THE STRATEGIC SCOUT -- Valid Concept or Not?

The Threads of History Tend to Weave the Fabric of Tomorrow

The mid-nineteenth century saw a young United States expanding it territory rapidly westward at the same time as it found itself in the throes of creating the vestiges of a mature nation state -- a standing modern national Army and a country-wide economic infrastructure. Rapid expansion westward and developing the infrastructural sinews of a new powerful nation state defined much of the United States' history during this century.

The Frontier.

As the new nation pushed its frontiers past the Mississippi River and turned its eyes and feet westward, its settlers increasingly encroached on native American tribal lands, driving these earlier residents farther westward out of their traditional territories. While this continued a forced resettlement process begun with the landings of the first European settlers in the new world, it also accelerated that process exponentially. The small professional Federal Army, responsible for protecting both the advance of the prospectors and settlers, as well as later their settlement became involved and embroiled in a conflict of significant duration called the Indian wars. A line of infantry, cavalry, and artillery regiments was stretched increasingly thinly to protect and defend an ever widening area of settlements and settlers moving west. Tiny, isolated forts dotted the west, held together only by tenuous threads of telegraph wires and rough trails. The forts, manned by platoon, company, or sometimes up to regimental elements, covered designated regional segments of the frontier with small patrols of soldiers winding their way through the forbidding wilderness. The potential that a sectional crisis could develop into a major regional war was enormous, requiring the American Army to first make the most of its limited local resources and then be able to respond with a major force concentration of its own with which to counter the specific regional native American threat.

The position in which the U.S. Army of the western frontier found itself forms an interesting parallel to that in which the U.S. Army finds itself today, but with regards to the global situation. Much of the world looks to us as the only force capable of policing the unstable regions of the world. To accomplish this unprecedented mission requirement, we are stretched extremely thinly, with large and small contingents of our Army deployed literally half-way around the world. It is again critical that the country first make the most of its limited local resources and then be able to respond with the appropriate level of force from its relatively limited CONUS based active forces, its national guard, and reserves. The parallel between the two periods forms the basis of this discussion of propriety of calling Foreign Area Officers "Strategic Scouts." I ask the reader to enter into my imagination for a few moments as I spin a tale of the wild west.

At a small isolated adobe and mud-brick fort in west Texas (call it Fort Phantom Hill) a cavalry lieutenant is preparing to mount a regular patrol of his area of responsibility. His cavalry platoon will be out in the field for at least two weeks just covering a segment of the command's area of concern. Along with his cavalry troopers he takes a native scout with him to act as his eyes and ears while on the trail. Even though his main goal is the interdiction and suppression of roving bands of Comanches, his native scout is a Cherokee from a reservation farther to the north in Oklahoma. The typical native scout was recruited from friendly tribes and was the equivalent of a common soldier, but one who brought specific skills of knowing the land, understanding trail signs, and an ability to translate simple discussions between the cavalry commanders and the local tribes. The cavalry lieutenant in our scenario, having been at his western post for almost three years, understood the tactical limitations in the abilities of his scout. The officer would use the information provided by the scout as a factor in his decision making - but probably not an overriding factor.

During the early spring of the same year as the above local scenario played itself out, larger forces are being assembled farther to the southwest for a major campaign against the Apache tribes that had begun to be a significant threat to the miners and prospectors in the Arizona and New Mexico Territories. The command consists of two regiments -- one cavalry and one infantry -- and the overall campaign was to be commanded by a two star general. The campaign objective was to decisively defeat, to capture the opposing warriors, and then drive the remnants of the various Apache bands onto reservations.

The usual contingent of native tactical scouts was present, but the campaign also had one or more white chief scouts -- paid civilian professionals hired into military service for the period of the campaign. These men, including such famous personages as "Kit" Carson, Jim Bridger, and "Buffalo" Bill Cody knew the land, understood Indian fighting tactics and operational art, spoke a number of Indian languages fluently, and had contacts and reputations at the highest levels of the Indian tribal hierarchies.

I would submit that the paid professional civilian scout used by the Army in this role provides a more applicable model for a FAO's contribution to warfighting, than does the native scout (they really fit the mold of a frontier FAO). They served as personal advisors to the expedition and, while with the expeditions were intimately involved with campaign planning and execution of those plans. It seems reasonable to use these men as one of the starting points for any consideration of and exploration into the question of what role the FAO plays in the force projection Army of the 21st Century.

Observer / Liaison Missions to Foreign Armies. Coincidental to the moves westward by the frontier Army, was a continuing effort to both regularize the practices of and generally professionalize the American Army. We sought to observe and emulate the great European armies as they practiced the art of warfare. Beginning before the Mexican War, liaison officers were dispatched to observe the operations of foreign armies in peace and war (the converse was also true with England, Germany, France, and other European powers sending observers to serve with both the Confederate and Union sides of the American Civil War). There are a number of famous examples of such missions. In the early 1840s, CPT Phil Kearny (who later in his life commanded at least one major western expedition) attended the French Royal Cavalry School and then served with the French Chasseurs D'Afrique in an Algerian campaign. On his return to the United States, he wrote the first U.S. Cavalry manual (used as late as the Civil War). Beginning with the Jefferson Davis (the then Secretary of War of the United States) Commission to the Cirmean War, U.S. Army officers can be found as observers on either side of battle lines in every major European conflict, and with many European and Asian military armies, from the Crimean War through World War II. Often these officers spoke one or more of the local languages or dialects and had numerous personal contacts in the Army that they were observing or serving with as liaison officers. During the nineteenth century, the goal of these officers was to gather and catalog information about tactics, logistics and support, and command and control. By the mid-twentieth century, especially during and since the Second World War, the goal had changed to one of offering military aid and support. Officers such as Pershing, Patton, and Stillwell all served with distinction in this roll. As the roles of these officers evolved one constant stood out throughout the history of these missions. Their success hinged on a working knowledge of foreign language, elicitation, and negotiation skills, all built on a solid tactical military foundation.

As officers returned from Europe and then served in the western theater, the lessons learned in each interweaved to improve the development of the American Army. Quite literally, these twin elements of professional scouts and observer-liaison officers roughly form the foundation and lineage of today's FAO program. But the relevance of these developments is more significant to today, given the interesting aforementioned similarities between the situation in which the western Army found itself then and the global situation in which the Army finds itself now.

The Modern Operational Evolution of the "Frontier Scout"/ "Observer-Liaison Officer"

As the 21st Century dawns, our force projection Army requires the same expertise from today's successors to Kit Carson and Buffalo Bill Cody, as did our frontier Army in the last century. The intimate knowledge of potential allies and enemies alike, combined with the ability to turn that knowledge into concrete advantages for an American Army forced to enter a regional crisis or conflict, must be considered a major force multiplier. Any operational commander worth his salt will welcome anything that will give him an advantage in a crisis environment, especially if that advantage can be translated into more efficient, successful operations that result in fewer friendly casualties. This expertise is necessary down to and including the operational level -- Division and Corps. It must be exploited in terms of projected unit missions, at every stage of planning and mission execution.

When the subject is broached, people speak of the FAO's serving at a Division or Corps headquarters as a commander's POLAD (political advisor). But the fact is that by using the frontier FAO of by-gone days as our example, it should be apparent that the regional expert assigned to a Division or Corps headquarters could and should play a much more diverse role than just POLAD. Force projection combined with our smaller force structure strongly implies participation in coalition warfare. As our combat systems become more and more modernized and digitized, the potential separation from our allies at the most basic tactical level of interoperability (who are not digitized and who are using less modern combat systems) increases exponentially. The idea of re-equipping every alliance participant with compatible, modern material is simply unrealistic. The only viable realistic solution is to create a robust liaison structure made up of officers who can easily communicate with our allies, thoroughly understand their armies, and have strong personal ties (with the resultant mutual confidence) within the allied command hierarchy. The requirement is really for a combination of the skills of both the frontier scout and the observer-liaison officer. The only specialty in the Army that comes close to achieving this is the Foreign Area Officer Specialty (Career Specialty 48) and it is an obvious fill for the regional/trans-regional requirement such as that described above. We have already seen examples of such use of FAOs in Bosnia, where three Eurasian FAOs served as the liaison between the US division and its subordinate Russian Brigade (two served day-and-night with the Russian unit, while one served on the division staff as a liaison for the commander in his interaction with the Russians). Whether the Army chooses to create independent regional liaison cells residing at the Corps level that can be attached to a Division or Brigade level deployment overseas or simply augment the one or two FAO staff planners that would already be resident in the deploying unit is a question to be considered later and in a different forum. However, it should be noted that the Marine Corps has already recognized this need and is at present preparing to create liaison units in support of their deployment missions overseas. The Army suddenly finds itself behind the power curve in an area that it has always been the leader of the other Services.

Frankly, who could participate more effectively in the campaign planning process (before departure from CONUS) than someone who is familiar with the region in question, the people of the region, the idiosyncrasies of cultures and politics, as well as knows the various militaries -- both allies and potential opponents? More importantly, the FAO in question, much like his frontier predecessor, brings a strong background of combat arms or combat support within our own Army to the table. In the same as Bill Cody might have participated in the frontier campaign commander's decision-making process, today's regional specialist assigned to the Division or Corps staff would be an integral part of every facet of the campaign planning and execution process. The addition of FAOs at the Division and Corps level has the significant by-product of making the FAO even "greener" on one hand and on the other it reintroduces a valuable mission asset to the Army operational level of war and to its middle-grade leadership (remember that Army officers who serve exclusively within the tactical Army structure really have no opportunity to observe FAOs in action and to learn what these specialized officers can do for their commands).

Until now, FAOs have normally been used at the strategic level, within the national arena and more as a defense/joint service asset than as an Army asset. As we all know, FAOs have served and continue to serve successfully as military attaches and security assistance officers around the world. As such they support the local ambassador and the theater CINC with timely political-military advice and by playing an active role in negotiating basing and nation-to-nation defense agreements at all levels. They are the "man on the ground" in areas that often have no other U.S. military presence. They have successfully fulfilled the function of strategic pointman for numerous small and large scale operational deployments of U.S. forces to these foreign lands. In addition, they also continue to serve successfully on the joint staff, DoD, and with the major Unified Commands as political-military analysts. More than 80 percent of the Army's FAO Colonel (O-6) positions currently reside within the Joint/DoD community. Therefore tying FAOs to the strategic level is no great stretch.

With the above in mind, we return to the basic question posed here -- "does the mission of the modern FAO warrant the moniker "Strategic Scout?" For that matter, what does this concept of "Strategic Scout" really mean? Is it just a nice sounding phrase that really describes nothing of significance or is it an accurate symbol of the future use of the FAO in the next century? We have established that FAO historical antecedents show distinct similarities to the present day FAO, but that is not terribly persuasive nor is it very objective. To delve further into this question, we must examine the basic premises of the modern cavalry scout, his missions, and skills, as well as whether these skills and missions can be readily translated into FAO missions and skills at the operational and strategic level of war.

What Does a Scout Do at the Tactical Level?

Reviewing a number of official and unofficial Army publications (including FM 17-98, Cavalry Scout Platoon) allows the reader to get more than a glimpse of the modern cavalry scout's primary missions -- reconnaissance and security in support of the parent unit. Scouts conduct reconnaissance to provide their commander with information that has tactical value concerning terrain, the enemy, and the effects of weather within an area of operations. Scouts reconnoiter the terrain to determine movement and maneuver conditions. When they find the enemy, they determine his strengths and weaknesses. A scout provides the information necessary to allow combined arms elements to maneuver against the enemy, strike him where he is most vulnerable, and apply overwhelming power to defeat him. Based on their commander's intent and guidance, scouts often also conduct reconnaissance forward of other friendly forces to provide current, accurate information about the terrain, resources, and enemy within a specified area of operations. This provides the follow-on forces with an opportunity to maneuver freely and rapidly to their objective. Scouts keep the follow-on forces from being surprised or interrupted, and they prevent these forces from losing men and equipment along the way to the objective. By observing the enemy undetected, scouts can retain the initiative, bring indirect fire to bear on the enemy, help larger units to maneuver and destroy the enemy, and if necessary, use direct fire themselves to kill the enemy.

Scouts are trained to:*
Perform quartering party duties. Provide traffic control.
Conduct chemical detection and radiological Survey and monitoring operations. Have an understanding of the fundamentals of reconnaissance
Call for and adjust indirect fire. Security operations.
Conduct limited pioneer (Minefield emplacement/clearing) and demolition work. Identify threat vehicles/equipment of ally/enemy vehicles

Evaluate BridgesParticipate in area security.
Direct Fire Gunnery Skills.
* FM 17-98 Cavalry Scout Platoon

Scouts are trained to recognize "threat" organizations and equipment specifically related to the reconnaissance and security phase of offensive and defensive battlefield tactics. Scouts must thoroughly understand how an opponent deploys its reconnaissance and security forces, as well as the sequence and timing of their entry into battle. The scouts' accurate and timely reporting of enemy locations and strength may be the difference between winning or losing the main battle. It is very important that scouts do not lose sight of their reconnaissance priorities and become decisively engaged in direct confrontation because this limits their effectiveness to their parent unit. Scouts must continually maintain an awareness of tactical developments and the environment within which they operate. They must have the confidence and the initiative to react quickly and appropriately to unexpected situations. When contact is made, they must seek to develop the situation at the lowest possible level, retaining the ability to maneuver and continue the mission, as needed.

Developing a situation rapidly is a key to good scout work. Whether scouts run into an obstacle or the enemy, they must quickly determine what they are up against and bypass it or, if appropriate, execute or assist in a breach. This all must be done quickly, with a minimum of guidance from higher. Time is the scout's most precious resource; he cannot waste it if he is to achieve mission success.

Scouts employ methods that achieve a balance between the acceptable level of risk and the security necessary to ensure mission accomplishment. Often this is expressed as a tradeoff between speed and security. The quicker the reconnaissance required, the more risk the scout takes and the less detailed the reconnaissance he can conduct. Scouts must use all available resources in the conduct of their mission.

A scout's primary tools for reconnaissance are his five senses; his equipment supplements and complements those senses. The following are some examples of what a scout must be able to determine about the enemy through the use of his senses

Sight. A scout looks for--
Enemy personnelVehicle tracks.
Enemy vehicles and aircraft.Signs or evidence of enemy occupation.
Sudden or unusual movementLights, fires, or reflections.
Smoke or dust. Recently cut foliage or vegetation.
Engine exhaust fumes. Muzzle flashes.
Unusual movement of farm or wild animals. Activity of the local populace.
Hearing. A scout listens for--
Running engines.Gunfire sounds (by type of weapon).
Track sounds. Unusual calm or silence.
Voices. Dismounted movement through brush or woods.
Metallic sounds.
Touch. A scout feels for--
Warmth of coals. Freshness of tracks.
Age of discarded food or trash.
Smell. A scout smells for--
Cooking food. Vehicle exhaust.
Burning petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL). Age of discarded food or trash.
Human waste.

Scouts can employ several reconnaissance methods. They must use their experience, professional judgment, and common sense to analyze a given situation and employ the appropriate method. Usually, a mission will require that these methods be applied using a variety of techniques, combinations, and variations. To reduce their vulnerability on the battlefield, scouts use reconnaissance methods that they have trained and rehearsed in detail. They take every opportunity during peacetime and on the battlefield to hone their skills. Scouts, by the nature of their mission, cannot achieve perfect security and still accomplish their mission; however, thorough knowledge of the various reconnaissance methods and their employment, combined with an understanding of a mission's particular requirements, allows the scout leader to mix and choose the reconnaissance methods that maximize security and mission accomplishment.

In security operations, security forces protect the main body from enemy observation and surprise attack. They provide the main body commander with early warning, allowing him to concentrate his combat power at the right place and time to defeat the enemy. Scouts can and do conduct screening missions independently of the larger maneuver force. To do this, they must understand the main body commander's concept of the operation and scheme of maneuver.

What Does a Scout Do at the Level of Operational Art or Strategy?

As described above, Scouts conduct reconnaissance forward of other friendly forces to provide current, accurate information about the terrain, resources, and enemy within a specified area of operations. Do these tactical activities translate to the Operational and Strategic levels of war? The short answer is yes they do -- a FAO does something very similar at the strategic level (and the operational level, too, if our projections of future Army needs are reasonably accurate). Actually located in or near the host-nation/ entrance point for a prospective overseas military operation, the FAO busies himself with all the preliminary coordination necessary to smooth the way of the entering U.S. force. He is justifiably expected to "grease the skids" for the incoming force package, as well as to welcome that unit's commander performing all of the necessary functions of introducing him to key host-country officials and translating his wants and needs into action. In this capacity, the FAO becomes an extension of the commanders reach in the host-nation. This "on the ground" asset is expected to work both overtly within the constraints of the local government rules and covertly outside the local rules and policies to search out obstacles to the operation, get a "feel" for the environment within which the operation must take place, and translate all of these source materials into a concise, accurate picture of the current situation for his commander. The need to tread carefully through a physically dangerous environment often requires all the personal contacts and skills that the FAO attach‚, liaison officer, or security assistance officer has gained over multiple tours of duty within the region.

As planners, other FAOs lend their "on the ground" background and regional expertise to the operational planning process, itself. Their job like their in-country brethren is to ensure that the command successfully enters a region as efficiently as possible and with the fewest possible casualties. Once successful entry is achieved their job (like that of their tactical cavalry scout counterpart) is to further ensure that follow-on support and sustainment packages flow smoothly and rapidly through the country in question (seemingly innocuous issues to us like military female drivers might be far more significant to a host-nation in the Middle East and actually become a show stopper if not carefully considered and negotiated during the initial phases of a deployment).

Scouting methods and training increase the individual's natural abilities to perform the mission and improve the professional results of the various scout missions. With the U.S. Army well into an era of coalition or combined warfare/operations, the training of a FAO for duty in the international arena is no less important. Language training, graduate education in a regional discipline, and in-country experience (beginning with an in-country training tour) form the FAO training cycle. These elements are the first rung on the ladder toward gaining the necessary skills to becoming a well qualified FAO regional specialist.

Obviously, language training forms the base from which the other phases of FAO training proceed. To say that it is the key to the world of the FAO is an understatement. Level of language skill is one of those areas that ultimately sets the FAO O-6 apart from his/her contemporary in other military career specialties. The FAO Colonel is expected to be able to operate without a translator at a level of language skill that would allow him/her to negotiate on an even footing with their foreign counterparts. The fact that a foreigner speaks English does not necessarily obviate the need for this skill. Nuances and critical second meanings are regularly lost when relying on a foreign officer to use his secondary language or relying on a translator to interpret the thoughts and concepts passing between two highly articulate commanders. The loss of those subtle differences in meaning often lead to misunderstandings that create very real obstacles to the successful completion of the mission. Success can even hinge on something so simple as using an officer whose speaks an educated form of the language in question vice have good skills but in the language of the rurals. Truth be known, the FAO should be able to do both, depending on the situation in which he finds himself. Language lets him in the door, while the other skills and training let him take full advantage of his quality language.

Graduate schooling in their regional discipline is more than a rubber stamp on the way through a FAOs career. The issue is not so much getting the degree, as getting the background that allows a regional specialist to put countries and their actions in the framework of the regional or even global politics, economics, social, or military contexts. The degree simply codifies the attainment of the needed education. Similarly, attaining a degree in some other field does not really go far towards building the necessary skills to perform as a FAO (a mechanical engineering degree does not make you a regional expert). The ability to classify actions toward one ally or opponent in a context of how that action will be perceived by other allies, neutrals, or opponents is significant. When working in the coalition or combined environment a misstep can send misleading and conflicting messages to both allies and enemies alike, resulting in at best reduced efficiency and at worst complete command breakdown. It is an interesting phenomena that to be a better regional specialist, the FAO ultimately has to become a globalist -- understanding how his region relates to the rest of the world at all levels.

As noted above, the in-country experience portion of FAO training is only the first regional rung on the ladder to really operating as a qualified FAO later in an Army career. Most FAO in-country experiences include a military school phase (usually a host-nation General Staff College within the region), an internship phase, and a travel phase. To say that the old-school ties and networks are alive and well in most of the world is an understatement. Officers who attend these schools are the cream of the nations crop and will almost assuredly become its senior military leadership corps of the future. This is true of the host-nation attendees and those attendees from neighboring nations as well. The FAO trainee enters a "club" for life by attending these schools. Internships that follow or are interspersed with the school attendance allow the young FAO to get his first taste of the realms of defense attach‚ or security assistance work. Lastly, the regional travel phase of his training introducing the officer to the other countries within his region. Travel is tightly controlled by the Army Attaches of the countries involved, to ensure that the trainee sees and learns about the other military, industries, cultures, social differences, and governments that compose the region in question. The travel firmly sets the foundation for future assignments in the region.

With these tools and after multiple tours both in the region and as analysts of the region, the senior FAO is well prepared to operate on his own as a pointman for any entering U.S. force. He can search for the tell-tale signs of change that might affect a well considered plan. He will be able to get out into the countryside, operate in isolation, hearing, seeing, smelling and touching the pulse of the host-nation -- not just the military and the bureaucracy, but segments of the population and the environment that can indirectly influence mission success or failure.

How about obstacles or pioneer work equating to Strategic Scouting? A FAO must locate obstructions (host nation laws, our own laws, cultural misperceptions, budgetary constraints etc ) at the strategic level placed by "the opponent" and develop the situation rapidly. Replace "Scout" with "FAO" and see if the description fits. The FAO combines with the S2's (intelligence agency) work and adds to this work creating a operational friendly, usable product for the commander. He, as the man on the ground, is in one of the best positions to identify any possible obstacles and restrictions to the commander's scheme of maneuver within his area of operations. The FAO's ability to deal with an obstacle or restriction is somewhat limited in the conventional sense, but this is where is career-long efforts to build intimate contacts within a host nation military establishment really pay off. He has the capability to clear small diplomatic and bureaucratic obstacles quickly and to influence the clearing of larger, but similar obstacles. The FAOs' most important function is reconnaissance of deliberate obstacles, including supporting enemy positions and possible breaching sites. At a strategic and operational level these obstacles can take the form of anything from something as large as the necessity to abrogate a standing nation-to-nation treaty to something as small as dealing with local customs officials. The FAO has to know and understand his region thoroughly (including customs and cultural oddities), so that in time of crisis he can steer a commander through the complexities of entering a foreign nation with a significant armed force.

The point of this section has been to illustrate that if you replace the word scout with Foreign Area Officer in the Army doctrine that describes what a scout is and does at the tactical level, there is a resultant and obvious parallel between it and what the FAO is expected to do at the Operational Art and Strategy. The moniker "Strategic Scout" appears both to be valid and appropriate for the U.S. Army of the 21st Century.

1997, Foreign Area Officer Association
Springfield, Virginia
Maintained by LTC Steve Gotowicki.
http://www.faoa.org