Bridging a Cultural Gap in Saudi Arabia

by MAJ David F. DiMeo, 48G

More than ever, US forces find themselves operating with allies from vastly different cultural backgrounds. Despite a shared mission, the cultural differences can create friction and impede effectiveness. FAOs are often expected to minimize this friction so that the combatant commanders can accomplish their missions with minimal disruption.

US-Saudi cooperation in Operation Southern Watch (patrolling the no-fly zone in Southern Iraq) provides an example of success in bridging this cultural divide. A force of several thousand US combatants has operated from Saudi Arabia for ten years. The cultural differences are great, the strategic stakes are high, and the results have been impressive. The lessons in successful cooperation can be applied to other regions of the world, as well.

Every US action has economic, political, social and religious implications for the Kingdom. The Saudis will assess the impact of proposed operations on all those areas.

These observations are based on my experience in the Saudi Ministry of Defense and Aviation (MoDA) as a liaison officer for deployed US combatant forces. Our small liaison cell coordinated combatant forces' issues in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, from Customs to logistics to communications to engineering. Although the US has a well- established military training mission in Saudi Arabia (and of course, an embassy), we were not part of those units. Our task was strictly to help the US combat forces accomplish their mission. As MG Scales' recent comments have created a stir about what FAOs actually contribute to the military, perhaps this will serve as another example of a tangible contribution. As we continue to deploy troops to areas where we have not had a previous troop presence (Somalia, Bosnia, East Timor, etc.) this FAO role will become more important.

Impact of Cultural Misperceptions

The majority of our military personnel serving with Operation Southern Watch (OSW) are on three-month TDY tours in Saudi Arabia. This includes many officers who deal with Saudi officials on a frequent basis. Most have had little or no previous interaction with an Arab military. As a result, misperceptions about Arabs or Muslims in general can affect the working relationship.

A Basic Misperception. The most common pitfall is to attribute far too much of the Saudis' behavior to traditional customs, while dismissing political, economic and military concerns. There is a general perception that Westerners are driven by practical concerns like dollars and power, while "exotic" nations are influenced by their traditional culture. In this case, that refers to Bedouin Arab culture, but similar perceptions exist about other "Eastern" societies.

By traditional culture, I mean social customs, pleasantries and taboos, like "don't shake with your left hand," or "don't cross your legs in public." Such customs are important in any society, but we should not overestimate their influence on the Host Nation's decision making process. When you propose a $100 million project to the Saudi government, they will be swayed more by the costs and benefits of that project than by how well you drink tea.

The central importance of Islam is reflected in the Saudi flag, which contains the Muslim confession of faith, "There is no god but God, and Mohammed is the messenger of God.
Source of Misperceptions. The root problem is not a lack of knowledge about the Host Nation. In fact, the most successful US staff officers were those who arrived in country admitting that they did not know much about the culture. They were eager to learn, and by the end of their tour, they had an impressiv e understanding of the Saudi situation.

The problem, rather, is having the wrong kind of knowledg e about the Host Nation. Unfortunately, the most popular sources for information about the Middle East tend to be the writings of T.E. Lawrence, or culture guides like The Arab Mind. These books do have value, but they represent very narrow views of Arab culture that are largely outdated. The warrior Bedouin of Lawrence's time is as representative of the modern Arab professional as Davy Crockett is of an American professional.

A Very Different Reality. Most of the Saudi officers we deal with have spent five to ten years in the United States. They have graduated from American military schools and have advanced degrees from American universities. They are also well aware of the American media stereotypes of Arabs and Muslims. It is fair to say that they have had more exposure to our culture than we have had to theirs'.

Impact. These misperceptions have several effects on Host Nation cooperation. First, it makes it very hard to anticipate the Saudi position and deal with it if one expects them to act based on old Bedouin traditions. Second, an American negotiator who expects to impress his counterpart with a discussion of camel husbandry will find himself stymied when the conversation turns to politics and economics. Third, such an American will appear confused, at best. At worst, the Saudis may find him condescending and insulting.

A More Accurate Picture of Saudi Government Concerns.

If Bedouin traditions are not the key to understanding the Host Nation's thinking, then where should we focus our attention? To answer that question, we must first recognize that the presence of several thousand combat troops has a tremendous impact on life in a small country like Saudi Arabia. A Host Nation can make major adjustments to accommodate a temporary deployment, like DESERT SHIELD, but the current OSW mission has been going on for a decade, with no end in sight. Every US move has economic, political, social and even religious implications for the Kingdom. The Saudis will assess the impact of proposed operations on all those areas.

Economic. In the economic realm, the deployed force has positive and negative impact on the Kingdom. Saudi Arabia provides over $85 million a year to support OSW (this is separate from what it pays for the US Military Training Mission). In past years, this number has been over $200 million. The Saudis financed the construction of permanent facilities to house US troops at the same time that they cut subsidies to their own people (like some benefits for the royal family). On the other hand, the OSW forces inject a considerable amount of money into the Saudi economy through labor contracts, construction and local purchases. These contributions are all the more important because they are in the non-oil sector.

Saudi Arabia can no longer count on consistent oil windfalls like in the 1970s. Oil prices reached lows in the 1990s and created record deficits in the country. In the year 2000, they jumped to high levels, but there is no guarantee this will continue. The Kingdom feels the pain of supporting OSW the most at the same time it most needs OSW's non-oil revenues. Therefore, multi-million dollar projects can be seen either as a boon or a burden for the Kingdom, depending on how they are presented.

In presenting a proposal to the Saudi military, it is very important to capture these benefits in a measurable way. The liaison officers must point out how much of the labor, consulting and supplies for a project comes from Saudi sources, and be able to explain why certain services had to be brought in from the US. They must be able to show projected revenues for maintenance and support in future years. Skilled Saudi consultants and technicians will scrutinize the figures and balance them against their own projections. An effective financial analysis that shows a "win-win" scenario will have a greater impact than the way you hold your teacup.

Religious. Islam plays a central role in Saudi affairs. The Kingdom contains the two Muslim holy cities of Mecca and Medina and is the Holy Land for over a billion Muslims worldwide. The Saud family does not have a lineage to the Prophet Muhammad, which is traditionally the source of religious legitimacy in Islam. Instead, the Saud family derives its religious legitimacy by enforcing a strict version of Islamic law in the Kingdom. This function is so important that the King's official title is "Custodian of the two Holy Sites."

Any perceived deviation from strict Islamic law weakens the regime's legitimacy. It is common to hear Muslims in other countries, like Egypt or Morocco say that liberal practices (like women driving cars) are acceptable in their country, but not in the Holy Land. Therefore, Saudi religious laws are not a sign of backwardness or resistance to change. They are, in fact, a part of the regime's legitimacy.

Naturally, the presence of several thousand non-Muslim troops is a very sensitive issue. When opponents of the Kingdom, like Saddam Hussein or Usama Bin Ladin want to attack the Saud family's legitimacy, this is the issue they use. It is very important for the Saudi government to convince its people that US troops are not violating Islamic laws. They must demonstrate that they have effective control over the actions of foreign troops in their Kingdom. If it appears that US forces are disregarding Saudi wishes, then speculation will follow that US forces are disregarding Islamic laws, as well. Little wonder that a popular English-language visitors' guide published by the Saudi government is entitled, This is Our Country.

Political. The OSW mission also has political costs for the Saudi regime that most Americans overlook. Support for the sanctions against Iraq is dwindling throughout the world, and especially among the Arab countries. Air strikes are even less popular. Although most Arabs hate Saddam Hussein, many feel that sanctions and air strikes are ineffective ways of dealing with him. It is quite common to hear Arabs say that the sanctions and air strikes only hurt Iraqi children, not Saddam. Therefore, Saudi Arabia pays a huge cost in terms of regional prestige by being a host to US forces.

Additionally, Americans often do not appreciate how important the sense of Arab brotherhood and unity is. The Gulf War was a humiliating reminder of the failure of Arab unity. Worse, the continuing US military operation demonstrates that after ten years, the Arabs are still unable to contain Saddam by themselves. While the US wants to draw maximum public attention to the US-Arab coalition against Iraq, the Saudis would like to be as discreet about it as possible.

In such a situation, it is critical for the Saudi regime to show that it is not surrendering its sovereignty to the US. As much as possible, it must appear that the Saudis have the final say about everything that goes on in their country. The US must appear to be an ally, assisting the Kingdom. Whenever US forces violate Saudi rules, it undermines Saudi credibility, much more than we realize. This leads to friction and mistrust that sap the effectiveness of the fighting force.

Causes of Friction

Americans do not consciously set out to deprive the Saudis of their sovereignty or humiliate them in front of the Arab world. Many of our actions, however, give the appearance that Saudi sovereignty and sensitivity are not considerations in our plans. We often appear as though we are acting like an army of occupation, with a green light to do whatever we please in the host country. Where does such an impression come from?

Skeptics within the Kingdom. We must recognize that many powerful elements within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia oppose the idea of a US military presence there. The religious establishment is one group, but there are also officials within Saudi Customs, Immigration, Aviation and even the military ministries charged with overseeing religious rules and practices. Numerous senior military and civilian leaders come from conservative Islamic backgrounds.

In order to win the acquiescence of these elements, the Saudi government had to make a strong case that US forces would respect the rules and practices in the Kingdom. Customs and Immigrations violations are a particular concern, because many of the officials who catch these violations are members of the conservative religious establishment who are already skeptical of the American influence. When one combines frequent violations of Saudi Customs laws with MTV-images of American culture, Saddam's propaganda about Americans defiling the Holy Land starts to sound credible.

Misconceptions of the American System. Contributing to the friction is a common misconception that many Saudis have about the US logistical, personnel and planning systems. Most Saudi officers have trained in the United States and are quite proud of their familiarity with the US military. Although they may have technical expertise, however, most have never worked with a global logistical system like ours. Consequently, most have no idea how complex it is. In truth, I think few American officers really appreciate how massive and complicated the system is until we actually have to work with it.

Much of our logistical system is driven from CONUS. The J4 staff in Saudi Arabia doesn't necessarily control what arrives in country, when it arrives and from where. Long lead times involved in scheduling sea lift, or changing airlift availability also make it difficult to completely control the system. Munitions destined for Saudi may be shifted to Korea and vice versa. These are events that we have come to accept as a normal part of the system.

The Saudi MoDA staff, however, tended to believe that the US commander on the ground had complete control over everything that happened involving US forces. If the US forces had authorization to import a certain type of missile, but a different type actually arrived at the airport, this was seen as a deliberate attempt to deceive the Saudi government. The fact that the original missiles were re-routed for the air campaign in Kosovo is of little concern. If prohibited religious items arrived at the Riyadh airport, the Saudis assumed that the US commander shipped them in open defiance of Saudi law. The fact that the items were misrouted from Germany would be of no consequence.

The Host Nation sees America as the most technologically advanced power in the world. They see the precision of our weapons, our capability to transmit data instantly around the world, our ability to get a ten-digit grid location by satellite anywhere in the world, and so on. How could the US be able to track every vehicle in the Iraqi army but not deliver a box to correct country? "You are supposed to be the Superpower!" was a very common lament in Riyadh. When you combine the American and Saudi misperceptions, it is easy to see how friction can build up.

Reducing the Friction in Host-Nation Relations

Increasing Awareness. Since so much of the friction is due to misperceptions, the first step is to clear up some of these misunderstandings. Most Americans deploying to the Gulf have never been given a clear explanation of Saudi concerns. Upon exiting the plane, they are told merely that "this is a very religious country," and "these people are very traditional."

At the very least, those staff members that will have contact with the Host Nation need to know some of the basic political, economic and religious issues involved. This could be as brief an explanation as we have presented here. Our staff officers and NCOs are perceptive and pro-active enough to scrutinize their operations and ensure that possible offenses to the Host Nation are minimal. With personnel changeover occurring every 90 days, this becomes even more critical.

Building Trust. There is much less we can do to change the Host Nation perceptions, but every effort helps. Saudi officers greatly appreciated being invited onto the US areas in their bases and getting a tour of our work areas. Observing all the proper security procedures, there is still plenty to show them to give them a window into the complexity of our operation. For many, just seeing the amount of automation equipment we use, the volumes of regulations we have and the many different agencies involved in our daily operations helps them appreciate that we are not trying to deceive anyone. Just the gesture itself conveys mutual respect and consideration. On the other hand, the over-eager US guard who holds a Saudi general at gunpoint sets us back years in terms of Host Nation relations.

Also, we must acknowledge and address Host Nation concerns at a high level and show that we are working toward "win-win" solutions. In our frequent meetings with the Saudis, our US Director and Chief of Staff would try to anticipate and address the Saudi concerns before the Saudi staff had to bring them up. Even when we did not have a solution to the problem, it paid great dividends for our Director to explain all the options we were exploring in order to satisfy everyone's requirements.

Cooperative Solutions. To put this into practice, we have to work out policies that satisfy both sides. Obviously, we have to meet US operational needs. Yet, we cannot merely do things according to our own SOPs, and expect the Host Nation to accept it as operational necessity. Sometimes the issues are simple ones. Using guard dogs to check vehicles coming into the US compound is an example. Dogs are considering filthy and offensive to Saudi Muslims, yet security is paramount. Between the US and Saudi Military Police, we were able to create procedures to inspect visiting Saudi vehicles without the dogs actually coming into contact with the Saudi officers themselves.

Some issues are much more complex. Resolution often involves bringing together technical experts for both nations. An example was obtaining an exemption from Saudi royal decrees to import blood and medicines for US forces. This required intense technical coordination to ensure compliance with FDA regulations, Saudi Customs law and Islamic law. Explaining why Saudi medical sources were not acceptable, without offending them, was another delicate matter. That required pointing out differences in the US and Saudi medical codes that did not necessarily make one sound better than the other. The point is that in these negotiations, the subject of camel racing did not come up very often.

Addressing Larger Controversies.

A final element in Host Nation relations concerns our role as representatives of the US government. We may be the only members of the US government that our Host Nation counterparts have the opportunity to talk to. While it would certainly be safer to limit the conversation to logistics and operations, any American military member can expect to be asked about American politics, religion or family values.

In this area, we walk a thin line. Quoting official military public relations statements will not do much to build positive relationships, yet we should not criticize our government's policies, either. When Arabs ask about our policy toward Israel and the Palestinians, or the very unpopular sanctions against Iraq, what do we say without offending them or discrediting our own government?

First, we should remember that in such cases, they are venting frustration more than anything else. People around the world watch CNN and see the US driving international relations. Often, they feel like they are small players who do not have a voice. An Arab soldier who questions US policy in the Middle East doesn't necessarily want an explanation as much as he wants to be heard.

Second, we must remember that the Host Nation's version of history is the only one that many of our counterparts have heard. Most Arab schoolchildren learn that the 1973 Arab-Israeli War was a crushing Arab victory; that Saddam's invasion of Kuwait was identical to the Israeli capture of the West Bank, Golan and Gaza; and that Israel is a European Colonial power. Arguing that their version of history is wrong is likely to be a futile, emotional exercise.

We can, however, emphasize the points on which we do agree. Any place where the US was involved in protecting Muslims is a good start. The liberation of Kosovo and the defeat of Yugoslav dictator Milosevic are examples. Our common disgust at the Russian attacks in Chechnya, is another. We can even point to US efforts to advance the peace process between Israel and Palestine, without getting bogged down in the specifics of the proposals and agreements.

Last, we can keep things amicable on a personal level, even where national policies differ somewhat. Emphasize that on the mission at hand, our governments agree. If they disagree on some other issues, those are not really our concern; we will leave those to the diplomats. Reiterating to your host how much you appreciate his assistance in your daily business will push any political disagreements to the back burner.

The FAO Contribution in Perspective.

It is obvious from the preceding discussion that "FAO work" is thoroughly interwoven with the operational success of a combatant mission in a foreign region. To view the FAO role as specializing in the language and social pleasantries is a far too narrow perspective. Political and economic concerns bleed over into treaties and military agreements and then into logistical support and operational constraints. If we make a clear dividing line between these subjects, it is an artificial one that will not apply in the real world.

While Saudi Arabia presents one particular operating environment, Bosnia, East Timor, Haiti and other countries present their own set of challenges. Those challenges will be different than the ones discussed here, but the skills required of the FAO to meet them will be similar. To return to the current controversy about what FAOs can actually contribute to the fighting force, perhaps the answer is not to be found in theories, but in what we are actually doing on the ground today.

MAJ David F. DiMeo is an Instructor of Arabic at the United States Military Academy at West Point. Prior to that, he served as the Liaison Officer for USCENTCOM-Forward to the Saudi MoDA in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. He conducted In- Country Training in Cairo, Egypt and received a Master's Degree from Princeton University. The views here are the author's and do not represent the US Military Academy or USCENTCOM.

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