Nepal's Insurgency

by Cadet Jessamyn Liu, USMA

The Kingdom of Nepal is a small, landlocked state often touted as the "land of Buddha" and a "trekker's paradise." With 8 of the world's 10 highest peaks, Nepal would seem an oasis of tranquility cloistered far above the petty conflicts which plague other countries. Sandwiched between two behemoths, China and India, Nepal is often a strategic afterthought. But beneath the veneer of tourist board idealization, the world's only Hindu kingdom is racked with endemic poverty, fractured along regional, ethnic, caste, linguistic, and religious lines, and in the throes of an insurgency that is among the most deadly and most brutal in the world. ¹

On February 13, 1996, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) declared the advent of People's War in Nepal. Due to government negligence, for its first five years the movement gained momentum and spread its influence largely unchallenged. ² Although, outside of Kathmandu, Nepal is "verging on anarchy," ³ and the insurgency has claimed the lives of 8,500 Nepalese, more than 1,500 since late-August 2003 alone, ⁴ the uprising remains largely unknown to the American public. Nonetheless, the CPN(M) has fallen increasingly under US concern both as a terrorist organization and for its potential to cause a "failed-state" scenario where an anarchic Nepal could become a haven for more globally-minded terrorist groups. ⁵

MOTIVATIONS

At its root, the insurgency springs from insurgency springs from insurgent exploitation of anti-government resentment which has been welling-up in the Rolpa and Rukum districts for decades. In 1996, these districts, which comprise the Maoist heartland, were the poorest in Nepal ⁶ and had been under Communist sway for nearly half a century. ⁷ The average Human Development Index in Rolpa was 45% of the average in Kathmandu, ⁸ while the poverty rate in the Mid and Far West regions was 18 times greater than the rate in the capital. ⁹ But according to the local population, it was not always so. From the 1930s to the 1970s, the Rolpa and Rukum districts were the primary source for Nepali hashish and, accordingly, the most prosperous region in Western Nepal. ¹⁰ However, in 1976, a distant Kathmandu government enacted the Drug Trafficking and Abuse Act, criminalizing the region's primary source of income. ¹¹

The resulting decent into abject poverty, compounded by a series of lesser, but perceived as equally arbitrary, government mandates, bred bitterness and disillusionment with the national government. Simultaneously, factions of the Communist party filtered this mounting discontent through an increasingly radical lens, cultivating a base of revolutionary sentiment. ¹² According to anecdotal sources, support for the Communist Party grew from 10% to 60% in the 4 years following the hashish ban, as segments of the alienated population came to believe that armed struggle was the only means for redress of grievances. ¹³

In addition to endemic regional poverty, Nepal's highly stratified society promotes gross horizontal equality along ethnic, caste, and gender lines. Magars and Tharus, the two largest ethnic minorities in Nepal, compose the majority of the CPN(M)'s ranks. These indigenous hill and Terai ethnic groups endure an HDI that is about half of what the upper castes experience ¹⁴ and, prior to 2000, many Tharus in particular were landless farmers caught in a debt nexus which essentially reduced them to bonded labor. ¹⁵ Dalits, the lowest, "untouchable" class of the Hindu caste system, earn less than a fifth of Nepal's average per capita income. ¹⁶ Women, too, have traditionally been afforded far less opportunity for education and personal betterment ¹⁷ and make up one-fifth to one-third of the Maoist cadre. ¹⁸ The Maoists have attempted to leverage the widespread discontent in these historically marginalized minority groups by incorporating their grievances into CPN(M) policy platforms and slogans. ¹⁹ But while promises of social equality and self-determination have resonated with some members of these disaffected groups, the Maoist leadership remains overwhelmingly upper caste and it is not altogether clear that the movement at its core is inherently motivated by ethnic, caste, or gender based issues. ²⁰

Finally, Maoist intimidation has made support for the CPN(M) the only logical choice for many in the isolated, Maoist dominated regions. The Maoists have made it clear that there can be no bystanders in people's war and demand payments in kind of food and shelter, as well as requiring that one member from each household join their cause. ²¹ When compliance has not been forthcoming, it has been coerced through use of force or terror. There are countless accounts of beatings, abductions, amputation of limbs, and murders of those who resist CPN(M) policies. ²² To a lesser extent, some Maoists may be motivated by unruly government response to the insurgency. In the early years of the uprising, security forces were inexperienced and undisciplined and often politicized, sometimes committing criminal acts with impunity. ²³ But since OP Romeo, the government's reaction to 1994 Maoist led election violence and often cited as a turning point for Maoist supporters, began only months before the declaration of people's war, it could not have been a root cause of a conflict that required extended preparation. ²⁴

LIKELY STRATEGIES OF MOBILIZATION

The Maoists have committed themselves to armed revolutionary struggle in the classic style of protracted people's war. Specifically, the CPN(M) draws from the vein of "Gang of Four" Maoism, which also inspired India's Naxalites, the Khmer Rouge, and Sendero Luminoso, all movements remarkable for their extreme brutality. ²⁵ In 2001, the Maoists adopted Prachanda Path, a synthesis of Mao's people's war in the countryside and Lenin's general insurrection in the towns specially concocted for the urban-rural realties of Nepal, ²⁶ and put theory into action with the launching of their general offensive in November of that year. ²⁷

Endnotes

^1. Alex Perry, "A Kingdom in Chaos," TIME, 26 January 2004 [magazine online]; available from http://www.time.com/time/asia/2004/nepal_king/story.html; Internet; accessed 28 January 2004.BACK

^2. Pancha N. Maharjan, "The Maoist Insurgency and Crisis of Governability in Nepal," in Domestic Conflict and Crisis of Governability, ed. Dhruba Kumai (Kathmandu: Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies, 2000), 164; Thomas A. Marks, Insurgency in Nepal (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003), available at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/2003/nepal/nepal.pdf; Internet.BACK

^3. Perry, n.p.BACK

^4. Amy Waldman, "Maoist Rebellion Shifts Balance of Power in Rural Nepal," New York Times, 5 February 2004, national ed., A3. the same number killed in the first 5 years of the conflict, breakdown of peace talks.BACK

^5. Perry, n.p.BACK

^6. United Kingdom, Department for International Development, ECON Centre for Economic Analysis, Economic Aspects of the Insurgency in Nepal; Leiv Lunde and Audun Gleinsvik, ed.; available from **, 37.. Table 1B According to the 1998 UNDP, in 1996, the year that People's War was declared, the mid-Western mountain regions of Nepal had the lowest HDI (Human Development Indicator) at .241. Since then, that region's status has improved and the 2001 UNDP shows the far-Western mountain region as the lowest HDI at .286. and the 2001 UNDP shows the far-Western mountain region as the lowest HDI at .286.BACK

^7. Deepak Thapa, "The Maobadi of Nepal," in State of Nepal, ed. Kanak Mani Dixit and Shastri Ramachandaran (Kathmandu: Himal Books, 2002), 83.BACK

^8. S. Mansoob Murshed and Scott Gates, "Spatial- Horizontal Inequality and the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal," 28 February 2003 [working paper online].BACK

^9. United Kingdom, Department for International Development, Nepal, Country Assistance Plan 2003-2007 DRAFT (12 Septermber 2003), by Rebecca Goddard. BACK

^10. Robert Gersony, Mercy Corps Internation/United States Agency for International Development, Sowing the Wind History and Dynamics of the Maoist Revolt in Nepal's Rapti Hills (October 2003).BACK

^11. Gersony, 13.BACK

^12. Thapa, 83.BACK

^13. Gersony, 12.BACK

^14. Murshed/Gates, 6.. table 2 = HDI, upper castes = Bahun-Chetri-Newar.BACK

^15. DFIDECON, 13. kamaiya systemBACK

^16. Gersony, 31.BACK

^17. DFID Nepal, 4. The number of years of schooling for women is only about half of the number received by men and literacy for women is one-quarter compared to two-thirds male. 2001 UNDP Table 2, 132.BACK

^18. LTC MarksBACK

^19. 40 demands (19-25); Waldman, n.p.; LTC Marks.BACK

^20. Gersony, 34; Thapa, 87.BACK

^21. Gersony, 69.BACK

^22. Ibid., 71.BACK

^23. Ibid., 38, 96.BACK

^24. Ibid., 39.BACK

^25. T. Marks 6, 8; Gersony, 82.BACK

^26. "A Great Achievement: Prachanda Path," excerpted from Document of the Second National Conference of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist); Thapa, 92; DFID, 15.BACK

^27. Prachanda, "Interview with Comrade Prachanda, the Chairman of the Communitst Party of Nepal (Maoist) and the Supreme Commander of the People' Liberation army, Nepal," n.d. [interview online]; available from http://www.cpnmaoist.org/interviews/english/newinterview.htm; Internet; accessed 08 February 2003. "As presently influences of the old regime and new regime prevail in the urban and rural areas respectively, the Party has also concretely defined dialectical relation between destruction and construction. Consequently, the Party has made clear the fact that the construction, not destruction, gets priority in rural areas where the old regime is wiped out . But be it known that in bigger cities, destruction, not construction, is accorded top priority since the regime of enemies is still dominant there.BACK

2004, Foreign Area Officer Association
Herndon, Virginia
Maintained by LTC Steve Gotowicki.
http://www.faoa.org