Syria at the Crossroads
By
Martin A. Perryman
Syria stands at a crossroads. The four historic pillars that supported regime stability for
President Hafiz Assad are weakening. The collapse of the Soviet Union has left Syria without a
strong patron. The Russia that emerged from the ashes no longer provides Syria with vital
military, economic, or political support. The Ba'ath Party, while still formidable, is finding its base
of support slowly eroding. The notable families on which the regime had depended are continually
finding their future linked to an opening with the West. Finally, the military, severed from its supply
of new equipment and training, is suffering from a decline in moral, respect, and confidence.
Taken together, these factors represent a climate in which Syria could break its traditional
mold. With the recent death of President Assad, an opportunity has been created. The new
President, his son Bashar, is a relative newcomer to national politics. He simultaneously
commands respect within Syrian society and is uncommitted to the established power structure. If
he possesses the courage, he could lead Syria down a new path. He could redirect Syrian
policies towards openness with the outside world and increased integration into the regional and
possibly global economies. This article will examine the four pillars of regime support as well as
Lebanon, economic, and geographic factors to demonstrate how the potential for reform is
currently present.
When the Soviet Union dissolved Syria found itself without a strong international supporter.
Over the past decade, this has had a profound affect of on events, both foreign and domestic, for
Syria. With the end of the Cold War, Syria has become increasingly irrelevant internationally. In
dealings with Israel, its belligerent, hard-line stance has become increasingly anachronistic. As a
result, it has become increasingly isolated both politically and economically.
In addition, the loss of Soviet economic largess has hurt the Syrian economy. Black market
activity, historically an important sector, has grown and become an almost indispensable element
of state livelihood. Over the years, Lebanon has become a vital base for black market activities
and smuggling. Emerging as one of the single largest contributors to the Syrian economy.
Consequently, the reasons supporting Syrian involvement in Lebanon have shifted from ones of
political and strategic interest to ones of economic necessity. This means that any change in
Syrian policy for Lebanon will require a corresponding reform in its economic policy to maintain
equilibrium.
The Soviets were also the main suppliers of military equipment, training, and doctrine. When
this pipeline closed, the Syrian military began to slowly decay. Syrian equipment ages daily with
few replacements projected. Spare parts are increasingly difficult to find. The remaining
operational equipment is outdated and no match for the modern equipment of its neighbors.
Finally, with the collapse of the Soviet military education system, Syria has been cut off from a
vital source of intellectual exchange. Current military concepts are not well known or understood
and the Syrian pool of military expertise is slowly atrophying.
Internally, regime stability has rested on three mutually supporting legs: the Ba'ath Party, the
notables, and the military. This tripod has proven to be very strong and resilient. Events over the
past decade, however, have weakened this traditional structure and opened the door for possible
change. The Ba'ath Party, dominated by the minority Alawis, has worked tirelessly to maintain a
dominant role for their special interest group. At the same time, they have worked with their
socialist doctrine to cut across various social and cultural differences and produce an accepted
Syrian identity. The goal was to produce a unified society that supported the regime and the
current distribution of power within it. This effort has only been partially successful. After several
decades, the concept of a Syrian identity is slowly emerging. This embryonic national identity, far
from supporting the current system, is working for changes that will further cement the concept of
Syrian society onto the myriad of minority interests within the country.
As demographics shift over time, the Alawis are becoming an increasingly smaller group.
Though considered Muslim by the government, the majority Sunni group has never accepted the
Alawis as equal Muslims. For the Sunnis there is a desire to see less active participation by the
Alawis and greater openness in the government. For the other minority groups, there is a growing
realization that the only genuine guarantee of their cultural, religious, and ethnic freedoms lies in a
greater degree of liberal democracy, rule of law, and market economics.
In addition, demographics are shifting dramatically towards youth. The vast majority of
Syrians are under thirty years old. Without adequate work or prospects, this group is becoming
increasingly disillusioned and frustrated. Many youths are fleeing the country in search of jobs
and opportunities. The ones that remain are beginning to demand change. It is in the
government's best interest to provide this change if for no other reason than to stem the loss of
skilled and educated labor to other countries.
Finally, as the World becomes increasingly smaller, communication and information become
increasingly difficult to control. The Syrian public is constantly presented with an ever-expanding
list of outside images, concepts, and ideas. Some of them are good and some of them are bad.
Naturally, they want to incorporate the good while rejecting the bad. This effort of selective
assimilation will require government reform, greater openness, and integration into the larger
World.
Another critical element of regime stability has been the old, established, and generally
wealthy aristocratic families of Syria. This group is very well entrenched and respected. Most of
these families have been in a position of power and influence that extends back into the Ottoman
Empire. They can be collectively referred to as the notables.
Many of the notables have been traditionally land owning and agricultural. A few have
maintained their position through commerce. Agricultural production in the region has not been
dependable for several centuries. As populations increase and water resources decrease, there
is increasing pressure to push agriculture onto marginal lands. The traditional base of the
agricultural notables is being undermined. These people, leaders in their communities, are
shifting to other sources of economic viability. The most common alternatives have become trade,
commerce, and industrial production.
Thus, the notables are now also the leading businessmen and traders in Syria. They have
two desires. First, they wish to maintain their traditional position of power and influence. Second,
they understand that in order to do this, they must maintain their successful business positions.
As businessmen, they desire greater contact and integration with the regional and global
economy. For their continued prosperity, they need to be able to exploit economic opportunities
as they present themselves. This is particularly true with their neighbors, Israel and Turkey.
Consequently, while the goal of the notables has remained unchanged, there is a new method. In
order to maintain their privileged position in society, they need the tools of economic development
that only reform can provide.
The military has also been a critical element of regime stability. With the end of the Cold
War, the armed forces went into a long and sustained period of decline. The acquisition of new
equipment virtually stopped. The equipment on hand has continued to age. It is becoming
increasingly obsolete, especially in the face of continued modernization and development by
Syria's two regional rivals, Israel and Turkey. This widening gap in regional military capabilities
coupled with the strong desire for greater regional contact and economic integration is a strong
motivational engine for reform.
Two events illustrate the significant loss of Syrian military capability over the past decade.
The first occurred in 1998 when Turkey massed troops on the Syrian border and demanded the
expulsion of internationally recognized terrorist Abdullah Ocalan. The Syrian military presented
only a token response, sending a few units north to reinforce those permanently stationed on the
border. The government, in a pragmatic recognition of its capabilities, quickly acquiesced and
quietly ejected Ocalan. This episode shows the significant loss of capability in the Syrian military.
More importantly, it demonstrates a lack of confidence in the military from the civilian government.
Finally, the military suffered a huge loss of prestige domestically for its inability to provide security
from an external threat.
Two years later, Israel chose to unilaterally withdraw from southern Lebanon after two
decades of occupation. The Syrian military has in part used its extensive commitments in
Lebanon as justification for huge budgets and extensive influence throughout Syrian society and
government. In addition to Israeli withdrawal, it now appears that an eventual settlement over the
Golan and a general Peace treaty are within reach. This brings into question the continued
relevance of Syria's huge, expensive, and outdated military.
Having said all of that, it must be remembered that the military remains a powerful force for
suppression of domestic dissent and that it is firmly in the hands of the government.
Nevertheless, the Syrians are deficient in modern equipment and incapable of projecting power
beyond their borders. Arguably, they are incapable of self-defense. A lighter, modernized
military, with strong, peaceful ties and cooperation with the other militaries of the region is the key
to external security. Only through reform, economic development, and regional engagement can
Syria hope to establish the conditions and secure the funding for much needed military
reorganization.
Recent events concerning Lebanon are also providing a strong incentive for modifications in
Syria's policies. Most obviously, the terrorist group, Hezbola, has quickly moved into the areas
vacated by Israel. They have made a strong case for legitimacy amongst both the people of
Lebanon and the international community. Consequently, they have become increasingly difficult
for Syria to control. This has been compounded by the fact that Hezbola does not rely solely on
Syria for funding. Iran, whose goals do not necessarily align with those of Syria, provides a
significant amount of money to the Lebanese Hezbola movement.
While Hezbola is a specific force inside of Lebanon, there is also a general desire for greater
autonomy and independence within the population at large. These institutions are growing in
organization, power, and legitimacy. They desire greater participation in the political life of
Lebanon. Most advocate the expulsion of Syrian troops from Lebanon. These forces will
eventually force a reform of the political structure and weaken Syrian influence and control within
the country.
Finally, there is external pressure. Syria is the only force holding up the government of
Lebanon. The same international pressure that convinced Israel to withdraw from southern
Lebanon is pushing Syria for similar actions. It is also pushing Lebanon to work towards internal
reforms of its own.
In addition to the various political forces discussed so far, there is currently a strong
economic incentive for Syria to seek reform. Currently, as noted above, a large portion of the
Syrian economy is based on smuggling across Lebanon and other black market activities. This is
contributing to the isolation of Syria from the international community. It also makes it almost
impossible for Syria to secure developmental aid or loans from outside sources. As a result, there
is growing pressure to curb the black economy and develop the equally, if not more lucrative
sectors of the Syrian economy that are currently fallow.
For example, a large amount of Syrian light industry and manufacturing profits are escaping
across the border. Traders from neighboring countries are buying up large amounts of Syrian
made goods, transporting them across the border, and selling them for huge profits. Legal
reforms could easily stem this flow and help to keep profits from those transactions in Syria.
Tourism is another grossly underdeveloped sector of the Syrian economy. Tourism is a
growth industry in most areas of the World. Current projections indicate that this will continue for
the immediate future. Biblical tourism in particular is expected to grow exponentially. Syria holds
many significant Biblical sites that could be easily developed. The majority of these sites sit near
the borders with Lebanon or Israel. Therefore, development of this sector will require Syria to
move towards a more harmonious relationship with its regional neighbors.
Regional geography is a final element that will compel Syria to consider reforming and
opening its system. The arbitrary nature of the international borders throughout the region make
national defense for all of the member nations difficult. In Syria, mountains define the border on
the north and west, but the desert to the south and east stretch uninterrupted for hundreds of
miles into neighboring countries. In addition, Syria, when compared to the other nations of the
region, is blessed by climate, usable land area, and resources. Without improved region relations,
Syria will remain unable to exploit this advantage and continue to be overly focused on defense.
There are also several specific geographic elements that will compel Syria to reform. The
most obvious is the Golan. This area has long been a bone of contention with Israel. Recently, it
has begun to lose its significance. Originally, Golan was important in a strategic and operational
perspective. Improved weaponry has diminished this importance, but the Golan remains
important for political reasons. Current negotiations indicate that the Golan is on the verge of
being returned to Syria. This relatively productive region will benefit Syria's economy.
Additionally, its return will be a significant political windfall, removing one more roadblock on the
road to reform.
Geography also dictates that Syria will continue to have close, strong economic ties to
Lebanon. The Homs Gap is the only natural outlet for goods moving from the interior to the coast.
This pass is situated between Syria and northern Lebanon through the mountains that form the
border between and generally separate the two countries. Trade will flow through this route. This
is true regardless of the level of political involvement or military occupation that Syria imposes.
Syria also borders Iraq. Eventually, the World will normalize relations with Iraq. With its oil
resources, Iraq's economy will return to its former levels. The time is ripe for Syria to take steps to
improve its economic and international political situation in order to position itself to take
advantage of the resurgence from Iraq. An economically strong Syria, with organic port facilities
and ready access to the well-developed ports of Lebanon will be in a prime position to exploit this
resurgence from Iraq. Syria can assume a position in relation to Iraq similar to the one played by
Jordan prior to the Gulf War.
Finally, water provides a major incentive for Syria to improve its relations in the region. As
populations continue to expand, the pressure to optimize the use of scarce regional water
resources will escalate. Currently, there is no comprehensive agreement on the use of regional
water. In fact, currently there is no agreed upon set of data to use in the discussion of regional
water issues.
The technology exists to properly monitor the flow and use of water from all of the various
regional sources, but political animosity and infighting, as well as a lack of funds, have prevented
their being utilized. Improved regional relations will lead to consensus, at least on the need for an
agreed upon set of data. This will open the door for World Bank funding of the necessary
monitoring devices.
With this data, there is a possibility for a comprehensive agreement on the use of regional
water resources. The current, bilateral, system of agreements is completely inadequate. They
have done more to exaggerate the problem and serve only to further various unrelated political
agendas. This agreement, between all of the nations connected to the water system, must
include all water resources, both surface and subterranean.
Improved regional relations and a comprehensive water agreement will be mutually
supporting. As relations in the region improve, the likelihood of a water agreement becomes more
likely. An effective water agreement will remove many of the sources of contention from the
political table and make improved regional relations more likely. The most notable example of this
would again be the Golan, where current high profile negotiations are focused on occupation of
the land, but heated, less public negotiations involve access to the water contained in the Golan
aquifer. A comprehensive water agreement would do much to simplify these and similar
negotiations.
There are many forces compelling Syria to begin to open and reform its policies. This sea
change, however, will be very difficult and fraught with hazards for those in charge. Seldom if
ever do those that begin to lead a reform survive to enjoy the final outcome. Above all else, the
current groups that are leading Syria wish to maintain their own privileged position, even at the
expense of their people and nation.
Fortunately, the group that is tied to the status quo is shrinking. Soviet patronage has ended.
The demographics that have historically supported the Ba'ath Party are irreversibly shifting. The
notables, whose influence is directly tied to economic relevance, are increasingly seeing their
future in a more open international policy. Finally, the military is declining in capability, prestige,
confidence, and relevance. They need access to the international community to reverse this
situation. As these trends continue, the traditional forces that have held power in Syria will find
their grip weakening. The possibility for change becomes increasingly likely.
Additionally, the groups that desire change are growing daily. The youth and the business
class are increasingly vocal in their dissatisfaction and they are slowly becoming organized to
oppose the status quo. External forces are also aligning in a manner that is conducive to reform.
The Lebanese are increasingly interested in a greater degree of autonomy and integration into the
World economy. Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon has made Syria's presence there less
defensible and has turned international opinion towards the desire for an eventual withdrawal from
northern Lebanon. Finally, the overall climate of the world has shifted since the Cold War. There
is an increased desire to seek settlements for disputes that were long subordinated to the
demands of the bi-polar world. The combination of shrinking authority within the traditional power
groups and the growing influence of new elements both within and without will create significant
pressure on the government to re-examine its policies. Syria will have to adapt to this new reality
to remain relevant. Historically seeing itself as a leader in the Arab World, it will have to work to
maintain that position. A policy of engagement and integration is the only logical course to follow.
2001, Foreign Area Officer Association
Springfield, Virginia
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Gotowicki.
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