Triangulating Security and Defense in the Southern Balkans

By MAJ Tim De Vito, 48C

"Military victories are not gained by a single arm - though the failure of any arm or service might well be disastrous - but are achieved through the efforts of all ... welded into a team." - General of the Army George C. Marshall

Do you realize that there are US Army majors who are charged with managing multi-million dollar security assistance programs in emerging democracies? Well believe it; it has been happening for quite some time now. Together with the other members of their country teams, they are advising defense ministers, ambassadors, and senior foreign military officials, as to the priorities, goals, and methods recommended for developing an armed force. In doing so, they obviously face a multitude of challenges.

Recently, during my regional orientation to the southern Balkans, I had the distinct pleasure of meeting four small teams of people (in Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, and in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) who are literally doing the work of legions. These teams consist of three separate entities, each of which must synchronize its activities with the others, in order to achieve the common goals established by key US governmental and military organizations, such as -- the US ambassador to the respective country, the US European Command (EUCOM), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), US Army Europe (USAREUR), and other agencies empowered to work in the area. This does not even include the "security contractors" operating in the region, such as those mentioned in MAJ Tom Milton's article in the December 1997 issue of the FAO Journal. The complementary in-country teams that I visited generally consisted of : a Defense Attaché (DATT), in the grade of O-5 or O-6; a Military Liaison Team (MLT), led by an O-6 from the Reserve Component; and a Security Assistance Officer (SAO), an Army FAO in the grade of O-4.

NOTE: IN FYROM and Albania, the DATT happens to be an Army FAO (COL and LTC, respectively); whereas in Bulgaria and Romania he is an Air Force O-6. The MLT to Albania has not returned since its evacuation during last year's turmoil there, however the SAO and DATT are both back on the ground.

Using the word team is not meant to imply, however, that everyone works together, or even for the same headquarters. In fact, each of the three elements works for a different agency and has a distinctly separate mission in the country. Rather, the team-work to which I refer is exercised on-site, by professionals who clearly understand the US goals and objectives for the region.

Figure 1. The triangular relationship that provides US representation, defense advice, security assistance, and familiarization with US programs in partner countries.

Several factors make this relationship an intricate one. First and foremost to this observer is the issue of rank. As one SAO pointed out to me, the fact that the DATT and the MLT chief are both colonels, while the SAO is a major, can give the host country the perception that the SAO is an entity of lesser importance, which can undermine mission effectiveness. The same situation can occur at the embassy, if the rest of the country team looks to "the highest ranking guy in the room" for all military related issues.

In actuality, however, the DATT has little to do with the SAO's day-to-day mission. He does not rate the SAO, nor does he decide on the expenditure or priority of security assistance. The same is true of the MLT chief. The DATT is the senior defense representative in these countries and intuitively then, one would think that he would have the responsibility, and the authority to ensure that the SAO and MLT are delivering security assistance in accordance with his outlook. Again, I suggest that teamwork and professionalism, such I observed in these four countries, is the reason why this relationship is working, despite its somewhat ambiguous hierarchical design.

In other words, while the DATT is advising the Ministry of Defense (MOD) to focus on uniforms as a first priority, for example, one would hope that the SAO's and MLT's programs were harmonized with that philosophy, and that the country is not trying to purchase F-16s before boots for its soldiers. In fact, in one of the countries that I visited the DATT hosted a meeting with the SAO and MLT to ensure that the entire year's agenda was synergetic.

That is an example of leadership, cooperation, and professionalism required for this triangulation to produce a unity of effort.

Another interesting point is that the SAO, the major, is "the one with the money." After professionalism and teamwork, this is the safeguard which guarantees that the triangular relation-ship functions properly, despite the disparity in rank. This reality demands that the SAO be treated as an equal member at the coun-try team table. Further, US defense policies governing security assistance dictate that the MOD deal with the SAO and MLT dir-ectly, and independently. For example, the MLT handles "familiarization" with US defense programs, while the SAO offers security assistance in IMET, Foreign Military Sales, For-eign Military Financing, Excess Defense Articles, and Humanitarian Assistance.

As one SAO poignantly observed, MODs in these emerging democracies tend to look straight to the highest level, probably because it is incomprehensible for an army major (in their own centralized systems) to be charged with so much authority. Once they understand that they are required to deal with the SAO, however, he is quickly elevated in status to one of the most important officers in the embassy, regardless of whether the rest of the country team recognizes it.

Furthermore, since many key host-nation leaders attribute the individual actions and initiatives of US military officers to our government as a whole, or to the US embassy (as the national symbol or "agent" in country), it is even more imperative that all the "team members" speak with one voice and act towards common and well-coordinated objectives. Form that perspective, there is little difference between this "triangle" in emerging democracies and the more traditional Office of Defense Cooper-ation (ODC) and Defense Attaché Office (DAO) relationships, found in countries where more mature security relations are established with the US.

There are obviously many issues that these teams have in common. For instance, they are all in Partnership for Peace (PFP) countries that aspire to future NATO membership. One of the DATTs has suggested that a regional get-together would be a good opportunity to share perspectives. Each of the SAOs, for example, is currently working issues such as the Regional Airspace Initiative (RAI), the Air Sovereignty Operations Center (ASOC), and the fielding of the PFP Information Management System (PIMS) in his respective country. In the broader context, they are all aiming towards the common goals of interoperability and eventual NATO membership. In fact, another DATT fittingly remarked that the lessons coming out of NATO's three invitees (Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic) would be very useful to those countries yet to be invited. This expands the triangular concept into a star across the entire European continent, with NATO, EUCOM, and USAREUR being the center of it.

With so many defense and security issues ongoing simultaneously, as is the case in the four Balkan countries that I visited, it is absolutely essential that "every car in the train" be moving in the same direction, at the same time. The DATTs in those respective countries have an enormous responsibility as the ambassador's, hence our nation's, senior defense representatives. Perhaps the role of advisor is a task inapplicable to the rest of the attaché world, but in these countries (especially at the present time) it very well may be that DATT's most important contribution to US security and defense objectives in the region. The representation they provide, to the highest levels of the host nation's defense and military establishments, is essentially helping to rebuild the armed forces from the ground up. From my perspective, as an outside observer, it is also helping to focus the SAO and MLT towards a synchronized effort, despite some of the challenges that I have mentioned in this article.

My hat especially goes off to MAJ Todd Oja (SAO-Romania), MAJ Ara Manjikian (SAO-Bulgaria), MAJ Brad Jones (SAO-Albania), and MAJ Bill Langan (SAO-FYROM). In many ways, they (undoubtedly like other SAOs around the world) each do the work of a 15-person ODC. Though previously unaware of their immense scope and colossal responsibility, their handling of multi-Service issues, in some extremely remote and difficult sites, absolutely impressed me during my short visit with each of them. Together with their respective MLTs, and with the leadership and support of the DATTs in each country, they are helping shape US defense policy in the southern Balkans. These are the "Strategic Scouts" we hear about so often, who are "globally engaged and strategically positioned around the world to pave the way for the US Army of tomorrow.

1997, Foreign Area Officer Association
Springfield, Virginia
Maintained by LTC Steve Gotowicki.
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