Staying Abreast of Conflict Situations: Nagorno-Karabakh

Mark R. Wilcox, Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.)
Assistant Professor, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

The Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group for the Nagorno- Karabakh conflict settlement expressed hope that the sides will maintain the momentum that had developed in the negotiations in recent months and that the Foreign Ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan will meet again in the nearest future, to overcome the remaining differences on the basic principles of a future settlement agreement. They called on the parties to avoid any action anywhere, including in the United Nations General Assembly, that could undermine the positive developments of recent months.
Joint Statement by the Minsk Group Co-Chairs, Paris, February 15, 2007 1 

          The persistence of conflict in the contemporary international security environment is a reality that influences our national security policy and strategy. In some cases, we choose to intervene directly in conflicts; in others, we seek to manage conflict situations in order to achieve our national objectives. An understanding of the nature of conflicts and the positions of the belligerents is critical in formulating approaches to conflict management. Periodic opportunities to gain insights into specific conflicts therefore warrant our attention and study.

          Fifteen years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, conflicts persist on the territories of states that once fell under Moscow's rule. The unresolved, "frozen" conflicts in the Caucasus region affect U.S. national interests and occupy the attention of Washington, as well as the international community. The Caucasus region states -- Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia -- find themselves at the confluence of a number of U.S. interests and concerns: the flow of energy resources from the Caspian Sea region and Central Asia, the enlargement of European and Euro-Atlantic institutions (the European Union and NATO), and problematic relationships with Russia and Iran. In furthering American interests in the region, United States policymakers work bilaterally and through multilateral organizations to resolve the conflicts in a manner that supports allies and partners. The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan offers a case in point.

The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

          The United States has played a key role in efforts to produce an agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. 2  This region of Azerbaijan, historically populated mainly by ethnic Armenians, has been under the occupation of Armenian and so-called "Nagorno-Karabakh Republic" forces since a war between Armenia and Azerbaijan immediately after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. A cease-fire has been in place since 1994, with Armenian forces occupying not only the Nagorno-Karabakh region, but also a number of surrounding districts, including the Lachin corridor, which links Nagorno- Karabakh to Armenia. Several hundred thousand ethnic Azerbaijani residents of Nagorno-Karabakh, who were forced out of the region, remain displaced in Azerbaijan. For Azerbaijanis, their return and the preservation of Nagorno- Karabakh as an integral part of Azerbaijan constitute a sine qua non for a settlement of the conflict.

          Negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan have taken place since 1994 under the auspices of the "Minsk Group" (so called because Minsk, Belarus was to be the site of the signing of a peace agreement) of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The United States, Russia and France, the three co-chairs of the Minsk Group, have led efforts to mediate an agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Although the Minsk Group has made progress, at times bringing the parties quite close to an agreement, difficult issues that will require tough political choices on the part of the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders remain unresolved.

          The OSCE's U.S., Russian and French mediators have expressed optimism about the prospects for progress in 2007. United States Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Bryza, the U.S. Minsk Group co-chair, told an interviewer on February 7 that the Armenians and Azerbaijanis " don't agree 100 percent on the basic principles, but they are close, very close" and only disagree on certain "technical issues." 3 

          The Minsk Group co-chairs' cautious optimism notwithstanding, it looks like business as usual between the Armenians and Azerbaijanis as they continue their efforts to stake out positions and seek the high ground in the eyes of the international community. Symptoms of the long-standing dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh recently were once again on display as the two countries' delegations sparred in two different meetings held under the auspices of the OSCE.

A Dispute Over Data

          On Wednesday, February 14 during the weekly meeting of the OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) 4 , the Azerbaijani delegation challenged the veracity of Armenia's 2006 submission to the Annual Information Exchange on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) 5 . The specific allegation of the Azerbaijani delegation was the Armenians' failure to report the transfer of 4000 rifles and carbines and 100 hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers from Serbia to Armenia, as reported by Serbia in its SALW annual information exchange submission. 6  Averring no "pretensions to the exporter country [Serbia], which has openly shared this information with other participating states," the Azerbaijani delegation "stress[ed] the fact that the Republic of Armenia has opted for concealing the purchase of weapons from Serbia under the above said categories. 7  The Azerbaijani statement cited as evidence Armenia's submission to the Annual Exchange of Information on SALW, which reported the import of only four revolvers and self- loading pistols (and not from Serbia). 8 

          The Armenian response thanked "our Azerbaijani neighbors for being so attentive to our reports" and suggested that further clarification of certain technical points, e.g. actual quantities and dates of delivery of the armaments, was in order. The Armenians also noted that in 2005 Azerbaijan "in a rude manner had accused Armenia in failing to report" a transfer of conventional arms from Slovakia to Armenia. In this earlier case, the Armenian delegation reported, the Slovaks addressed the technical error in question by correcting their submission to remove the armaments in question. 9  The Armenian statement implied that the new Azerbaijani accusation was analogous to the previous "rude" one, and would be resolved in a similar manner.

          Both sides consistently have examined with great care each other's submissions to various data exchanges on armed forces and armaments, e.g. for the Vienna Document 1999, Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Global Exchange of Military Information and Annual Exchange of Information on SALW, in search of discrepancies with which to confront one another in open fora. Armenia and Azerbaijan can be expected to continue this practice in order to garner support and further their agendas vis-…-vis Nagorno-Karabakh.

A Frank Exchange of Views

          The OSCE Permanent Council, meeting on February 15, also witnessed an exchange on Nagorno-Karabakh. 10  Armenian Ambassador Jivan Tabibian criticized the submission to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) of a resolution regarding the unresolved conflicts in Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan by the GUAM Member States (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova). 11  The thrust of Tabibian's comments was that, first, the conflicts in question are not alike, and, second, "Though operating for a long time, with occasional progress and some setbacks, the [OSCE] Minsk Process remains the only recognized and enabled process in the OSCE for the search for Peace [sic] in Nagorno-Karabakh." In a none-too-subtle warning, Tabibian concluded that,

Armenia believes that deflecting this process through an undifferentiated United Nations General Assembly resolution, may derail the delicate stage of the bilateral meetings held under the auspices of the Co-Chairs of the Minsk group. Armenia will consider the introduction of such a resolution a serious threat to the integrity of the ongoing negotiations. Under the circumstances Armenia will have to seriously reconsider its continued willingness to participate in the present format. It will do so convinced that our interlocutors do not share our confidence in the promises of the current state of play under the Minsk Group Co- Chairs. 12 

          GU AM delegations rose to the Armenian challenge. Speaking on behalf of the GUAM states, the Georgian delegation disputed Armenian Ambassador Tabibian's comments and dismissed his concerns. Noting that "[t]his is, we believe, a critical period in the resolution processes" for the conflicts, the Georgian ambassador explained the purpose behind the draft UNGA resolution as to "draw the attention of the international community to these conflicts and to the urgent need to make real progress in their settlement." 13  In substance and tone, the Georgian statement on behalf of the GUAM states, while rebutting the Armenian statement, was a model of diplomatic tact.

          A subsequent response by the Azerbaijani delegation, however, was less nuanced. Speaking in a national capacity, the Azerbaijani representative began by characterizing the Armenian statement as "nothing but a farcical panic and hysteria" and then asserted that the Armenian concerns over the GUAM UNGA initiative were "completely wrong." The Azerbaijani delegation brushed aside Armenia's statements about their efforts towards settling the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, observing, " contrary to these brazen declarations, Armenia's continued behavior and regressive attitude in the negotiations gives us no hope for a substantial breakthrough." The Azerbaijani delegation accused Armenian foreign minister Oskanian of having taken positions, during a 23 January 2007 meeting with his Azerbaijani counterpart in Moscow, which contravened and were tougher than those expressed previously over the key issues of the return of the displaced Azerbaijani population to their homes in Nagorno-Karabakh and the use of the Lachin corridor. Regarding the former issue, the Azerbaijani statement made clear that the status of Nagorno-Karabakh cannot be determined in the absence - "as a result of ethnic cleansing" - of the Azerbaijani population. On the latter issue, the Azerbaijanis asserted that Armenia is "trying to appropriate the whole region under the pretext of guaranteeing the preservation" of the Lachin corridor." The Azerbaijanis affirmed that "[t]he land communication between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia is possible only under the conditions of mutual use of the corridor and respect for the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan." Concluding, the Azerbaijani delegation made clear that in cooperation with the other GUAM states, Azerbaijan would continue to pursue the adoption of a resolution concerning the unresolved conflicts in the GUAM area in the UN General Assembly. Not to be outdone by the Armenian ambassador's warning, the Azerbaijani representative added that "I would like to bring to the attention of the Armenian Delegation that if the negotiations are not continued on the basis of already agreed issues, it will become needless to continue them at all." 14 

Prospects and Implications

          Ho w to interpret this latest rhetorical dust-up between Armenia and Azerbaijan? Pessimists will chalk it up to "business as usual" on the diplomatic front of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. This exchange is not the first instance exchange of rhetorical fire between the Armenians and Azerbaijanis, and it will not be the last. Optimists, in line with the cautious optimism of the Assistant Secretary of State Bryza and the Minsk Group co-chairs, might view the Armenians' angst over the GUAM states' UNGA effort as a renewed commitment to the Minsk process and interpret the Azerbaijanis' focus on only two issues -- tough ones though they are -- as a positive sign that the two sides are close to an agreement.

          Wh at are the implications for U.S. policy? The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan continues to intrude on U.S. bilateral and multilateral efforts in the Caucasus region. The U.S. must continue to manage bilateral relationships with Armenia and Azerbaijan, while simultaneously pushing them towards a resolution of the conflict; always keeping in mind the myriad U.S. interests in the region that involve energy, NATO enlargement, relations with Russia, and challenges from Iran. Even working through a multinational institution like NATO has proven challenging, as the 2004 killing of an Armenian officer by an Azerbaijani at a NATO language course in Hungary and the Azerbaijanis' denial of visas to Armenian officers for attendance at a NATO Partnership for Peace event in the same year have demonstrated. It is therefore worthwhile to keep a finger on the pulse of the conflict in any way possible, even, as in this case, through monitoring what might seem like banal diplomatic exchanges.


Endnotes

1. Joint Statement by the Minsk Group Co-Chairs, Paris, February 15, 2007, http://osce.usmission.gov/archive/2007/02/MGCoChairs_Paris_Feb15.pdf, accessed 23 February 2007. BACK

2. For more information, see U.S. Department of State, "The United States and the Conflict Over Nagorno- Karabakh," Fact Sheet, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Washington, D.C., February 7, 2005, http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/41401.htm, accessed 23 February 2007.BACK

3. Danielyan, Emil. "Armenia/Azerbaijan: Has a New Chance Emerged for Karabakh Peace?" Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/02/40543219-3a2c-4ba8-95db-b1773daeb378.html, accessed February 16, 2007.BACK

4. The OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation meets weekly in Vienna "to discuss and make decisions regarding military aspects of security in the OSCE area, in particular confidence- and security-building measures." http://www.osce.org/fsc/, accessed 22 February 2007.BACK

5. In accordance with the politically-binding OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons, all 56 OSCE participating states exchange, on an annual basis, information about their small arms exports to and imports from other OSCE participating states. OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons, 24 November 2000, Section IV: Management of Stockpiles, Reduction of Surpluses and Destruction, paragraph (E), Transparency Measures. http://www.osce.org/documents/fsc/2000/11/1873_en.pdf, accessed 23 February 2007.BACK

6. FSC.DEL/554/06, 28 December 2006, "Republic of Serbia: Annual Information on SALW, " Annex 3, Template for the Annual Information on SALW Exports, report for calendar year 2005.BACK

7. FSC.DEL/38/07, 15 February 2007, "Statement by the Delegation of Azerbaijan at 507th meeting [sic] of the Forum for Security Cooperation."BACK

8. FSC.DEL/464/06, 17 October 2006, Delegation of the Republic of Armenia, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, note verbale 327/OSCE/101, Annex 4, Template for the Annual Information on SALW Imports, report for calendar year 2005. BACK

9. FSC.DEL/40/07, 20 February 2007, "Statement in Response to Azerbaijan at the 507th Meeting of the OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation, February 14, 2007."BACK

10. The OSCE Permanent Council, the organization's main decision-making body, meets weekly at the ambassador level "to discuss current developments in the OSCE area and to make appropriate decisions." http://www.osce.org/pc/, accessed 22 February 2007.BACK

11. Azerbaijan has sought to include of the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh and the negotiations towards a settlement on the UNGA agenda since at least 2004. At that time, the Armenian Foreign Minister warned of the potential negative consequences of this initiative on the ongoing Minsk Group process. See McMahon, Robert, "Nagorno- Karabakh: UN General Assembly to Discuss Occupation of Azerbaijani Land," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2004/11/fd3b3f90-d3a8-43df-9b5d-77a21d5431a0.html, accessed February 16, 2007. The GUAM delegations to the UN requested the inclusion of "Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development" on the agenda of the current (61st) UNGA. See UNGA A/61/195, 14 August 2006, "Request for the inclusion of a supplementary item in the agenda of the sixty-first session, Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development, Letter dated 10 August 2006 from the representatives of Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General," http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/466/35/PDF/N0646635.pdf?OpenElement, accessed February 16, 2007. The conflicts in question are those involving the separatist territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, Transdniestria in Moldova and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan. BACK

12. PC.DEL/125/07, 15 February 2007, "Statement On the Draft UN GA Resolution on the Protracted Conflicts in GUAM Area delivered by Ambassador Jivan Tabibian at the 652nd Meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council February 15, 2007."BACK

13. PC.DEL/129/07, 15 February 2007, "Statement by the Georgian Delegation on Behalf of GUAM." BACK

14. PC.DEL/130/07, 15 February 2007, "Statement at the 652nd meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council, 15 February 2007," Permanent Mission of the Republic of Azerbaijan to the OSCE.BACK

2007, Foreign Area Officer Association
Mt. Vernon, Virginia
Maintained by LTC Steve Gotowicki.
http://www.faoa.org