and deploying their global initiatives.

We combine tested localization procedures with cultural insight to support global objectives with true intelligence. Our multidisciplinary subject matter experts understand the complete spectrum of communication services, working as an extension of a client’s team, to address projects from every angle and deliver consistent value and ROI.

JTG-INC.COM

North Korean system a deadly proposition for its leaders, who fear they will be deposed if their population learns the truth about South Korea’s prosperity and freedom. Therefore, the North Korean regime has attempted, quite effectively, to keep its people isolated, to control information, and to put extended family members and loyal supports of the Kim dynasty in positions of power in government.

Some of the most intriguing aspects of The Real North Korea are Lankov’s policy recommendations. Having lived through the fall of his native Soviet Union and studied abroad in North Korea during the 1980s, Lankov is convinced that the current situation and government in the North will not last. He believes that the best way to soften the effects of the North Korean government’s demise is by implementing a policy of sustained engagement that will facilitate the development of a “second society” – a class of skilled individuals, largely disinterested in the current regime, who may be in the position to run the government after the Kim dynasty’s fall. One might question the degree to which the Soviet experience in Europe can provide a model for North Korea today, particularly considering the unique path that the Kim dynasty has paved for North Korea and the strategic landscape of Northeast Asia. Nevertheless, sustained engagement with North Korea is necessary because the country, as recent news headlines indicate, cannot simply be ignored.

In summary, North Korea is a country that is often obscured by our own policy rhetoric and the sensational hyperbole of our news media. Armstrong and Lankov succeed in producing two very readable histories that shed light on this modern-day “Hermit Kingdom.” They also illustrate North Korea’s continuity with Korea’s pre-modern past. For instance, Lankov’s description of the contemporary North Korean hereditary songbun system of social ranking is strikingly similar, in practice, to the Yangban-led caste system under the Koryo and Choson dynasties. With regards to foreign policy, Armstrong’s account of North Korean leaders’ skillful attempts to balance China and the Soviet Union for aid is reminiscent of both the Koryo and Choson dynasties’ dealings with the various polities of North China over the last one thousand years. Now, as then, a strong desire for independence and self-preservation remains the central priority and, save for a relatively brief yet intense period of Japanese colonial rule, Korean leaders have been very successful at achieving that end. With this in mind, there is no reason to assume that North Korean leaders would deliberately take steps to undermine their own authority or simply relinquish their leadership of the country. Therefore, future provocations are likely to reoccur.

About the Author

MAJ Jason Halub is a China FAO currently conducting In-Region Training in Beijing, China. He previously taught East Asian and military history at the United States Military Academy and has served as a Signal Company Commander in Germany and an Infantry Company Mentor to the Afghan National Army. He earned his Master’s degree in International History from Georgetown University.
United States Foreign Policy in Vietnam

by Lieutenant Colonel Timothy G. Sumja, U.S. Air Force

Editor’s Note: Lieutenant Colonel Sumja’s thesis won the FAO Association writing award at the Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy, National Defense University. In the interest of space the thesis is published here without research references. The complete thesis, with references, will be available at faoa.org.

Your Association is pleased to bring you this outstanding scholarship.

Author’s Disclaimer: The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

In 2015, the United States and Vietnam will observe the 20th anniversary of the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two nations. Over those 20 years, the relationship between the two countries has grown stronger on multiple fronts, and even more so in recent years with President Obama’s strategic “pivot” to East Asia. One of the obvious reasons for this shift centers on China. As China continues to grow economically and militarily, it has increased its outward aggression towards some of the smaller nations in the area, including Vietnam. While regional stability is definitely in the national security interests of the United States, it is imperative that foreign policy with Vietnam not be solely centered on containing China. This paper will provide a brief history of relations between the United States and Vietnam following the Vietnam War, an overview of current foreign policies as they relate to Vietnam, and recommendations for policies and actions with Vietnam over the next decade.

How Did We Get Here?

For 15 years after the Vietnam War, diplomatic and economic relations between the United States and Vietnam were all but absent. The United States established trade embargos and cut off all foreign assistance to Vietnam. Vietnam’s economic and military alignment with the Soviet Union during this time further complicated the relationship. In the 1980s, Vietnam’s economy was in shambles and its government found themselves in relative diplomatic isolation.

Realizing changes had to be made, the Vietnamese Communist Party adopted market-oriented economic reforms they called Doi Moi, or “renovation”. Under Doi Moi, the government shifted its focus from national security towards economic development and national prestige. This policy shift has allowed Vietnam to realize more than a sevenfold increase in GDP since 1985. In 2013, Vietnam had a GDP of $170 billion and has moved itself into the rankings of the middle-income countries.

Relations between the United States and Vietnam began to improve in the late 1980s under President Reagan as the two countries began working together on POW/MIA issues. Following Vietnam’s withdrawal from Cambodia, President George H. W. Bush looked to continue strengthening the relationship. In 1991, the Administration provided Vietnam with a detailed plan on what was required to normalize relations. President Clinton continued this effort in 1993 by ending the U.S. opposition to Vietnam receiving international financial assistance and again in 1994 when the trade embargo on Vietnam was lifted. The relationship between the United States and Vietnam was normalized in 1995. Under the President George W. Bush Administration, the two countries made efforts to reestablish bilateral relations. In 2001, Congress ratified the U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement, which granted Vietnam conditional normal trade relations (NTR). Congress renewed this conditional agreement each year until 2006, when Vietnam was granted permanent NTR status and subsequently became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2007.

Current U.S. Policies and Efforts in Vietnam

As part of the recent “rebalancing” of U.S. priorities towards the Asia-Pacific, President Obama’s Administration recognized the importance of continuing to strengthen and bolster its relationship with Vietnam. After all, a strong and prosperous Vietnam could be extremely beneficial for regional peace and stability. This section will analyze current U.S. policies in Vietnam with a specific focus on the diplomatic, economic and military elements.

When it comes to diplomatic efforts, one of the issues at the forefront today involves territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Vietnam has actively sought international support to prevent China from acting unilaterally on its claims. While the Vietnamese government does not expect the United States to take sides in the dispute, it has asked the U.S. to do more to emphasize that all parties, especially China, must adhere to common principles, transparency, and the commitment of the freedom of the seas. The United States stepped up its
involvement in the disputes in 2010, when then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated freedom of navigation in the South China Sea was a U.S. national interest and the United States was opposed to the use or threat of force by any of the claimants.

During President George W. Bush’s time in office, both countries sought to increase the number of high-level bilateral visits and began holding annual summits to discuss economic and political reforms in Vietnam as well as a partnership on strategic issues. This policy has continued under President Obama’s Administration and in July 2013, President Obama hosted President Sang during his first-ever trip to the United States. The two held a meeting at the White House where both sides announced an effort to form a bilateral “comprehensive partnership” to move the relationship to a “new phase.” Both Presidents reaffirmed their commitment to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and discussed other important areas of cooperation such as science and technology, education, the environment, war legacy issues, defense and security, and the protection of human rights.

Another avenue the Obama Administration has taken to strengthen its ties with Vietnam has been the creation of multilateral agreements between nations in the area. The Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) is one of these efforts. Created in 2009, the LMI was designed to enhance cooperation between Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam primarily in areas such as the environment, health, and education. Burma also joined the initiative in 2012. While the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has already developed a Climate Change and Development Strategy with Vietnam to address issues such as deforestation, the LMI goes one step further by seeking to improve conditions for the entire region, which ultimately benefits Vietnam. For instance, the Mekong River Commission signed an agreement with the Mississippi River Commission to form a partnership to improve the utilization of transboundary water resources and in 2010, the U.S. and Vietnam co-sponsored the first ever U.S.-Lower Mekong Health Conference to address regional health challenges.

In addition to diplomatic initiatives, efforts by the United States on the economic front are equally as important. Over the past 20 years, trade between the United States and Vietnam has grown from $450 million annually to $35 billion in 2014 and the United States is Vietnam’s largest export market. One of the key items that assisted Vietnam with this growth was the Support for Trade Acceleration (STAR) project led by USAID. This project was key to ensure Vietnam met the requirements of the U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement and further helped the country gain accession into the WTO. STAR helped to create an atmosphere of cooperation between the government, private sector, and civil society to ensure the rule of law promoted business rather than hindered it. One of the important parts of this project was the fact that it was led by the Vietnamese Prime Minister’s office. USAID assisted throughout the project, especially with the laws required to meet international standards, but the Vietnamese leaders were the ones who identified the needs that had to be addressed.

The biggest effort currently underway is the TPP. The TPP is a free trade agreement between the United States, Canada, Mexico and several countries in the Asia-Pacific region and will likely eliminate tariffs on goods and services, and knock down many non-tariff barriers. If signed, this agreement will account for over 40% of U.S. imports and exports. One of the challenges in this agreement with regards to Vietnam has been the fact their government owns a large part of their economy. But this is not likely to be a deal breaker since other countries such as Malaysia and Singapore fall into the same arena. Proponents of the TPP argue Vietnam’s membership would further open a sizeable market for the U.S. and could lead to economic reforms in Vietnam. Furthermore, it could lay the foundation for other countries with governments that intervene in their economies, such as China, to join TPP at a later date. Besides the diplomatic and economic efforts, the U.S. has also slowly increased its military cooperation with Vietnam.

On August 23, 2011, the Military Sealift Command dry cargo/ammunition ship USNS Richard E. Byrd sailed out of Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam after undergoing routine maintenance and repairs. While Cam Ranh Bay was one of the largest U.S. military facilities during the Vietnam War, it was the first visit by a U.S. Navy ship to the port in 38 years. In 2005, the U.S. and Vietnam signed the International Military and Education and Training (IMET) agreement which provided an opportunity for Vietnamese officers to receive English training and in 2007, the United States modified the International Traffic in Arms Regulation to allow certain non-lethal defense items to be sold to Vietnam. This was followed with the U.S. providing foreign military financing (FMF) to Vietnam for the first time in 2009. Other signs of increased military cooperation can be seen with joint naval engagements, peacekeeping and search-and-rescue training operations, and the attendance of Vietnamese officers to U.S. military staff colleges.

Following visits to Vietnam in 2014 by Senator John McCain and General Martin Dempsey, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, there have been discussions about allowing the sale of arms to Vietnam, which have been banned since the end of the Vietnam War. The first round of sales could possibly include items such as P-3 Orion patrol plane to help Vietnam patrol its coastline. General Dempsey is in favor of helping Vietnam build a better Navy if the embargo is lifted. Pointing to Vietnam’s key location in the region, he stated, “In terms of managing its maritime resources and managing territorial disputes -- I’d suggest as goes Vietnam, I think as goes the South China Sea.” However, any future arms sales to Vietnam could very well be tied to the Vietnamese government showing an effort to improve its human rights record. As the U.S. looks to continue strengthening its relationship with Vietnam, it must ensure future policies are balanced across the diplomatic, economic, and military realms.

**The Way Ahead in Vietnam**

As the United States shifted its focus towards the Asia-Pacific region, the military aspects of this “rebalance” are the ones that are outwardly the most evident. However, it is imperative for the United States to ensure the non-military aspects, such as
In addition to diplomatic initiatives, efforts by the United States on the economic front are equally as important.

As the United States seeks to continue the momentum built over the past 20 years with Vietnam, it must keep in mind that Vietnam is walking a fine line between the United States and China. Vietnam has a history of conflict with both countries and no one is eager for another one. However, a strong and prosperous Vietnam will help provide stability in the region and could provide some future deterrence to China’s aggression in the region. The United States should continue to assist Vietnam in their growth and should do so with a balanced mix of diplomatic, economic and military policies. The United States and Vietnam have come along way in repairing their relationship, but it could all come unraveled if the United States makes too many demands of Vietnam and essentially forces them to turn towards China.
PROVIDING AIRPOWER SOLUTIONS TO MAURITANIA
A QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT OF USAF EFFORTS TO SUPPORT MAURITANIA’S SECURITY NEEDS THROUGH MILITARY PARTNERSHIPS

By Major Jonathan Wallevand, U.S. Air Force

Editor’s Note: Major Wallevand’s thesis won the FAO Association Writing Award at the Air Command and Staff College. The thesis contains extensive research and statistical data. Because of space limitations, we are publishing a shortened version. The full thesis, including all references and statistical analysis, will be published to FAOA.org. We are pleased to bring you this outstanding scholarship.

Author’s Disclaimer: The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. government or the Department of Defense. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United States government.

Preface

I chose to conduct this research for two primary reasons. First, it is always important that the USAF spend taxpayer dollars wisely and even more so in the face of diminishing defense budgets forced on the nation by an expanding national debt. Although results have been mixed in the past, Security Cooperation (SC) has the potential to fulfill its promise given the proper design and framework. This can be accomplished by selecting willing partners and using narrowly defined goals, then following through with targeted assistance designed to nurture and enhance the original program utilizing lessons-learned to close the feedback loop. Second, my Air National Guard unit, the 217th Air Component Operations Squadron (ACOS), is heavily invested in assisting USAFE and AFRICOM plan in the AFRICOM AOR. I was interested in exploring ways of ensuring USAF Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) accomplishes all it can with its limited budget, by measuring the effectiveness of this aid and tailoring follow-on assistance to address any identified shortfalls. Hopefully, this Mauritanian study can serve as a template for further TSC on the continent.

Introduction

Mauritania has legitimate security concerns. These concerns include but are not limited to al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) attempts to use the window of opportunity presented by the Arab Spring to reestablish itself in North Africa, as well as the smuggling of goods ranging from cigarettes, and stolen cars, to drugs, weapons, and persons. The U.S. Air Force (USAF) undertakes Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) programs on the continent of Africa to counter the afore-mentioned issues in general and to provide Mauritania assistance in particular. This research was conducted to answer the question, is USAF TSC providing solutions properly suited to Mauritania’s security requirements?

This report employed a qualitative evaluation framework in order to analyze the efficacy of the USAF C-208 TSC program on Mauritania’s security needs. This was accomplished by evaluating the data utilizing the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) analytical tool. DOTMLPF is defined in the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) process. It is the formal U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) procedure that defines acquisition requirements and evaluation criteria for future defense programs by focusing the requirements generation process on needed capabilities. The JCIDS process provides an analytical tool that considers solutions involving any combination of DOTMLPF. 217th Air Component Operations Squadron A-Staff Planners (217th ACOS) have analyzed data from the Mauritanian C-208 program in order to determine successes and failures in the program. Subject matter experts (SMEs) from Headquarters U.S. Air Forces in Europe – Air Forces in Africa (HQ USAFE-AFAFRICA/A51O), Training Program Manager (AFRICOM), Air Force Security Assistance Training Squadron (AFSAT), and Secretary of the Air Force International Affairs (SAFIA) were also consulted for their insight into these programs. Additionally, the Office of Security Cooperation at the U.S. Embassy in Nouakchott, Mauritania was interviewed to gain insight to the Mauritanian perspective on the TSC program in general and the C-208 in particular. The findings were then used to reach conclusions and make recommendations for future TSC program improvements.

Chapter 2 provides background relevance and reviews some of the literature on the topic. A detailed description of the research methodology follows in chapter 3. Chapter 4 contains the results of the analysis and finally, chapters 5 and 6 comprise conclusions reached and recommendations going forward, respectively.
Background and Literature Review

Mauritania is a large country (a little bigger than three times the size of New Mexico) with a small population (approximately 3.5 million). It is exceedingly poor and therefore requires cost-effective and versatile security solutions. After achieving independence in 1960, France supplied equipment such as C-47s and MH-1521 Broussards to the Mauritanian Air Force (MAF), known as the Faidem (Force Aerienne Islamique de Mauritanie). These aircraft were later replaced by the Britten-Norman BN-2A Defender from 1976–78 and operated as transport and observation platforms during the Western Sahara War. In 1978, the Polisario Front shot down one Defender and damaged two others. Additionally, two Cessna 337s and two DHC-5 Buffalo Short Take-off and Landing (STOL) transports were supplied in 1977–78 with one DHC-5 crashing almost immediately and the other being returned to De Havilland-Canada in 1979. More recently, in September 1995, Mauritania procured two Harbin Y-12 II turboprop transports from China and crashed one in April 1996. In 1997, the Mauritians purchased a Xian Y7-100C (a copy of the AN-24 transport) and crashed it in May 1998. Mauritania’s poor safety record suggests due diligence was not provided in terms of training or foreign sales support from supplier nations for these air assets.

Security Cooperation (SC) or Security Aid (SA) is a major function of U.S. foreign policy. The challenge for the U.S. is, it must balance its limited national resources and incorporate U.S. national strategy to prioritize those resources in order to accomplish its international mandates. The USAF TSC mission is part of the U.S. government’s prioritization and is structured around due diligence. USAF TSC generally comes as a package consisting of hard assets (aircraft and other equipment); maintenance (equipment, technology); and training support via U.S. Government organizations, private corporate entities, and/or Non-Government Organizations (NGOs). In the case of the two U.S. contracted C-208s donated to Mauritania in 2014, the package was purposefully constructed with a spare engine, as well as pilot, sensor-operator, and maintainer training (see figure 1). The USAF incorporated deployed Military Training Teams (MTTs) to train Mauritanian personnel in a “train the trainer” model in order to establish an indigenous self-service program highlighting Mauritanian autonomy. This research relied on an examination of the C-208 TSC program in Mauritania in order to highlight the efficiencies and economy of scale USAF TSC employed to balance resources, strategy, and mission fulfillment.

The growing economic importance of the 54 African nations in the U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM), as well as increasing instability on the continent of Africa, requires the USAF to have reliable partners with whom to conduct SC. For example, recent deliveries of C-208 aircraft are proving invaluable in conducting counterterrorism Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) operations on the borders of Mauritania, Niger, and Chad. These efforts are multifaceted and take time to implement but can bring greater partnership returns and increase U.S. influence. One could argue the focus of the U.S. should be in securing its own access to Mauritania’s raw materials instead of building military partnerships. However, without security on the continent, instability will continue to hamper Mauritania’s ability to bring their resources to the world market and slow indigenous development, economic growth, and quality of life for the Mauritanian people. Additionally, comprehensive SC efforts, especially in the aeronautical arena, can open the door to further access and collaboration.

The U.S. established its embassy in the capital Nouakchott in 1962 and has provided some form of security assistance to Mauritania for decades. Due to the growing threat from AQIM, cooperation between the two countries has deepened in recent years. The benefits of the relationship are mutual. In exchange for access to U.S. resources, Mauritania provides the U.S. with a security partner in the War on Terror.

Economic growth on the African continent is now the fastest of any region in the world. Additionally, analysts say the rate of return on foreign investment in Africa is higher than in any other developing region, which has led to its having the fastest growing middle class in the world. China has undertaken a massive increase in foreign aid during the previous decade – from roughly $1.7 billion in 2001 to $189.3 billion by 2011. Whereas the U.S. has chosen to concentrate its efforts on regional security, China pursues its economic interests. The U.S. has provided aid in Africa since the early 1950s and in Mauritania since 1960 when it was the first nation to recognize Mauritania’s independence from France. Similarly, China first gave aid to Africa in 1956 and Mauritania in 1965. In Mauritania, USAF TSC focuses on building security partnerships through mil-to-mil exchange and development of an indigenous C-208 program to help the Mauritians address their ISR needs. USAF TSC seeks to develop comprehensive, efficient, and sustainable security relationships. This combination of capabilities and relationships with the USAF TSC/USAFRICOM further enables Mauritania to stand up their own air capabilities to address their relevant national security issues.

There are many reasons for the formation of USAFRICOM. The official reason according to USAFRICOM website is: “United States Africa Command, in concert with interagency and international partners, builds
defense capabilities, responds to crisis, and deters and defeats transnational threats in order to advance U.S. national interests and promote regional security, stability, and prosperity.” During a USAFRICOM Conference held at Fort McNair on February 18, 2008, Vice Admiral Robert T. Moeller openly declared the guiding principle of USAFRICOM is to protect “the free flow of natural resources from Africa to the global market”, before going on to cite China’s increasing presence in the region as challenging to American interests. There are African leaders who worry that USAFRICOM represents a Western attempt at the recolonization of the continent. The truth probably lies somewhere in the middle of these statements. The fact of the matter is Mauritania has significant security issues, and the U.S. has its own regional security concerns in the Sahel.

The real questions are: Are USAFRICOM efforts bearing fruit and why? Is the U.S. providing the best solutions to address Mauritanian security concerns? Are U.S. programs successful in addressing U.S. security concerns in Mauritania and the region at large?

USAFRICOM is conducting more mil-to-mil cooperation with a focus on solving Mauritania’s regional security problems. In the long run, this should bring goodwill to Mauritania and hopefully be viewed positively by its neighbors and other regional competitors. The one aspect USAFRICOM must avoid is short-term appeasement of security concerns. Inevitably this limited strategy would cause rapid economic gains followed by bilateral disappointment since true relationships were never the intended goal. Ultimately, the USAFRICOM and USAF TSC goal in Mauritania is regional security based on devising durable relationships, which in turn will enable and enhance economic development, which serves the interests of the U.S., Mauritania, and the North African region.

Conclusions

TSC efforts are positive conduits for both security support and mutual understanding. When done diligently, both the planning and implementation of SC events provide insight into regional cultures and operations. In turn, such knowledge can be used to further build regional partnerships, define common goals, and strengthen the regional interests of the U.S.

Conclusion 1: Seek Synergy in TSC efforts

Security engagement results may manifest themselves in unexpected areas. In the C-208 case, the greater relative improvements are in facilities and personnel training. The material acquisition of the aircraft had greater effect in two related areas. This outcome reveals the synergistic opportunities to develop multi-faced capabilities. It also demonstrates the importance of observations, and forecasts what the effect of cooperation will actually be. Caution should be observed when considering this complex set of effects (including secondary and tertiary ones).

Successful TSC implementation requires a combination of big-picture thinking and small-scale execution. In line with the above findings, the strategic imperatives for the event must always be kept in mind. At the same time, both event planners and executioners must ensure the projects are being delivered on schedule. After all, this effort is about trust and building relationships i.e. competency matters.

As the USAF implements additional TSC program efforts and gains understanding of each country’s strengths and weaknesses, opportunities for future SC events will be revealed. While implementing current efforts, U.S. planners can discover additional areas delivering improvement or previously unidentified interest areas from the host country. Special areas for consideration are the doctrine and organizational structures. Process improvements in these two areas are inexpensive to implement but can have significant effects on the way a country employs its forces.

The right kind of aid can galvanize internal support for additional investments. In the case of the C-208, delivery of the aircraft convinces the Mauritanian government to further invest in infrastructure hosting the new system. This in turn, ads to their capacity to host regional events and better support the rest of their air force.

Conclusion 2: TSC is a complex endeavor

According to the U.S. Embassy in Mauritania, the complexity of the TSC support case for follow-on equipment and training creates a challenge for tracking and coordination. For a single airframe and associated support systems, there are six CONUS training assignments, eight different MTTs, and six equipment systems planned for delivery with follow-on MTTs in FY15. The whole MAF is staffed at only 300 personnel, so supporting all of the MTTs, CONUS courses, and equipment fielding has been a challenge for the Mauritanians. The TSC coordination team has been doing a great job keeping all of the moving pieces synchronized. The real challenge for everyone in Washington DC, the embassy, and in the PN military has been finishing all of the fielding initiatives within the required single fiscal year. The C-208s were fielded with FY14 TSC funding, with all of the follow-on training for pilot training and basic maintenance, followed by the IRS systems and support equipment, which was fielded with FY15 TSC funding.

Conclusion 3: Continue to refine follow-on training

Although the system works well from the aspect of identifying a need, fielding the equipment, and conducting follow-on training, it would be helpful to require an on-the-ground assessment from the MTTs, and an integration of those assessments into future-training planning cycles. It is reported the MTTs often come into the PN completely isolated from any previous training conducted and any After Action Reports (AARs), which were submitted. Previous teams’ feedback would be a valuable tool for the new teams while they plan and prepare
their Program of Instruction (POIs) for the next iteration of training. Additionally, some of the MTTs do not appear to have a well-defined plan for training before they arrive. Ideally, each MTT would have specific training objectives assigned by the formal MTT request, which the OSC submits. The team lead should then develop a POI according to AARs from previous teams and the request submitted by the OSC (for the host nation government). It is wasteful for an MTT to spend several days of a two-week assignment in-country writing a training plan.

**Conclusion 4: Strive to meet the PN’s stated needs**

**Maintenance was the highest concern for the MAF.** Although there are sufficient numbers of pilots for this airframe, there are not enough correctly trained mechanics. The mechanics available are not certified to conduct the advanced inspections required, as the MAF lacks the Internet and computer support required to access the various maintenance manuals. Furthermore, this equipment shortfall contributes to an inability to track maintenance schedules IAW the required directives for the aircraft. Without the necessary quality assurance programs and Test Measurement Diagnostics Equipment (TMDE) available, it is likely the C-208 will have serious safety fault deadlines by next year. The training (platform) package cannot compensate for the vast disparity in maintenance capabilities between the USAF and the MAF. Most everything the Mauritians use is in paper copy. Having maintenance programs that support paper (at least initially) would be very helpful for this specific country.

The MAF appreciates the C-208 platform, claiming it fits their needs perfectly; however fuel availability has risen as a formidable obstacle to real-world deployment. The MAF does not currently have any forward fueling stations at their remote airbases (airstrips), and therefore have difficulty employing the C-208 where it is needed most - on their land borders.

Although very satisfied with the training provided, the MAF continually requests follow-on events, claiming USAF training to be “the best in the world”. The TSC plan of equip and train is a robust system, smart enough to have planners who think through what the country will need after a TSC fielding. The OSC and MAF could not plan to that level of detail for follow-on training and equipping requirements in support of a fielding.

Top security concerns for the MAF are international extremist organizations and transnational crime i.e. illicit trafficking of goods and persons. These concerns mirror U.S. national priorities and are successfully addressed by enabling the Mauritanian military to continue combating extremism and crime within their land borders, independent of assistance from the international community, all while learning to independently train, sustain, equip, and deploy their armed forces.

In general, governments desire good quality, affordable equipment to solve their problems. The MAF is no different. USAF TSC should make sure end requirements as well as fiscal limitations are understood. Delivering on these parameters can prove to be the source of a fruitful long-term partnership.

**Recommendations**

It is important to understand that before any USAFRICOM or USAF TSC program is put into execution, it must achieve a common goal and has a finite budget. These restraints effect what the U.S. is willing to do and actually capable of achieving. On one hand, both finances and manning must be allocated carefully. As such, impact matters, both from a monetary and a human perspective. On the other hand, the age of austerity requires U.S. focus on regional partnerships. To be successful, any regional partnership has to serve U.S. national interests in that region. To be effective, every partnership must also address directly or indirectly the interests of both nation states. The intersection of U.S. and PN interests is the sweet spot of realistic, achievable, effects-based SC. Recommendations are grouped into four generic groups: process, product, people, and analysis tool.

**Process:** The USAF must direct its focus on the critical aspects of the SC effort and avoid complicated, long-term projects. Resources are limited on the U.S. side; resources may be even more limited in a partnership with a developing nation’s military. Predetermined, disciplined operations are the most successful. Solving one achievable problem at a time, with clearly vetted objectives and timelines, lays the foundation for successful TSC. By focusing on clear, achievable benefits that do not impose unnecessary costs on U.S. systems or those of the host country, that foundation can be expanded and built upon. If the plan is formulated to be achievable, tailored to a specific issue, and is properly socialized with both nation’s populations, it is an easy win for both nations. USAFRICOM also benefits by showing...
proof it is complying with U.S. Government doctrine in the National Security Strategy (NSS), National Military Strategy (NMS), and the Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP).

Multi-dimensional impact: Cooperative engagements that can benefit several attributes are better than a singular focus. For example, a training team helping to develop annual readiness for a new squadron would also impact leadership and organisational structure. In turn, the PN gains more than just training. They gain the comprehensive key to effective asset utilization. Further, the U.S. gains a regional partner better able to understand the technical jargon and support joint operations.

Long-term sustainability: The product or process the U.S. is helping to build will either take root and become part of the local security needs, or will exist for a short while and eventually disappear, ending up as a rusting piece of metal, or a forgotten process. If the intent of the effort is to establish a partnership, the U.S. should always have a goal of long-term sustainability. That is what will offer the next opportunity and the next area for growth.

The next (small) step: Security cooperation efforts, like any other partnership, take time to develop. Engagement often builds rapport, capability, and trust. More important is the state of mind required. Tactical competency requires constant training and adaptation. Small but regular TSC events deliver just that. In contrast, infrequent, large-scale operations lack the constancy of purpose necessary for technical competency.

Interoperability as a force multiplier: By considering how the project fits into the greater capacity of the PN and focusing on the big picture, TSC planners can figure out where U.S. aid will actually count for more than the sum of its parts. For example, the C-208 system not only delivered an ISR tool, but increased communication between the MAF and the Mauritanian Army. It introduced a solid training methodology and highlighted the need for further perimeter security. The C-208 is also a mobility platform capable of providing air transport. Lastly, it introduces the potential for integration with other light air attack platforms. Overall, the presence of the C-208 connects other resources and delivers results greater than the ones provided by the platform alone.

Tracking data and interpreting results: “Fire and forget” SC is worse than neutral and actually has the opposite of the desired effect. It can destroy trust, and decrease U.S. credibility in the region. Thus, such efforts must be monitored from the perspective of the consumer, and with the tools used in identifying and executing the TSC events. When done properly, such evaluation offers insight into the real needs of the region, and the U.S. role in them.

Product: Smaller is better: From the type of system delivered, to the duration of the training period, smaller packages are easier to manage, easier to source, and easier to fund. System recipients are satisfied because the system is not challenging, expensive, or difficult to incorporate in what is usually a developing military. Funders (U.S. Congress, Department of State, etc.) are content, since funding and execution does not strain an already stressed system.

Cost consciousness: Although much of the cost of the TSC process is carried by the U.S., host nations will have to eventually spend limited budgets on the sustainment of the respective system. When developing TSC packages, planners must take this perspective into consideration. The long-term costs for employing a weapon system must be in line with the purchasing power of the ultimate users, and in synergy with their national goals.

Ease of use: By definition, TSC provides assistance where capabilities lack. The weapon-system under consideration must integrate in the capabilities of the existing force. Although training and education are important parts of TSC, such developmental opportunities require time. At the same time, delivering a complex system can erode basic force readiness. As such, provided military aid must offer a short learning curve and relative ease of use to the newly empowered forces. This principle correlates customer requirements with the “small steps” concept listed under processes recommendations.

People: General management: The planners of TSC events must have a combination of regional knowledge and systems awareness. Such planners do not need to be experts in either subject. Rather, they must be able to correlate insight from people in the region with emerging or existing technical solutions. These capabilities are developed through problem solving, training, and selection of a training cadre exhibiting intellectual curiosity. While technical knowledge in an area is very important, the ability to move beyond established knowledge is essential. The same can be said about regional knowledge. Lastly, staff planners must have strong communication skills and be able to deliver comprehensive cases for approval and execution.

Knowledge workers: Communication of information is critical in the creative environment of TSC. As such, collecting and disseminating information should be a dedicated responsibility. Every pre-planning event should begin with the knowledge manager. Every post-TSC event should provide an opportunity for data collection. The data captured must include MTT data and utilize the A-9 (lessons learned) function of the staff. The team participants as well as the planners must be included in this community of knowledge.

Partners: In essence, partnership is the underlying process of TSC. TSC requires the cooperation of many DoD agencies, U.S. Government institutions, and host country agents. Therefore, the TSC planners must be trained in and practice the art of partnership. Such orientation will offer needed synergy and scale in both the planning and execution of TSC events.
The Case for a Less “Selective Service”

By Brigadier General Mary-Kate Leahy, U.S. Army

Editor’s Note: Brigadier General Leahy’s paper won the FAO Association writing award at the Joint Forces Staff College. In the interest of space we publish this version without the author’s research notes. The full thesis will be published to FAOA.org

Author’s Disclaimer: A submission to the Faculty of the Joint Forces Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for Advanced Joint Professional Military Education. The contents of this submission reflect the author’s views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

Our political and military leaders are reinterpreting various aspects of both the United States Code and Department of Defense policies that exclude women from equal roles and opportunities in the Armed Services. Among the policies that should be reviewed and re-examined is the Selective Service Registration requirement. For a variety of reasons, the time is right to expand registration to include females. This change makes sense now more than ever before because of the changes to the Combat Exclusion Policy; the acknowledgement of women’s critical role in Counter Insurgency (COIN) operations; the nation’s foreign policy initiatives regarding women in peace and security activities; and the fact the pool of qualified military age males is shrinking.

The History and Background of Selective Service Registration

Current law, as codified in the United States Code, states “it shall be the duty of every male citizen of the United States, and every other male residing in the United States, between the ages of 18 and 26, to present himself for and submit to registration,” and thereby become eligible for the draft. Section 451 of the US Code contains the Congressional declaration of policy regarding the need for an “adequate armed strength” which is required to maintain and ensure the security of this nation. The Code states “Congress further declares that in a free society the obligations and privileges of serving in the armed forces and reserve components thereof should be shared generally, in accordance with a system of selection which is fair and just.” When the US Code was written, the concepts of fairness, justness, and the equitable sharing of responsibility may well have been compatible with male-only registration – but today it can be argued that is no longer the case.

The origin of the Selective Service System and its associated legislation dates back nearly one hundred years. The Selective Service Act, passed on May 18, 1917, created the Selective Service System and gave the President the power to draft men into military service.

Nearly sixty years later on March 25, 1975, President Gerald Ford signed Proclamation 4360, Terminating Registration Procedures Under Military Selective Service Act, which eliminated the registration requirement. Five years later, on July 2, 1980, President Jimmy Carter signed Proclamation 4771, which retroactively re-established the registration requirement for all 18 – 26 year old male citizens born on or after January 1, 1960. Although President Carter requested funds from Congress to include women in the registration process, Congress authorized funds for a male-only registration.

U.S. Representative Martha McSally is a prominent advocate for consistency in Selective Service registration requirements for men and women. McSally is an Air Force Academy graduate, the first woman to fly in combat, and the first female to command an Air Force fighter squadron. While noting that more than a quarter million women have deployed to combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, she questions the registration exemption for females and whether or not the “continued inconsistencies between the sexes in the area of national defense (are) incongruent with democratic tenets?” McSally notes that since our nation’s creation women have volunteered to defend it, but have always been “limited by law or policy grounded in accepted gender roles and norms….While every American male is required by law, as a basic obligation of citizenship, to register for the Selective Service…women continue to be exempt from this responsibility of citizenship.”

The Shifting Tectonics on Direct Ground Combat Assignments

In the last several years, there have been a number of policy changes and events which make the case for expanding Selective Service registration more compelling than the observation that
gender norms have evolved. Justifications for change include the recent elimination of the 1994 Direct Ground Combat Assignment Rule and the Secretary of Defense’s Directive to Review and Update Occupational Specialty Qualifications. These revisions of long-standing Department of Defense (DoD) policies are factors which negate the basis for the 1981 Supreme Court Decision which upheld women’s exclusion from Selective Service registration. These elements together combine to form a compelling argument that the time is right to expand the registration requirement to include women.

On January 24, 2013, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta announced the end of the direct ground combat exclusion policy which precluded women from serving in certain military roles. In his announcement, he declared the change “would strengthen both the military and the country,” and said it was the “responsibility of every citizen to protect the nation.” The decision replaced a 1994 policy memo which excluded women from assignments in units below brigade level if the unit would engage in direct combat. Panetta stated the change was intended to ensure the “best qualified and most capable service members, regardless of gender, are available to carry out the mission.” In his subsequent memo to the Service Chiefs, Secretary Panetta announced the combat exclusion was rescinded effective immediately, and directed that closed units and positions be opened by the Services after the development and implementation of “validated, gender-neutral occupational standards and the required notifications to Congress.” Secretary Panetta directed each of the Military Departments to submit their plans by May 15, 2013, and complete integration no later than January 1, 2016.

As evidence of how rapidly the Services began implementing the Secretary’s directive to fully integrate women into every job field, (or request an exception to policy from the Secretary of Defense), just three months later the Army announced its plan to open approximately 6000 positions in twenty-six Brigade Combat Teams, as well as Special Operations Aviation assignments, to women. The Secretary of the Army announced his Service’s plan to continue expansion of opportunities for women by "opening all remaining closed Areas of Concentration (AOC), Military Occupational Specialties (MOS), units and positions as expeditiously as possible, but not later than 1 JAN 2016.”

As noted earlier, when President Carter reestablished the Selective Service registration requirement in 1980, he sought to include women. After intense debate, the Congress decided to exempt females. The Senate Armed Services Committee cited the Pentagon’s ban on women in combat as the main reason for exempting females from registration. In 1981, a group sued the Director of the Selective Service, Bernard Rostker, claiming the exclusion of women from the registration requirement was a violation of the U.S. Constitution’s Fifth Amendment “due process” clause. In March 1981, the case reached the Supreme Court, in Rostker v. Goldberg. In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court ruled it was acceptable to exclude women from Selective Service Registration. The Court’s ruling stated “the purpose of registration was to prepare for a draft of combat troops. Since women are excluded from combat, Congress concluded that they would not be needed in the event of a draft, and, therefore, decided not to register them.” In his majority opinion, Justice William Rehnquist wrote that because Congress and the Executive branch decided that women should not serve in combat, Congress was therefore fully justified in not authorizing their registration. With this decision, the Supreme Court avoided a comprehensive “equal protection” legal analysis by basing their decision on the existing combat exclusion policy. Secretary Panetta, shortly after his January 2013 announcement regarding the elimination of the combat exclusion, stated he didn’t know who had oversight of Selective Service, “but whoever does, they’re going to have to exercise some judgment based on what we just did.” In an interview following Panetta’s statement, Richard Flanahan, a Selective Service Agency spokesman stated, “If the combat exclusion goes away, someone needs to be relooking at that now that the Supreme Court rationale no longer holds water.”

The Value of Women in COIN

The widespread recognition of the unique contributions of military women, particularly in Counter Insurgency Operations, bolsters the argument for requiring females to shoulder their share of the burden of national defense. Women serving in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated that the ground combat exclusion policy is obsolete. During these conflicts, the U.S. military updated and applied a Counter Insurgency strategy and doctrine which served to demonstrate the value of female service members in critical roles.

The traditional counterinsurgency strategy formulation describes the battle for the trust of the entirety of the civilian population and is classically described as a battle for “hearts and minds.” Winning over the female half of the civilian population has proven to be a task often best left to women in uniform. As one Marine Commander stated, “To win the COIN operation in Afghanistan, you need to engage the entire population. For that reason, in today’s contingency operations, women are serving in roles far beyond the awareness of the average member of the public and even members of the military.”

About the Author:

Brigadier General Mary-Kate Leahy is an Army officer, currently serving as the Director of Intelligence (J-2) at US Southern Command in Miami, FL. She was previously assigned as the Deputy Commander, 81st Regional Support Command, Fort Jackson, SC. BG Leahy holds a Master’s Degree in Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College. Previously published work includes “Keeping up with the Drones: Is Just War Theory Obsolete?”
How to Win Friends and Influence People Using Security Cooperation
An Old Foreign Policy Dog Decidedly in Need of Some New Tricks

BY COLONEL TODD A. CYRIL, U.S. ARMY

AUTHOR’S DISCLAIMER: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense.

The current international security environment is characterized by complex and evolving threats, to include new sectarian conflicts along religious and ethnic lines that threaten countries from within and without. This evolving and spreading extremist threat is morphing from the shadow of Al-Qa’ida into numerous similar groups with diverse goals, make-up and intentions. It is an increasingly important threat from the proliferation of technology and weapons of mass destruction. And as well there are the age-old threats associated with countries intent on local or regional domination. To address these threats, the United States continues to champion a policy of cooperating with regional partners in order to bring about joint goals aimed at improving security and stability. We hope that our related interaction in the international community will complementarily lead to a respect for democratic ideals and human rights and to the probability of open and free markets.

Security Cooperation (SC) remains perhaps the most prevalent method of interacting in the security realm with our international partners. The associated tools have expanded greatly over the last decade and have played significant roles in supporting our major undertakings in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. They have largely been directed at increasing our partners’ capacities to take on missions alongside us or instead of us. The prevalence of broad counter terrorist efforts since 9-11, combined with the need to assist allies in preparing to help us fight in the major conflicts, has led to an increasingly large array of tools directly funded, planned and implemented by the Department of Defense (DoD), which supplement the existing Title 22 programs supervised by the Department of State.

These Building Partner Capacity programs have generally provided more flexibility for combatant commanders to provide directed and relatively rapid support to critical needs in the fight. DoD has also actively leveraged and intensively managed the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process on many occasions in support of these operational efforts. However, all of these programs rely on an increasingly overloaded and strained procurement and supply system that also provides support to the U.S. warfighter for all of the same types of defense equipment and services. And, more importantly, all remain subject to the complex policy, administrative, and legal requirements that sanction the export of technology and expertise to our partners. These latter considerations often take the luster off of the assistance we provide, resulting in delayed production or deliveries, miscommunications, unfulfilled expectations and other negative impacts on the customer and the relationship.

The international environment is also increasingly characterized by greater competition, tighter budgets, and the wide-ranging and growing proliferation of high tech expertise. High profile competition for large and expensive purchases, such as for fleets of fighter aircraft, naval vessels, air defense and C4ISR systems, are now the norm and the results have far reaching impacts on the economies and ultimately the influence of the countries for the winning bidders. While the defense industrial base and the amount, sophistication, and quality of military and security products produced in the United States has generally far exceeded those of other countries, the competition against U.S. systems, particularly in many important niche capabilities, has grown significantly. Fortunately for us, a majority of customers still seem to desire the latest technology and the most capable systems. These high-end options are by and large only available from U.S. defense industry sources, but there are some downsides associated with buying from the U.S.

The U.S. FMS system prides itself in offering a total case approach and supporting systems it provides, with training, spare parts, maintenance, manuals and other technical support over time. The FMS system uses normal U.S. procurement channels and provides the customer with the assurance of relative transparency, significant quality controls and contracting oversight, as well as potential benefits of lower costs for research and development, production and other aspects of the purchase through economies of scale. However, increasingly customers also want more participation in the purchasing process and potentially within their economies (often in the form of contracted offsets, joint production or technology sharing), particularly when the purchase involves large monetary outlays, which the purchasing government needs to justify to its constituents. The FMS process is legally restricted from
providing offsets to customers and joint R&D or joint production, although possible, are negotiated and implemented outside of the FMS system.

Alternatively, many customers seek to interact directly with U.S. defense industry for their security needs, in what is known as Direct Commercial Sales (DCS). The DCS route is also fraught with frequent complaints and problems. While it may seem easier to go directly to the source to purchase defense articles and services, this process is also subject to export controls administered by the Department of State. Many customers pride themselves in their business acumen and their negotiation skills, and expect to be able to achieve a better deal than what FMS can offer. And profit motivated defense industry salesmen want to make these sales. However, often through a lack of familiarity with the complicated minutiae of arms export controls, they may offer goods to the customer that cannot easily be delivered.

Customers are also often confused by the different requirements entailed in FMS and DCS processes, as well as who can best address these issues on the American side. In-country Security Cooperation Offices can generally have limited impact on a DCS transaction, as opposed to the ability to gain insights and potentially assist customers in issues that arise from FMS cases. These issues are compounded by the seemingly random impacts on programs from Congress, other international or domestic purchases, or the limitations of production timelines. Some items must be procured through FMS due to the sensitivity of their components. To add another level of complexity, some customers use hybrid cases, a combination of FMS and DCS cases.

Faced with the complexity, headaches, bureaucracy, and what is often considered a lack of transparency in procuring defense articles and services from the U.S., and offered with increasingly competitive alternatives, many customers may be more likely to purchase from another foreign supplier. While the nearest competitor may not have the exact capabilities and specifications desired, they might be significantly less expensive or offer enough of a capability to meet the requirement. While the U.S. cannot corner the entire world arms market, loss of sales could mean the loss of access and influence, or lead down the road toward this outcome: the recent Turkish preliminary decision to opt for a Chinese air defense system vice the U.S. offer from Raytheon has caused significant consternation concerning NATO interoperability and technology leaks, not to mention the economic impacts of the lost sale.

Countries may also decide to purchase from a non-U.S. defense provider for various other reasons. Many wealthier countries often hedge bets by diversifying suppliers. This allows them to maintain relationships and potentially gain influence with other countries while decreasing their reliance on a single source. This often leads to higher costs and complications in interoperability, logistics and maintenance while attempting to support major systems from various countries. Just as we gain influence from our FMS relationships, purchasing countries may also make buying decisions based on geopolitical considerations.

As the international environment changes, it is increasingly important to have the right tools and to be able to use them effectively with our partners. To address shortcomings that hinder this need, there has been a good deal of effort in recent years to reform the planning and implementation of security assistance. The Obama administration has made a national priority of easing export controls on several defense related systems through the Export Control Reform initiative, but the requirements for the purchase of a vast panoply of defense goods continue to frustrate customers’ desires for speedy procurement and delivery. It is certainly an admirable goal to improve a process that has been characterized as archaic, frustrating, plodding, overly bureaucratic, and just plain unfathomable by international customers.

However there are bureaucratic, political, security and legal factors which limit what can be done. In an era of decreasing R&D budgets, the U.S. government must protect our technology superiority and prevent unwanted proliferation of our strategic expertise to those who might use it against us. Technology release constraints must be taken seriously. Additionally, there has been little significant modification of the Arms Export Control Act or the Foreign Assistance Act (the two major laws which most significantly impact security cooperation programs) in terms of easing constraints on the defense export system. Congress purposely established this oversight, and likes to actively maintain it. Many decisions on allowing exports are very politically sensitive, particularly when they involve transfers to areas of multiple and sometimes competing interests such as
the Middle East, or where active conflicts are on the front pages of the news. Finally, there are parts of the bureaucratic and legal maze that must be negotiated, some of which simply take time.

OSD initiated a SC business process review over the last three years and there has been a growing OSD focus on strategy for cooperation. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) has been undertaking institutional efforts to better support customer needs over the last several years. From time to time DSCA has created internal teams to focus intensively on specific priority programs based on senior administration officials’ guidance. The DoD has been struggling to figure out ways to make the system work better, but there are no magical solutions. The bottom line is that the FMS system is just the U.S. Government procurement system, which is highly regulated and bureaucratic, and further encumbered by the laws and policies impacting foreign exports. Some parts are just bureaucracy and many involve administrative or technical tasks that simply take time to accomplish, although with the right emphasis, remuneration, or decisions, some things can move faster.

Senior direction from policymakers can expedite the focus and direct effort within the normal FMS system. If customers are willing to accept it, they can pay for above standard level of service on FMS cases, which pays the additional costs associated with additional effort. Cases can be prioritized over others in development or execution. If a decision is made at fairly senior levels that the need is sufficiently urgent and in the best interest of the U.S., contracted goods or services on a case destined for another customer, or even for a U.S. service, can be diverted to support the urgent need. One partner’s requirements can supersede another’s and in effect, jump the line for production or delivery. Of course there is an associated amount of bureaucratic hurdles even for these decisions and potentially some additional costs for the benefiting partner, but the U.S. has a fairly good track record of surging when the need is great and moving requests swiftly through the required wickets.

In an environment of shrinking and more tightly controlled resources, where the forward presence of American troops is decreasing and overall troop numbers are shrinking, traditional SC military to military opportunities are also destined to shrink. The DoD has an obligation to make every resource count and to use all possible opportunities to interact with and positively influence our allies and partners. Major FMS programs require long-term professional and technical relationships, which can lead to significant personal relationships at many diverse levels within our allies’ military and government structure, as well as access inside host nation militaries and mindsets. This makes the FMS portion of SC increasingly important in the future.

The DoD ought to look at ways to make the FMS aspects of our defense relationships pay off more effectively. A more comprehensive and creative approach toward FMS plans and policy initiatives should be undertaken in order to better leverage SC partnerships. The process for defense sales ought to be much more collaborative, policy driven, and logical. Instead of just evaluating sales as they are proposed or advocating general U.S. sales, the interagency process should develop tailored FMS strategies. These strategies ought to leverage our understanding of our partners’ capabilities, threats, and needs, as well as the specific aspects of cooperation that could benefit from the use of U.S. technology by our partners in order to work toward mutual strategic goals. Such an endeavor could easily be tied in with existing combatant command perspectives and priorities. However, it will require an additional degree of interagency work to integrate seamlessly into existing strategic documents and plans, and to lead toward desired outcomes. This kind of effort will likely also require a greater degree of internal understanding of our partners’ plans and capabilities, which might in turn lead to additional areas of cooperation. Some of these areas include strategic planning, budgeting, and forecasting requirements, any of which could also lead to improvements in partners’ internal defense processes and internal control mechanisms.

In order to see improvements from the functional side, perhaps it is time to evaluate dealing with countries in priority based on how well they patronize the FMS system. One way to do this would be to look at countries’ proclivities for accepting offered cases. The U.S. generally tries to treat all customers equally in response to their demands for defense articles and services. The level of investment does not always have a direct correlation to supporting U.S. national security interests. In an increasingly complex world with competing priorities and a limited FMS structure, perhaps this sort of calculus is required. Many countries are fairly inconsistent in their levels of discipline within the FMS process. Countries may not link requests internally to their own budget authority in a timely fashion or may make requests that are not part of a Ministry of Defense level plan, or subject to prior review by the appropriating authorities within their country. Some may submit requests for cases that they never intend to purchase. Many will ask for the

RELATIVELY OPEN RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE PRODUCERS OF THE DEFENSE GOODS COULD LEAD TO BETTER MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF MARKET FACTORS, PARTNER EXPECTATIONS AND PERCEPTIONS, AND A BETTER, MORE HOLISTIC DEFENSE POLICY
special processing and insist on a timely offer, only to allow the offer to expire, or worse continue to ask for multiple Offer Expiration Date (OED) extensions and then ultimately let them expire without acceptance.

These kinds of behavior within the FMS system create more work and put additional pressures on both the multiple U.S. entities involved in creating and offering FMS cases, and on the U.S. defense firms involved in providing goods and services. Maintaining or updating stale offers is challenging, as the costs, supplies, other customer requirements, production, and manufacturing possibilities are constantly changing for most defense goods. If the calculus of potential harm to U.S. national security interests can be justified, perhaps countries that are abusive of the FMS system could be prioritized for case development below those with better track records. This could alleviate some stressors on the system, promote better FMS business practices, and reward those countries that use the system properly.

One of the most difficult barriers to surmount is often the technical release process. We need a better way to manage and implement technology release expeditiously. This is not an easy nut to crack, as it involves potential impacts well beyond the sale of the items in question, such as inadvertent proliferation of sensitive technology to adversaries. At the very least, if combatant commands took a more detailed look at planning and projecting FMS sales of major defense systems and the most popular or effective defense technologies, the technical release process could be more front loaded. Better plans and a more long range, proactive approach to marketing major systems could grease the skids of the technical release process, if not leading to pre-release documentation well before a case is in preparation, effectively speeding up the implementation of cases and the eventual deliveries.

DoD officials should move toward more industry outreach and collaboration. Relatively open relationships with the producers of the defense goods could lead to better mutual understanding of market factors, partner expectations and perceptions, and a better, more holistic defense policy. Of course DoD needs to treat all of the defense firms on an equal plane, and avoid spillage of proprietary information or insider knowledge. While the underpinnings of defense sales are traditionally designed to promote the defense needs of partners, with economic benefits to the U.S. taking a secondary, almost supplementary role in the equation, an increasingly competitive global arms market ought to bring this aspect of defense sales more to the forefront. Additionally, as the defense industrial base is increasingly threatened by shrinking budgets, FMS sales remain a key component in keeping major production lines open. Better collaboration with industry will allow better understanding of potential impacts on the defense industrial base and may help lead to preservation of key parts and capabilities which otherwise may be destined to be lost.

Additionally, DoD and the defense industrial base could work more proactively with Congress. More detailed and coordinated FMS planning from DoD would likely go a long way in terms of communicating to legislators concerning our partners’ long range plans and how weapons purchases link into defensive goals and tie in with U.S. policy priorities. This kind of socialization with Congress could foster cleaner, easier release processes and may even have a supplementary benefit of improving the overall relationship between DoD, the industrial base, and Congress. To this end, better coordination and FMS planning efforts between the National Security Council, the Department of State and DoD would also help. If the major government entities involved in defense sales were more closely tied at the hip on where we as a nation want to go with our partners and what that means in terms of the release of systems, the likelihood of easier bureaucratic processes is much greater.

As the U.S. struggles to redefine and prioritize its major objectives for impact, and its role in a changing world, foreign policy challenges are becoming increasingly difficult. Our efforts to influence others must be better targeted, more efficient, and more likely to succeed than ever before. In the foreign policy realm, this means we must not stop working to improve the efficiency, impact, and reach of the tools we have available. Security cooperation is a major tool in this quiver and one that clearly has large equities for DoD. Foreign Military Sales, always a standby and often relatively ignored in terms of overall impact, is becoming an increasingly important aspect of the overall policy effort. We have an obligation to think innovatively, to look for new ways to improve and to leverage this tool with our partners and then to undertake the work and its requirements to make it better. With an increasing array of high tech weapons being marketed by others, the rest of the world will not stand idly by on the sidelines and we have only our own influence to lose.

About the Author:

Colonel Todd A. Cyril, U.S. Army, a Middle East/North Africa FAO currently assigned as Special Advisor to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense. He previously served as the Defense and Army Attaché in Israel, the Deputy Chief of the Military Assistance Program in Jordan, Program Director for Lebanon and Saudi Arabia at DSCA, Middle East Political-Military Affairs officer at U.S. Central Command, United Nations Military Observer in Iraq and as a Senior Intelligence Officer on the Joint Staff. He is a distinguished graduate of the United States Military Academy and holds a Master’s Degree from Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government.
Director of National Intelligence (DNI):  
The Current Statutory and Executive Authorities Granted to the Office of the DNI are Insufficient for the Past and Current DNIs to Fully Execute Their Responsibilities

By Commander Erik M. Dullea, United States Navy Reserve

Editor’s Note: Commander Dullea’s paper won the FAO Association writing award at the Joint Forces Staff College. In the interest of space we publish this version without the author’s research notes. The full version will be published to FAOA.org. We are pleased to bring you this outstanding scholarship.

Disclaimer: The contents of this submission reflect my original views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College of the Department of Defense.

Thesis Statement

The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the Office of the DNI (ODNI) lack the statutory and executive authority to effectively perform their statutory responsibilities. To coordinate and unify the efforts of the Intelligence Community (IC), the DNI needs greater statutory authority to direct the activities of the constituent intelligence departments via budgetary control over the Military Intelligence Program. Without that authority, the DNI must rely on Presidential backing to encourage leaders within the IC to voluntarily cooperate with respect to budgetary priorities and broaden their departments’ professional expertise by prodding personnel to accept temporary assignments (“Joint IC Duty”) with other IC entities.

Theories

- The interagency relationships and structure for the ODNI are incrementally improving, but the ODNI will continue to face bureaucratic challenges from Cabinet level agencies that will resist DNI’s attempts to alter the status quo within the Intelligence Community.
- The existing level of cooperation between DOD and ODNI, particularly with respect to budgetary authority must be memorialized through an executive order.
- The DNI should continue to prioritize the ‘Joint Service’ requirement for promotion to senior leadership positions, analogous to the Goldwater-Nichols requirements for the Department of Defense.

Conclusion

Assuming that significant legislative action and revision of Executive Orders are unlikely in the near future, the DNI should pursue collaboration within the Intelligence Community through internal, grass roots initiatives akin to the Department of Defense joint service requirements for senior leaders.

Introduction

The maxim within Washington politics and the national security industry is that there are only two possible outcomes for national security endeavors – operational successes and intelligence failures.1 The Intelligence Community (IC) is a term to describe the various federal agencies that perform intelligence activities in support of the United States Government’s (USG) foreign relations and national defense efforts.2 Today’s IC consists of seventeen federal agencies, including intelligence departments within the five military branches, six combat support agencies, and five departments within civilian agencies (see diagram p. 6, infra). The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) serves as the head of the IC, and the Office of the DNI (ODNI) is responsible for integrating foreign, military and domestic intelligence to protect and defend the United States and its national interests around the world.3 The DNI and ODNI were established by Congress in 2004, but the idea of having an overall coordinator for the IC was not new.4 As early as the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, experts called for a centralized intelligence authority, but successive White House administrations resisted these calls and Congress lacked the political will and urgency to take action.5 In December 2004, following two perceived intelligence failures (the IC’s failure to detect and prevent the September 11, 2001 attacks and the IC’s 2003 assessment that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction), Congress and the White House were compelled to act.6 The result was the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), the largest restructuring of the United States intelligence apparatus since the 1947 National Security Act. 7 However, ten years after IRTPA’s enactment, the centerpiece of the legislation – the DNI position – is mired by skepticism over its purported effectiveness, value for national security and is considered by many to simply be another layer of bureaucracy.8 The diagram below highlights the DNI’s position within the IC and the National Security Council (NSC) participants...
Intelligence Reform Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004

Creation of the DNI, and Office (ODNI) thereof IRTPA created the Director of National Intelligence to replace the former Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) as the head of the IC and the principal advisor to the President and National Security Council for intelligence matters related to national security. IRTPA re-titled the DCI position as the Director of the CIA (DCIA) who now reports to the DNI regarding CIA activities.9

Congress included clear language within the statute prohibiting the DNI from concurrently serving as the DCIA or the head of any other element of the IC.10 As a result, the DNI could not piggyback on an existing intelligence agency for personnel and resources as the DCI had done since the adoption of the 1947 National Security Act.

The rationale for this prohibition was two-fold. First, Congress wanted to ensure the DNI position was actually filled and not just an additional title on an organizational chart. Second, Congress wanted to avoid the historical dilemma faced by multiple DCIs – lead and manage the CIA or shepherd the IC – which, without control over budgets and personnel, meant the DCI would have zero effective control over IC members.11 Invariably, DCIs chose to prioritize running the CIA. 12

One result of this provision was that ODNI started from ground zero – no resources, no culture and no personnel who had spent their entire career affiliated with the ODNI mission.13 Because the DNI is not part of an existing intelligence agency, the DNI lacks operational control over any of the intelligence agencies. Pointing to his inability to dictate the operations and actions of IC entities, former DNI McConnell described his job as being a coordinator rather than a director of national intelligence due to the statutory limits on his authority.14 Including the ODNI, the seventeen organizations comprising the IC and the acronym identifiers for their “parent” agencies are listed below and on the following chart:

- Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
- Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
- Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
- National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA)
- National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)
- National Security Agency (NSA)
- Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)
- Department of Energy (DOE)
- Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
- State Department's Bureau of Intelligence & Research (INR)
- Treasury Department (TREAS)
- Air Force Intelligence (25th Air Force)
- Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM)
- Coast Guard Intelligence (USCGI)
- Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA)
- Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI).

IRTPA also revised the meaning of ‘national intelligence’ to eliminate the distinction between foreign and domestic intelligence.15 National intelligence and ‘intelligence related to national security’ are now defined as: all intelligence, regardless of the source … that (a) pertains, as determined consistent with any guidance issued by the President, to more than one United States Government agency; and (b) that involves (i) threats to the United States, its people, property or interests; (ii) the development proliferation or use of weapons of mass destruction; or (iii) any other matter bearing on United States national or homeland security.”16

Among other things, the DNI is responsible for providing national intelligence to the President, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and senior military commanders and other policy makers as directed.17
The DNI is also responsible for determining: (1) requirements and priorities where the IC should contribute; ensuring timely and effective (2) collection; (3) processing; (4) analysis; and dissemination of national intelligence. IRTPA essentially makes the DNI responsible for five of the seven phases of the intelligence cycle, but did not require the full integration or of the IC under the DNI.

To the contrary, IRTPA specifically limited the DNI’s ability to encroach on the existing “statutory responsibilities of heads of the departments of the United States Government.” This provision, known as IRTPA Section 1018, was included in the law at the behest of Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Rumsfeld and Congressman Duncan Hunter in order to protect DOD’s direct control over its intelligence assets and personnel.

Despite having equal or greater responsibilities than the now defunct DCI position, the DNI is required to fulfill these obligations without having direct control over one, let alone the seventeen members of the IC. This dichotomy was a problem faced by the DCI pre-IRTPA and continues to be a challenge today.

This disparity between responsibility and authority, and the DNI’s minimal control over the IC’s annual budgets are the primary reasons that the improvements and changes Congress sought through IRTPA remain a mixed bag of success.

Executive Order 12233 and Post-IRTPA Revisions.

Executive Order 12333 (EO 12333), signed by President Reagan in 1981, remains the mainstay of presidential guidance to the IC. In 2008, President George W. Bush signed Executive Order 13470, which made several changes to EO 12333. The Bush administration chose to revise rather than replace EO 12333 because the original order had become part of the national security industry and IC’s vocabulary. The Obama administration has yet to make any substantive changes to either executive order.

President Bush claimed that the revisions to EO 12333 strengthened the DNI’s authority by giving the DNI “new authority over any intelligence information collected that
perts to more than one agency.”26 This additional authority was intended to encourage, if not force, IC members to share more information between them.27 EO 13470 elaborated on IRTPA’s authority for the DNI by requiring that “the [DNI] will lead a unified, coordinated, and effective intelligence effort. In addition, the [DNI] shall, in carrying out the duties and responsibilities under this [Executive Order], take into account the views of the heads of departments containing an element of the [IC] and of the [DCIA].”28

Despite this directive language, calling for the DNI to lead the intelligence effort, the amendments to EO 12333 mimic the problematic language in Section 1018 of IRTPA discussed above. The revised EO 12333 authorizes any department head whose department contains an element of the IC and who believes that a directive or action of the Director violates the requirements of Section 1018 of [IRTPA] or this subsection shall bring the issue to the attention of the [DNI], the NSC, or the President for resolution in a manner that respects and does not abrogate the statutory responsibilities of the heads of the department.29

The revised executive order perpetuates IRTPA’s structural problems with respect to the DNI’s actual authority to lead a unified and coordinated intelligence effort. In fact, well-funded organizations such as CIA, DIA, the military service intelligence organizations and those intelligence departments that support cabinet officials or are favorite sons of Congressional sponsors (e.g. INR, NRO) are very effective at guarding their turf.30

The DNI Must Balance the IC’s Requirement to Produce All-Source Intelligence Against Efficient Utilization of the IC’s Finite Resources.

The Intelligence Community’s goal is to produce “all-source intelligence,” also known as fused intelligence, which by definition is intelligence based on multiple sources. As the head of the IC, the DNI must ensure that finished intelligence products are “based upon all sources of available intelligence and employ the standards of proper analytic tradecraft.”34 This all-source intelligence requirement is not new.

Although there are benefits with all-source or fused intelligence, the efforts to obtain these fused products create certain side effects. One of these side effects stems from the inherent limitation of finite collection resources. The IC’s collection system has no excess capacity – “it is inelastic in terms of both technical and human collectors.”37 When a collection resource is redirected from its current/primary task to provide a complementary (all-source) intelligence source for a higher priority product, the original mission for that redirected collection resource likely goes unfilled.

A second side effect from the push for all-source intelligence is referred to as the “swarm ball” collection effort.38 Swarm ball collection efforts occur when multiple collectors and agencies choose to focus on a perceived priority task, regardless of their ability to provide actionable intelligence for the task. Swarm ball collection is a byproduct of a human behavior assumption that work on priority tasks will improve future budget allocations for the collector or agency.39

To counter the problems of a limited supply of collection resources and the tendency for swarm ball collections, IC department heads, Cabinet Secretaries and the DNI must prioritize their respective collection targets based on each agencies’ capabilities and the decision makers must adhere to those decisions.40 Despite the overlap in these all-source agencies and the conscious effort to take advantage of the

**Overlap in IC Organizations and Missions Are Necessary to Deliver Useful Intelligence to Policy Makers**

Decades before IRTPA, Congress desired that the IC utilize all-source intelligence, as evidenced by the three separate all-source intelligence organizations: CIA, DIA and INR.35 This overlap is redundant, but individual policy makers and commanders have different areas of responsibility within each national security issue, and each of these all-source agencies focus on the individual facets that are important to its individual customers.36

The IC developed this redundancy to improve its analytical skills and intelligence products. The IC utilizes a technique called Competitive Analysis to avoid groupthink or forced consensus. Competitive Analysis requires analysts from different backgrounds, employed by multiple agencies, to be assigned to the same analytical project but work independently in an effort to validate the conclusions and assessments the IC reaches.

**Improper Allocation and Prioritization of Intelligence Resources**

The IC developed this redundancy to improve its analytical skills and intelligence products. The IC utilizes a technique called Competitive Analysis to avoid groupthink or forced consensus. Competitive Analysis requires analysts from different backgrounds, employed by multiple agencies, to be assigned to the same analytical project but work independently in an effort to validate the conclusions and assessments the IC reaches.

**Improper Allocation and Prioritization of Intelligence Resources**

The IC developed this redundancy to improve its analytical skills and intelligence products. The IC utilizes a technique called Competitive Analysis to avoid groupthink or forced consensus. Competitive Analysis requires analysts from different backgrounds, employed by multiple agencies, to be assigned to the same analytical project but work independently in an effort to validate the conclusions and assessments the IC reaches.
benefits of Competitive Analysis, the IC was widely criticized for its failure to detect and prevent the September 11th terrorist attack and to wrongly conclude that Saddam Hussein and Iraq were in possession of weapons of mass destruction.41

Strengthening the DNI’s Authority to Direct IC Departments Would Come at the Expense of Existing Stakeholders’ Authorities.

One of the conclusions from the Congressional hearings on the September 11 Commission’s recommendations was that the DNI must have control over intelligence budgets,42 because “there are only two things matter that matter in Washington: firing authority and who controls the purse strings.”43 That maxim is captured by the Washington D.C. equation: J = FTE + $$, where J is the jurisdiction/authority to perform a task, FTE is the number of full-time-equivalent employees assigned and $$ is the funding appropriated to perform the task.44 Political power is a zero-sum game.45 When one agency gains power, another surrenders power. Government officials understand that as J increases, the personnel and funding associated with it also rise. Conversely, if Agency X loses jurisdiction to Agency Y, it is highly likely that Agency X will eventually see a decrease in personnel and funding.46

Any power or authority transferred from DOD to ODNI would be a loss for the former and a gain for the latter. This explains why Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld resisted Congress stripping any spending control for military intelligence to the DNI.47 However, as the DOD has embraced the concept that national security objectives require a ‘whole government’ approach, utilizing diplomatic, informational, military and economic resources, DOD and CIA must embrace the fusion of traditional military intelligence and foreign intelligence into national intelligence.48 The threat posed by state-sponsored terrorist groups and transnational non-state actors requires the government and the IC to implement a comprehensive, holistic response to these threats.49

For the fifty years that the Director of Central Intelligence was the primary adviser to the President and the NSC for matters involving national foreign intelligence, the DCI struggled with the inconsistency between his list of responsibilities and his limited authority to act on those responsibilities.50

The DNI faces similar if not more difficult problem.51 Whereas the DCI faced a two-front bureaucratic battle with the Secretaries of Defense and State, the DNI has a third rival in that turf war – the DCIA. Not only does the DNI have to wrangle with the SECDEF over intelligence matters, the DNI must coordinate with DCIA in the fields of Human Intelligence and clandestine activities.52 IRTPA not only assigned the DCIA to report to the DNI, the statute gave the ODNI and the CIA responsibility for human intelligence.53 Accordingly, correcting any of the weaknesses in the DNI’s authority to coordinate, direct and unify the activities of the IC will come at the expense of the SECDEF, DCIA or other agency leaders.

Section 1018 of IRTPA and the revisions to EO 12333 institutionalized the DOD’s and other IC members’ ability to resist DNI directives.54 The language in these documents is the result of DOD opposition to awarding ODNI actual authority over military intelligence resources occurred prior to the enactment of IRTPA. Secretary Rumsfeld and House Armed Services Committee Chairman Duncan Hunter waged a highly successful opposition campaign that led to the inclusion of Section 1018 into IRTPA in order to keep NGA, NRO and NSA under DOD control.55

The primary rationale for DOD’s resistance was guaranteeing intelligence support for military operations.56 Although this argument sounds plausible, it is illogical to assume that any DNI would decline to provide full support to the Department of Defense during the planning or execution of combat operations as such a decision would be political suicide.57

The DNI has already lost one turf battle with the DCIA, which undermined ODNI’s influence and authority within the IC.

The disparity between responsibility and lack of control was one of the contributing factors in DNI Blair’s resignation following a dispute with DCIA Leon Panetta. The clash between the leaders of the ODNI and the CIA involved two main areas: (1) the authority to appoint Chiefs of Station (COS); 58 and (2) the DNI’s role in formulating and supervising covert actions.59 Historically, the COS were appointed by the CIA, and a majority of the COS are CIA officers. Post-IRTPA, the COS are dual-hatted not only as the senior U.S. intelligence representatives, but also the DNI’s representative in their assigned countries. DNI Blair battled with CIA Director Panetta over which organization would be appointing individuals to these positions in various locations.60

When the DNI and DCIA were unable to resolve their dispute, the National Security Advisor General James Jones and eventually the White House weighed in, siding with DCIA Panetta. The only authority the National Security Advisor gave to ODNI regarding covert actions was to evaluate those actions after the fact, if such evaluations were requested by the White House.61 When the White House and National Security Advisor sided with the CIA, ODNI’s authority took a substantial hit.62 Even if the turf battle between DNI Blair and DCIA Panetta could be attributed to personality conflicts, the structural flaws in IRTPA and the amended EO 12333 guarantee that similar turf battles will continue in the future.
Battles with DOD and CIA are not the only potential source of conflict for the ODNI. If a dispute over the mission, priorities, personnel or budget for an IC organization assigned to a Cabinet Secretary arose, ODNI would likely discover that the lack of a Cabinet position and reduced access to the President’s ear, can weaken an agency’s position relative to other members of the IC. 63

In order for ODNI to comply with IRTPA’s requirement that finished intelligence products be “timely, objective, independent of political considerations, based upon all sources of available intelligence, and employ the standards of proper analytic tradecraft,” ODNI must have a significant role in the IC’s budgets and personnel allocations. Section 1018’s political compromise language contradicts this directive by preventing the DNI from abrogating the statutory responsibilities of other IC department heads, such as the Secretary of State (SEOSTATE).

IRTPA defines national intelligence as intelligence that relates to foreign policy, and puts national intelligence within the purview of the DNI, but SEOSTATE is the nation’s lead diplomat and foreign policy officer.64 Hence, INR is responsible to both a Cabinet Secretary and the DNI. In a dispute with SEOSTATE over INR activities, the DNI would be at a disadvantage because the DNI does not have authorities and influence that Cabinet Secretaries possess within their own agencies.65 Moreover, there is scant evidence Congress desires to weaken Cabinet Secretaries’ influence and control over the intelligence departments within their respective agencies, as none of the recent intelligence authorization acts or appropriation bills have advocated such a change. 66

The revolving door of DNIs between 2005 and 2010 is a symptom of these past and future disputes. The root cause for these disputes will continue to be the DNI’s lack of operational control over specific IC entities and activities, and the inherent inequality between the DNI and the cabinet officials that own specific IC departments.67

For the Fifty Years That the Director of Central Intelligence Was the Primary Adviser to the President and the NSC for Matters Involving National Foreign Intelligence, the DCI Struggled with the Inconsistency Between His List of Responsibilities and His Limited Authority to Act on Those Responsibilities. The DNI Faces Similar If Not More Difficult Problems.
that encourages integration and collaboration rather than stove-piping information.76

As the threats to U.S. national interests continue to include terrorism, non-state actor, and transnational organizations, the DNI must be able to orchestrate cooperation between each IC organization, and leverage the resources, skills and requirements to support the National Security Strategy, even if such actions are not directly in line with an individual IC member's objectives.

The 2007 Memorandum of Understanding Between DNI and SECDEF, Dual-hatting The USD(I) Must Be Memorialized By Executive Order Or Statute.

In May 2007, in a conscious effort to “strengthen the relationship between the DNI and the DOD … to facilitate staff interaction and promote synchronization,” the DNI and SECDEF signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that designated the incumbent USD(I) to also be ODNI’s Director of Defense Intelligence.77 The MOU did not alter the statutory responsibilities of the DNI or SECDEF, but the USD(I) was now required to report directly to the DNI as well as SECDEF.78

This MOU is a significant step to improve the coordination between ODNI and DOD, but the MOU is not permanent, nor is it required under IRTPA or EO 12333. The MOU was implemented by DNI McConnell and SECDEF Gates, appointing then USD(I) and current DNI Clapper into the position. This trio was part of a “Dream Team” that reformers hoped would refine the roles and missions of their respective organizations.79

In the absence of a legal requirement to cooperate, the likelihood of such cooperation will be a function of the individual personalities involved and the desires of future presidents.80 This shared responsibility and cooperation could deteriorate as new individuals assume these positions. To ensure that this synchronization becomes the norm and is not only expected but also required in the future, the concept of the MOU should be incorporated into a new revision to EO 12333, and become a pillar of the IC’s integrated culture.

The DNI Must Use Its Existing Authorities to Strengthen the Requirements for the IC Joint Duty Tours for Future IC Leaders Until Such Requirements are Passed by Congress.

Choosing the correct personnel for senior leadership positions within the intelligence agencies is critical to fully integrating the IC.81 IRTPA requires the DNI to improve the cross-disciplinary education and training of the IC, but the statute does not go far enough.82 The IC Joint Duty program requires that candidates for senior executive positions in the IC have served in more than one IC element.83

ODNI has identified hundreds of IC senior executive positions where previous joint duty is required. ODNI created an interagency webpage listing hundreds of joint duty placements opportunities. ODNI also sponsored the Leadership Exchange and Assignment Pilot program, which places candidates in rotational assignments with other IC organizations for up to two years.84

Critics of the existing ODNI joint duty requirements note that several civilian agencies (e.g. CIA, NGA, NSA) each have more than 500 internal positions that qualify for joint duty.85 To the extent this criticism remains accurate, IC personnel in these positions are not benefitting from the cultural exposure gained when physically working at an unfamiliar agency.86 Although IRTPA references the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 as a requirement the IC should emulate “to the extent practical,” individual agencies continue to resist sending their talented employees to other organizations for a year or more.87

Former DNI and retired Admiral Dennis Blair contends that one way to counter these internal joint duty positions is to require DNI concurrence and consultation, not only on nominations to become IC department heads, but on all second and third level positions within each IC department.88 Admiral DNI Blair argues that this requirement can be accomplished via statute or executive order. However, section II of this paper discussed the resistance the original IRTPA and EO 12333 amendments faced from the IC stakeholders over ODNI’s control over personnel decisions. There is no reason to believe similar resistance would not arise in response to Admiral Blair’s suggestion.89

A more realistic option would be to for ODNI to reduce the number of internal joint duty positions that can satisfy the requirements. These reductions can be invoked using the existing provisions of ITRPA that require the IC agencies to periodically revise the training curricula of senior and intermediate level personnel and developing cross-disciplinary education and joint training.90

Conclusion

IRTPA, the DNI, the Director’s office and staff are only ten years old. While the 2008 amendments to EO 12333 attempted to strengthen the DNI’s authorities, the DNI must have additional authority over the IC’s budget, training and development to maximize the IC’s effectiveness as a joint, interagency asset. In the absence of Congressional action, iterative improvements, such as the 2007 MOU that dual-hatted the USD(I) as the DDI, must be implemented to allow the DNI concept to reach its potential.
Marketing: A Vital Skill Necessary for Effective Security Cooperation

By Lieutenant Colonel Michael McCullough, U.S. Army

The old adage, “If a tree falls in the woods and no one hears it…” can be said about security cooperation activities with our partner nations (PN). One of the underestimated facts of security cooperation is that every security assistance officer (SAO) needs to be a marketeer. An unstated goal of the Office of Security Cooperation (OSC) is to implement foreign policy by leveraging engagement activities. This is “real politic.” If the U.S. Embassy Country Team, the local public, and the Ministry of Defense (MoD) in the host country do not fully comprehend the role of the OSC and the activities it is facilitating, then the time and resources spent is for naught and security cooperation as a policy lever is lost.

The execution of military cooperation events is only one piece of managing security assistance. The critical task that is often forgotten is publication of the event before, during and after execution. It is a painful irony that we (the U.S.) have the most successful, lucrative, and influential media industry in the world yet most of our foreign partners and allies to whom we give significant assistance have little knowledge on what the OSC is and why the U.S. government engages in certain areas of a partner nation’s military complex.

To validate where your OSC is on this subject check your communication resources and ask yourself or others near you the following questions: 1) MoD: Ask them to explain what programs OSC has to offer and why those specific offers are made to their country. 2) Does your embassy web page explain your program? 3) Ask your Public Diplomacy (PD) or Public Affairs Section (PAS), including locally employed staff and Americans, to explain to you what they believe the role of the OSC is on the country team and what programs it is responsible for. 4) How much press coverage have your events received? 5) How often is security cooperation briefed to the Ambassador or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM)?

The answers you receive may concern you. Truth be told I could have worked much harder on these categories as a SAO myself; however, there were some practices that I developed over time that may be useful to you in order to close the loop on communications and further U.S. interests.

Public Diplomacy and the Press

The first course of action should be to provide an office brief to your Public Diplomacy office and determine how best to communicate your activities to the public. Solicit PD support in every event. Provide updates and yearly activities lists regularly so that PD is aware of the variety of security cooperation events that the OSC facilitates. The OSC should help establish and then maintain a solid connection between the Combatant Command (COCOM) and Component Public Affairs Offices (PAO). The press should be invited to every closing ceremony along with your PD office. This will increase transparency and inform civilians of the professional engagements the U.S. facilitates. Keep copies of published articles and present them during your MoD coordination meetings. Consolidate the articles at the end of the year and present as a gift. Examples should be maintained in the OSC and PD offices.

During one of our OSC-PD meetings a PD team member offered to facilitate a “Facebook Campaign” on an OSC capstone event. This was very popular and led other media outlets to cover the event that included radio interviews that were broadcasted around the country.

Ambassador “One Pager”

Ambassadors and DCMs are very busy and security cooperation is just one element of the diplomatic mission on which the Ambassador focuses. That being said, as a member of the Country Team it is imperative that the OSC keep the Chief of Mission (COM) informed. Create an executive level summary every two weeks or monthly and brief what happened, what will happen, and key concerns. Keep it to one page and treat the document as if it were going to a four-star general. If you are unable to get on the COM’s calendar then forward a clear and concise one-page paper that hits the “wave tops” to the COM and the Country Team staff. This one-page report will have a high likelihood of being read vice a multipage paper filled with military jargon. This reoccurring update will remind the ambassador of security assistance efforts and facilitates COM feedback in refining security cooperation embedded to the overall USG approach with a PN. A one page summary also becomes a tool for the Senior Defense Official (SDO) to use when talking to other Attaches assigned to the country and will also assist your desk officer (COCOM and Component) in staying in touch with key issues.
In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) the security cooperation team discovered that there was significant MoD misunderstanding on the roles and responsibilities of the OSC. Working with the Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) funded training advisor and site coordinator, we developed a color trifold in French that described the mission and the programs available. We handed out hundreds of these trifolds to PN general officers, civilian leaders, commanders, and allies. This is an easy way to show transparency and broaden the understanding of government officials. We also made a similar product on the Leahy vetting issue due to the misunderstanding of why the U.S. conducts “background” checks. This trifold helped immensely in communicating the purpose of vetting. We also added a blank personal information page on the back so someone could provide their details and submit it to the OSC. This allowed the OSC to socialize the theme of “if you don’t conduct human rights violations you may have a chance to participate in U.S. training.”

Every Embassy has a home page. Many have drop down menus that lead to specific offices. If an OSC or a combined DAO/OSC website does not exist, you are missing out on an easy tool to explain your mission. If possible have a secondary link in the partner country language. This will increase understanding both internally and externally. Additionally, add links to the COCOM and Component websites, as they will often have interesting information, and highlights of activities that will be useful to those following the links. If you have a robust Humanitarian Assistance (HA) program, consider building a Google map into your web page. You can pin the locations of your projects with photos and press releases. This will create an understanding that the COCOM engages in countries beyond military training, it will archive COCOM facilitated HA, and re-enforce a positive image of COCOM security cooperation. Additionally, more detailed versions of the above web information should be created on the mission Share Point to facilitate greater staff understanding of DoD activities.

AFRICOM maintains an excellent communication platform through the Africa Defense Forum (ADF) journal. It has professional articles addressing issues on the continent. The journal is produced in multiple languages. Not only is the journal a great item to hand to partners/colleagues within a partner nation, but it can also serve as a platform for you to highlight something in your country that the U.S. Country Team facilitated. Handing a copy of the journal to an international colleague (embassy employees, PN military and allies) that you or ADF wrote and pertains to important local issues can be very powerful and strengthen relations.

The best publicity is that which comes from within your target population. Strategic study centers like the George C. Marshall Center (GCMC) and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) maintain “Alumni Chapters” in the countries that participate in their programs. When was the last time your Chapter met? When were they last invited to a COM hosted reception? Chapters should be empowered to be outspoken on the positive experience they had in U.S. funded programs. Arranging for senior MoD officials to attend a U.S. Embassy social event with a short brief by the Chapter can open doors and increase participation.

There will always be a need for greater communication (i.e. marketing) of U.S. investment with our partners. The Defense Attaché’s Office and Office of Security Cooperation’s unique access in a country team and in a partner nation provide a invaluable opportunity to market the benefit of U.S. security cooperation. The recommendations above may take a little time initially, but once built into your battle rhythm, they will yield significant returns.

LTC McCullough is a Branch Chief at J5, U.S. African Command. He was commissioned in 1993 from the Washington State University ROTC program as an armor officer, and became a FAO in 2002. His FAO assignments include Chief, Office of Security Cooperation, U.S. Embassy Kinshasa/Brazzaville (Democratic Republic of Congo/Republic of Congo); Operations Chief for the Multinational Training Division - USAREUR G3; J9 USFORA-S Afghanistan; ODC Chief Yerevan (Armenia); Caucasus Team Chief and Deputy Division Chief for Counter Terrorism at RAF Molesworth, UK; and Deputy Commander U.S. National Intelligence Cell Sarajevo. LTC McCullough has contributed two earlier articles to your FAO Association Journal of International Affairs.
International Security Engagement for an Unpredictable World

By Lieutenant Colonel Mark J. Teel, U.S. Army National Guard

Editor’s Note: LTC Teel’s paper won the FAO Association writing award at the Joint Forces Staff College. In the interest of space the thesis is published here without research references. The full version will be published to FAOA.org. We are pleased to bring you this outstanding scholarship.

Despite constrained budgets, the U.S. military must continue to maintain forward deployed forces, combined operations training, and international engagement throughout the joint force. These activities enable interoperability with our allies and partners during emergencies. Reductions in forward deployed forces, real-world combined operations, and funding for international engagements create a problem in preparing our current force for unknown future threats and requirements around the world and at home. While we cannot predict what form these hazards and requirements might take, we can reliably anticipate that it will entail international cooperation. Interoperability, built on a strong foundation of international engagement, is indispensable to our ability to work or fight as part of an effective international coalition, and is thereby vital for maintaining our national security in an uncertain and dangerous world.

Our inability to forecast future global national security threats is not simply an academic concern or minor planning criteria. As General Douglas MacArthur stated, “In no other profession are the penalties for employing untrained personnel so appalling or so irrevocable as in the military.” Our inevitable failure to accurately anticipate future threats and requirements is a driving force behind the need to remain internationally engaged. Future challenges will arrive unforeseen. Just as we failed to anticipate the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, North Korea’s launch of the Korean War (or subsequent Chinese intervention), Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, Al Qaida’s attack on 9/11, and the current challenge from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), we will assuredly fail to predict the precise nature of future perils. The key to maintaining our flexibility to confront unpredictable challenges obliges the joint force to prioritize all elements of international engagement and interoperability.

Nassim Nicholas Taleb best describes the seriousness and impact of the problem we face with unpredictability in The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable. Taleb identifies three characteristics of his Black Swan concept as “rarity, extreme impact, and retrospective (though not prospective) predictability.” He argues convincingly that these rare and unpredictable Black Swans are responsible for almost all consequential social events from wars to scientific breakthroughs, and that “the inability to predict outliers implies the inability to predict the course of history.” Taleb concludes that since Black Swans are unpredictable, “we need to adjust to their existence (rather than naively try to predict them).” Flexibility in adjusting to the unpredictable is perhaps never so important as in national security.

Maintaining robust international engagement and interoperability is how the joint force adjusts to the existence of extreme and unpredictable Black Swan events that threaten our national security. That often-maligned characteristic of redundancy plays a much more positive and necessary role when developing the forces and alliances that secure our continued national livelihood and existence. Since experts have been reliably ineffective in predicting when or where these hazards may explode, we must be flexible and diversified. Forward deployment, combined operations training and international engagement will mitigate risks from extreme events, by increasing our ability to effectively lead and conduct operations as a combined force.

Changes and Challenges in International Engagement:

International engagement, broadly defined, includes forward deployed forces and combined operations training, but each element is also necessary separately. Each aspect provides benefits for strengthening international interoperability and maintaining diversified capabilities to meet unanticipated threats and dangers. As a 2004 Department of Defense Report to Congress states, “Forward-deployed forces provide the basic building blocks with which to project military power in crises and strengthen U.S. military access.” It adds that “forward forces serve to: strengthen U.S. diplomacy and foreign policy; demonstrate U.S. commitment to the security of America’s friends and allies; and demonstrate to any potential challengers U.S. resolve to deter aggression and meet our commitments.” Projecting power, strengthening diplomacy, and demonstrating resolve are critical aspects of a proactive and preventive national security strategy. The interoperability that forward deployment fosters is also essential should prevention fall short. A broad
array of international engagement throughout the joint force will pay dividends in terms of effective cooperation and lives saved.

The reduction in forward deployed U.S. forces is an ongoing worldwide trend. At its Cold War peak, over 250,000 soldiers were based in Europe alone. Multiple factors have contributed to reducing our level of forward deployed forces from its Cold War peak, including isolationist sentiment among some political leaders, a widespread desire to decrease defense spending in general, and a desire by individual members of Congress to base military personnel in their districts rather than abroad. Less than 67,000 total U.S. military personnel remained in Europe in September 2014, with the bulk coming from the Army and Air Force, with approximately 29,000 each. Approximately 28,500 military personnel remain in the Republic of Korea. Despite the dramatic decline following the Cold War, the United States did increase its engagement in Eastern Europe through the Partnership for Peace, the National Guard State Partnership Program, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) expansion. This outreach and cooperation resulted in additional allies agreeing to support U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, even by governments that did not necessarily agree with the U.S. decision to invade Iraq. Continued reductions put at risk the benefits that the United States achieves through international engagement, including security cooperation, building partnership capacity, assuring allies, deterring rivals, and responding quickly to crises.

U.S. Armed Forces developed considerable experience working with international partners during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The recent decline in real world combined operations has sharply decreased the opportunities for working with international allies and partners. International cooperation and interoperability, however, remain imperfect and represent a perishable skill. Reductions in overseas deployments sharply limit the experience that our joint force, especially the National Guard and Reserve, has working with allies and partners. While the limited U.S. forces permanently stationed in Europe with NATO allies, in Korea as part of the Combined Forces Command, and in Japan continue to gain experience in combined operations, these personnel represent a small percentage of the total force.

**Partial Measures**

While there are efforts already in place to improve our ability to operate effectively with international partners, they remain insufficient and ad hoc. Aside from permanently stationed forces in Europe and Asia, other efforts include International Military Education and Training (IMET), outreach from Special Operations Forces, the Army’s Regionally Aligned Forces (RAF) concept, and the National Guard’s State Partnership Program (SPP). In response to the rebalance toward Asia, the Army has been promoting rotational deployments in the Pacific area, while the Marines have developed an ongoing training relationship with Australia (Camp Darwin). Other international operations such as fighting Ebola in Africa or ISIL in Syria will also develop combined operations skills, but these are responses to unexpected crises rather than part of a comprehensive strategy to maintain and strengthen these skills.

The National Guard’s State Partnership Program (SPP) represents another significant effort to engage international partners in support of U.S. national security objectives. It also improves the National Guard’s ability to function as part of a combined operation. Since the National Guard includes only the Army and Air Force, SPP is limited to those two Services, although in executing its events, the National Guard interacts with the joint Combatant Commands and cooperates with other Services including the Coast Guard. Funding for SPP is under threat as the Department of Defense seeks to eliminate “redundancy” to save money. Significant funding for SPP originates from the Combatant Commands, and in this era of cutbacks, other organizations are eager to claim those missions in order to justify their continued funding. With the decreased opportunity for National Guard personnel to participate in international deployments, SPP represents a critical opportunity to maintain international interoperability skills while supporting international allies and partners. The relationships developed over years of cooperation through SPP have also improved access and trust.

There is insufficient formal training devoted to working with international partners. Whole of government and inter-organizational cooperation are important buzzwords in today’s military, but they still have not become ingrained. International cooperation and interoperability receive even less attention and require even more development. There are no schools for improving combined skills comparable to our schools for improving joint operations. Barring a new course to train personnel to understand and adapt to foreign cultures, especially those of our allies and potential partners (similar to what Advanced Joint Professional Military Education does for joint training), adding more international engagement to our current military education and more opportunities for international interaction should be priorities. Special Operations Force training, Regionally Aligned Forces, and rotational forces, such as Pacific Pathways, can be a part of the solution, but the unknown nature of the threat requires the broadest possible preparation.

Redundancy is a negative concept for budget cutters and efficiency analysts, but when designing the total force responsible for protecting our security and way of life against unpredictable threats, developing redundancy in our critical capabilities is only prudent and the only way to prepare for Black Swan events. Building partnership capacity by helping our allies improve their individual skills as well as their international interoperability provides insurance against these unpredictable threats. Rotational forces represent an important ingredient of international engagement, but the short duration of those exercises cannot replicate the critical lessons learned from long-term basing and interaction, or the continuity offered by the National Guard’s SPP.

Our ad hoc responses have spanned the globe from rotations to Europe in response to Russian aggression in
Ukraine, forces returning to Iraq to confront the unexpected success of ISIL, and forces deployed to Liberia to help contain the sudden spread of Ebola. All of these events demonstrate the concern with unpredicted Black Swan events, although fortunately so far, none of them have hit the United States with the severity of 9/11, which itself is certainly not the limit of a worst-case scenario. While our ability to react to these crises is commendable, it is merely a warning that our ability to operate as part of an international coalition is essential. Our presence near multiple hotspots, our skills at interoperability, and our bonds of trust and cooperation with allies and partners must be built on a solid and unwavering foundation. Focused training in an international environment and experience in that setting are critical to success.

**Why We Need a Comprehensive Solution Today**

If international engagement is the answer to future volatility, why do we need forward deployed forces and combined operations training today? Combined operations and international coalitions cannot be constructed effectively at the last minute, only as they are needed. As we have learned in the U.S. Armed Forces, effective joint operations require training and practice. One cannot show up on the day of an event with separate Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine planners (not to mention Inter-agency planners) and expect to effectively synchronize multiple services with varying capabilities, limitations and cultures. To address this challenge, the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986 placed greater priority on joint experience and joint education. Despite this increased emphasis and schools devoted specifically to joint matters, challenges still exist, as we learned in responding to international disasters such as the Haiti earthquake and domestic disasters like Hurricane Katrina. Joint integration requires a concerted and continuing effort.

Like joint integration, international interoperability does not occur without training and practice. In fact, the challenges grow exponentially when one moves from joint to combined and adds in the complicating factors of different languages, cultures, and capabilities that result from international coalitions. The purpose of building international interoperability mirrors the rationale for developing joint experience and doctrine within our military. As Deni writes, “the primary purpose of U.S. forces in Europe today is to build interoperability and military capability within and among America’s most capable and most likely future coalition partners through security cooperation activities like exercises and training events.” Deni argues convincingly about the importance of building interoperability and partner capacity, but like many others, he did not anticipate the revival of an expansionist Russia as a potential danger in Europe. All of Deni’s conventional prudent arguments for maintaining a forward presence in Europe are only bolstered by the threat of Black Swans, i.e. unpredictable and dangerous events.

The costs of creating international coalitions on an ad hoc basis are not limited to military personnel. We rely on our joint force for relief assistance during oil spills, hurricanes, earthquakes, and floods, not to mention nuclear meltdowns resulting from the combination of earthquakes and floods. The search and rescue, logistics, and medical capabilities that the military possesses are often the only resources available on short notice and capable of operating with limited support in austere environments. The danger of neglecting international engagement extends far beyond the military arena since the disaster response missions that the military engages in are often matters of life and death for large numbers of innocent civilians. Lack of interoperability can lead to increased civilian casualties in addition to failed missions.

A comprehensive strategy for international engagement must include forward basing, combined operations training and ongoing international exchanges and cooperation. Every effort must be taken to resist calls for further reductions of foreign bases and forward deployed forces. Forward deployment must span the joint spectrum from Army bases and training facilities to Navy support facilities, and Air Force bases and training ranges. This resistance should not take the form of inflexible opposition to relocating forces from their current locations, but it should not involve an overall reduction. Professor Deni makes a reasonable case for re-allocation of forces in the Pacific, arguing that “by reorienting some of its existing forward presence from Northeast Asia toward Southeast Asia, the U.S. Army could make its efforts at promoting, enhancing, opening, and sustaining key relationships cheaper and easier to fulfill.” In assessing calls for a reallocation, however, it is essential that they are not used simply as a cover for reducing our presence, and that the impact on international relationships, security cooperation and access to key regions be evaluated.

**Critics and Conflicting Demands**

Challenges to expanding our international engagement exist on multiple fronts, including isolationist politicians, anti-imperialist academics, overall budget cuts from Sequestration, and conflicting budget demands. Professor John Deni’s research concludes that “over at least the last half-century, many members of the U.S. Congress from both sides of the political aisle … have called for cuts, sometimes dramatic, in the U.S. military forces forward-based in Europe.” In a compromise from his father Ron Paul’s extreme non-interventionism, Senator Rand Paul captured the common sentiment of politicians favoring bases in their own districts: “I’m not saying don’t have any…. I’m just saying maybe not 900. I mean, I’d rather have one at Fort Campbell and Fort Knox than one in Timbuktu.” Political battles in Congress, as well as inter-service rivalry over funding, will lead to choices that do not always reflect the best interests of national security. Despite these conflicting demands, service leaders should recognize the critical influence of international engagement and work to ensure its funding and implementation.

In *The Sorrows of Empire*, Chalmers Johnson argues that the United States is a “military juggernaut intent on world domination.” In criticizing U.S. bases abroad, Johnson claims that “the bases are not needed to fight wars but are instead
pure manifestations of militarism and imperialism.” Johnson concludes that our descent into militarism and imperialism is “so far advanced and obstacles to them so neutralized that our decline has already begun. Our refusal to dismantle our own empire of military bases when the menace of the USSR disappeared, and our inappropriate response to the blowback of September 11, 2001, makes this decline close to inevitable.” While Johnson raises some legitimate concerns regarding potential negative repercussions of foreign bases, he exaggerates comparisons with the former Soviet Union and underestimates the positive impact as well as the support of many countries for hosting American forces. Many countries in Eastern Europe or Asia feel threatened by aggressive neighbors, and welcome the stability and cooperation that U.S. international engagement delivers.

Even more than political or ideological opposition, Sequestration threatens to impose reductions in international engagement. Inter-Service budget battles, which had decreased during eras of plentiful defense spending, are likely to grow only more bitter as funds decrease and if Sequestration hits again with full force. A call for isolationism has always been present in American politics, and when faced with cutbacks at home it has the potential to become even more vocal. There is no question that there are challenges and costs associated with maintaining international engagement and combined experience, but failing to make these investments would undermine our ability to respond to and overcome future perils. In the long-term, the cost of being unprepared or responding to a crisis that could have been prevented will far outweigh the cost of maintaining our international partnerships and interoperability.

**Conclusion**

In order to meet future challenges with minimum loss of life and devastation, the U.S. Armed Forces must maintain and expand a solid foundation in international engagement, including forward deployed forces and combined operations training. Our own budgetary, personnel and equipment limitations will increase our reliance on international coalitions to meet future threats or requirements, yet international coalitions do not work effectively without training and experience. Reductions in U.S. forces make international interoperability even more important as an option for filling in U.S. gaps and shortages when action is required. Creating these combined organizations on an ad hoc basis at the last minute is a recipe for an ineffective response, if not disaster. As General Douglas MacArthur stated, “The history of failure in war can be summed up in two words: too late. Too late in comprehending the deadly purpose of a potential enemy; too late in realizing the mortal danger; too late in preparedness; too late in uniting all possible forces for resistance; too late in standing with one’s friends.” The high stakes in the national security arena, combined with the unpredictability of our world make it critical that we not be too late. The ability to confront unpredictable threats requires a flexible joint force with combined operations training and experience in international engagement. The experience that international engagement brings, working side-by-side with international partners in distant locations, lays the groundwork for an effective response to unpredicted threats, increasing our national security in an uncertain and dangerous world.

---

**HAND-ROLLED PREMIUM TOBACCO**
**BY PUCHO CIGARS COMPANY, LLC**

**AN AMERICAN COMPANY SINCE 1996**
**"SHARE THE EXPERIENCE"**
**MICHAEL "PUCHO" PALMA SEMPER FIDELIS**

**PUCHO@YAHOO.COM**
**703-225-9953**

**WE CUSTOMIZE BLENDS AND LABELS**
**(MINIMUM ORDER REQUIRED)**
MILITARY CAPACITY BUILDING: PROGRAMS TO PERPETUATE REGIONAL INSTABILITY

by Major Alan E. Van Saun, U.S. Army

Major Van Saun’s thesis won the FAO Association writing award at the College of Naval Command and Staff, Naval War College. We are pleased to bring you this outstanding scholarship. Because of space constraints, with the author’s permission we publish only the text of this winning thesis. The full version will be published to FAOA.org.

Disclaimer: The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Introduction

The popular business challenge to “do more with less” is a catch phrase that is continuing to permeate throughout the Department of Defense (DoD). In response to the fiscal drawdown occurring across the Department, the United States Government (USG) is identifying ways to meet this challenge while still maintaining order and influence around the world. One method of achieving this is through the DoD use of Security Cooperation (SC). In theory, the use of SC allows DoD, through the Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCC), to create stability in strategically important regions of the world in a manner that requires fewer resources than deploying U.S. forces.

Increasing foreign military capacity is an inherently risky endeavor, and there are numerous examples throughout history where negative consequences resulted. Early controversies involved the training of Latin American militaries through the infamous School of Americas at Fort Benning, Georgia. Some of the most recent examples, and the ones that will be analyzed in this paper, occurred in Mali, Burkina Faso, Egypt, and Iraq. If building capacity is to be utilized in support of stability within an entire region, recent negative events should cause doubt about the feasibility of reaching this objective. These events include the enablement of coup d’êats, U.S. trained forces committing human rights violations, and U.S. purchased equipment arming enemy forces. The continued reliance on foreign military capacity building in the future will have the unintended consequence of creating or perpetuating instability within a region.

Background - The Growing Importance of Security Cooperation

Before analyzing the negative trends that are resulting from foreign military capacity building, it is important to first understand where capacity building fits into the broader scheme of Security Cooperation and the operational objective of creating stability within a region. While government programs focused on building the capacity of foreign militaries have a long history in the United States, these programs moved to the forefront of U.S. foreign policy in the past decade. As these programs expanded with the addition of new policies, authorities and funds, new terms and responsibilities between various departments subsequently emerged. This section will delineate the applicable programs related to foreign military capacity building within the context of the latest policies.

The expansion and reliance on foreign military capacity building by the USG is evident when examining the latest policy documents, and comparing them to earlier versions. In his 2015 National Security Strategy, President Obama describes his plan to “Build Capacity to Prevent Conflict” in the fourth of eight sections within the “Security” chapter of the document. This concept is based on his foundational theory provided in the introduction of the document, which argues that in order to lead into the future the United States must “lead with capable partners.” In comparison, President Obama dictates that the United States will “Invest in the Capacity of Strong and Capable Partners” as the sixth of seven sections of the “Security” chapter within the 2010 National Security Strategy. Like all policy documents, words matter, and the fact that partner capacity progressed up within the sections of the “Security” chapter indicates the growing importance of this concept.

Consistent with the National Security Strategy, the DoD also prioritizes foreign military capacity building within the national defense strategy. In the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, DoD emphasizes three pillars within the defense strategy, the second of which is “build security globally.” In order to describe the elements of this pillar in more detail, the report goes on to explain that building foreign military capacity “... helps protect the homeland by deterring conflict and increasing stability in regions like the Middle East and North Africa.” Of interest here is that not only is DoD prioritizing the need to build security globally, but the concept is being linked to the objective of creating stability within two volatile regions of the world.
With respect to the Department of State (DoS) there are twelve programs that fall within the realm of Security Assistance authorities. Of the twelve programs, seven of the programs are administered by DoD but remain under the general control of DoS as part of foreign assistance. The program from this group of seven that is applicable to this paper is International Military Education and Training (IMET). Initiated by Congress as part of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976, IMET provides professional military education and technical training to military students from allied and friendly nations. Due to the relatively small cost of the program, IMET provides a significant return on investment with respect to access and influence globally. Of note, according to the DoS website, IMET not only “... further[s] the goal of regional stability through effective, mutually beneficial military-to-military relations,” but also exposes foreign students to “... the manner in which military organizations function under civilian control.” The specified objectives identified by the DoS, however, are contradicted by the crisis examined in the subsequent sections of this paper.

Similarly, within the DoD there are a collection of programs enabled by security cooperation authorities. These programs can be unofficially grouped into seven categories, the most prominent of which is “global train and equip.” Within this category, the three applicable programs for this paper are “1206” Building Partner Capacity of Foreign Military, “1208” Support of Special Operations to Combat Terrorism, and Iraq Security Forces Funds (ISFF). While each of these programs have unique and specific uses, all of them contribute to the means of building foreign military capacity to achieve the end of stability within a specific region.

It is evident that over the last decade, building foreign military capacity grew in prominence within USG policy and DoD strategy. With the expansion of authorities, funding and programs to implement this strategy, there should be tangible means of building foreign military capacity to achieve the end of stability within a specific region.

CONSEQUENCE #1: ENABLING A COUP

Just as the United States has a long history of providing training and equipment to foreign military forces, the USG also has a storied history of training future coup plotters around the world. Many of these coups were led by Central and South American military officers who participated in the controversial School of the Americas (SOA) at Fort Benning through the second half of the 20th century. However, not all of the coups are tied to SOA, and more recent examples include rebel leader Guy Phillipe, who led a 2004 coup in Haiti after receiving training from U.S. Special Forces. The two most recent cases, and most relevant to the expansion of the capacity building programs discussed in this paper, occurred in Mali and Burkina Faso within the last three years.

The first coup, which occurred on March 22, 2012, was conducted by renegade Malian soldiers referring to themselves as the newly formed National Committee for the Return of Democracy and the Restoration of the State (CNRDR). The bloodless coup overthrew then President Amadou Toumani Toure, claiming that the weak government failed to quell a nomad-led rebellion in the north of the country. While this coup was unsettling to the international community due to Toure’s decade-long democratically elected government serving as an example for the region, another alarming fact was that the coup leader was a recipient of U.S. training.

At the time, Mali benefited from various forms of aid from both the DoS and DoD. Specifically, the coup leader, Capt. Amadou Jaya Sanogo, received military training in the U.S. on several occasions through IMET, including basic officer training. Given this fact, Captain Sanogo would have received training and exposure to the manner in which a military should function under civilian control. In a news report following the event, a DoS spokeswoman claimed, “The actions of the mutineers run contrary to everything that is taught in U.S. military schools, where students are exposed to American concepts of the role of a military in a free society.” Contributing to this problem is the fact that Captain Sanogo was passed through his professional military education (PME) courses despite failing his tests. But an IMET producing contradictory results was only part of the problem.

While individuals were receiving training through IMET, there is no indication that any other training or equipment was allocated to the remainder of the military. The lack of training and resources for those not participating in IMET eroded the military’s trust of the democratic Malian government. One of the many complaints made by the military coup members of the CNRDR was about resource shortfalls, including a recent attack where rebels killed 100 Malian soldiers and civilians after
the soldiers ran out of ammunition. After examining the DoD and DoS Joint Report to Congress on Foreign Military Training for 2011-2012, there was no money allocated for “1206” in FY 2011, and only $63,000 for FY 2012, which was subsequently suspended due to the coup. This type of “train and equip” funding could have filled the void that created distrust throughout the Malian military ranks. The funding that was obligated had the stated objective to “Develop capacity of the military as a non-political, professional force respectful of human rights.”

In the end however, the SC programs created an unprofessional and politicized force.

A similar crisis occurred just one year later, within the same region. To the east of Mali is the neighboring country of Burkina Faso, where in November 2014 a military coup ousted former President Blaise Campaoré. The President fled the country amid protests over his political maneuvering to change the country’s constitution and extend his ability to rule. Although the military did not necessarily force the President’s withdrawal, they quickly replaced him by installing a military leader in the executive office and suspending the country’s constitution. The military essentially conducted a “bloodless” coup, and also disregarded rule of law within the country by suspending the constitution. Ultimately, the man who was put in charge by the military was once again a recipient of U.S. training.

This time, the training was not as extensive as training received by Captain Sanago from Mali, but it was enough to question the efficacy of foreign military capacity building efforts. Lieutenant Colonel Isaac Zida, the former deputy commander of the presidential guard, became the ruler of Burkina Faso following the coup. Two years prior, then Major Zida attended a 12-day counterterrorism training course sponsored by the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. Subsequently, Major Zida attended a five-day U.S. funded military intelligence course in Botswana. Due to the scope and nature of these courses, one could not expect that Zida would have received the extensive rule of law or ethics training inherent in PME programs. However, better screening, pre-requisite training or SC program management could have provided more applicable training to meet IMET objectives.

Looking once again at the Joint Report to Congress on Foreign Military Training, one could expect that enough capacity existed within the Burkinabé military to prevent such an event. In FY 2013, two lines of accounting for IMET programs were reported, totaling over $300,000 for nine separate training courses. In FY 2014, one line of accounting for IMET was reported, for $256,577 and ten separate training courses. These programs had the stated objectives of “Military Professionalization” and “Civilian Control of the Military.” Clearly these objectives were not achieved, and efforts to build foreign military capacity eroded regional stability.

**Consequence #2: Human Rights Violations**

Like coups, instances of human rights violations conducted by U.S. trained foreign military forces are equally as controversial and strewn throughout the country’s history. Once again, many of these cases involved individuals who received training at SOA, but they also included African militaries from Rwanda, Zimbabwe and Uganda. The most prominent example from the late twentieth century involved Robert Mugabe and his Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front. Mugabe and his military received consistent IMET training throughout the 1990s despite his direct role in both domestic and international human rights violations that contributed to significant regional instability. This controversial event, along with other known human rights issues, eventually led to the implementation of the “Leahy Amendment” to identify and prevent future occurrences. However, recent events indicate that while the Leahy Amendment can prevent certain organizations from receiving aid, it cannot prevent the negative actions and subsequent instability from foreign militaries after training is complete.

The most recent example that fits within this scope of this argument involved the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Following the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq in 2012 and the emergence of ISIL, the subsequent years, building partner capacity became a key element of the strategy to counter ISIL. While accusations and instances of human rights violations occurred during the establishment and build-up of ISF and the Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) throughout Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the most recent violations occurred after OIF, at a time when the U.S. relied upon the ISF for stability.

The atrocities committed by the ISF not only contributed to instability within Iraq, but also had a regionally destabilizing
effect due to the nature in which they were recorded. An ABC News investigation initially broke the news of the incidents, after monitoring various social media sites operated by members of the CTS and ISF. Online postings of still pictures and videos captured human rights violations such as torture, beheadings and the summary execution of ISIS prisoners. Because these postings were online, and accessible elsewhere in the world, they ultimately contributed to the sectarian strife that fueled ISIL in Syria and throughout the region.

The significant time and resources spent in building and maintaining the ISF did not achieve SC objectives in Iraq. Critics argue that the $19 billion spent to establish and maintain the ISF to that point should have had a more stabilizing effect. Additionally, during the period immediately preceding the publicized human rights violations, increased weapons sales and training in third country parties were conducted to further build ISF capacity. Despite all of these efforts, ISF still conducted atrocities and spread instability within the region.

Another recent example occurred in Egypt in July, 2013, following the overthrow of the legitimately elected president Mohammed Morsi. Because naming this event a coup was debated throughout the USG and never officially determined, it will be discussed here instead due to the undeniable human rights violations that ensued. Following the installment of General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, Chief of Egyptian Armed Forces, as the interim leader, Egyptian forces unlawfully detained, interrogated and even killed protesters loyal to Morsi. This highly publicized event created turmoil in Egypt and contributed to further instability throughout North Africa and the Middle East.

In comparison to Iraq and other countries discussed thus far, Egypt had a longer history of benefiting from U.S. military capacity building efforts, which should have prevented such an event. The Egyptian military was backed by more than $40 million in aid since 1948, and at the time was receiving $1.3 billion in annual military aid. Although the exact breakdown of these funds is unknown, IMET played a key role in training Egyptian officers, including Gen. Abdel el-Sisi, who attended both the Infantry Officer Basic Course and the Army War College. Once again, foreign military capacity building programs intended to stabilize a vital region proved to have the opposite effect.

Consequence #3: Arming the Enemy

The final consequence that directly contributes to instability is arming terrorist and insurgent forces. It is not uncommon for weapons to trade sides through battlefield recovery, such as the case with the U.S. provided weapons that ISIL obtained from defeated ISF. While these occurrences are somewhat expected, the issue at hand is when U.S. provided weapons reach terrorist groups willingly by the very forces DoD identified for training and capacity building.

Such was the case at a base outside Tripoli, Libya in August, 2013. At the time, DoD allocated $16 million of “train-and-equip” funds to develop counterterrorism forces in Libya. As part of the training, the Libyan forces were issued rifles, pistols, night vision goggles, and armored vehicles. Within a day of receiving and securing the weapons and equipment, forces from a local militia stole all of the equipment in what was believed to be an inside job. The circumstances of the theft, which was allegedly facilitated by the Libyan forces, contradicts the preconditions for building the capacity of a foreign military. Those preconditions would have included a vetting process to identify reliable and appropriate forces for counterterrorism training, and identifying facilities with the capacity to receive new equipment.

Although some of the equipment was recovered, some of it inevitably made it to various militia forces perpetuating instability in the under-governed region. Egyptian security forces reported months later that U.S. weapons and military equipment were captured during raids on Al Qaida-aligned militias operating in the Sinai peninsula. Additionally, the Egyptians found evidence that insurgents were employing night-vision goggles for attacks on critical infrastructure, including the Suez Canal. Due to the extensive illicit trade networks that exist throughout northern Africa and the Middle East, the failure of one “train and equip” mission in Libya created destabilizing consequences for the entire region.

Not only do these incidents occur in “Phase 0” operations where operational commanders are trying to maintain stability, but they also occur in theaters of war where the U.S. is trying to set the conditions for long term stability. Audits by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) discovered that large volumes of weapons and equipment purchased by the USG for both Afghan and Iraqi Security Forces went missing during capacity building efforts. The weapons were provided to the countries’ security forces as part of the “train and equip” missions to build the capacity of future U.S. partners, and create stability in the region. Unfortunately, the weapons also armed various insurgent and terrorist groups in neighboring countries, including Turkey, where stolen weapons were being used for assassinations and attacks on the government. Once again, programs intended to create stability in one partner country, created instability in another.

Conclusion

Unless changes are made in the current use of security cooperation by DoD, the continued reliance on foreign military capacity building will have the unintended consequence of creating or perpetuating regional instability. The examples provided in this paper demonstrate that programs such as “train and equip” and IMET are creating dangerous consequences both within partner nations and also in the surrounding region. These consequences include the enablement of coup d’etats, U.S. trained forces committing human rights violations and U.S. purchased equipment arming enemy forces. Although some capacity building programs may provide the intermediate benefit of addressing specific threats to the United States, the programs are not achieving the ultimate objective of regional stability.
The threats facing the United States will continue to grow in complexity as the world evolves. Preventing these threats from emerging or proliferating will remain at the forefront of USG policy in an effort to avoid large-scale wars in the future. As DoD resources reduce in size, the endeavor of maintaining stability will continue to challenge CCDR to find innovative solutions for problems within their AOR. Security cooperation offers many tools to meet the challenge, but it is not a panacea upon which the future should depend.

**Recommendations**

Although this paper is very critical of foreign military capacity building, the author does not imply that all security cooperation efforts should be abandoned. Rather, the argument demonstrates that planning and executing SC programs must be a deliberate process, that accounts for inherent risks and implements control measures which minimize negative consequences.

First, training should focus less on tactical and technical training, and more on the professionalization of sustainable military forces. Following the coup in Mali, the AFRICOM Commander, General Carter Ham, recognized that military training up to that point focused only on tactical skills without any emphasis on rule of law or human rights. While tactical and technical training has its role within security cooperation, this cannot be the sole focus. Operational commanders should seek opportunities to establish professional military training schools within the host nation that incorporate ethics training, emphasize military subservience to civilian rule and are sustainable. Sustainability is a key consideration, in that it truly addresses capacity, and not just capability. While this is a challenging prospect for planning and resourcing, and the results are not as immediate and tangible as other train-and-equip programs, it is a process that must be utilized to create regional stability.

Next, operational commanders must understand the history and strength of the relationship between the government and military of countries set to receive military capacity building benefits. The relationship between the military and the democratically elected civilian government within the United States is unique, and DoD should not assume that relationship exists in partner nations. The practice of mirror imaging is especially dangerous with newly formed democracies that have historically dominant militaries, such as in Africa. Understanding the Operational Environment (OE) is not a new imperative, and appreciating the interrelationship of military and government leaders within partner nations must be at the forefront of SC employment.

Finally, and in line with the first two points, ethics and rule of law training must have a greater emphasis and be included with all capacity building programs. Prioritizing ethics not only reduces the potential for destabilizing events, like previously discussed, but also allows the United States to maintain legitimacy with these programs. The control measures provided through the Leahy Amendment allow operational commanders to deny military benefits, or restrict benefits following an incident. However, the amendment does not mitigate the risks of building capacity by altering opinions and behaviors. Because some of the IMET and train-and-equip programs do not inherently include ethics training, operational commanders should develop employment methods such as requiring a foreign military leaders to undergo ethics training prior to receiving equipment or attending a school.

**Transparent Language** is the developer of the CL-150 Matrix for Critical Languages (CL-150). The CL-150 is a constantly evolving infrastructure of innovative technology, content and services providing economical and effective learning, sustaining and assessing of 120+ foreign languages for the Joint FAO Program and the greater U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and Intelligence Communities.

The purpose of the CL-150 is to improve the economics and effectiveness of language learning for both general use and for special purposes such as humanitarian relief, international relations or military liaison.

The CL-150 is available to all FAOs via FAOweb (fao.nps.edu) and all U.S. Government personnel (with a .gov or .mil address), language schools, and language programs via the Department of Defense’s language portal, Joint Language University (jlu.wbtrain.com). Access is sponsored by the Defense Language and National Security Education Office and by Joint Language University. For more information, visit TRANSPARENT.COM/GOVERNMENT
Building Language Skills & Cultural Competencies for the Joint Force 2020 and Beyond

By Colonel William R. Bridgemohan, U.S. Air Force Reserve

Editor’s Note: Colonel Bridgemohan’s article won the FAO Association writing award at the Joint Forces Staff College. The Journal is pleased to bring you this outstanding scholarship. Because of its length, we have removed research notes in this version. The full version will be available at FAOA.org

Disclaimer: The contents of this submission reflect my original views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

Introduction

“Fighting with one arm behind our back” is how Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey French characterizes military operations when our joint forces do not have the necessary cultural capabilities to pursue national security objectives. After more than a decade of military conflict in both Iraq and Afghanistan, it is probably not surprising that nearly every study, panel, lessons learned report, after-action review, and assessment are in agreement. Successful military operations overseas require understanding both culture and language. Senior leaders who ignore this truth do so at their own peril for it leads to disastrous effects. The consequences of not having regional expertise are well documented: decisive blunders, lack of strategic empathy, disrespect for customs and courtesies, and even violations of international law. Simply stated, the Defense Department needs to improve its efforts to build a joint force with regional expertise, language skills, and knowledge of U.S. and foreign political-military relationships. Former Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee and namesake for the library at Joint Forces Staff College, Ike Skelton, put it bluntly; “For a country that welcomes people from so many cultures around the world, the United States can be remarkably insular.”

The dearth of regional and cultural experts is not unique to the military. The Department of State and intelligence agencies are facing similar critical shortfalls in strategic languages. According to a 2014 report on the U.S. Education Reform and National Security, fewer than half of State Department officers met the language prerequisites in positions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Similarly, the report highlights that there are shortfalls in other strategically important languages such as Chinese, Dari, Korean, Russian, and Turkish.

The backbone of joint force regional expertise is the Foreign Area Officer. In this paper, I will discuss how the DoD builds and funds the training of regional and cultural skills, shortfalls to date with the overall program, compare best practices with the interagency and the private sector, and finally provide three recommendations to improve training for the joint force of the future: establishing a joint training course, leveraging civilian education and training, and utilizing our total force assets.

The recently published 2015 National Military Strategy provides the ways and means in which the military will advance enduring U.S. national interests. To that end, the strategy focuses on working with our allies and partners to counter state and non-state rogue actors that are challenging international accepted standards as well as extremist organizations that are undermining international security. “Central to these efforts is strengthening our global network of allies and partners.” A 2013 RAND Study on the efficacy of building partnership capacity derived a similar conclusion when it reported that “relationships matter.” To implement this strategy, the joint force will need to leverage regional and cultural expertise, which

If you talk to a man in a language he understands, that goes to his head. If you talk to him in his language, that goes to his heart.

-Nelson Mandela
is embodied in the Foreign Area Officer. The challenge will be how to integrate this regional and cultural understanding at the combatant command and highest strategic levels.

**DOD Vision**

The DOD's Strategic Plan for Language Skills, Regional Expertise, and Cultural Capabilities pinpoints the Department's concept to “have the required combination of language skills, regional expertise, and cultural capabilities to meet current and projected needs.” To achieve this vision systematically, three goals will help prioritize the Department’s efforts to strengthen language skills, regional expertise, and cultural capabilities:

1. **Goal 1:** Identify and prioritize requirements based upon operational needs.
2. **Goal 2:** Build a force (to include reserve components) with the optimal skillset to meet our national security objectives.
3. **Goal 3:** Increase interoperability and build partner capacity

**Defense Department Foreign Area Officer Programs**

The 2005 Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 1315.17, “Military Department Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Programs,” directs each Service to develop and sustain a program of officers with “foreign language proficiency and detailed knowledge of the regions of the world gained through in-depth study and personal experience.” The Services have chosen two general approaches to FAOs: “single-tracked” and “dual-tracked” career management. The Army and Navy follow a “single-tracked” path while the Marine Corps and Air Force employ “dual-tracked” career management. There are also differences in the type of positions the FAOs are placed. With the exception of the Marine Corps, most FAOs are slotted in joint assignments. For example, in the Army, only about a quarter of the positions are service specific Army positions. Overall, FAOs tend to serve as strategic assets -- regional experts at combatant commands, joint staff, and the office of the secretary of defense. The Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs appreciates the importance of FAOs and recognizes that they have “the best understanding of what your partner nation needs and where they want to be for several years from now.”

**Single-track**

The Army and the Navy manage their foreign area officers as a separate career field. This is known as a single-track because these officers will leave their primary occupation and serve in predominately FAO-coded billets until they retire. The Army’s Functional Area (FA) 48 is the gold standard of the Defense Department’s Foreign Area Officer program. Army FAOs are accessed into the program after having experienced seven to ten years of commissioned service in a “basic” branch and those officers are methodically developed over the next three to five years at a cost of over two hundred and fifty thousand dollars. FAO training in the Army is a five-phased approach that starts with a FAO Basic Course. Next, students attend language training (typically ranging from 26 to 63 weeks). Following language instruction, the students are sent in country for what is known as In-Region Training (IRT). Fourth, the FAO will obtain a Master’s Degree with that same regional focus at a civilian institution. Finally, FAOs are required to complete Intermediate Level Education.

Starting in 2006 and loosely modeled after the Army, the Navy FAO program is one of the smallest and is a restricted specialty of the line-officer community. “You cannot surge trust,” is the concept where the Navy must rely on international partnerships and cooperation and FAOs are a key component in its engagement strategy. In a way, the Navy’s approach to develop new FAOs is more standardized than the Army as it relies on organic institutions. FAOs receive a graduate degree at the Naval Postgraduate School, language instruction at the Defense Language Institute, and limited (if any) In Country Training (ICT).

Single-track FAOs face significant challenges maintaining operational relevance, sustaining branch proficiency and currency on weapon systems. Given that three-quarters of the Army FAO positions are Joint, the efforts of these uniquely trained officers may go unnoticed by peers in the operational Army until these officers serve at the Pentagon, Joint Staff or combatant command. Due to the realities of the Army operations since 9/11, it is likely that many FAOs have combat experience from their primary branch prior to accessing into the FAO program.

**Dual-track**

The Air Force and the Marine Corps take a different approach to FAO career management as officers are permitted to remain in their primary branch but add the FAO as an additional MOS (or Air Force Specialty Code). In the Air Force, FAOs, known as regional affairs specialists or RAS, alternate assignments between their primary and RAS specialties. The AFSC of 16F is the designation for RAS. The primary specialty retains overall control and decision authority regarding an officer’s career management. This means that the career management of a RAS pilot will always depend on the pilot career assignment manager. From a career management standpoint, the Marine Corps’ FAO program is very similar to the Air Force. Marine Corps FAOs can choose FAO assignments as well as assignments in their primary occupation (MOS). Consequently, the FAO proponent office seeks to ensure that FAOs’ non-FAO assignments are synchronized with their regional focus areas.

One key difference from the Marine Corps FAO program is the emphasis on the tactical rather than operational roles. In comparison with the other Service programs, only about 40 percent of the Marine Corps billets are joint assignments. The majority of the FAOs are assigned across the range of Marine Corps Formations and Organizations.

The challenges of a dual-track system are inherent in a hybrid career management approach. Prior to the new AF
program in 2005, officers had long considered the FAO track as a “career ender.” According to SAF/IA, promotion rates to O-6 have consistently been above the overall average line officer percentages. Based on the Commandant’s Planning Guidance of 2010, the Marine Corps sought to improve promotion and command competitiveness for its FAOs. A 2011 Marine Corps FAO requirement study showed promotions rates to O-6 equal or greater than the Service average.

The Way Ahead

Each of the Services’ FAO programs are evolving and trying to be responsive to the changing needs and operational demands of the warfighter for the greatest bang for the buck. Services are finding innovative ways to “grow” FAOs more rapidly and at lower expense. Two examples of a novel approach are the Marine Corps’ experience track, which gives officers credit based on life experiences and the Air Force’s Language Enabled Airmen Program (LEAP), which selects officers with pre-existing high levels of proficiency in a foreign language.

Service FAOs are usually assigned to the strategic planning, operations, or international affairs directorates within each military department. Combatant command and other agencies tend to staff its FAOs in similar functions. On the other hand, while the Joint Staff J-5 and OSD Policy have the largest cluster of FAOs, it is the personnel community that manages the program. This means that the human resources strategy may not be aligned to ensure “appropriate consideration of FAO requirements on the Joint Staff and within combatant commands” to support warfighter demands.

Establish a Joint Basic FAO Course Pilot Program

DD should establish a joint basic FAO course that would consolidate initial training of selected FAOs. Many specialized career fields have already embraced joint training: Explosive Ordnance Disposal, dive school, specialized undergraduate pilot training, and basic airborne course are just a few examples. A joint school has the benefit of taking the best practices of all the Services and reducing the overhead required for four separate initial training pipelines. While the exact school duration should be carefully examined, four to six weeks of blended education would provide a good baseline.

The Defense Attaché System provides a good comparison for development of a joint FAO course. In 1964, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara issued a directive to improve the management of attaches from a system in which each individual service managed their own attaches to a single, centrally managed defense-wide system. Today, officers who are selected to be defense attaches are required to attend the Joint Military Attaché School (JMAS) for approximately 20 weeks at Defense Intelligence Agency in Washington, DC.

A new concept that should be considered as part of the pilot program is cultural intelligence. Cultural intelligence includes elements of both intelligence quotient and emotional intelligence as it demands the capacity to decipher, interpret, and integrate both rational thought and emotional behavior. While it may seem “soft” to certain military officers, truly effective leaders are distinguished with a high degree of cultural intelligence and are able to adapt to new global environments and embrace cultural diversity. Cultural intelligence reflects an aptitude to gather a wide-ranging base, draw inferences, and adapt behaviors in response to one’s cultural environment and situation.

Daniel Goleman’s research goes so far as to state that emotional intelligence is the “sine qua non of leadership.” He states that without it, a person simply won’t make a great leader no matter how much training or intelligence they may have.

Special Forces are at the forefront of putting theory regarding cultural knowledge into practice. In fact, culture and warfare have been “inextricably bound” for centuries. Lawrence of Arabia is known to have remarked, “Geography, tribal structure, religion, social customs, language, appetites, standards were at my finger-ends. The enemy I knew almost like my own side.” Moreover, Al-Qaeda without a doubt understands the importance of culture, and has scolded the United States for lacking cultural awareness. Not surprisingly, most anthropologists believe the best and quickest way to learn about other cultures is to experience it. The December 2011 Joint Special Operations University Report recommends that

EVERYONE SHOULD LEARN LANGUAGE SKILLS. EVERY DEPLOYED PERSON SHOULD BE ABLE TO GREET LOCALS AND SAY “THANK YOU.” THIS LANGUAGE SKILL IS AS IMPORTANT AS YOUR OTHER BASIC COMBAT SKILLS.

- GENERAL STAN MCCRHRYSTAL
ISAF COMMANDER, 9 NOV 2009
course in cultural anthropology would be a good baseline for Special Forces. Correspondingly, this would be a worthwhile part of the syllabus for the Joint Basic FAO course.

Establishing a joint basic course pilot program would be the first step towards making FAOs interoperable. There are other defense agencies that share the same pool for FAO talent, specifically DIA’s Joint Military Attaché Training and Joint Special Operations University. In addition to the Services, this provides another opportunity for crossflow and sharing of best practices. Moreover, outside of Defense, State Department’s Foreign Service Institute adds another potential enduring partner.

Leverage Civilian Education and Training

Civilian education and the explosive increase for internet and on demand learning presents an amazing opportunity for the FAO education. Online education is no longer just for granting degrees to “check the box.” Even the best universities, such as Harvard and Michigan, recognize the importance of integrating an online education into their curriculum. This is because a study commissioned by the U.S. Department of Education has shown that students who took online classes “performed better, on average, than those taking the same course through traditional face-to-face instruction.” Furthermore, blending online and face-to-face elements had larger advantage than solely online instruction. The DOD has embraced blended education and service members tend to be comfortable with this style of training.

A robust and improved FAO program could draw increase the recruiting of specialized talent into the ROTC program as well as the Total Force FAO corps. There is a sizable supply of civilian students with international relations and political science degrees who might be interested in alternatives to the Foreign Service, think tanks or other non-governmental organizations as a career path. The generous compensation coupled with a fully funded undergraduate and graduate education, extensive language training, and the ability to continue foreign policy by other means could entice our future military leaders abroad.

Utilize the Total Force

The Reserve and Guard are often seen as the bridge between the country’s military professions with civil society. These citizen airmen, soldiers, sailors and marines live and work with ordinary Americans. They work for the U.S. Congress, State Department, Commerce Department, investment banks on Wall Street, multinational corporations and technology firms in Silicon Valley. Furthermore, these reservists and guardsmen speak many languages and have lived overseas. These reserve component members tend to be older and more experienced than their active duty counterparts. Why don’t we leverage this intellectual capital in the realm of Foreign Area Officers? During a crisis, the military simply cannot afford to wait years to develop a new FAO. After devoting over a quarter of a million dollars to train a Foreign Area Officer, maximizing return on that investment should be a priority.

Reserve Component members give our armed forces access to these highly specialized skills that would prove too expensive for the services to sustain. Less than a third of our young high school graduates are eligible for military service and fewer service members are transitioning into the Reserve Component. According to a RAND study, of the 430,000 master’s degrees conferred in the U.S. in 1998, fewer than 1,700 were in the international affairs area. Furthermore, when the Pentagon needs to attract them, often on very short notice, it may not need to retain them for their entire career. This makes keeping and leveraging Reserve component FAO skills even more imperative.

Recommendations

If the past decade of persistent conflict has taught us anything, it is that ignorance and lies are the greatest enemies and the most relevant threats to our national security and to the security and prosperity of the world. We must become deft warriors in a volatile intellectual market. In the present climate we must influence, not control; convince, not coerce; inspire, not rebuke; and we must launch better ideas than those promulgated by our foes.

Today’s operations demand a much greater degree of language and regional expertise requiring years of training and education, as well as greater cultural adaptability. Admiral Stavridis highlighted an important shift in strategic focus by the President as reflected in the Afpak Hands program. The program demands consistent and persistent regional engagement underscoring the reality that peace is the result of understanding and will likely not be achieved “down the barrel of a gun.” Admiral Stavridis advocates for a blueprint one step ahead of my recommendations; he believes that the intensely focused Afpak Hands model can be duplicated in other regions of the world such as Latin America, Eastern Europe and Africa.

About the Author

Colonel William Bridgemohan, USAFR, is a Manhattan College ROTC graduate with a BBA in Public Accounting from Pace University, MBA from the University of Michigan, and Masters of International Service from American University. Colonel Bridgemohan serves as Chief, International Engagement Program at Headquarters United States Air Force.
“News from the Field”
Missed Opportunities to Build Goodwill
We Should Use Strategic Gift-Giving to Build Our Partnerships

BY LIEUTENANT JOSHUA AISEN, U.S NAVY

“You’re joking, right?” The European Command (EUCOM) resources officer, with a half-smirk, asked as though he wasn’t sure whether he was in on the gag.

It was a fair question. On that day in October 2012, we were getting close to the budget calamity known as “sequestration,” and every expenditure was subject to a high (and rising) degree of scrutiny. I had just arrived in Stuttgart, Germany, for the EUCOM’s annual Regional Working Group. I had traveled there from the NATO Maritime Interdiction Operations Training Center (NMIOTC) in Souda Bay, Crete, where I, alongside the NMIOTC team, had put the finishing touches on a 7-nation tactical interdiction event scheduled to take place that December.

Part of our planning was counting the costs associated with the event and identifying the funding sources available to meet these costs. We had jumped through the necessary hoops and rigorously justified hundreds of thousands of dollars of expenses in travel, lodging, food, and training materials. We had a hard time, though, finding the right funding source for our last expense category: gifts. We had planned for each participant to leave with assorted mementos of the event – a t-shirt, a ball cap, a pen, and a satchel, all at a total cost of about 30 Euros per person. As the leading organizer of the event, I also wanted to present gifts to each country’s delegation and to our hosts, the Greek Navy.

But when I asked the EUCOM resource officer which funding stream to use for gifts, he thought I was joking and, when he understood that I wasn’t, literally laughed in my face: “We don’t have money to waste on those kinds of things! You should know better than that!” He was partially right: I understood that there was funding set aside for gifts and mementos under the Official Representation Funds (ORF). But ORF only applies to high-ranking officials (O-6 or above, in most cases), which left it unavailable for my working-level event. Maybe he meant that I should have recognized the futility of asking for money in that budgetary environment. Or maybe he thought I should have joined with much of the federal government in pretending that the “optics” of gifts as “wasteful” are more important than their actual potential effect.

But he – and all of us – are wrong if we consider money spent on gifts to be a waste.

When we engage in multi-lateral exercises, training, or conferences, the actual increase in cooperative operational proficiency is usually a very small portion of the benefit to the United States. This is especially true when we work with partners on an irregular or ad hoc basis with a low likelihood that the people participating in the training will be the same personnel in any future combined operations. We conduct these events, however, because of the very large potential benefits of positively influencing individuals: people who are or will be leaders in their organizations. To create these positive impressions and capture the associated benefits to U.S. interests, gifts should not be an afterthought, but a focal point in our planning process.

A large part of the reasoning behind this is simply intuitive: although the NMIOTC event I planned was made possible by U.S. funding, I still felt deeply embarrassed when, at the close of the week, sailors from every country presented gifts to us and each other. Other, individual gifts had been presented earlier in the week. When the United States, with a per capita GDP between four and fifteen times higher than those of our counterparts, is the sole participant that refuses to fund gifts at a major international event, it reflects neither power nor generosity – both key attributes of valued allies.

We should reconsider carefully our choice to create such negative personal impressions. Dr. Julia Minson, a behavioral psychologist and assistant professor of public policy at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, points out that in many cultures it is unbelievable that one would come to a meeting or major event without a display of generosity or hospitality. By not specifically planning for gifts, we run the risk of giving away any gains that we hope to achieve by staging the event in the first place.

Furthermore, while we spend large sums of money to conduct international exercises with the goal of improving the capability of allied forces to act in concert with us, we can also use gifts (at a comparatively much lower cost) to increase their willingness to work with us. Dr. Minson points out there is a large body of research that suggests strongly that gift-giving leads to reciprocity, either in terms of gifts or collaborative actions. While ORF is targeted at high-ranking officials, creating goodwill among the rank-and-file is also a worthwhile pursuit. It
is plain that if the majority of military personnel in a country are favorably disposed to the U.S., it creates an environment where it is more difficult for their leadership to be uncooperative or hostile to U.S. interests.

How do we create that environment? We start with mugs on desktops or a pen offered to a colleague – conversation starters and tangible reminders of cooperation and camaraderie.

A main objective of international training events is to provide a hopeful glimpse of a possible future scenario in which we are working side-by-side with our allied forces. We not only want our partners to work with us, though. We want them to strive to be us! This is bedrock principle in U.S. foreign relations: The whole world will be better off if everyone lives under a democratic government, works within a market-based economic system, and has their military governed by civilians and the rule of law. In every interaction, then, with our partner nations, we show them an example of how we want them to shape their future. Our partners are no strangers to tight budget environments and complicated bureaucratic requirements, but we defeat ourselves if the vision of the future offered by the mighty U.S. Navy is one where restrictions on funding are so onerous that even basic cultural niceties cannot be observed.

About the Author
Lieutenant Joshua Aisen is a Navy Foreign Area Officer specializing in the EUCOM AOR. His past assignments include desk officer for Romania, Bulgaria, and Georgia at Naval Forces Europe in Naples, Italy. While at NAVEUR, he also directed the Eurasia Partnership Program. He has a BA in International Relations from Brigham Young University and will finish a Master in Public Administration from Harvard University in May 2016.
The FAOs in training and senior FAOs in the Monterey Bay area came to the events for a fine evening of FAO networking and mentoring.

The FAO Association also sponsored a continental breakfast at each course for JFAOC attendees, which has become a standard part of the Joint FAO Orientation course. In January two members of the Association Board of Governors, Journal content editor Colonel John Haseman, U.S. Army (retired) and FAOA local representative Colonel Mark Chakwin U.S. Army (retired) provided an orientation on the Association including its history, its missions, and its programs—with a special focus on the FAOA Journal of International Affairs. At the June breakfast Colonel Chakwin spoke about the Association's history, and learned about the programs that FAOA sponsors to promote the Foreign Area Officer profession.

Also in June, Colonel Chakwin presented the FAOA writing award for Excellence in International Affairs to Major Amy Roznowski, U.S. Marine Corps. Major Roznowski is a FAO and was recognized for her exceptional thesis during the Naval Postgraduate School's Summer Graduation Awards Program.

This year the FAO Association will help improve the FAO professional programs on the Monterey Peninsula with several initiatives including the two mentioned above. This is important since, as officers graduate from the Defense Language Institute or from the Naval Postgraduate School, professional activities need to be restarted or refreshed. Our Association is a positive influence in developing, and sustaining a focus on the profession, even while the acceding FAO and RAS officers complete their academic and language studies at the Peninsula schools.
FAOS ENJOY AN EVENING OF NETWORKING AT CANNERY ROW

FAOS ON TAP
TURKEY
A MISUNDERSTOOD ALLY

By Major Jeff Jager, U.S. Army

Editor’s Note: In the interest of space we publish this version of Major Jager’s essay without the author’s research notes. The full essay with research notes will be published to FAOA.org

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed are those of the author and not necessarily the positions of the U.S. Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Colonel Chris William Chronis, in his article “Is Turkey Slipping Out of the West’s Orbit” in the fall 2015 issue of International Affairs, describes the “Islamification of Turkish politics” and “the rise of political Islam” in Turkey, two extremely important concepts in regard to understanding Turkey on the domestic and international stage. Such topics being highlighted by the editors of International Affairs through publishing articles like Colonel Chronis’ and recognizing his work through the Foreign Area Officers Association’s U.S. Army War College Writing Award will hopefully serve to open discussion in U.S. military and policy-making circles about Turkey’s role as a key U.S. ally and the challenges faced in aligning U.S. and Turkish interests to achieve mutually desired objectives. Colonel Chronis and International Affairs should be congratulated for pursuing and promoting research in this critical subject area. At the same time, counter-perspectives on Turkey exist, and these should be considered when assessing Turkey as a critical regional and global player.

Response to “Is Turkey Slipping Out of the West’s Orbit”

As a summary, Colonel Chronis argues that “Turkey will no doubt look to the east” in response to mixed messages from the U.S. and a cold shoulder from the European Union. To counter this inevitable development, the U.S. should primarily be concerned with developing a Turkish military officer corps that “may one day re-assert itself domestically as a secular, educated, pro-western bulwark against anti-western sentiment and the rise of political Islam.” It appears that the author suggests that in order to align Turkey with U.S. interests in the future, the Turkish military might have to topple the democratically elected Turkish government in yet another coup. Such a policy could not be farther from the Western, democratic values the U.S. professes and promotes. However, policy recommendations based on the diplomacy, information, military, and economic (DIME) power construct that follow, such as promoting Turkey’s accession to the European Union, expanding Turkey’s role in international economic organizations, substantially increasing bilateral U.S.-Turkey trade, promoting a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), and increasing military cooperation, would likely contribute to enhanced relations between Turkey, the EU, and the U.S. However, to guard against the likelihood of Turkey fleeing east to Russia, China, and Iran, they are neither necessary nor sufficient.

Adding the inflammatory descriptor of “Islamic” to the name of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), or by suggesting that the Muslim Brotherhood had political power or influence in Turkey during the early 1920s when in fact Hassan al-Banna did not found the Muslim Brotherhood until 1928, provides the reader the opportunity to conclude that Erdogan abandoned the “secular, pro-western nation with European customs, habits, and culture” that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the modern Republic of Turkey, pursued.

This bias prevails throughout the essay, even as it questions but does not answer, what the meaning of Islam is for Turkey. Like many U.S. observers, the essay’s author both acknowledges Turkey’s demographic reality—that it is 99.8% Sunni Muslim—and then derides Turkish politics for reflecting this fact. The role of Islam in Turkish politics and society is a fascinating topic that the article barely discusses—even though it seems to form its entire approach to how the U.S. should view Turkey. But the approach at biasing the audience with creative nuance pales in comparison to the problems with the article’s insinuation to implement a coup-centric policy recommendation.

The article laments the loss of U.S. influence with Turkey...
and argues that “far from acting like the Cold War era ‘puppet’ of the West, Turkey became more independent, defiant, and often uncooperative.” The policy recommendations provided, though, do not take this reality into account. The plethora of anti-AKP scholars and writers that work in Washington and influence U.S. politics harken back to the good old days of the Cold War when the balance of power placed countries in the U.S./NATO/West, Soviet, or non-aligned camp and futilely wish for a return to such a setting in which the U.S. exerted substantial influence over those in the U.S./NATO/West camp. From the evidence supplied in “Is Turkey Slipping Out of the

**POPULAR CALLS FOR NATO TO CONSIDER EXPELLING TURKEY FROM THE NATO ALLIANCE NOT ONLY MISUNDERSTAND THE MECHANICS OF HOW MULTINATIONAL ENTITIES FUNCTION... BUT ALSO SUGGEST A MYOPIC WORLDVIEW**

West’s Orbit,” including Turkey’s rejection of U.S. desires to open a northern front in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Turkey’s economic relationship with Iran, and the Turkey-Israel relationship, the essay acknowledges that Turkey “will do what is in the best interests of Turkey, and this may from time to time put it at odds with the EU, NATO, the U.S., and Israel.”

The degree to which academic work describes or predicts actual observable events provides an indicator of its quality. Especially in the disciplines of international relations and security studies, the value of researched writing often emerges based on how influential an argument or perspective becomes, or how accurately a piece describes past and present developments or predicts future real-world events. George Kennan and containment would not be immediately recognized in academic circles if his work had not accurately described the environment in the post-World War II era and provided an accurate blueprint for how the ensuring decades might unfold. Using this perspective as a benchmark helps one understand some of the issues with the policy recommendations and perspectives presented in “Is Turkey Slipping Out of the West’s Orbit.” While the article may have been quite different had it been written after (and not before) certain events transpired in 2015 and 2016, the fact that its policy recommendations have not withstood the test of time is telling. There is little chance of Turkey turning to China, Russia, or Iran. Turkey is now engaged in the counter-ISIL fight, and Israel-Turkey relations are on the mend.

The “threat” of Turkey turning to Russia (if such a possibility ever existed, given the historic animosity between the two entities) evaporated on 24 November 2015 when Turkey shot down a Russian fighter jet that violated Turkish airspace despite repeated warnings to change course. Russian rhetoric and actions in response to this incident have contributed to heightened tensions between Turkey and Russia, and Russia and NATO. Russian economic sanctions on Turkey threaten key parts of Turkey’s economy, including tourism, agriculture, and construction. Diurnally opposed Turkish and Russian perspectives regarding Syria, with Russia backing President Bashar al-Assad and Turkey advocating his removal, suggest continued Turkish-Russian tension in at least the near-term and likely beyond.

While Turkey remains relatively dependent on Russia for natural gas, even this ever-so-important aspect of the bilateral Turkey-Russia relationship has been impacted by the 24 November 2015 shoot-down, with President Erdogan pledging in early December 2015 to “break his country’s dependence on the Kremlin’s oil and gas.” Multilateral relations between Russia and Turkey seemed headed towards formalization under Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) agreements earlier in the decade, as Turkey became a dialogue partner country of the SCO in April 2013. President Erdogan visited China in July 2015 and Russia in September 2015, with both visits inspiring commentary and discussion regarding the chance of Turkey joining the SCO. Following the downing of the Russian fighter jet by Turkey and subsequent developments between Russia and Turkey, regionally, and with Russia as a member of the SCO, however, any chance of Turkey joining the SCO also disappeared.

Regarding Iran, alleged Turkish circumvention of UN sanctions and clear Turkish opposition to EU sanctions (U.S. and EU sanctions clearly would not limit Turkey; Turkey implemented the letter of UN sanctions) now seem quite quaint, given the overarching nuclear deal with Iran. Iran is emerging into the world economy following the lifting of UN, EU, and U.S. sanctions due to the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Global powers are establishing strong economic ties with Iran. Turkey is in compliance with UN sanctions leading up to and during negotiations with Iran. Turkish insistence that EU and U.S. sanctions were not legally binding on Turkey, and the developing Iran-Turkey economic relationship all appear to be on the level, with perhaps Turkish support for Iran in the UN Security Council assisting in the culmination of the comprehensive nuclear deal that forms a substantial component of U.S. regional policy.

The downturn in Turkish-Israeli relations is now on the mend, making the 2010-2015 period an anomaly in the bilateral relationship during the AKP era. Israel apologized for the Mavi Marmara incident. As explained by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Israeli apology led to the official normalization of relations between Turkey and Israel, continuing the tradition established when Turkey was among the first nations to recognize Israel in 1948. Although perspectives of Turkey and
Israel about Palestine diverge and create tension in the bilateral relationship, a convergence in Israeli and Turkish regional objectives exists on topics as varied as Syria, Iran’s nuclear program, and instability in Iraq. Economic ties between the two states, with trade reaching a record $5.44 billion in 2014, underscore the importance of the bilateral relationship, especially in an era in which Turkey is looking to diversify export and import partners following Russian sanctions after the 24 November 2015 shoot-down of the Russian jet.

Since the summer of 2015, Turkey has been cooperating with the U.S. and others in the counter-ISIL fight. As with the vast majority of issues in which the U.S. has requested Turkish support, Turkey responded positively to U.S. requests to allow use of Incirlik Air Base in southeast Turkey for operations against the Islamic State. As explained by U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter during his visit to Incirlik Air Base in December 2015, the U.S. welcomed the additional steps Turkey has taken against the Islamic State and was appreciative of the special and difficult role Turkey played in the counter-ISIL fight given its geographic location. The deal reached with Turkey for use of Incirlik Air Base to launch attacks against the Islamic State underscores Turkey’s willingness to cooperate with the United States, when doing so also serves Turkish interests. This most recent development at Incirlik Air Base is but one in a long arch of historical Turkish support for U.S. objectives, given the history of the use of Turkey’s air base as a staging and launching point for a bevy of critical missions—including operations during the Cold War, no-fly zone operations in Iraq, and support of U.S. operations in Iraq after 2003. While Turkish and U.S. timelines may not always align, as exemplified by Turkey’s delayed entrance into counter-ISIL operations and hesitancy to support U.S. operations in Iraq in 2003, in numerous examples over the last three decades Turkey has supported U.S. regional objectives from Incirlik Air Base.

These global and regional developments and adjustments likely are not fleeting; while no one has perfect insight into the future, the likelihood of substantial positive change in the Turkey-Russia bilateral relationship seems minute. There is no chance of Turkey partnering with Russia, China, Iran, or the SCO in a way that risks Turkey’s anchoring in security, economic, and political organizations the U.S. values so dearly.

**What Should Be Done?**

This being the case, what should policymakers and defense professionals understand about Turkey, and what policy options should be pursued?

Above all else, Turkey first and foremost should be understood as a country that prides itself on its independence and is not likely easily swayed by arguments that are not in its best interest. Turkey is no longer a “puppet” of the U.S. (if it ever truly was), and Turkey will act in realist terms to pursue options it believes are in its best interest. Turkey’s “Sèvres Syndrome,” born out of the end of the First World War and the envisioned dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire by the Allies in the Treaty of Sèvres, creates a special sense of paranoia in Turkey regarding foreign interest and/or involvement in Turkey, exacerbating tendencies to pursue its national interests above other considerations. While Turkey may consider the desires of its Allies and partners, Turkish national interests (as Colonel Chronis rightly notes) are likely to diverge from U.S., EU, and NATO interests. This does not mean Turkey is a bad, challenging, or unwilling ally or partner; it simply means that Turkey’s partners should treat Turkey as an equal, and not as a “puppet” whose strings can be pulled to induce action.

This perspective applies to our other foreign partners, as well. The U.S. acting as though it is in a position to absolutely dictate terms to other sovereign states does not provide policymakers a functional or sustainable strategic platform from which to operate. In today’s multipolar world, our foreign partners, formal allies, and both declared and undeclared foes -- smaller, less powerful, or poorer though they may be -- do get a vote in our bilateral or multilateral relationships. They will pursue their own interests, at times regardless of U.S. positions or in opposition to U.S. interests. Ignoring this basic tenet leads to a zero-sum focus that precludes a real strategic approach to moving forward together on aligning interests on truly important objectives.

On 1 March 2003, the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) rejected by a vote of 264 to 250 (with 19 abstentions) the bill offered by the ruling AKP that would have authorized the deployment of U.S. forces to northern Iraq via Turkish air and ground bases, as well as the deployment of Turkish military forces in support of the Coalition. This prevented Turkey from participating in the invasion, blocked U.S. desires for a northern route, and terminated U.S. air operations at Incirlik Air base in southern Turkey. In the weeks and months following the initial invasion, Turkey did contribute to the Coalition in a variety of ways, most significantly by opening its airspace to the U.S., but the parliamentary decision of 1 March 2003 has largely led to a definition of Turkey’s role as non-supportive of
the U.S.-led Coalition in the second Iraq War.

This characterization exemplifies an anachronistic perspective and represents the second important required adjustment in perspective regarding Turkey. This applies especially to the U.S.—policymakers and writers should move on from criticizing Turkey for not granting the U.S. permission to open a northern front via Turkey during the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Such perspectives generally omit mention of the substantial support Turkey did provide to the U.S.-led coalition before, during, and after the 2003 invasion. Characterizations such as “the fact that a NATO ally and U.S. client state with deep military ties extending back decades would obstruct the U.S. invasion of Iraq seemed unimaginable” provide an example of the conventional wisdom on this topic in U.S. policymaking and defense circles. This focus on Turkey pursuing its own interests in 2003 also conveniently ignores that Turkey was not the only NATO Ally to disagree with the 2003 invasion (“freedom fries,” anyone?). In hindsight, perhaps the region would have been better off if the U.S. Congress had joined the Turkish Parliament in opposing the war. This 2003 decision by Turkey continues to reverberate in policymaking and academic circles as evidence that Turkey is not a reliable partner; instead of this perspective, this example should be considered as evidence that Turkey will pursue its national interests above all else.

Many Turkey observers argue that U.S. and NATO influence within the Turkish Armed Forces has declined recently, primarily due to the “rise of Erdogan and his subsequent removal of hundreds of pro-western Turkish officers.” While “the purge” of the officer corps removed substantial numbers of senior officers from the military for alleged coup-plotting, this and related developments exemplify the maxim that “all politics is local.” This event centered on domestic political infighting likely linked to the ongoing struggle between the AKP and the Gülenists (the latter are not mentioned in “Is Turkey Slipping Out of the West’s Orbit” or generally understood by anyone other than experts in Turkish affairs, despite the enormous influence Gülen has in Turkey). The vast majority of officers convicted were freed in 2014, a move backed by President Erdogan, due to a flawed initial trial and potential Gülen influence with the prosecutorial process. At any rate, U.S. and NATO influence is still extremely important with the Turkish military.

As Colonel Chronis astutely notes, one area “where U.S.-Turkish relations have come closest to realizing their strategic potential is in the area of military cooperation, both within the framework of NATO and bilaterally.” Foreign military sales (FMS) are robust and increasing, and the International Military Education and Training (IMET) is an important military cooperation program that the Turks fully take advantage of. With Turkey a full partner in the F-35 project, it is unclear how much more involved they could become. Furthermore, military cooperation in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Kosovo, and elsewhere demonstrates Turkey’s continued prioritization of its military relationship with NATO, the EU, and the U.S. Colonel Chronis accurately notes that as conditions have changed with advancements in the Turkish economy and defense industrial base, Turkey has become less dependent on U.S. weapons systems. Yet bilateral defense trade still provides the U.S. substantial influence. While general economic trade data provides some indicator of the advanced state of relations between the U.S. and Turkey, information on the importance of bilateral defense trade significantly indicates that, even as strength in the Turkish defense industry has emerged, U.S. influence has held steady. The U.S. is still Turkey’s major source of international arms, military equipment, training, and partnership; other NATO partners are Turkey’s other main partners.

Popular calls for NATO to consider expelling Turkey from the NATO Alliance not only misunderstand the mechanics of how multinational entities function (Turkey, as founding member of NATO, has a veto on all NATO activities so it is not clear how such a process could even unfold) but also suggest a myopic worldview in which the current crisis in Syria and Iraq outweighs the value demonstrated across more than six decades that an ally such as Turkey provides. As Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL Brett McGurk noted on 23 February 2016 regarding the fight against the Islamic State, “we can’t succeed in this without Turkey.” Even though Turkey focuses primarily on its national interests, the U.S. and NATO still matter in the Turkish military—a lot. Policymakers should remember this, and seek engagement and cooperation on projects and programs of shared interest.

For Turkey, one potential area of shared interest is the fight against terrorism. Turkey, the United States, and the European Union officially characterize the PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, or Kurdish Worker’s Party) as a terrorist organization. Turkey has been conducting counterterrorist operations against the PKK for four decades. Since July 2015, Turkey has conducted renewed counterterrorist operations in southeast Turkey to combat PKK activities against the state and the population. The Kurdish issue and the fight against the PKK is perhaps the most important domestic issue in Turkey. This is a common omission in the U.S. American academics, policy makers, and politicians rally against ISIL and al Qaeda and the like, but cannot conceive that Turkey’s operations in the southeast are counterterrorist operations, even given U.S. categorization of the PKK as a terrorist organization. Publications like The Wall Street Journal (which recently inaccurately stated that a de facto Kurdish state exists in southeast Turkey and was under assault by the Turkish military) lend to this mindset. Recognizing that Turkey is in the midst of fighting a declared terrorist organization, and offering substantial public support and sympathy, would go a long way towards improving relations with Turkey. Vice President Biden did this exactly during his January 2016 visit to Istanbul, perhaps marking an adjustment in messaging at the highest levels of the U.S. Government. Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper’s statement of 9 February 2016 on the Worldwide Threat Assessment also reflects this adjustment and is worth quoting at length:

“Ankara will continue to see the Kurdistan Workers’
Party (PKK) as its number one security threat and will maintain military and political pressure on the PKK, as well as on the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its armed affiliate People’s Protection Units (YPG), which Turkey equates with the PKK. Turkey is extremely concerned about the increasing influence of the PYD and the YPG along its borders, seeing them as a threat to its territorial security and its efforts to control Kurdish separatism within its borders.”

The Kurdistan Freedom Falcons’ (TAK, Teyrêbazén Azadiya Kurdistan) attack against buses carrying military personnel on 17 February 2016 in Ankara underlines the deteriorating security situation in Turkey and exemplifies how Turkey views Kurdish groups such as TAK, PYD, and YPG under the PKK umbrella, with Turkish officials characterizing TAK as a front group for PKK attacks. The 17 February attack occurred in the heart of Ankara, within meters of the Turkish General Staff Headquarters, the headquarters of all the military services, and the Turkish Grand National Assembly in an area nearly equivalent to Capitol Hill in Washington, DC, if West Point and the Pentagon were also located there. That carries a qualitatively different meaning for Turks and Turkey than the terrorist attacks of 20 July 2015 in Suruç, 10 October 2015 in Ankara, and 12 January 2016 in Istanbul.

In addition to the societal acclimation to tourists and civilians dying in these terror attacks in 2015 and 2016, Turkey is unfortunately accustomed to its security forces personnel being killed by Kurds in southeast Turkey, with almost 277 killed in action between 20 July 2015 and 10 February 2016, and hundreds more wounded. The 17 February attack in Ankara, though, in an area long thought to be safe given the enormous security presence and precautions taken in the area, has shaken Turkish society in a way not completely unlike the impact of 11 September on the American psyche. Regarding the security situation, the feeling is that “Turkey is slowly becoming Afghanistan.”

**Conclusion**

As with some senior military leaders, policymakers, scholars, and throngs of social media users, “Is Turkey Slipping Out of the West’s Orbit” ascribes attributes of “the Other” to Turks and Turkey. For many, perhaps it is difficult to recognize similarities and shared values and easier to focus on differences; perhaps Samuel Huntington is to blame for this. For example, after the 10 October bombings in Ankara, little outpouring of sympathy for Turkish victims could be found anywhere. Meanwhile, victims of other contemporaneous attacks (Paris, San Bernardino, Beirut) were mourned on social media sites, from use of the Tricolor as profile photo backgrounds to public statements by officials that condemned the Paris and San Bernardino terrorist attacks but omitted mention of the Ankara attack.

Such perspectives have a negative impact on the relationships with Turks and Turkey. Try, for example, explaining the bevy of Republican presidential candidates calling for a total ban on Muslim immigrants and visitors to the U.S. From the Turkish Foreign Minister to Turks I meet here in Ankara, such comments and perspectives are offensive and harmful to relations. The community of practice and interest in Turkish affairs would be better served by focusing on shared values—be they economic, legal, military, historical, etc.—than on ascribed attributes that highlight differences. This is perhaps the most important recommendation that can be made in regards to improving relations with Turkey. Combining this with a greater understanding of the need to conceive of Turkey as an equal partner primarily focused on pursuing its own interest, a recognition of the continued primacy of importance of the U.S., NATO, and the EU in Turkish foreign affairs, and increased sensitivity to and support for Turkey’s fight against the PKK terrorist organization would likely increase and improve the already advanced state of the U.S.-Turkey bilateral relationship and contribute to an even greater level of cooperation on moving forward together on aligning interests on truly important strategic objectives.

**About the Author:**

Major Jeff Jager is a European FAO with Turkish as a control language. He commissioned as an infantry officer from the United States Military Academy in 2000, commanded two infantry companies during “the Surge” in Baghdad in 2007-2008, and was selected as a FAO in 2008. He holds an Associate of Arts degree in Turkish from the Defense Language Institute, a certification as an Army Intermediate Linguist in Turkish, a Bachelor of Science Degree from West Point, a Masters Degree in Security Studies from the Turkish Army War College, a Masters Degree in German and European Studies and a Graduate Certificate in Eurasian, Russian, and East European Studies from Georgetown University, and a certification as a Defense Strategist from the U.S. Army War College. As a FAO, he served as the Assistant Army Attaché in Cyprus from 2012-2015 (with six months of service as the acting SDO/DATT) and has served as the Training and Doctrine Command Liaison Officer to Turkey since June 2015. He has served overseas for nearly ten of his sixteen years of service, with assignments in Germany, Turkey (twice), and Cyprus and deployments to Kosovo and Iraq (twice). He speaks excellent Turkish and has basic French and Greek language skills.
Unlike other professions, a soldier is judged not only by his rank and professional accomplishments, but also by the demeanor presented by his physical bearing and uniform. “Under dressing” for a military or inter-governmental situation can cause the same relative success as one might expect from a junior executive in his best polo shirt pitching a new idea to the chairman of the board or CEO of a large company.

It is commonly understood in the current culture of business today that proper attire can make or break a job interview or be critical towards securing a contract. Similarly, the U.S. Department of State advises its foreign service personnel that “through tradition and usage, diplomats have come to wear certain kinds of clothes for certain occasions,” further cautioning them that in many parts of the world in which they will serve, “informal dress” equates to business dress. This should be a concept easily and universally understood by our U.S. military professionals.

Unfortunately, in reality, U.S. military personnel sometimes fall short in this regard, and in the process “cheapen our brand.” When Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) fail in this protocol, or fail to advise other senior U.S. military leaders meeting with foreign defense personnel of the value placed upon proper uniform attire, it adds needless hurdles – and worse, embarrassment and loss of face. When FAOs engage with foreign militaries/nationals, correct dress is important as a sign of respect. Initial impressions matter to success at the table, and what one wears is a big part of that success, especially when dealing with cultures that place a premium on appearance, decorum and demeanor. When advancing our national strategic objectives, even the small details must be measured and attended to towards this end.

The paramount importance of cultural awareness and understanding for the military professional extends far beyond the boundaries of the counterinsurgency environment. Winning the “hearts and minds” has always been as much a goal of military observers – modern day FAOs – as it has been of those warriors interacting with indigenous peoples. The organized uniforming of militaries stems from the post-Westphalian establishment of a system of internally ordered, independent states. The uniform is, in effect, the stamp of ownership the sovereign puts on his army, and this stamp renders the external quality of what they do, attributable to the sovereign rather than to the individual. Just as military customs and courtesies require all military personnel to render salutes to senior foreign military officers as a sign of professional courtesy and respect, such officers must also wear appropriate uniforms in the same vein of courtesy and respect in their daily military-to-military and military-to-civil diplomatic engagements. To do less needlessly stymies rapport building, and can easily appear as a cultural affront to the very people FAOs are tasked to court.

In 2012, I had the honor of being part of a military team that liaised with a central African nation’s army. In anticipation of this mission, I researched the host nation’s uniforms, and concluded

One French officer I met on this trip shared his thoughts:

“Wearing the same kind of uniform reinforces of course the cohesion of any teams and, as a consequence, contributes to the same purpose. Wearing a different kind of uniform is an indication of differences regarding the spirit, the objectives and the methods used to reach them. As such, it contributes to create a gap. Wearing field uniforms points out to the very operational character of any military organizations.”
that meetings would be held in their equivalent of the U.S. Marine Corps’ service uniform, which consists of green and khaki colors. It is roughly equivalent in function and composition to a business suit, and is the prescribed uniform when making official visits and calls on American and foreign dignitaries, defense officials, and military officers. I was accompanied on the trip by a fellow U.S. military officer from a sister service. This officer, however, chose to wear his service’s battle dress uniform to the meetings. From the outset, it was quite clear that due to our different levels of uniformed attire, the host-nation officers viewed us differently and as a result treated us differently. It was much easier for me to build rapport as a result of being similarly and properly attired for the occasion and level of interaction.

Similarly, on a recent trip to NATO Headquarters, it was disappointing to observe U.S. Army FAOs wearing their Army Combat Uniforms (ACUs) amidst foreign officers who were all sporting “Dress B” equivalents and civilian staff wearing traditional business attire. These U.S. Army FAOs were the only personnel in the impressively large dining facility in field uniforms. One French officer I met on this trip shared his thoughts:

“Wearing the same kind of uniform reinforces of course the cohesion of any teams and, as a consequence, contributes to the same purpose. Wearing a different kind of uniform is an indication of differences regarding the spirit, the objectives and the methods used to reach them. As such, it contributes to create a gap. Wearing field uniforms points out to the very operational character of any military organizations.”

This difference in attire reflects a difference in focus and approach, which militates against the unity of effort that is the strategic center of gravity of the Atlantic Alliance.

The 2012 U.S. Army Military Attaché Guide states, “Wearing of the uniform is a symbol that the visit is officially sanctioned by both nations. Additionally, it ensures that U.S. military personnel will render the Military Attaché proper military courtesy.” Similarly, Army Regulation 614–10 governing the “Army Military Personnel Exchange Program with Military Services of Other Nations” states, “The order of dress for any occasion will be that which most conforms to the order of dress of the particular host.” Perhaps these general requirements should also include the guidance that FAOs should pay particular attention to wearing the U.S. equivalent class of uniform as their foreign peers and host nation counterparts when conducting business with them and as the occasion requires.

Put another way, the dress for the occasion should always be the U.S. military uniform equivalent to the foreign military uniform. Naval custom has long required that an officer on an official foreign visit “shall wear the uniform prescribed . . . opposite the grade of the senior to whom the visit is made.” As one senior U.S. Navy FAO succinctly stated, “This makes it easy.” It should apply to all military services equally and across the board as well.

To the European mind, the idea of a military officer serving as a uniformed diplomat is not alien. In many of the nations in which FAOs are privileged to serve, a strong colonial history exists that deeply influenced the design of their military fashions. In the post-colonial era, many of these newly independent countries nevertheless copied or retained the uniform style reminiscent of their previous colonial masters, and therefore strongly reflected French and British military traditions. This influence tends to more often than not lean toward more formality than is currently the similar U.S. military standard.

Any command that engages in inter-agency coordination or has military officers employed performing staff tasks and missions should be wearing the appropriate uniform of the day or business suit equivalent. American officers, and specifically FAOs, should not represent the United States of America in their service’s field uniform while serving in a staff position with Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) from the U.S. State Department. This is an issue of professionalism and protocol, not only with our allied counterparts, but also with those within our own government from other departments and agencies.

The camouflage or field uniform is a combat uniform and should only be reserved for combat or field-specific use. In a diplomatic context, as one former diplomat stated, it is “off-putting.” If FAOs are to be taken seriously as “uniformed diplomats” (FAOs are usually given full diplomatic status by the host country, but not always – it depends on the billet and duties involved.), it seems not only inappropriate but also counterproductive to our purposes to attend events in a uniform normally reserved for combat. When having a diplomatic exchange outside of a combat or field environment, even if that exchange is in a politico-military context, the formality of a FAO’s uniform should mirror his foreign

**“THE UNIFORM MAKES FOR BROTHERHOOD, SINCE WHEN UNIVERSALLY ADOPTED IT COVERS UP ALL DIFFERENCES OF CLASS AND COUNTRY.”**

SIR ROBERT BADEN-POWELL, LIEUTENANT GENERAL, BRITISH ARMY (1857-1941)

The camouflage or field uniform is a combat uniform and should only be reserved for combat or field-specific use. In a diplomatic context, as one former diplomat stated, it is “off-putting.” If FAOs are to be taken seriously as “uniformed diplomats” (FAOs are usually given full diplomatic status by the host country, but not always – it depends on the billet and duties involved.), it seems not only inappropriate but also counterproductive to our purposes to attend events in a uniform normally reserved for combat. When having a diplomatic exchange outside of a combat or field environment, even if that exchange is in a politico-military context, the formality of a FAO’s uniform should mirror his foreign
military and/or civilian counterparts. One current, experienced FAO acknowledged his “biggest issue with the State Department is that they do not take us [FAOs, POLADS] seriously. Dressing the part would help to level the playing field.” Further, a lack of uniform parity is diplomatically awkward. This is de rigueur for general officers, who routinely and rightfully react adversely when their staffs allow them to attend a meeting in a uniform that is different, especially less formal, than their counterpart(s). So, if it’s good for the generals, why would this same standard not also be good for FAOs?

Aristotle wrote, “We like those who resemble us.” Sizing up one’s peers occurs in the rapport-building phase of any relationship, and continues throughout the life of the association. Unfortunately, while we in the U.S. military understand medals and ribbons are not always indicative of accomplishments or merit deserved, they nevertheless function as the storyboard of one’s career, and serve as an immediate credibility builder with foreign military officers. Right or wrong, first impressions are lasting and these military awards also aid in identifying contemporaneous and temporal experiences. In the scenario mentioned previously in central Africa, my service ribbons and war fighting school pins displayed on the “Class B” uniform simultaneously facilitated my foreign hosts’ scrutiny of me as this “new alien” and concurrently aided the establishment of his bona fides in the initial rapport building minutes. As one retired FAO aptly noted, “other countries’ military professionals rightly or wrongly look at one’s warfare pins and ribbons and consciously or subconsciously differentiate him from a ‘desk jockey.’” Absent having worn the proper uniform for this engagement, my subsequent discussions with my foreign counterparts would perhaps not have ensued. Put Socratically, how can you expect to win hearts and minds and gain influence if you refuse to dress to resemble those whom you court, or refuse to do things to help their subconscious want to like you?

Even senior military leaders at the Pentagon realized the inappropriateness of wearing combat uniforms in such environments. In January 2010, then Secretary of Defense Gates told his close aides to ‘ditch the fatigues at the Pentagon,’ and wear more formal uniforms adorned with appropriate combat ribbons and warfare insignia instead. This was extended to all military personnel in October 2011, when a change of policy went into effect requiring formal service uniforms at the Pentagon. One article noted “despite the respect an Army uniform commands in public, some in Washington fall short of treating a soldier in combat attire as an equal.” This same guidance should also be applicable for FAOs worldwide.

This mindset change must come from the most senior levels of our military, however, and especially from the U.S. Army leadership. For example, I was professionally embarrassed in 2008 while attending a speech by then Army Chief of Staff General George Casey at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. General Casey appeared at Harvard in his ACUs before an Ivy League academic audience, a crowd already inclined to anti-military sentiments. The more refined appearance of his class-As would have gone a long way towards bridging a communications gap with those present even before he uttered the first word of his speech. This lack of senior officer observance of commensurate attire is corrosive to healthy civil-military relations. Had General Casey chosen instead to wear his service dress uniform to these events in Harvard, he would most certainly have set a more professional tone for the ensuing discussions with the academic audience with whom he had been invited to meet. In another scenario, one FAO serving as a military attaché related he recently had to intervene with the staff of a US Army major general when they proposed the general wear his ACUs for a visit with his three-star foreign counterpart.

While military fashion and attire has changed over the time, the messages that the proper wear of a military uniform conveys have not. “As a professional, there are certain standards of attire associated with certain activities. Military officers – FAOs in particular – will continue to participate in the formulation and execution of some of the most diverse and critical national security policies and programs as long as national security is a paramount concern to American policy. We can always do it smarter and better. Wear of a more formal uniform appropriate for the occasion and audience is the right thing to do and as a matter of policy should be more actively enforced and directed from senior leadership. Not doing so conveys a lack of sincerity and just plain laziness that can compromise the mission before it even begins. We should not permit a failure to observe proper uniform parity to get in the way of achieving these outcomes just for the sake of comfort. Be smart and make sure we, as FAOs, dress the part!

About the Author:

LTC Wagner, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, is a Foreign Area Officer assigned to AFRICOM. He earned a B.S. in History from the United States Naval Academy, and an M.A. in International Relations from The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. As an infantry officer he has served in defense of The American Embassy in Panama, trained foreign personnel in Croatia, Australia, Argentina, Korea, Japan, Curacao and Iraq. LTC Wagner has also served as a Congressional Liaison Officer for the Marine Corps. He has published articles on military history and counterinsurgencies in Combating Terrorism Exchange, The Journal for the Anglo-Zulu War Historical Society, The Joint Center for Operational Analysis, and Armchair General. His most recent article is entitled “’The Bones of the British Lying in Maiwand Are Lonely’: A Victorian Battle and its Continuing Impact on Afghan Memory,” published by The Marine Corps University Journal in 2012.
As a Foreign Area Officer (FAO), it is vital to overcome conventional thinking and perform alternative analysis. As history has illustrated, understanding that America will face a new archenemy should prompt FAO and intelligence analysts to take deeper looks into their respective regions. America’s next grand adversary could be developing in your region. Major Joseph Royo expounded upon Admiral Eric T. Olson’s concept of “unlit spaces” in his monograph, SOF in Unlit Spaces: Understanding the World’s Dark Spots in the Context of SOF Operational Planning. He wrote, “At first glance, the implication of Admiral Olson’s intention seems obvious; bring light to the darkened spaces. However, some of those spaces will be void of light for the foreseeable future. Some of those spaces are darkened for ecological reasons. Some are void of light for eco-political reasons. Moreover, some are void for reasons related to failed systems of self-determination and development.” Major Royo’s description of unlit spaces describes portions of every FAO’s region, as shown by NASA (see figure 1).

FAOs must be able to identify the unlit spaces of their regions. Identification of these spaces should lead to analysis of the risks within these regions. Analysis, when combined with indications and warnings, will better prepare the nation for the unknown horizons of the future. While the best analysis may not prevent the next adversary from actually becoming an adversary, it may mitigate the risks posed by the adversary. At a time when one viral video has the power to send a shockwave through an entire region, it is imperative for every FAO to prepare for the dark horse actors to come into play.

Experience has taught many lessons throughout the course of American history. It is important to learn from these lessons and codify best practices from these lessons. Simply not repeating the mistakes of the past does not go far enough in adequately learning the lessons history strives to instruct. For the U.S. military, many of these lessons are how we face our enemies in the future. Adversaries evolve over time. Our methods and procedures must anticipate adversarial adaptation to the operating environment. From a national identity, there are uniquely American idiosyncrasies that would, if better understood, allow us to gain greater insight into the types of adversaries the U.S. may face in the future. There are hurdles that prevent analysts and operators alike from being able to forecast the types of adversaries the U.S. may face. Using history as a guide, this article provides justification for overcoming those hurdles. Anticipating future adversaries will ensure the U.S. is postured for future engagements. Foreign Area Officers play a crucial role in helping the government posture against potential and actual adversaries.

While the geopolitical sensitivities of debating American exceptionalism are outside the purpose of this article, a primary assumption of this article is that many different countries, at one point or another, have viewed the U.S. as exceptional. Furthermore, throughout history, many regions of the globe have called upon the U.S. to provide various methods of aid. And by so doing, the U.S. has established a record for coming to the aid of other nations, which further develops this exceptional paradigm. This article also assumes that this paradigm is the natural result of being the world’s only true superpower.

The paradigm of American exceptionalism, when combined with historical precedent, creates a model that applies to forecasting future adversaries. Famed geopolitical theorist Samuel Huntington wrote in the Clash of Civilizations, that simple paradigms, “are indispensable for human thought and action,” and again, “every model…is an abstraction and will be more useful for some purposes than for others.” Additionally, every model, paradigm, and metaphor will suffer from limitations.

American exceptionalism is dependent upon the existence of a primary villain to justify its often-exceptional involvement in foreign affairs. Moreover, if the U.S. is dependent upon a primary adversary to interpolate across the globe, what can its previous adversaries reveal about whom the U.S. might face in the future? Dissecting American history at a macro and somewhat superficial level will illustrate the different adversaries the U.S. has faced in the past, thus paving the way for a model of whom the U.S. may face in the coming decades. History reveals periods where one particular type of enemy was more prominent in the eyes of Americans than others. Throughout American history, there have been multiple distinct adversarial
The American Revolutionary War provides a launching point to begin dissecting American adversarial history. Paradoxically, the type of adversary facing the American colonists prior to the revolution was the same as it was after the revolution. Fighting for independence, American patriots found themselves pitted against one of the world’s great powers. England was fighting to maintain control of its rebellious American colonies. King George III, ever the imperialist, refused to recognize American independence. Eventually the American patriots prevailed and achieved their independence from their colonial rulers. This war initiated the adversarial period where America faced its first type of archenemy. Starting with the American Revolutionary War and ending with World War I, the U.S. found itself in multiple wars fighting against imperialist and colonial powers. For the American Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, and even the American Civil War to some extent, England was the face of the adversary. Germany and its central power allies replaced England as the adversary during World War I. While the enemies changed throughout this period, the U.S. fought wars against imperialist powers for more than 100 years. This marked the first type of adversary for America.

When imperialist aggression against the U.S. abated, it marked the end of a period. America subconsciously sought out the next archenemy. The end of “the war to end all wars” created a permissive environment for fascism to rear its ugly head in the form of the Axis, consisting of Germany, Japan and Italy. This marked the beginnings of an archenemy of “collective Fascism” that would lead into the “Collective Communism” of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact, and to a lesser degree Mao’s China. It is interesting to note that even though Germany was the face of the adversary for two consecutive wars, the type of archenemy Germany represented had morphed with Adolf Hitler’s rise to power.

Before continuing, it is critical to point out that Japan was still an imperial power and that communism, though still infantile, was on its ascendancy during this period. The reign of Nazi fascism, while short-lived when compared to the length of time colonial powers parsed the globe, resulted in terrible consequences for many parts of the world. Whenever America’s archenemy presents itself, American culture tends to vilify the enemy. Making this effect even more pronounced, American’s have the tendency of not being able to think past the current archenemy. It is difficult for Americans to fathom what kind of evil nemesis could replace the current adversary. Yet, every so often, a new enemy arises to take the place of the previous nemesis as the preeminent adversary of the U.S.

Vilifying the adversary occurred on a large scale with the foe that replaced fascism. With the Nazis vanquished, America turned to former allies to fill the void of adversarial evil. Communist Russia was on the rise. Communism was diametrically opposed to the fabric of American society. The period of adversarial communism was unique in a few ways. First, it was fought through proxy wars in many parts of the world, namely Korea and Vietnam. Second, the public vilification of communism was the most pronounced during this period, in the form of McCarthyism. Third, communism ceased being the
archenemy of the U.S. with the fall of the Berlin Wall, a peaceful event, rather than a large-scale decisive military victory. Communism was no longer the primary threat of the U.S. Despite the drastic decline in communism, it did not cease to exist or present itself as a threat to the U.S.

A decade before the fall of the Soviet Union, events of violent Islamic extremism began to occur. This change was evident with the Iranian revolution and was followed by the Lebanese Hizballah bombing of the U.S. Marine Corps Beirut barracks in 1983. These two events were signs of things to come. Of course, it is easier to Monday-morning quarterback world events and think, “we should have seen this coming.” When the reality of the situation is that most did not see the rise of violent Islamic extremism becoming the adversarial problem it is right now. As with the previous periods, Americans vilified and lashed out against terrorism.

The 9/11 attacks on the U.S. solidified violent Islamic extremism’s place as the current and premier adversary for America. Even now, it is difficult for Americans to think of a time in the future when they will not face the threat of this Islamic terrorism. As with the previous archenemies, each generation of Americans views the current archenemy as the end-all-be-all of threats they face. Even more interesting is that this paradigm does not rely on a threat of an existential nature. Multiple wars fought against violent Islamic extremists in the Middle East reinforced this paradigm. Despite Islamic radicalism not presenting an existential threat to America, most intelligence analysts still struggle thinking past the current brand of Islamic-driven terrorism.

Historical trends indicate there will be a new archenemy to replace the current brand of terrorism. Exactly what kind of adversary will replace violent Islamic extremism is unknown; however state and non-state actors alike are striving to put out the lights and create more unlit areas across the globe. Future adversaries could range from cartel-driven narco-terrorism in borderless regions of South and Central America to a resurgence of fascism resulting in large-scale conventional force-on-force conflict. Numerous literary resources address this topic of strategic prediction to varying degrees. This topic continues to warrant further attention. FAOs are in unique positions to be able to search out potentially nefarious actors who may have the capability and intent to become the next primary adversary of the United States.

About the Author

Captain Daniel Sheets is a U.S. Air Force all-source intelligence analyst assigned to U.S. Central Command as a counterterrorism analyst. He holds a Bachelor’s degree in Journalism with an emphasis in Public Relations and dual minors in Mandarin Chinese and Aerospace Studies from Utah State University. More recently he was awarded a Master’s degree in Intelligence Studies and Graduate Certificate in Counterintelligence from American Military University. Captain Sheets hopes to serve the U.S. and the FAO community as an Olmsted Scholar and eventual FAO. His article “Social Media and Open-Source Intelligence Resources for the Modern Foreign Area Officer” appeared in the Summer 2013 issue of your FAO Association Journal of International Affairs.
FAOA would like to thank its corporate members and partners who make it possible to serve the Foreign Area Officer community. To become a FAOA sponsor, please contact president@FAOA.org
When submitting articles, book reviews or letters to the editor for potential publication, please email them as word documents, single spaced, in Times New Roman, size 11 font to EDITOR@FAOA.org. Insert any graphics or maps within the text at the appropriate locations and include a short “About the Author” bio with personal photo at the end of the piece. Photos, maps and graphics are highly encouraged, especially high resolution pictures that might make for a good cover image. Footnotes/endnotes are generally not printed, but may be included in an online version of the article, so include critical references within the text body and provide an extended copy for online publishing if applicable. All regular articles are peer reviewed by the Editorial Board before being approved for print. Letters to the Editor receive minor edits for spelling and are printed at the discretion of the Editor-in-Chief.

EMAIL SUBMISSIONS TO EDITOR@FAOA.ORG