The Turkish Military in Transition: A Partner
in Future Coalition Operations

By Martin A. Perryman

Turkey recently took command of the International Stabilization Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. This is indicative of the new direction the Turkish Military has taken since the collapse of the Soviet Union. They already possessed a high degree of interoperability due to their participation in NATO. Their modernization program has increased their deployability. Today, from the Balkans to the Middle East, Turkey has the most credible force in the region with by far the most modern military. It is the sole regional power with the military capability, international position, and domestic will to conduct operations beyond its borders. From this perspective, there is a potential for Turkey to make significant contributions to current and future coalition operations.

This has not always been the case. The Turkey that emerged from the defeat of the Ottoman Empire following World War I was isolationist; its military was defensive. The creation of the Republic of Turkey, and its subsequent survival, consumed the mental and physical resources of the military. Three factors shaped the initial course of military development within the new state: the remnants of its Ottoman heritage; the renunciation of irredentist claims on former Ottoman territories; and the presence of tangible threats to its national survival.

The well-established system of Ottoman military education was the primary factor shaping the development of the Turkish military. Crafted over five centuries, it was designed to weld individuals from a polyglot empire into an effective military instrument using rote memorization and obedience. In the short-term, it produced the solid, disciplined officer corps that built, under fire, the military that won the Turkish War for Independence. In the long-term, it provided the institutions and instructors that became the foundation upon which the new Republic built a military, retaining both positive and negative aspects of the Ottoman system.

The second factor shaping Turkey's military development was the renunciation of irredentism. Seeing Ottoman expansionism as the leading contributor to the fall of the empire, one of the key characteristics of the new nation was an inward focus on security and development. Its foreign policy was captured in Atatrk's slogan, "Turkey desires not one inch of foreign soil, nor will it concede one inch to a foreign power." Militarily, this translated into the development of a static, territorial defense force. Vulnerability, and thus neutrality during World War II, membership in NATO, and the rigid discipline of the bipolar world reinforced and maintained this defensive focus.

The third factor was the presence of many legitimate threats to the security and survival of the Turkish State. From the beginning, Turkey was confronted by an array of hostile forces. The dangers posed by first Nazi Germany and then the Soviet Union were primary. However, there were also internal insurgency groups; long standing disputes with Greece, Syria, and Armenia; and at times tension with both Iran and Iraq that added to the complexity of the security question for Turkey.

Several events, beginning in the mid-1980s, created the opportunity for Turkey to evaluate and redefine the focus of its military. The most significant event was the removal of the Soviet Union as the primary adversary on the Turkish border. Simultaneously, Turkey deepened its military relationship with Israel and to a lesser extent Jordan. Internally, success against the Kurdish insurgency group, the PKK, in Turkey's southeastern provinces worked to improve security and stability on several fronts. It set the stage for a confrontation with Syria over its harboring of PKK forces and leadership. Syria eventually expelled Abdullah ™calan, the group's leader, which led to his capture by Turkish security forces in Kenya. Though tensions at the time escalated rapidly between the two countries, removing this impediment has subsequently led to a slow thawing of Turkish - Syrian relations. Furthermore, as the facts surrounding these events came to light, it was revealed that following his expulsion from Syria, several highly placed persons in Greece had actively aided ™calan, an international criminal wanted by INTERPOL. The bad publicity led directly to a reshuffling within the Greek government and subsequently to improved relations between Greece and Turkey. This improvement accelerated following the two earthquakes that struck Istanbul and Athens in 1999 and the aid each nation gave to the other. Today, the outlook between the two countries remains guardedly optimistic.

The shifting political climate was the catalyst for military development. Since the Gulf War the Turkish military has broken with its old model and has been in a period of transition. Based on its analysis of the war, the General Staff decided to scrap its divisional system for a more flexible one based on brigades directly under the control of a corps headquarters. This organization is very similar to the one described in Colonel MacGregor's book, Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century. During this period of organizational upheaval, and unlike most other countries, Turkey maintained its levels of defense spending. In 1998, concurrent with the events mentioned earlier, the decision was made to further transform into a force-projection military. This has been a very difficult and expensive transition that is not yet complete. The pace is dictated by fiscal realities over time, involving a retooling of the entire military culture. There are two areas where the Turkish system is undergoing revisions: officer development, and equipment procurement.

Officer development is the key to a successful transformation from a static to a deployable military. The areas of officer selection, education, and promotion are all undergoing a slow, thoughtful, and deliberate evolution. Over the past eleven years, the Turkish military has made efforts to expand the civilian population base from which it draws its officers. The goal is to help create a military that more closely reflects society. Currently there are officers on active service from every part of the country and from a broader range of socio-economic levels than ever before.

Once selected, officer candidates enter the military education system. In Turkey, all of the officers are commissioned through their service academy, which is a college level institution similar to the military academies in America. In addition, 70% of the cadets accepted by the academies are graduates of the military high school system, which accepts students at 14 years of age. Because training begins at such an early age and because all of the officers are produced through a single system, there is a remarkable degree of uniformity within the corps. It is through this system that officers learn the basics of their profession, develop leadership skills, and internalize the culture and values of their service.

During the year I spent as a student at the Turkish War College, from 1999 - 2000, I was able to observe the dynamics of the education system first hand. Here, transition means moving from the time- honored Ottoman system of memorization to a more dynamic model that stresses creativity, problem solving, and individual initiative. The administration of the Turkish War College is behind this effort. The commandant, Tumgeneral Kudrut Cengiz repeatedly stressed the importance of an interactive educational experience. They want to develop officers who can think on their feet under stress. To that end they have worked to develop a curriculum that places the students under stress, forces them to respond, and analyses the results. During the entire process, the students are evaluated. Characteristically, due to the competitive nature of the course, the evaluation element receives the majority of the focus. The old methods facilitate evaluation and grading. As a result, there is institutional resistance to change, but there appears to be sufficient will to see the transition through. The most capable officers will quickly learn the requirements for successfully negotiating the new courses and rise to the top.

Herein lies the litmus test for evaluating the success of the transition -- promotions. The institution must identify those characteristics needed for the officer corps to successfully lead a force projection military; then begin to promote based on the demonstrated mastery of those capabilities. To be effective, the elements that contribute to individual success must be in line with the goals of the institution.

Officer selection, education, and promotion are being slowly modified. The art is to maintain those characteristics that have served the country well while preparing the officer corps to effectively meet the challenges of the future. Officer development is recognized as the key of the transformation process. Translating that into procedures that will eventually percolate through the entire officer corps will take time.

Equipment procurement is another vital element of the transformation process. Turkey, a net importer of arms, has found itself encumbered with a variety of equipment from several countries. This has created a myriad of problems for organization, supply, maintenance, and training. As part of their basic reorganization plan, the General Staff has outlined a program for achieving greater commonality and standardization in their equipment inventory. They are producing or acquiring an impressive array of modern equipment. Billions of dollars have been earmarked over several years for this effort. Currently, Turkey is in the midst of the most severe economic down turn since the early 1980s. Consequently, many of these programs, particularly the larger items, have been postponed or stretched over additional fiscal years. There is, however, no indication that the government of Turkey has backed away from its long-term commitment to modernize.

One final area that will potentially require attention as the transformation process continues is personnel policy. Currently, the ranks are filled by universal conscription, which is well suited to Turkey's traditionally defensive military posture. As the Turkish military shifts to support Turkey's expanding national interests, participation in multinational efforts outside of Turkey will most likely increase. For the average Turkish citizen, the linkage between national security and military activity abroad will become less obvious and increasingly debated across the spectrum of Turkish society. Additionally, the acquisition of newer, more complicated equipment just does not lend itself to a conscription system that provides a basic level of skill during a restricted active duty phase; then sends the vast majority of its soldiers back into the civilian work force to await a national mobilization that might be years in the future. Therefore, for the society in general and for the military in particular the continued validity of conscription to meet manpower needs will come under question. Having said that, conscription has been extremely successful and will no doubt continue in the short-term. Altering personnel policies will most likely come as an effect of the transformation process rather than as one of the drivers.

The last decade has seen a significant shift in the Turkish approach to national defense. The conscious decisions made by the Turkish General Staff began a slow but steady process that will dramatically improve its capabilities. Seeing the benefit of defusing potential problems before they cross the border, they are developing along lines similar to the United States and becoming a force projection military that can readily deploy as part of a coalition. Turkish officers, adapting to a new paradigm, will continue to improve their ability to operate smoothly within a coalition staff. Likewise, equipment development and procurement will continue to emphasize interoperability and compatibility, at least with NATO, and by extension, with the United States. The final piece, not yet addressed by the General Staff, is the question of soldier management. Until it is addressed, the current system appears to be adequate. Turkish soldiers have performed admirably in every out of area deployment in which they have participated. Most recently, they assumed command of the International Stabilization Force in Afghanistan. Turkey has always been a close ally with the United States. As a regional power, Turkey continues to share many of the same goals as the United States. As their force projection capabilities continue to improve, so does their ability to make a significant contribution to coalition operations.

MAJOR Martin A. Perryman, USA is armor officer and now a 48G currently assigned to U.S. Central Command J5 as a Pol-Mil desk officer for Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. His previous assignment was for ICT at the Turkish War College in Istanbul. His next assignment, bginning in the summer of 03, is as the Executive Officer at the Office of Defense Cooperation in Ankara, Turkey.

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