Shaping Russian Foreign and Security Policy

By MAJ Edward R. McCleskey, USAF

In the post-Soviet era, successive Russian administrations have attempted to establish domestic stability while simultaneously dealing with external pressures that could undermine this transition. The perceived gravity of these pressures has varied by subject and with time, but security has always been a major subject for debate by policy makers in Moscow. Russia's foreign and security interests face challenges all over the world: nuclear non-proliferation in Korea and the Indian Subcontinent, relations with former client states in Africa, and interaction with the People's Republic of China come to mind. However, the most crucial (and controversial) issues that face Russia are in the West -- in its relations with the United States and Western Europe. With NATO expansion and the integration of new market economies, one would now have to include Central and parts of Eastern Europe in what constitutes "the West" as well. This paper will concentrate on current topics relating to Russian-Western interaction and attempt to answer the question, "How Is Russian Foreign and Security Policy Shaped by Relations with the West?".

Political Groupings In Russia. In order to understand the current topics and how Russia reacts to them, one must first comprehend the domestic forces at work. First, in a democracy (albeit a nascent one), public opinion must be considered. For a period of time after the fall of communist rule, the public perceived little direct threat from the West. For example, the New Russian Barometer Poll III conducted in 1994 revealed that the majority of the public did not feel threatened by any of the eight listed countries (Japan, US, China, Iran, Germany, Ukraine, Poland, and Belarus).
The Kremlin perspective: Shaped in the West?
Since then, events such as the NATO bombing campaign in Serbia and Kosovo in 1999 and Western criticism of Russian tactics in Chechnya have changed the opinion of some. According to Alexander Kabakov, a columnist with Kommersant Daily, "The pacifism that had prevailed in Russia since the early days of perestroika has vanished because of anger over Western bombing raids on Serbia last year and the violent challenge to Russian stability posed by Chechen terrorists who have attacked civilians in Moscow and other cities."

There are clearly differing attitudes among political elites toward the approach Moscow should take in dealing with the West. Alex Pravda, writing in Developments in Russian Politics 4, divides these elites into three groups: "radical reformers" who can be characterised as "liberal Westernisers"; "radical conservatives," both communist and non-communist, who are "nationalists"; and "centrists" who use a "state realist" approach.

Radical reformers are pro- West in outlook and feel that Russia's future lies in rapid and total integration into Western institutions. Radical conservatives, on the other hand, are strongly nationalistic and suspicious of Western policies, seeing in many of them an American strategy to isolate Russia and keep it weak. Centrists, following a realpolitik perspective, attempt to find a middle path and use Western co- operation as a springboard for expansion of Russia's own status as a great continental power.

The relative influence of each of these blocs has varied. Currently, it can be said that the Centrists' "state realist" approach remains dominant with the transition of power from Boris Yeltsin to his hand-picked successor, Vladimir Putin.

Current Issues. Having defined the landscape of domestic politics, we are now ready to examine specific issues which shape Russia's foreign and security policies.

Expansion of NATO. This is hardly a new topic, having first appeared early in the 1990's following the demise of the Warsaw Pact and the democratisation of its former members. However, the issue has gained more immediacy since March 1999. It was at this time that the first new members were added to the Alliance: Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic. A few weeks later, these countries found themselves supporting NATO's first-ever combat operations -- in Kosovo, which has already been referred to in this paper as a source of Russian irritation.

Russian reaction to NATO expansion has been inconsistent over time. In 1992 the revised Russian security doctrine still listed NATO as a continuing threat, and in the early 1990's the Duma linked compliance with the terms of the SALT II treaty to a deceleration in the Alliance's plans for eastward expansion. However, in 1992, Boris Yeltsin made the bold suggestion that NATO peacekeepers actually replace Russian soldiers in Nagorno-Karabach, within the former territorial boundaries of the erstwhile USSR. In August of 1993, Yeltsin appeared to signal Russia's approval for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to proceed with accession; however the attempted coup shortly thereafter led to a reversal in policy.

Over time a series of institutional compromises were attempted to ameliorate Russian concerns while allowing the West's agenda of expansion to proceed. Russia at first tried to marginalize NATO altogether by emphasising the role of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), later styled the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Established in 1975, this was a forum for discussion and negotiation among European countries, both NATO and Warsaw Pact, but significantly without the U.S. Richard Sakwa states, "Russia's call for a comprehensive system of collective security based on the OSCE were clearly designed in part to oppose plans for NATO expansion." Russia was unable to take NATO out of its role as the primary guarantor of European security, so Russia had to deal with the Alliance again. To this end, a North Atlantic Co-operation Council was established in November 1991. This was a forum in which Russia could directly present its security concerns to NATO. Another tool was the Partnership for Peace (PfP), which slowed the pace of expansion as such and created a level of association below that of full membership. In this program, initiated in January 1994, partners could participate on a limited basis in NATO exercises and express security concerns. PfP membership would be a prerequisite to, but not guarantee of, eventual full membership. Russia itself eventually joined PfP.

PfP provided the impetus to final accession of new members into NATO, and, as previously stated, the first new members joined in March 1999. The transition from potential to reality, as well as NATO's war against fellow Slavs in Serbia, has made this issue one of the most prominent in Russia's relations with the West. The view of the "state realists" appears to be ascendant; recent pronouncements from Russian leaders are more accepting of expansion. President Vladimir Putin was interviewed by Sir David Frost of the BBC on March 4, 2000, and stated Russia is amenable to "more profound integration" provided Russia is treated on a basis of equality. Putin went on to say, "Attempts to exclude us from the process is what causes opposition and concern on our part, but that does not mean we are going to shut ourselves off from the rest of the world. Isolationism is not an option."

Missile Defence. The next issue shaping relations between the West and Russia is the U.S. plan to deploy a system to defend itself against attacks from "rogue states" using ballistic missiles. Although the system is not intended to defend against a robust threat from a state such as Russia, there are those that feel that it nevertheless could diminish the deterrent effect of Russia's arsenal and enable a U.S. first strike.

The Russian reaction has been to play on European concerns that the U.S. system leaves them exposed. Putin has proposed that Russia will develop its own system that would destroy incoming missiles in the boost phase, shortly after launch. (The proposed U.S. system would have the much more difficult task of targeting individual warheads in space). Russia would share this system with the Europeans, thus providing a lever to alienate Europeans from the U.S. and increase Russian influence. The Russian position was recently restated by Defence Minister Sergeyev, but again the statement was lacking in specifics. The timing is probably not coincidental but rather intended to influence European Union opinion and U.S. domestic debate. The EU states recently committed themselves to an EU-only reaction force within NATO, potentially decoupling US strategic guarantees from the continent. Meanwhile, President Clinton will be required to make a decision on implementation of the U.S. system within the month. The issue has also become a topic of the U.S. presidential campaign.

Other Issues. Besides NATO expansion and the development of a national missile defence system, there are other issues that are affecting Russia's relations with the West. As referred to previously, NATO's air campaign against Serbia in 1999 became a source of anti-Western and anti-NATO sentiment. Russia found itself in a position where it was divided between its loyalty to a Slavic brother state and a desire to keep good relations with NATO. Russia stayed out of the 78-day conflict, but has participated in the peacekeeping duties following Serbia's withdrawal from Kosovo. Although Russia doesn't have it's own sector in Kosovo per se (as do the U.S., France, the UK, and Italy), it does have forces patrolling in the sectors of other nations. Their presence is viewed by ethnic Serbs in Kosovo as a guarantor of objectivity due to the close historical and cultural ties between Serbia and Russia.

Closer to home, Chechnya continues to be a source of tension between the West and Russia. As stated earlier, many Russians resent Western criticism of tactics used against "terrorists" within their own borders. It is unlikely that such criticism will actually change Russian methods, since this is widely seen as a matter crucial to national survival. Indeed, many give the aggressive campaign in Chechnya credit for Putin's popularity. Nevertheless, those statements Putin makes for Western consumption (such as the Frost interview) declare an intention to punish any Russian war criminals and attempt to justify the action in Western eyes.

Finally, one can't ignore the economic factor in Russia's relations with the West. The most important economic issue at this time is debt restructuring, which Moscow is having success with. Much of the debt owed to external lenders was inherited from the Soviet era. Moscow recently was successful in its negotiations with the London Club of private lenders. According to the deal, approximately one-third of the $32 billion debt was written off, and the remainder transferred to 30-year Eurobonds guaranteed by the Russian government. Negotiations with the Paris Club, which is owed $42 billion, will probably have similar aims.

Conclusion. The driving factor in Russia's foreign policy vis-à-vis the West is the need to have a stable international situation in order to complete the transition to domestic stability. Initially fearful of NATO expansion, Moscow now realises the inevitability of its fruition and attempts to work on a more cordial, if not friendly, basis with the Alliance.

Moscow views the U.S. proposal to defend itself from rogue ballistic missile attacks as the precursor to a system that could render its own arsenal ineffective, therefore threatening stability. It sees opportunity in offering an alternative, which could not only reduce the threat it perceives from the U.S. policy but also provide a lever to decouple the U.S. from European defence, resulting in more influence for Russia.

The Russian elite views Western policies in the Balkans and Chechnya in different ways. Moscow probably had the power to prevent the bombing of Serbia, but did not, in order to preserve its relatively good relations with an ever-expanding NATO. However, Chechnya is viewed as a matter of national survival; Western objections to Russian tactics are ignored. Probably the most important underlying factor in Russia's relations with the West are economic interests. It is here that foreign policy toward the West affects the government's domestic ability to stabilise. It is currently successful in securing marginal relief of its loans, and hopes for further aid and development assistance.

The course of Russia's foreign policy with the West is viewed in terms of its impact on domestic stability. Depending on which political grouping reigns, different approaches will be taken. However, the national interests of Russia will always be the deciding factor.

Major McCleskey is in the USAF FAO program and this article is based on his regional studies component in the Air Force Area Studies and Advanced Program (ASAP). The article was thoroughly researched and footnoted, but I deleted the footnotes to save space. -- DOS

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