Mines - A Political Approach

Stephen P. Dawkins

I. Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to make the point that a political approach to mine clearing can achieve more results faster than any technological approach. The basic principle is: those who laid the mines must lift them.

Background

Anti-personnel mines, at $3. each, remain an attraction for opposing sides in any ethnic conflict or civil war. All sides lay those mines for military and political reasons: to restrict movement of military units, and to restrict the movement of civilians for political reasons.

This paper will cover the political approach to clearing mines, both during hostilities and afterwards during a cease fire.

Lifting mines as an occupation neither pays well nor offers steady employment. Few civilians are willing to expose themselves to the risks of mine clearing. Most governments, including the U.S. Government, offer to train the trainers, but not lift the mines with their own people.

The media bewails the loss of life and limb to land mines, declaring all but the media guilty. And the mines remain armed and ready.

The Military Response

Since soldiers know more about mines than anybody else, they are the experts on mine clearing. They know that two vastly different standards apply: military clearing which permits the passage of troops in restricted lanes; and humanitarian mine clearing which demands a 99.6% clearance. Even the latter would leave four AP mines for every thousand cleared.

Soldiers also know that the wide variety of mines, about 700, makes it extraordinarily difficult to train people to lift mines unless they know just what they are lifting. Dealing with variety, therefore, is a key to the solution. And that solution must include efforts to get the soldiers that laid the mines to lift them. They are the best informed and most capable at lifting the mines they themselves laid.

On all sides in the Bosnian war, the soldiers of the former warring factions who laid the mines were called engineers. In fact, they were those men too old for infantry duty. They were given the option of laying mines or joining rifle platoons and the prospect of casualties. Weighing their options, they became mine engineers and laid mines all over Bosnia. These same men are the most qualified to lift them even at this late date.

High Technology and all that

The New York Times of December 16, 1997, page F1, devoted a special article in its Science Times Supplement to the problems of lifting mines. The article takes the technical approach for granted: only advanced technology will move us forward in lifting the 110 million buried mines around the world. Among the promising technologies cited are "ground-penetrating radars, infrared heat sensors, devices that detect vapors from explosives, gadgets that generate and analyze sound waves reflecting from objects, and bombarding the ground with radiation or radio waves to set off signals characteristic of the explosives."

Nowhere in this article does the Times discuss the political approach to lifting mines: the people who laid them must lift them.

I would also add that the common perception that all mines are underground is false. "Death Lurks Under the Ground" says the Times. Not so. I saw minefields in Bosnia, near the far end of the Sarajevo airport, where the mines, which looked like small dirty green pineapples, were about 4" above ground on wooden stakes. They were designed not only to slow attacking infantry, but to discourage those infantry from attacking in that sector. The defending Muslims felt more secure with their mines visible and above ground to deter Serb attackers.

Small boys playing in the mine field, and daring us to join them, knew their way around. I believe that the soldiers who laid those mines could pick them up without much difficulty.

II. Clearing Mines during Hostilities

United Nations forces in Bosnia before the October 1995 cease fire proved able at times to convince the former warring factions in some cases to cross back into terrain they had defended and lost to lift mines they had used in their defense. A Danish brigadier general told me that he had done just that in the Krajina area of Croatia.

With the Serbs and the Croats a few miles apart in new positions, the Croats faced Serb mines left behind in Croatian territory. The Danish brigadier convinced the Serbs to return to their old positions to lift their mines left behind, if the Croats would also lift their mines in what was then Serb territory. Done without fanfare or publicity, the engineer troops of both sides returned and lifted their mines.

III. The Political Reality

The political reality is that governments lay mines for, as cited above, military and political reasons. Outsiders, however, make the mistake that the governments that laid those mines share the same enthusiasm as the outside world to lifting them once hostilities have ended. Not true. The governments that laid those mines in almost all cases want them to remain right where they are even after a cease fire.

Bosnia - Initial Efforts

The Muslims, Serbs, and Croats planted between 3 and 4 million AP mines. Lifting those mines as part of the peace process became a high priority in Washington. The Congress allocated several million dollars and State's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs was tasked to coordinate a mine lifting program with the Government of Bosnia. The State Department office director who headed that effort, Colonel Dan Layton, USA, was one of 42 US. Army officers detailed to the Department of State. About 14 State Department Foreign Service officers, the author included, were on detail to the Department of Defense. This exchange program dates back to 1960 and demonstrates how closely State and Defense work together.

Other European countries, such as Finland, sent trainers to Bosnia to help with the mine clearing effort.

One of the first priorities was to develop a computer data base to provide information for training mine clearing teams. It seemed a simple matter to get the Federation Government headed by Muslim President Alija Izetbegovic to sign the standard aid agreements that provided for free custom entry for the computers and related equipment, to hire local citizens, and to enjoy the cooperation of the local government.

By early winter 1996, plans for a Bosnia-wide mine clearing campaign were firmed up and approved. Hitches developed, however, that made it look as though the State Department did not know how to get the program moving.

The Reality

By summer, however, mine clearing was moving too slowly to have much effect. IFOR HQ estimated that if each of the three former warring factions put 1,000 men to work lifting mines, it would take 33 years to clear the 3-4 million mines in Bosnia.

We saw that soldiers of the Republika Srpska Army were promised 5 DM a day for lifting mines, but rarely saw the money. They actually received one hot meal and one cold meal a day. Croat soldiers rarely lifted mines and the Muslims demanded more and more money to do anything. The initial demands of the Muslims were for an annual salary of $80,000. for each soldier so engaged. The annual per capita income then was less than $400. a year for Muslims and about $300. for Serbs. Izetbegovic's people "softened" their demands and agreed to $8,000. per year for a limited number of people to get the program moving.

Nothing happened.

By the summer of 1996, IFOR HQ noted that the Muslim Army was trying to buy mine components in bulk in Europe and was starting up production in secret land mine factories underground in Gorazde and in the Tito Barracks area of Sarajevo.

By August 1996, the lack of any movement on clearing mines brought then Secretary of State Warren Christopher to Sarajevo. He found that Izetbegovic was demanding a 94% income tax on all Bosnians working for the U.S. mine clearing program, and was also demanding 90% customs duties on all equipment entering Bosnia.

Foreign Service officers in the field found it difficult to explain to Mr. Christopher and to Washington that the Muslims wanted those mines to remain right where they were. They were willing to talk about mine clearing, but came up with one excuse after another to avoid having to actually lift mines. The Administration just assumed that all Bosnians wanted to lift those mines, and the Congress just assumed that State was not competent to administer the program. The fact, is, and remains, that Muslims, Croats, and Serbs do not believe in a peace settlement coming out of the present cease fire and therefore want those mines to remain.

The State Department Colonel

Col. Layton then put forth a proposal that combined the political and military realities. He reminded all sides that even if they put 1,000 men to work it would take 33 years to lift all the mines. So why not, he said, start now on those mine fields that meet two criteria: they are not important either in a military or political sense; and the people have requested that mines in certain areas be removed.

The results proved encouraging. The respective army staffs decided which mine fields were not really necessary. And it was easy to find out from local officials which areas should be cleared to benefit the local people. These were areas such as river banks, country roads, wooded paths, old markets, and schools that had been mined during the war and were still too dangerous to enter. It was a novel approach for the former warring factions with their communist mentality to ask their people their views on anything. When they did, and the military staffs then lifted those mines in selected areas, the party officials -- Serb, Croat, Muslim -- were astounded to see that the people gave them credit and were grateful.

So, demining when treated as a political issue can do some good. The goal here is not the humanitarian standard, but the what is possible. And if mines are cleared in areas important to the local people that is at least a measured success.

IV. Conclusion

Those people who lay the mines should be the first pressed into service to lift them. However, since the political authorities which ordered the mine laying have most likely not changed their goals following a cease-fire, peace enforcement operations require a political approach. Colonel Layton's sensible approach should be offered early after the cease-fire, keeping in mind that those who lay the mines should lift them. The technology can come later.

A Note About the Author: Stephen P. Dawkins, a retired Foreign Service officer, served as the POLAD (political advisor) to the Commander-in-Chief of the Implementation Force in Bosnia from December 1995 to September 1996. Prior to that he was POLAD to the former Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, General Gordon R. Sullivan. From 1958-1961, he served as an infantry lieutenant and platoon leader in the USMC.

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