Reflections on the Role of
the FAO - Mongolia

by BG Michael T. Byrnes, USA (48F)

I recently departed from Beijing after serving in the DAO for six and a half years. During that period I served as the first DATT (non-resident) to Ulaanbataar, and as the Army Attach‚ and latter as the DATT to Beijing. In both locations it was a time of great transition and significant change. What follows below is a thumbnail sketch of a FAO challenge on Mongolia.

Mongolia has one of the world's worst strategic locations. Not only is it a landlocked state, but it has only two bordering neighbors, Russia to the north and China to the south. Mongolia has a population that is smaller by a third than the Chinese military and a land area about one third that of the U.S. Inhospitable weather conditions exist throughout the entire country.

In 1990 Mongolia went from being a dictatorship dominated by the Soviet Union to a free and open democracy with a struggling market economy. This transition was very painful economically, but it is now pretty much complete and by all accounts it has been relatively successful. In the past the Mongolian military was totally dependent on the Soviet army for equipment, training and funding. Prior to 1990, the 40,000 man army was an adjunct to the Soviet forces stationed in Mongolia. With the withdrawal of Soviet aid Ulaanbataar began cutting down the size of its force. The army now numbers less than 20,000 men and the air force no longer has any operational capability.

The first order challenge for the U.S. in developing a military relationship was that Mongolia's national security problem could not be solved through military means. Our initial contacts and training programs had to be directed toward getting the Mongolian military to recognize this uncomfortable situation. Additionally, in 1991 the Mongolian military had only one officer who spoke English. Language training became the key priority for the first two to three years of the relationship. Eventually the priority shifted to providing information that would help the Mongolian army align its mission and organization with the developing democratic form of government. Training, logistics and medical support followed.

In addition to the representational side of the FAO mission there was a great need for reporting on the security situation in Mongolia. Washington knew little of the organization and leadership of the Mongolian army. As Mongolia struggled with the transition from a dictatorship to a democratic form of government, the role of the military force was of great interest. Mongolia also provided a window on China, Russia and north Korea. The U.S. role in helping Mongolia increasingly provided good access to all parts of the Mongolian military, making the gathering of information relatively easy.

In conclusion, the national security problems posed by the Mongolian experience and how a U.S. military relation is structured to deal with such problems are the types of political-military issues for which FAOS are trained and educated. Operating with broad policy guidance in an austere environment, interfacing with military and government agencies across deep cultural gaps is the essence of the FAO mission.

1997, Foreign Area Officer Association
Springfield, Virginia
Maintained by LTC Steve Gotowicki
http://www.faoa.org