One plan is for FYROM to establish a corridor to move refugees into Albania.
However, Albania's current deteriorating situation makes this a complicated solution; nor
is it certain FYROM even has the capacity to execute such a plan. Furthermore, in such
a situation, there are indications that Greece would move into FYROM to establish a
buffer zone in order to keep the refugees from entering its territory. Another threat to
FYROM sovereignty comes from the possibility that Serbia might conduct limited raids
across the border to attack UCK (Kosovo Liberation Army) elements that Serbia
believes are operating out of FYROM.
Lastly, FYROM has a weak economy, a poor transportation network, and an uncertain
leadership future after President Kiro Gligorov steps down. On the positive side,
FYROM has Kivolak Training Area, the largest in the Balkans, which it has suggested
might be leased or rented for use by the international community (it should be noted,
however, that Kivolak is currently in less than perfect condition). The nation's other
selling point is its location within the Balkans Region -- it offers a suitable location for an
"over-the-horizon" reaction force in case the Bosnian crisis were to flare up again.
Albania. Albanian is making painfully slow progress toward recovery from its
1997 implosion. In fact, a strong case can be made that Albania is moving toward the
situation that Martin van Creveld describes in The Transformation of War in
which the state loses its monopoly over armed violence and crime reigns supreme.
Certainly the scenario is ripe for chaos with tenuous central government control,
weapons everywhere, crime already virtually unchecked, and the economy in shambles.
Add this to certain Albanians' dream of a "Greater Albania" and the situation is extremely
dangerous. An eruption in Kosovo could easily trigger a sypathetic reaction in Albania
that could greatly destabilize the region.
What is largely keeping Albania in check are the strings attached to the massive
amount of international aid that is currently keeping it afloat. The Economist
points out that "Part of the price of all this help is that Albania play its part in promoting
regional tranquility" and Prime Minister Fatos Nano has announced that "Albanians will
play their role to prevent [regional destabilization] from happening" (24 Jan 98, 17).
While diplomacy and inner turmoil has done much to contain Albania, the "poor and
violent country remains on the edge" (The Economist, 24 Jan 98, 17). An
international military presence in nearby FYROM would be a valuable assurance to
regional stability in case events take a turn for the worse.
Greece. After initial problems, Greek relations with FYROM have shown
improvement. In spite of whatever tensions remain, Greece has some vested interests
in a stable FYROM. The first is the already mentioned desire to keep Kosovar ethnic
Albanians out of Greece. The second is that Greece likes Serbia, and an improved
transportation network in FYROM would greatly increase Greek trade opportunities with
Serbia.
Greek Prime Minister Kostis Simitis is a Europeanist who has taken steps to increase
Greece's regional engagement. He has shown a willingness to commit troops to places
like Albania in order to help some European problems, especially those that pose
potential refugee threats to his own country. He would likely support a U.S. presence in
FYROM that would lessen the danger of ethnic Albanians entering Greece and improve
stability and trade opportunities.
Moreover, the nearby U.S. presence would be a reassurance to Greek fears of
Turkish aggression. Greece wants to modernize its military, especially by purchasing F-15s. It also supports Greek Cypriot plans to position SA-10s on Cyprus, but many view
this as more of a diplomatic than a military gesture. The U.S. could use its increased
presence in nearby FYROM, albeit though not directly related to Cyprus, to convince
Greece that such deployments as the SA-10s are no longer necessary. If Greece is
looking for a face-saving way to turn off the SA-10 deployment, this might be it. It would
also save Greece much needed modernization money that it could devote to the more
valuable F-15 purchases. The NATO base planned for Larissa (located in northern
Greece) could also have a contribution to make in such a scenario.
Turkey. Turkey is going to be suspicious of anything that hints at additional
U.S. or NATO support for the Greeks, but promises of U.S. pressure on Greece to
forego the SA-10 purchase (and the accompanying increase of Russian presence in
Cyprus) should ease their reservations. Additionally, Turkey would like to see NATO
expansion not just in central Europe, but in the east as well. Invitations to Bulgaria to
participate in training exercises at Kivolak could help Turkey's agenda here and also
improve FYROM-Bulgaria relations.
A last option to make this regional strategy more palatable to the Turks is to offer
them a role in Albania helping their fellow Muslims. This would give Turkey a chance to
reengage Europe after the recent EU rebuff. Turkey's feelings are currently hurt by the
snub, but it also still hopes to join the EU and a commitment to Albania might show it
has not given up on Europe.
The Albanian option also poses the exciting possibility of a multi-lateral exercise
involving Greece and Turkey in a Kosovar refugee scenario. The scenario would be
that in the event of a mass refugee situation, Greece would set up its buffer zone to
contain the exodus, and Turkey would establish the corridor to direct the refugees
toward Albania proper. Other countries such as Albania and the U.S. could likewise
participate. Not only would such an exercise between the Greek and Turkish militaries,
something much more difficult to achieve in the more contentious Aegean or eastern
Mediterranean. This would be a rare instance in which Greece and Turkey could
cooperate in a win-win situation.
Bosnia. The U.S. can't stay in Bosnia forever. It must gradually disengage.
However, a U.S. over-the-horizon force in nearby FYROM would be close enough to
deter or stop a restoration of hostilities, yet far enough away to allow the FWFs to start
taking more ownership and responsibility for the situation. Additionally, FYROM would
be an excellent base for many of the airborne intelligence platforms that would monitor
the situation and give the indications of any renewed fighting. A U.S. over-the-horizon
force would still keep the U.S. engaged in the problem. However the U.S. shift to
FYROM must be explained in terms of a regional strategy -- not an abandonment of
Bosnia. Thus the pattern would transpire from the current U.S.-led/Europe-supported
operation to a Europe-led/U.S. supported operation to a European operation to a
Bosnian operation. Throughout this transition, the U.S. would maintain an incrementally
lessening safety net in FYROM. The idea would be to shift forces from Bosnia to
FYROM, though not in a one-for-one or like-kind fashion. The mission in FYROM would
be very different than in Bosnia. The FYROM mission would be one of containment and
nation assistance in FYROM, with a secondary focus on Bosnia. Neither of these
missions has to begin tomorrow, but they should begin soon.
Thus, the NATO force in Bosnia does not have to be drawn-down immediately, nor
does the FYROM force have to be stood up immediately. The point is that there should
be a well-thought out, coordinated, and synchronized relation between these two
events.
Serbia. It is probable that even Serbia could be convinced that such a plan is in
its own best interests. One reason is the already mentioned ability to improve regional
trade, particularly with Greece, through improved transportation systems in FYROM.
The second reason is that obviously Serbia would like the U.S. to get out of Bosnia and
certainly some diplomatic concessions could be exacted from that desire. What those
concessions might be I don't exactly know, but an obvious candidate would be an
increased respect for the minority rights of the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. Many
analysts perceive Kosovo to be the real flashpoint of the Balkans, so anything that
alleviates tensions there would go a long way toward establishing regional stability.
Currently, Serbian relations with Kosovo are extremely tense, and many predict a Serb
crackdown in the near future [Ed Note: Readers will recall this was written more than
two months ago, and since then Major Dougherty's predictions have come true].
Finally, though the U.S. force in FYROM would not be in a direct counter-terrorist
role, its presence would allow the FYROM government to focus more attention on the
UCK which would be welcomed by Serbia. Gligorov would face some political pressure
from ethnic Albanians against such a step, but the law and order necessity of such
action is easily supportable. Cooperation between FYROM and Serbia in this regard
would be mutually beneficial.
The Force. Not much U.S. combat power would be required in FYROM to deter
aggression. The success of the small and lightly armed TFAS is proof of that. It is the
presence that is the key.
Given the current situation, a mechanized infantry battalion task force in the
FYROM and a mechanized brigade task force in Bosnia might be a good starting point
for discussion. After a couple of months, the next iteration might transition to a
mechanized infantry battalion in Bosnia and two mechanized infantry battalions in
FYROM. The final phase would have no U.S. combat forces in Bosnia and reduce
those in FYROM to a single mechanized infantry battalion. The U.S. would probably
have to commit to a two-three year program of assistance to FYROM in order to build
FYROM up to the desired level of a sustainable, defendable, viable nation without any
U.S. presence. However, perhaps only a year of this period would involve a substantial
deployed U.S. military involvement.
What is really needed beyond the U.S. combat power is the nation assistance
piece. Much of this must come from non-military instruments of power, but the military
can make a considerable contribution here -- engineers to upgrade roads and airfields,
JAG and CA to provide education on minority rights, SF to train a FYROM army,
intelligence assets for I & W, and an array of different specialties to help the NGOs to
prepare FYROM for a potential refugee crisis. The U.S. would also have to commit to
an active diplomatic role that might include equip-ping the FYROM army (in a program
similar to the Train and Equip program in Bosnia), and economic aid, as well as border
patrol, customs, and police training. An additional presence could come from units
rotating through Kivolak for training. As mentioned, many of these could be international
units. Con-struction projects from these training exercises could build up FRYOM in the
same way Honduras was built up in the 1980s.
Conclusion. If we are looking for a regional strategy, the U.S. vital interest in
the Balkans lies in protecting NATO's southern flank. The better place from which to do
that is FRYOM, not Bosnia. If a couple years from now fighting erupts again in Bosnia,
the U.S. would be disheartened and a lot of hard work marginalized, but no vital national
interest would be threatened. If, on the other hand, a variety of internal and external
factors combine to dissolve FYROM, the frontline of the Balkans problem then becomes
Greece and NATO's southern flank -- a much more serious situation. Furthermore, a
U.S. force such as the one described in this paper could deploy from FYROM to Bosnia
if needed. A force located in Bosnia would be much harder pressed to disengage and
address any instability in FYROM.
Perhaps more pragmatically, in the long-term a U.S. contribution can fix the
problems in FYROM. Few would say the same is true in Bosnia. Additionally if the
elusive success in Bosnia could be realized, the FYROM problem would still exist and
would still need to be dealt with.
Thus, I suggest that the U.S. needs to view the problem regionally, commit itself to
strengthening FYROM and therefore NATO's southern flank, gradually disengage from
Bosnia with an accompanying strengthening in FYROM, and turn the required
diplomatic, military, economic, and informational instruments of multinational power
toward FYROM.
The author, Major Kevin Dougherty, is a European FAO, did his training in Greece and
is currently assigned to Ft. Bragg.
1997, Foreign Area Officer Association
Springfield,
Virginia
Maintained by LTC Steve
Gotowicki.
http://www.faoa.org
