The Significance of Russian Weapon Sales to China

by Major Stephen M. Bruce

What is the nature of the "strategic alliance" between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China?1  For the United States, understanding the nature of the Sino-Russian convergence is critical in developing foreign and security polices for the next decade. As President-elect George W. Bush has stated, "in the long run, security in the world is going to be how we deal with China and Russia." The new president's approach is likely to eschew the Clinton Administration's strategic-partnership- through-engagement approach towards both Russia and China during the 1990s, which vice- president Al Gore had intended to continue.2  However, this 'new' relationship between Russia and China, despite the "Who Lost Russia?" debate and the concern of Chinese espionage and regional expansion is at times misunderstood or simplified.3 

One of these simplifications is Russian weapon sales to China, which is often relegated to the idea that Russia simply needs money and China needs new weapons, so they can both band against the United States to create a multi-polar world.4  Although this is a significant part of the motivations for these sales, it is not the only part. In fact, the motivations are more complex and reflect domestic concerns as well as short and long-term foreign policy goals of China and Russia. An examination of the extent and character of Russian armament sales to China and, the subject of this paper, serves as a starting point to understand the current Russian-Chinese relationship.

What emerges is not an equal rapprochement between Russia and China.5  Although both countries are working together against what they see as a US hegemonic drive, they are using this period to weather different changes and build the infrastructure for the pursuit of future geopolitical goals that are potentially opposing. Furthermore, until now Russia's relationship to China has not been based on a unified strategy. Instead it is an amalgamation of individual actors for their own interests. China's, on the other hand, has been, in comparison, a unified strategy. Russian weapon sales are a prime example.

Since 1991, the Russian arms industry increased its arms sales to China, with total sales exceeding $9 billion by the end of 1998.6  Stemming from the economic collapse and revolutionary state of transferring from communism, with its command economy, to a free market-based democracy, Russia started to actively expand its arms sales.7  This occurred for several reasons.

First, as Stephen Blank points out, "arms sales are critical to Russian defense industry and planners because the defense industry cannot survive on the basis of domestic procurements alone."8  The Soviet military-industrial complex that the Russian Federation inherited still remains capable of producing state-of-the art weaponry, but is not capable of finding consumers at home. For, instance the Ministry of Defense owes the arms industry over 20 billion rubles, with a quarter of these for wages alone.9  This is partially a legacy of the Russian military leadership, which opted for retaining force structure and readiness over investment in future technologies in the early 1990s. Throughout the nineties, the Russian government has been unable to implement any coherent defense conversion program that is tied into a realistic national security strategy.10 

This opened up windows of opportunity for the defense industry to find purchasers abroad. With a weak central government, these actors were free to act without the constraint of a coherent national security strategy, to which arms sales would be subordinated and regulated by licensing.11  In fact, under Yeltsin, self-serving defense industry officials were elevated to ministerial status and were able to gain some subsidies of the arms industry. Today many high-tech armaments and platforms are sold, with state consent, abroad, before Russian forces get them.12  In many cases, arms are sold to states that Russia is likely to confront in the future.

As a result, the Russian military currently can not afford to modernize itself or invest and support new weapons development or procurement. By not investing in R&D, it is likely that Russia will exhaust any technological lead it has in the arms trade in the next five to ten years. By 1997, Russian military output was only 8.8% of its 1991 level, reflecting a thirty- percent decline per annum.13  Although there was a five-percent increase in 1998, overall real output still declined. Significantly, the sectors that did not decrease amidst this overall decline were the missile and space sector, the aircraft and radio and shipbuilding sectors.14 

It is these sectors where Russian weapon transfers are concentrated. Russia, primarily through transfers to India and China, is the second leading supplier of major conventional weapons in the world for the 1994-1998 period, even though from 1997-1998 these transfers have declined by almost sixty percent.15  Future transfers of ships and combat aircraft will soon boost this figure, although only for the short term. Due to a lack of major investment in new technologies Russia risks losing its edge in the arms market.16 

State support of these weapon sales, even if after the fact, could satisfy immediate domestic needs of Russia. The revenue gained could slow deterioration of the armed forces and create space for Russia to first stabilize the collapse of the armed forces and then start implementing true military reform.17  As Alexei Arbatov, the deputy chairman of the Committee of on Defense in the Russian Duma, shows: "If Russia's mammoth military- industrial establishment were to collapse - a distinct possibility in the next few years -- the consequences would be no less devastating than were the events of 1941 not only for Russia but for the entire world. Debates and infighting over military reform are at the very core of Russia's domestic politics."18 

It is crucial for Russia to prevent a complete collapse of its armaments industry. From 1991 to 1997, the number of enterprises subject to Ministry of Defense control has dropped from over 1,800 to less than 500, most of which never successfully converted to civilian production.19  Lacking any real defense conversion policy, though sorely needed, Russia must rely on foreign financing of its limited R&D efforts to prevent a complete disintegration of its scientific-technological base, one of the few bases where Russia still excels and that took decades to build up. Russia, in effect, due to this lack of future investment in its military (R&D, weapons procurement, etc.) is suffering from a "creeping disarmament," so that by 2010 only ten percent of Russia's military equipment will be rated as modern.20  Thus, Russia's fiscal motivations for selling arms to China are fueled by more than simple profit-motive, but by a genuine need to protect some of the most vital assets to a modern industrial state and to prevent an erosion of its national capital and power.

China, as well as India, is one of the two major markets open to Russia, as the other large arms-trading countries follow the sanctions against selling arms to China.21  Beijing has several reasons for turning to Moscow for arms to modernize the People's Liberation Army (PLA). One observer credits four major impulses for this. This includes a realization and commitment by the Chinese leadership to modernize the PLA to develop asymmetrical warfare capabilities; the acceptance of the "inability of China's research and development sector to produce equipment that matches, or indeed, exceeds the state of the art;" an amelioration of fears of dependence, by realizing China's growing international economic leverage; and recent sustained economic growth, allowing greater defense budgets.22 

What this assessment does not stress, however, is that Beijing's arms purchases are, in stark contrast to Moscow, nested on a well-defined national security strategy with its supporting national military strategy, which has been characterized as "long-term and incremental." 23  Importantly, all major organs of state subscribe to this strategy. The PLA is subordinate to the state and the arms industries are equally integrated into the overall state structure under the control of a one-party regime.24  Decision-making is more open to consensus building.25  However, what is important to note is that when it comes time to act, China is still a unitary actor, compared to Russia.

Specifically, Jiang Zemin's and the PLA's view of the security environment converge.26  China sees the next two to three decades as relatively safe from world war and allowing for large-scale peace and development. However, this is on the backdrop of a classical Hobbesian view of a zero-sum game for personal advantage between states. Thus, China, and particularly its military strategists, sees the world, or at least the region, as basically hostile to China's sovereignty and that current partners can transform into future rivals.27  In context, a great part of China's armament drive is a response to a potential regional arms race.28  It sees itself as threatened, although most of its neighbors generally see themselves forced to counter China's potential.29 

Two of China's regional neighbors have gone nuclear. Potential future, and often current, rivals Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea receive 74% of all Asian conventional weapons transfers.30  In addition, most other South and East Asian countries have been embarking on a modernization of their forces, especially combat aircraft and naval forces.31  India, as well as Singapore and Thailand are actively arming and pursuing regional aspirations for influence. Globally, both Russia and China, see American might, in all its forms, as a threat. This includes US-led actions of NATO expansion and military actions in the Balkans, support for Taiwan and Japan, as well as pursuit of energy sources in the greater Caspian region. Many of China's neighbors' armament programs include US combat aircraft, or other high-tech components.

The PLA's future concept of warfare, in addition to the impulses mentioned above, is derived from other factors. First, the PLA has accepted the fundamental revolution in military affairs (RMA) after assessing how easily the US-led coalition defeated Iraqi forces in 1991. Second, China's strategic center of gravity has shifted from the interior, to deter a Soviet invasion, to its periphery, especially the eastern coast from Dalian to Hunan.32  Resolving most of its land border problems,33  with the exception of its border with North Korea, and potential friction spots with India, frees China from the requirement to have large land forces for defense. But, at the same time, China gains a "littoral and maritime defense requirement the essence of defending China will be defined by the PLA's ability to defend seaward from the coast in the surface, subsurface, and aerospace battle-space dimensions."34 

It is this picture that drives the acquisition of Russian arms. Russia is desperate to prevent further erosion of its scientific-technological infrastructure and has in its arms exports, besides its energy resources, one of the last viable sectors that it can produce immediately. China desires to make generational leaps to build its own scientific-technological base for domestic armament production and, therefore, compete against what it sees as a rising regional military threat. 35  Specifically, this translates into building a PLA that can compete with its neighbors in force- projection for either coercive or deterrent ends and to deter the US with asymmetrical warfare.36 

Thus, China is focusing on combat and lift aircraft, combatant ships, information and space technology, command and control and nuclear missile improvement. Russia is selling state-of- the-art combat aircraft, such as the Su-27 and Su-30, Kilo class submarines and combat ships, radar technology, air-to-air and surface-to-air missile technology, and AWACs. In addition, Russia has been indiscriminately selling dual-use technology, as well as ballistic missile technology.37  This indiscriminate and uncontrolled Russian policy is "distinguished by the absence of coherence and consistency due to the struggle among the 'multipolar' interests and opinions at the policy-making level and the government's utter disorganization."38  As a result, narrow interest groups are selling off Russian technology not only in the form of an industrial end product, but also the actual know-how and blueprints, further eroding the Russian technological base.

China is actively seeking and successfully acquiring not only the finished hardware, but also the know-how (see notes 11 and 37), in what Blank calls a "Chinese arms transfer offensive."39  This is part of a program of major, long- term restructuring and defense conversion.40  The intent includes not only rapidly upgrading the armaments of existing and new formations to counter the regional arms race, but to rapidly expand and elevate the technological base. This is accomplished by pursuing 'spin- off' and 'spin-on' of dual-use technologies and conventional military products, which is also seen to contribute to the civilian economy, as well as strengthen deterrence.41  China is successfully melding technologies and advancing them to slowly build up its technological base.42 

This leads to several conclusions. First, given the weight that defense conversion plays in future Russian reform, the current lack of control over arms sales and lack of investment in military reform is a significant inhibitor to Russian internal stability and long-term security policy. With the world arms trade in long-term decline,43  the Russian defense industry, on its current tack, faces the prospect of near-complete collapse, which spells further problems for a country already troubled. Russia is helping to build up and arm a country with which it may very well have significant future friction. For instance, China is proliferating Russian technology to current and potential adversaries of Russia, resulting in arms technology 'blowback.'44  However, Russia has significant interests that coincide with China's on multiple issues and most Russian strategists think that the costs outweigh the risks, and that Russia should continue on a 'balanced open foreign policy' that allows it to remain engaged with China and the West.45 

Secondly, China's 'arms transfer offensive' is tied into a coherent national security strategy, with a supporting national military strategy, making it capable of acting as a significant regional actor. It is pursuing a defense conversion and modernization strategy that will significantly increase its military capabilities over the long run. Importantly, the scope of this paper, the modernization of the PLA is playing second fiddle to the main effort, economic conversion.46 

Although this will not entail a direct confrontation with the US, or its major allies of Japan and South Korea, this increased capability will give it limited deterrent capabilities versus these states. This same build-up, however, is providing China a fledgling power projection capacity to compel actions versus other regional actors, if it so desires to do so, especially in maritime affairs.47 

Furthermore, it is not conclusive that China is participating in a 'spiral of fear' arms build- up, similar to pre-World War One Europe. Much of China's build-up seems to be oriented as much towards internal stability as it is towards foreign policy objectives. Nonetheless, most neighbors of China are pursuing a 'prepare for the worst, but hope for the best' approach to China, realizing that policies are easier changed than capabilities.48  They can not ignore China's pursuit of high-technology weaponry from Russia, given China's sheer size and economic potential, and any ensuing imbalance of power. This is especially relevant, as Jonathan Pollack point out, as the region does not have, and is unlikely to develop, region-wide, stabilizing "security norms to regulate potential rivalries," and, therefore, this will "tend to generate particular anxieties among smaller states." 49  Taken together, Russian structural and economic instability and Chinese defense modernization do not present an clear and present danger to the international order, but merely a possible one, for which there is time and opportunity to act, or build on.

Endnotes

1. For a good overview of this 'strategic convergence', see Bluth, Christopher. "Russia and China Consolidate Their New Strategic Partnership." Jane's Intelligence Review1998, 18-25; and Menon Rajan. "The Strategic Convergence Between Russia and China." Survival 39, no. 2, Summer (1997): 101-125. Furthermore, China and Russia have continuously issued statements reinforcing their partnership; for an example see The Russian Federation, and The People's Republic of China. "China-Joint Statement on International Issues and Relations." , 5. Moscow, 1997, and ITAR-TASS. Russian-Chinese Statement. FBIS Document ID: 0fmos2204ezoew, 1999. Accessed 14 Dec 1999. . Available from http://wnc.fedworld.gov/cgi-bin/retrieve.cgi BACK

2. Gore, Al. Engagement with Russia and China. Gore 2000, Inc., 2000. Accessed 18 May 2000. Internet. Available from http://www.algore2000.com/agenda/index.html BACK

3. For a comprehensive coverage of these last two issues mentioned, see Pollack, Jonathan D., and Richard Yang, eds. In China's Shadow: Regional Perspectives on Chinese Foreign Policy and Military Development, CF-137-CAPP: RAND, 1998, as well as ; The United States House of Representatives. U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China. Washington, DC: The Congress of the United States, 1999.BACK

4. As in the references in note 1, it should be noted that both China and Russia have adopted specific goals of creating a multi-polar world that differs from the policy of the US for the last ten years to create interdependence.BACK

5. The ideological rift between Russia and China ended when party-to-party relations were re-established during the Deng- Gorbachev summit in May of 1989. BACK

6. Simunovic, Pjer. "Controversy Just Fans The Flames Of Russia's Arms Export Drive." Jane's Intelligence Review1998, pp. 4-12.BACK

7. Often overlooked in the Western media, the Russian Federation was borne from a revolution, despite being a generally bloodless transition of political and economic systems, and is still in a state of revolutionary transition. All state institutions and channels to power are contested and wholesale elite replacement has taken plane; see McFaul, Michael. "A Precarious Peace: Domestic Politics of Russian Foreign Policy." International Security 22, no. 3 (1997): 5-35. BACK

8. Blank, Stephen J. The Dynamics of Russian Weapon Sales to China. Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 1997. Study.BACK

9. SIPRI, ed. SIPRI Yearbook 1999: Armamemts, Disarmament and International Security. Edited by Connie Wall. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. BACK

10. For one of the best analysis and summaries of the state of Russian military reform and conditions, see Arbatov, Alexei G. "Military Reform in Russia." International Security (1998): 83-134.BACK

11. Due to a weak central government, many arms deals, especially in the early and middle 1990s were arranged without governmental control or approval. For instance, The general director of Sukhoi, Mikhail Simonov, personally arranged to transfer licenses for production of the Su-27 fighter to China. Moscow was then forced to back this, lest it sour relations with Beijing; see Blank, 1997 However, since 1998, Moscow has attempted to shore up its control over the arms industries, although not as effective as hoped, thus allowing dual-use technologies to continue to spread.BACK

12. Blank, 1997, p.2.BACK

13. SIPRI, 1999, p. 391.BACK

14. SIPRI, 1999, p. 392.BACK

15. Russia transferred $12.26 during the 1994-1998 period, with the US leading the world with $53.88 million. France ($10.58M), the UK ($8.9M), and Germany ($7.2) are the next three largest suppliers. These five nations comprise 82.7% ($92.851M of $112.278M) of the world's arms transfer market. China is the sixth largest supplier with $2.826M; SIPRI, 1999, pp. 422-426BACK

16. See SIPRI, 1999, p. 423 In addition, there are already some indicators that Russian arms transfers may be starting to slump. Arms sales were valued at $2.3 billion for 1998 and were not expected to increase for 1999, although Rosvoorouzhonie, the Russian arms export company, is trying to arrange sales of T-90 main battle tanks to India; Arms Trade News. News Briefs. Conventional Arms Transfer Project ,, 1999. Accessed Feb 3 2000. Internet. Available from http://www.clw.org/pub/clw/cat/atn0499.html BACK

17. Arms sales also present one of the strongest inflows of hard currency not subject to conditions, such as IMF funds do. Most of Russian arms transfers are paid in hard currency; Simunovic, 1998 BACK

18. Arbatov 1998, p.83.BACK

19. Arbatov 1998, p. 110.BACK

20. In the 1970s, the relationship of maintenance (wages, salaries, food, supplies) to investment funding (R&D, weapons procurement, etc.) was 30:70. From 1991-1996, this reversed to 70:30. Defense funding during this time actually was at only 70% of requirements, so, due to sequestering, which prevented cutting wages, etc., investment funding was gutted. In 1997 this was corrected to 53:47, but has since drifted back to more than sixty percent for maintenance; see Arbatov, 1998, pp. 103-105BACK

21. China and India absorb over 80 percent of Russian arms transfers. Exact figures are difficult to determine, due to secrecy of all three governments; seeSimunovic, 1998BACK

22. Fisher, Richard D. "Foreign Arms Acquistions and PLA Modernization." In China's Military Faces The Future, ed. James R. Lilley and David Shambaugh, 85-126. Washington, DC: East Gate, 1999.BACK

23. Godwin, Paul H. B. "Uncertainty, Insecurity, and China's Military Power." Current History 96, no. 611 (1997): 252-257.BACK

24. Today policy-making under Jiang Zemin is not the complete one-man show under Mao, nor does Jiang enjoy the position of Deng as the final decision-maker Joffe, Ellis. "The Military And China's New Politics: Trends and Counter-Trends." A paper delivered at the Conference On The People's Liberation Army in the Information Age, San Diego, 1999.BACK

25. For other, earlier views that reached this conclusion, see Lewis, John W., Hua Di, and Xue Litai. "Beijing's Defense Establishment." International Security 15, no. 4 Spring (1991): 87-109.BACK

26. Finkelstein, David M. "China's National Military Strategy." A paper delivered at the The People's Liberation Army in the Information Age, San Diego, 1999.BACK

27. Finkelstein, 1999BACK

28. The term 'potential' arms race will be used here. Although the entire region is arming, it is not primarily to a perceived overt offensive threat from China. Much of the regional arming is due to the economic boom of the last decade. China figures as one of the reasons, but not the primary reason driving this modernization. However, Bates Gill also finds that Chinese maritime- oriented security policies and modernization are of greatest concern to its neighbors and that China's overall defense conversion is increasingly affecting procurement decisions in the region; Gill, Bates. "Chinese Military Modernization and Arms Proliferation in the Asia-Pacific." A paper delivered at the In China's Shadow: Regional Perspectives on Chinese Foreign Policy and Military Development, Honolulu, 1998.BACK

29. For a comprehensive treatment of the region's perception of China's growth, see Pollack and Yang, 1998 BACK

30. SIPRI 1999, p. 424.BACK

31. Japan's maritime Self-Defense forces are the region's largest and most powerful navy, capable of being operating over a 1,00o nautical miles off its shores, and supported by a cutting-edge air force. Thailand has recently launched its first aircraft carrier, albeit small by Western standards, with 11,500 tons displacement.BACK

32. China's strategic center of gravity was deliberately established in its center, based on the concept of "people's war under modern conditions". Any modern invading army would be absorbed and then defeated through low-tech attrition. Having the economic center of gravity, such as industrial nodes, in the country's center would afford protection and therefore the ability to sustain the war effort. In essence, this would be a Chinese adaptation of Svechin's concept of strategic defense and a defensive form of the German Kesselschlacht.BACK

33. China and Russia have settled over 98 percent of all their border problems; see SIPRI, 1999 However, much of the cooperation and rapprochement is in the strategic security arena. Russia and China share several problems and give each other several other problems at the regional level. This includes migrations, trade, and smuggling across porous borders, to name a few. For a representative overview of these issues as possible sources for Sino- Russian friction, see the following (1) Kerr, David. "Problems In Sino-Russian Economic Relations." Euroe-Asia Studies 50, no. 7 (1998): 1133-1156, (2) Kim, Won Bae. "Sino-Russian Relations And Chinese Workers In The Russian Far East: A Porous Border." Asian Review , no. Dec (1994): 1064-1076, and (3) Moltz, James Clay. "Regional Tensions In The Sino-Chinese Rapprochement." Asian Survey , no. Jun 1 (1995): 511-527.BACK

34. Finkelstein 1999, p. 115 In addition, see Ahrari 1998 and Thompson 1999BACK

35. For a concise treatment of the China's defense industry conversion program, see Frankenstein, John. "China's Defense Industries: A New Course?", A paper delivered at the Conference On The People's Liberation Army in the Information Age, San Diego, 1999. Unlike Russia, China has a synchronized defense conversion program. This is succinctly expressed in a statement of the director of the Commission on Science, Technology & Industry for National Defense, General Cao Gangchuan: "We must deepen the structural reform and make continuous efforts to improve the mechanism of management and operation. We must strengthen unity and cooperation, fully bring into play the role of provincial and municipal offices of science, technology and industry for national defense, energetically promote the "64-character spirit of pioneering an enterprise" .." BACK

36. For an overview of the PLA's concepts, see the following (1) Mulvernon, James C. "The PLA and Information Warfare." A paper delivered at the The People's Liberation Army in the Information Age, San Diego, 1999., (2) Nan Li. "The PLA's Evolving Campaign Doctrine and Strategies." A paper delivered at the The People's Liberation Army in the Information Age, San Diego, 1999, (3) Pilsbury, Michael. "Chinese Views of Future Warfare." In China's Military Faces The Future, ed. James R. Lilley and David Shambaugh, 64-84. Washington, DC: East Gate, 1999, and (4) Yang, Andrew N. D., and Col. Milton (ret.) Wen Chung Liao. "PLA Rapid Reaction Forces: Concept, Training, And Preliminary Assessment." A paper delivered at the The People's Liberation Army in the Information Age, San Diego, 1999.BACK

37. In 1995, for instance, China purchased upper-stage rocket engines from Russia, in violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime, and without a state license; Blank, 1997, pp. 6-8BACK

38. Quoting an article by Andrei Kortunov and Andrei Shumikhin in Comparative Strategy, XV:2, April 1996, Blank, 1997, p.8BACK

39. Blank, 1997, p. 9BACK

40. This was announced at the 1998 Ninth National People's Congress and referred to as a 'strategic shift' of the Chinese defense industrial complex; see Frankenstein, 1999, 189-191 and 202-205BACK

41. Frankenstein 1999, p. 209BACK

42. This is a recurring conclusion of many observers. For instance, see Fisher 1999, 88-89BACK

43. Current forecasts anticipate a continuing and steady decline in global transfers of conventional weapons, barring a dramatic shift in the world security environment. From the last years of the Cold War, global transfers of conventional weapons have declined significantly from approximately $40 billion annually in 1984-1988, to through a steep decline in 1989-1994, to approximately $21.9 billion in 1998, which approximates the 1970 level of annual spending (prices are in constant 1990 dollars; SIPRI, 1999, pp. 421-422BACK

44. This is where arms are sold from country A to country B, who in turn sells it to an adversary of A. Although not dealt with here in detail, China is not only 'spinning off' new technologies from Russian technologies, but also proliferating these to other countries with whom Russia is in conflict, or might be in the future. This includes Iran, for instance. Russia, however, is not the only recipient of this unintended consequence. Israel and the US, mainly through Israeli weapon sales, some of them joint ventures with Russia, is experiencing the same thing. See Fisher 1999, p. 90, and Rodan, Steve. "USA Again Presses Israel To Stop Technology Sales To China." Jane's Defence Weekly, Apr 5 2000.BACK

45. See Bazhanov, Evgeni. "Russian Perspectives on China's Foreign Policy and Military Development." A paper delivered at the In China's Shadow: Regional Perspectives on Chinese Foreign Policy and Military Development, Honolulu, 1998.BACK

46. For instance, during security Chinese- Japanese dialogues in 1998, China promised to keep its defense budget at one percent GNP; see Akiyama, Mashahiro. "Japan's Security Policy Toward the 21st Century." Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies (RUSI) Journal , no. Apr (1998): 5-9. This should be looked at very skeptically, as China does not publish reliable figures on defense spending. Serious studies estimate that China's "official" and "actual" defense spending vary considerably. As a result estimates of actual defense investment for the 1996 budget, for instance, range from $8.7 billion, the estimated figure, to $63.5 billion in actual investment. For a thorough treatment of this subject, see Gill, Bates. "Chinese Military Modernization and Arms Proliferation in the Asia-Pacific." A paper delivered at the In China's Shadow: Regional Perspectives on Chinese Foreign Policy and Military Development, Honolulu, 1998, as well as Joffe, Ellis. "The PLA and the Chinese Economy: The Effect of Involvement." Survival , no. Summer (1995): 24-43.BACK

47. For instance, China's has formed a political alliance with Myanmar, and is constructing inland waterway to Rangoon, which will give China direct maritime access to central Asian sea areas, and will result in increased Chinese naval activity in the Bay of Bengal; Downing, John. "Evolving influence of sea power in the 21st century." Jane's Navy International, Nov 1, 1999.BACK

48. Pollack and Yang, 1998, p. 4.BACK

49. Pollack and Yang, 1998, p. 3. BACK

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