State Building and Conflict Resolution in Colombia, 1986-1994, Harvey F. Kline
University of Alabama Press Tuscaloosa, Alabama USA, 1999, 240 pgs, $34.95
Violence in Colombia is a pervasive, debilitating phenomenon that has attracted
domestic and foreign intellectuals to explore the many facets of this problem. North
American author Harvey Kline has dedicated over thirty years to the study of Colombian
politics. Politics in Colombia has a long history of violence as a chief means of
resolving conflict. In his latest book, State Building and Conflict Resolution in
Colombia, 1986-1994, Kline examines the attempts made by Presidents Virgilio
Barco and César Gaviria to formulate policy that would bring an end to rampant
political violence in the country.
Kline's main thesis is that preexisting weaknesses within the Colombian state
prevented either administration from making significant progress in resolving conflicts
with the three opponents of the state: guerrilla organizations, drug cartels, and
paramilitary squads. These three groups have claimed, through the threat and use of
violence, a sort of political, economic, and territorial autonomy within Colombia that the
weak state cannot reclaim. Kline effectively traces Colombia's political history to
illustrate how governments have failed to maintain a monopoly on military power, thus
allowing regional leaders to provide for their own protection while maintaining a small,
poorly equipped national military. Periods of political conflict led to protracted violence
because each group had the military force available to advance its particular cause.
Hisn discussion of Colombia's tradition of violence provides the framework to
understand the rise of guerrilla organizations, drug cartels, and paramilitary squads in
the country.
Kline states that Colombia's inability to provide adequate police forces that protect
people and property, establish a court system that functions at all stages of the judicial
process, and protect the human rights of its citizens has afforded these groups the right
to disregard the rule of law and to use political violence to promote and protect their
interests. Kline examines the Barco and Gaviria administration's efforts at negotiations
with these groups and discovers that each president made gains with certain groups
(Barco with the M-19 guerrilla group, Gaviria with the Medell¡n drug cartel and with
paramilitary squads), but those achievements were blunted by policy failures with other
violent groups and an overall increase in violence throughout the country. The limited
and unsustainable gains made by Barco and Gaviria reinforce Kline's argument that
existing institutional deficiencies prevent the government from making real progress
against the forces of violence.
This book offers keen insights on the complexities of charting effective policy,
taking into account multiple groups that have only their interests to promote and their
equities to defend. The book clearly defines the challenges facing future Colombian
presidents as each one contemplates policy options that will offer the country a real
chance for peace. Negotiating from a position of weakness offers poor prospects for
policy success. The book also offers an accurate synopsis of the Colombian problem
and a good lead in to the policy challenges of former President Ernesto Samper; this
understanding is essential to formulating effective foreign policy with regards to
Colombia.
1999, Foreign Area Officer Association
Springfield,
Virginia
Maintained by LTC Steve
Gotowicki.
http://www.faoa.org
