Consolidated Military Attache and Security Assistance Activities:
A Case for Unity of Command

by LtCol Kurt M. Marisa, USAF

INTRODUCTION

In the post-9/11 world "global war on terror", the U.S. government (USG), Department of Defense (DoD), and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) are pursuing a foreign policy of "urgency" and collaboration and a strategy of pre-emption (8)--the ultimate objective being to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as deter other catastrophic terrorist attacks against U.S. interests at home or abroad. In this light, the DoD and JCS must ensure that their military-to-military relationships and cooperation around the world--in most cases as established through in-country U.S. Defense Attache Offices (DAO) and Security Assistance Offices (SAO)--are established and maintained in a way that fully supports this policy, strategy, and objective.

However, the Cold War system of worldwide military assistance offices responsible for security assistance and weapons sales--usually separate and distinct from DAOs and any intelligence reporting and force protection responsibility--may have outlived its usefulness and practicality. In recent decades, U.S. military security assistance and security cooperation (previously called military engagement) activities were conducted for the primary purpose of increasing U.S. influence in a country and supporting foreign policy, with little connection to in-country reporting and representational missions. The assistance and reporting missions were purposefully kept separate and distinct in most cases, but must they really be mutually exclusive?

This "split-unit" DAO/SAO configuration may have worked adequately for decades during the Cold War. However, this was a period when U.S. friends and enemies were clearer; U.S. defense sales more robust; force protection not the paramount concern it is today; and defense budget authorizations and personnel resources more able to support redundant units and a large in-country military presence. But in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 era, the reality is that the DoD must draw down resources in less critical parts of the world, and reassign personnel and reallocate resources to priority "hot spots." The current DAO/SAO system, with the lack of a clear, single senior military officer responsible for all in-country programs and DoD policy, is increasingly attracting the attention of DoD, JCS, and combatant command leadership budget-cutters and planners responsible for rationalizing the overseas military presence.

The DoD will increasingly have a reduced ability to adequately resource multiple embassy-based military units worldwide. Consequently, a new way of conducting business overseas is needed to better integrate and consolidate the defense attaché and security assistance missions to conform to 21st century imperatives, one in which the responsibility for all DoD policy and the control and management of all attaché, security assistance, and security cooperation activities rests with one senior officer in each country. Consolidated DAO/SAO operations offer many advantages over the split-unit arrangement, including improved unity of command and effort; a reduction in DoD manpower and resource requirements; a smaller military "footprint" with a lower force protection threat; and an increased synergy between the DAO and SAO missions. Each of these advantages will be analyzed, with emphasis on the benefits of a closer integration between U.S. security assistance programs and attaché reporting, drawing the conclusion that consolidated DAO/SAOs is preferable to the current split- unit system.

BACKGROUND

During the Napoleonic years of the early 1800s, France began the practice of adding military personnel to its diplomatic missions, a system which many other European nations adopted. The primary purpose of military diplomats was to observe and report on the military developments in their host nations (7:47). The first official military attaché to the United States--a naval attaché from the United Kingdom-- was not accredited until 1867, and the U.S. did not enter the military diplomacy game until 1877 when the first attaches were dispatched to Russia, Austria, and Turkey (7:49). The main task of U.S. military attaches from the beginning was to obtain and report military information, in accordance with established diplomatic conventions.

Initially, U.S. military attaches were detailed to the Department of State (DoS). In the early 1890s, the military decided to retain more control over its attaches and subordinated them directly to their respective departments--War and Navy (7:53). At the end of WW II, with the creation of the Department of Defense and Department of the Air Force, the military created the designations of Defense Attache (DATT), the head of the military mission; Army Attache (ARMA); Air Force Attache (AIRA); and Naval Attache (ALUSNA). Then in the 1960s, all U.S. military attaches were resubordinated to the new Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), vice their respective services, a system that exists to this day, despite several initiatives to transfer the responsibility for military attaches to JCS, the military services, or to the combatant commands.

The primary missions of a Defense Attache Office are to report military and political intelligence, perform representational functions, serve as military advisor to the ambassador and national security decision-makers, manage security cooperation/engagement activities, conduct DAO management and administration, and serve as U.S. Defense Representative and/or perform security assistance functions as assigned (5). In respect to the Air Force, the duties of Air Attaches are identified by Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC) as to report military information responding to military and national requirements; represent the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Secretary of the Air Force, and other DoD agencies as required; advise the ambassador on military matters; and plan and direct operational and administrative functions (1).

With the sharp increase in arms sales and military assistance programs after WW II and during the Cold War, the military attache offices of many western and communist nations also became responsible for managing these programs for their respective nations. Some countries even created the title of "Defense Cooperation Attache," to designate their responsible military diplomats. While most developed nations merged their growing military assistance/sales programs with the traditional diplomatic, advisory, and reporting missions of their attaches, the United States--and to a lesser extent Britain and France--began to bifurcate the defense attaché and military assistance missions. Although the U.S. had a small number of military advisory groups (MAG) prior to WWII, the start of the Cold War caused a proliferation in the number of MAGs--separate from the traditional DAOs--to train host nation forces and run security assistance programs. MAGs were usually kept independent from DAOs, largely because of the belief that the attaché reporting mission was incompatible with military assistance programs and that security assistance and weapons sales should not be managed by, or from an office connected with, an intelligence organization. The new military assistance offices--which took a variety of names and forms such as MAG, MAAG, JUSMAG, SAO, ODA, ODC, OMC, MAC--generally fell under the reporting chain of their respective regional combatant commands.

The U.S. "security assistance" program, an important element of foreign policy guided by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, consists of economic and military assistance to allied and friendly governments. Although the DoS is responsible for directing and overseeing the program, most of the missions are administered by the DoD, including Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Excess Defense Article (EDA) transfer program, International Military Education and Training (IMET), and Humanitarian Affairs Programs (HAP). The primary DoD organization responsible for directing military security assistance missions is the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), a direct reporting unit of the DoD. Currently, the military offices in foreign countries that run security assistance activities on behalf of DSCA, in addition to supporting the security cooperation programs of the regional commands, are often called Security Assistance Offices. For consistency, the term SAO will be used throughout this paper, although many go by other designations. SAOs are also part of their ambassadors' "Country Team" at embassies around the world, but they usually retain little formal connection to, or close interaction with, the DAOs.

In comparison with the missions of a DAO, while working as an SAO Chief in 2002, the author determined the primary mission of an SAO is to support U.S. foreign policy through management of security assistance programs, including weapons sales, military training, advisory role, and humanitarian assistance. However, equally important are the security cooperation programs conducted by the SAOs on behalf of the combatant commands, often with augmentees provided by the command, but more often accomplished "out of hide." This includes serving as focal point for combatant command in-country military exercises; conducting and managing command engagement activities; acting as the military representative of the combatant commander; acting as military focal point for disaster relief and other military operations as required; and serving as U.S. Defense Representative/diplomatic representative as required.

In each country, U.S. security assistance programs are primarily administered through one of four configurations--separate SAOs, DAO-managed programs, augmented-DAOs, and DoS run programs. In FY03, separate SAOs existed in 79 countries, although the majority had only a few personnel. Additionally, in the majority of the 166 countries in which the U.S. offered security assistance, 101 were administered by SAOs. The activities in most of the remaining countries were administered by DAOs (55 locations), either using augmentation personnel from DSCA and/or the combatant commands (37 locations) or without any augmentation (18 locations) (see attachment). The remaining 10 countries were administered directly by the DoS (13 & 14). However, aside from some exceptions which have DAO-administered programs for various geo- political reasons--the most significant being Russia, Israel, China, Algeria, India, Indonesia, Vietnam, Yemen, Mexico, and Canada--the DAO-administered security assistance programs are usually in small or strategically less important countries in Africa and Asia. A significant disparity also exists between commands. Within the 83 countries in the EUCOM area of responsibility (AOR), 45 programs are run by SAOs-- 43 by DAOs and five by DoS. Similarly, within PACOM's 30 countries of responsibility, 14 are run by DAOs, 11 by SAOs, and five by DoS. In contrast, CENTCOM and SOUTHCOM programs are run almost exclusively by SAOs--17 SAOs and three DAOs in the former and 28 SAOs and five DAOs in the latter (13 & 14) (Attachment).

SAO offices are primarily established and manned using DSCA "administrative fees," obtained through security assistance programs, for the purpose of running FMS, FMF, IMET, and HAP, although some manning and funding comes directly from the combatant commands. However, in many countries, the combatant commands have turned their SAOs into frontline engagement "Mil Groups." In fact, the majority of activities conducted by many SAOs are in direct support of combatant command security cooperation/engagement activities, exercises, and operations for which the SAOs are usually not fully manned or trained to properly accomplish.

Although attaches and security assistance officers are drawn from the same candidate pool of Foreign Area Officers (FAO) and other qualified personnel, only the U.S. Army has created a career track to select, train, develop, and promote officers to serve as both military attaches and security assistance personnel. The Army primarily chooses attaches and security assistance officers from within its FAO program, with some SAO personnel coming from the acquisitions and logistics career fields. Air Force selections for attaché and security assistance assignments are made directly by AFPC assignment specialists. Attache nominees are confirmed by the Air Staff International Airmen Division, but are not dependent upon the individual having the FAO specialty (1). Within the Navy, ALUSNAs are selected by the Office of Naval Intelligence, usually from naval warfare career fields and not intelligence, and security assistance personnel are assigned by Navy "detailers." Although desired, nominees are not required to have the Navy FAO designation. The U.S. Marine Corps also maintains a small cadre of FAOs.

Security assistance personnel are trained at a 3-week course at the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM) at Wright-Patterson Air Force base in Dayton, Ohio. All military attaches are prepared at a 12-week course taught at DIA's Joint Military Attache School (JMAS) in Washington DC, and some also attend DISAM if performing security assistance duties. Although focusing on their respective areas of expertise, both courses have as an objective to train military personnel as U.S. representatives abroad and to work in an embassy environment.

Despite both being integrated parts of the embassy Country Teams, the DAOs and SAOs have different chains of command, often competing objectives, little interaction, and in more than a few cases--semi-hostile relations. The plethora of 1-5 person micro- unit DAOs and SAOs are each "commanded" by a senior U.S. military officer (O-4 to O- 6). These officers are vulnerable to the "rice bowl" syndrome, with each DATT and SAO Chief working to maximize their influence and access with the ambassador and host nation military, often at the expense of the other. Neither is solely responsible for implementing overall DoD policy in their assigned country. In way of comparison, whereas SAO Chiefs usually report to the J4, J5, or Chief of Staff of their respective combatant commands, DATTs report directly to the Director of the Defense HUMINT Service of DIA. Although attaché performance is formally rated through DIA, both ambassadors and command senior officers--including the commander, J2, and J5--may provide input. Both SAO Chiefs and DATTs must perform to their ambassador's satisfaction or risk relief for cause.

In an attempt to reconcile the competing, and sometimes conflicting, roles of the DATTs and SAO Chiefs, the DoD issued DoD Instruction 5105.57 in 1975 to create the designation of "U.S. Defense Representative" (USDR). The USDR designation is used to identify the military officer who is the in-country representative of the DoD, JCS, and unified combatant commanders--as well as being responsible for in-country security/force protection and other administrative issues common to both DAOs and SAOs (4:1-5). The USDR (who is either the DATT, SAO Chief, or in a few cases an operational force commander) is nominated for each country by the JCS, in consultation with the respective regional combatant commanders, and approved by the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy (OSD(P)). Overall, DATTs are appointed more frequently as USDR than SAO Chiefs--currently DATTs in 144 countries and SAO Chiefs in 38 countries (2)--but the regional differences in application are substantial. Largely because it does not have any permanently assigned combatant forces in its AOR, with a few exceptions SOUTHCOM prefers that SAO Chiefs serve as the USDR. In EUCOM, DATTs are normally designated as the USDR, and in CENTCOM and PACOM it is mixed (2).

ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES

The current DoD system of in-country military representation remains inherently dysfunctional for many DATTs and SAO Chiefs alike, as well as for the respective ambassadors and combatant commanders. Many ambassadors have failed to understand why they must have multiple, often "bickering," military bosses on their Country Teams (3) and some have directed there can be only one military officer in charge (2). In countries with both DAOs and SAOs, neither the DATTs nor the SAO Chiefs have been designated as being solely responsible for overall DoD policy, and the USDR designation has failed to address this dysfunction, resulting in an inconsistent "personality- dependent" application--in some locations the DATT and SAO Chief arrive at a workable, cooperative arrangement, in others they try to stay clear of each other, and in too many countries the DAOs and SAOs work at cross-purposes. In the worst cases, more than once an ambassador has relieved either the DATT, SAO Chief, or both for failure to cooperate (3).

The USDR designation was faulty from the beginning. Partly designed to address the problem of who is "in charge" between DATTs and SAO Chiefs, it is a classic example of the inadequate results of a compromise solution. The original directive, as well as its updated versions, failed to clear up confusion over the relationship between DAOs and SAOs--and actually complicated matters further. As stated, the directive chose a title for the designation that would indicate the USDR is indeed the top military representative. However, the directive states the designation of USDR is only an "additional duty" (4:2). In actuality and in accordance with diplomatic norms, the DATT is the only diplomatically-accredited representative to the host nation of the DoD, JCS, and his/her respective military service. Although not diplomatically-accredited, SAO Chiefs often have been viewed as the primary representative of the combatant commanders to the host nation, though many DATTs claim this label as well. The USDR designation has only muddled the "representation" picture. Unfortunately, many combatant commands, DAOs, and SAOs at times have used the title and authorities of USDR to suit their own agendas.

DoDI 5105.57 also assigned to the USDR the responsibility for the security and force protection of all permanent and temporary duty non-combatant military personnel in-country but stated that the USDR "will not become involved in intelligence matters" (4:2). This statement has created the most confusion, particularly with DIA, since DATTs by definition work for DIA and perform an intelligence support mission. Furthermore, in order for an SAO Chief to provide security and force protection for in- country military personnel, he/she would obviously require an involvement with intelligence. The fact is that most SAO Chiefs serving as USDR lack the resources and training to properly accomplish the security/force protection requirements.

Adding to concerns over lack of unity of command and a muddled force protection mission, the counterintelligence (CI) organizations of the military services have created "force protection" units at several embassies. Although the small units are loosely attached to DAOs for reporting oversight, they remain independent elements outside the reporting chain of the DAO.

Rather than being a rational system, the current primary method of establishing in- country military representation is a dysfunctional compromise that places the burden of responsibility at each embassy on the two senior military officers assigned. The current system is overdue for an indepth study of ways to improve the security assistance/cooperation missions, and make them more relevant to warfighting needs, as well as of the optimal subordination and reporting chain for DAO and SAO personnel. In this time of national urgency, military transformation, diminishing military personnel and tightening budgets, and the need to reduce the U.S. military footprint around the world, it is becoming increasingly important to re-think, rationalize, and transform the current Cold War system of U.S. overseas military presence. The "old way" of establishing military components of Country Teams is in need of being "transformed." In reality, the issue has emerged repeatedly in recent years at various forums.

At the regional combatant commander's conference in early 2000, one major issue identified was the defense attaché rating chain. Most combatant commanders, led by CENTCOM, desired that DATTs fall under their direct chain of command rather than under DIA. During mid-2001, after consultations with the J2s and J5s of the combatant commands, JCS/J5 recommended keeping the DATTs under the DIA chain of command (2).

At the 2002 Western Hemisphere "DATT Conference," attended by the author, many DATTs complained about the interactions and relationships with the SOUTHCOM "Mil Groups" in their countries who, as the designated USDRs, often sought to exclude the DAOs from access to and influence with the host nation militaries, as well as with SOUTHCOM leadership (3). In fact, a primary action item was revision of DoD Instruction 5105.57 on USDR roles. Similarly, at the annual SOUTHCOM Naval Attache Conference in September 2002, using the Goldwater Nichols Act to justify their position, the ALUSNAs determined that the current dual-unit system is unworkable and that DAOs and SAOs should be consolidated whenever feasible (2 & 12).

In November 2000, a Pentagon-level working group comprised of DIA, DSCA, JCS/J5, and combatant command representatives concluded that the USDR designation was "confusing and had outlived its usefulness," and recommended that the designation be terminated and USDR responsibilities--except for force protection--be transferred to the DATTs (2). However, a follow-on review was delayed by other staff actions and finally "shelved" after 9/11.

The issue reemerged in early June 2003 when JCS/J5 hosted another USDR program review which again concluded that the USDR designation is misunderstood and corrective action is needed. The panel proposed three options: 1) keep the USDR program intact but redefine authorities and functions, 2) eliminate the designation and redistribute functions to DATTs and SAO Chiefs, and 3) consolidate DoD embassy- based programs under a single, senior officer, thus eliminating the need for a separate USDR designation (2 & 6). Although still pending, the final report and recommendations must be staffed through the combatant commands and affected defense agencies--and approved by the OSD(P)--but future change appears likely (6).

The current system of multiple military units at most embassies, with an absence of unity of command, will be difficult to sustain in the future. In the following sections, the advantages of consolidated DAO/SAO operations will be discussed, including 1) improved unity of command and effort; 2) a reduction in committed DoD manpower, financial, and logistics commitments and requirements; 3) a smaller in-country U.S. military "footprint" with a reduced force protection threat; and 4) an increased synergy between DAO and SAO missions.

The current DAO/SAO system is contrary to some elements of the Goldwater- Nichols Act. Designed to institutionalize "jointness," the act also focused on unity of command and, in particular, assigned primacy of the regional commands over all U.S. military activities in their AOR. However, the current DAO/SAO system is contrary to the basic military principles of unity of effort and command. No other nation in the world, except the UK and France in some locations, has established separate DAOs and SAOs at diplomatic missions around the world. Other countries apparently do not see an inherent conflict in the ability of a single military unit to perform the roles of security assistance, diplomatic representation, and military advisor, along with the task of military reporting. Only the U.S. has created the "myth" that these missions cannot be done by one unit.

In reality, most host nations do not differentiate between the missions and purposes of the DAOs and SAOs. The common belief within U.S. military circles that military assistance and information reporting are mutually exclusive, and cannot be accomplished by the same unit, developed over many years during the Cold War. In actuality, most host nations do not differentiate much between U.S. DAOs and SAOs and often suspect SAO personnel of being closely tied to the DAOs and the DAO reporting mission. Additionally, the fact that both missions are currently being performed by DAOs in 55 countries helps debunk this belief. Therefore, it is a false conclusion that U.S. security assistance and cooperation programs would become suspect or ineffective, and lose their special position with host militaries, if these programs were to be run by a DAO. Would host militaries actually forego military assistance programs--including FMS, FMF, EDA, IMET, exercises, and humanitarian programs--and minimize their cooperation and collaboration with the United States if all SAOs are combined with DAOs or run by the same senior officer? This has not been the case at any of the current consolidated DAO- administered locations. In the short term, some host militaries may have some uncertainty and questions, but in all likelihood most would quickly adjust. U.S. national interests are not well served by allowing actual or perceived host nation sensitivities to dictate the structure and conduct of our security assistance and attaché programs, and in the worst case situations to permit them to be manipulated. Consolidated DAO/SAOs would offer a unity of command and effort currently lacking.

Joint DAO/SAO offices could also offer significant cost savings and personnel reductions in a time of diminishing resources. Presently, the manning of most SAOs and DAOs is stretched thin, many having only 2-3 personnel each (including local nationals) in smaller and mid-sized countries. In fact, of the current 79 separate SAOs, only 14 have ten or more personnel (including DSCA and command military, civilian, and local national personnel) (13 & 14). Many SAOs are undermanned worldwide and--due to competing personnel requirements--the military services are having increasing difficulty keeping SAO billets filled with quality, trained personnel. Similarly, filling attaché system billets with the right personnel is a major challenge for DIA and the services. As a result, in many cases non-resident attaches have been accredited to countries where there is an established SAO, and as already discussed, in many other cases DAOs are running the military/security assistance missions when there is no separate in-country SAO.

Beginning in FY04, the combatant commands are scheduled to receive up to a 15 percent overall reduction in personnel strength, including in their overseas SAOs (10). According to DSCA, the manning levels for DSCA-funded positions worldwide was frozen for FY03 (629 total positions) and zero growth is expected in the future (9 & 14). And despite repeated calls within the USG for increases, little growth is expected in the overall number of military attaches around the world. Merging DAO and SAO functions would allow a smaller number of personnel with a reduced "footprint" to more efficiently and economically accomplish the respective missions.

According to one senior DSCA representative, the main problem with combining DAOs and SAOs is the "color of money" (9). DAOs are primarily funded with General Defense Intelligence Program funds, whereas SAOs are funded with DSCA administrative funds, obtained through FMS sales, and to a lesser extent with combatant command operations and maintenance funds. However, rather than being a defining obstacle, this appears to be one of the issues to address in a consolidation. Certainly, the command finance offices already simultaneously handle a variety of funding lines-- including the above and many more. Additionally, the myriad of separate directives and administrative guidance for establishing and managing DAOs and SAOs could be consolidated and standardized, since both units operate on embassy Country Teams.

The primary purpose of SAOs is to improve military-to-military cooperation, but to what purpose? Why does DoD focus its theater cooperation plans on providing security assistance around the globe, generously spending billions of dollars--over 11 billion USD in FY03 (12)--in assistance? Not having the luxury of altruism, being conducted with taxpayer dollars, security assistance and cooperation programs are conducted as part of U.S. foreign policy strategy to better understand, influence, prepare, and preempt friends, foes, and fence-sitters alike. One of the prerequisites for successful security assistance/cooperation programs should be to better understand the capabilities, system, and plans of host nation militaries. Good operational interactions with the host nation and good intelligence are both needed for this. Additionally, SAOs cannot effectively conduct their security assistance and engagement missions if their personnel are not secure from military, terrorist, or criminal attack. SAO Chiefs often maintain they can have no connection with intelligence matters (11); however, the security assistance and force protection missions (when USDR) inherently rely upon good information to be effective.

Certainly, given the "intelligence failures" in recent years and post-9/11 demands for more and better HUMINT, the DoS and DAO reporting functions have increased significantly in importance. U.S. economic and military assistance programs are used to gain or increase influence around the world in support of foreign policy objectives, but little has been done to help improve the quality and quantity of information reporting by connecting aid programs to better cooperation and access to information supporting force protection, the global war on terrorism, and regional defense issues. Joint Publication 3- 16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, 5 April 2000, identifies four tenets of multinational military cooperation: respect, rapport, patience, and knowledge of partners. The publication states it is vital to "understand the doctrine, capabilities, strategic goals, culture, religion, customs, history, and values" of coalition and alliance partners. DAOs and SAOs are both ideally placed to obtain and provide this type of information.

The bottom line is that security assistance and cooperation missions are not incompatible with the information reporting mission and can actually be complementary. Increased involvement with security assistance missions would enhance DAO reporting on military and force protection issues, which in turn would help maximize the effectiveness of security assistance programs, as well as increase the security of in- country military personnel. Similarly to the three missions of DoS foreign-service teams--diplomatic representation, country reporting (political and economic), and aid programs--DoD personnel accomplish these same missions. State Department "cable" reporting is no different than the DAO reporting mission. The ability and propriety of DoS embassy personnel to conduct both reporting and assistance missions is never questioned. Likewise, there is no reason that consolidated military units could not also simultaneously perform the representation, reporting, and assistance missions. The issue of creating a better operational synergy between SAO and DAO mission areas deserves future study and consideration.

However, despite the high number of DAOs currently running security assistance programs, the key stakeholders in the present system--the combatant commands, DIA, and DSCA--have previously not been overly supportive of consolidated DAO/SAO missions and have perpetuated the split-unit approach. DIA generally believes separate DAOs are preferable due to the "specialized" sales and training functions of SAOs (2). Furthermore, in cases where DAO and SAO functions or offices are merged, since DAO personnel are the only diplomatically-accredited officers assigned, DIA contends that consolidated units must remain under DIA "ownership" (2). DIA opposes placing the attaché representation and reporting functions under the purview of an SAO Chief (2). DSCA and the combatant commands have also been generally hesitant to allow DIA to manage their security assistance and cooperation programs. One unified commander stated to the author that DAOs should not do the SAO jobs and SAOs should not do the DAO jobs.

In actuality, several good "templates" already exist in the system for consolidated DAO/ SAOs. In most cases, these anomalies exist due to the low relative significance of the countries to U.S. foreign policy or to the particular desires of the host nation, the ambassador, or the command. Probably the best known is the "Moscow model" where the senior military diplomat, a general officer, is dual-hatted as the DATT and the SAO Chief. Israel and Mexico follow this model as well. In these cases, the DAO reports to DIA and the SAO to its combatant command, but both have a common boss--the DATT. In other countries like India and Indonesia, there is an SAO Chief who is subordinate to the DATT--in India the ODC Chief and in Indonesia the Military Attache for Defense Programs (similar to Defense Cooperation Attache). In many smaller countries, including much of Africa and in special cases such as Canada, China, and Suriname in South America, the DAO performs all security assistance/engagement functions for the regional command--in some cases with command augmentation. In the "Jordan model," where the SAO Chief has been accredited as the DATT, the opposite case exists. These special cases offer insight into how an overall consolidated DAO/SAO system could be established and work.

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The future ability of the DoD to adequately resource separate military entities at each U.S. embassy worldwide will be significantly reduced by budgetary, personnel, and political realities. In this light, except for a few possible special cases, such as Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Egypt, Turkey, and possibly Jordan and Kuwait, having more consolidated DAO/SAO units and operations would offer many advantages over the current split-unit system, including a unity of command and effort at each embassy, a reduction in committed DoD personnel and other resources, improved security and reduced force protection vulnerability, and a synergy between the DAO and SAO missions. Several models exist for such a consolidation but, in any case, the most important requirement is that in each country only one senior military officer--regardless of his/her organizational subordination--be responsible for and "own" all in-country military activities, including representation, advisory, reporting, military assistance/cooperation, and force protection of in-country non-combatant command military personnel. For the reasons discussed in this paper, the DATT is best-suited to be assigned responsibility for these collective duties. This corresponds to the third option under consideration by JCS/J5--consolidating embassy-based programs under one senior officer and eliminating the need for a separate USDR designation. The office responsible for consolidated DAO/SAO activities should be called the Defense Attaché Office but, depending upon its size, several configurations and/or chains of command could work.

The most preferable would be along the lines of the Moscow model with a DATT in charge of a DAO, as well as a separate SAO headed by a diplomatically-accredited "Defense Cooperation Attache" who is directly responsible for all security assistance programs. Another configuration would be for the DATT and the service attaches to directly manage the security assistance/cooperation programs, possibly with augmentation from the respective combatant commands--the Suriname model. A third possible configuration would be for the DAO to have three subordinate sections--1) attaché operations (representation, advisory, reporting, and force protection), 2) security assistance/cooperation, and 3) common support staff.

Assigning one senior officer, the DATT, responsibility for the SAO, as well as the DAO, would create the necessary unity of command and effort, but would still require some "massaging" of the rating chain to address concerns of the key stakeholders. Some acceptable compromises would involve DIA being the first line rater for DATTs with the combatant commander or his/her Chief of Staff being the senior rater. Alternatively, the rater for DATTs could be the combatant commander or designated representative with DIA as the senior rater. When assigned, the Defense Cooperation Attache, in charge of the SAO programs, would report to the DATT and then be senior-rated at the combatant command. Other SAO personnel would be rated by the Defense Cooperation Attache and then senior-rated at the command. The DATT would continue to rate the ARMA, AIRA, and ALUSNA, who would all be senior-rated by DIA.

Another more extreme approach would decentralize the management of DAOs, placing them under the purview of their respective regional commanders. Using the DSCA system of having regional command personnel perform the security assistance missions on behalf of DSCA, the reporting mission could be accomplished using attaché and intelligence personnel assigned to the combatant command's in-country military team. Just as DSCA and DISAM create the hiring, standardization, training, and policies and procedures for the security assistance programs and personnel--which are then managed by the combatant commands--DIA and the JMAS could create the standards, hiring, training, requirements, and operations policies and procedures for the intelligence reporting mission which could then be managed by the regional commands.

As stated above, whatever the configuration or chain of command, one senior officer in country must be in charge of all military missions. Although a merger of DAO and SAO activities under could require changes in certain laws directing security assistance missions, unity of command/effort is paramount. To be fully prepared to manage both missions, all DATTs should attend both the DIA JMAS and the DISAM Security Assistance Managers Overseas Course (SAM-O). Any designated Defense Cooperation Attaches should also attend JMAS training, in addition to the SAM-O course. Other service attaches would attend SAM-O as required by duties.

With the JCS/J5 preparing to make a recommendation to DoD on changes to the USDR designation and system of in-country responsibility, additional discussion and debate is needed on this issue within military policy and academic circles to ensure that a solution is reached which best meets the needs of the combatant commanders, DIA, and DSCA. For decades to come, the decision could impact the way security assistance, military-to military cooperation, in-country force protection, and intelligence reporting is conducted by the DoD.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Air Force Personnel Center, Air Attache Specialty Job Summary. On-line. Internet, 6 Nov 2002. Available at http://afas.randolph.af.mil/rated- staff/attache.html.

2. DIA Directorate of HUMINT Operations, Plans and Policy Division. Personal interviews and E-Mails, June-August 2003 (interviewee requested anonymity).

3. DIA Western Hemisphere Defense Attache Annual Conference, May 2002, Washington DC.

4. DoD Instruction 5105.57. Procedures for the U.S. Defense Representative (USDR) in Foreign Countries. Washington: Department of Defense, 26 Dec 1995

5. Joint Military Attache School. Curriculum Review: Attache Training Program. 29 Nov-3 Dec 1999.

6. JCS Plans and Policy Division (JCS/J5). Personal interview by E-Mail with JCS/J5 planner, 10 June 2003.

7. Prout, John. "The Origins of the Military Attache Corps." American Intelligence Journal, Vol. 21, Nos. 1&2, Spring 2002.

8. USSOUTHCOM Security Assistance Chief's Annual Conference, remarks by representative of the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Plans and Policy, 22 October 2002, Miami. FL.

9. USSOUTHCOM Security Assistance Chief's Annual Conference, remarks by Diane Lamb, representative of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, 23 October 2002, Miami, FL

10. USSOUTHCOM Security Assistance Chief's Annual Conference, remarks by representatives of the USSOUTHCOM J-1 (personnel) Office, 22 October 2002, Miami, FL.

11. USSOUTHCOM Information Paper. USMAAG and USDAO Missions and Responsibilities in the Dominican Republic. 24 Apr 2002.

12. U.S. Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management Security Assistance Program Overview Briefing. Internet, 26 September 2003. Available on DSCA website at http://www.dsca.osd.mil/.

13. U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Key Security Assistance Personnel Roster Worldwide (DSCA-(P)1239 (FOUO). August 2002.

14. U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Overseas Military Program Management Listing-Personnel Strengths, FY02-FY04. Undated.

2004, Foreign Area Officer Association
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