EGYPTIAN RED SEA DESTROYER SQUADRON:
CLOSING THE BAB-EL-MANDAB STRAITS
By LT Youssef H. Aboul-Enein,
USN
Much has been written about the 1973 Arab-Israeli War with the focus on the tremendous revolution
in air and ground infantry warfare. The United States Army and Marine Corps spent hours studying this
conflict with the result being a complete change in doctrine for both services. What is not explored is the
Egyptian exploitation of its Red Sea Destroyer Squadron that executed a blockade of the Israeli port of Eilat
by closing the Bab-El-Mandab Straits located at the narrow isthmus between Yemen and Somalia.
The actions of the Egyptian Red Sea Destroyer Squadron indicates meticulous planning on the part of
military planners in Alexandria and Cairo and a highly developed sense of appreciation for cutting the sea-
lanes of communications during the 1973 War. The tactic was not to engage Israeli naval and air forces but
to only disrupt shipping bound for Israel from the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. Sadly, little has been
written about the naval aspects of the Yom-Kippur War, the Israelis including the prominent author,
statesman and historian Chaim Herzog dismisses the naval aspect of the 1973 War in both his books
War of Attonement and the seminal The Arab-Israeli Wars. Even
Egyptian authors like Egyptian Chief of Staff during the war Field Marshal Abd-al-Gahnny El-Gamassy
devotes a few paragraphs in his 500 plus page memoirs published in Arabic in 1998.
An Interview with an Egyptian Commodore
Commodore Mustafa Kamal Mansour, Egyptian Navy was interviewed by journalist Manal Nour-
al-Din on the 25th anniversary of the Yom-Kippur War or Ramadan War as the Arab side
calls it. The Commodore explains that his squadron --which consisted of two Skory-type Destroyers,
ancillary craft (Herzog, 1982)-- departed in August 1973 with orders to get underway towards the Indian
Ocean. Their orders were to proceed toward Pakistan or India for needed repairs of the destroyers. The
squadron put anchor in Aden, explaining to authorities that the Indian dry-docks would not be ready to
receive the Squadron of Destroyers. They remained in Aden for two months conducting exercises and
paying port visits in Port Sudan, Sudan; Berbera, Somalia and Hodeidah in Northern Yemen.
Five days prior to the opening of hostilities, sealed orders were opened designating H-Hour as the
6th of October at 1400 Cairo Time. Commodore Mansour was to execute a blockade of all
Israeli bound shipping entering or departing the Bab-El-Mandab Straits. The Egyptians would remain on
station seven months from the start of the war conducting maritime interdiction operations and cutting off
tankers and merchant shipping bound for Eilat. The Egyptian destroyers also had ancillary ships as part of
the squadron that provided re-supply while on-station. Being out of range from Israeli air and missile
attack, the Egyptians relied on intelligence gathered from Arab merchant ships entering Bab-el-Mandab and
had little interference except from naval vessels observing Egyptian actions. These observing warships
included vessels from the United States, France and England along with bordering Arab and African states
that sent ships to monitor events.
Choosing the Bab-el-Mandab Straits dealt a blow to Israel's ability to import petroleum products. The
Egyptian Red Sea Squadron's Blockade would be used by the late Anwar Sadat as a bargaining tool during
the cease-fire negotiations that were undertaken to disengage forces and negotiate the release of the
Egyptian Third Army which was surrounded by the Israelis. In studying the Egyptian Navy Official
website (navy.mmc.gov.eg) cites this blockade as an important long-term naval operation
that disrupted Israel's supply of oil from the Persian Gulf. One can never underestimate the maritime
potential of forces engaged in combat, in particular regional powers like Israel and Egypt.
According to the memoirs of Field Marshal Gamassy, he recounts that Egypt estimated that 18 million
tons of oil in imported annually by Israel and arrives their port of Eilat. Egyptian military planners intended
to provide a layered blockade of this port laying mines around the Gulf of Suez, and interdiction of
merchant shipping using fast attack boats north of the Bab-el-Mandab Straits and finally the blockade of the
Straits themselves. Gamassy writes that mines sunk a total of 48,000 tons of shipping bound for Eilat in the
opening days of the war.
Egyptian Naval Order of Battle for Yom-Kippur War
Egyptian books on the war lacks detail on the number and order of battle and focuses mainly on
tactics, strategy and political explanations of the outcome of military action. Western and Israeli sources
report the total number of Egyptian naval warships deployed in the Suez Canal Zone, Mediterranean, and
Red Sea Theaters as:
Fast Attack Boats 60
Submarines 12
Destroyers 08
Amphibious Craft 14
Overall command of Egyptian Naval Forces was under Vice Admiral Fuad Abu Zikry with a division
of the Red Sea Squadron and the Mediterranean Squadron.
Conclusion
The 1973 Red Sea Blockade occurred 1,000 miles away from the nearest Egyptian port and the Egyptian
Navy of today is quite different from the one encountered in 1973. As anyone who has served with
Egyptian Naval Forces today can attest there is a shift away from Soviet-style doctrine and an embracing of
western combat styles and technology. The brevity of the war overshadows the significance of Egyptian
naval planning (Aker, 1985). Had the war extended, Israel could not have sustained itself solely on airlift
and several attempts to break this blockade is an illustration of the effectiveness of Egyptian naval forces in
the Red Sea theater (Aker, 1985).
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LT Youssef Aboul-Enein, USN is Middle-East/North Africa Navy Foreign Area Officer stationed at Great
Lakes, Illinois. He has served as Arabic interpreter for Exercise Bright Star 1998 and 2000.
Sources Used:
(1) Official Website of the Egyptian Navy navy.mmc.gov.eg.
(2) El-Gamassy, Muhammed. Memoirs of the 1973 October War. Egyptian
Publishers Guild. Cairo, Egypt. 1998.
(3) Nour-el-Din, Manal. Heroism Behind the Scenes: Interviews with those that fought the
1973 War. Egyptian Publishers Guild. Cairo, Egypt. 1997
(4) Herzog, Chaim. The Arab-Israeli Wars. Lionel Leventhal Publishing.
London, England. 1982
(5) Herzog, Chaim. The War of Attonement, the Inside Story of the Yom-Kippur War,
1973 Lionel Leventhal Publishing. London, England. 1975
(6) Aker, Frank. October 1973, The Arab-Israeli War. Archon Book. Hamden,
Connecticut. 1985
Note:
(A). Excerpts from Arabic Books were translated by LT Aboul-Enein and errors in translation are
solely his.
2001, Foreign Area Officer Association
Springfield,
Virginia
Maintained by LTC Steve
Gotowicki.
http://www.faoa.org
