FAO HISTORY: General Van Fleet and the JUSMAPG in Greece

Major Kevin Dougherty

We Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) like to consider ourselves to be "soldier-statesmen;" a name that implies a wide variety of skills to include military expertise, an understanding of all the instruments of national power, diplomatic skill, political sensitivity, and regional awareness. The F.A.O Journal has in several articles described the difference that the right soldier-statesman in the right place at the right time can make (see for example Perrin and Norton, Mar 1998, and Dougherty, Dec 1997). Another example of a man who made such a difference is General James Van Fleet during the Greek Civil War.

Van Fleet served as a machine gun battalion commander in World War I, a corps commander in World War II, and an army commander in the Korean War. Van Fleet undoubtedly had the "soldier" part of the soldier-statesman equation down pat. Amidst these phenomenal accomplishments, Van Fleet's outstanding service from 1948 to 1950 as the head of the Joint US Military Advisory and Planning Group (JUSMAPG) in what he called "a first-class war against international communism" (Time, 23 May 1949, 26) in Greece is often overshadowed. However, it was in this a role that Van Fleet demonstrated he was a soldier-statesman as well.

The fact that Van Fleet's mission in Greece has been relegated to a footnote in Cold War history is a testimony to its tremendous success rather than an indication of insignificance. In fact, it was the United States' first successful resistance to an armed communist invasion (Army, Dec 1992, 11). Nor was there any certainty at the time that US ground forces would not be drug into the fray. On 5 March 1948, US News World Report (USNWR) reported that "Plans for actually moving units of the American Army into Greece are far advanced.... At present, in readiness is a combat force of American ground troops, about one and a third undersized Army divisions and a division of Marines. The total is about 25,000 men". Should these ground troops be committed, USNWR further predicted inevitable Soviet involvement with the end result being "a big war".

The fact that Van Fleet avoided this crisis and saved Greece for democracy with the help of just 350 odd US advisors is a true testimony to his greatness and gives credence to President Harry Truman's assessment that Van Fleet was "the greatest general we ever had" (McCaffrey, Dec 1992, 8). FAOs like to talk about being "force multipliers." Van Fleet and his team certainly were.

The situation with which Van Fleet was faced was one of a Communist guerrilla rebellion. The aftermath of World War II left Greece and many other European countries destitute and ideologically confused. The three and a half years of German occupation of Greece were ones of despair, collaboration, inflation, hunger, and oppression. The population was socially, economically, and politically disintegrated. It was a situation which left Greece very vulnerable to the spread of Communism (Wainhouse, June 1957, 16).

This bleak situation was exacerbated by the inadequate size of the 26,500 man British liberation force and Greece's proximity to countries which had fallen into the Soviet satellite system. The smallness of the liberation force meant that it could physically station soldiers only in Athens, Piraeus, and a handful of other cities and communications centers to "show the flag." Otherwise, the country remained under the control of existing guerrilla armies (O'Ballance, 1966, p9). The key Communist organization that had developed during the German occupation was the EAM or National Liberation Front. The military arm of the EAM was the ELAS or National People's Liberation Army. As the Germans withdrew, the ELAS seized large quantities of arms and ammunition that were left behind (O'Ballance, 1966, 88).

The ELAS benefited greatly from the Red Army's presence and Soviet influence around Greece. On the Albanian border, ELAS made contact with Albanian Communist Party resistance leader Enver Hoxha's guerrillas. In exchange for the ELAS' handing over some Albanian war criminals, a unit of Albanian guerrillas was placed under ELAS command. On the Yugoslav frontier, the ELAS moved forward into the old frontier posts and buildings wherever it could. To the east, four divisions of the ELAS northern corps moved into Thrace and Macedonia when the Bulgarian Army departed. Edgar O'Ballance notes that with these developments, "ELAS was in effective control of the greater part of northern Greece" (O'Ballance, 1966, 91).

At the time of liberation, ELAS strength was roughly 50,000 armed fighters. The Communists quickly noted the inadequate size of the British liberation force and were successful in seizing physical possession of practically the entire countryside of continental Greece. The British were only able to control those cities where they could physically station troops (O'Ballance, 1966, 91).

With this upper hand, the KKE or Communist Party of Greece decided that the time to strike for power had come and it switched its strategy from one of infiltration and political intrigue to one of force. A massive EAM demonstration against the government was called for in Athens to be followed by a general strike. The demonstration took place on 2 December 1944, and by the 4th, ELAS and British troops were involved in shooting clashes in the streets of Athens. The British were woefully outnumbered, and within weeks they became isolated in the center of Athens (O'Ballance, 1966, 95-99).

British sent reinforcements, however, and by the arrival of the new year of 1945, the tide had taken a turn in the British favor in Athens and Piraeus (O'Ballance, 1966, 105). The guerrilla's military setback was followed by a political one as two prominent socialist leaders in the EAM broke away from the coalition and formed their own parties (O'Ballance, 1966, 108).

Thus weakened, the EAM was in a poor bargaining position when it met with British delegates in Varkiza on 2 February. The Varkiza Agreement of 12 February included a provision to completely demobilize and disarm the ELAS. The main body of the ELAS was peacefully disarmed and disbanded, but thousands of ex-ELAS extremists escaped across the border into Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria (O'Ballance, 1966, 112-113).

These embittered ex-ELAS leaders were the inspiration for and the nucleus of the DAS or Democratic People's Army which came into being as the result of a Politburo level meeting in Bulgaria in December 1945. At this meeting, members of the Central Committee of the KKE and representatives of the Yugoslav and Bulgarian General Staffs agreed to reorganize an insurgent Army to fight the Greek government (O'Ballance, 1966, 121).

Initial actions centered in the north, especially in Macedonia and Thrace, where the rugged mountains favored guerrilla tactics. The Communist forces, which never surpassed 28,000, were overwhelmingly outnumbered by the 265,000 troops of the Greek National Army (GNA) and Gendarmerie or national police force. To partially offset this numerical inferiority, the DAS received substantial military aid and advice from Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria. With this assistance, the guerrillas had an advantage in moral, tactics, tererain, and, to some extent, talent. The GNA pursued a static defensive strategy which was inappropriate against a guerrilla enemy and often lacked effective leadership. Within seven months, the DAS claimed to dominate three-fourths of Greece, and the GNA was left in disarray (Shinn, 1986, 52-53).

The problem was clearly beyond the resources of Britain, who was suffering from its own post-war economic shortages. On 21 February 1947, the British informed the US that they were pulling out of Greece (Paterson, 1991, 450), and on 3 March the Greek government formally requested US aid (O'Ballance, 1986, 137). On 12 March, President Truman announced the Truman Doctrine which stated that "I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." On 22 May, Truman signed a bill authorizing $400 million in aid to Greece and Turkey. By 1952, Greek forces would receive $500 million in US aid (Paterson, 1991, 449-451).

But the most valuable aspect of this US assistance was the person of Lieutenant General Van Fleet who on 7 February 1948 was appointed to command JUSMAPG. Van Fleet concentrated his efforts on two basic programs. The first was to retrain and reorganize the Greek Army, and the second was to cut off the flow of supplies reaching the guerrillas from Greece's northern borders (McCaffrey, Dec 1992, 10).

To accomplish this first objective, Van Fleet attached American officers to the Greek General Staff, to each corps headquarters, and to the headquarters of each fighting division. A major benefit of this dispersion was to ensure that General Staff orders were being carried out. A contemporary report noted that previously top level plans "invariably have been changed by politicians somewhere along the line. Political control of the 132,000-man Army has been so great that members of Parliament often have vetoed military orders, had Army units stationed in their own areas regardless of military need elsewhere" (USNWR, 5 March 1948, 31).

This phenomenon had contributed to the defensive strategy thus far employed by the Greeks. Van Fleet and his men retrained the Greeks "to fight a mobile, offensive war instead of simply garrisoning key towns and villages - a policy which in the past had left most of the countryside at the mercy of hit-and-run raids" (Stavrianos, 1952, 203).

Van Fleet also endeavored to reorganize the GNA at the highest levels in order to decentralize command and to encourage greater initiative on the part of field commanders. The field army was reorganized into five corps instead of three. In the past, each corps commander had been directly responsible to the National Defense Council for operations. Now they would come under the control of the Chief of the General Staff (O'Ballance, 1966, 166). There was also a reshuffling of senior Greek officers, involving the gradual replacement of less efficient and energetic commanders and staff officers (O'Ballance, 1966, 187).

The most notable of these personnel moves occurred on 25 February 1949 when "with Van Fleet's hearty approval" (Time, 23 May 1949, 27), General Alexander Papagos, the hero of the Greek victories in the Albanian campaign of 1940, became Greece's Commander-in-Chief. Part of Papagos' conditions for accepting this post was a streamlining of the National Defense Council. With Papagos firmly in charge, GNA operations could proceed according to a coordinated central strategy that would allow "the country to be treated as a whole and to be swept through from south to north" (O'Ballance, 1966, 187-188).

Van Fleet also discovered that it was not just the hierarchy of the Greek Army that required attention. There was also a shortage of trained junior officers, and to correct this problem he set up training schools to increase the supply. In so doing, Van Fleet had to massage the Greek sense of pride which was slow to admit that more training was needed (Time, 23 May 1949, 27).

But the key element Van Fleet brought to the retraining of the Greek Army was his own strength of personality. The 23 May 1949 issue of Time featured Van Fleet on the cover and describes the accomplishments in Greece as being brought by Van Fleet's "unrelenting pressure" (Time, 23 May 1949, 27) and notes that Van Fleet has "a heart every bit as stout" as the Greeks he is advising (Time, 23 May 1949, 26). But the author's strongest compliment may be that Van Fleet "has given the Greeks a great more than [US arms and supplies]. He has given them hope" (Time, 23 May 1949, 26).

Armed with this new enthusiasm and emphasis, the Greeks launched an anti-guerrilla offensive on 15 April 1948 designed to surround and annihilate the guerrilla concentrations in northern and central Greece. The two principal operations, DAWN and CROWN, were directed against guerrilla concentrations near Rumeli in central Greece and in Grammos near the northern border (Condit, 1967, 514). CROWN was the Greek's first effort to capture Grammos, and they fought well. They inflicted severe casualties on the guerrillas but were unable to destroy them. The bulk of the enemy was able to withdraw into Albania (Condit, 1967, 515).

In spite of this failure, it can be argued that at this point the tide was turned. LTC Edward Wainhouse writes that "Despite the fact that the guerrillas at the end of 1948 still were 23,000 strong, the initiative had passed to the GNA and a confident, more experienced, and better trained national army was ready to launch its offensive in the spring of 1949" (Wainhouse June 1957, 24). In just a short while, Van Fleet had made a big difference.

It was this steady improvement in the Greek Army that allowed Van Fleet to implement the second of his programs -- to seal off the guerrillas from their lines of communication on Greece's northern border. He did this by an autumn 1948 offensive which involved clearing operations beginning in the south and moving northwards. This process would drive the guerrillas back to their main base in the Grammos-Vitsi region where the final blow would be struck (Condit, 1967, 516). Along the way, the army and the police took steps to negate or destroy the guerrilla intelligence net by arresting or temporarily detaining known Communist sympathizers or suspected informants prior to initiating offensive operations. These efforts were very successful (Wainhouse, June 1957 and O'Ballance, 1966, 192-193).

The Greek Army was now able to secure its lines of communication and prevent the enemy from reinfiltrating into areas that had already been secured (Condit, 1967, 516). The results were dramatic. By 16 March, the Greek government was able to announce that the Peloponnese were completely clear of guerrillas and the Greek Army could thus be released for operations on the mainland (O'Ballance, 1966, 189). This capability was first exercised in the mountain ranges to the north and northwest of Athens. The GNA units were used to seize and hold passes and peaks while the LOK (Commando) and other infantry battalions trained in antiguerrilla warfare spread outwards in movements to contact (O'Ballance, 1966, 192).

The conflict between Tito and Stalin benefited the Greeks when on 10 July, Tito announced his intention to progressively close his borders with Greece. The guerrillas received increased assistance from Bulgaria and Rumania, but the main center of DAS activity was Albania (O'Ballance, 1966, 195). Given this situation, the guerrillas amassed 7,000 troops in the Vitsi range region and another 5,000 to the south in the Grammos Range. From these positions, the guerrillas hoped to launch offensive operations (O'Ballance, 1966, 196). But since most of the other parts of Greece were now clear, General Papagos was able to concentrate six of his eight field divisions against the guerrillas in these areas. Under these circumstances, Van Fleet stated on 23 June that he was "very optimistic" about the situation and that he was "confident that [the Greek Army] can do the job by winter" (Stavrianos, 1952, 203).

On 5 August, Papagos initiated his attack on the Grammos Range, and on the 10th he attacked the Vitsi. Initially there was little progress. Then, slowly but surely, and largely thanks to 51 Curtiss Helldivers supplied by the US to the Greek Air Force, the guerrillas fell back. On 28 August, the Greeks seized and blocked the two main passes from the Grammos Range into Albania (O'Ballance, 1966, 198-199).

The changing political landscape began to greatly benefit the Greeks. With Yugoslav aid drying up, the guerrillas became dramatically dependent on Albania. However, Albania now had on its border a Greek Army that "with US aid... had been converted over-night from an ill-equipped, dispersed, and not-too-efficient army, into a formidable, well-equipped, competently led fighting force with guns, trucks, tanks, and over fifty modern aircraft. If Greece chose to swoop into Albania to try and encircle the Greek insurgent elements sheltering there, there was nothing the tiny, rag-tag Albanian Army could do to stop her..." (O'Ballance, 1966, 199-200). Being a pragmatist, Hoxha, who by this time was the Albanian Prime Minister, announced that all Greeks found in Albania would be disarmed and detained (O'Ballance, 1966, 200). On 16 October 1949, from a secret radio station in Rumania, Greece's Communist guerrilla leaders announced a "cease-fire" in order to "prevent the complete annihilation of Greece" (Time, 24 October 1949, 32 and O'Ballance, 966, 201).

Contemporary reports and later analysts give much of the credit for the United States' first Cold War victory to General Van Fleet. Time described the victory as "a great day for Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet and the Greek people to whom he had tried so hard to bring peace" (Time, 24 October 1949, 32). In commemorating Van Fleet's death in 1992, Army likened Van Fleet's efforts in Greece to those of Baron Friedrich von Steuben and the Marquis de Lafayette during the American Revolution: "As Baron von Steuben, he was the trainer of their armies, and as the Marquis de Lafayette, he was the leader from overseas who helped secure their freedom on the field of battle" (McCaffrey, Army, December 1992, 11). Perhaps, President Truman put it best when he succinctly stated that "I sent him to Greece and he won the war" (McCaffrey, Army, December 1992, 11).

As today's Army increases its involvement in security and stability operations, as FAOs assume greater visibility and responsibilities, and as the military continues to try to do more with less, the example of General Van Fleet in Greece represents a standard for study and emulation.

MAJOR Dougherty is an Army European FAO and has contributed to the Journal on numerous occasions. His thought provoking articles are always welcome and have a large following among the membership of the Association.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Condit, D. M. et al. Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict: The Experience in Europe and the Middle East, Washington, DC: American University, 1967.

Dougherty, Kevin, "T. E. Lawrence and the Establishment of Legitimacy During the Arab Revolt," F.A.O. Journal, Dec 1997, 8-9. McCaffrey, LTG William, "Gen. Van Fleet: One of the Last The Stars Fell On," Army, Dec 1992, 8-11. Molnar, Andrew et al. Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance Warfare, Washington, DC: American University, 1963. O'Ballance, Edgar. The Greek Civil War: 1944-1949, NY: Praeger, 1966. Paterson, Thomas et al. American Foreign Policy: A History Since 1900, Lexington: DC Heath, 1991.

Perrin, Bill and Stephen Norton, "A Deconfrontation Agreement Reached in Cyprus: How U. S. Army Foreign Area Officer Expertise Complemented a Siplomatic Initiative," F.A.O. Journal, Mar 1998, 4-619, 23-24. Shinn, Rinn. Greece: A Country Study, Washington, DC: American University, 1986. Stavrianos, L. S. Greece: American Dilemma and Opportunity, Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1952.

Time, "Greece: A First-Class War," 24 July 1950, 32. Time, "Greece: Winged Victory," 24 October 1949, 32. Time, "Greece: With Will to Win," 23 May 1949, 26-28. US News & World Report, "War Risks in Greek-aid Plans," 5 March 1948, 30-31. Wainhouse, LTC Edward, "Guerrilla War in Greece, 1946-49: A Case Study," Military Review, June 1957, 17-25.

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