Dates primarily apply to the time of personal involvement or complementary information. It also covers highlights of major changes up to the deactivation of the 24th PSYOP Detachment, which replaced the Korea Detachment on 4 December 1968. The 24th PSYOP provided all audio and visual, strategic-psychological operations support to the United Nations Command/United States Forces Korea.
The applicant had applied for the Foreign Information Officer position, but despite a degree from Colorado University in Asian Studies, a MA in Far Eastern Regional Studies on a National Defense Foreign Language (Korean) Fellowship from Washington University, a fellowship from a Korean Businessman to study in Korea, and teaching for the University of Maryland, Ancient and Modern Asian Civilization at the US Army Education Center in Seoul, the position still required skills in writing
The position's counterpart with the 7th PSYOP Group in Japan was held by Walt Sheldon, author of "Hell Or High Water" on MacArthur's Landing at Inchon. The selection committee wanted evidence of writing to fully meet the requirements of the job. The applicant offered his MA thesis on "Kim Ku: A Study of A Korean Nationalist" and got the job as Branch Chief in July.
Chayu Magazine
Sixteen pages of Korean domestic information were written and edited locally while sixteen pages of the monthly, 4-color magazine, Chayu ("Chayu-ui Pot"), "Friends of Freedom," were added in Japan and covered world events, Americana, and general items of interest. Korea's distribution of Chayu's 266,000 copies was poorly targeted. When copies were increased to a half million, Commander Major Dennis Howley, stopped most of the urban distribution of 50,000 copies to universities and various departments like transportation in Seoul. Students had looked down on it as propaganda and none of the other recipients ever asked for it to be reinstated except the Department of Justice, which continued to send about 1,000 copies to inmates in prison to improve prisoner moral.
In August 1968 rural police boxes became responsible for getting 183,000 copies to people living in their rural areas. The bulk of the rest went to various ROK security forces. Although our domestic target audience had changed, the basic objective to promote UNC/USFK relations and ROK's self-reliance, nationalism, and democratic institutions remained the same. However, presentation of written material was more sensitized to the reader's background and education.
Visual Branch included four Korean writers, one female and three males, to write in English. Besides editing their articles, the editor might, after a comprehensive discussion with the writer, put in editorial nuggets to enhance the PSYOP effectiveness of the article. The English text was sent for review by USIS, State's Political Counselor, and the UNC-J5. No changes were ever made. The text then went to Japan's 7th PSYOP for translation into Korean and printed by Army's printing plant there. Sometimes the Korean translators were not familiar with colloquial language changes in the ROK or some subtleties. This initially required frequent phone calls and TDY exchanges between writers and translators.
Occasionally there was a thin line of difference with Walt Sheldon. His target was mainly Japanese employees of U.S. Services, with more emphasis on pro-Americana. However, Korean local coverage emphasized nation-building and strengthening UNC popular support. Sheldon also reviewed writer's English drafts sent to Japan for translation and printing. In a particular case the Korean editor disagreed with his comments on a Homeland Reserve story. It was author vs. propagandist. He wrote, "A few minor points should be mentioned. In paragraph two the author starts preaching to us again: in order to pursue a peaceful national existence we must maintain steady vigilance in the face of the consistent threat poised by an enemy bent on the destruction of our society.' Please, everybody: we are not writing political analyses or patriotic speeches. As authors we keep ourselves and the first--person pronouns out of these articles. ROK citizens are intensely anti-Communist and do not need to be exhorted--this is the least of our problems. If one of the people you're writing about says things like this, and you quote him, fine. But not you."
My response was: "Since we are a propaganda magazine and when the author can't quote others, as an observer a little preaching is necessary. This is actually where I am still very much involved with the articles. Of course, I am more than conscious to avoid blind, gushy patriotism,' however, when used in taste, such preaching becomes the salt and pepper of the article--and this propaganda is much more than an appeal towards their anti-Communist spirit--rather it is directed toward ideals--hopefully instilling patriotism for, dedication to, and pride and faith in their own country." I sent Walt's comments to my boss, Bill Hunt, and his written response: "Ralph -- I couldn't have written the sentence better myself all the right words and ideals peaceful national existence,' vigilance,' and consistent threat.' Sheldon should realize he (Korean writer) is writing for a military command that is justifying its existence! Do you want me to call him?" That wasn't necessary. I sent Walt a written reply.
The Visual Branch also included graphic artists, photographers, intel specialists, and those in distribution. The output involved designing the back cover of Chayu, writing and graphic layouts for the farmers' almanac, later replaced by a fishermen's almanac with shift of NK agent activity, the UNC Calendar, wall posters, hand bills, and leaflets sent to North Korea. Chayu periodically covered isolated, mountain-top guard posts, with minefields located along the DMZ and each post had its own mines it could independently trip. Having the editor present with a writer and photographer facilitated access and reception. This was true also in visiting cement plants, major economic construction, etc. It had less to do being editor and more to do with being a foreigner, with a serious interest in Korea.
With the significant increase in the magazine's distribution by the Korean National Police, Chayu started a twelve-month series on police-community relations. This increased policemen's interest in distributing the magazine. It was often personally delivered to villages, posted on bulletin boards, preserved in makeshift bindings in village "libraries", and in some cases readers had to initial it and pass it on to others. It was estimated that Chayu had a readership of at least ten million.
There was one provincial police director, who told our reporter, "police duty was to control the people," implying civil affairs wasn't their responsibility. Consequently, an interview was set up for Chayu with the Korean National Police Director, PakYong-Su, to publicize his policy. He emphasized that local police-involvement was essential to win the confidence of the citizens. "We will have to strengthen civic actions which often extends far beyond our primary duty. For example, police help an illiterate old man register a complaint to the investigating authorities or teach boys and girls, who do not attend regular classes."
About countering North Korean agents, he added, "in those cases, police have a larger responsibility. Only as a good friend of the inhabitants in isolated areas can he perform his duty successfully. For this he must be a reliable person, so he can be informed of any movements of agents from the inhabitants." He gave a recent example where agents had landed and offered money for information. Two of the islanders stole their boat and contacted the police.
Still it took two more visits to that province to get an article. Long-term, strategic psychological operations are difficult to evaluate because of time and other influencing factors. However, through Chayu articles on police strong involvement in community affairs and seen as giving something away free, police attitudes and perceptions of its own role in the Korean society was substantially changed. Of interest, when a cadet at the police academy was asked what he thought would be most challenging in his job? He replied, "getting married." Korean society still don't want their daughters to marry a policeman, a shoe-maker, nor a butcher.
When the Republic of Korea sent 50,000 troops to Vietnam, 20,000 copies of Chayu followed. More articles on security were also written. Ms. Chayu, who had normally appeared in each issue in traditional dress, might now appear in a uniform, stressing women's role in defense.
Through the ambitions of Chayu writers and photographers, Chayu's reputation was outstanding. Once they wrote an article and showed pictures of a 19-page Sutra of pure gold and other ancient relics, hidden under the Wangkung Pagoda. They were discovered during repairs in 1965 and still (1969) undergoing extensive examination. They had not been put on display to avoid Japanese misinterpretations. The Korean public saw them for the first time in Chayu. Again, when The first C-5 cargo plane landed in Korea, Chayu had photos, to include one showing Ms. Chayu in traditional clothes standing inside one engine housing unit with outstretched arms to show how huge it was.
However, old traditions die hard. Once one of my photographers was driving on a dirt road in the middle of nowhere, when our jeep died. A farmer came out of a rice field and got it started. As the photographer started to drive away, I told him to thank the farmer. The photographer answered that since we were from Seoul, etc., etc. the farmer would be insulted to have helped someone whose status was so low as to thank him. We both thanked him and the photographer got a long lecture about winning hearts and minds.
Nationalism was relatively new in Korea, starting slowly with Japanese occupation in 1906. It spiked in March, 1919, after U.S. President Wilson gave a speech to the League of Nations about independence and democracy. The Korean uprising was quickly and brutally put down. Nevertheless, a Korean Provisional Government was established in China and a few assassinations, bombings, etc., occurred over the next twenty-five years. Japan's occupation was near absolute. Only Japanese could be taught and spoken in schools and Koreans were forced to take Japanese names.
In addition, Seoul, as the seat of power for 800 years, was plagued with traditions that promoted factionalism and regionalism interspersed heavily with nepotism, favoritism, and corruption. If one looked with cold reality upon the Korean situation after the war, the mixing up of North and South Koreans in the South was a blessing for the country. Many Koreans from the industrial North, who fled South, most of whom came with little financial and personnel support, have attained economic and decision-making positions in the society. This was largely based on their own individualism and initiative.
Voice of the United Command (VUNC)
The general North Korean (NK) citizenry could only receive broadcasts on a single- controlled radio and television frequency. Therefore, VUNC's targeted audiences were the few NK communist leaders, party members, intellectuals, military and civilians, and agents in training, who were authorized to listen to other broadcasts. Balloons carrying a radio and extra batteries were dropped on land and float bags in the ocean. There was a risk, of course, to be found listening to one.
VUNC broadcasts included a variety of music, VOA news, and local news, but also emphasized UNC strict compliance with the Armistice; report on all officially announced military moves or reinforcement; point out repeated violations of the Armistice by NK; UNC & ROK ability to cope with negative situations; play up ROK economic & social progress; and emphasize ROK international status.
VUNC's don't list was: not to threaten; not speculate on what U.S. or UNC will or will not do; not speculate on motives behind NK actions; not mention military moves not officially announced; not use propaganda that would be beneath the dignity of the UN; and not run wholesale condemnation of communism, but select targeted commentaries to specific attitude changes or modification points that could be exploited in North Korea.
VUNC had interviewed a number of defectors to the ROK. However, KIM Myong-sik would be its first agent. He was in ROK Army fatigues with the rank of 1st lieutenant, swimming in the Han River along the Kimpo Peninsula, when captured. It was anticipated, based on his military background, that he would not voluntarily cooperate in making a normal defector- type interview to be broadcast to the North.
The interview was conducted under the guise of normal interrogation, using selected question designed to bring out the points desired. The interview was then analyzed to remove questions and answers that would have little psychological advantage. The second step was to cut from the original tape the male interrogator and dub in a female interviewer. The tape was excellent in both quality and credibility. The agent answered all questions in a very sincere way, based on his own personal reaction to the positive conditions he discovered in the South. It was aired weekly for four consecutive weeks. Future agent interviews followed. It also dispelled the North's claim, that if an agent was captured, he would be killed.
One time in Japan the editor went into a North Korean book store and picked out a couple magazines. Looking at other publications, there were school books for children, depicting numerous drawings of Koreans in the agrarian South in servitude to Yankee imperialists, being beaten, raped, bayoneted, etc. However, they wouldn't sell the book. Finally the owner(?) came out and explained that whatever number of books they had were the number of students and if they sold one, a student would have to go without.
This story underscores the major propaganda theme that was constantly promoted internally in schools, on television, training, indoctrination, and even to North Koreans in Japan (for about 30 years). It was always the agrarian South, Yankee brutality, and the misery suffered by South Koreans in servitude. Consequently, it had so permeated those in the North that it became a fact even within its leadership. The North believed if they sent enough well-trained, armed commandos, they could rally the suppressed to start a revolution. Many leaflets sent south encouraged the South to revolt, or at least sabotage the Imperialist stranglehold on the people.
NK's Pyongyang KCNA International with the objective of destroying the U.S. position in Korea broadcasted in English all U.S. Servicemen's transgressions committed, i.e., "A wolf named JACK of the U.S. imperialist aggressor army unit entrenched in Inchon perpetrated on the night of the 19th of May the thrice-cursed atrocity of mercilessly strangling to death a South Korean woman, Kim Kum-sun, residing in Inchon, according to a report from Inchon. This is a diabolical murderous act conceivable only for human butchers and shows in all nakedness the heinous nature of the U.S. imperialist wolves, who can not pass even a single day without seeing the sight of bloodshed. That day this beast, who was running around Inchon City like a mad dog, making it a mere "pastime" to plunder and commit violence against the guiltless inhabitants on preposterous pretexts, broke into the house of the pre-mentioned woman to satisfy his carnal desire. But the woman stubbornly resisted him. The U.S. imperialist beasts not only shoot and knife people to death but the beast committed the brutal barbarity of throttling her to death."
1968 was a pivotal year. In January thirty- one commandos from the 124th North Korean army unit, fully armed and in ROK army uniforms reached Seoul streets as a unit. Their goal was to attack the Blue House (U.S. White House equivalent). However, police and security forces confronted them before reaching their goal. Only North Korean Kim Shin-jo survived. After that failure, the Communist Labor Party increased the number of the guerrillas of the 124th by thousands.
These soldiers were highly professional. Their training was to get up at 6 every morning, fill sand bags with 30 kilograms of sand and run, often bare- footed, over mountain trails for about 30ri (about 8-10 kilometers. Take a cold rubdown with a wet towel, eat breakfast, then attend a political class and study the "Reminiscences" (collection of writings on Kim Il-sung's fight against Japan). They would sleep 8 hours in the afternoon before night training began. To cultivate courage, each soldier had to go by himself, dig up a tomb, take out the remains of a dead body and hide himself in the tomb.
In early November the 124th landed 120 commandos on the more isolated East Coast with the mission to create an uprising against the ROK. During agent interrogation, there was no doubt in the success of their mission because they fully expected friendly contact with the locals. Instead they found them hostile. Within five days the Visual Branch made a poster. At the top, in small pictures, were some of the atrocities committed, followed by larger pictures of the public reporting locations of the enemy, still larger, mobilization of the security forces, and finally largest pictures of the dead enemy with caption "as long as NK agents don't turn themselves in, their final fate will be like this." Also leaflets were drop asking South Koreans to report any sign of the enemy and leaflets encouraging North Koreans to surrender. One leaflet had a picture of Kim Shin-jo, sole survivor of the 124th January attack in Seoul, telling them to give up and they wouldn't be hurt. One hundred and ten were killed, two gave up, five captured, and three remained unknown.
The two, who gave themselves up and given defector status, were brought to our detachment in preparation of broadcasting back to their unit, which we knew listened to VUNC. They were to dispel the myth that South Koreans were suffering or would welcome "invaders" from the North and to encourage their fellow soldiers of the 124th to defect as soon as possible when sent to the South. Both defectors cursed Kim Il-sung to ensure their own survival. The shocker was when they came into the commander's' office, where a picture of Kim Il-sung hung on the wall with the caption, "know your enemy!" One defector gave a sharp salute. Realizing what he had done, his expression became fearful. Instead we gave them sodas and talked. We knew the enemy listen to the Voice of The United Nations. No further, large-force commando attacks followed, although North Koreans continued to try to infiltrate in rubber rafts and heavily armed speed boats along the coast lines, in groups of three to nine agents and/or commandos.
Leaflet And Other Printed Materials
Ninety-nine percent of all leaflets sent to North Korea came out of the Visual Branch. A wide-range of truthful subjects and messages were designed, mostly in black and white, but color leaflets were steadily increased. No black propaganda was ever made. Leaflets were stored in Okinawa and dropped by C-130 flights over ROK territory. They were aero-dynamically designed to take advantage of the wind velocity and height of flight, to predict where the leaflets would fall. They could be floated to drop along the north side of the DMZ, North Korea's capital, Pyongyang, and areas up to, but inside NK's side of the Yalu river.
When the Visual Chief initially reviewed contingency leaflets stored in the event of another North Korean invasion, some had the mythical figure of Han Kun with a long white beard solemnly standing over a North Korean about to bayonet a farmer. The message was, "What would He think about brother killing brother" Myth had it that Han Kun's mother was a bear and his father a tiger and he created Koreans.
A new leaflet, "salkil" (the way to live) was introduced in 1968 to be used in the defector inducement program and emphasized the fact that people in the Republic of Korea live better than those in North Korea. In September, 1968, a North Korean defector indicated that a leaflet he had seen, using the salkil theme, was the final persuader for his defection. Also a number of posters and leaflets were developed to exploit the disillusionment agents faced with total resistance to their efforts on the part of the South Korean people.
One-year example of total printed media support provided by Japan Detachment for the 24th PSYOP in 1968 was:
Calendars 350,000 Almanacs 350,000 Magazines 3,600,000
Posters 640,000 Leaflets 18,300,980 Booklets 50,000
The Detachment's most unusual posters were the result of race riots in 1971. This was a time that black and white American soldiers were trying to kill each other in Germany, Vietnam, Korea, and the U.S. This was a particular side-effect of the mandatory draft. In Korea it hit a high level June 9, 1971 when 100 black soldiers rampaged in Pyongtaek going into the local bars in search of white soldiers, who quickly fled. Blacks proceeded to trash (destroy would be a better description) the bars, Korean stores, and attacked Koreans. Ten American soldiers and nearly 20 Koreans were injured, some seriously.
This led to a large Korean demonstration the next day with banners, "NIGGERS GO BACK TO YOUR COTTON FIELDS." A long series of race riots, which spread over to the Korean communities, gave NK considerable opportunity to spin their own propaganda version, which had nothing to do with race, but about South Koreans rising up and striking back at U.S. Imperialist aggressors.
North Korea had for some time directed some of their English leaflets toward American black soldiers in an effort to encourage them to rebel against their military leaders, desert the Army, abandon the defense of the ROK, and return to America to fight for the emancipation of their own people. There was no evidence such propaganda had much influence.
At a meeting on 14 June the Detachment outlined the problem and consequences to include North Korea's propaganda exploitation of USFK racial confrontations. The Problem was one of discrimination by club owners, waitresses and business girls against black GIs. It spread to eleven camps all the way down to Pusan. Eighth Army Garrison Commander asked the 24th PSYOP to get involved. Psychological objective was to convince the target audience that they must actively contribute to the prevention of racial clashes by ceasing all discriminatory practices against black soldiers. Communication was necessary for Koreans involvement in services to U.S. GIs. As Korean-language propagandists (legally prohibited to produce anything in English), the Detachment's assets were well suited to address and solve the issue..
Visits to the area showed that club owners were trying to improve the situation and had instructed their waitresses to treat customers equally. In some clubs, the practice was started to even give blacks better treatment than whites and in the U.N. Club in Seoul this included giving them an occasional free beer. On 30 June, 1971 Mr. Kim Tong-hyon, manager of the graphics office, and The Visual Branch Chief visited several of the club owners.
It became apparent that racial problems were more than just discrimination against blacks. There was also among the blacks a "militant" group who did not want equality. They wanted their own clubs and "territory." This group followed black racist's concepts and wanted to aggravate the situation. Two popular arguments they used to establish mutuality with the Koreans was: "Japan exploited Korea 36 years and the whites have exploited the blacks over a hundred years." Also, "Koreans and blacks are colored and should work together against the whites." Fortunately, their overall impact was limited, although festering.
It was decided that posters inside the bars with the Korean message to "treat all guests equally" could have the greatest impact. The bars were a common meeting area, were often the site of discrimination, and word-of-mouth was sure to spread. The challenge was left to my artists to create such posters. After considerable discussions with a number of Korean men and women, the artists elected to show Caucasian women in various sexual enticements with the "treat all guests equally" slogan.
It had the necessary impact, was not thought of as insulting, perhaps somewhat interesting because of white females on the posters, and possibly even conveyed a common theme among white women. In conclusion, it got their attention and understanding!
It was imperative for the success of operations that all PSYOP materials be reviewed by club owners for acceptance and that distribution be made by ROK law enforcement agencies. It was equally important that U.S. military installations not be readily identifiable with these materials. PSYOP materials should imply Korean concern to improve the racial situation in their respective areas and Korean awareness that they contributed to racial problems and it is their problem also.
On 2 July, 8 posters and 500 flyers were given to the Yongsan Police to distribute among the 7 club owners. This was done during the evening of the 2nd and by the fifth, all clubs had posted them and passed out most of the flyers to lady patrons. Feedback concerning the printed materials developed by the Detachment were quite favorable. They had been well received and disseminated by the club owners. Incidents among blacks, Koreans, and whites had decreased considerably.
Osan's one-year-old Brotherhood' system had been so effective since April 1970, when there was a bloody racial brawl resulting in 17 American and two Korean injuries, there have been no incidents of any significant. According to Maj General Robert W. Maloy, commander of the U.S. Air Force in Korea and the 314th Air Div., "the system is a Brotherhood Association for Servicemen (BAS). It comprised of mostly blacks and some whites and aimed at promoting harmony among all people living in and assigned to Korea."
Associated Press reported that the "Osan Brotherhood' spreads to Travis AFB in California, the scene of a four-hour racial brawl involving 600 airmen in May 71 and is copying Osan's system of solving racial problems, base official here said Friday."
The Department of Army in August sent the Detachment's editor to the University of Southern California for long-term training in journalism. His return in June, 1972, coincided with the final issue of Chayu. Mr. Ronald Rhodes, Chief of Propaganda Production, wrote in a Chayu After-Action Report that there was no formal directive from UNC on how the program was to be terminated. 69,750,000 copies of Chayu had been produced from June 1955 through June 1972.
The 24th PSYOP Detachment elected to publish a 64-page, full-color final issue which summarized the aims of the past 17 years in relation to the latest UNC policy guidance. The last issue contained a brief summary of conditions in postwar Korea and how they changed with the United States and UNC assistance to the point that the ROK had become increasingly self- reliant in its own defense and economy. This was in keeping with the Nixon Doctrine in terms of increased modernization of ROK Armed Forces with the aim of reducing the need for large numbers of U.S. troops in Korea.
The report went on to state that everyone had seen Chayu at one time or another according to distribution surveys,. There was never any question, in the minds of Chayu readers, that Chayu was a valuable and useful publication. Harder to measure, the report went on, was whether Chayu was actually responsible for maintaining conditions favorable to the continued presence of the UNC in the ROK?
Therein lies somewhat of a contradiction. Nation-building is a lot like parenthood. Children are expected eventually to stand on there on. ROK is not there yet and with NK annual spending of about $5.2 billion on military expenditures (22.9% GDP, CIA World Factbook) and its total obsession of uniting the Korean peninsula under its control, are realities not lost on the ROK. Although ROK wants to further positive relations with NK and believe it is now strong enough to do so, it can be expected to continue a pragmatic, security relationship with UNC/U.S Forces Korea.
The UNC Commander in Chief received a letter from the Honorable Yoon Ju Young, Ministry of Culture and Public Information, dated February 16, 1972, requesting continued publication of "Chayu-ui-pot." General J. H. Michaelis, wrote back on the 28th of February, "it had been published the past seventeen years to promote understanding among the Korean people and the United Nations Command. The very strong bonds of friendship which exist today between the Republic of Korea and the United Nations Command indicate that this objective has been achieved. This will permit the redirection of efforts to other important areas."
Eventually the ROK began to publish its own "Sae Maul Un-dong" (New Village Movement). This basically meant having to pick up the tab. Chayu was a proven model, but now Korean emphasis and priorities could prevail.
Chayu writers were always strong-willed with a lot of initiative. It was interesting to note in the after-action report, that one writer with four years with the 24th PSYOP was quoted as saying "Chayu editors had a unique problem It was the cultural gap existing between editors and their writers. The magazine operated best when its chief was capable of writing and capable of understanding the writers. The magazine was most miserable when its chief thought himself merely to be an administrator. It seems UNC sees its PSYOP mission in the ROK completed while still admitting the need of continued UNC presence in this country. The logic is beyond my comprehension." I interpreted this to mean the writer missed me as an editor and wished he still had a job.
VUNC actually ended its broadcasting June 30, 1971 at 9:00 p.m. The 7th PSYOP Group in Japan and the 15th PSYOP Group in Okinawa were deactivated back to the States. I became the Command's Operation Officer as the 24th PSYOP was tasked to develop and implement new programs and to provide mission options, while its destiny was being decided between the Joint Chief of Staff and State Department.
My position was reclassified as a Supervisory Intelligence Officer in November 1973. I planned and directed the research and evaluation of North Korea's propaganda impact upon South Korea; provided training and assistance to Korean PSYOP units; and continued to work closely with the Korean National Police.
However, Strategic PSYOP is more of a user of intelligence and less a collector. Assisted in the closure of the command February 1975 with Detachment Commander, Captain Charles Ray.