Kosovo: Long-term Impacts of Short-term Policy

LTC Kevin Dougherty

Much of U.S. policy with regard to supporting insurgencies and counterinsurgencies seems to be shaped by the assumption that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." Sometimes this short-term expedient backfires over the long-term. A good example is U.S. support of the mujaheddin against the Soviets in Afghanistan during the 1980s. At the time, we supported the mujaheddin as an ally against a common enemy because they were willing and able to provide capabilities and a level of engagement that we could not. Since then, we have had to live with the mujaheddin's connections to radical Islamic fundamentalism and international terrorism.

In Kosovo, we entered into a similar marriage of convenience with the Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosoves (UCK or Kosovo Liberation Army-- KLA) (Smucker, 28). We needed someone who would fight Federal Republic of Yugoslavia President Slobodan Milosevic on the ground when we had the will to do it only from the air, and we needed someone we could cast in the role of heroic freedom fighter that we could use to rally domestic political support. We saw the UCK as fulfilling both needs. In so doing, we overlooked several key facts that have longer-term implications: First, the UCK had no recognized political arm or centralized command structure that could hold it accountable. Second, the UCK's agenda for independence in Kosovo was contrary to our stated policy. Third, the UCK had direct ties to crime and corruption. Finally, personal ambition and quest for power made it extremely unlikely that UCK leaders would completely surrender their instruments of power to international organizations like the Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).

Now that we have expelled Milosevic from Kosovo, although he remains a menace and a threat, his power is well past its zenith. He may have one or two last dirty tricks up his sleeve, but his days are numbered. The UCK, officially disbanded, but still very much alive in the form of its successor Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), the UCK-led Provisional Government of Kosovo (PGOK), and the mind of the Kosovar Albanian populace, is an unresolved issue with which we will have to live for some time. Moreover, those Kosovar Albanian interests that currently represent the old UCK are increasing in power and divergence from US objectives for Kosovo, and pose a growing threat to KFOR. The occurrence of a significant KFOR- Kosovar Albanian incident is merely a matter of time, as is eventual Kosovo de facto independence. For the sake of short-term expediency, we have opened a Pandora's Box of long-term troubles with the UCK and its successors.

No Political Arm. The UCK grew sporadically throughout the 1990s from an ever-expanding clan base. Its loose, secretive, decentralized structure did not lend itself to a superior political arm or a centralized command and control structure. The fighting elements of the UCK were highly individualized and unencumbered by any centralized authority. There were many factions within the body generally called the UCK, but as long as the Serbs presented a common enemy, these Kosovar Albanians factional differences were suppressed. With victory, these differences became very apparent. This situation combined with the underdeveloped political arm to make the Kosovar Albanian cause unaccountable. No one Kosovar Albanian is in a position of unchallenged or legitimate authority to guarantee compliance with any agreement. Nonetheless, in our eagerness to combat Milosevic, we treated the UCK and the PGOK as a viable, legitimate, sovereign entity in negotiations. Clearly, the UCK has not complied with its demilitarization agreements, nor has the PGOK compelled it to do so. Indeed, the Kosovar Albanians have embarked on their own ethnic cleansing campaign in Kosovo, have attacked KFOR, and have continued their independence rhetoric in a threatening and confrontational way. We do not, however, hold the Kosovar Albanians accountable for such behavior for at least three reasons: First, as the "enemy of our enemy" we hold them to a different standard than we do our enemy. Second, even if we demanded compliance, the Kosovar Albanians have no one authority that could be held accountable for such enforcement. Third, we are afraid of the force protection issues that would arise from a strict stance toward the Kosovar Albanians. This combination of situational ethics, no one being clearly in charge, and a fear of someone who is supposedly on your side, all add up to a bad situation. We have given the Kosovar Albanians much of the authority of a nation-state, but little of the responsibility.

Independence. For a variety of reasons beyond the scope of this discussion, the U.S. does not want independence for Kosovo. The UCK wanted just that, and the PGOK and many Kosovar Albanians still do. In "Kosovo's Next Masters?," Chris Hedges writes that "The KLA is uncompromising in its quest for an independent Kosovo now and a Greater Albania later" (Hedges, 24). Moreover, they want not just an Independent Kosovo, but an ethnically pure Kosovo. The UCK likes the U.S. only so far as the U.S. supports Kosovar Albanian interests. The UCK needed the U.S. during its war against Milosevic, and it needs KFOR for some period of time to ensure Milosevic does not return. However, it has no desire to remain subservient to either Serbia or the UNMIK or KFOR forever. It wants independence. Milosevic's days are in fact numbered, and at some point he will be unable to threaten Kosovo. At that time, if not before, Kosovar Albanian patience with the international community will wear thin, and they will demand independence. Hedges describes the Kosovar Albanian leadership as "militant, nationalistic, uncompromising, and deeply suspicious of all outsiders" (Hedges, 26). They will not let KFOR stand in their way. This will occur when the Kosovar Albanians determine that their relationship with the international community has reached what they consider the point of diminishing returns. We will then be in the awkward position of having to fight the same Kosovar Albanians we once defended or having to reverse our policy on independence. If you accept that the reasons for our current opposition to independence are well-founded, such a reversal would appear unwise.

Crime and Corruption. Another long-term problem presented by the Kosovar Albanians is their significant involvement in crime and corruption. This involvement unfortunately is not just in Kosovo but extends well into neighboring countries, especially Albania. Such activity is particularly destabilizing in a region of fragile, fledgling democracies and free market economies. Crime and corruption have been a significant obstacle to full implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement in Bosnia. The same situation is currently developing in Kosovo. Any organization such as KFOR that represents law and order will be perceived as a threat to those Kosovar Albanians that benefit from crime and corruption.

Power and Ambition.When the NATO air war ended and Serb forces withdrew from Kosovo, there was a power vacuum before KFOR entered. The UCK rushed in to fill this void, and the Kosovar Albanians have been very reluctant to relinquish any gains now that KFOR and UNMIK are on the ground. The UCK commanders were extremely powerful in their local regions, achieving an almost warlord-type status and control. Along with such power came financial, personal, and authoritative benefits. The arrival of KFOR and the requirement for UCK demilitarization serves to dismantle this power. Political leaders of the various Kosovar Albanian parties, managers of the numerous Kosovar Albanian monetary funds, and local leaders of all sorts are extremely loath to surrender their power to international outsiders. It is counter to human nature to act against one's self-interest. The post- war situation makes personal ambition and gain an even more powerful motivator than usual. Kosovar Albanians cannot be faulted more than anyone else for succumbing to temptation, but this reality places them in a position contrary to U.S. interests.

Long Term Threats. As this marriage of convenience slowly dissolves, KFOR, to include its U.S. elements, becomes increasingly threatened. Two serious scenarios are likely to develop. One parallel Beirut, the other is Somalia.

In September 1982, US Marines began landing in Beirut as part of the Multinational Force (MNF) requested by the Lebanese government. The MNF was a peacekeeping force designed to provide an interposition force and a multinational presence. Initially the Marines received a warm welcome. However, the internal political situation in Lebanon quickly changed. Militant Shia Muslim groups eventually accused the US forces of being in league with the Israeli Defense Force (IDF), the very forces the Marines were supposed to protect the Lebanese population from. The militant Hizb Allah committed itself to a jihad against Israel and its sponsor, the US. Adjustments made to the Marines' mission, location, rules of engagement (ROE), force protection measures, and security posture were inadequate in light of the changing situation. The Marines presented a vulnerable target and on 23 October, 1983, 241 US servicemen died in a terrorist attack on the USMNF's headquarters and barracks.

What do we do now?
The same situation could develop in Kosovo. Like the USMNF, KFOR received an initial welcome upon its arrival in Kosovo. The Kosovar Albanians are clearly appreciative of the work done by NATO to halt Serb aggression, but their gratitude does not curb their passion for an independent Kosovo, one in which the ex-UCK constitutes the dominant political, military, and administrative authority. The Kosovar Albanians will eventually see KFOR as an unwanted impediment just as the militant Shia Muslims viewed the MNF. This development may be accelerated if a political movement of ex-UCK hardliners coalesces along the lines of the militant Shia movement. The awkward relationship between the Russian KFOR troops, who the Kosovar Albanians view as being in league with the Serbs, and U.S. KFOR also has uneasy parallels with the U.S. and Israeli forces in Beirut.

The Kosovar Albanians accuse KFOR of expending too much effort on protecting the few remaining Serbs in Kosovo while KFOR's objective to demilitarize the UCK and install the UNMIK is clearly perceived by the PGOK as a threat to its own power. Tensions are already high between the Kosovar Albanians and KFOR in several places and are getting worse. Left to their present course, they will eventually reach Beirut proportions.

In Somalia, U.S. forces were well-received initially when they were primarily associated with the humanitarian assistance mission. Disaster followed when the nature of the mission changed to the capture of Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aideed. U.S. forces in Kosovo face the same vulnerability to mission creep and a similar environment of high profile clan-based or warlord-type personalities that may someday become the objects of U.S. action. KFOR forces have already arrested two key UCK leaders for carrying weapons in unauthorized manners. Certain hardline ex-UCK commanders continue to resist demilitarization and are challenging both PGOK Prime Minister Hashim Thaqi and the UNMIK. UCK and other Kosovar Albanian ties to criminal activity and murder of ethnic Serbs may also place KFOR in a position of taking direct action against a powerful Kosovar leader. Such action would cause KFOR to be perceived as the enemy of the Kosovar Albanians just as the U.S. forces in Somalia became the enemies of Aideed and his followers.

The Difficulty. The problem with Kosovo is that the changes in the situation that could lead to a Beirut or Somalia-type disaster may be incremental and inconspicuous enough to sneak up undetected. The Kosovar Albanians viewed KFOR as being initially pro-Kosovar Albanian, but this view will eventually become somewhat neutral or ambivalent, and ultimately pro-Serb or at least anti-Kosovar Albanian. The key for KFOR is to understand how the Kosovar Albanians perceive its actions. Since the Kosovar Albanians have a markedly different agenda than our own, tensions are inevitable.

Conclusion. The purpose of this paper has been not so much to point out the dangers of the "the enemy of my enemy is a friend of mine" approach in supporting insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, although that is certainly the underlying problem, but to show the dangers posed to U.S. interests in Kosovo by the Kosovar Albanians. It is easy to see the Serbs as evil, and indeed they are. However, that reality does not change the fact that the Kosovar Albanians, as Secretary of Defense William Cohen noted about the UCK, are no "choirboy circle" either (Smucker, 28). Overlooking this threat may well lead to a disaster in Kosovo.

Bibliography

Hedges, Chris. "Kosovo's Next Masters?", Foreign Affairs. May/June 99, 24-42.

Smucker, Philip. "Why America May or May Not Arm the Rebels." US News and World Report. 26 Apr 99, 28.

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