A New Map and a New Challenge:
A Review of Thomas P. M. Barnett's The Pentagon's New Map:
War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century

By Major Tyler Fitzgerald

The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century. Thomas P.M. Barnett, Berkley Books, New York. 435 Pages.

          Thomas P.M. Barnett, in his book, The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century, proposes a new way of looking at the world and a new strategic concept for security in the post Cold-War era. He tells the story of his search for this new strategic paradigm from his perspective as a senior strategic researcher and professor at the Naval War College with added insight from his work in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the private firm Cantor Fitzgerald. He writes in an easy to read style that educates the reader on complex strategic issues as well as how things work behind the scenes in the unique culture of the Pentagon.

          The new map that Barnett introduces divides the world into what he calls the "Functioning Core" and the "Non-integrating Gap." The former includes countries where basic rule sets are adhered to, societies are generally stable, economies are integrated into the world economic system and the idea of globalization is embraced. These countries include the U.S., Canada, Mexico, most of the European nations, Russia, China, India, South Africa, Japan, Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Australia and New Zealand. The latter is defined by countries where rule sets accepted and embraced by the Core states do not apply. They are disconnected from the world economic system, the idea of globalization is either rejected or not practiced, poverty is widespread and there is a general lack of security. These states include the countries of the Andean Ridge, Central America, the Caribbean, the Balkans, Africa (minus South Africa), the Middle East, Central Asia and South East Asia.

          Barnett shows that the majority of the military operations and interventions conducted by US forces since 1990 have occurred in this inherently unstable, disconnected and dangerous Gap region. As a result he makes two primary arguments. The first is that Core military operations will inevitably take place in the Gap region. Because of this the U.S., and other Core nations, should maintain military forces designed to operate within the Gap and eschew the search for a "near peer competitor." These forces would consist of what he terms the "Leviathan" force, which would be a powerful force capable of high to mid-intensity conflict in order to overthrow regimes which refuse to abide by the established rule sets of the Core. The second is what he terms the "System Administration" force which would be a low-intensity force capable of nation-building tasks and maintaining security in the Gap.

          The second argument is that the Core states, led by the U.S., should make every effort to "shrink the Gap." This would be through a multi-faceted approach to integrate the Gap states into the functioning Core. The role of the military in this effort would be to "export" security into the Gap in order to facilitate economic, political and societal reforms to integrate the Gap states into the Core to enjoy the benefits of globalization. He argues that this is inherently good for the people of the Gap while at the same time it is in the self-interest of the Core because the instability of the Gap will eventually become a direct threat to the peace and prosperity of the Core. This could be in the form of refugee and immigration flows, trade restrictions, general instability or direct attacks.

          Barnett believes that the elimination of the Gap can be accomplished. His writing is optimistic in the extreme and full of hope that the suffering in the Gap can be reduced by providing an opportunity to join the Core. His analysis of the situation is good and he provides a useful framework to work within to develop the strategic paradigm that the U.S. has been lacking since the end of the Cold War. His challenge to shrink the Gap is commendable and from a human and moral point of view difficult to challenge. However, three issues loom large in undertaking this challenge.

          The first is regarding cost. Overthrowing regimes that refuse to abide by the rule sets of the Core will be costly in terms of money, casualties and committed troops. Additionally, the costs of rebuilding countries where regime change has occurred, such as Afghanistan and Iraq, show that rebuilding costs are extremely high. They include the costs of rebuilding infrastructure and institutions as well as the continuing costs of combat from remnants of the regime and other elements. There has also been a political cost and a burden to bear for the countries in the "coalition of the willing" from their own people, the press, the people of other nations and other governments. To fully integrate the Gap would require tremendous costs for a long period of time. Is the Core truly prepared to bear this cost for a generation or more? This is at best questionable.

          Secondly, Barnett fails to acknowledge the Gap countries' own responsibility for themselves. The responsibility for their development ultimately is their own. Assuredly, the Core can and must help, but the Gap countries must be able and willing to eliminate corruption, use assistance resources wisely and ultimately pay the price in blood and sweat for their own freedom from tyrants, oppression, corruption, mismanagement and poverty. Billions of dollars have been given to Gap nations over the years for the purpose of development but the return on this investment has often been severely lacking. The Gap nations must prove that they can effectively take responsibility to be good stewards of resources or development money will end up squandered.

          Lastly, Barnett advocates U.S. led military action in the Gap. This great undertaking would have to answer two questions to a sceptical world and to the American people. The first is when does altruism cross the line into elitism. The second is when does the export of security become imperialism? There is a fine line that should not be crossed on both of these issues. The individual countries of the Gap would most likely appreciate the well intentioned assistance of the Core. However, no sovereign nation wants to be told what is best for them by outsiders. On a similar note, unending military operations to integrate all nations of the globe into the U.S. model of globalization would at some point cross into forced integration. At what point does this become imperialism? Neither the U.S. nor the other nations of the Core should engage in empire building. How far can the Core go down the road of shrinking the Gap without crossing over into imperialism?

          Barnett's book is interesting and educational. Though he falls short on his solutions, his optimism and hope give encouragement as the nations of the Core seek to grasp security for themselves and alleviate suffering in the Gap. It is well worth reading by anyone who seeks to understand why the U.S. and other militaries have been so active in certain parts of the world in recent years as well as to understand the security challenges ahead.

2006, Foreign Area Officer Association
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