South Asia: Time for Reevaluation
by LTC Frank Rindone
The United States unexpectedly found itself with two new nuclear states with whom
to contend early in the summer of 1998. Indian and Pakistani scientists detonated
somewhere between three and eleven nuclear devices that summer. 1 Yet, United States policymakers
chose to treat this momentous security development as a failure of nuclear
nonproliferation regimes or the latest manifestation of a parochial, regional arms race.
Staff around the U. S. government dedicated little intellectual 'horsepower' to examining
the effects of these events on the United States' global security strategy or on adjacent
regions. Most policymakers, government analysts and members of the media, continued
to view South Asia through the prism of narrow, single-issue imperatives. Working-level
U. S. foreign affairs officials, civilian and uniformed, did not recognize the failure of this
methodology and evaluate existing strategies in the wake of these irreversible events.
OFTEN OVERLOOKED
United States policy makers for the most part fail to notice South Asia's
impressive potential. Most Americans only know the region through the 1960-era film
"Gandhi" or possibly a non-Western history course from secondary school days. South
Asia's numbers can stagger the imagination. Fully 25% of the world's population live in
this relatively small, geographic area -- India has about a BILLION people itself. In other
words, future consumers of American goods and services greater than all of Europe
continued (including Russia) live within an area about the size of Canada. True, more
than 800 million people live at or below the poverty level; yet, considerably more than
300 million people are middle-class or above. The region has produced some of the
world's finest scientists and institutions of higher learning. 2 South Asia has deposits of oil, natural gas, iron,
coal, gems, and a myriad of other important and strategic natural resources. Natural
resources notwithstanding, the region continues to produce the bulk of the world's opiates
(legal and illegal). Finally, this region has the world's largest concentration of combat
arms battalions, 3 along
with two 'blue water' navies, modern air forces, competent special operations forces,
short-and-medium range missile forces, as well as violent government and independently
sponsored terrorist organizations.
Democracy is present throughout the region -- the isolated and landlocked
states of Afghanistan and Bhutan along with politically isolated Myanmar (Burma) the
only exceptions. Still, democracy lives side-by-side with feudalism and religious
fundamentalism (and growing xenophobia). The vast bulk of the Asian Subcontinent's
people lives under democratically elected leaders, though. India, Bangladesh, Pakistan,
and Nepal have functioning Westminster-style parliamentary democracies; albeit, how
well functioning is a matter of continuing debate within those countries. Sri Lanka and
Maldives have Presidential-style parliamentary democracies. Indian and Sri Lankan
democracies have functioned almost continuously their fifty-one years of independence.
Bangladesh, Pakistan and Nepal have short, and spotty histories with Western-style
democracy; however, commitment to the concept by their political elites is almost
universal.
Senior leaders in the United States tend to miss South Asia's successes.
South Asia's achievements over the last few decades are generally unfamiliar outside of a
small cadre of specialists. The region has growing democratization, increased economic
liberalism and scientific advancement, all of which contributed to improved defense
forces. Indian and Pakistan have missile forces with the ability to reach out well beyond
1000 kilometers. Also, both nations are working toward having much longer ranged
missiles in the future. These newly nuclear capable nations have robust pharmaceutical
and chemical industries. These industries presumably possess the ability to produce
simple chemical and biology munitions. Moreover, India continues to work towards a
medium-ranged missile system and modern space program. Bangladesh and Sri Lanka
have growing pharmaceutical and chemical industries. Even isolated Bhutan has
developed a budding computer assembly industry, with a goal of fully manufacturing
computers early in the next century. Many of the industries maturing in the region have
dual military-civilian applications, with little oversight or observation from the outside
world.
MISUNDERSTANDING OR LACK OF RESPECT: CAUSE FOR CONFLICT
South Asia's political, military, scientific and professional elites generally
perceive a subtle, and sometimes not so subtle, lack of respect on the part of United
States officials. The saying 'perception is reality' appropriately describes this situation.
No amount of verbal expression to the contrary appears to penetrate the widespread
South Asian viewpoint that the United States does not thoughtfully consider South Asia,
or its requirements. Actions take on greater meaining than words. Post-May 1998
nuclear detonation interviews with Indian and Pakistani leaders always returned to the
theme 'now the United States will take us seriously,' implying that the United States did
not prior to the detonations. 4 Also, the non-nuclear South Asian states' elites
voice similar sentiments. Decision-makers across the region quickly point to the half
century of neglect and lack of bilateral visits by senior United States policymakers. This
situation turned around dramatically in the wake of India's May 1998 nuclear tests.
Regional political leaders point to the United States' tendency to sermonize to them on
issues ranging from dowry to global security policy. Indian leaders in particular note that
United States policymakers do not treat Europeans in the same condescending (from an
Indian standpoint) fashion. Military leaders point to the lack of substantive cooperation
between their countries and the United States. Scientific leaders have the perception that
Western colleagues judge South Asian scientific efforts as rudimentary, rather than on
par. Finally, South Asian professionals believe Western associates denigrate their skills
because of a lack of Western university credentials. In the end, South Asia's elites tend
to see insult rather than misunderstanding when dealing with the United States'
policymakers.
The configuration of the United States government's bureaucracy contributes
to a failure to fully comprehend the region. Few in the United States have first-hand
experience with South Asia or have ever studied the region in detail. Transnational
issues 5 and their narrow
specialists tend to dominate United States policy for the region as a result. This factor
alone gives South Asian leaders the impression that their area of the world is of little
consequence. The Department of State's South Asia Bureau 6 is the only section in the United States government
that focuses exclusively on the region as a whole. However, that bureau divides the
region into Pakistan-Afghanistan-Bangladesh (the Muslim countries) and India-Burma-Nepal-Sri Lanka (the Hindu and Buddist countries) directorates, unnecessarily
establishing staffs with competing imperatives. The other agencies and departments of
the United States government licate South Asia with Southwest Asia 7 or as a part of an Asia/Pacific zone.
Southwest Asian or East Asian concerns and issues take the forefront of effort in these
various MESAs, NESAs and Asia/Pacific sections because of the ongoing commitment
of United States forces in those regions.
The Department of Defense, with the most people and best funding, does
not assist itself in dealing with the region and developing a comprehensive strategy to
support policymakers. Afghanistan and Pakistan are in the Commander-in-Chief (CINC)
Central Command's area of responsibility (AOR). The remainder of the region is in
CINC Pacific Commands AOR. This administrative division contributes significantly to
the bureaucratic 'fog of war' and failure to 'see' the region. The separation of the region
along the India-Pakistan 'fault-line also apportions the few Foreign Area Officers of the
Department of Defense who specialize in the region between the two CINC-doms.
Additionally, crises in Southwest Asia, China, and Europe siphoned off South Asian
specialists working in various MESAs and NESAs around Washington. As a
consequence, policymakers little understand the long-standing Pakistan-China and India-Russia alliances, the growing India-Chian competition south of the Tibetan plateau, and
Russian-Chinese competition in Sout Asia, as each staff narrowly focuses on their
bilateral issues, projects and programs.
Few in the United Statesgovernment (civilian or military) closely follow
events in this region, resulting in misinterpretations between South Asian elites and
United States policymakers. The Department of Defense, including the CINC-doms
responsible for the region, has less than twenty officers from all Services working on
South Asian issues and strategy. The Intelligence Community, too, has very few
individuals dedicated to "seeing and knowing" South Asia to assist policymakers. The
situation is not any better in the other foreign affairs departments. The Department of
State, likewise, has limited resources dedicated to South Asia in spite of the region's
growing commercial and military importance. The Departments of Commerce and
Energy are much worse off, with no one specifically dedicated to the region. The staff
shortfall significantly contributes to policymakers' inability to properly develop an
effectual strategy in the wake of growing bilateral concerns. The United States' lack of
expertise contributes to the South Asian general perception of a lack of respect. The
United States loses ability to effectively influence the region as a result.
A FEW FINAL NOTES
United States policymakers have paid little attention to South Asia since the
end of World War II. American foreign policy leaders tend to push South Asian
countries' individual security concerns to the background, often belittling those concerns
in the process. Scarcely appreciated is the seriousness of regional border tensions since
the United Kingdom's withdrawal. Of the world's seven acknowledged nuclear states,
three if those nations converge in the mountains of South Asia (India, Pakistan, and
China). Facts often missed by security policymakers: China and India fought a war as
recently as 1962 and have continuing, unresolved border issues; and, India and Pakistan
have fought four wars (one as recently as 1971), not counting constant border skirmishes
over unresolved border issues. South Asia's large armed forces today center on
individual concerns with regional neighbors or internal security matters. The region's
nuclear powers, too, focus on regional players, if we take their leaders at face value.
United States policymakers continue to address little attention toward the region's
conflict potential because of this perception. However, Indian and Pakistani submarine
units, air forces, and missile forces today can impact the Arabian Gulf region if their
governments so chose. Moreover, all South Asian intelligence services, while focused on
the region and inward for now, can easily support operations on a global scale given the
number of their expatriates working in North America, Europe and Southwest Asia.
WHERE CAN WE GO FROM HERE?
South Asia requires more attention, resources and effort, on our part. The
region's military, scientific and commercial potential makes a good argument for this
additional allocation of resources, even without the nuclear issue present. The region's
growing power will impact more and more on United States interests. United States
policymakers require the best advice and information available. Clearly India and
Pakistan will continue their search for Great Power status, driving increased effort to
acquire additional nuclear, chemical, biological, missile and conventional assets.
However, United States policymakers show little concern over burgeoning India-China
competition or the tacit alliances of India-Russia and Pakistan-China, all of whom have
continuing border issues and animosities going back centuries. Unifying study and
analysis could a single CINC-dom and moving the region out from various MESAs and
NESAs in the government could immediately improve "seeing" the region -- without
prohibitive expenditure of additional resources. To conclude, the past's benign neglect
towards the region should change to guarantee that a repeat of the information and policy
shortfall in the wake of India's May 1998 nuclear detonations does not occur.
Endnotes
1. India's government stated that their
scientists detonated five nuclear devices; while Pakistan's government informed
the world that it's scientists set off six devices. However, Western, in particular
United States, sensors could not verify that eleven explosions occurred. Each
nation did have at least one confirmed detonation thereby demonstrating that
both India and Pakistan have a nuclear capability.
BACK
2. Figures obtained from the Department of
State indicated that South Asians apply for and get the overwhelming majority of
the so called 'high tech' worker visas for employment in the United States
information technology industry -- attesting to their quality given the fact that
these visas are only granted to United States corporation-sponsored
applicants. BACK
3. Combat Arms battalions include: air
defense, armor, artillery, aviation, engineers, infantry, and special operations
forces; for the purpose of South Asia, this category also takes into account
paramilitary forces. BACK
4. A look at Time, Newsweek,
and the New York Times for the thrid week of May 1998 or the last week
of June 1998 provides an overview of different interviews that stress the 'respect'
theme. BACK
5. A short list of the many "global-wide"
issues dominating discussions with South Asian elites, without prioritization, is:
child labor, narcotics production and smuggling, missile proliferation, nuclear test
ban treaty, software piracy, intellectual property copyright infringement, and
human rights violations. BACK
6. Myanmar is the only 'traditional' South
Asian country not located in the DOS South Asia Bureau.
BACK
7. The majority of government agencies
place South Asia as a subsection of a MESA (Middle East and South Asia) or a
NESA (Near East and South Asia) section; although, some departments place
the region in the broader collective of Asia/Pacific sections. BACK
